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fs: hardlink creation restriction cleanup

PATCH Superseded Kees Cook 2 participants 3 messages Feb 22, 2012 VFS

v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

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Kees Cook

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 fs: hardlink creation restriction cleanup

Clean-up of hardlink restriction logic, as suggested by Andrew Morton.

---
 fs/namei.c |   59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +41 -18
index 8ed4e00..a4a21a5 100644
@@ -693,46 +693,69 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link)
 }
 
 /**
+ * safe_hardlink_source - Check for safe hardlink conditions
+ * @inode: the source inode to hardlink from
+ *
+ * Return false if at least one of the following conditions:
+ *    - inode is not a regular file
+ *    - inode is setuid
+ *    - inode is setgid and group-exec
+ *    - access failure for read and write
+ *
+ * Otherwise returns true.
+ */
+static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	mode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
+
+	/* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
+	if (!S_ISREG(mode))
+		return false;
+	/* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
+	if (mode & S_ISUID)
+		return false;
+	/* Executable setgid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
+	if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP))
+		return false;
+	/* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */
+	if (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
  * may_linkat - Check permissions for creating a hardlink
  * @link: the source to hardlink from
  *
  * Block hardlink when all of:
  *  - sysctl_protected_hardlinks enabled
  *  - fsuid does not match inode
- *  - at least one of:
- *    - inode is not a regular file
- *    - inode is setuid
- *    - inode is setgid and group-exec
- *    - access failure for read and write
+ *  - hardlink source is unsafe (see safe_hardlink_source() above)
  *  - not CAP_FOWNER
  *
  * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
  */
 static int may_linkat(struct path *link)
 {
-	int error = 0;
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	struct inode *inode;
-	int mode;
 
 	if (!sysctl_protected_hardlinks)
 		return 0;
 
 	cred = current_cred();
 	inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
-	mode = inode->i_mode;
 
-	if (cred->fsuid != inode->i_uid &&
-	    (!S_ISREG(mode) || (mode & S_ISUID) ||
-	     ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) ||
-	     (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))) &&
-	    !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
-		error = -EPERM;
-
-	if (error)
-		audit_log_link_denied("linkat", link);
+	/* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like,
+	 * otherwise, it must be a safe source.
+	 */
+	if (cred->fsuid == inode->i_uid || safe_hardlink_source(inode) ||
+	    capable(CAP_FOWNER))
+		return 0;
 
-	return error;
+	audit_log_link_denied("linkat", link);
+	return -EPERM;
 }
 #else
 static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link)
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
#1 lore raw
Quoted 34 lines · Kees Cook

Clean-up of hardlink restriction logic, as suggested by Andrew Morton.

---
 fs/namei.c |   59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +19 -0
index 8ed4e00..a4a21a5 100644
@@ -693,46 +693,69 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link)
 }
 
 /**
+ * safe_hardlink_source - Check for safe hardlink conditions
+ * @inode: the source inode to hardlink from
+ *
+ * Return false if at least one of the following conditions:
+ *    - inode is not a regular file
+ *    - inode is setuid
+ *    - inode is setgid and group-exec
+ *    - access failure for read and write
+ *
+ * Otherwise returns true.
+ */
+static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	mode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
+
+	/* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
+	if (!S_ISREG(mode))
+		return false;
+	/* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */

fs/namei.c static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link) · line 724

Quoted 10 lines
fs/namei.c +10 -0
+	if (mode & S_ISUID)
+		return false;
+	/* Executable setgid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
+	if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP))
+		return false;
+	/* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */
+	if (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;

A really minor nitpick, could we use this form please:

static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)

{
	mode_t mode = inode->i_mode;

	/* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
	if (!S_ISREG(mode))
		return false;

	/* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
	if (mode & S_ISUID)
		return false;

	/* Executable setgid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
	if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP))
		return false;

	/* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */
	if (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))
		return false;

	return true;
}

Those separate blocks of comments and conditions stand out much nicer this way, making it way easier on the eyes - to my eyes at least ;-)

Thanks,

Ingo

author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 70 lines · Ingo Molnar
Quoted 34 lines · Kees Cook

Clean-up of hardlink restriction logic, as suggested by Andrew Morton.

---
 fs/namei.c |   59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------

 1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +19 -0
index 8ed4e00..a4a21a5 100644
@@ -693,46 +693,69 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link)
  }
 
  /**
+ * safe_hardlink_source - Check for safe hardlink conditions
+ * @inode: the source inode to hardlink from
+ *
+ * Return false if at least one of the following conditions:
+ *    - inode is not a regular file
+ *    - inode is setuid
+ *    - inode is setgid and group-exec
+ *    - access failure for read and write
+ *
+ * Otherwise returns true.
+ */
+static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
+{
+     mode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
+
+     /* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
+     if (!S_ISREG(mode))
+             return false;
+     /* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */

fs/namei.c static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link) · line 724

Quoted 10 lines
fs/namei.c +10 -0
+     if (mode & S_ISUID)
+             return false;
+     /* Executable setgid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
+     if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP))
+             return false;
+     /* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */
+     if (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))
+             return false;
+
+     return true;

A really minor nitpick, could we use this form please:

static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode) {
       mode_t mode = inode->i_mode;

       /* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ if (!S_ISREG(mode))
               return false;

       /* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ if (mode & S_ISUID)
               return false;

       /* Executable setgid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) return false;

       /* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */ if (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)) return false;

Quoted 6 lines

       return true;
}

Those separate blocks of comments and conditions stand out much nicer this way, making it way easier on the eyes - to my eyes at least ;-)

Heh, sure. I've sent v2 now. :)

-Kees

Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook
ChromeOS Security