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4.14.151-stable review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 10 participants 135 messages Oct 27, 2019 – Dec 3, 2019

Subsystems (5)
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author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/119 mips: Loongson: Fix the link time qualifier of serial_exit()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 25b69a889b638b0b7e51e2c4fe717a66bec0e566 ]

'exit' functions should be marked as __exit, not __init.

---
 arch/mips/loongson64/common/serial.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/mips/loongson64/common/serial.c +1 -1
index ffefc1cb26121..98c3a7feb10f8 100644
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static int __init serial_init(void)
 }
 module_init(serial_init);
 
-static void __init serial_exit(void)
+static void __exit serial_exit(void)
 {
 	platform_device_unregister(&uart8250_device);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/119 scsi: ufs: skip shutdown if hba is not powered

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stanley Chu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f51913eef23f74c3bd07899dc7f1ed6df9e521d8 ]

In some cases, hba may go through shutdown flow without successful initialization and then make system hang.

For example, if ufshcd_change_power_mode() gets error and leads to ufshcd_hba_exit() to release resources of the host, future shutdown flow may hang the system since the host register will be accessed in unpowered state.

To solve this issue, simply add checking to skip shutdown for above kind of situation.

---
 drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +3 -0
index 60c9184bad3be..07cae5ea608c7 100644
@@ -7755,6 +7755,9 @@ int ufshcd_shutdown(struct ufs_hba *hba)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	if (!hba->is_powered)
+		goto out;
+
 	if (ufshcd_is_ufs_dev_poweroff(hba) && ufshcd_is_link_off(hba))
 		goto out;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/119 scsi: megaraid: disable device when probe failed after enabled device

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xiang Chen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 70054aa39a013fa52eff432f2223b8bd5c0048f8 ]

For pci device, need to disable device when probe failed after enabled device.

---
 drivers/scsi/megaraid.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/megaraid.c +2 -2
index 9b6f5d024dbae..f5c09bbf93741 100644
@@ -4221,11 +4221,11 @@ megaraid_probe_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
 		 */
 		if (pdev->subsystem_vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_COMPAQ &&
 		    pdev->subsystem_device == 0xC000)
-		   	return -ENODEV;
+			goto out_disable_device;
 		/* Now check the magic signature byte */
 		pci_read_config_word(pdev, PCI_CONF_AMISIG, &magic);
 		if (magic != HBA_SIGNATURE_471 && magic != HBA_SIGNATURE)
-			return -ENODEV;
+			goto out_disable_device;
 		/* Ok it is probably a megaraid */
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/119 ARM: OMAP2+: Fix missing reset done flag for am3 and am43

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ad8041b98c665b6147e607b749586d6e20ba73a ]

For ti,sysc-omap4 compatible devices with no sysstatus register, we do have reset done status available in the SOFTRESET bit that clears when the reset is done. This is documented for example in am437x TRM for DMTIMER_TIOCP_CFG register. The am335x TRM just says that SOFTRESET bit value 1 means reset is ongoing, but it behaves the same way clearing after reset is done.

With the ti-sysc driver handling this automatically based on no sysstatus register defined, we see warnings if SYSC_HAS_RESET_STATUS is missing in the legacy platform data:

ti-sysc 48042000.target-module: sysc_flags 00000222 != 00000022 ti-sysc 48044000.target-module: sysc_flags 00000222 != 00000022 ti-sysc 48046000.target-module: sysc_flags 00000222 != 00000022
...

Let's fix these warnings by adding SYSC_HAS_RESET_STATUS. Let's also remove the useless parentheses while at it.

If it turns out we do have ti,sysc-omap4 compatible devices without a working SOFTRESET bit we can set up additional quirk handling for it.

---
 arch/arm/mach-omap2/omap_hwmod_33xx_43xx_ipblock_data.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/mach-omap2/omap_hwmod_33xx_43xx_ipblock_data.c +2 -1
index de06a1d5ffab5..e61c14f590634 100644
@@ -966,7 +966,8 @@ static struct omap_hwmod_class_sysconfig am33xx_timer_sysc = {
 	.rev_offs	= 0x0000,
 	.sysc_offs	= 0x0010,
 	.syss_offs	= 0x0014,
-	.sysc_flags	= (SYSC_HAS_SIDLEMODE | SYSC_HAS_SOFTRESET),
+	.sysc_flags	= SYSC_HAS_SIDLEMODE | SYSC_HAS_SOFTRESET |
+			  SYSC_HAS_RESET_STATUS,
 	.idlemodes	= (SIDLE_FORCE | SIDLE_NO | SIDLE_SMART |
 			  SIDLE_SMART_WKUP),
 	.sysc_fields	= &omap_hwmod_sysc_type2,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/119 net: hisilicon: Fix usage of uninitialized variable in function mdio_sc_cfg_reg_write()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yizhuo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 53de429f4e88f538f7a8ec2b18be8c0cd9b2c8e1 ]

In function mdio_sc_cfg_reg_write(), variable "reg_value" could be uninitialized if regmap_read() fails. However, "reg_value" is used to decide the control flow later in the if statement, which is potentially unsafe.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns_mdio.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns_mdio.c +5 -1
index baf5cc251f329..9a3bc0994a1db 100644
@@ -156,11 +156,15 @@ static int mdio_sc_cfg_reg_write(struct hns_mdio_device *mdio_dev,
 {
 	u32 time_cnt;
 	u32 reg_value;
+	int ret;
 
 	regmap_write(mdio_dev->subctrl_vbase, cfg_reg, set_val);
 
 	for (time_cnt = MDIO_TIMEOUT; time_cnt; time_cnt--) {
-		regmap_read(mdio_dev->subctrl_vbase, st_reg, &reg_value);
+		ret = regmap_read(mdio_dev->subctrl_vbase, st_reg, &reg_value);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
 		reg_value &= st_msk;
 		if ((!!check_st) == (!!reg_value))
 			break;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 15/119 namespace: fix namespace.pl script to support relative paths

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 82fdd12b95727640c9a8233c09d602e4518e71f7 ]

The namespace.pl script does not work properly if objtree is not set to an absolute path. The do_nm function is run from within the find function, which changes directories.

Because of this, appending objtree, $File::Find::dir, and $source, will return a path which is not valid from the current directory.

This used to work when objtree was set to an absolute path when using "make namespacecheck". It appears to have not worked when calling ./scripts/namespace.pl directly.

This behavior was changed in 7e1c04779efd ("kbuild: Use relative path for $(objtree)", 2014-05-14)

Rather than fixing the Makefile to set objtree to an absolute path, just fix namespace.pl to work when srctree and objtree are relative. Also fix the script to use an absolute path for these by default.

Use the File::Spec module for this purpose. It's been part of perl 5 since 5.005.

The curdir() function is used to get the current directory when the objtree and srctree aren't set in the environment.

rel2abs() is used to convert possibly relative objtree and srctree environment variables to absolute paths.

Finally, the catfile() function is used instead of string appending paths together, since this is more robust when joining paths together.

---
 scripts/namespace.pl | 13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
scripts/namespace.pl +7 -6
index 729c547fc9e1e..30c43e639db8a 100755
@@ -65,13 +65,14 @@
 use warnings;
 use strict;
 use File::Find;
+use File::Spec;
 
 my $nm = ($ENV{'NM'} || "nm") . " -p";
 my $objdump = ($ENV{'OBJDUMP'} || "objdump") . " -s -j .comment";
-my $srctree = "";
-my $objtree = "";
-$srctree = "$ENV{'srctree'}/" if (exists($ENV{'srctree'}));
-$objtree = "$ENV{'objtree'}/" if (exists($ENV{'objtree'}));
+my $srctree = File::Spec->curdir();
+my $objtree = File::Spec->curdir();
+$srctree = File::Spec->rel2abs($ENV{'srctree'}) if (exists($ENV{'srctree'}));
+$objtree = File::Spec->rel2abs($ENV{'objtree'}) if (exists($ENV{'objtree'}));
 
 if ($#ARGV != -1) {
 	print STDERR "usage: $0 takes no parameters\n";
@@ -231,9 +232,9 @@ sub do_nm
 	}
 	($source = $basename) =~ s/\.o$//;
 	if (-e "$source.c" || -e "$source.S") {
-		$source = "$objtree$File::Find::dir/$source";
+		$source = File::Spec->catfile($objtree, $File::Find::dir, $source)
 	} else {
-		$source = "$srctree$File::Find::dir/$source";
+		$source = File::Spec->catfile($srctree, $File::Find::dir, $source)
 	}
 	if (! -e "$source.c" && ! -e "$source.S") {
 		# No obvious source, exclude the object if it is conglomerate
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 16/119 md/raid0: fix warning message for parameter default_layout

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Song Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3874d73e06c9b9dc15de0b7382fc223986d75571 ]

The message should match the parameter, i.e. raid0.default_layout.

Fixes c84a1372df92 ("md/raid0: avoid RAID0 data corruption due to layout confusion.")
Cc NeilBrown <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/md/raid0.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/md/raid0.c +1 -1
index 28fb717217706..449c4dd060fcd 100644
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static int create_strip_zones(struct mddev *mddev, struct r0conf **private_conf)
 	} else {
 		pr_err("md/raid0:%s: cannot assemble multi-zone RAID0 with default_layout setting\n",
 		       mdname(mddev));
-		pr_err("md/raid0: please set raid.default_layout to 1 or 2\n");
+		pr_err("md/raid0: please set raid0.default_layout to 1 or 2\n");
 		err = -ENOTSUPP;
 		goto abort;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 17/119 Revert "drm/radeon: Fix EEH during kexec"

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8d13c187c42e110625d60094668a8f778c092879 ]

This reverts commit 6f7fe9a93e6c09bf988c5059403f5f88e17e21e6.

This breaks some boards. Maybe just enable this on PPC for now?

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_drv.c | 8 --------
 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_drv.c +0 -8
index 54d97dd5780a1..f4becad0a78c0 100644
@@ -368,19 +368,11 @@ radeon_pci_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 static void
 radeon_pci_shutdown(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 {
-	struct drm_device *ddev = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
-
 	/* if we are running in a VM, make sure the device
 	 * torn down properly on reboot/shutdown
 	 */
 	if (radeon_device_is_virtual())
 		radeon_pci_remove(pdev);
-
-	/* Some adapters need to be suspended before a
-	* shutdown occurs in order to prevent an error
-	* during kexec.
-	*/
-	radeon_suspend_kms(ddev, true, true, false);
 }
 
 static int radeon_pmops_suspend(struct device *dev)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH 19/119 ipv4: Return -ENETUNREACH if we cant create route but saddr is valid

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stefano Brivio <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 595e0651d0296bad2491a4a29a7a43eae6328b02 ]

...instead of -EINVAL. An issue was found with older kernel versions while unplugging a NFS client with pending RPCs, and the wrong error code here prevented it from recovering once link is back up with a configured address.

Incidentally, this is not an issue anymore since commit 4f8943f80883 ("SUNRPC: Replace direct task wakeups from softirq context"), included in 5.2-rc7, had the effect of decoupling the forwarding of this error by using SO_ERROR in xs_wake_error(), as pointed out by Benjamin Coddington.

To the best of my knowledge, this isn't currently causing any further issue, but the error code doesn't look appropriate anyway, and we might hit this in other paths as well.

In detail, as analysed by Gonzalo Siero, once the route is deleted because the interface is down, and can't be resolved and we return -EINVAL here, this ends up, courtesy of inet_sk_rebuild_header(), as the socket error seen by tcp_write_err(), called by tcp_retransmit_timer().

In turn, tcp_write_err() indirectly calls xs_error_report(), which wakes up the RPC pending tasks with a status of -EINVAL. This is then seen by call_status() in the SUN RPC implementation, which aborts the RPC call calling rpc_exit(), instead of handling this as a potentially temporary condition, i.e. as a timeout.

Return -EINVAL only if the input parameters passed to ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu() are actually invalid (this is the case if the specified source address is multicast, limited broadcast or all zeroes), but return -ENETUNREACH in all cases where, at the given moment, the given source address doesn't allow resolving the route.

While at it, drop the initialisation of err to -ENETUNREACH, which was added to __ip_route_output_key() back then by commit 0315e3827048 ("net: Fix behaviour of unreachable, blackhole and prohibit routes"), but actually had no effect, as it was, and is, overwritten by the fib_lookup() return code assignment, and anyway ignored in all other branches, including the if (fl4->saddr) one:
I find this rather confusing, as it would look like -ENETUNREACH is the "default" error, while that statement has no effect.

Also note that after commit fc75fc8339e7 ("ipv4: dont create routes on down devices"), we would get -ENETUNREACH if the device is down, but -EINVAL if the source address is specified and we can't resolve the route, and this appears to be rather inconsistent.

---
 net/ipv4/route.c |    9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/route.c +6 -3
@@ -2351,14 +2351,17 @@ struct rtable *ip_route_output_key_hash_
 	int orig_oif = fl4->flowi4_oif;
 	unsigned int flags = 0;
 	struct rtable *rth;
-	int err = -ENETUNREACH;
+	int err;
 
 	if (fl4->saddr) {
-		rth = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 		if (ipv4_is_multicast(fl4->saddr) ||
 		    ipv4_is_lbcast(fl4->saddr) ||
-		    ipv4_is_zeronet(fl4->saddr))
+		    ipv4_is_zeronet(fl4->saddr)) {
+			rth = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 			goto out;
+		}
+
+		rth = ERR_PTR(-ENETUNREACH);
 
 		/* I removed check for oif == dev_out->oif here.
 		   It was wrong for two reasons:
author maintainer
#20 lore raw

PATCH 20/119 net: bcmgenet: Fix RGMII_MODE_EN value for GENET v1/2/3

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit efb86fede98cdc70b674692ff617b1162f642c49 ]

The RGMII_MODE_EN bit value was 0 for GENET versions 1 through 3, and became 6 for GENET v4 and above, account for that difference.

Fixes aa09677cba42 ("net: bcmgenet: add MDIO routines")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.h |    1 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmmii.c   |    6 +++++-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.h +1 -0
@@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ struct bcmgenet_mib_counters {
 #define  EXT_PWR_DOWN_PHY_EN		(1 << 20)
 
 #define EXT_RGMII_OOB_CTRL		0x0C
+#define  RGMII_MODE_EN_V123		(1 << 0)
 #define  RGMII_LINK			(1 << 4)
 #define  OOB_DISABLE			(1 << 5)
 #define  RGMII_MODE_EN			(1 << 6)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmmii.c +5 -1
@@ -277,7 +277,11 @@ int bcmgenet_mii_config(struct net_devic
 	 */
 	if (priv->ext_phy) {
 		reg = bcmgenet_ext_readl(priv, EXT_RGMII_OOB_CTRL);
-		reg |= RGMII_MODE_EN | id_mode_dis;
+		reg |= id_mode_dis;
+		if (GENET_IS_V1(priv) || GENET_IS_V2(priv) || GENET_IS_V3(priv))
+			reg |= RGMII_MODE_EN_V123;
+		else
+			reg |= RGMII_MODE_EN;
 		bcmgenet_ext_writel(priv, reg, EXT_RGMII_OOB_CTRL);
 	}
 
author maintainer
#21 lore raw

PATCH 21/119 net: bcmgenet: Set phydev->dev_flags only for internal PHYs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 92696286f3bb37ba50e4bd8d1beb24afb759a799 ]

phydev->dev_flags is entirely dependent on the PHY device driver which is going to be used, setting the internal GENET PHY revision in those bits only makes sense when drivers/net/phy/bcm7xxx.c is the PHY driver being used.

Fixes 487320c54143 ("net: bcmgenet: communicate integrated PHY revision to PHY driver")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmmii.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmmii.c +3 -2
@@ -296,11 +296,12 @@ int bcmgenet_mii_probe(struct net_device
 	struct bcmgenet_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
 	struct device_node *dn = priv->pdev->dev.of_node;
 	struct phy_device *phydev;
-	u32 phy_flags;
+	u32 phy_flags = 0;
 	int ret;
 
 	/* Communicate the integrated PHY revision */
-	phy_flags = priv->gphy_rev;
+	if (priv->internal_phy)
+		phy_flags = priv->gphy_rev;
 
 	/* Initialize link state variables that bcmgenet_mii_setup() uses */
 	priv->old_link = -1;
author maintainer
#22 lore raw

PATCH 22/119 net: i82596: fix dma_alloc_attr for sni_82596

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 61c1d33daf7b5146f44d4363b3322f8cda6a6c43 ]

Commit 7f683b920479 ("i825xx: switch to switch to dma_alloc_attrs") switched dma allocation over to dma_alloc_attr, but didn't convert the SNI part to request consistent DMA memory. This broke sni_82596 since driver doesn't do dma_cache_sync for performance reasons. Fix this by using different DMA_ATTRs for lasi_82596 and sni_82596.

Fixes 7f683b920479 ("i825xx: switch to switch to dma_alloc_attrs")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/i825xx/lasi_82596.c |    4 +++-
 drivers/net/ethernet/i825xx/lib82596.c   |    4 ++--
 drivers/net/ethernet/i825xx/sni_82596.c  |    4 +++-
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/i825xx/lasi_82596.c +3 -1
@@ -96,6 +96,8 @@
 
 #define OPT_SWAP_PORT	0x0001	/* Need to wordswp on the MPU port */
 
+#define LIB82596_DMA_ATTR	DMA_ATTR_NON_CONSISTENT
+
 #define DMA_WBACK(ndev, addr, len) \
 	do { dma_cache_sync((ndev)->dev.parent, (void *)addr, len, DMA_TO_DEVICE); } while (0)
 
@@ -199,7 +201,7 @@ static int __exit lan_remove_chip(struct
 
 	unregister_netdev (dev);
 	dma_free_attrs(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct i596_private), lp->dma,
-		       lp->dma_addr, DMA_ATTR_NON_CONSISTENT);
+		       lp->dma_addr, LIB82596_DMA_ATTR);
 	free_netdev (dev);
 	return 0;
 }
drivers/net/ethernet/i825xx/lib82596.c +2 -2
@@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@ static int i82596_probe(struct net_devic
 
 	dma = dma_alloc_attrs(dev->dev.parent, sizeof(struct i596_dma),
 			      &lp->dma_addr, GFP_KERNEL,
-			      DMA_ATTR_NON_CONSISTENT);
+			      LIB82596_DMA_ATTR);
 	if (!dma) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Couldn't get shared memory\n", __FILE__);
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@ static int i82596_probe(struct net_devic
 	i = register_netdev(dev);
 	if (i) {
 		dma_free_attrs(dev->dev.parent, sizeof(struct i596_dma),
-			       dma, lp->dma_addr, DMA_ATTR_NON_CONSISTENT);
+			       dma, lp->dma_addr, LIB82596_DMA_ATTR);
 		return i;
 	}
 
drivers/net/ethernet/i825xx/sni_82596.c +3 -1
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
 
 static const char sni_82596_string[] = "snirm_82596";
 
+#define LIB82596_DMA_ATTR	0
+
 #define DMA_WBACK(priv, addr, len)     do { } while (0)
 #define DMA_INV(priv, addr, len)       do { } while (0)
 #define DMA_WBACK_INV(priv, addr, len) do { } while (0)
@@ -151,7 +153,7 @@ static int sni_82596_driver_remove(struc
 
 	unregister_netdev(dev);
 	dma_free_attrs(dev->dev.parent, sizeof(struct i596_private), lp->dma,
-		       lp->dma_addr, DMA_ATTR_NON_CONSISTENT);
+		       lp->dma_addr, LIB82596_DMA_ATTR);
 	iounmap(lp->ca);
 	iounmap(lp->mpu_port);
 	free_netdev (dev);
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/119 ieee802154: ca8210: prevent memory leak

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6402939ec86eaf226c8b8ae00ed983936b164908 ]

In ca8210_probe the allocated pdata needs to be assigned to spi_device->dev.platform_data before calling ca8210_get_platform_data. Othrwise when ca8210_get_platform_data fails pdata cannot be released.

---
 drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c +1 -1
index dcd10dba08c72..3a58962babd41 100644
@@ -3153,12 +3153,12 @@ static int ca8210_probe(struct spi_device *spi_device)
 		goto error;
 	}
 
+	priv->spi->dev.platform_data = pdata;
 	ret = ca8210_get_platform_data(priv->spi, pdata);
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_crit(&spi_device->dev, "ca8210_get_platform_data failed\n");
 		goto error;
 	}
-	priv->spi->dev.platform_data = pdata;
 
 	ret = ca8210_dev_com_init(priv);
 	if (ret) {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#23 lore raw

PATCH 23/119 net: stmmac: disable/enable ptp_ref_clk in suspend/resume flow

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Biao Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e497c20e203680aba9ccf7bb475959595908ca7e ]

disable ptp_ref_clk in suspend flow, and enable it in resume flow.

Fixes f573c0b9c4e0 ("stmmac: move stmmac_clk, pclk, clk_ptp_ref and stmmac_rst to platform structure")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c |   12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c +8 -4
@@ -4402,8 +4402,10 @@ int stmmac_suspend(struct device *dev)
 		priv->hw->mac->set_mac(priv->ioaddr, false);
 		pinctrl_pm_select_sleep_state(priv->device);
 		/* Disable clock in case of PWM is off */
-		clk_disable(priv->plat->pclk);
-		clk_disable(priv->plat->stmmac_clk);
+		if (priv->plat->clk_ptp_ref)
+			clk_disable_unprepare(priv->plat->clk_ptp_ref);
+		clk_disable_unprepare(priv->plat->pclk);
+		clk_disable_unprepare(priv->plat->stmmac_clk);
 	}
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
 
@@ -4468,8 +4470,10 @@ int stmmac_resume(struct device *dev)
 	} else {
 		pinctrl_pm_select_default_state(priv->device);
 		/* enable the clk previously disabled */
-		clk_enable(priv->plat->stmmac_clk);
-		clk_enable(priv->plat->pclk);
+		clk_prepare_enable(priv->plat->stmmac_clk);
+		clk_prepare_enable(priv->plat->pclk);
+		if (priv->plat->clk_ptp_ref)
+			clk_prepare_enable(priv->plat->clk_ptp_ref);
 		/* reset the phy so that it's ready */
 		if (priv->mii)
 			stmmac_mdio_reset(priv->mii);
author maintainer
#24 lore raw

PATCH 24/119 sctp: change sctp_prot .no_autobind with true

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 63dfb7938b13fa2c2fbcb45f34d065769eb09414 ]

syzbot reported a memory leak:

  BUG: memory leak, unreferenced object 0xffff888120b3d380 (size 64):
  backtrace:
    [...] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3319 [inline]
    [...] kmem_cache_alloc+0x13f/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3483
    [...] sctp_bucket_create net/sctp/socket.c:8523 [inline]
    [...] sctp_get_port_local+0x189/0x5a0 net/sctp/socket.c:8270
    [...] sctp_do_bind+0xcc/0x200 net/sctp/socket.c:402
    [...] sctp_bindx_add+0x4b/0xd0 net/sctp/socket.c:497
    [...] sctp_setsockopt_bindx+0x156/0x1b0 net/sctp/socket.c:1022
    [...] sctp_setsockopt net/sctp/socket.c:4641 [inline]
    [...] sctp_setsockopt+0xaea/0x2dc0 net/sctp/socket.c:4611
    [...] sock_common_setsockopt+0x38/0x50 net/core/sock.c:3147
    [...] __sys_setsockopt+0x10f/0x220 net/socket.c:2084
    [...] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2100 [inline]

It was caused by when sending msgs without binding a port, in the path:
inet_sendmsg() -> inet_send_prepare() -> inet_autobind() -> .get_port/sctp_get_port(), sp->bind_hash will be set while bp->port is not. Later when binding another port by sctp_setsockopt_bindx(), a new bucket will be created as bp->port is not set.

sctp's autobind is supposed to call sctp_autobind() where it does all things including setting bp->port. Since sctp_autobind() is called in sctp_sendmsg() if the sk is not yet bound, it should have skipped the auto bind.

THis patch is to avoid calling inet_autobind() in inet_send_prepare() by changing sctp_prot .no_autobind with true, also remove the unused .get_port.

---
 net/sctp/socket.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/sctp/socket.c +2 -2
@@ -8313,7 +8313,7 @@ struct proto sctp_prot = {
 	.backlog_rcv =	sctp_backlog_rcv,
 	.hash        =	sctp_hash,
 	.unhash      =	sctp_unhash,
-	.get_port    =	sctp_get_port,
+	.no_autobind =	true,
 	.obj_size    =  sizeof(struct sctp_sock),
 	.sysctl_mem  =  sysctl_sctp_mem,
 	.sysctl_rmem =  sysctl_sctp_rmem,
@@ -8352,7 +8352,7 @@ struct proto sctpv6_prot = {
 	.backlog_rcv	= sctp_backlog_rcv,
 	.hash		= sctp_hash,
 	.unhash		= sctp_unhash,
-	.get_port	= sctp_get_port,
+	.no_autobind	= true,
 	.obj_size	= sizeof(struct sctp6_sock),
 	.sysctl_mem	= sysctl_sctp_mem,
 	.sysctl_rmem	= sysctl_sctp_rmem,
author maintainer
#30 lore raw

PATCH 25/119 net: avoid potential infinite loop in tc_ctl_action()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 39f13ea2f61b439ebe0060393e9c39925c9ee28c ]

tc_ctl_action() has the ability to loop forever if tcf_action_add() returns -EAGAIN.

This special case has been done in case a module needed to be loaded, but it turns out that tcf_add_notify() could also return -EAGAIN if the socket sk_rcvbuf limit is hit.

We need to separate the two cases, and only loop for the module loading case.

While we are at it, add a limit of 10 attempts since unbounded loops are always scary.

syzbot repro was something like :

socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW|SOCK_NONBLOCK, NETLINK_ROUTE) = 3
write(3, ..., 38) = 38
setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, [0], 4) = 0
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{..., 388}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0x10}, ...)

NMI backtrace for cpu 0

CPU: 0 PID: 1054 Comm: khungtaskd Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold+0x70/0xb2 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:101
 nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x23b/0x28b lib/nmi_backtrace.c:62
 arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/apic/hw_nmi.c:38
 trigger_all_cpu_backtrace include/linux/nmi.h:146 [inline]
 check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:205 [inline]
 watchdog+0x9d0/0xef0 kernel/hung_task.c:289
 kthread+0x361/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:255
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 8859 Comm: syz-executor910 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:arch_local_save_flags arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:751 [inline]
RIP: 0010:lockdep_hardirqs_off+0x1df/0x2e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3453
Code: 5c 08 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 48 c7 c0 58 1d f3 88 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 10 00 0f 85 d3 00 00 00 <48> 83 3d 21 9e 99 07 00 0f 84 b9 00 00 00 9c 58 0f 1f 44 00 00 f6
RSP: 0018:ffff8880a6f3f1b8 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 1ffffffff11e63ab RBX: ffff88808c9c6080 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88808c9c6914
RBP: ffff8880a6f3f1d0 R08: ffff88808c9c6080 R09: fffffbfff16be5d1
R10: fffffbfff16be5d0 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffffffff8746591f
R13: ffff88808c9c6080 R14: ffffffff8746591f R15: 0000000000000003
FS:  00000000011e4880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffff600400 CR3: 00000000a8920000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 trace_hardirqs_off+0x62/0x240 kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:45
 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x6f/0xcd kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
 __wake_up_common_lock+0xc8/0x150 kernel/sched/wait.c:122
 __wake_up+0xe/0x10 kernel/sched/wait.c:142
 netlink_unlock_table net/netlink/af_netlink.c:466 [inline]
 netlink_unlock_table net/netlink/af_netlink.c:463 [inline]
 netlink_broadcast_filtered+0x705/0xb80 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1514
 netlink_broadcast+0x3a/0x50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1534
 rtnetlink_send+0xdd/0x110 net/core/rtnetlink.c:714
 tcf_add_notify net/sched/act_api.c:1343 [inline]
 tcf_action_add+0x243/0x370 net/sched/act_api.c:1362
 tc_ctl_action+0x3b5/0x4bc net/sched/act_api.c:1410
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x463/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5386
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5404
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x531/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
 netlink_sendmsg+0x8a5/0xd60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:657
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x803/0x920 net/socket.c:2311
 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2356
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2365 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2363 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2363
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x760 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x440939
Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by [email protected]
---
 net/sched/act_api.c |   13 ++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/sched/act_api.c +8 -5
@@ -1072,10 +1072,16 @@ tcf_add_notify(struct net *net, struct n
 static int tcf_action_add(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 			  struct nlmsghdr *n, u32 portid, int ovr)
 {
-	int ret = 0;
+	int loop, ret;
 	LIST_HEAD(actions);
 
-	ret = tcf_action_init(net, NULL, nla, NULL, NULL, ovr, 0, &actions);
+	for (loop = 0; loop < 10; loop++) {
+		ret = tcf_action_init(net, NULL, nla, NULL, NULL, ovr, 0,
+				      &actions);
+		if (ret != -EAGAIN)
+			break;
+	}
+
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -1122,10 +1128,7 @@ static int tc_ctl_action(struct sk_buff
 		 */
 		if (n->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE)
 			ovr = 1;
-replay:
 		ret = tcf_action_add(net, tca[TCA_ACT_TAB], n, portid, ovr);
-		if (ret == -EAGAIN)
-			goto replay;
 		break;
 	case RTM_DELACTION:
 		ret = tca_action_gd(net, tca[TCA_ACT_TAB], n,
author maintainer
#31 lore raw

PATCH 26/119 MIPS: Treat Loongson Extensions as ASEs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiaxun Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d2f965549006acb865c4638f1f030ebcefdc71f6 ]

Recently, binutils had split Loongson-3 Extensions into four ASEs:
MMI, CAM, EXT, EXT2. This patch do the samething in kernel and expose them in cpuinfo so applications can probe supported ASEs at runtime.

---
 arch/mips/include/asm/cpu-features.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/mips/include/asm/cpu.h          |  4 ++++
 arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c         |  4 ++++
 arch/mips/kernel/proc.c              |  4 ++++
 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
arch/mips/include/asm/cpu-features.h +16 -0
index 721b698bfe3cf..1befd483d5a3b 100644
@@ -348,6 +348,22 @@
 #define cpu_has_dsp3		(cpu_data[0].ases & MIPS_ASE_DSP3)
 #endif
 
+#ifndef cpu_has_loongson_mmi
+#define cpu_has_loongson_mmi		__ase(MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_MMI)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef cpu_has_loongson_cam
+#define cpu_has_loongson_cam		__ase(MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_CAM)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef cpu_has_loongson_ext
+#define cpu_has_loongson_ext		__ase(MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_EXT)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef cpu_has_loongson_ext2
+#define cpu_has_loongson_ext2		__ase(MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_EXT2)
+#endif
+
 #ifndef cpu_has_mipsmt
 #define cpu_has_mipsmt		(cpu_data[0].ases & MIPS_ASE_MIPSMT)
 #endif
arch/mips/include/asm/cpu.h +4 -0
index d39324c4adf13..a6fdf13585916 100644
@@ -433,5 +433,9 @@ enum cpu_type_enum {
 #define MIPS_ASE_MSA		0x00000100 /* MIPS SIMD Architecture */
 #define MIPS_ASE_DSP3		0x00000200 /* Signal Processing ASE Rev 3*/
 #define MIPS_ASE_MIPS16E2	0x00000400 /* MIPS16e2 */
+#define MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_MMI	0x00000800 /* Loongson MultiMedia extensions Instructions */
+#define MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_CAM	0x00001000 /* Loongson CAM */
+#define MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_EXT	0x00002000 /* Loongson EXTensions */
+#define MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_EXT2	0x00004000 /* Loongson EXTensions R2 */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_CPU_H */
arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c +4 -0
index cf3fd549e16d0..3007ae1bb616a 100644
@@ -1478,6 +1478,7 @@ static inline void cpu_probe_legacy(struct cpuinfo_mips *c, unsigned int cpu)
 			__cpu_name[cpu] = "ICT Loongson-3";
 			set_elf_platform(cpu, "loongson3a");
 			set_isa(c, MIPS_CPU_ISA_M64R1);
+			c->ases |= (MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_MMI | MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_EXT);
 			break;
 		case PRID_REV_LOONGSON3B_R1:
 		case PRID_REV_LOONGSON3B_R2:
@@ -1485,6 +1486,7 @@ static inline void cpu_probe_legacy(struct cpuinfo_mips *c, unsigned int cpu)
 			__cpu_name[cpu] = "ICT Loongson-3";
 			set_elf_platform(cpu, "loongson3b");
 			set_isa(c, MIPS_CPU_ISA_M64R1);
+			c->ases |= (MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_MMI | MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_EXT);
 			break;
 		}
 
@@ -1845,6 +1847,8 @@ static inline void cpu_probe_loongson(struct cpuinfo_mips *c, unsigned int cpu)
 		decode_configs(c);
 		c->options |= MIPS_CPU_FTLB | MIPS_CPU_TLBINV | MIPS_CPU_LDPTE;
 		c->writecombine = _CACHE_UNCACHED_ACCELERATED;
+		c->ases |= (MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_MMI | MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_CAM |
+			MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_EXT | MIPS_ASE_LOONGSON_EXT2);
 		break;
 	default:
 		panic("Unknown Loongson Processor ID!");
arch/mips/kernel/proc.c +4 -0
index b2de408a259e4..f8d36710cd581 100644
@@ -124,6 +124,10 @@ static int show_cpuinfo(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	if (cpu_has_eva)	seq_printf(m, "%s", " eva");
 	if (cpu_has_htw)	seq_printf(m, "%s", " htw");
 	if (cpu_has_xpa)	seq_printf(m, "%s", " xpa");
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_mmi)	seq_printf(m, "%s", " loongson-mmi");
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_cam)	seq_printf(m, "%s", " loongson-cam");
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_ext)	seq_printf(m, "%s", " loongson-ext");
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_ext2)	seq_printf(m, "%s", " loongson-ext2");
 	seq_printf(m, "\n");
 
 	if (cpu_has_mmips) {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#32 lore raw

PATCH 27/119 MIPS: elf_hwcap: Export userspace ASEs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiaxun Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 38dffe1e4dde1d3174fdce09d67370412843ebb5 ]

A Golang developer reported MIPS hwcap isn't reflecting instructions that the processor actually supported so programs can't apply optimized code at runtime.

Thus we export the ASEs that can be used in userspace programs.

---
 arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 11 ++++++++++
 arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c       | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h +11 -0
index 600ad8fd68356..2475294c3d185 100644
@@ -5,5 +5,16 @@
 /* HWCAP flags */
 #define HWCAP_MIPS_R6		(1 << 0)
 #define HWCAP_MIPS_MSA		(1 << 1)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16	(1 << 3)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MDMX     (1 << 4)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS3D   (1 << 5)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_SMARTMIPS (1 << 6)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP      (1 << 7)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP2     (1 << 8)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP3     (1 << 9)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16E2 (1 << 10)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_MMI  (1 << 11)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT  (1 << 12)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT2 (1 << 13)
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_HWCAP_H */
arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c +33 -0
index 3007ae1bb616a..c38cd62879f4e 100644
@@ -2080,6 +2080,39 @@ void cpu_probe(void)
 		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MSA;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_has_mips16)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16;
+
+	if (cpu_has_mdmx)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MDMX;
+
+	if (cpu_has_mips3d)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS3D;
+
+	if (cpu_has_smartmips)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_SMARTMIPS;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp2)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP2;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp3)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP3;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_mmi)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_MMI;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_mmi)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_CAM;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_ext)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_ext)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT2;
+
 	if (cpu_has_vz)
 		cpu_probe_vz(c);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#38 lore raw

PATCH 28/119 loop: Add LOOP_SET_DIRECT_IO to compat ioctl

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Alessio Balsini <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fdbe4eeeb1aac219b14f10c0ed31ae5d1123e9b8 ]

Enabling Direct I/O with loop devices helps reducing memory usage by avoiding double caching. 32 bit applications running on 64 bits systems are currently not able to request direct I/O because is missing from the lo_compat_ioctl.

This patch fixes the compatibility issue mentioned above by exporting LOOP_SET_DIRECT_IO as additional lo_compat_ioctl() entry. The input argument for this ioctl is a single long converted to a 1-bit boolean, so compatibility is preserved.

---
 drivers/block/loop.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/block/loop.c +1 -0
index 87d7c42affbc4..ec61dd873c93d 100644
@@ -1605,6 +1605,7 @@ static int lo_compat_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode,
 		arg = (unsigned long) compat_ptr(arg);
 	case LOOP_SET_FD:
 	case LOOP_CHANGE_FD:
+	case LOOP_SET_DIRECT_IO:
 		err = lo_ioctl(bdev, mode, cmd, arg);
 		break;
 	default:
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#39 lore raw

PATCH 29/119 memfd: Fix locking when tagging pins

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>

The RCU lock is insufficient to protect the radix tree iteration as a deletion from the tree can occur before we take the spinlock to tag the entry. In 4.19, this has manifested as a bug with the following trace:

kernel BUG at lib/radix-tree.c:1429!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI

CPU: 7 PID: 6935 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 4.19.36 #25
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:radix_tree_tag_set+0x200/0x2f0 lib/radix-tree.c:1429
Code: 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 89 44 24 10 e8 a3 29 7e fe 48 8b 44 24 10 48 0f ab 03 e9 d2 fe ff ff e8 90 29 7e fe <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 e0 5a 87 84 e8 f0 e7 08 ff 4c 89 ef e8 4a ff ac fe
RSP: 0018:ffff88837b13fb60 EFLAGS: 00010016
RAX: 0000000000040000 RBX: ffff8883c5515d58 RCX: ffffffff82cb2ef0
RDX: 0000000000000b72 RSI: ffffc90004cf2000 RDI: ffff8883c5515d98
RBP: ffff88837b13fb98 R08: ffffed106f627f7e R09: ffffed106f627f7e
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed106f627f7d R12: 0000000000000004
R13: ffffea000d7fea80 R14: 1ffff1106f627f6f R15: 0000000000000002
FS:  00007fa1b8df2700(0000) GS:ffff8883e2fc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fa1b8df1db8 CR3: 000000037d4d2001 CR4: 0000000000160ee0
Call Trace:
 memfd_tag_pins mm/memfd.c:51 [inline]
 memfd_wait_for_pins+0x2c5/0x12d0 mm/memfd.c:81
 memfd_add_seals mm/memfd.c:215 [inline]
 memfd_fcntl+0x33d/0x4a0 mm/memfd.c:247
 do_fcntl+0x589/0xeb0 fs/fcntl.c:421
 __do_sys_fcntl fs/fcntl.c:463 [inline]
 __se_sys_fcntl fs/fcntl.c:448 [inline]
 __x64_sys_fcntl+0x12d/0x180 fs/fcntl.c:448
 do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293

The problem does not occur in mainline due to the XArray rewrite which changed the locking to exclude modification of the tree during iteration. At the time, nobody realised this was a bugfix. Backport the locking changes to stable.

---
 mm/shmem.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
mm/shmem.c +10 -8
index 037e2ee9ccacc..5b2cc9f9b1f1d 100644
@@ -2657,11 +2657,12 @@ static void shmem_tag_pins(struct address_space *mapping)
 	void **slot;
 	pgoff_t start;
 	struct page *page;
+	unsigned int tagged = 0;
 
 	lru_add_drain();
 	start = 0;
-	rcu_read_lock();
 
+	spin_lock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
 	radix_tree_for_each_slot(slot, &mapping->page_tree, &iter, start) {
 		page = radix_tree_deref_slot(slot);
 		if (!page || radix_tree_exception(page)) {
@@ -2670,18 +2671,19 @@ static void shmem_tag_pins(struct address_space *mapping)
 				continue;
 			}
 		} else if (page_count(page) - page_mapcount(page) > 1) {
-			spin_lock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
 			radix_tree_tag_set(&mapping->page_tree, iter.index,
 					   SHMEM_TAG_PINNED);
-			spin_unlock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
 		}
 
-		if (need_resched()) {
-			slot = radix_tree_iter_resume(slot, &iter);
-			cond_resched_rcu();
-		}
+		if (++tagged % 1024)
+			continue;
+
+		slot = radix_tree_iter_resume(slot, &iter);
+		spin_unlock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
+		cond_resched();
+		spin_lock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
 	}
-	rcu_read_unlock();
+	spin_unlock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#40 lore raw

PATCH 30/119 USB: legousbtower: fix memleak on disconnect

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit b6c03e5f7b463efcafd1ce141bd5a8fc4e583ae2 upstream.

If disconnect() races with release() after a process has been interrupted, release() could end up returning early and the driver would fail to free its driver data.

---
 drivers/usb/misc/legousbtower.c |    5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/misc/legousbtower.c +1 -4
@@ -423,10 +423,7 @@ static int tower_release (struct inode *
 		goto exit;
 	}
 
-	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&dev->lock)) {
-	        retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
-		goto exit;
-	}
+	mutex_lock(&dev->lock);
 
 	if (dev->open_count != 1) {
 		dev_dbg(&dev->udev->dev, "%s: device not opened exactly once\n",
author maintainer
#41 lore raw

PATCH 31/119 ALSA: hda/realtek - Add support for ALC711

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kailang Yang <[email protected]>

commit 83629532ce45ef9df1f297b419b9ea112045685d upstream.

Support new codec ALC711.

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +3 -0
@@ -359,6 +359,7 @@ static void alc_fill_eapd_coef(struct hd
 	case 0x10ec0700:
 	case 0x10ec0701:
 	case 0x10ec0703:
+	case 0x10ec0711:
 		alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x10, 1<<15, 0);
 		break;
 	case 0x10ec0662:
@@ -7272,6 +7273,7 @@ static int patch_alc269(struct hda_codec
 	case 0x10ec0700:
 	case 0x10ec0701:
 	case 0x10ec0703:
+	case 0x10ec0711:
 		spec->codec_variant = ALC269_TYPE_ALC700;
 		spec->gen.mixer_nid = 0; /* ALC700 does not have any loopback mixer path */
 		alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x4a, 1 << 15, 0); /* Combo jack auto trigger control */
@@ -8365,6 +8367,7 @@ static const struct hda_device_id snd_hd
 	HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0700, "ALC700", patch_alc269),
 	HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0701, "ALC701", patch_alc269),
 	HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0703, "ALC703", patch_alc269),
+	HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0711, "ALC711", patch_alc269),
 	HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0867, "ALC891", patch_alc662),
 	HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0880, "ALC880", patch_alc880),
 	HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0882, "ALC882", patch_alc882),
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/119 ARM: dts: am4372: Set memory bandwidth limit for DISPC

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Peter Ujfalusi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f90ec6cdf674248dcad85bf9af6e064bf472b841 ]

Set memory bandwidth limit to filter out resolutions above 720p@60Hz to avoid underflow errors due to the bandwidth needs of higher resolutions.

am43xx can not provide enough bandwidth to DISPC to correctly handle 'high' resolutions.

---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/am4372.dtsi | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/arm/boot/dts/am4372.dtsi +2 -0
index 4714a59fd86df..345c117bd5ef5 100644
@@ -1118,6 +1118,8 @@
 				ti,hwmods = "dss_dispc";
 				clocks = <&disp_clk>;
 				clock-names = "fck";
+
+				max-memory-bandwidth = <230000000>;
 			};
 
 			rfbi: rfbi@4832a800 {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#43 lore raw

PATCH 33/119 USB: serial: ti_usb_3410_5052: fix port-close races

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 6f1d1dc8d540a9aa6e39b9cb86d3a67bbc1c8d8d upstream.

Fix races between closing a port and opening or closing another port on the same device which could lead to a failure to start or stop the shared interrupt URB. The latter could potentially cause a use-after-free or worse in the completion handler on driver unbind.

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/usb/serial/ti_usb_3410_5052.c |   10 +++-------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/serial/ti_usb_3410_5052.c +3 -7
@@ -780,7 +780,6 @@ static void ti_close(struct usb_serial_p
 	struct ti_port *tport;
 	int port_number;
 	int status;
-	int do_unlock;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	tdev = usb_get_serial_data(port->serial);
@@ -804,16 +803,13 @@ static void ti_close(struct usb_serial_p
 			"%s - cannot send close port command, %d\n"
 							, __func__, status);
 
-	/* if mutex_lock is interrupted, continue anyway */
-	do_unlock = !mutex_lock_interruptible(&tdev->td_open_close_lock);
+	mutex_lock(&tdev->td_open_close_lock);
 	--tport->tp_tdev->td_open_port_count;
-	if (tport->tp_tdev->td_open_port_count <= 0) {
+	if (tport->tp_tdev->td_open_port_count == 0) {
 		/* last port is closed, shut down interrupt urb */
 		usb_kill_urb(port->serial->port[0]->interrupt_in_urb);
-		tport->tp_tdev->td_open_port_count = 0;
 	}
-	if (do_unlock)
-		mutex_unlock(&tdev->td_open_close_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&tdev->td_open_close_lock);
 }
 
 
author maintainer
#44 lore raw

PATCH 34/119 USB: ldusb: fix memleak on disconnect

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit b14a39048c1156cfee76228bf449852da2f14df8 upstream.

If disconnect() races with release() after a process has been interrupted, release() could end up returning early and the driver would fail to free its driver data.

Fixes 2824bd250f0b ("[PATCH] USB: add ldusb driver")
Cc stable <[email protected]> # 2.6.13
---
 drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c |    5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c +1 -4
@@ -383,10 +383,7 @@ static int ld_usb_release(struct inode *
 		goto exit;
 	}
 
-	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&dev->mutex)) {
-		retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
-		goto exit;
-	}
+	mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
 
 	if (dev->open_count != 1) {
 		retval = -ENODEV;
author maintainer
#45 lore raw

PATCH 35/119 USB: usblp: fix use-after-free on disconnect

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 7a759197974894213621aa65f0571b51904733d6 upstream.

A recent commit addressing a runtime PM use-count regression, introduced a use-after-free by not making sure we held a reference to the struct usb_interface for the lifetime of the driver data.

Fixes 9a31535859bf ("USB: usblp: fix runtime PM after driver unbind")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
Reported-by [email protected]
---
 drivers/usb/class/usblp.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/class/usblp.c +3 -1
@@ -458,6 +458,7 @@ static void usblp_cleanup(struct usblp *
 	kfree(usblp->readbuf);
 	kfree(usblp->device_id_string);
 	kfree(usblp->statusbuf);
+	usb_put_intf(usblp->intf);
 	kfree(usblp);
 }
 
@@ -1120,7 +1121,7 @@ static int usblp_probe(struct usb_interf
 	init_waitqueue_head(&usblp->wwait);
 	init_usb_anchor(&usblp->urbs);
 	usblp->ifnum = intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber;
-	usblp->intf = intf;
+	usblp->intf = usb_get_intf(intf);
 
 	/* Malloc device ID string buffer to the largest expected length,
 	 * since we can re-query it on an ioctl and a dynamic string
@@ -1209,6 +1210,7 @@ abort:
 	kfree(usblp->readbuf);
 	kfree(usblp->statusbuf);
 	kfree(usblp->device_id_string);
+	usb_put_intf(usblp->intf);
 	kfree(usblp);
 abort_ret:
 	return retval;
author maintainer
#47 lore raw

PATCH 37/119 arm64: sysreg: Move to use definitions for all the SCTLR bits

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7a00d68ebe5f07cb1db17e7fedfd031f0d87e8bb ]

__cpu_setup() configures SCTLR_EL1 using some hard coded hex masks, and el2_setup() duplicates some this when setting RES1 bits.

Lets make this the same as KVM's hyp_init, which uses named bits.

First, we add definitions for all the SCTLR_EL{1,2} bits, the RES{1,0} bits, and those we want to set or clear.

Add a build_bug checks to ensures all bits are either set or clear. This means we don't need to preserve endian-ness configuration generated elsewhere.

Finally, move the head.S and proc.S users of these hard-coded masks over to the macro versions.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h |   65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/head.S        |   13 +-------
 arch/arm64/mm/proc.S            |   24 --------------
 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +63 -2
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_SYSREG_H
 #define __ASM_SYSREG_H
 
+#include <asm/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/stringify.h>
 
 /*
@@ -297,25 +298,81 @@
 
 /* Common SCTLR_ELx flags. */
 #define SCTLR_ELx_EE    (1 << 25)
+#define SCTLR_ELx_WXN	(1 << 19)
 #define SCTLR_ELx_I	(1 << 12)
 #define SCTLR_ELx_SA	(1 << 3)
 #define SCTLR_ELx_C	(1 << 2)
 #define SCTLR_ELx_A	(1 << 1)
 #define SCTLR_ELx_M	1
 
+#define SCTLR_ELx_FLAGS	(SCTLR_ELx_M | SCTLR_ELx_A | SCTLR_ELx_C | \
+			 SCTLR_ELx_SA | SCTLR_ELx_I)
+
+/* SCTLR_EL2 specific flags. */
 #define SCTLR_EL2_RES1	((1 << 4)  | (1 << 5)  | (1 << 11) | (1 << 16) | \
 			 (1 << 18) | (1 << 22) | (1 << 23) | (1 << 28) | \
 			 (1 << 29))
+#define SCTLR_EL2_RES0	((1 << 6)  | (1 << 7)  | (1 << 8)  | (1 << 9)  | \
+			 (1 << 10) | (1 << 13) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 15) | \
+			 (1 << 17) | (1 << 20) | (1 << 21) | (1 << 24) | \
+			 (1 << 26) | (1 << 27) | (1 << 30) | (1 << 31))
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
+#define ENDIAN_SET_EL2		SCTLR_ELx_EE
+#define ENDIAN_CLEAR_EL2	0
+#else
+#define ENDIAN_SET_EL2		0
+#define ENDIAN_CLEAR_EL2	SCTLR_ELx_EE
+#endif
+
+/* SCTLR_EL2 value used for the hyp-stub */
+#define SCTLR_EL2_SET	(ENDIAN_SET_EL2   | SCTLR_EL2_RES1)
+#define SCTLR_EL2_CLEAR	(SCTLR_ELx_M      | SCTLR_ELx_A    | SCTLR_ELx_C   | \
+			 SCTLR_ELx_SA     | SCTLR_ELx_I    | SCTLR_ELx_WXN | \
+			 ENDIAN_CLEAR_EL2 | SCTLR_EL2_RES0)
+
+/* Check all the bits are accounted for */
+#define SCTLR_EL2_BUILD_BUG_ON_MISSING_BITS	BUILD_BUG_ON((SCTLR_EL2_SET ^ SCTLR_EL2_CLEAR) != ~0)
 
-#define SCTLR_ELx_FLAGS	(SCTLR_ELx_M | SCTLR_ELx_A | SCTLR_ELx_C | \
-			 SCTLR_ELx_SA | SCTLR_ELx_I)
 
 /* SCTLR_EL1 specific flags. */
 #define SCTLR_EL1_UCI		(1 << 26)
+#define SCTLR_EL1_E0E		(1 << 24)
 #define SCTLR_EL1_SPAN		(1 << 23)
+#define SCTLR_EL1_NTWE		(1 << 18)
+#define SCTLR_EL1_NTWI		(1 << 16)
 #define SCTLR_EL1_UCT		(1 << 15)
+#define SCTLR_EL1_DZE		(1 << 14)
+#define SCTLR_EL1_UMA		(1 << 9)
 #define SCTLR_EL1_SED		(1 << 8)
+#define SCTLR_EL1_ITD		(1 << 7)
 #define SCTLR_EL1_CP15BEN	(1 << 5)
+#define SCTLR_EL1_SA0		(1 << 4)
+
+#define SCTLR_EL1_RES1	((1 << 11) | (1 << 20) | (1 << 22) | (1 << 28) | \
+			 (1 << 29))
+#define SCTLR_EL1_RES0  ((1 << 6)  | (1 << 10) | (1 << 13) | (1 << 17) | \
+			 (1 << 21) | (1 << 27) | (1 << 30) | (1 << 31))
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
+#define ENDIAN_SET_EL1		(SCTLR_EL1_E0E | SCTLR_ELx_EE)
+#define ENDIAN_CLEAR_EL1	0
+#else
+#define ENDIAN_SET_EL1		0
+#define ENDIAN_CLEAR_EL1	(SCTLR_EL1_E0E | SCTLR_ELx_EE)
+#endif
+
+#define SCTLR_EL1_SET	(SCTLR_ELx_M    | SCTLR_ELx_C    | SCTLR_ELx_SA   |\
+			 SCTLR_EL1_SA0  | SCTLR_EL1_SED  | SCTLR_ELx_I    |\
+			 SCTLR_EL1_DZE  | SCTLR_EL1_UCT  | SCTLR_EL1_NTWI |\
+			 SCTLR_EL1_NTWE | SCTLR_EL1_SPAN | ENDIAN_SET_EL1 |\
+			 SCTLR_EL1_UCI  | SCTLR_EL1_RES1)
+#define SCTLR_EL1_CLEAR	(SCTLR_ELx_A   | SCTLR_EL1_CP15BEN | SCTLR_EL1_ITD    |\
+			 SCTLR_EL1_UMA | SCTLR_ELx_WXN     | ENDIAN_CLEAR_EL1 |\
+			 SCTLR_EL1_RES0)
+
+/* Check all the bits are accounted for */
+#define SCTLR_EL1_BUILD_BUG_ON_MISSING_BITS	BUILD_BUG_ON((SCTLR_EL1_SET ^ SCTLR_EL1_CLEAR) != ~0)
 
 /* id_aa64isar0 */
 #define ID_AA64ISAR0_RDM_SHIFT		28
@@ -463,6 +520,7 @@
 
 #else
 
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
 asm(
@@ -519,6 +577,9 @@ static inline void config_sctlr_el1(u32
 {
 	u32 val;
 
+	SCTLR_EL2_BUILD_BUG_ON_MISSING_BITS;
+	SCTLR_EL1_BUILD_BUG_ON_MISSING_BITS;
+
 	val = read_sysreg(sctlr_el1);
 	val &= ~clear;
 	val |= set;
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S +3 -10
@@ -388,17 +388,13 @@ ENTRY(el2_setup)
 	mrs	x0, CurrentEL
 	cmp	x0, #CurrentEL_EL2
 	b.eq	1f
-	mrs	x0, sctlr_el1
-CPU_BE(	orr	x0, x0, #(3 << 24)	)	// Set the EE and E0E bits for EL1
-CPU_LE(	bic	x0, x0, #(3 << 24)	)	// Clear the EE and E0E bits for EL1
+	mov_q	x0, (SCTLR_EL1_RES1 | ENDIAN_SET_EL1)
 	msr	sctlr_el1, x0
 	mov	w0, #BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL1		// This cpu booted in EL1
 	isb
 	ret
 
-1:	mrs	x0, sctlr_el2
-CPU_BE(	orr	x0, x0, #(1 << 25)	)	// Set the EE bit for EL2
-CPU_LE(	bic	x0, x0, #(1 << 25)	)	// Clear the EE bit for EL2
+1:	mov_q	x0, (SCTLR_EL2_RES1 | ENDIAN_SET_EL2)
 	msr	sctlr_el2, x0
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_VHE
@@ -505,10 +501,7 @@ install_el2_stub:
 	 * requires no configuration, and all non-hyp-specific EL2 setup
 	 * will be done via the _EL1 system register aliases in __cpu_setup.
 	 */
-	/* sctlr_el1 */
-	mov	x0, #0x0800			// Set/clear RES{1,0} bits
-CPU_BE(	movk	x0, #0x33d0, lsl #16	)	// Set EE and E0E on BE systems
-CPU_LE(	movk	x0, #0x30d0, lsl #16	)	// Clear EE and E0E on LE systems
+	mov_q	x0, (SCTLR_EL1_RES1 | ENDIAN_SET_EL1)
 	msr	sctlr_el1, x0
 
 	/* Coprocessor traps. */
arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +1 -23
@@ -430,11 +430,7 @@ ENTRY(__cpu_setup)
 	/*
 	 * Prepare SCTLR
 	 */
-	adr	x5, crval
-	ldp	w5, w6, [x5]
-	mrs	x0, sctlr_el1
-	bic	x0, x0, x5			// clear bits
-	orr	x0, x0, x6			// set bits
+	mov_q	x0, SCTLR_EL1_SET
 	/*
 	 * Set/prepare TCR and TTBR. We use 512GB (39-bit) address range for
 	 * both user and kernel.
@@ -470,21 +466,3 @@ ENTRY(__cpu_setup)
 	msr	tcr_el1, x10
 	ret					// return to head.S
 ENDPROC(__cpu_setup)
-
-	/*
-	 * We set the desired value explicitly, including those of the
-	 * reserved bits. The values of bits EE & E0E were set early in
-	 * el2_setup, which are left untouched below.
-	 *
-	 *                 n n            T
-	 *       U E      WT T UD     US IHBS
-	 *       CE0      XWHW CZ     ME TEEA S
-	 * .... .IEE .... NEAI TE.I ..AD DEN0 ACAM
-	 * 0011 0... 1101 ..0. ..0. 10.. .0.. .... < hardware reserved
-	 * .... .1.. .... 01.1 11.1 ..01 0.01 1101 < software settings
-	 */
-	.type	crval, #object
-crval:
-	.word	0xfcffffff			// clear
-	.word	0x34d5d91d			// set
-	.popsection
author maintainer
#46 lore raw

PATCH 36/119 USB: ldusb: fix read info leaks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 7a6f22d7479b7a0b68eadd308a997dd64dda7dae upstream.

Fix broken read implementation, which could be used to trigger slab info leaks.

The driver failed to check if the custom ring buffer was still empty when waking up after having waited for more data. This would happen on every interrupt-in completion, even if no data had been added to the ring buffer (e.g. on disconnect events).

Due to missing sanity checks and uninitialised (kmalloced) ring-buffer entries, this meant that huge slab info leaks could easily be triggered.

Note that the empty-buffer check after wakeup is enough to fix the info leak on disconnect, but let's clear the buffer on allocation and add a sanity check to read() to prevent further leaks.

Fixes 2824bd250f0b ("[PATCH] USB: add ldusb driver")
Cc stable <[email protected]> # 2.6.13
Reported-by [email protected]
---
 drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c |   15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c +11 -4
@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ static ssize_t ld_usb_read(struct file *
 
 	/* wait for data */
 	spin_lock_irq(&dev->rbsl);
-	if (dev->ring_head == dev->ring_tail) {
+	while (dev->ring_head == dev->ring_tail) {
 		dev->interrupt_in_done = 0;
 		spin_unlock_irq(&dev->rbsl);
 		if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
@@ -477,12 +477,17 @@ static ssize_t ld_usb_read(struct file *
 		retval = wait_event_interruptible(dev->read_wait, dev->interrupt_in_done);
 		if (retval < 0)
 			goto unlock_exit;
-	} else {
-		spin_unlock_irq(&dev->rbsl);
+
+		spin_lock_irq(&dev->rbsl);
 	}
+	spin_unlock_irq(&dev->rbsl);
 
 	/* actual_buffer contains actual_length + interrupt_in_buffer */
 	actual_buffer = (size_t *)(dev->ring_buffer + dev->ring_tail * (sizeof(size_t)+dev->interrupt_in_endpoint_size));
+	if (*actual_buffer > dev->interrupt_in_endpoint_size) {
+		retval = -EIO;
+		goto unlock_exit;
+	}
 	bytes_to_read = min(count, *actual_buffer);
 	if (bytes_to_read < *actual_buffer)
 		dev_warn(&dev->intf->dev, "Read buffer overflow, %zd bytes dropped\n",
@@ -693,7 +698,9 @@ static int ld_usb_probe(struct usb_inter
 		dev_warn(&intf->dev, "Interrupt out endpoint not found (using control endpoint instead)\n");
 
 	dev->interrupt_in_endpoint_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(dev->interrupt_in_endpoint);
-	dev->ring_buffer = kmalloc(ring_buffer_size*(sizeof(size_t)+dev->interrupt_in_endpoint_size), GFP_KERNEL);
+	dev->ring_buffer = kcalloc(ring_buffer_size,
+			sizeof(size_t) + dev->interrupt_in_endpoint_size,
+			GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!dev->ring_buffer)
 		goto error;
 	dev->interrupt_in_buffer = kmalloc(dev->interrupt_in_endpoint_size, GFP_KERNEL);
author maintainer
#49 lore raw

PATCH 39/119 arm64: Fix the feature type for ID register fields

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5bdecb7971572a1aef828df507558e7a4dfe25ec ]

Now that the ARM ARM clearly specifies the rules for inferring the values of the ID register fields, fix the types of the feature bits we have in the kernel.

As per ARM ARM DDI0487B.b, section D10.1.4 "Principles of the ID scheme for fields in ID registers" lists the registers to which the scheme applies along with the exceptions.

This patch changes the relevant feature bits from FTR_EXACT to FTR_LOWER_SAFE to select the safer value. This will enable an older kernel running on a new CPU detect the safer option rather than completely disabling the feature.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c |  102 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +51 -51
@@ -107,11 +107,11 @@ cpufeature_pan_not_uao(const struct arm6
  * sync with the documentation of the CPU feature register ABI.
  */
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar0[] = {
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR0_DP_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM4_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR0_RDM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_DP_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM4_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_RDM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_ATOMICS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_CRC32_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA2_SHIFT, 4, 0),
@@ -121,36 +121,36 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_i
 };
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = {
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR1_LRCPC_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_LRCPC_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0[] = {
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_NI),
 	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_NI),
 	/* Linux doesn't care about the EL3 */
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64PFR0_EL3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64PFR0_EL2_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_64BIT_ONLY),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_64BIT_ONLY),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_EL3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_EL2_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_64BIT_ONLY),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_64BIT_ONLY),
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr0[] = {
-	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN4_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN4_NI),
-	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN64_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN64_NI),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN16_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN16_NI),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR0_BIGENDEL0_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN4_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN4_NI),
+	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN64_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN64_NI),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN16_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN16_NI),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_BIGENDEL0_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	/* Linux shouldn't care about secure memory */
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR0_SNSMEM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR0_BIGENDEL_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR0_ASID_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_SNSMEM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_BIGENDEL_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_ASID_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	/*
 	 * Differing PARange is fine as long as all peripherals and memory are mapped
 	 * within the minimum PARange of all CPUs
@@ -161,20 +161,20 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_i
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr1[] = {
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_PAN_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR1_LOR_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR1_HPD_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR1_VHE_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR1_VMIDBITS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR1_HADBS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_LOR_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_HPD_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_VHE_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_VMIDBITS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_HADBS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr2[] = {
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR2_LVA_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR2_IESB_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR2_LSM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR2_UAO_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64MMFR2_CNP_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_LVA_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_IESB_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_LSM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_UAO_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_CNP_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
 
@@ -201,14 +201,14 @@ struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel
 };
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_mmfr0[] = {
-	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 28, 4, 0xf),	/* InnerShr */
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 24, 4, 0),	/* FCSE */
+	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 28, 4, 0xf),	/* InnerShr */
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 24, 4, 0),	/* FCSE */
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 20, 4, 0),	/* AuxReg */
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 16, 4, 0),	/* TCM */
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 12, 4, 0),	/* ShareLvl */
-	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 8, 4, 0xf),	/* OuterShr */
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 4, 4, 0),	/* PMSA */
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 0, 4, 0),	/* VMSA */
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 16, 4, 0),	/* TCM */
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 12, 4, 0),	/* ShareLvl */
+	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 8, 4, 0xf),	/* OuterShr */
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 4, 4, 0),	/* PMSA */
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 0, 4, 0),	/* VMSA */
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
 
@@ -229,8 +229,8 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_i
 };
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_mvfr2[] = {
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 4, 4, 0),		/* FPMisc */
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 0, 4, 0),		/* SIMDMisc */
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 4, 4, 0),		/* FPMisc */
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 0, 4, 0),		/* SIMDMisc */
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
 
@@ -242,25 +242,25 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_d
 
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_isar5[] = {
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_ISAR5_RDM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_ISAR5_CRC32_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_ISAR5_SHA2_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_ISAR5_SHA1_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_ISAR5_AES_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_ISAR5_SEVL_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_ISAR5_RDM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_ISAR5_CRC32_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_ISAR5_SHA2_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_ISAR5_SHA1_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_ISAR5_AES_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_ISAR5_SEVL_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_mmfr4[] = {
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 4, 4, 0),		/* ac2 */
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 4, 4, 0),	/* ac2 */
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_pfr0[] = {
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 12, 4, 0),	/* State3 */
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 8, 4, 0),		/* State2 */
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 4, 4, 0),		/* State1 */
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 0, 4, 0),		/* State0 */
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 12, 4, 0),		/* State3 */
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 8, 4, 0),		/* State2 */
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 4, 4, 0),		/* State1 */
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 0, 4, 0),		/* State0 */
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
 
author maintainer
#48 lore raw

PATCH 38/119 arm64: Expose support for optional ARMv8-A features

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f5e035f8694c3bdddc66ea46ecda965ee6853718 ]

ARMv8-A adds a few optional features for ARMv8.2 and ARMv8.3. Expose them to the userspace via HWCAPs and mrs emulation.

SHA2-512 - Instruction support for SHA512 Hash algorithm (e.g SHA512H,

	    SHA512H2, SHA512U0, SHA512SU1)

SHA3 - SHA3 crypto instructions (EOR3, RAX1, XAR, BCAX).
SM3 - Instruction support for Chinese cryptography algorithm SM3
SM4 - Instruction support for Chinese cryptography algorithm SM4
DP - Dot Product instructions (UDOT, SDOT).

---
 Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.txt |   12 +++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h               |    4 ++++
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h           |    5 +++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                |    9 +++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c                   |    5 +++++
 5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.txt +11 -1
@@ -110,10 +110,20 @@ infrastructure:
      x--------------------------------------------------x
      | Name                         |  bits   | visible |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
-     | RES0                         | [63-32] |    n    |
+     | RES0                         | [63-48] |    n    |
+     |--------------------------------------------------|
+     | DP                           | [47-44] |    y    |
+     |--------------------------------------------------|
+     | SM4                          | [43-40] |    y    |
+     |--------------------------------------------------|
+     | SM3                          | [39-36] |    y    |
+     |--------------------------------------------------|
+     | SHA3                         | [35-32] |    y    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
      | RDM                          | [31-28] |    y    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
+     | RES0                         | [27-24] |    n    |
+     |--------------------------------------------------|
      | ATOMICS                      | [23-20] |    y    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
      | CRC32                        | [19-16] |    y    |
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +4 -0
@@ -375,6 +375,10 @@
 #define SCTLR_EL1_BUILD_BUG_ON_MISSING_BITS	BUILD_BUG_ON((SCTLR_EL1_SET ^ SCTLR_EL1_CLEAR) != ~0)
 
 /* id_aa64isar0 */
+#define ID_AA64ISAR0_DP_SHIFT		44
+#define ID_AA64ISAR0_SM4_SHIFT		40
+#define ID_AA64ISAR0_SM3_SHIFT		36
+#define ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA3_SHIFT		32
 #define ID_AA64ISAR0_RDM_SHIFT		28
 #define ID_AA64ISAR0_ATOMICS_SHIFT	20
 #define ID_AA64ISAR0_CRC32_SHIFT	16
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h +5 -0
@@ -37,5 +37,10 @@
 #define HWCAP_FCMA		(1 << 14)
 #define HWCAP_LRCPC		(1 << 15)
 #define HWCAP_DCPOP		(1 << 16)
+#define HWCAP_SHA3		(1 << 17)
+#define HWCAP_SM3		(1 << 18)
+#define HWCAP_SM4		(1 << 19)
+#define HWCAP_ASIMDDP		(1 << 20)
+#define HWCAP_SHA512		(1 << 21)
 
 #endif /* _UAPI__ASM_HWCAP_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +9 -0
@@ -107,6 +107,10 @@ cpufeature_pan_not_uao(const struct arm6
  * sync with the documentation of the CPU feature register ABI.
  */
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar0[] = {
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR0_DP_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM4_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR0_RDM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_ATOMICS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_CRC32_SHIFT, 4, 0),
@@ -1040,9 +1044,14 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_AES_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_AES),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA1_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SHA1),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA2_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SHA2),
+	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA2_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 2, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SHA512),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_CRC32_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_CRC32),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_ATOMICS_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 2, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ATOMICS),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_RDM_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ASIMDRDM),
+	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA3_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SHA3),
+	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM3_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SM3),
+	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM4_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SM4),
+	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_DP_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ASIMDDP),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 0, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_FP),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_FPHP),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 0, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ASIMD),
arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c +5 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,11 @@ static const char *const hwcap_str[] = {
 	"fcma",
 	"lrcpc",
 	"dcpop",
+	"sha3",
+	"sm3",
+	"sm4",
+	"asimddp",
+	"sha512",
 	NULL
 };
 
author maintainer
#50 lore raw

PATCH 40/119 arm64: v8.4: Support for new floating point multiplication instructions

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dongjiu Geng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3b3b681097fae73b7f5dcdd42db6cfdf32943d4c ]

ARM v8.4 extensions add new neon instructions for performing a multiplication of each FP16 element of one vector with the corresponding FP16 element of a second vector, and to add or subtract this without an intermediate rounding to the corresponding FP32 element in a third vector.

This patch detects this feature and let the userspace know about it via a HWCAP bit and MRS emulation.

---
 Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.txt |    4 +++-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h               |    1 +
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h           |    2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                |    2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c                   |    2 ++
 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.txt +3 -1
@@ -110,7 +110,9 @@ infrastructure:
      x--------------------------------------------------x
      | Name                         |  bits   | visible |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
-     | RES0                         | [63-48] |    n    |
+     | RES0                         | [63-52] |    n    |
+     |--------------------------------------------------|
+     | FHM                          | [51-48] |    y    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
      | DP                           | [47-44] |    y    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +1 -0
@@ -375,6 +375,7 @@
 #define SCTLR_EL1_BUILD_BUG_ON_MISSING_BITS	BUILD_BUG_ON((SCTLR_EL1_SET ^ SCTLR_EL1_CLEAR) != ~0)
 
 /* id_aa64isar0 */
+#define ID_AA64ISAR0_FHM_SHIFT		48
 #define ID_AA64ISAR0_DP_SHIFT		44
 #define ID_AA64ISAR0_SM4_SHIFT		40
 #define ID_AA64ISAR0_SM3_SHIFT		36
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h +2 -0
@@ -42,5 +42,7 @@
 #define HWCAP_SM4		(1 << 19)
 #define HWCAP_ASIMDDP		(1 << 20)
 #define HWCAP_SHA512		(1 << 21)
+#define HWCAP_SVE		(1 << 22)
+#define HWCAP_ASIMDFHM		(1 << 23)
 
 #endif /* _UAPI__ASM_HWCAP_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +2 -0
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ cpufeature_pan_not_uao(const struct arm6
  * sync with the documentation of the CPU feature register ABI.
  */
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar0[] = {
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_FHM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_DP_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM4_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
@@ -1052,6 +1053,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM3_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SM3),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM4_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SM4),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_DP_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ASIMDDP),
+	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_FHM_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ASIMDFHM),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 0, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_FP),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_FPHP),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 0, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ASIMD),
arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c +2 -0
@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ static const char *const hwcap_str[] = {
 	"sm4",
 	"asimddp",
 	"sha512",
+	"sve",
+	"asimdfhm",
 	NULL
 };
 
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/119 net: dsa: qca8k: Use up to 7 ports for all operations

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Michal Vokáč <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7ae6d93c8f052b7a77ba56ed0f654e22a2876739 ]

The QCA8K family supports up to 7 ports. So use the existing QCA8K_NUM_PORTS define to allocate the switch structure and limit all operations with the switch ports.

This was not an issue until commit 0394a63acfe2 ("net: dsa: enable and disable all ports") disabled all unused ports. Since the unused ports 7-11 are outside of the correct register range on this switch some registers were rewritten with invalid content.

Fixes 6b93fb46480a ("net-next: dsa: add new driver for qca8xxx family")
Fixes a0c02161ecfc ("net: dsa: variable number of ports")
Fixes 0394a63acfe2 ("net: dsa: enable and disable all ports")
---
 drivers/net/dsa/qca8k.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/dsa/qca8k.c +2 -2
index c3c9d7e33bd6c..8e49974ffa0ed 100644
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ qca8k_setup(struct dsa_switch *ds)
 		    BIT(0) << QCA8K_GLOBAL_FW_CTRL1_UC_DP_S);
 
 	/* Setup connection between CPU port & user ports */
-	for (i = 0; i < DSA_MAX_PORTS; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < QCA8K_NUM_PORTS; i++) {
 		/* CPU port gets connected to all user ports of the switch */
 		if (dsa_is_cpu_port(ds, i)) {
 			qca8k_rmw(priv, QCA8K_PORT_LOOKUP_CTRL(QCA8K_CPU_PORT),
@@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ qca8k_sw_probe(struct mdio_device *mdiodev)
 	if (id != QCA8K_ID_QCA8337)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	priv->ds = dsa_switch_alloc(&mdiodev->dev, DSA_MAX_PORTS);
+	priv->ds = dsa_switch_alloc(&mdiodev->dev, QCA8K_NUM_PORTS);
 	if (!priv->ds)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#53 lore raw

PATCH 43/119 arm64: move SCTLR_EL{1,2} assertions to <asm/sysreg.h>

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1c312e84c2d71da4101754fa6118f703f7473e01 ]

Currently we assert that the SCTLR_EL{1,2}_{SET,CLEAR} bits are self-consistent with an assertion in config_sctlr_el1(). This is a bit unusual, since config_sctlr_el1() doesn't make use of these definitions, and is far away from the definitions themselves.

We can use the CPP #error directive to have equivalent assertions in <asm/sysreg.h>, next to the definitions of the set/clear bits, which is a bit clearer and simpler.

At the same time, lets fill in the upper 32 bits for both registers in their respective RES0 definitions. This could be a little nicer with GENMASK_ULL(63, 32), but this currently lives in <linux/bitops.h>, which cannot safely be included from assembly, as <asm/sysreg.h> can.

Note the when the preprocessor evaluates an expression for an #if directive, all signed or unsigned values are treated as intmax_t or uintmax_t respectively. To avoid ambiguity, we define explicitly define the mask of all 64 bits.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h |   20 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +10 -10
@@ -315,7 +315,8 @@
 #define SCTLR_EL2_RES0	((1 << 6)  | (1 << 7)  | (1 << 8)  | (1 << 9)  | \
 			 (1 << 10) | (1 << 13) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 15) | \
 			 (1 << 17) | (1 << 20) | (1 << 21) | (1 << 24) | \
-			 (1 << 26) | (1 << 27) | (1 << 30) | (1 << 31))
+			 (1 << 26) | (1 << 27) | (1 << 30) | (1 << 31) | \
+			 (0xffffffffUL << 32))
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
 #define ENDIAN_SET_EL2		SCTLR_ELx_EE
@@ -331,9 +332,9 @@
 			 SCTLR_ELx_SA     | SCTLR_ELx_I    | SCTLR_ELx_WXN | \
 			 ENDIAN_CLEAR_EL2 | SCTLR_EL2_RES0)
 
-/* Check all the bits are accounted for */
-#define SCTLR_EL2_BUILD_BUG_ON_MISSING_BITS	BUILD_BUG_ON((SCTLR_EL2_SET ^ SCTLR_EL2_CLEAR) != ~0)
-
+#if (SCTLR_EL2_SET ^ SCTLR_EL2_CLEAR) != 0xffffffffffffffff
+#error "Inconsistent SCTLR_EL2 set/clear bits"
+#endif
 
 /* SCTLR_EL1 specific flags. */
 #define SCTLR_EL1_UCI		(1 << 26)
@@ -352,7 +353,8 @@
 #define SCTLR_EL1_RES1	((1 << 11) | (1 << 20) | (1 << 22) | (1 << 28) | \
 			 (1 << 29))
 #define SCTLR_EL1_RES0  ((1 << 6)  | (1 << 10) | (1 << 13) | (1 << 17) | \
-			 (1 << 21) | (1 << 27) | (1 << 30) | (1 << 31))
+			 (1 << 21) | (1 << 27) | (1 << 30) | (1 << 31) | \
+			 (0xffffffffUL << 32))
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
 #define ENDIAN_SET_EL1		(SCTLR_EL1_E0E | SCTLR_ELx_EE)
@@ -371,8 +373,9 @@
 			 SCTLR_EL1_UMA | SCTLR_ELx_WXN     | ENDIAN_CLEAR_EL1 |\
 			 SCTLR_EL1_RES0)
 
-/* Check all the bits are accounted for */
-#define SCTLR_EL1_BUILD_BUG_ON_MISSING_BITS	BUILD_BUG_ON((SCTLR_EL1_SET ^ SCTLR_EL1_CLEAR) != ~0)
+#if (SCTLR_EL1_SET ^ SCTLR_EL1_CLEAR) != 0xffffffffffffffff
+#error "Inconsistent SCTLR_EL1 set/clear bits"
+#endif
 
 /* id_aa64isar0 */
 #define ID_AA64ISAR0_TS_SHIFT		52
@@ -585,9 +588,6 @@ static inline void config_sctlr_el1(u32
 {
 	u32 val;
 
-	SCTLR_EL2_BUILD_BUG_ON_MISSING_BITS;
-	SCTLR_EL1_BUILD_BUG_ON_MISSING_BITS;
-
 	val = read_sysreg(sctlr_el1);
 	val &= ~clear;
 	val |= set;
author maintainer
#54 lore raw

PATCH 44/119 arm64: add PSR_AA32_* definitions

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 25086263425641c74123f9387426c23072b299ea ]

The AArch32 CPSR/SPSR format is *almost* identical to the AArch64 SPSR_ELx format for exceptions taken from AArch32, but the two have diverged with the addition of DIT, and we need to treat the two as logically distinct.

This patch adds new definitions for the SPSR_ELx format for exceptions taken from AArch32, with a consistent PSR_AA32_ prefix. The existing COMPAT_PSR_ definitions will be used for the PSR format as seen from AArch32.

Definitions of DIT are provided for both, and inline functions are provided to map between the two formats. Note that for SPSR_ELx, the (RES0) J bit has been re-allocated as the DIT bit.

Once users of the COMPAT_PSR definitions have been migrated over to the PSR_AA32 definitions, the (majority of) the former will be removed, so no efforts is made to avoid duplication until then.

Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
Cc Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc Suzuki Poulose <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h |   57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h +56 -1
@@ -35,7 +35,37 @@
 #define COMPAT_PTRACE_GETHBPREGS	29
 #define COMPAT_PTRACE_SETHBPREGS	30
 
-/* AArch32 CPSR bits */
+/* SPSR_ELx bits for exceptions taken from AArch32 */
+#define PSR_AA32_MODE_MASK	0x0000001f
+#define PSR_AA32_MODE_USR	0x00000010
+#define PSR_AA32_MODE_FIQ	0x00000011
+#define PSR_AA32_MODE_IRQ	0x00000012
+#define PSR_AA32_MODE_SVC	0x00000013
+#define PSR_AA32_MODE_ABT	0x00000017
+#define PSR_AA32_MODE_HYP	0x0000001a
+#define PSR_AA32_MODE_UND	0x0000001b
+#define PSR_AA32_MODE_SYS	0x0000001f
+#define PSR_AA32_T_BIT		0x00000020
+#define PSR_AA32_F_BIT		0x00000040
+#define PSR_AA32_I_BIT		0x00000080
+#define PSR_AA32_A_BIT		0x00000100
+#define PSR_AA32_E_BIT		0x00000200
+#define PSR_AA32_DIT_BIT	0x01000000
+#define PSR_AA32_Q_BIT		0x08000000
+#define PSR_AA32_V_BIT		0x10000000
+#define PSR_AA32_C_BIT		0x20000000
+#define PSR_AA32_Z_BIT		0x40000000
+#define PSR_AA32_N_BIT		0x80000000
+#define PSR_AA32_IT_MASK	0x0600fc00	/* If-Then execution state mask */
+#define PSR_AA32_GE_MASK	0x000f0000
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
+#define PSR_AA32_ENDSTATE	PSR_AA32_E_BIT
+#else
+#define PSR_AA32_ENDSTATE	0
+#endif
+
+/* AArch32 CPSR bits, as seen in AArch32 */
 #define COMPAT_PSR_MODE_MASK	0x0000001f
 #define COMPAT_PSR_MODE_USR	0x00000010
 #define COMPAT_PSR_MODE_FIQ	0x00000011
@@ -50,6 +80,7 @@
 #define COMPAT_PSR_I_BIT	0x00000080
 #define COMPAT_PSR_A_BIT	0x00000100
 #define COMPAT_PSR_E_BIT	0x00000200
+#define COMPAT_PSR_DIT_BIT	0x00200000
 #define COMPAT_PSR_J_BIT	0x01000000
 #define COMPAT_PSR_Q_BIT	0x08000000
 #define COMPAT_PSR_V_BIT	0x10000000
@@ -111,6 +142,30 @@
 #define compat_sp_fiq	regs[29]
 #define compat_lr_fiq	regs[30]
 
+static inline unsigned long compat_psr_to_pstate(const unsigned long psr)
+{
+	unsigned long pstate;
+
+	pstate = psr & ~COMPAT_PSR_DIT_BIT;
+
+	if (psr & COMPAT_PSR_DIT_BIT)
+		pstate |= PSR_AA32_DIT_BIT;
+
+	return pstate;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long pstate_to_compat_psr(const unsigned long pstate)
+{
+	unsigned long psr;
+
+	psr = pstate & ~PSR_AA32_DIT_BIT;
+
+	if (pstate & PSR_AA32_DIT_BIT)
+		psr |= COMPAT_PSR_DIT_BIT;
+
+	return psr;
+}
+
 /*
  * This struct defines the way the registers are stored on the stack during an
  * exception. Note that sizeof(struct pt_regs) has to be a multiple of 16 (for
author maintainer
#55 lore raw

PATCH 45/119 arm64: Introduce sysreg_clear_set()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6ebdf4db8fa564a150f46d32178af0873eb5abbb ]

Currently we have a couple of helpers to manipulate bits in particular sysregs:

* config_sctlr_el1(u32 clear, u32 set)

* change_cpacr(u64 val, u64 mask)

The parameters of these differ in naming convention, order, and size, which is unfortunate. They also differ slightly in behaviour, as change_cpacr() skips the sysreg write if the bits are unchanged, which is a useful optimization when sysreg writes are expensive.

Before we gain yet another sysreg manipulation function, let's unify these with a common helper, providing a consistent order for clear/set operands, and the write skipping behaviour from change_cpacr(). Code will be migrated to the new helper in subsequent patches.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +11 -0
@@ -584,6 +584,17 @@ asm(
 	asm volatile("msr_s " __stringify(r) ", %x0" : : "rZ" (__val));	\
 } while (0)
 
+/*
+ * Modify bits in a sysreg. Bits in the clear mask are zeroed, then bits in the
+ * set mask are set. Other bits are left as-is.
+ */
+#define sysreg_clear_set(sysreg, clear, set) do {			\
+	u64 __scs_val = read_sysreg(sysreg);				\
+	u64 __scs_new = (__scs_val & ~(u64)(clear)) | (set);		\
+	if (__scs_new != __scs_val)					\
+		write_sysreg(__scs_new, sysreg);			\
+} while (0)
+
 static inline void config_sctlr_el1(u32 clear, u32 set)
 {
 	u32 val;
author maintainer
#57 lore raw

PATCH 47/119 arm64: capabilities: Move errata work around check on boot CPU

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5e91107b06811f0ca147cebbedce53626c9c4443 ]

We trigger CPU errata work around check on the boot CPU from smp_prepare_boot_cpu() to make sure that we run the checks only after the CPU feature infrastructure is initialised. While this is correct, we can also do this from init_cpu_features() which initilises the infrastructure, and is called only on the Boot CPU. This helps to consolidate the CPU capability handling to cpufeature.c. No functional changes.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c |    5 +++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c        |    6 ------
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +5 -0
@@ -521,6 +521,11 @@ void __init init_cpu_features(struct cpu
 		init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_MVFR2_EL1, info->reg_mvfr2);
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Run the errata work around checks on the boot CPU, once we have
+	 * initialised the cpu feature infrastructure.
+	 */
+	update_cpu_errata_workarounds();
 }
 
 static void update_cpu_ftr_reg(struct arm64_ftr_reg *reg, u64 new)
arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c +0 -6
@@ -449,12 +449,6 @@ void __init smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
 	jump_label_init();
 	cpuinfo_store_boot_cpu();
 	save_boot_cpu_run_el();
-	/*
-	 * Run the errata work around checks on the boot CPU, once we have
-	 * initialised the cpu feature infrastructure from
-	 * cpuinfo_store_boot_cpu() above.
-	 */
-	update_cpu_errata_workarounds();
 }
 
 static u64 __init of_get_cpu_mpidr(struct device_node *dn)
author maintainer
#58 lore raw

PATCH 48/119 arm64: capabilities: Move errata processing code

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1e89baed5d50d2b8d9fd420830902570270703f1 ]

We have errata work around processing code in cpu_errata.c, which calls back into helpers defined in cpufeature.c. Now that we are going to make the handling of capabilities generic, by adding the information to each capability, move the errata work around specific processing code. No functional changes.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |    7 -----
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c      |   33 ---------------------------
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c      |   43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +0 -7
@@ -230,15 +230,8 @@ static inline bool id_aa64pfr0_32bit_el0
 }
 
 void __init setup_cpu_features(void);
-
-void update_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps,
-			    const char *info);
-void enable_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps);
 void check_local_cpu_capabilities(void);
 
-void update_cpu_errata_workarounds(void);
-void __init enable_errata_workarounds(void);
-void verify_local_cpu_errata_workarounds(void);
 
 u64 read_sanitised_ftr_reg(u32 id);
 
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +0 -33
@@ -621,36 +621,3 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 	{
 	}
 };
-
-/*
- * The CPU Errata work arounds are detected and applied at boot time
- * and the related information is freed soon after. If the new CPU requires
- * an errata not detected at boot, fail this CPU.
- */
-void verify_local_cpu_errata_workarounds(void)
-{
-	const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps = arm64_errata;
-
-	for (; caps->matches; caps++) {
-		if (cpus_have_cap(caps->capability)) {
-			if (caps->cpu_enable)
-				caps->cpu_enable(caps);
-		} else if (caps->matches(caps, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
-			pr_crit("CPU%d: Requires work around for %s, not detected"
-					" at boot time\n",
-				smp_processor_id(),
-				caps->desc ? : "an erratum");
-			cpu_die_early();
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-void update_cpu_errata_workarounds(void)
-{
-	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, "enabling workaround for");
-}
-
-void __init enable_errata_workarounds(void)
-{
-	enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata);
-}
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +40 -3

67 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/119 MIPS: dts: ar9331: fix interrupt-controller size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0889d07f3e4b171c453b2aaf2b257f9074cdf624 ]

It is two registers each of 4 byte.

---
 arch/mips/boot/dts/qca/ar9331.dtsi | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/mips/boot/dts/qca/ar9331.dtsi +1 -1
index efd5f07222060..39b6269610d41 100644
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@
 
 			miscintc: interrupt-controller@18060010 {
 				compatible = "qca,ar7240-misc-intc";
-				reg = <0x18060010 0x4>;
+				reg = <0x18060010 0x8>;
 
 				interrupt-parent = <&cpuintc>;
 				interrupts = <6>;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/119 xen/efi: Set nonblocking callbacks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ross Lagerwall <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit df359f0d09dc029829b66322707a2f558cb720f7 ]

Other parts of the kernel expect these nonblocking EFI callbacks to exist and crash when running under Xen. Since the implementations of xen_efi_set_variable() and xen_efi_query_variable_info() do not take any locks, use them for the nonblocking callbacks too.

---
 arch/arm/xen/efi.c | 2 ++
 arch/x86/xen/efi.c | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/arm/xen/efi.c +2 -0
index b4d78959cadf0..bc9a37b3cecd6 100644
@@ -31,7 +31,9 @@ void __init xen_efi_runtime_setup(void)
 	efi.get_variable             = xen_efi_get_variable;
 	efi.get_next_variable        = xen_efi_get_next_variable;
 	efi.set_variable             = xen_efi_set_variable;
+	efi.set_variable_nonblocking = xen_efi_set_variable;
 	efi.query_variable_info      = xen_efi_query_variable_info;
+	efi.query_variable_info_nonblocking = xen_efi_query_variable_info;
 	efi.update_capsule           = xen_efi_update_capsule;
 	efi.query_capsule_caps       = xen_efi_query_capsule_caps;
 	efi.get_next_high_mono_count = xen_efi_get_next_high_mono_count;
arch/x86/xen/efi.c +2 -0
index a18703be9ead9..4769a069d5bd8 100644
@@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ static efi_system_table_t __init *xen_efi_probe(void)
 	efi.get_variable             = xen_efi_get_variable;
 	efi.get_next_variable        = xen_efi_get_next_variable;
 	efi.set_variable             = xen_efi_set_variable;
+	efi.set_variable_nonblocking = xen_efi_set_variable;
 	efi.query_variable_info      = xen_efi_query_variable_info;
+	efi.query_variable_info_nonblocking = xen_efi_query_variable_info;
 	efi.update_capsule           = xen_efi_update_capsule;
 	efi.query_capsule_caps       = xen_efi_query_capsule_caps;
 	efi.get_next_high_mono_count = xen_efi_get_next_high_mono_count;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/119 mac80211: fix txq null pointer dereference

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Miaoqing Pan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ed31a264065ae92058ce54aa3cc8da8d81dc6d7 ]

If the interface type is P2P_DEVICE or NAN, read the file of '/sys/kernel/debug/ieee80211/phyx/netdev:wlanx/aqm' will get a NULL pointer dereference. As for those interface type, the pointer sdata->vif.txq is NULL.

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000011
CPU: 1 PID: 30936 Comm: cat Not tainted 4.14.104 #1

task: ffffffc0337e4880 task.stack: ffffff800cd20000 PC is at ieee80211_if_fmt_aqm+0x34/0xa0 [mac80211] LR is at ieee80211_if_fmt_aqm+0x34/0xa0 [mac80211] [...]
Process cat (pid: 30936, stack limit = 0xffffff800cd20000) [...]

[<ffffff8000b7cd00>] ieee80211_if_fmt_aqm+0x34/0xa0 [mac80211]
[<ffffff8000b7c414>] ieee80211_if_read+0x60/0xbc [mac80211]
[<ffffff8000b7ccc4>] ieee80211_if_read_aqm+0x28/0x30 [mac80211]
[<ffffff80082eff94>] full_proxy_read+0x2c/0x48
[<ffffff80081eef00>] __vfs_read+0x2c/0xd4
[<ffffff80081ef084>] vfs_read+0x8c/0x108
[<ffffff80081ef494>] SyS_read+0x40/0x7c
---
 net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c +9 -2
index c813207bb1236..928b6b0464b82 100644
@@ -490,9 +490,14 @@ static ssize_t ieee80211_if_fmt_aqm(
 	const struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, char *buf, int buflen)
 {
 	struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
-	struct txq_info *txqi = to_txq_info(sdata->vif.txq);
+	struct txq_info *txqi;
 	int len;
 
+	if (!sdata->vif.txq)
+		return 0;
+
+	txqi = to_txq_info(sdata->vif.txq);
+
 	spin_lock_bh(&local->fq.lock);
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
@@ -659,7 +664,9 @@ static void add_common_files(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
 	DEBUGFS_ADD(rc_rateidx_vht_mcs_mask_5ghz);
 	DEBUGFS_ADD(hw_queues);
 
-	if (sdata->local->ops->wake_tx_queue)
+	if (sdata->local->ops->wake_tx_queue &&
+	    sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_DEVICE &&
+	    sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_NAN)
 		DEBUGFS_ADD(aqm);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/119 scsi: qla2xxx: Fix unbound sleep in fcport delete path.

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Quinn Tran <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c3b6a1d397420a0fdd97af2f06abfb78adc370df ]

There are instances, though rare, where a LOGO request cannot be sent out and the thread in free session done can wait indefinitely. Fix this by putting an upper bound to sleep.

---
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_target.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_target.c +4 -0
index 87e04c4a49821..11753ed3433ca 100644
@@ -996,6 +996,7 @@ static void qlt_free_session_done(struct work_struct *work)
 
 	if (logout_started) {
 		bool traced = false;
+		u16 cnt = 0;
 
 		while (!ACCESS_ONCE(sess->logout_completed)) {
 			if (!traced) {
@@ -1005,6 +1006,9 @@ static void qlt_free_session_done(struct work_struct *work)
 				traced = true;
 			}
 			msleep(100);
+			cnt++;
+			if (cnt > 200)
+				break;
 		}
 
 		ql_dbg(ql_dbg_disc, vha, 0xf087,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#60 lore raw

PATCH 50/119 arm64: capabilities: Add flags to handle the conflicts on late CPU

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5b4747c5dce7a873e1e7fe1608835825f714267a ]

When a CPU is brought up, it is checked against the caps that are known to be enabled on the system (via verify_local_cpu_capabilities()). Based on the state of the capability on the CPU vs. that of System we could have the following combinations of conflict.

	x-----------------------------x
	| Type  | System   | Late CPU |
	|-----------------------------|
	|  a    |   y      |    n     |
	|-----------------------------|
	|  b    |   n      |    y     |
	x-----------------------------x

Case (a) is not permitted for caps which are system features, which the system expects all the CPUs to have (e.g VHE). While (a) is ignored for all errata work arounds. However, there could be exceptions to the plain filtering approach. e.g, KPTI is an optional feature for a late CPU as long as the system already enables it.

Case (b) is not permitted for errata work arounds that cannot be activated after the kernel has finished booting.And we ignore (b) for features. Here, yet again, KPTI is an exception, where if a late CPU needs KPTI we are too late to enable it (because we change the allocation of ASIDs etc).

Add two different flags to indicate how the conflict should be handled.

ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU - CPUs may have the capability ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU - CPUs may not have the cappability.

Now that we have the flags to describe the behavior of the errata and the features, as we treat them, define types for ERRATUM and FEATURE.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |   68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c      |   12 +++---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c      |   26 ++++++-------
 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +68 -0
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_re
  *    an action, based on the severity (e.g, a CPU could be prevented from
  *    booting or cause a kernel panic). The CPU is allowed to "affect" the
  *    state of the capability, if it has not been finalised already.
+ *    See section 5 for more details on conflicts.
  *
  * 4) Action: As mentioned in (2), the kernel can take an action for each
  *    detected capability, on all CPUs on the system. Appropriate actions
@@ -166,6 +167,34 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_re
  *
  *	  check_local_cpu_capabilities() -> verify_local_cpu_capabilities()
  *
+ * 5) Conflicts: Based on the state of the capability on a late CPU vs.
+ *    the system state, we could have the following combinations :
+ *
+ *		x-----------------------------x
+ *		| Type  | System   | Late CPU |
+ *		|-----------------------------|
+ *		|  a    |   y      |    n     |
+ *		|-----------------------------|
+ *		|  b    |   n      |    y     |
+ *		x-----------------------------x
+ *
+ *     Two separate flag bits are defined to indicate whether each kind of
+ *     conflict can be allowed:
+ *		ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU - Case(a) is allowed
+ *		ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU - Case(b) is allowed
+ *
+ *     Case (a) is not permitted for a capability that the system requires
+ *     all CPUs to have in order for the capability to be enabled. This is
+ *     typical for capabilities that represent enhanced functionality.
+ *
+ *     Case (b) is not permitted for a capability that must be enabled
+ *     during boot if any CPU in the system requires it in order to run
+ *     safely. This is typical for erratum work arounds that cannot be
+ *     enabled after the corresponding capability is finalised.
+ *
+ *     In some non-typical cases either both (a) and (b), or neither,
+ *     should be permitted. This can be described by including neither
+ *     or both flags in the capability's type field.
  */
 
 
@@ -179,6 +208,33 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_re
 #define SCOPE_SYSTEM				ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM
 #define SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU				ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU
 
+/*
+ * Is it permitted for a late CPU to have this capability when system
+ * hasn't already enabled it ?
+ */
+#define ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU	((u16)BIT(4))
+/* Is it safe for a late CPU to miss this capability when system has it */
+#define ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU	((u16)BIT(5))
+
+/*
+ * CPU errata workarounds that need to be enabled at boot time if one or
+ * more CPUs in the system requires it. When one of these capabilities
+ * has been enabled, it is safe to allow any CPU to boot that doesn't
+ * require the workaround. However, it is not safe if a "late" CPU
+ * requires a workaround and the system hasn't enabled it already.
+ */
+#define ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM		\
+	(ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU | ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU)
+/*
+ * CPU feature detected at boot time based on system-wide value of a
+ * feature. It is safe for a late CPU to have this feature even though
+ * the system hasn't enabled it, although the featuer will not be used
+ * by Linux in this case. If the system has enabled this feature already,
+ * then every late CPU must have it.
+ */
+#define ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE	\
+	(ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM | ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU)
+
 struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {
 	const char *desc;
 	u16 capability;
@@ -212,6 +268,18 @@ static inline int cpucap_default_scope(c
 	return cap->type & ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_MASK;
 }
 
+static inline bool
+cpucap_late_cpu_optional(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap)
+{
+	return !!(cap->type & ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU);
+}
+
+static inline bool
+cpucap_late_cpu_permitted(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap)
+{
+	return !!(cap->type & ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU);
+}
+
 extern DECLARE_BITMAP(cpu_hwcaps, ARM64_NCAPS);
 extern struct static_key_false cpu_hwcap_keys[ARM64_NCAPS];
 extern struct static_key_false arm64_const_caps_ready;
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +6 -6
@@ -406,14 +406,14 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
 #endif	/* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
 
 #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \
-	.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, \
+	.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, \
 	.matches = is_affected_midr_range, \
 	.midr_model = model, \
 	.midr_range_min = min, \
 	.midr_range_max = max
 
 #define MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(model) \
-	.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, \
+	.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, \
 	.matches = is_affected_midr_range, \
 	.midr_model = model, \
 	.midr_range_min = 0, \
@@ -517,14 +517,14 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 		.desc = "Mismatched cache line size",
 		.capability = ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_LINE_SIZE,
 		.matches = has_mismatched_cache_type,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
 		.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access,
 	},
 	{
 		.desc = "Mismatched cache type",
 		.capability = ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_TYPE,
 		.matches = has_mismatched_cache_type,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
 		.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access,
 	},
 #ifdef CONFIG_QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_1003
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 	{
 		.desc = "Qualcomm Technologies Kryo erratum 1003",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
 		.midr_model = MIDR_QCOM_KRYO,
 		.matches = is_kryo_midr,
 	},
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
 	{
 		.desc = "Speculative Store Bypass Disable",
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
 		.capability = ARM64_SSBD,
 		.matches = has_ssbd_mitigation,
 	},
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +13 -13
@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		.desc = "GIC system register CPU interface",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_SYSREG_GIC_CPUIF,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
 		.matches = has_useable_gicv3_cpuif,
 		.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1,
 		.field_pos = ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT,
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		.desc = "Privileged Access Never",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_PAN,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
 		.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
 		.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1,
 		.field_pos = ID_AA64MMFR1_PAN_SHIFT,
@@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		.desc = "LSE atomic instructions",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_LSE_ATOMICS,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
 		.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
 		.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1,
 		.field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR0_ATOMICS_SHIFT,
@@ -959,14 +959,14 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		.desc = "Software prefetching using PRFM",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_NO_HW_PREFETCH,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
 		.matches = has_no_hw_prefetch,
 	},
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_UAO
 	{
 		.desc = "User Access Override",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_UAO,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
 		.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
 		.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1,
 		.field_pos = ID_AA64MMFR2_UAO_SHIFT,
@@ -980,21 +980,21 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PAN
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_ALT_PAN_NOT_UAO,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
 		.matches = cpufeature_pan_not_uao,
 	},
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PAN */
 	{
 		.desc = "Virtualization Host Extensions",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
 		.matches = runs_at_el2,
 		.cpu_enable = cpu_copy_el2regs,
 	},
 	{
 		.desc = "32-bit EL0 Support",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
 		.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
 		.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1,
 		.sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
@@ -1004,14 +1004,14 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		.desc = "Reduced HYP mapping offset",
 		.capability = ARM64_HYP_OFFSET_LOW,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
 		.matches = hyp_offset_low,
 	},
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 	{
 		.desc = "Kernel page table isolation (KPTI)",
 		.capability = ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
 		.matches = unmap_kernel_at_el0,
 		.cpu_enable = kpti_install_ng_mappings,
 	},
@@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		/* FP/SIMD is not implemented */
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_NO_FPSIMD,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
 		.min_field_value = 0,
 		.matches = has_no_fpsimd,
 	},
@@ -1027,7 +1027,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		.desc = "Data cache clean to Point of Persistence",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_DCPOP,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
 		.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
 		.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1,
 		.field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT,
@@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 #define HWCAP_CAP(reg, field, s, min_value, cap_type, cap)	\
 	{							\
 		.desc = #cap,					\
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,		\
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,		\
 		.matches = has_cpuid_feature,			\
 		.sys_reg = reg,					\
 		.field_pos = field,				\
author maintainer
#69 lore raw

PATCH 59/119 arm64: capabilities: Add support for features enabled early

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fd9d63da17daf09c0099e3d5e3f0c0f03d9b251b ]

The kernel detects and uses some of the features based on the boot CPU and expects that all the following CPUs conform to it. e.g, with VHE and the boot CPU running at EL2, the kernel decides to keep the kernel running at EL2. If another CPU is brought up without this capability, we use custom hooks (via check_early_cpu_features()) to handle it. To handle such capabilities add support for detecting and enabling capabilities based on the boot CPU.

A bit is added to indicate if the capability should be detected early on the boot CPU. The infrastructure then ensures that such capabilities are probed and "enabled" early on in the boot CPU and, enabled on the subsequent CPUs.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |   48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c      |   57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 2 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +39 -9
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_re
  *    value of a field in CPU ID feature register or checking the cpu
  *    model. The capability provides a call back ( @matches() ) to
  *    perform the check. Scope defines how the checks should be performed.
- *    There are two cases:
+ *    There are three cases:
  *
  *     a) SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU: check all the CPUs and "detect" if at least one
  *        matches. This implies, we have to run the check on all the
@@ -117,6 +117,11 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_re
  *        capability relies on a field in one of the CPU ID feature
  *        registers, we use the sanitised value of the register from the
  *        CPU feature infrastructure to make the decision.
+ *		Or
+ *     c) SCOPE_BOOT_CPU: Check only on the primary boot CPU to detect the
+ *        feature. This category is for features that are "finalised"
+ *        (or used) by the kernel very early even before the SMP cpus
+ *        are brought up.
  *
  *    The process of detection is usually denoted by "update" capability
  *    state in the code.
@@ -136,6 +141,11 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_re
  *    CPUs are treated "late CPUs" for capabilities determined by the boot
  *    CPU.
  *
+ *    At the moment there are two passes of finalising the capabilities.
+ *      a) Boot CPU scope capabilities - Finalised by primary boot CPU via
+ *         setup_boot_cpu_capabilities().
+ *      b) Everything except (a) - Run via setup_system_capabilities().
+ *
  * 3) Verification: When a CPU is brought online (e.g, by user or by the
  *    kernel), the kernel should make sure that it is safe to use the CPU,
  *    by verifying that the CPU is compliant with the state of the
@@ -144,12 +154,21 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_re
  *	secondary_start_kernel()-> check_local_cpu_capabilities()
  *
  *    As explained in (2) above, capabilities could be finalised at
- *    different points in the execution. Each CPU is verified against the
- *    "finalised" capabilities and if there is a conflict, the kernel takes
- *    an action, based on the severity (e.g, a CPU could be prevented from
- *    booting or cause a kernel panic). The CPU is allowed to "affect" the
- *    state of the capability, if it has not been finalised already.
- *    See section 5 for more details on conflicts.
+ *    different points in the execution. Each newly booted CPU is verified
+ *    against the capabilities that have been finalised by the time it
+ *    boots.
+ *
+ *	a) SCOPE_BOOT_CPU : All CPUs are verified against the capability
+ *	except for the primary boot CPU.
+ *
+ *	b) SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, SCOPE_SYSTEM: All CPUs hotplugged on by the
+ *	user after the kernel boot are verified against the capability.
+ *
+ *    If there is a conflict, the kernel takes an action, based on the
+ *    severity (e.g, a CPU could be prevented from booting or cause a
+ *    kernel panic). The CPU is allowed to "affect" the state of the
+ *    capability, if it has not been finalised already. See section 5
+ *    for more details on conflicts.
  *
  * 4) Action: As mentioned in (2), the kernel can take an action for each
  *    detected capability, on all CPUs on the system. Appropriate actions
@@ -198,15 +217,26 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_re
  */
 
 
-/* Decide how the capability is detected. On a local CPU vs System wide */
+/*
+ * Decide how the capability is detected.
+ * On any local CPU vs System wide vs the primary boot CPU
+ */
 #define ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU		((u16)BIT(0))
 #define ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM		((u16)BIT(1))
+/*
+ * The capabilitiy is detected on the Boot CPU and is used by kernel
+ * during early boot. i.e, the capability should be "detected" and
+ * "enabled" as early as possibly on all booting CPUs.
+ */
+#define ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU		((u16)BIT(2))
 #define ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_MASK			\
 	(ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM	|	\
-	 ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
+	 ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU	|	\
+	 ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU)
 
 #define SCOPE_SYSTEM				ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM
 #define SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU				ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU
+#define SCOPE_BOOT_CPU				ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU
 #define SCOPE_ALL				ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_MASK
 
 /*
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +44 -13

103 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#70 lore raw

PATCH 60/119 arm64: capabilities: Change scope of VHE to Boot CPU feature

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 830dcc9f9a7cd26a812522a26efaacf7df6fc365 ]

We expect all CPUs to be running at the same EL inside the kernel with or without VHE enabled and we have strict checks to ensure that any mismatch triggers a kernel panic. If VHE is enabled, we use the feature based on the boot CPU and all other CPUs should follow. This makes it a perfect candidate for a capability based on the boot CPU, which should be matched by all the CPUs (both when is ON and OFF). This saves us some not-so-pretty hooks and special code, just for verifying the conflict.

The patch also makes the VHE capability entry depend on CONFIG_ARM64_VHE.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |    6 +++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/virt.h       |    6 -----
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c      |    5 ++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c             |   38 ------------------------------------
 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +6 -0
@@ -283,6 +283,12 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_re
 	(ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU		|	\
 	 ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU)
 
+/*
+ * CPU feature used early in the boot based on the boot CPU. All secondary
+ * CPUs must match the state of the capability as detected by the boot CPU.
+ */
+#define ARM64_CPUCAP_STRICT_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU
+
 struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {
 	const char *desc;
 	u16 capability;
arch/arm64/include/asm/virt.h +0 -6
@@ -102,12 +102,6 @@ static inline bool has_vhe(void)
 	return false;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_VHE
-extern void verify_cpu_run_el(void);
-#else
-static inline void verify_cpu_run_el(void) {}
-#endif
-
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif /* ! __ASM__VIRT_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +3 -2
@@ -982,13 +982,15 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 		.matches = cpufeature_pan_not_uao,
 	},
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PAN */
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_VHE
 	{
 		.desc = "Virtualization Host Extensions",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_STRICT_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE,
 		.matches = runs_at_el2,
 		.cpu_enable = cpu_copy_el2regs,
 	},
+#endif	/* CONFIG_ARM64_VHE */
 	{
 		.desc = "32-bit EL0 Support",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0,
@@ -1332,7 +1334,6 @@ static bool verify_local_cpu_caps(u16 sc
  */
 static void check_early_cpu_features(void)
 {
-	verify_cpu_run_el();
 	verify_cpu_asid_bits();
 	/*
 	 * Early features are used by the kernel already. If there
arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c +0 -38
@@ -83,43 +83,6 @@ enum ipi_msg_type {
 	IPI_WAKEUP
 };
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_VHE
-
-/* Whether the boot CPU is running in HYP mode or not*/
-static bool boot_cpu_hyp_mode;
-
-static inline void save_boot_cpu_run_el(void)
-{
-	boot_cpu_hyp_mode = is_kernel_in_hyp_mode();
-}
-
-static inline bool is_boot_cpu_in_hyp_mode(void)
-{
-	return boot_cpu_hyp_mode;
-}
-
-/*
- * Verify that a secondary CPU is running the kernel at the same
- * EL as that of the boot CPU.
- */
-void verify_cpu_run_el(void)
-{
-	bool in_el2 = is_kernel_in_hyp_mode();
-	bool boot_cpu_el2 = is_boot_cpu_in_hyp_mode();
-
-	if (in_el2 ^ boot_cpu_el2) {
-		pr_crit("CPU%d: mismatched Exception Level(EL%d) with boot CPU(EL%d)\n",
-					smp_processor_id(),
-					in_el2 ? 2 : 1,
-					boot_cpu_el2 ? 2 : 1);
-		cpu_panic_kernel();
-	}
-}
-
-#else
-static inline void save_boot_cpu_run_el(void) {}
-#endif
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
 static int op_cpu_kill(unsigned int cpu);
 #else
@@ -448,7 +411,6 @@ void __init smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
 	 */
 	jump_label_init();
 	cpuinfo_store_boot_cpu();
-	save_boot_cpu_run_el();
 }
 
 static u64 __init of_get_cpu_mpidr(struct device_node *dn)
author maintainer
#71 lore raw

PATCH 61/119 arm64: capabilities: Clean up midr range helpers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5e7951ce19abf4113645ae789c033917356ee96f ]

We are about to introduce generic MIDR range helpers. Clean up the existing helpers in erratum handling, preparing them to use generic version.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c |  109 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +62 -47
@@ -405,20 +405,38 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
 
-#define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \
-	.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, \
-	.matches = is_affected_midr_range, \
-	.midr_model = model, \
-	.midr_range_min = min, \
-	.midr_range_max = max
-
-#define MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(model) \
-	.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, \
-	.matches = is_affected_midr_range, \
-	.midr_model = model, \
-	.midr_range_min = 0, \
+#define CAP_MIDR_RANGE(model, v_min, r_min, v_max, r_max)	\
+	.matches = is_affected_midr_range,			\
+	.midr_model = model,					\
+	.midr_range_min = MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(v_min, r_min),	\
+	.midr_range_max = MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(v_max, r_max)
+
+#define CAP_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(model)					\
+	.matches = is_affected_midr_range,				\
+	.midr_model = model,						\
+	.midr_range_min = MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0),			\
 	.midr_range_max = (MIDR_VARIANT_MASK | MIDR_REVISION_MASK)
 
+#define MIDR_FIXED(rev, revidr_mask) \
+	.fixed_revs = (struct arm64_midr_revidr[]){{ (rev), (revidr_mask) }, {}}
+
+#define ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(model, v_min, r_min, v_max, r_max)		\
+	.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,				\
+	CAP_MIDR_RANGE(model, v_min, r_min, v_max, r_max)
+
+/* Errata affecting a range of revisions of  given model variant */
+#define ERRATA_MIDR_REV_RANGE(m, var, r_min, r_max)	 \
+	ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(m, var, r_min, var, r_max)
+
+/* Errata affecting a single variant/revision of a model */
+#define ERRATA_MIDR_REV(model, var, rev)	\
+	ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(model, var, rev, var, rev)
+
+/* Errata affecting all variants/revisions of a given a model */
+#define ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(model)				\
+	.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,			\
+	CAP_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(model)
+
 const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
 #if	defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_826319) || \
 	defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_827319) || \
@@ -427,7 +445,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 	/* Cortex-A53 r0p[012] */
 		.desc = "ARM errata 826319, 827319, 824069",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CLEAN_CACHE,
-		MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0x00, 0x02),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0, 0, 2),
 		.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap,
 	},
 #endif
@@ -436,7 +454,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 	/* Cortex-A53 r0p[01] */
 		.desc = "ARM errata 819472",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CLEAN_CACHE,
-		MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0x00, 0x01),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0, 0, 1),
 		.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap,
 	},
 #endif
@@ -445,9 +463,9 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 	/* Cortex-A57 r0p0 - r1p2 */
 		.desc = "ARM erratum 832075",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_DEVICE_LOAD_ACQUIRE,
-		MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A57,
-			   MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0),
-			   MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(1, 2)),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A57,
+				  0, 0,
+				  1, 2),
 	},
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_834220
@@ -455,9 +473,9 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 	/* Cortex-A57 r0p0 - r1p2 */
 		.desc = "ARM erratum 834220",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_834220,
-		MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A57,
-			   MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0),
-			   MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(1, 2)),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A57,
+				  0, 0,
+				  1, 2),
 	},
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_845719
@@ -465,7 +483,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 	/* Cortex-A53 r0p[01234] */
 		.desc = "ARM erratum 845719",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_845719,
-		MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0x00, 0x04),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0, 0, 4),
 	},
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_23154
@@ -473,7 +491,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 	/* Cavium ThunderX, pass 1.x */
 		.desc = "Cavium erratum 23154",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_23154,
-		MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX, 0x00, 0x01),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX, 0, 0, 1),
 	},
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456
@@ -481,15 +499,15 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 	/* Cavium ThunderX, T88 pass 1.x - 2.1 */
 		.desc = "Cavium erratum 27456",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456,
-		MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX,
-			   MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0),
-			   MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(1, 1)),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX,
+				  0, 0,
+				  1, 1),
 	},
 	{
 	/* Cavium ThunderX, T81 pass 1.0 */
 		.desc = "Cavium erratum 27456",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456,
-		MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX, 0x00, 0x00),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_REV(MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX, 0, 0),
 	},
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_30115
@@ -497,20 +515,21 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 	/* Cavium ThunderX, T88 pass 1.x - 2.2 */
 		.desc = "Cavium erratum 30115",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_30115,
-		MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX, 0x00,
-			   (1 << MIDR_VARIANT_SHIFT) | 2),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX,
+				      0, 0,
+				      1, 2),
 	},
 	{
 	/* Cavium ThunderX, T81 pass 1.0 - 1.2 */
 		.desc = "Cavium erratum 30115",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_30115,
-		MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX, 0x00, 0x02),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX, 0, 0, 2),
 	},
 	{
 	/* Cavium ThunderX, T83 pass 1.0 */
 		.desc = "Cavium erratum 30115",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_30115,
-		MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX, 0x00, 0x00),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_REV(MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX, 0, 0),
 	},
 #endif
 	{
@@ -531,9 +550,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 	{
 		.desc = "Qualcomm Technologies Falkor erratum 1003",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003,
-		MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1,
-			   MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0),
-			   MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0)),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_REV(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1, 0, 0),
 	},
 	{
 		.desc = "Qualcomm Technologies Kryo erratum 1003",
@@ -547,9 +564,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 	{
 		.desc = "Qualcomm Technologies Falkor erratum 1009",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,
-		MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1,
-			   MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0),
-			   MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0)),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_REV(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1, 0, 0),
 	},
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_858921
@@ -557,56 +572,56 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 	/* Cortex-A73 all versions */
 		.desc = "ARM erratum 858921",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_858921,
-		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
 	},
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
-		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
 		.cpu_enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1,
 	},
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
-		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
 		.cpu_enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1,
 	},
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
-		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
 		.cpu_enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1,
 	},
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
-		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75),
 		.cpu_enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1,
 	},
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
-		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1),
 		.cpu_enable = qcom_enable_link_stack_sanitization,
 	},
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT,
-		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1),
 	},
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
-		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR),
 		.cpu_enable = qcom_enable_link_stack_sanitization,
 	},
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT,
-		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR),
 	},
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
-		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN),
 		.cpu_enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1,
 	},
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
-		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2),
+		ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2),
 		.cpu_enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1,
 	},
 #endif
author maintainer
#73 lore raw

PATCH 63/119 arm64: Add MIDR encoding for Arm Cortex-A55 and Cortex-A35

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6e616864f21160d8d503523b60a53a29cecc6f24 ]

Update the MIDR encodings for the Cortex-A55 and Cortex-A35

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +4 -0
@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A53		0xD03
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73		0xD09
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75		0xD0A
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A35		0xD04
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A55		0xD05
 
 #define APM_CPU_PART_POTENZA		0x000
 
@@ -108,6 +110,8 @@
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_A72 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72)
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_A73 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73)
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_A75 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75)
+#define MIDR_CORTEX_A35 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A35)
+#define MIDR_CORTEX_A55 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A55)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_83XX)
author maintainer
#74 lore raw

PATCH 64/119 arm64: capabilities: Add support for checks based on a list of MIDRs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit be5b299830c63ed76e0357473c4218c85fb388b3 ]

Add helpers for detecting an errata on list of midr ranges of affected CPUs, with the same work around.

Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
[ardb: add Cortex-A35 to kpti_safe_list[] as well]
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |    1 
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h    |    9 ++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c      |   81 +++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c      |   21 +++++----
 4 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +1 -0
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {
 			struct midr_range midr_range;
 		};
 
+		const struct midr_range *midr_range_list;
 		struct {	/* Feature register checking */
 			u32 sys_reg;
 			u8 field_pos;
arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +9 -0
@@ -159,6 +159,15 @@ static inline bool is_midr_in_range(u32
 				 range->rv_min, range->rv_max);
 }
 
+static inline bool
+is_midr_in_range_list(u32 midr, struct midr_range const *ranges)
+{
+	while (ranges->model)
+		if (is_midr_in_range(midr, ranges++))
+			return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
 /*
  * The CPU ID never changes at run time, so we might as well tell the
  * compiler that it's constant.  Use this function to read the CPU ID
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +44 -37

113 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +12 -9
@@ -826,6 +826,17 @@ static int __kpti_forced; /* 0: not forc
 static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 				int scope)
 {
+	/* List of CPUs that are not vulnerable and don't need KPTI */
+	static const struct midr_range kpti_safe_list[] = {
+		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2),
+		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN),
+		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35),
+		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53),
+		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55),
+		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
+		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
+		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
+	};
 	char const *str = "command line option";
 
 	/*
@@ -850,16 +861,8 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const st
 		return true;
 
 	/* Don't force KPTI for CPUs that are not vulnerable */
-	switch (read_cpuid_id() & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) {
-	case MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2:
-	case MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN:
-	case MIDR_CORTEX_A53:
-	case MIDR_CORTEX_A55:
-	case MIDR_CORTEX_A57:
-	case MIDR_CORTEX_A72:
-	case MIDR_CORTEX_A73:
+	if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list))
 		return false;
-	}
 
 	/* Defer to CPU feature registers */
 	return !has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
author maintainer
#75 lore raw

PATCH 65/119 arm64: KVM: Use SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 for Falkor BP hardening

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shanker Donthineni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4bc352ffb39e4eec253e70f8c076f2f48a6c1926 ]

The function SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 was introduced as part of SMC V1.1 Calling Convention to mitigate CVE-2017-5715. This patch uses the standard call SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 for Falkor chips instead of Silicon provider service ID 0xC2001700.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h |    7 ++---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h |    2 -
 arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S          |    7 -----
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c   |   54 ++++++++++++---------------------------
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S       |   12 --------
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c      |   10 -------
 6 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +3 -4
@@ -42,10 +42,9 @@
 #define ARM64_HAS_DCPOP				21
 #define ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0		23
 #define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR		24
-#define ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT		25
-#define ARM64_SSBD				26
-#define ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_TYPE		27
+#define ARM64_SSBD				25
+#define ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_TYPE		26
 
-#define ARM64_NCAPS				28
+#define ARM64_NCAPS				27
 
 #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +0 -2
@@ -70,8 +70,6 @@ extern u32 __kvm_get_mdcr_el2(void);
 
 extern u32 __init_stage2_translation(void);
 
-extern void __qcom_hyp_sanitize_btac_predictors(void);
-
 /* Home-grown __this_cpu_{ptr,read} variants that always work at HYP */
 #define __hyp_this_cpu_ptr(sym)						\
 	({								\
arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S +0 -7
@@ -55,13 +55,6 @@ ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start)
 	.endr
 ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end)
 
-ENTRY(__qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_start)
-	stp     x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
-	.rept	16
-	bl	. + 4
-	.endr
-	ldp	x29, x30, [sp], #16
-ENTRY(__qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_end)
 
 .macro smccc_workaround_1 inst
 	sub	sp, sp, #(8 * 4)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +17 -37

100 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S +0 -12
@@ -196,15 +196,3 @@ alternative_endif
 
 	eret
 ENDPROC(__fpsimd_guest_restore)
-
-ENTRY(__qcom_hyp_sanitize_btac_predictors)
-	/**
-	 * Call SMC64 with Silicon provider serviceID 23<<8 (0xc2001700)
-	 * 0xC2000000-0xC200FFFF: assigned to SiP Service Calls
-	 * b15-b0: contains SiP functionID
-	 */
-	movz    x0, #0x1700
-	movk    x0, #0xc200, lsl #16
-	smc     #0
-	ret
-ENDPROC(__qcom_hyp_sanitize_btac_predictors)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c +0 -10
@@ -405,16 +405,6 @@ again:
 
 	__set_host_arch_workaround_state(vcpu);
 
-	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT)) {
-		u32 midr = read_cpuid_id();
-
-		/* Apply BTAC predictors mitigation to all Falkor chips */
-		if (((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR) ||
-		    ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1)) {
-			__qcom_hyp_sanitize_btac_predictors();
-		}
-	}
-
 	fp_enabled = __fpsimd_enabled();
 
 	__sysreg_save_guest_state(guest_ctxt);
author maintainer
#77 lore raw

PATCH 67/119 arm64: Get rid of __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_*

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 22765f30dbaf1118c6ff0fcb8b99c9f2b4d396d5 ]

The very existence of __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_* is a thinko, as KVM will never use a HVC call to perform the branch prediction invalidation. Even as a nested hypervisor, it would use an SMC instruction.

Let's get rid of it.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S        |   12 ++----------
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c |    9 +++------
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S +2 -10
@@ -56,21 +56,13 @@ ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start)
 ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end)
 
 
-.macro smccc_workaround_1 inst
+ENTRY(__smccc_workaround_1_smc_start)
 	sub	sp, sp, #(8 * 4)
 	stp	x2, x3, [sp, #(8 * 0)]
 	stp	x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 2)]
 	mov	w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
-	\inst	#0
+	smc	#0
 	ldp	x2, x3, [sp, #(8 * 0)]
 	ldp	x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 2)]
 	add	sp, sp, #(8 * 4)
-.endm
-
-ENTRY(__smccc_workaround_1_smc_start)
-	smccc_workaround_1	smc
 ENTRY(__smccc_workaround_1_smc_end)
-
-ENTRY(__smccc_workaround_1_hvc_start)
-	smccc_workaround_1	hvc
-ENTRY(__smccc_workaround_1_hvc_end)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +3 -6
@@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_har
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM
 extern char __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start[];
 extern char __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end[];
-extern char __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_start[];
-extern char __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_end[];
 
 static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start,
 				const char *hyp_vecs_end)
@@ -131,8 +129,6 @@ static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp
 #else
 #define __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start		NULL
 #define __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end		NULL
-#define __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_start		NULL
-#define __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_end		NULL
 
 static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
 				      const char *hyp_vecs_start,
@@ -206,8 +202,9 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const str
 		if ((int)res.a0 < 0)
 			return;
 		cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
-		smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_start;
-		smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_end;
+		/* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */
+		smccc_start = NULL;
+		smccc_end = NULL;
 		break;
 
 	case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
author maintainer
#78 lore raw

PATCH 68/119 arm64: cpufeature: Detect SSBS and advertise to userspace

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d71be2b6c0e19180b5f80a6d42039cc074a693a2 ]

Armv8.5 introduces a new PSTATE bit known as Speculative Store Bypass Safe (SSBS) which can be used as a mitigation against Spectre variant 4.

Additionally, a CPU may provide instructions to manipulate PSTATE.SSBS directly, so that userspace can toggle the SSBS control without trapping to the kernel.

This patch probes for the existence of SSBS and advertise the new instructions to userspace if they exist.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h    |    3 ++-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h     |   16 ++++++++++++----
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h |    1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c      |   19 +++++++++++++++++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c         |    1 +
 5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +2 -1
@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@
 #define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR		24
 #define ARM64_SSBD				25
 #define ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_TYPE		26
+#define ARM64_SSBS				27
 
-#define ARM64_NCAPS				27
+#define ARM64_NCAPS				28
 
 #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +12 -4
@@ -297,6 +297,7 @@
 #define SYS_ICH_LR15_EL2		__SYS__LR8_EL2(7)
 
 /* Common SCTLR_ELx flags. */
+#define SCTLR_ELx_DSSBS	(1UL << 44)
 #define SCTLR_ELx_EE    (1 << 25)
 #define SCTLR_ELx_WXN	(1 << 19)
 #define SCTLR_ELx_I	(1 << 12)
@@ -316,7 +317,7 @@
 			 (1 << 10) | (1 << 13) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 15) | \
 			 (1 << 17) | (1 << 20) | (1 << 21) | (1 << 24) | \
 			 (1 << 26) | (1 << 27) | (1 << 30) | (1 << 31) | \
-			 (0xffffffffUL << 32))
+			 (0xffffefffUL << 32))
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
 #define ENDIAN_SET_EL2		SCTLR_ELx_EE
@@ -330,7 +331,7 @@
 #define SCTLR_EL2_SET	(ENDIAN_SET_EL2   | SCTLR_EL2_RES1)
 #define SCTLR_EL2_CLEAR	(SCTLR_ELx_M      | SCTLR_ELx_A    | SCTLR_ELx_C   | \
 			 SCTLR_ELx_SA     | SCTLR_ELx_I    | SCTLR_ELx_WXN | \
-			 ENDIAN_CLEAR_EL2 | SCTLR_EL2_RES0)
+			 SCTLR_ELx_DSSBS | ENDIAN_CLEAR_EL2 | SCTLR_EL2_RES0)
 
 #if (SCTLR_EL2_SET ^ SCTLR_EL2_CLEAR) != 0xffffffffffffffff
 #error "Inconsistent SCTLR_EL2 set/clear bits"
@@ -354,7 +355,7 @@
 			 (1 << 29))
 #define SCTLR_EL1_RES0  ((1 << 6)  | (1 << 10) | (1 << 13) | (1 << 17) | \
 			 (1 << 21) | (1 << 27) | (1 << 30) | (1 << 31) | \
-			 (0xffffffffUL << 32))
+			 (0xffffefffUL << 32))
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
 #define ENDIAN_SET_EL1		(SCTLR_EL1_E0E | SCTLR_ELx_EE)
@@ -371,7 +372,7 @@
 			 SCTLR_EL1_UCI  | SCTLR_EL1_RES1)
 #define SCTLR_EL1_CLEAR	(SCTLR_ELx_A   | SCTLR_EL1_CP15BEN | SCTLR_EL1_ITD    |\
 			 SCTLR_EL1_UMA | SCTLR_ELx_WXN     | ENDIAN_CLEAR_EL1 |\
-			 SCTLR_EL1_RES0)
+			 SCTLR_ELx_DSSBS | SCTLR_EL1_RES0)
 
 #if (SCTLR_EL1_SET ^ SCTLR_EL1_CLEAR) != 0xffffffffffffffff
 #error "Inconsistent SCTLR_EL1 set/clear bits"
@@ -417,6 +418,13 @@
 #define ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_64BIT_ONLY	0x1
 #define ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_32BIT_64BIT	0x2
 
+/* id_aa64pfr1 */
+#define ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_SHIFT		4
+
+#define ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_NI	0
+#define ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_ONLY	1
+#define ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_INSNS	2
+
 /* id_aa64mmfr0 */
 #define ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN4_SHIFT	28
 #define ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN64_SHIFT	24
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h +1 -0
@@ -48,5 +48,6 @@
 #define HWCAP_USCAT		(1 << 25)
 #define HWCAP_ILRCPC		(1 << 26)
 #define HWCAP_FLAGM		(1 << 27)
+#define HWCAP_SSBS		(1 << 28)
 
 #endif /* _UAPI__ASM_HWCAP_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +17 -2
@@ -145,6 +145,11 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_i
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
 
+static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr1[] = {
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_NI),
+	ARM64_FTR_END,
+};
+
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr0[] = {
 	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN4_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN4_NI),
 	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN64_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN64_NI),
@@ -345,7 +350,7 @@ static const struct __ftr_reg_entry {
 
 	/* Op1 = 0, CRn = 0, CRm = 4 */
 	ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64pfr0),
-	ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, ftr_raz),
+	ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, ftr_id_aa64pfr1),
 
 	/* Op1 = 0, CRn = 0, CRm = 5 */
 	ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64dfr0),
@@ -625,7 +630,6 @@ void update_cpu_features(int cpu,
 
 	/*
 	 * EL3 is not our concern.
-	 * ID_AA64PFR1 is currently RES0.
 	 */
 	taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, cpu,
 				      info->reg_id_aa64pfr0, boot->reg_id_aa64pfr0);
@@ -1045,6 +1049,16 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 		.min_field_value = 1,
 	},
 #endif
+	{
+		.desc = "Speculative Store Bypassing Safe (SSBS)",
+		.capability = ARM64_SSBS,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_WEAK_LOCAL_CPU_FEATURE,
+		.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
+		.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1,
+		.field_pos = ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_SHIFT,
+		.sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
+		.min_field_value = ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_ONLY,
+	},
 	{},
 };
 
@@ -1087,6 +1101,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR1_LRCPC_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_LRCPC),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR1_LRCPC_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 2, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ILRCPC),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1, ID_AA64MMFR2_AT_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_USCAT),
+	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_INSNS, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SSBS),
 	{},
 };
 
arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c +1 -0
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ static const char *const hwcap_str[] = {
 	"uscat",
 	"ilrcpc",
 	"flagm",
+	"ssbs",
 	NULL
 };
 
author maintainer
#61 lore raw

PATCH 51/119 arm64: capabilities: Unify the verification

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit eaac4d83daa50fc1b9b7850346e9a62adfd4647e ]

Now that each capability describes how to treat the conflicts of CPU cap state vs System wide cap state, we can unify the verification logic to a single place.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c |   91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +58 -33
@@ -1229,6 +1229,58 @@ static inline void set_sys_caps_initiali
 }
 
 /*
+ * Run through the list of capabilities to check for conflicts.
+ * If the system has already detected a capability, take necessary
+ * action on this CPU.
+ *
+ * Returns "false" on conflicts.
+ */
+static bool
+__verify_local_cpu_caps(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps_list)
+{
+	bool cpu_has_cap, system_has_cap;
+	const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps;
+
+	for (caps = caps_list; caps->matches; caps++) {
+		cpu_has_cap = __this_cpu_has_cap(caps_list, caps->capability);
+		system_has_cap = cpus_have_cap(caps->capability);
+
+		if (system_has_cap) {
+			/*
+			 * Check if the new CPU misses an advertised feature,
+			 * which is not safe to miss.
+			 */
+			if (!cpu_has_cap && !cpucap_late_cpu_optional(caps))
+				break;
+			/*
+			 * We have to issue cpu_enable() irrespective of
+			 * whether the CPU has it or not, as it is enabeld
+			 * system wide. It is upto the call back to take
+			 * appropriate action on this CPU.
+			 */
+			if (caps->cpu_enable)
+				caps->cpu_enable(caps);
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Check if the CPU has this capability if it isn't
+			 * safe to have when the system doesn't.
+			 */
+			if (cpu_has_cap && !cpucap_late_cpu_permitted(caps))
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (caps->matches) {
+		pr_crit("CPU%d: Detected conflict for capability %d (%s), System: %d, CPU: %d\n",
+			smp_processor_id(), caps->capability,
+			caps->desc, system_has_cap, cpu_has_cap);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
  * Check for CPU features that are used in early boot
  * based on the Boot CPU value.
  */
@@ -1250,25 +1302,10 @@ verify_local_elf_hwcaps(const struct arm
 		}
 }
 
-static void
-verify_local_cpu_features(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps_list)
+static void verify_local_cpu_features(void)
 {
-	const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps = caps_list;
-	for (; caps->matches; caps++) {
-		if (!cpus_have_cap(caps->capability))
-			continue;
-		/*
-		 * If the new CPU misses an advertised feature, we cannot proceed
-		 * further, park the cpu.
-		 */
-		if (!__this_cpu_has_cap(caps_list, caps->capability)) {
-			pr_crit("CPU%d: missing feature: %s\n",
-					smp_processor_id(), caps->desc);
-			cpu_die_early();
-		}
-		if (caps->cpu_enable)
-			caps->cpu_enable(caps);
-	}
+	if (!__verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_features))
+		cpu_die_early();
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1278,20 +1315,8 @@ verify_local_cpu_features(const struct a
  */
 static void verify_local_cpu_errata_workarounds(void)
 {
-	const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps = arm64_errata;
-
-	for (; caps->matches; caps++) {
-		if (cpus_have_cap(caps->capability)) {
-			if (caps->cpu_enable)
-				caps->cpu_enable(caps);
-		} else if (caps->matches(caps, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
-			pr_crit("CPU%d: Requires work around for %s, not detected"
-					" at boot time\n",
-				smp_processor_id(),
-				caps->desc ? : "an erratum");
-			cpu_die_early();
-		}
-	}
+	if (!__verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_errata))
+		cpu_die_early();
 }
 
 static void update_cpu_errata_workarounds(void)
@@ -1315,7 +1340,7 @@ static void __init enable_errata_workaro
 static void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void)
 {
 	verify_local_cpu_errata_workarounds();
-	verify_local_cpu_features(arm64_features);
+	verify_local_cpu_features();
 	verify_local_elf_hwcaps(arm64_elf_hwcaps);
 	if (system_supports_32bit_el0())
 		verify_local_elf_hwcaps(compat_elf_hwcaps);
author maintainer
#79 lore raw

PATCH 69/119 arm64: ssbd: Add support for PSTATE.SSBS rather than trapping to EL3

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8f04e8e6e29c93421a95b61cad62e3918425eac7 ]

On CPUs with support for PSTATE.SSBS, the kernel can toggle the SSBD state without needing to call into firmware.

This patch hooks into the existing SSBD infrastructure so that SSBS is used on CPUs that support it, but it's all made horribly complicated by the very real possibility of big/little systems that don't uniformly provide the new capability.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h   |    7 +++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h      |    1 
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h      |    3 ++
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h |    1 
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c       |   26 ++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c       |   45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/process.c          |    4 +++
 arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c             |   22 +++++++++++++++++
 8 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +7 -0
@@ -153,6 +153,10 @@ static inline void start_thread(struct p
 {
 	start_thread_common(regs, pc);
 	regs->pstate = PSR_MODE_EL0t;
+
+	if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() != ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE)
+		regs->pstate |= PSR_SSBS_BIT;
+
 	regs->sp = sp;
 }
 
@@ -169,6 +173,9 @@ static inline void compat_start_thread(s
 	regs->pstate |= COMPAT_PSR_E_BIT;
 #endif
 
+	if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() != ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE)
+		regs->pstate |= PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT;
+
 	regs->compat_sp = sp;
 }
 #endif
arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h +1 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 #define PSR_AA32_I_BIT		0x00000080
 #define PSR_AA32_A_BIT		0x00000100
 #define PSR_AA32_E_BIT		0x00000200
+#define PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT	0x00800000
 #define PSR_AA32_DIT_BIT	0x01000000
 #define PSR_AA32_Q_BIT		0x08000000
 #define PSR_AA32_V_BIT		0x10000000
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +3 -0
@@ -86,11 +86,14 @@
 
 #define REG_PSTATE_PAN_IMM		sys_reg(0, 0, 4, 0, 4)
 #define REG_PSTATE_UAO_IMM		sys_reg(0, 0, 4, 0, 3)
+#define REG_PSTATE_SSBS_IMM		sys_reg(0, 3, 4, 0, 1)
 
 #define SET_PSTATE_PAN(x) __emit_inst(0xd5000000 | REG_PSTATE_PAN_IMM |	\
 				      (!!x)<<8 | 0x1f)
 #define SET_PSTATE_UAO(x) __emit_inst(0xd5000000 | REG_PSTATE_UAO_IMM |	\
 				      (!!x)<<8 | 0x1f)
+#define SET_PSTATE_SSBS(x) __emit_inst(0xd5000000 | REG_PSTATE_SSBS_IMM | \
+				       (!!x)<<8 | 0x1f)
 
 #define SYS_DC_ISW			sys_insn(1, 0, 7, 6, 2)
 #define SYS_DC_CSW			sys_insn(1, 0, 7, 10, 2)
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h +1 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 #define PSR_I_BIT	0x00000080
 #define PSR_A_BIT	0x00000100
 #define PSR_D_BIT	0x00000200
+#define PSR_SSBS_BIT	0x00001000
 #define PSR_PAN_BIT	0x00400000
 #define PSR_UAO_BIT	0x00800000
 #define PSR_Q_BIT	0x08000000
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +24 -2
@@ -304,6 +304,14 @@ void __init arm64_enable_wa2_handling(st
 
 void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state)
 {
+	if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) {
+		if (state)
+			asm volatile(SET_PSTATE_SSBS(0));
+		else
+			asm volatile(SET_PSTATE_SSBS(1));
+		return;
+	}
+
 	switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
 	case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
 		arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, state, NULL);
@@ -328,6 +336,11 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
 
 	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
 
+	if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) {
+		required = false;
+		goto out_printmsg;
+	}
+
 	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) {
 		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
 		return false;
@@ -376,7 +389,6 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
 
 	switch (ssbd_state) {
 	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
-		pr_info_once("%s disabled from command-line\n", entry->desc);
 		arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(false);
 		required = false;
 		break;
@@ -389,7 +401,6 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
 		break;
 
 	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
-		pr_info_once("%s forced from command-line\n", entry->desc);
 		arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true);
 		required = true;
 		break;
@@ -399,6 +410,17 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
 		break;
 	}
 
+out_printmsg:
+	switch (ssbd_state) {
+	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
+		pr_info_once("%s disabled from command-line\n", entry->desc);
+		break;
+
+	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
+		pr_info_once("%s forced from command-line\n", entry->desc);
+		break;
+	}
+
 	return required;
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +45 -0

64 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +4 -0
@@ -296,6 +296,10 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flag
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_UAO) &&
 		    cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_UAO))
 			childregs->pstate |= PSR_UAO_BIT;
+
+		if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE)
+			childregs->pstate |= PSR_SSBS_BIT;
+
 		p->thread.cpu_context.x19 = stack_start;
 		p->thread.cpu_context.x20 = stk_sz;
 	}
arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c +22 -0
@@ -3,13 +3,32 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2018 ARM Ltd, All Rights Reserved.
  */
 
+#include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/prctl.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
 
+#include <asm/compat.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 
+static void ssbd_ssbs_enable(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	u64 val = is_compat_thread(task_thread_info(task)) ?
+		  PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT : PSR_SSBS_BIT;
+
+	task_pt_regs(task)->pstate |= val;
+}
+
+static void ssbd_ssbs_disable(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	u64 val = is_compat_thread(task_thread_info(task)) ?
+		  PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT : PSR_SSBS_BIT;
+
+	task_pt_regs(task)->pstate &= ~val;
+}
+
 /*
  * prctl interface for SSBD
  */
@@ -45,12 +64,14 @@ static int ssbd_prctl_set(struct task_st
 			return -EPERM;
 		task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
 		clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
+		ssbd_ssbs_enable(task);
 		break;
 	case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
 		if (state == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE)
 			return -EPERM;
 		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
 		set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
+		ssbd_ssbs_disable(task);
 		break;
 	case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
 		if (state == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE)
@@ -58,6 +79,7 @@ static int ssbd_prctl_set(struct task_st
 		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
 		task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
 		set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
+		ssbd_ssbs_disable(task);
 		break;
 	default:
 		return -ERANGE;
author maintainer
#80 lore raw

PATCH 70/119 KVM: arm64: Set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD is forcefully disabled and !vhe

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7c36447ae5a090729e7b129f24705bb231a07e0b ]

When running without VHE, it is necessary to set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD has been forcefully disabled on the kernel command-line.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   11 +++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c    |   11 +++++++++++
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +11 -0
@@ -356,6 +356,8 @@ struct kvm_vcpu *kvm_mpidr_to_vcpu(struc
 void __kvm_set_tpidr_el2(u64 tpidr_el2);
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(kvm_cpu_context_t, kvm_host_cpu_state);
 
+void __kvm_enable_ssbs(void);
+
 static inline void __cpu_init_hyp_mode(phys_addr_t pgd_ptr,
 				       unsigned long hyp_stack_ptr,
 				       unsigned long vector_ptr)
@@ -380,6 +382,15 @@ static inline void __cpu_init_hyp_mode(p
 		- (u64)kvm_ksym_ref(kvm_host_cpu_state);
 
 	kvm_call_hyp(__kvm_set_tpidr_el2, tpidr_el2);
+
+	/*
+	 * Disabling SSBD on a non-VHE system requires us to enable SSBS
+	 * at EL2.
+	 */
+	if (!has_vhe() && this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS) &&
+	    arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE) {
+		kvm_call_hyp(__kvm_enable_ssbs);
+	}
 }
 
 static inline void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c +11 -0
@@ -188,3 +188,14 @@ void __hyp_text __kvm_set_tpidr_el2(u64
 {
 	asm("msr tpidr_el2, %0": : "r" (tpidr_el2));
 }
+
+void __hyp_text __kvm_enable_ssbs(void)
+{
+	u64 tmp;
+
+	asm volatile(
+	"mrs	%0, sctlr_el2\n"
+	"orr	%0, %0, %1\n"
+	"msr	sctlr_el2, %0"
+	: "=&r" (tmp) : "L" (SCTLR_ELx_DSSBS));
+}
author maintainer
#81 lore raw

PATCH 71/119 arm64: fix SSBS sanitization

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f54dada8274643e3ff4436df0ea124aeedc43cae ]

In valid_user_regs() we treat SSBS as a RES0 bit, and consequently it is unexpectedly cleared when we restore a sigframe or fiddle with GPRs via ptrace.

This patch fixes valid_user_regs() to account for this, updating the function to refer to the latest ARM ARM (ARM DDI 0487D.a). For AArch32 tasks, SSBS appears in bit 23 of SPSR_EL1, matching its position in the AArch32-native PSR format, and we don't need to translate it as we have to for DIT.

There are no other bit assignments that we need to account for today. As the recent documentation describes the DIT bit, we can drop our comment regarding DIT.

While removing SSBS from the RES0 masks, existing inconsistent whitespace is corrected.

Fixes d71be2b6c0e19180 ("arm64: cpufeature: Detect SSBS and advertise to userspace")
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c |   15 ++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +8 -7
@@ -1402,19 +1402,20 @@ asmlinkage void syscall_trace_exit(struc
 }
 
 /*
- * SPSR_ELx bits which are always architecturally RES0 per ARM DDI 0487C.a
- * We also take into account DIT (bit 24), which is not yet documented, and
- * treat PAN and UAO as RES0 bits, as they are meaningless at EL0, and may be
- * allocated an EL0 meaning in future.
+ * SPSR_ELx bits which are always architecturally RES0 per ARM DDI 0487D.a.
+ * We permit userspace to set SSBS (AArch64 bit 12, AArch32 bit 23) which is
+ * not described in ARM DDI 0487D.a.
+ * We treat PAN and UAO as RES0 bits, as they are meaningless at EL0, and may
+ * be allocated an EL0 meaning in future.
  * Userspace cannot use these until they have an architectural meaning.
  * Note that this follows the SPSR_ELx format, not the AArch32 PSR format.
  * We also reserve IL for the kernel; SS is handled dynamically.
  */
 #define SPSR_EL1_AARCH64_RES0_BITS \
-	(GENMASK_ULL(63,32) | GENMASK_ULL(27, 25) | GENMASK_ULL(23, 22) | \
-	 GENMASK_ULL(20, 10) | GENMASK_ULL(5, 5))
+	(GENMASK_ULL(63, 32) | GENMASK_ULL(27, 25) | GENMASK_ULL(23, 22) | \
+	 GENMASK_ULL(20, 13) | GENMASK_ULL(11, 10) | GENMASK_ULL(5, 5))
 #define SPSR_EL1_AARCH32_RES0_BITS \
-	(GENMASK_ULL(63,32) | GENMASK_ULL(23, 22) | GENMASK_ULL(20,20))
+	(GENMASK_ULL(63, 32) | GENMASK_ULL(22, 22) | GENMASK_ULL(20, 20))
 
 static int valid_compat_regs(struct user_pt_regs *regs)
 {
author maintainer
#83 lore raw

PATCH 73/119 arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1b3ccf4be0e7be8c4bd8522066b6cbc92591e912 ]

We implement page table isolation as a mitigation for meltdown. Report this to userspace via sysfs.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c |   58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +44 -14
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ static bool has_no_fpsimd(const struct a
 					ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT) < 0;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
+static bool __meltdown_safe = true;
 static int __kpti_forced; /* 0: not forced, >0: forced on, <0: forced off */
 
 static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
@@ -842,6 +842,16 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const st
 		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
 	};
 	char const *str = "command line option";
+	bool meltdown_safe;
+
+	meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list);
+
+	/* Defer to CPU feature registers */
+	if (has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope))
+		meltdown_safe = true;
+
+	if (!meltdown_safe)
+		__meltdown_safe = false;
 
 	/*
 	 * For reasons that aren't entirely clear, enabling KPTI on Cavium
@@ -853,6 +863,19 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const st
 		__kpti_forced = -1;
 	}
 
+	/* Useful for KASLR robustness */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) && kaslr_offset() > 0) {
+		if (!__kpti_forced) {
+			str = "KASLR";
+			__kpti_forced = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0)) {
+		pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+
 	/* Forced? */
 	if (__kpti_forced) {
 		pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation forced %s by %s\n",
@@ -860,18 +883,10 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const st
 		return __kpti_forced > 0;
 	}
 
-	/* Useful for KASLR robustness */
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
-		return true;
-
-	/* Don't force KPTI for CPUs that are not vulnerable */
-	if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list))
-		return false;
-
-	/* Defer to CPU feature registers */
-	return !has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
+	return !meltdown_safe;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 static void
 kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 {
@@ -896,6 +911,12 @@ kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct ar
 
 	return;
 }
+#else
+static void
+kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
+{
+}
+#endif	/* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
 
 static int __init parse_kpti(char *str)
 {
@@ -909,7 +930,6 @@ static int __init parse_kpti(char *str)
 	return 0;
 }
 early_param("kpti", parse_kpti);
-#endif	/* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
 
 static void cpu_copy_el2regs(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 {
@@ -1056,7 +1076,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
 		.matches = hyp_offset_low,
 	},
-#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 	{
 		.desc = "Kernel page table isolation (KPTI)",
 		.capability = ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0,
@@ -1072,7 +1091,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 		.matches = unmap_kernel_at_el0,
 		.cpu_enable = kpti_install_ng_mappings,
 	},
-#endif
 	{
 		/* FP/SIMD is not implemented */
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_NO_FPSIMD,
@@ -1629,3 +1647,15 @@ static int __init enable_mrs_emulation(v
 }
 
 core_initcall(enable_mrs_emulation);
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+			  char *buf)
+{
+	if (__meltdown_safe)
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+	if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
+		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
author maintainer
#82 lore raw

PATCH 72/119 arm64: Add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v1

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3891ebccace188af075ce143d8b072b65e90f695 ]

spectre-v1 has been mitigated and the mitigation is always active. Report this to userspace via sysfs

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +6 -0
@@ -638,3 +638,9 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 	{
 	}
 };
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+			    char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
+}
author maintainer
#85 lore raw

PATCH 75/119 arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d42281b6e49510f078ace15a8ea10f71e6262581 ]

Ensure we are always able to detect whether or not the CPU is affected by SSB, so that we can later advertise this to userspace.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |    4 ----
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c      |    9 +++++----
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +0 -4
@@ -493,11 +493,7 @@ static inline int arm64_get_ssbd_state(v
 #endif
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
 void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state);
-#else
-static inline void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state) {}
-#endif
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +5 -4
@@ -231,7 +231,6 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const str
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
 DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
 
 int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL;
@@ -304,6 +303,11 @@ void __init arm64_enable_wa2_handling(st
 
 void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state)
 {
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD)) {
+		pr_info_once("SSBD disabled by kernel configuration\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) {
 		if (state)
 			asm volatile(SET_PSTATE_SSBS(0));
@@ -423,7 +427,6 @@ out_printmsg:
 
 	return required;
 }
-#endif	/* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
 
 #define CAP_MIDR_RANGE(model, v_min, r_min, v_max, r_max)	\
 	.matches = is_affected_midr_range,			\
@@ -627,14 +630,12 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 		.cpu_enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1,
 	},
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
 	{
 		.desc = "Speculative Store Bypass Disable",
 		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
 		.capability = ARM64_SSBD,
 		.matches = has_ssbd_mitigation,
 	},
-#endif
 	{
 	}
 };
author maintainer
#86 lore raw

PATCH 76/119 arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e5ce5e7267ddcbe13ab9ead2542524e1b7993e5a ]

There are various reasons, such as benchmarking, to disable spectrev2 mitigation on a machine. Provide a command-line option to do so.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |    8 ++++----
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  |   13 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +4 -4
@@ -2745,10 +2745,10 @@
 			(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks
 			are possible in the system.
 
-	nospectre_v2	[X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
-			(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
-			allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
-			to spectre_v2=off.
+	nospectre_v2	[X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E,ARM64] Disable all mitigations for
+			the Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch prediction)
+			vulnerability. System may allow data leaks with this
+			option.
 
 	nospec_store_bypass_disable
 			[HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +13 -0
@@ -181,6 +181,14 @@ static void qcom_link_stack_sanitization
 		     : "=&r" (tmp));
 }
 
+static bool __nospectre_v2;
+static int __init parse_nospectre_v2(char *str)
+{
+	__nospectre_v2 = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_v2", parse_nospectre_v2);
+
 static void
 enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
 {
@@ -192,6 +200,11 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const str
 	if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
 		return;
 
+	if (__nospectre_v2) {
+		pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
 		return;
 
author maintainer
#87 lore raw

PATCH 77/119 arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 73f38166095947f3b86b02fbed6bd592223a7ac8 ]

We currently have a list of CPUs affected by Spectre-v2, for which we check that the firmware implements ARCH_WORKAROUND_1. It turns out that not all firmwares do implement the required mitigation, and that we fail to let the user know about it.

Instead, let's slightly revamp our checks, and rely on a whitelist of cores that are known to be non-vulnerable, and let the user know the status of the mitigation in the kernel log.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c |  108 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +56 -52
@@ -98,9 +98,9 @@ static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot
 	flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)dst, (uintptr_t)dst + SZ_2K);
 }
 
-static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
-				      const char *hyp_vecs_start,
-				      const char *hyp_vecs_end)
+static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
+				    const char *hyp_vecs_start,
+				    const char *hyp_vecs_end)
 {
 	static int last_slot = -1;
 	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bp_lock);
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp
 #define __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start		NULL
 #define __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end		NULL
 
-static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
+static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
 				      const char *hyp_vecs_start,
 				      const char *hyp_vecs_end)
 {
@@ -138,23 +138,6 @@ static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KVM */
 
-static void  install_bp_hardening_cb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
-				     bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
-				     const char *hyp_vecs_start,
-				     const char *hyp_vecs_end)
-{
-	u64 pfr0;
-
-	if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
-		return;
-
-	pfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1);
-	if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT))
-		return;
-
-	__install_bp_hardening_cb(fn, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
-}
-
 #include <uapi/linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/psci.h>
@@ -189,31 +172,27 @@ static int __init parse_nospectre_v2(cha
 }
 early_param("nospectre_v2", parse_nospectre_v2);
 
-static void
-enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
+/*
+ * -1: No workaround
+ *  0: No workaround required
+ *  1: Workaround installed
+ */
+static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
 {
 	bp_hardening_cb_t cb;
 	void *smccc_start, *smccc_end;
 	struct arm_smccc_res res;
 	u32 midr = read_cpuid_id();
 
-	if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
-		return;
-
-	if (__nospectre_v2) {
-		pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
-		return;
-	}
-
 	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
-		return;
+		return -1;
 
 	switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
 	case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
 		arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
 				  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
 		if ((int)res.a0 < 0)
-			return;
+			return -1;
 		cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
 		/* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */
 		smccc_start = NULL;
@@ -224,23 +203,23 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const str
 		arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
 				  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
 		if ((int)res.a0 < 0)
-			return;
+			return -1;
 		cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
 		smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start;
 		smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end;
 		break;
 
 	default:
-		return;
+		return -1;
 	}
 
 	if (((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR) ||
 	    ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1))
 		cb = qcom_link_stack_sanitization;
 
-	install_bp_hardening_cb(entry, cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
+	install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
 
-	return;
+	return 1;
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
 
@@ -479,23 +458,48 @@ out_printmsg:
 	CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
-
 /*
- * List of CPUs where we need to issue a psci call to
- * harden the branch predictor.
+ * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all.
  */
-static const struct midr_range arm64_bp_harden_smccc_cpus[] = {
-	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
-	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
-	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
-	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75),
-	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN),
-	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2),
-	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1),
-	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR),
-	{},
+static const struct midr_range spectre_v2_safe_list[] = {
+	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35),
+	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53),
+	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55),
+	{ /* sentinel */ }
 };
 
+static bool __maybe_unused
+check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
+{
+	int need_wa;
+
+	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
+
+	/* If the CPU has CSV2 set, we're safe */
+	if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1),
+						 ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT))
+		return false;
+
+	/* Alternatively, we have a list of unaffected CPUs */
+	if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_v2_safe_list))
+		return false;
+
+	/* Fallback to firmware detection */
+	need_wa = detect_harden_bp_fw();
+	if (!need_wa)
+		return false;
+
+	/* forced off */
+	if (__nospectre_v2) {
+		pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (need_wa < 0)
+		pr_warn_once("ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 missing from firmware\n");
+
+	return (need_wa > 0);
+}
 #endif
 
 const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
@@ -639,8 +643,8 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
-		ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(arm64_bp_harden_smccc_cpus),
-		.cpu_enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
+		.matches = check_branch_predictor,
 	},
 #endif
 	{
author maintainer
#62 lore raw

PATCH 52/119 arm64: capabilities: Filter the entries based on a given mask

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cce360b54ce6ca1bcf4b0a870ec076d83606775e ]

While processing the list of capabilities, it is useful to filter out some of the entries based on the given mask for the scope of the capabilities to allow better control. This can be used later for handling LOCAL vs SYSTEM wide capabilities and more. All capabilities should have their scope set to either LOCAL_CPU or SYSTEM. No functional/flow change.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |    1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c      |   33 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +1 -0
@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_re
 
 #define SCOPE_SYSTEM				ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM
 #define SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU				ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU
+#define SCOPE_ALL				ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_MASK
 
 /*
  * Is it permitted for a late CPU to have this capability when system
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +22 -11
@@ -1164,10 +1164,12 @@ static bool __this_cpu_has_cap(const str
 }
 
 static void update_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps,
-				    const char *info)
+				    u16 scope_mask, const char *info)
 {
+	scope_mask &= ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_MASK;
 	for (; caps->matches; caps++) {
-		if (!caps->matches(caps, cpucap_default_scope(caps)))
+		if (!(caps->type & scope_mask) ||
+		    !caps->matches(caps, cpucap_default_scope(caps)))
 			continue;
 
 		if (!cpus_have_cap(caps->capability) && caps->desc)
@@ -1189,12 +1191,14 @@ static int __enable_cpu_capability(void
  * CPUs
  */
 static void __init
-enable_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps)
+enable_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps,
+			u16 scope_mask)
 {
+	scope_mask &= ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_MASK;
 	for (; caps->matches; caps++) {
 		unsigned int num = caps->capability;
 
-		if (!cpus_have_cap(num))
+		if (!(caps->type & scope_mask) || !cpus_have_cap(num))
 			continue;
 
 		/* Ensure cpus_have_const_cap(num) works */
@@ -1236,12 +1240,18 @@ static inline void set_sys_caps_initiali
  * Returns "false" on conflicts.
  */
 static bool
-__verify_local_cpu_caps(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps_list)
+__verify_local_cpu_caps(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps_list,
+			u16 scope_mask)
 {
 	bool cpu_has_cap, system_has_cap;
 	const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps;
 
+	scope_mask &= ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_MASK;
+
 	for (caps = caps_list; caps->matches; caps++) {
+		if (!(caps->type & scope_mask))
+			continue;
+
 		cpu_has_cap = __this_cpu_has_cap(caps_list, caps->capability);
 		system_has_cap = cpus_have_cap(caps->capability);
 
@@ -1304,7 +1314,7 @@ verify_local_elf_hwcaps(const struct arm
 
 static void verify_local_cpu_features(void)
 {
-	if (!__verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_features))
+	if (!__verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_features, SCOPE_ALL))
 		cpu_die_early();
 }
 
@@ -1315,18 +1325,19 @@ static void verify_local_cpu_features(vo
  */
 static void verify_local_cpu_errata_workarounds(void)
 {
-	if (!__verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_errata))
+	if (!__verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_errata, SCOPE_ALL))
 		cpu_die_early();
 }
 
 static void update_cpu_errata_workarounds(void)
 {
-	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, "enabling workaround for");
+	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_ALL,
+				"enabling workaround for");
 }
 
 static void __init enable_errata_workarounds(void)
 {
-	enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata);
+	enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_ALL);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1368,8 +1379,8 @@ void check_local_cpu_capabilities(void)
 
 static void __init setup_feature_capabilities(void)
 {
-	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, "detected feature:");
-	enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features);
+	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_ALL, "detected:");
+	enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_ALL);
 }
 
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(arm64_const_caps_ready);
author maintainer
#89 lore raw

PATCH 79/119 arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d2532e27b5638bb2e2dd52b80b7ea2ec65135377 ]

Track whether all the cores in the machine are vulnerable to Spectre-v2, and whether all the vulnerable cores have been mitigated. We then expose this information to userspace via sysfs.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c |   27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +26 -1
@@ -456,6 +456,10 @@ out_printmsg:
 	.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,			\
 	CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list)
 
+/* Track overall mitigation state. We are only mitigated if all cores are ok */
+static bool __hardenbp_enab = true;
+static bool __spectrev2_safe = true;
+
 /*
  * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all.
  */
@@ -466,6 +470,10 @@ static const struct midr_range spectre_v
 	{ /* sentinel */ }
 };
 
+/*
+ * Track overall bp hardening for all heterogeneous cores in the machine.
+ * We are only considered "safe" if all booted cores are known safe.
+ */
 static bool __maybe_unused
 check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
 {
@@ -487,6 +495,8 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm6
 	if (!need_wa)
 		return false;
 
+	__spectrev2_safe = false;
+
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
 		pr_warn_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
 		__hardenbp_enab = false;
@@ -496,11 +506,14 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm6
 	/* forced off */
 	if (__nospectre_v2) {
 		pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
+		__hardenbp_enab = false;
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	if (need_wa < 0)
+	if (need_wa < 0) {
 		pr_warn_once("ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 missing from firmware\n");
+		__hardenbp_enab = false;
+	}
 
 	return (need_wa > 0);
 }
@@ -663,3 +676,15 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic
 {
 	return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+		char *buf)
+{
+	if (__spectrev2_safe)
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+	if (__hardenbp_enab)
+		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n");
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
author maintainer
#90 lore raw

PATCH 80/119 arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 526e065dbca6df0b5a130b84b836b8b3c9f54e21 ]

Return status based on ssbd_state and __ssb_safe. If the mitigation is disabled, or the firmware isn't responding then return the expected machine state based on a whitelist of known good cores.

Given a heterogeneous machine, the overall machine vulnerability defaults to safe but is reset to unsafe when we miss the whitelist and the firmware doesn't explicitly tell us the core is safe. In order to make that work we delay transitioning to vulnerable until we know the firmware isn't responding to avoid a case where we miss the whitelist, but the firmware goes ahead and reports the core is not vulnerable. If all the cores in the machine have SSBS, then __ssb_safe will remain true.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c |   42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +42 -0
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
 DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
 
 int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL;
+static bool __ssb_safe = true;
 
 static const struct ssbd_options {
 	const char	*str;
@@ -328,6 +329,7 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
 	struct arm_smccc_res res;
 	bool required = true;
 	s32 val;
+	bool this_cpu_safe = false;
 
 	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
 
@@ -336,8 +338,14 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
 		goto out_printmsg;
 	}
 
+	/* delay setting __ssb_safe until we get a firmware response */
+	if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list))
+		this_cpu_safe = true;
+
 	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) {
 		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
+		if (!this_cpu_safe)
+			__ssb_safe = false;
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -354,6 +362,8 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
 
 	default:
 		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
+		if (!this_cpu_safe)
+			__ssb_safe = false;
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -362,14 +372,18 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
 	switch (val) {
 	case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED:
 		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
+		if (!this_cpu_safe)
+			__ssb_safe = false;
 		return false;
 
+	/* machines with mixed mitigation requirements must not return this */
 	case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED:
 		pr_info_once("%s mitigation not required\n", entry->desc);
 		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED;
 		return false;
 
 	case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
+		__ssb_safe = false;
 		required = true;
 		break;
 
@@ -379,6 +393,8 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
 
 	default:
 		WARN_ON(1);
+		if (!this_cpu_safe)
+			__ssb_safe = false;
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -419,6 +435,14 @@ out_printmsg:
 	return required;
 }
 
+/* known invulnerable cores */
+static const struct midr_range arm64_ssb_cpus[] = {
+	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35),
+	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53),
+	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55),
+	{},
+};
+
 #define CAP_MIDR_RANGE(model, v_min, r_min, v_max, r_max)	\
 	.matches = is_affected_midr_range,			\
 	.midr_range = MIDR_RANGE(model, v_min, r_min, v_max, r_max)
@@ -666,6 +690,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
 		.capability = ARM64_SSBD,
 		.matches = has_ssbd_mitigation,
+		.midr_range_list = arm64_ssb_cpus,
 	},
 	{
 	}
@@ -688,3 +713,20 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic
 
 	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
+		struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	if (__ssb_safe)
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+	switch (ssbd_state) {
+	case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
+	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD))
+			return sprintf(buf,
+			    "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl\n");
+	}
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
author maintainer
#91 lore raw

PATCH 81/119 arm64: ssbs: Dont treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit eb337cdfcd5dd3b10522c2f34140a73a4c285c30 ]

SSBS provides a relatively cheap mitigation for SSB, but it is still a mitigation and its presence does not indicate that the CPU is unaffected by the vulnerability.

Tweak the mitigation logic so that we report the correct string in sysfs.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +6 -4
@@ -333,15 +333,17 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
 
 	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
 
+	/* delay setting __ssb_safe until we get a firmware response */
+	if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list))
+		this_cpu_safe = true;
+
 	if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) {
+		if (!this_cpu_safe)
+			__ssb_safe = false;
 		required = false;
 		goto out_printmsg;
 	}
 
-	/* delay setting __ssb_safe until we get a firmware response */
-	if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list))
-		this_cpu_safe = true;
-
 	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) {
 		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
 		if (!this_cpu_safe)
author maintainer
#93 lore raw

PATCH 83/119 arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 517953c2c47f9c00a002f588ac856a5bc70cede3 ]

The SMCCC ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 service can indicate that although the firmware knows about the Spectre-v2 mitigation, this particular CPU is not vulnerable, and it is thus not necessary to call the firmware on this CPU.

Let's use this information to our benefit.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c |   32 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +23 -9
@@ -190,22 +190,36 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
 	case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
 		arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
 				  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
-		if ((int)res.a0 < 0)
+		switch ((int)res.a0) {
+		case 1:
+			/* Firmware says we're just fine */
+			return 0;
+		case 0:
+			cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
+			/* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */
+			smccc_start = NULL;
+			smccc_end = NULL;
+			break;
+		default:
 			return -1;
-		cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
-		/* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */
-		smccc_start = NULL;
-		smccc_end = NULL;
+		}
 		break;
 
 	case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
 		arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
 				  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
-		if ((int)res.a0 < 0)
+		switch ((int)res.a0) {
+		case 1:
+			/* Firmware says we're just fine */
+			return 0;
+		case 0:
+			cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
+			smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start;
+			smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end;
+			break;
+		default:
 			return -1;
-		cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
-		smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start;
-		smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end;
+		}
 		break;
 
 	default:
author maintainer
#95 lore raw

PATCH 85/119 MIPS: tlbex: Fix build_restore_pagemask KScratch restore

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Paul Burton <[email protected]>

commit b42aa3fd5957e4daf4b69129e5ce752a2a53e7d6 upstream.

build_restore_pagemask() will restore the value of register $1/$at when its restore_scratch argument is non-zero, and aims to do so by filling a branch delay slot. Commit 0b24cae4d535 ("MIPS: Add missing EHB in mtc0 -> mfc0 sequence.") added an EHB instruction (Execution Hazard Barrier) prior to restoring $1 from a KScratch register, in order to resolve a hazard that can result in stale values of the KScratch register being observed. In particular, P-class CPUs from MIPS with out of order execution pipelines such as the P5600 & P6600 are affected.

Unfortunately this EHB instruction was inserted in the branch delay slot causing the MFC0 instruction which performs the restoration to no longer execute along with the branch. The result is that the $1 register isn't actually restored, ie. the TLB refill exception handler clobbers it - which is exactly the problem the EHB is meant to avoid for the P-class CPUs.

Similarly build_get_pgd_vmalloc() will restore the value of $1/$at when its mode argument equals refill_scratch, and suffers from the same problem.

Fix this by in both cases moving the EHB earlier in the emitted code. There's no reason it needs to immediately precede the MFC0 - it simply needs to be between the MTC0 & MFC0.

This bug only affects Cavium Octeon systems which use build_fast_tlb_refill_handler().

Fixes 0b24cae4d535 ("MIPS: Add missing EHB in mtc0 -> mfc0 sequence.")
Cc Dmitry Korotin <[email protected]>
Cc [email protected] # v3.15+
---
 arch/mips/mm/tlbex.c |   23 +++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/mips/mm/tlbex.c +15 -8
@@ -658,6 +658,13 @@ static void build_restore_pagemask(u32 *
 				   int restore_scratch)
 {
 	if (restore_scratch) {
+		/*
+		 * Ensure the MFC0 below observes the value written to the
+		 * KScratch register by the prior MTC0.
+		 */
+		if (scratch_reg >= 0)
+			uasm_i_ehb(p);
+
 		/* Reset default page size */
 		if (PM_DEFAULT_MASK >> 16) {
 			uasm_i_lui(p, tmp, PM_DEFAULT_MASK >> 16);
@@ -672,12 +679,10 @@ static void build_restore_pagemask(u32 *
 			uasm_i_mtc0(p, 0, C0_PAGEMASK);
 			uasm_il_b(p, r, lid);
 		}
-		if (scratch_reg >= 0) {
-			uasm_i_ehb(p);
+		if (scratch_reg >= 0)
 			UASM_i_MFC0(p, 1, c0_kscratch(), scratch_reg);
-		} else {
+		else
 			UASM_i_LW(p, 1, scratchpad_offset(0), 0);
-		}
 	} else {
 		/* Reset default page size */
 		if (PM_DEFAULT_MASK >> 16) {
@@ -926,6 +931,10 @@ build_get_pgd_vmalloc64(u32 **p, struct
 	}
 	if (mode != not_refill && check_for_high_segbits) {
 		uasm_l_large_segbits_fault(l, *p);
+
+		if (mode == refill_scratch && scratch_reg >= 0)
+			uasm_i_ehb(p);
+
 		/*
 		 * We get here if we are an xsseg address, or if we are
 		 * an xuseg address above (PGDIR_SHIFT+PGDIR_BITS) boundary.
@@ -942,12 +951,10 @@ build_get_pgd_vmalloc64(u32 **p, struct
 		uasm_i_jr(p, ptr);
 
 		if (mode == refill_scratch) {
-			if (scratch_reg >= 0) {
-				uasm_i_ehb(p);
+			if (scratch_reg >= 0)
 				UASM_i_MFC0(p, 1, c0_kscratch(), scratch_reg);
-			} else {
+			else
 				UASM_i_LW(p, 1, scratchpad_offset(0), 0);
-			}
 		} else {
 			uasm_i_nop(p);
 		}
author maintainer
#94 lore raw

PATCH 84/119 arm64/speculation: Support mitigations= cmdline option

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a111b7c0f20e13b54df2fa959b3dc0bdf1925ae6 ]

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

[will: reorder checks so KASLR implies KPTI and SSBS is affected by cmdline]
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |    8 +++++---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  |    6 +++++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                  |    8 +++++++-
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5 -3
@@ -2389,8 +2389,8 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
-			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			[X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] Control optional mitigations for
+			CPU vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
@@ -2399,12 +2399,14 @@
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
 				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       kpti=0 [ARM64]
 					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
 					       nobp=0 [S390]
 					       nospectre_v1 [X86]
-					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 					       mds=off [X86]
 
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +5 -1
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
@@ -347,6 +348,9 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
 
 	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE;
+
 	/* delay setting __ssb_safe until we get a firmware response */
 	if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list))
 		this_cpu_safe = true;
@@ -544,7 +548,7 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm6
 	}
 
 	/* forced off */
-	if (__nospectre_v2) {
+	if (__nospectre_v2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
 		__hardenbp_enab = false;
 		return false;
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +7 -1
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
@@ -841,7 +842,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const st
 		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
 		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
 	};
-	char const *str = "command line option";
+	char const *str = "kpti command line option";
 	bool meltdown_safe;
 
 	meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list);
@@ -871,6 +872,11 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const st
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off() && !__kpti_forced) {
+		str = "mitigations=off";
+		__kpti_forced = -1;
+	}
+
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0)) {
 		pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
 		return false;
author maintainer
#96 lore raw

PATCH 86/119 staging: wlan-ng: fix exit return when sme->key_idx >= NUM_WEPKEYS

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>

commit 153c5d8191c26165dbbd2646448ca7207f7796d0 upstream.

Currently the exit return path when sme->key_idx >= NUM_WEPKEYS is via label 'exit' and this checks if result is non-zero, however result has not been initialized and contains garbage. Fix this by replacing the goto with a return with the error code.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Uninitialized scalar variable")

Fixes 0ca6d8e74489 ("Staging: wlan-ng: replace switch-case statements with macro")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/staging/wlan-ng/cfg80211.c |    6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/wlan-ng/cfg80211.c +2 -4
@@ -490,10 +490,8 @@ static int prism2_connect(struct wiphy *
 	/* Set the encryption - we only support wep */
 	if (is_wep) {
 		if (sme->key) {
-			if (sme->key_idx >= NUM_WEPKEYS) {
-				err = -EINVAL;
-				goto exit;
-			}
+			if (sme->key_idx >= NUM_WEPKEYS)
+				return -EINVAL;
 
 			result = prism2_domibset_uint32(wlandev,
 				DIDmib_dot11smt_dot11PrivacyTable_dot11WEPDefaultKeyID,
author maintainer
#97 lore raw

PATCH 87/119 scsi: sd: Ignore a failure to sync cache due to lack of authorization

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>

commit 21e3d6c81179bbdfa279efc8de456c34b814cfd2 upstream.

I've got a report about a UAS drive enclosure reporting back Sense: Logical unit access not authorized if the drive it holds is password protected. While the drive is obviously unusable in that state as a mass storage device, it still exists as a sd device and when the system is asked to perform a suspend of the drive, it will be sent a SYNCHRONIZE CACHE. If that fails due to password protection, the error must be ignored.

---
 drivers/scsi/sd.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/sd.c +2 -1
@@ -1658,7 +1658,8 @@ static int sd_sync_cache(struct scsi_dis
 		/* we need to evaluate the error return  */
 		if (scsi_sense_valid(sshdr) &&
 			(sshdr->asc == 0x3a ||	/* medium not present */
-			 sshdr->asc == 0x20))	/* invalid command */
+			 sshdr->asc == 0x20 ||	/* invalid command */
+			 (sshdr->asc == 0x74 && sshdr->ascq == 0x71)))	/* drive is password locked */
 				/* this is no error here */
 				return 0;
 
author maintainer
#63 lore raw

PATCH 53/119 arm64: capabilities: Prepare for grouping features and errata work arounds

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 600b9c919c2f4d07a7bf67864086aa3432224674 ]

We are about to group the handling of all capabilities (features and errata workarounds). This patch open codes the wrapper routines to make it easier to merge the handling.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c |   58 ++++++++++++-----------------------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +18 -40
@@ -485,7 +485,8 @@ static void __init init_cpu_ftr_reg(u32
 }
 
 extern const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[];
-static void update_cpu_errata_workarounds(void);
+static void update_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps,
+				    u16 scope_mask, const char *info);
 
 void __init init_cpu_features(struct cpuinfo_arm64 *info)
 {
@@ -528,7 +529,8 @@ void __init init_cpu_features(struct cpu
 	 * Run the errata work around checks on the boot CPU, once we have
 	 * initialised the cpu feature infrastructure.
 	 */
-	update_cpu_errata_workarounds();
+	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_ALL,
+				"enabling workaround for");
 }
 
 static void update_cpu_ftr_reg(struct arm64_ftr_reg *reg, u64 new)
@@ -1312,33 +1314,6 @@ verify_local_elf_hwcaps(const struct arm
 		}
 }
 
-static void verify_local_cpu_features(void)
-{
-	if (!__verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_features, SCOPE_ALL))
-		cpu_die_early();
-}
-
-/*
- * The CPU Errata work arounds are detected and applied at boot time
- * and the related information is freed soon after. If the new CPU requires
- * an errata not detected at boot, fail this CPU.
- */
-static void verify_local_cpu_errata_workarounds(void)
-{
-	if (!__verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_errata, SCOPE_ALL))
-		cpu_die_early();
-}
-
-static void update_cpu_errata_workarounds(void)
-{
-	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_ALL,
-				"enabling workaround for");
-}
-
-static void __init enable_errata_workarounds(void)
-{
-	enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_ALL);
-}
 
 /*
  * Run through the enabled system capabilities and enable() it on this CPU.
@@ -1350,8 +1325,15 @@ static void __init enable_errata_workaro
  */
 static void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void)
 {
-	verify_local_cpu_errata_workarounds();
-	verify_local_cpu_features();
+	/*
+	 * The CPU Errata work arounds are detected and applied at boot time
+	 * and the related information is freed soon after. If the new CPU
+	 * requires an errata not detected at boot, fail this CPU.
+	 */
+	if (!__verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_errata, SCOPE_ALL))
+		cpu_die_early();
+	if (!__verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_features, SCOPE_ALL))
+		cpu_die_early();
 	verify_local_elf_hwcaps(arm64_elf_hwcaps);
 	if (system_supports_32bit_el0())
 		verify_local_elf_hwcaps(compat_elf_hwcaps);
@@ -1372,17 +1354,12 @@ void check_local_cpu_capabilities(void)
 	 * advertised capabilities.
 	 */
 	if (!sys_caps_initialised)
-		update_cpu_errata_workarounds();
+		update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_ALL,
+					"enabling workaround for");
 	else
 		verify_local_cpu_capabilities();
 }
 
-static void __init setup_feature_capabilities(void)
-{
-	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_ALL, "detected:");
-	enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_ALL);
-}
-
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(arm64_const_caps_ready);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(arm64_const_caps_ready);
 
@@ -1405,8 +1382,9 @@ void __init setup_cpu_features(void)
 	int cls;
 
 	/* Set the CPU feature capabilies */
-	setup_feature_capabilities();
-	enable_errata_workarounds();
+	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_ALL, "detected:");
+	enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_ALL);
+	enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_ALL);
 	mark_const_caps_ready();
 	setup_elf_hwcaps(arm64_elf_hwcaps);
 
author maintainer
#99 lore raw

PATCH 89/119 scsi: core: try to get module before removing device

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yufen Yu <[email protected]>

commit 77c301287ebae86cc71d03eb3806f271cb14da79 upstream.

We have a test case like block/001 in blktests, which will create a scsi device by loading scsi_debug module and then try to delete the device by sysfs interface. At the same time, it may remove the scsi_debug module.

And getting a invalid paging request BUG_ON as following:

[   34.625854] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffa0016bb8
[   34.629189] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[   34.629618] CPU: 1 PID: 450 Comm: bash Tainted: G        W         5.4.0-rc3+ #473
[   34.632524] RIP: 0010:scsi_proc_hostdir_rm+0x5/0xa0
[   34.643555] CR2: ffffffffa0016bb8 CR3: 000000012cd88000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[   34.644545] Call Trace:
[   34.644907]  scsi_host_dev_release+0x6b/0x1f0
[   34.645511]  device_release+0x74/0x110
[   34.646046]  kobject_put+0x116/0x390
[   34.646559]  put_device+0x17/0x30
[   34.647041]  scsi_target_dev_release+0x2b/0x40
[   34.647652]  device_release+0x74/0x110
[   34.648186]  kobject_put+0x116/0x390
[   34.648691]  put_device+0x17/0x30
[   34.649157]  scsi_device_dev_release_usercontext+0x2e8/0x360
[   34.649953]  execute_in_process_context+0x29/0x80
[   34.650603]  scsi_device_dev_release+0x20/0x30
[   34.651221]  device_release+0x74/0x110
[   34.651732]  kobject_put+0x116/0x390
[   34.652230]  sysfs_unbreak_active_protection+0x3f/0x50
[   34.652935]  sdev_store_delete.cold.4+0x71/0x8f
[   34.653579]  dev_attr_store+0x1b/0x40
[   34.654103]  sysfs_kf_write+0x3d/0x60
[   34.654603]  kernfs_fop_write+0x174/0x250
[   34.655165]  __vfs_write+0x1f/0x60
[   34.655639]  vfs_write+0xc7/0x280
[   34.656117]  ksys_write+0x6d/0x140
[   34.656591]  __x64_sys_write+0x1e/0x30
[   34.657114]  do_syscall_64+0xb1/0x400
[   34.657627]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   34.658335] RIP: 0033:0x7f156f337130

During deleting scsi target, the scsi_debug module have been removed. Then, sdebug_driver_template belonged to the module cannot be accessd, resulting in scsi_proc_hostdir_rm() BUG_ON.

To fix the bug, we add scsi_device_get() in sdev_store_delete() to try to increase refcount of module, avoiding the module been removed.

---
 drivers/scsi/scsi_sysfs.c |   11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/scsi_sysfs.c +10 -1
@@ -722,6 +722,14 @@ sdev_store_delete(struct device *dev, st
 		  const char *buf, size_t count)
 {
 	struct kernfs_node *kn;
+	struct scsi_device *sdev = to_scsi_device(dev);
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to try to get module, avoiding the module been removed
+	 * during delete.
+	 */
+	if (scsi_device_get(sdev))
+		return -ENODEV;
 
 	kn = sysfs_break_active_protection(&dev->kobj, &attr->attr);
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(!kn);
@@ -736,9 +744,10 @@ sdev_store_delete(struct device *dev, st
 	 * state into SDEV_DEL.
 	 */
 	device_remove_file(dev, attr);
-	scsi_remove_device(to_scsi_device(dev));
+	scsi_remove_device(sdev);
 	if (kn)
 		sysfs_unbreak_active_protection(kn);
+	scsi_device_put(sdev);
 	return count;
 };
 static DEVICE_ATTR(delete, S_IWUSR, NULL, sdev_store_delete);
author maintainer
#100 lore raw

PATCH 90/119 scsi: ch: Make it possible to open a ch device multiple times again

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>

commit 6a0990eaa768dfb7064f06777743acc6d392084b upstream.

Clearing ch->device in ch_release() is wrong because that pointer must remain valid until ch_remove() is called. This patch fixes the following crash the second time a ch device is opened:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000790
RIP: 0010:scsi_device_get+0x5/0x60
Call Trace:
 ch_open+0x4c/0xa0 [ch]
 chrdev_open+0xa2/0x1c0
 do_dentry_open+0x13a/0x380
 path_openat+0x591/0x1470
 do_filp_open+0x91/0x100
 do_sys_open+0x184/0x220
 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x1a0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
---
 drivers/scsi/ch.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/ch.c +0 -1
@@ -578,7 +578,6 @@ ch_release(struct inode *inode, struct f
 	scsi_changer *ch = file->private_data;
 
 	scsi_device_put(ch->device);
-	ch->device = NULL;
 	file->private_data = NULL;
 	kref_put(&ch->ref, ch_destroy);
 	return 0;
author maintainer
#102 lore raw

PATCH 92/119 Input: synaptics-rmi4 - avoid processing unknown IRQs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Evan Green <[email protected]>

commit 363c53875aef8fce69d4a2d0873919ccc7d9e2ad upstream.

rmi_process_interrupt_requests() calls handle_nested_irq() for each interrupt status bit it finds. If the irq domain mapping for this bit had not yet been set up, then it ends up calling handle_nested_irq(0), which causes a NULL pointer dereference.

There's already code that masks the irq_status bits coming out of the hardware with current_irq_mask, presumably to avoid this situation. However current_irq_mask seems to more reflect the actual mask set in the hardware rather than the IRQs software has set up and registered for. For example, in rmi_driver_reset_handler(), the current_irq_mask is initialized based on what is read from the hardware. If the reset value of this mask enables IRQs that Linux has not set up yet, then we end up in this situation.

There appears to be a third unused bitmask that used to serve this purpose, fn_irq_bits. Use that bitmask instead of current_irq_mask to avoid calling handle_nested_irq() on IRQs that have not yet been set up.

---
 drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c +5 -1
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int rmi_process_interrupt_request
 	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&data->irq_mutex);
-	bitmap_and(data->irq_status, data->irq_status, data->current_irq_mask,
+	bitmap_and(data->irq_status, data->irq_status, data->fn_irq_bits,
 	       data->irq_count);
 	/*
 	 * At this point, irq_status has all bits that are set in the
@@ -412,6 +412,8 @@ static int rmi_driver_set_irq_bits(struc
 	bitmap_copy(data->current_irq_mask, data->new_irq_mask,
 		    data->num_of_irq_regs);
 
+	bitmap_or(data->fn_irq_bits, data->fn_irq_bits, mask, data->irq_count);
+
 error_unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&data->irq_mutex);
 	return error;
@@ -425,6 +427,8 @@ static int rmi_driver_clear_irq_bits(str
 	struct device *dev = &rmi_dev->dev;
 
 	mutex_lock(&data->irq_mutex);
+	bitmap_andnot(data->fn_irq_bits,
+		      data->fn_irq_bits, mask, data->irq_count);
 	bitmap_andnot(data->new_irq_mask,
 		  data->current_irq_mask, mask, data->irq_count);
 
author maintainer
#103 lore raw

PATCH 93/119 ASoC: rsnd: Reinitialize bit clock inversion flag for every format setting

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Junya Monden <[email protected]>

commit 22e58665a01006d05f0239621f7d41cacca96cc4 upstream.

Unlike other format-related DAI parameters, rdai->bit_clk_inv flag is not properly re-initialized when setting format for new stream processing. The inversion, if requested, is then applied not to default, but to a previous value, which leads to SCKP bit in SSICR register being set incorrectly.
Fix this by re-setting the flag to its initial value, determined by format.

Fixes 1a7889ca8aba3 ("ASoC: rsnd: fixup SND_SOC_DAIFMT_xB_xF behavior")
Cc Andrew Gabbasov <[email protected]>
Cc Jiada Wang <[email protected]>
Cc Timo Wischer <[email protected]>
Cc [email protected] # v3.17+
---
 sound/soc/sh/rcar/core.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/soc/sh/rcar/core.c +1 -0
@@ -676,6 +676,7 @@ static int rsnd_soc_dai_set_fmt(struct s
 	}
 
 	/* set format */
+	rdai->bit_clk_inv = 0;
 	switch (fmt & SND_SOC_DAIFMT_FORMAT_MASK) {
 	case SND_SOC_DAIFMT_I2S:
 		rdai->sys_delay = 0;
author maintainer
#105 lore raw

PATCH 95/119 mac80211: Reject malformed SSID elements

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

commit 4152561f5da3fca92af7179dd538ea89e248f9d0 upstream.

Although this shouldn't occur in practice, it's a good idea to bounds check the length field of the SSID element prior to using it for things like allocations or memcpy operations.

---
 net/mac80211/mlme.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/mac80211/mlme.c +3 -2
@@ -2430,7 +2430,8 @@ struct sk_buff *ieee80211_ap_probereq_ge
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	ssid = ieee80211_bss_get_ie(cbss, WLAN_EID_SSID);
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ssid == NULL))
+	if (WARN_ONCE(!ssid || ssid[1] > IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN,
+		      "invalid SSID element (len=%d)", ssid ? ssid[1] : -1))
 		ssid_len = 0;
 	else
 		ssid_len = ssid[1];
@@ -4756,7 +4757,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_assoc(struct ieee80211
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	ssidie = ieee80211_bss_get_ie(req->bss, WLAN_EID_SSID);
-	if (!ssidie) {
+	if (!ssidie || ssidie[1] > sizeof(assoc_data->ssid)) {
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		kfree(assoc_data);
 		return -EINVAL;
author maintainer
#65 lore raw

PATCH 55/119 arm64: capabilities: Allow features based on local CPU scope

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fbd890b9b8497bab04c1d338bd97579a7bc53fab ]

So far we have treated the feature capabilities as system wide and this wouldn't help with features that could be detected locally on one or more CPUs (e.g, KPTI, Software prefetch). This patch splits the feature detection to two phases :

1) Local CPU features are checked on all boot time active CPUs.
2) System wide features are checked only once after all CPUs are active.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c |   17 +++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +11 -6
@@ -485,6 +485,7 @@ static void __init init_cpu_ftr_reg(u32
 }
 
 extern const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[];
+static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[];
 static void update_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps,
 				    u16 scope_mask, const char *info);
 
@@ -526,11 +527,12 @@ void __init init_cpu_features(struct cpu
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Run the errata work around checks on the boot CPU, once we have
-	 * initialised the cpu feature infrastructure.
+	 * Run the errata work around and local feature checks on the
+	 * boot CPU, once we have initialised the cpu feature infrastructure.
 	 */
 	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
 				"enabling workaround for");
+	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, "detected:");
 }
 
 static void update_cpu_ftr_reg(struct arm64_ftr_reg *reg, u64 new)
@@ -1349,15 +1351,18 @@ void check_local_cpu_capabilities(void)
 
 	/*
 	 * If we haven't finalised the system capabilities, this CPU gets
-	 * a chance to update the errata work arounds.
+	 * a chance to update the errata work arounds and local features.
 	 * Otherwise, this CPU should verify that it has all the system
 	 * advertised capabilities.
 	 */
-	if (!sys_caps_initialised)
+	if (!sys_caps_initialised) {
 		update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
 					"enabling workaround for");
-	else
+		update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
+					"detected:");
+	} else {
 		verify_local_cpu_capabilities();
+	}
 }
 
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(arm64_const_caps_ready);
@@ -1382,7 +1387,7 @@ void __init setup_cpu_features(void)
 	int cls;
 
 	/* Set the CPU feature capabilies */
-	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_ALL, "detected:");
+	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_SYSTEM, "detected:");
 	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_SYSTEM,
 				"enabling workaround for");
 	enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_ALL);
author maintainer
#66 lore raw

PATCH 56/119 arm64: capabilities: Group handling of features and errata workarounds

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ed478b3f9e4ac97fdbe07007fb2662415de8fe25 ]

Now that the features and errata workarounds have the same rules and flow, group the handling of the tables.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c |   73 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +42 -31
@@ -485,9 +485,7 @@ static void __init init_cpu_ftr_reg(u32
 }
 
 extern const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[];
-static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[];
-static void update_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps,
-				    u16 scope_mask, const char *info);
+static void update_cpu_capabilities(u16 scope_mask);
 
 void __init init_cpu_features(struct cpuinfo_arm64 *info)
 {
@@ -530,9 +528,7 @@ void __init init_cpu_features(struct cpu
 	 * Run the errata work around and local feature checks on the
 	 * boot CPU, once we have initialised the cpu feature infrastructure.
 	 */
-	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
-				"enabling workaround for");
-	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, "detected:");
+	update_cpu_capabilities(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU);
 }
 
 static void update_cpu_ftr_reg(struct arm64_ftr_reg *reg, u64 new)
@@ -1167,8 +1163,8 @@ static bool __this_cpu_has_cap(const str
 	return false;
 }
 
-static void update_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps,
-				    u16 scope_mask, const char *info)
+static void __update_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps,
+				      u16 scope_mask, const char *info)
 {
 	scope_mask &= ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_MASK;
 	for (; caps->matches; caps++) {
@@ -1182,6 +1178,13 @@ static void update_cpu_capabilities(cons
 	}
 }
 
+static void update_cpu_capabilities(u16 scope_mask)
+{
+	__update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, scope_mask, "detected:");
+	__update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, scope_mask,
+				  "enabling workaround for");
+}
+
 static int __enable_cpu_capability(void *arg)
 {
 	const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap = arg;
@@ -1195,8 +1198,8 @@ static int __enable_cpu_capability(void
  * CPUs
  */
 static void __init
-enable_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps,
-			u16 scope_mask)
+__enable_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps,
+			  u16 scope_mask)
 {
 	scope_mask &= ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_MASK;
 	for (; caps->matches; caps++) {
@@ -1221,6 +1224,12 @@ enable_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm
 	}
 }
 
+static void __init enable_cpu_capabilities(u16 scope_mask)
+{
+	__enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, scope_mask);
+	__enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, scope_mask);
+}
+
 /*
  * Flag to indicate if we have computed the system wide
  * capabilities based on the boot time active CPUs. This
@@ -1294,6 +1303,12 @@ __verify_local_cpu_caps(const struct arm
 	return true;
 }
 
+static bool verify_local_cpu_caps(u16 scope_mask)
+{
+	return __verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_errata, scope_mask) &&
+	       __verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_features, scope_mask);
+}
+
 /*
  * Check for CPU features that are used in early boot
  * based on the Boot CPU value.
@@ -1327,15 +1342,9 @@ verify_local_elf_hwcaps(const struct arm
  */
 static void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void)
 {
-	/*
-	 * The CPU Errata work arounds are detected and applied at boot time
-	 * and the related information is freed soon after. If the new CPU
-	 * requires an errata not detected at boot, fail this CPU.
-	 */
-	if (!__verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_errata, SCOPE_ALL))
-		cpu_die_early();
-	if (!__verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_features, SCOPE_ALL))
+	if (!verify_local_cpu_caps(SCOPE_ALL))
 		cpu_die_early();
+
 	verify_local_elf_hwcaps(arm64_elf_hwcaps);
 	if (system_supports_32bit_el0())
 		verify_local_elf_hwcaps(compat_elf_hwcaps);
@@ -1355,14 +1364,10 @@ void check_local_cpu_capabilities(void)
 	 * Otherwise, this CPU should verify that it has all the system
 	 * advertised capabilities.
 	 */
-	if (!sys_caps_initialised) {
-		update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
-					"enabling workaround for");
-		update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
-					"detected:");
-	} else {
+	if (!sys_caps_initialised)
+		update_cpu_capabilities(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU);
+	else
 		verify_local_cpu_capabilities();
-	}
 }
 
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(arm64_const_caps_ready);
@@ -1381,17 +1386,23 @@ bool this_cpu_has_cap(unsigned int cap)
 		__this_cpu_has_cap(arm64_errata, cap));
 }
 
+static void __init setup_system_capabilities(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * We have finalised the system-wide safe feature
+	 * registers, finalise the capabilities that depend
+	 * on it. Also enable all the available capabilities.
+	 */
+	update_cpu_capabilities(SCOPE_SYSTEM);
+	enable_cpu_capabilities(SCOPE_ALL);
+}
+
 void __init setup_cpu_features(void)
 {
 	u32 cwg;
 	int cls;
 
-	/* Set the CPU feature capabilies */
-	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_SYSTEM, "detected:");
-	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_SYSTEM,
-				"enabling workaround for");
-	enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_ALL);
-	enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_ALL);
+	setup_system_capabilities();
 	mark_const_caps_ready();
 	setup_elf_hwcaps(arm64_elf_hwcaps);
 
author maintainer
#67 lore raw

PATCH 57/119 arm64: capabilities: Introduce weak features based on local CPU

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5c137714dd8cae464dbd5f028c07af149e6d09fc ]

Now that we have the flexibility of defining system features based on individual CPUs, introduce CPU feature type that can be detected on a local SCOPE and ignores the conflict on late CPUs. This is applicable for ARM64_HAS_NO_HW_PREFETCH, where it is fine for the system to have CPUs without hardware prefetch turning up later. We only suffer a performance penalty, nothing fatal.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |    8 ++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c      |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +8 -0
@@ -235,6 +235,14 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_re
  */
 #define ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE	\
 	(ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM | ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU)
+/*
+ * CPU feature detected at boot time based on feature of one or more CPUs.
+ * All possible conflicts for a late CPU are ignored.
+ */
+#define ARM64_CPUCAP_WEAK_LOCAL_CPU_FEATURE		\
+	(ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU		|	\
+	 ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU	|	\
+	 ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU)
 
 struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {
 	const char *desc;
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +1 -1
@@ -959,7 +959,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		.desc = "Software prefetching using PRFM",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_NO_HW_PREFETCH,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_WEAK_LOCAL_CPU_FEATURE,
 		.matches = has_no_hw_prefetch,
 	},
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_UAO
author maintainer
#68 lore raw

PATCH 58/119 arm64: capabilities: Restrict KPTI detection to boot-time CPUs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d3aec8a28be3b88bf75442e7c24fd9da8d69a6df ]

KPTI is treated as a system wide feature and is only detected if all the CPUs in the sysetm needs the defense, unless it is forced via kernel command line. This leaves a system with a mix of CPUs with and without the defense vulnerable. Also, if a late CPU needs KPTI but KPTI was not activated at boot time, the CPU is currently allowed to boot, which is a potential security vulnerability.
This patch ensures that the KPTI is turned on if at least one CPU detects the capability (i.e, change scope to SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU). Also rejetcs a late CPU, if it requires the defense, when the system hasn't enabled it,

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |    9 +++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c      |   16 +++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +9 -0
@@ -244,6 +244,15 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_re
 	 ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU	|	\
 	 ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU)
 
+/*
+ * CPU feature detected at boot time, on one or more CPUs. A late CPU
+ * is not allowed to have the capability when the system doesn't have it.
+ * It is Ok for a late CPU to miss the feature.
+ */
+#define ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_RESTRICTED_CPU_LOCAL_FEATURE	\
+	(ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU		|	\
+	 ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU)
+
 struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {
 	const char *desc;
 	u16 capability;
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +11 -5
@@ -824,10 +824,9 @@ static bool has_no_fpsimd(const struct a
 static int __kpti_forced; /* 0: not forced, >0: forced on, <0: forced off */
 
 static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
-				int __unused)
+				int scope)
 {
 	char const *str = "command line option";
-	u64 pfr0 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1);
 
 	/*
 	 * For reasons that aren't entirely clear, enabling KPTI on Cavium
@@ -863,8 +862,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const st
 	}
 
 	/* Defer to CPU feature registers */
-	return !cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0,
-						     ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT);
+	return !has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
 }
 
 static void
@@ -1011,7 +1009,15 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		.desc = "Kernel page table isolation (KPTI)",
 		.capability = ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_RESTRICTED_CPU_LOCAL_FEATURE,
+		/*
+		 * The ID feature fields below are used to indicate that
+		 * the CPU doesn't need KPTI. See unmap_kernel_at_el0 for
+		 * more details.
+		 */
+		.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1,
+		.field_pos = ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT,
+		.min_field_value = 1,
 		.matches = unmap_kernel_at_el0,
 		.cpu_enable = kpti_install_ng_mappings,
 	},
author maintainer
#59 lore raw

PATCH 49/119 arm64: capabilities: Prepare for fine grained capabilities

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 143ba05d867af34827faf99e0eed4de27106c7cb ]

We use arm64_cpu_capabilities to represent CPU ELF HWCAPs exposed to the userspace and the CPU hwcaps used by the kernel, which include cpu features and CPU errata work arounds. Capabilities have some properties that decide how they should be treated :

1) Detection, i.e scope : A cap could be "detected" either :
- if it is present on at least one CPU (SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) Or
- if it is present on all the CPUs (SCOPE_SYSTEM)

2) When is it enabled ? - A cap is treated as "enabled" when the system takes some action based on whether the capability is detected or not. e.g, setting some control register, patching the kernel code. Right now, we treat all caps are enabled at boot-time, after all the CPUs are brought up by the kernel. But there are certain caps, which are enabled early during the boot (e.g, VHE, GIC_CPUIF for NMI) and kernel starts using them, even before the secondary CPUs are brought up. We would need a way to describe this for each capability.

3) Conflict on a late CPU - When a CPU is brought up, it is checked against the caps that are known to be enabled on the system (via verify_local_cpu_capabilities()). Based on the state of the capability on the CPU vs. that of System we could have the following combinations of conflict.

	x-----------------------------x
	| Type	| System   | Late CPU |
	------------------------------|
	|  a    |   y      |    n     |
	------------------------------|
	|  b    |   n      |    y     |
	x-----------------------------x

Case (a) is not permitted for caps which are system features, which the system expects all the CPUs to have (e.g VHE). While (a) is ignored for all errata work arounds. However, there could be exceptions to the plain filtering approach. e.g, KPTI is an optional feature for a late CPU as long as the system already enables it.

Case (b) is not permitted for errata work arounds which requires some work around, which cannot be delayed. And we ignore (b) for features. Here, yet again, KPTI is an exception, where if a late CPU needs KPTI we are too late to enable it (because we change the allocation of ASIDs etc).

So this calls for a lot more fine grained behavior for each capability. And if we define all the attributes to control their behavior properly, we may be able to use a single table for the CPU hwcaps (which cover errata and features, not the ELF HWCAPs). This is a prepartory step to get there. More bits would be added for the properties listed above.

We are going to use a bit-mask to encode all the properties of a capabilities. This patch encodes the "SCOPE" of the capability.

As such there is no change in how the capabilities are treated.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |  105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c      |   12 ++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c      |   34 +++++------
 3 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +99 -6
@@ -85,16 +85,104 @@ struct arm64_ftr_reg {
 
 extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0;
 
-/* scope of capability check */
-enum {
-	SCOPE_SYSTEM,
-	SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
-};
+/*
+ * CPU capabilities:
+ *
+ * We use arm64_cpu_capabilities to represent system features, errata work
+ * arounds (both used internally by kernel and tracked in cpu_hwcaps) and
+ * ELF HWCAPs (which are exposed to user).
+ *
+ * To support systems with heterogeneous CPUs, we need to make sure that we
+ * detect the capabilities correctly on the system and take appropriate
+ * measures to ensure there are no incompatibilities.
+ *
+ * This comment tries to explain how we treat the capabilities.
+ * Each capability has the following list of attributes :
+ *
+ * 1) Scope of Detection : The system detects a given capability by
+ *    performing some checks at runtime. This could be, e.g, checking the
+ *    value of a field in CPU ID feature register or checking the cpu
+ *    model. The capability provides a call back ( @matches() ) to
+ *    perform the check. Scope defines how the checks should be performed.
+ *    There are two cases:
+ *
+ *     a) SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU: check all the CPUs and "detect" if at least one
+ *        matches. This implies, we have to run the check on all the
+ *        booting CPUs, until the system decides that state of the
+ *        capability is finalised. (See section 2 below)
+ *		Or
+ *     b) SCOPE_SYSTEM: check all the CPUs and "detect" if all the CPUs
+ *        matches. This implies, we run the check only once, when the
+ *        system decides to finalise the state of the capability. If the
+ *        capability relies on a field in one of the CPU ID feature
+ *        registers, we use the sanitised value of the register from the
+ *        CPU feature infrastructure to make the decision.
+ *
+ *    The process of detection is usually denoted by "update" capability
+ *    state in the code.
+ *
+ * 2) Finalise the state : The kernel should finalise the state of a
+ *    capability at some point during its execution and take necessary
+ *    actions if any. Usually, this is done, after all the boot-time
+ *    enabled CPUs are brought up by the kernel, so that it can make
+ *    better decision based on the available set of CPUs. However, there
+ *    are some special cases, where the action is taken during the early
+ *    boot by the primary boot CPU. (e.g, running the kernel at EL2 with
+ *    Virtualisation Host Extensions). The kernel usually disallows any
+ *    changes to the state of a capability once it finalises the capability
+ *    and takes any action, as it may be impossible to execute the actions
+ *    safely. A CPU brought up after a capability is "finalised" is
+ *    referred to as "Late CPU" w.r.t the capability. e.g, all secondary
+ *    CPUs are treated "late CPUs" for capabilities determined by the boot
+ *    CPU.
+ *
+ * 3) Verification: When a CPU is brought online (e.g, by user or by the
+ *    kernel), the kernel should make sure that it is safe to use the CPU,
+ *    by verifying that the CPU is compliant with the state of the
+ *    capabilities finalised already. This happens via :
+ *
+ *	secondary_start_kernel()-> check_local_cpu_capabilities()
+ *
+ *    As explained in (2) above, capabilities could be finalised at
+ *    different points in the execution. Each CPU is verified against the
+ *    "finalised" capabilities and if there is a conflict, the kernel takes
+ *    an action, based on the severity (e.g, a CPU could be prevented from
+ *    booting or cause a kernel panic). The CPU is allowed to "affect" the
+ *    state of the capability, if it has not been finalised already.
+ *
+ * 4) Action: As mentioned in (2), the kernel can take an action for each
+ *    detected capability, on all CPUs on the system. Appropriate actions
+ *    include, turning on an architectural feature, modifying the control
+ *    registers (e.g, SCTLR, TCR etc.) or patching the kernel via
+ *    alternatives. The kernel patching is batched and performed at later
+ *    point. The actions are always initiated only after the capability
+ *    is finalised. This is usally denoted by "enabling" the capability.
+ *    The actions are initiated as follows :
+ *	a) Action is triggered on all online CPUs, after the capability is
+ *	finalised, invoked within the stop_machine() context from
+ *	enable_cpu_capabilitie().
+ *
+ *	b) Any late CPU, brought up after (1), the action is triggered via:
+ *
+ *	  check_local_cpu_capabilities() -> verify_local_cpu_capabilities()
+ *
+ */
+
+
+/* Decide how the capability is detected. On a local CPU vs System wide */
+#define ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU		((u16)BIT(0))
+#define ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM		((u16)BIT(1))
+#define ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_MASK			\
+	(ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM	|	\
+	 ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
+
+#define SCOPE_SYSTEM				ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM
+#define SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU				ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU
 
 struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {
 	const char *desc;
 	u16 capability;
-	int def_scope;			/* default scope */
+	u16 type;
 	bool (*matches)(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps, int scope);
 	/*
 	 * Take the appropriate actions to enable this capability for this CPU.
@@ -119,6 +207,11 @@ struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {
 	};
 };
 
+static inline int cpucap_default_scope(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap)
+{
+	return cap->type & ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_MASK;
+}
+
 extern DECLARE_BITMAP(cpu_hwcaps, ARM64_NCAPS);
 extern struct static_key_false cpu_hwcap_keys[ARM64_NCAPS];
 extern struct static_key_false arm64_const_caps_ready;
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +6 -6
@@ -406,14 +406,14 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
 #endif	/* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
 
 #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \
-	.def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, \
+	.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, \
 	.matches = is_affected_midr_range, \
 	.midr_model = model, \
 	.midr_range_min = min, \
 	.midr_range_max = max
 
 #define MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(model) \
-	.def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, \
+	.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, \
 	.matches = is_affected_midr_range, \
 	.midr_model = model, \
 	.midr_range_min = 0, \
@@ -517,14 +517,14 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 		.desc = "Mismatched cache line size",
 		.capability = ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_LINE_SIZE,
 		.matches = has_mismatched_cache_type,
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
 		.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access,
 	},
 	{
 		.desc = "Mismatched cache type",
 		.capability = ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_TYPE,
 		.matches = has_mismatched_cache_type,
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
 		.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access,
 	},
 #ifdef CONFIG_QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_1003
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 	{
 		.desc = "Qualcomm Technologies Kryo erratum 1003",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003,
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
 		.midr_model = MIDR_QCOM_KRYO,
 		.matches = is_kryo_midr,
 	},
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
 	{
 		.desc = "Speculative Store Bypass Disable",
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
 		.capability = ARM64_SSBD,
 		.matches = has_ssbd_mitigation,
 	},
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +17 -17
@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		.desc = "GIC system register CPU interface",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_SYSREG_GIC_CPUIF,
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
 		.matches = has_useable_gicv3_cpuif,
 		.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1,
 		.field_pos = ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT,
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		.desc = "Privileged Access Never",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_PAN,
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
 		.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
 		.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1,
 		.field_pos = ID_AA64MMFR1_PAN_SHIFT,
@@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		.desc = "LSE atomic instructions",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_LSE_ATOMICS,
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
 		.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
 		.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1,
 		.field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR0_ATOMICS_SHIFT,
@@ -959,14 +959,14 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		.desc = "Software prefetching using PRFM",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_NO_HW_PREFETCH,
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
 		.matches = has_no_hw_prefetch,
 	},
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_UAO
 	{
 		.desc = "User Access Override",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_UAO,
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
 		.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
 		.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1,
 		.field_pos = ID_AA64MMFR2_UAO_SHIFT,
@@ -980,21 +980,21 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PAN
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_ALT_PAN_NOT_UAO,
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
 		.matches = cpufeature_pan_not_uao,
 	},
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PAN */
 	{
 		.desc = "Virtualization Host Extensions",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN,
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
 		.matches = runs_at_el2,
 		.cpu_enable = cpu_copy_el2regs,
 	},
 	{
 		.desc = "32-bit EL0 Support",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0,
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
 		.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
 		.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1,
 		.sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
@@ -1004,14 +1004,14 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		.desc = "Reduced HYP mapping offset",
 		.capability = ARM64_HYP_OFFSET_LOW,
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
 		.matches = hyp_offset_low,
 	},
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 	{
 		.desc = "Kernel page table isolation (KPTI)",
 		.capability = ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0,
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
 		.matches = unmap_kernel_at_el0,
 		.cpu_enable = kpti_install_ng_mappings,
 	},
@@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		/* FP/SIMD is not implemented */
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_NO_FPSIMD,
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
 		.min_field_value = 0,
 		.matches = has_no_fpsimd,
 	},
@@ -1027,7 +1027,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{
 		.desc = "Data cache clean to Point of Persistence",
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_DCPOP,
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,
 		.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
 		.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1,
 		.field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT,
@@ -1037,16 +1037,16 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	{},
 };
 
-#define HWCAP_CAP(reg, field, s, min_value, type, cap)	\
+#define HWCAP_CAP(reg, field, s, min_value, cap_type, cap)	\
 	{							\
 		.desc = #cap,					\
-		.def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM,			\
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_SYSTEM,		\
 		.matches = has_cpuid_feature,			\
 		.sys_reg = reg,					\
 		.field_pos = field,				\
 		.sign = s,					\
 		.min_field_value = min_value,			\
-		.hwcap_type = type,				\
+		.hwcap_type = cap_type,				\
 		.hwcap = cap,					\
 	}
 
@@ -1140,7 +1140,7 @@ static void __init setup_elf_hwcaps(cons
 	/* We support emulation of accesses to CPU ID feature registers */
 	elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_CPUID;
 	for (; hwcaps->matches; hwcaps++)
-		if (hwcaps->matches(hwcaps, hwcaps->def_scope))
+		if (hwcaps->matches(hwcaps, cpucap_default_scope(hwcaps)))
 			cap_set_elf_hwcap(hwcaps);
 }
 
@@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@ static void update_cpu_capabilities(cons
 				    const char *info)
 {
 	for (; caps->matches; caps++) {
-		if (!caps->matches(caps, caps->def_scope))
+		if (!caps->matches(caps, cpucap_default_scope(caps)))
 			continue;
 
 		if (!cpus_have_cap(caps->capability) && caps->desc)
author maintainer
#107 lore raw

PATCH 97/119 drm/amdgpu: Bail earlier when amdgpu.cik_/si_support is not set to 1

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

commit 984d7a929ad68b7be9990fc9c5cfa5d5c9fc7942 upstream.

Bail from the pci_driver probe function instead of from the drm_driver load function.

This avoid /dev/dri/card0 temporarily getting registered and then unregistered again, sending unwanted add / remove udev events to userspace.

Specifically this avoids triggering the (userspace) bug fixed by this plymouth merge-request:
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/plymouth/plymouth/merge_requests/59

Note that despite that being a userspace bug, not sending unnecessary udev events is a good idea in general.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c |   35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_kms.c |   35 --------------------------------
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c +35 -0
@@ -572,6 +572,41 @@ static int amdgpu_pci_probe(struct pci_d
 	if (ret == -EPROBE_DEFER)
 		return ret;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DRM_AMDGPU_SI
+	if (!amdgpu_si_support) {
+		switch (flags & AMD_ASIC_MASK) {
+		case CHIP_TAHITI:
+		case CHIP_PITCAIRN:
+		case CHIP_VERDE:
+		case CHIP_OLAND:
+		case CHIP_HAINAN:
+			dev_info(&pdev->dev,
+				 "SI support provided by radeon.\n");
+			dev_info(&pdev->dev,
+				 "Use radeon.si_support=0 amdgpu.si_support=1 to override.\n"
+				);
+			return -ENODEV;
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_DRM_AMDGPU_CIK
+	if (!amdgpu_cik_support) {
+		switch (flags & AMD_ASIC_MASK) {
+		case CHIP_KAVERI:
+		case CHIP_BONAIRE:
+		case CHIP_HAWAII:
+		case CHIP_KABINI:
+		case CHIP_MULLINS:
+			dev_info(&pdev->dev,
+				 "CIK support provided by radeon.\n");
+			dev_info(&pdev->dev,
+				 "Use radeon.cik_support=0 amdgpu.cik_support=1 to override.\n"
+				);
+			return -ENODEV;
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
 	/* Get rid of things like offb */
 	ret = amdgpu_kick_out_firmware_fb(pdev);
 	if (ret)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_kms.c +0 -35
@@ -87,41 +87,6 @@ int amdgpu_driver_load_kms(struct drm_de
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev;
 	int r, acpi_status;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DRM_AMDGPU_SI
-	if (!amdgpu_si_support) {
-		switch (flags & AMD_ASIC_MASK) {
-		case CHIP_TAHITI:
-		case CHIP_PITCAIRN:
-		case CHIP_VERDE:
-		case CHIP_OLAND:
-		case CHIP_HAINAN:
-			dev_info(dev->dev,
-				 "SI support provided by radeon.\n");
-			dev_info(dev->dev,
-				 "Use radeon.si_support=0 amdgpu.si_support=1 to override.\n"
-				);
-			return -ENODEV;
-		}
-	}
-#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_DRM_AMDGPU_CIK
-	if (!amdgpu_cik_support) {
-		switch (flags & AMD_ASIC_MASK) {
-		case CHIP_KAVERI:
-		case CHIP_BONAIRE:
-		case CHIP_HAWAII:
-		case CHIP_KABINI:
-		case CHIP_MULLINS:
-			dev_info(dev->dev,
-				 "CIK support provided by radeon.\n");
-			dev_info(dev->dev,
-				 "Use radeon.cik_support=0 amdgpu.cik_support=1 to override.\n"
-				);
-			return -ENODEV;
-		}
-	}
-#endif
-
 	adev = kzalloc(sizeof(struct amdgpu_device), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (adev == NULL) {
 		return -ENOMEM;
author maintainer
#116 lore raw

PATCH 106/119 CIFS: avoid using MID 0xFFFF

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Roberto Bergantinos Corpas <[email protected]>

commit 03d9a9fe3f3aec508e485dd3dcfa1e99933b4bdb upstream.

According to MS-CIFS specification MID 0xFFFF should not be used by the CIFS client, but we actually do. Besides, this has proven to cause races leading to oops between SendReceive2/cifs_demultiplex_thread. On SMB1, MID is a 2 byte value easy to reach in CurrentMid which may conflict with an oplock break notification request coming from server

---
 fs/cifs/smb1ops.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/cifs/smb1ops.c +3 -0
@@ -181,6 +181,9 @@ cifs_get_next_mid(struct TCP_Server_Info
 	/* we do not want to loop forever */
 	last_mid = cur_mid;
 	cur_mid++;
+	/* avoid 0xFFFF MID */
+	if (cur_mid == 0xffff)
+		cur_mid++;
 
 	/*
 	 * This nested loop looks more expensive than it is.
author maintainer
#117 lore raw

PATCH 107/119 x86/boot/64: Make level2_kernel_pgt pages invalid outside kernel area

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Steve Wahl <[email protected]>

commit 2aa85f246c181b1fa89f27e8e20c5636426be624 upstream.

Our hardware (UV aka Superdome Flex) has address ranges marked reserved by the BIOS. Access to these ranges is caught as an error, causing the BIOS to halt the system.

Initial page tables mapped a large range of physical addresses that were not checked against the list of BIOS reserved addresses, and sometimes included reserved addresses in part of the mapped range. Including the reserved range in the map allowed processor speculative accesses to the reserved range, triggering a BIOS halt.

Used early in booting, the page table level2_kernel_pgt addresses 1 GiB divided into 2 MiB pages, and it was set up to linearly map a full
1 GiB of physical addresses that included the physical address range
of the kernel image, as chosen by KASLR. But this also included a large range of unused addresses on either side of the kernel image. And unlike the kernel image's physical address range, this extra mapped space was not checked against the BIOS tables of usable RAM addresses. So there were times when the addresses chosen by KASLR would result in processor accessible mappings of BIOS reserved physical addresses.

The kernel code did not directly access any of this extra mapped space, but having it mapped allowed the processor to issue speculative accesses into reserved memory, causing system halts.

This was encountered somewhat rarely on a normal system boot, and much more often when starting the crash kernel if "crashkernel=512M,high" was specified on the command line (this heavily restricts the physical address of the crash kernel, in our case usually within 1 GiB of reserved space).

The solution is to invalidate the pages of this table outside the kernel image's space before the page table is activated. It fixes this problem on our hardware.

[ bp: Touchups. ]

---
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c +20 -2
@@ -145,13 +145,31 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsign
 	 * we might write invalid pmds, when the kernel is relocated
 	 * cleanup_highmap() fixes this up along with the mappings
 	 * beyond _end.
+	 *
+	 * Only the region occupied by the kernel image has so far
+	 * been checked against the table of usable memory regions
+	 * provided by the firmware, so invalidate pages outside that
+	 * region. A page table entry that maps to a reserved area of
+	 * memory would allow processor speculation into that area,
+	 * and on some hardware (particularly the UV platform) even
+	 * speculative access to some reserved areas is caught as an
+	 * error, causing the BIOS to halt the system.
 	 */
 
 	pmd = fixup_pointer(level2_kernel_pgt, physaddr);
-	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++) {
+
+	/* invalidate pages before the kernel image */
+	for (i = 0; i < pmd_index((unsigned long)_text); i++)
+		pmd[i] &= ~_PAGE_PRESENT;
+
+	/* fixup pages that are part of the kernel image */
+	for (; i <= pmd_index((unsigned long)_end); i++)
 		if (pmd[i] & _PAGE_PRESENT)
 			pmd[i] += load_delta;
-	}
+
+	/* invalidate pages after the kernel image */
+	for (; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++)
+		pmd[i] &= ~_PAGE_PRESENT;
 
 	/*
 	 * Fixup phys_base - remove the memory encryption mask to obtain
author maintainer
#118 lore raw

PATCH 108/119 pinctrl: armada-37xx: fix control of pins 32 and up

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Patrick Williams <[email protected]>

commit 20504fa1d2ffd5d03cdd9dc9c9dd4ed4579b97ef upstream.

The 37xx configuration registers are only 32 bits long, so pins 32-35 spill over into the next register. The calculation for the register address was done, but the bitmask was not, so any configuration to pin 32 or above resulted in a bitmask that overflowed and performed no action.

Fix the register / offset calculation to also adjust the offset.

---
 drivers/pinctrl/mvebu/pinctrl-armada-37xx.c |   18 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/pinctrl/mvebu/pinctrl-armada-37xx.c +9 -9
@@ -205,11 +205,11 @@ static const struct armada_37xx_pin_data
 };
 
 static inline void armada_37xx_update_reg(unsigned int *reg,
-					  unsigned int offset)
+					  unsigned int *offset)
 {
 	/* We never have more than 2 registers */
-	if (offset >= GPIO_PER_REG) {
-		offset -= GPIO_PER_REG;
+	if (*offset >= GPIO_PER_REG) {
+		*offset -= GPIO_PER_REG;
 		*reg += sizeof(u32);
 	}
 }
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static inline void armada_37xx_irq_updat
 {
 	int offset = irqd_to_hwirq(d);
 
-	armada_37xx_update_reg(reg, offset);
+	armada_37xx_update_reg(reg, &offset);
 }
 
 static int armada_37xx_gpio_direction_input(struct gpio_chip *chip,
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ static int armada_37xx_gpio_direction_in
 	unsigned int reg = OUTPUT_EN;
 	unsigned int mask;
 
-	armada_37xx_update_reg(&reg, offset);
+	armada_37xx_update_reg(&reg, &offset);
 	mask = BIT(offset);
 
 	return regmap_update_bits(info->regmap, reg, mask, 0);
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static int armada_37xx_gpio_get_directio
 	unsigned int reg = OUTPUT_EN;
 	unsigned int val, mask;
 
-	armada_37xx_update_reg(&reg, offset);
+	armada_37xx_update_reg(&reg, &offset);
 	mask = BIT(offset);
 	regmap_read(info->regmap, reg, &val);
 
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static int armada_37xx_gpio_direction_ou
 	unsigned int reg = OUTPUT_EN;
 	unsigned int mask, val, ret;
 
-	armada_37xx_update_reg(&reg, offset);
+	armada_37xx_update_reg(&reg, &offset);
 	mask = BIT(offset);
 
 	ret = regmap_update_bits(info->regmap, reg, mask, mask);
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ static int armada_37xx_gpio_get(struct g
 	unsigned int reg = INPUT_VAL;
 	unsigned int val, mask;
 
-	armada_37xx_update_reg(&reg, offset);
+	armada_37xx_update_reg(&reg, &offset);
 	mask = BIT(offset);
 
 	regmap_read(info->regmap, reg, &val);
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ static void armada_37xx_gpio_set(struct
 	unsigned int reg = OUTPUT_VAL;
 	unsigned int mask, val;
 
-	armada_37xx_update_reg(&reg, offset);
+	armada_37xx_update_reg(&reg, &offset);
 	mask = BIT(offset);
 	val = value ? mask : 0;
 
author maintainer
#120 lore raw

PATCH 110/119 btrfs: block-group: Fix a memory leak due to missing btrfs_put_block_group()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>

commit 4b654acdae850f48b8250b9a578a4eaa518c7a6f upstream.

In btrfs_read_block_groups(), if we have an invalid block group which has mixed type (DATA|METADATA) while the fs doesn't have MIXED_GROUPS feature, we error out without freeing the block group cache.

This patch will add the missing btrfs_put_block_group() to prevent memory leak.

Note for stable backports: the file to patch in versions <= 5.3 is fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c

Fixes 49303381f19a ("Btrfs: bail out if block group has different mixed flag")
---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +1 -0
@@ -10255,6 +10255,7 @@ int btrfs_read_block_groups(struct btrfs
 			btrfs_err(info,
 "bg %llu is a mixed block group but filesystem hasn't enabled mixed block groups",
 				  cache->key.objectid);
+			btrfs_put_block_group(cache);
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			goto error;
 		}
author maintainer
#122 lore raw

PATCH 112/119 cpufreq: Avoid cpufreq_suspend() deadlock on system shutdown

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>

commit 65650b35133ff20f0c9ef0abd5c3c66dbce3ae57 upstream.

It is incorrect to set the cpufreq syscore shutdown callback pointer to cpufreq_suspend(), because that function cannot be run in the syscore stage of system shutdown for two reasons: (a) it may attempt to carry out actions depending on devices that have already been shut down at that point and (b) the RCU synchronization carried out by it may not be able to make progress then.

The latter issue has been present since commit 45975c7d21a1 ("rcu:
Define RCU-sched API in terms of RCU for Tree RCU PREEMPT builds"), but the former one has been there since commit 90de2a4aa9f3 ("cpufreq:
suspend cpufreq governors on shutdown") regardless.

Fix that by dropping cpufreq_syscore_ops altogether and making device_shutdown() call cpufreq_suspend() directly before shutting down devices, which is along the lines of what system-wide power management does.

Fixes 45975c7d21a1 ("rcu: Define RCU-sched API in terms of RCU for Tree RCU PREEMPT builds")
Fixes 90de2a4aa9f3 ("cpufreq: suspend cpufreq governors on shutdown")
Cc 4.0+ <[email protected]> # 4.0+
---
 drivers/base/core.c       |    3 +++
 drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c |   10 ----------
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/base/core.c +3 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
  *
  */
 
+#include <linux/cpufreq.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/fwnode.h>
@@ -2845,6 +2846,8 @@ void device_shutdown(void)
 	wait_for_device_probe();
 	device_block_probing();
 
+	cpufreq_suspend();
+
 	spin_lock(&devices_kset->list_lock);
 	/*
 	 * Walk the devices list backward, shutting down each in turn.
drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c +0 -10
@@ -2570,14 +2570,6 @@ int cpufreq_unregister_driver(struct cpu
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpufreq_unregister_driver);
 
-/*
- * Stop cpufreq at shutdown to make sure it isn't holding any locks
- * or mutexes when secondary CPUs are halted.
- */
-static struct syscore_ops cpufreq_syscore_ops = {
-	.shutdown = cpufreq_suspend,
-};
-
 struct kobject *cpufreq_global_kobject;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpufreq_global_kobject);
 
@@ -2589,8 +2581,6 @@ static int __init cpufreq_core_init(void
 	cpufreq_global_kobject = kobject_create_and_add("cpufreq", &cpu_subsys.dev_root->kobj);
 	BUG_ON(!cpufreq_global_kobject);
 
-	register_syscore_ops(&cpufreq_syscore_ops);
-
 	return 0;
 }
 module_param(off, int, 0444);
author maintainer
#123 lore raw

PATCH 113/119 xen/netback: fix error path of xenvif_connect_data()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>

commit 3d5c1a037d37392a6859afbde49be5ba6a70a6b3 upstream.

xenvif_connect_data() calls module_put() in case of error. This is wrong as there is no related module_get().

Remove the superfluous module_put().

Fixes 279f438e36c0a7 ("xen-netback: Don't destroy the netdev until the vif is shut down")
Cc <[email protected]> # 3.12
---
 drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c +0 -1
@@ -718,7 +718,6 @@ err_unmap:
 	xenvif_unmap_frontend_data_rings(queue);
 	netif_napi_del(&queue->napi);
 err:
-	module_put(THIS_MODULE);
 	return err;
 }
 
author maintainer
#124 lore raw

PATCH 114/119 PCI: PM: Fix pci_power_up()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>

commit 45144d42f299455911cc29366656c7324a3a7c97 upstream.

There is an arbitrary difference between the system resume and runtime resume code paths for PCI devices regarding the delay to apply when switching the devices from D3cold to D0.

Namely, pci_restore_standard_config() used in the runtime resume code path calls pci_set_power_state() which in turn invokes __pci_start_power_transition() to power up the device through the platform firmware and that function applies the transition delay (as per PCI Express Base Specification Revision 2.0, Section 6.6.1). However, pci_pm_default_resume_early() used in the system resume code path calls pci_power_up() which doesn't apply the delay at all and that causes issues to occur during resume from suspend-to-idle on some systems where the delay is required.

Since there is no reason for that difference to exist, modify pci_power_up() to follow pci_set_power_state() more closely and invoke __pci_start_power_transition() from there to call the platform firmware to power up the device (in case that's necessary).

---
 drivers/pci/pci.c |   24 +++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/pci.c +11 -13
@@ -749,19 +749,6 @@ void pci_update_current_state(struct pci
 }
 
 /**
- * pci_power_up - Put the given device into D0 forcibly
- * @dev: PCI device to power up
- */
-void pci_power_up(struct pci_dev *dev)
-{
-	if (platform_pci_power_manageable(dev))
-		platform_pci_set_power_state(dev, PCI_D0);
-
-	pci_raw_set_power_state(dev, PCI_D0);
-	pci_update_current_state(dev, PCI_D0);
-}
-
-/**
  * pci_platform_power_transition - Use platform to change device power state
  * @dev: PCI device to handle.
  * @state: State to put the device into.
@@ -940,6 +927,17 @@ int pci_set_power_state(struct pci_dev *
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(pci_set_power_state);
 
 /**
+ * pci_power_up - Put the given device into D0 forcibly
+ * @dev: PCI device to power up
+ */
+void pci_power_up(struct pci_dev *dev)
+{
+	__pci_start_power_transition(dev, PCI_D0);
+	pci_raw_set_power_state(dev, PCI_D0);
+	pci_update_current_state(dev, PCI_D0);
+}
+
+/**
  * pci_choose_state - Choose the power state of a PCI device
  * @dev: PCI device to be suspended
  * @state: target sleep state for the whole system. This is the value
author maintainer
#125 lore raw

PATCH 115/119 KVM: X86: introduce invalidate_gpa argument to tlb flush

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>

commit c2ba05ccfde2f069a66c0462e5b5ef8a517dcc9c upstream.

Introduce a new bool invalidate_gpa argument to kvm_x86_ops->tlb_flush, it will be used by later patches to just flush guest tlb.

For VMX, this will use INVVPID instead of INVEPT, which will invalidate combined mappings while keeping guest-physical mappings.

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc "Jitindar SIngh, Suraj" <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c              |   14 +++++++-------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c              |   21 +++++++++++----------
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |    6 +++---
 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	unsigned long (*get_rflags)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 	void (*set_rflags)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags);
 
-	void (*tlb_flush)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+	void (*tlb_flush)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool invalidate_gpa);
 
 	void (*run)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 	int (*handle_exit)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +7 -7
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static int vgif = true;
 module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
 
 static void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
-static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool invalidate_gpa);
 static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
 
 static int nested_svm_exit_handled(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
@@ -2097,7 +2097,7 @@ static int svm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *
 		return 1;
 
 	if (npt_enabled && ((old_cr4 ^ cr4) & X86_CR4_PGE))
-		svm_flush_tlb(vcpu);
+		svm_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
 
 	vcpu->arch.cr4 = cr4;
 	if (!npt_enabled)
@@ -2438,7 +2438,7 @@ static void nested_svm_set_tdp_cr3(struc
 
 	svm->vmcb->control.nested_cr3 = __sme_set(root);
 	mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_NPT);
-	svm_flush_tlb(vcpu);
+	svm_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
 }
 
 static void nested_svm_inject_npf_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
@@ -3111,7 +3111,7 @@ static bool nested_svm_vmrun(struct vcpu
 	svm->nested.intercept_exceptions = nested_vmcb->control.intercept_exceptions;
 	svm->nested.intercept            = nested_vmcb->control.intercept;
 
-	svm_flush_tlb(&svm->vcpu);
+	svm_flush_tlb(&svm->vcpu, true);
 	svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl = nested_vmcb->control.int_ctl | V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;
 	if (nested_vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_INTR_MASKING_MASK)
 		svm->vcpu.arch.hflags |= HF_VINTR_MASK;
@@ -4947,7 +4947,7 @@ static int svm_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool invalidate_gpa)
 {
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
 
@@ -5288,7 +5288,7 @@ static void svm_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu
 
 	svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = __sme_set(root);
 	mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
-	svm_flush_tlb(vcpu);
+	svm_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
 }
 
 static void set_tdp_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long root)
@@ -5302,7 +5302,7 @@ static void set_tdp_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu
 	svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
 	mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
 
-	svm_flush_tlb(vcpu);
+	svm_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
 }
 
 static int is_disabled(void)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +11 -10
@@ -4427,9 +4427,10 @@ static void exit_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *
 
 #endif
 
-static inline void __vmx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vpid)
+static inline void __vmx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vpid,
+				bool invalidate_gpa)
 {
-	if (enable_ept) {
+	if (enable_ept && (invalidate_gpa || !enable_vpid)) {
 		if (!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa))
 			return;
 		ept_sync_context(construct_eptp(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa));
@@ -4438,15 +4439,15 @@ static inline void __vmx_flush_tlb(struc
 	}
 }
 
-static void vmx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static void vmx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool invalidate_gpa)
 {
-	__vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, to_vmx(vcpu)->vpid);
+	__vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, to_vmx(vcpu)->vpid, invalidate_gpa);
 }
 
 static void vmx_flush_tlb_ept_only(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (enable_ept)
-		vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu);
+		vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
 }
 
 static void vmx_decache_cr0_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -4644,7 +4645,7 @@ static void vmx_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu
 		ept_load_pdptrs(vcpu);
 	}
 
-	vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu);
+	vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
 	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3);
 }
 
@@ -8314,7 +8315,7 @@ static int handle_invvpid(struct kvm_vcp
 		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
 	}
 
-	__vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, vmx->nested.vpid02);
+	__vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, vmx->nested.vpid02, true);
 	nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
 
 	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
@@ -11214,11 +11215,11 @@ static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcp
 			vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->nested.vpid02);
 			if (vmcs12->virtual_processor_id != vmx->nested.last_vpid) {
 				vmx->nested.last_vpid = vmcs12->virtual_processor_id;
-				__vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vpid02);
+				__vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vpid02, true);
 			}
 		} else {
 			vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->vpid);
-			vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu);
+			vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
 		}
 
 	}
@@ -11921,7 +11922,7 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struc
 		 * L1's vpid. TODO: move to a more elaborate solution, giving
 		 * each L2 its own vpid and exposing the vpid feature to L1.
 		 */
-		vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu);
+		vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
 	}
 	/* Restore posted intr vector. */
 	if (nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12))
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +3 -3
@@ -6943,10 +6943,10 @@ static void vcpu_scan_ioapic(struct kvm_
 	kvm_x86_ops->load_eoi_exitmap(vcpu, eoi_exit_bitmap);
 }
 
-static void kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static void kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool invalidate_gpa)
 {
 	++vcpu->stat.tlb_flush;
-	kvm_x86_ops->tlb_flush(vcpu);
+	kvm_x86_ops->tlb_flush(vcpu, invalidate_gpa);
 }
 
 void kvm_arch_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range(struct kvm *kvm,
@@ -7017,7 +7017,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_v
 		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC, vcpu))
 			kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu);
 		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu))
-			kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb(vcpu);
+			kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
 		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_REPORT_TPR_ACCESS, vcpu)) {
 			vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_TPR_ACCESS;
 			r = 0;
author maintainer
#108 lore raw

PATCH 98/119 drivers/base/memory.c: dont access uninitialized memmaps in soft_offline_page_store()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>

commit 641fe2e9387a36f9ee01d7c69382d1fe147a5e98 upstream.

Uninitialized memmaps contain garbage and in the worst case trigger kernel BUGs, especially with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING. They should not get touched.

Right now, when trying to soft-offline a PFN that resides on a memory block that was never onlined, one gets a misleading error with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING:

  :/# echo 5637144576 > /sys/devices/system/memory/soft_offline_page
  [   23.097167] soft offline: 0x150000 page already poisoned

But the actual result depends on the garbage in the memmap.

soft_offline_page() can only work with online pages, it returns -EIO in case of ZONE_DEVICE. Make sure to only forward pages that are online (iow, managed by the buddy) and, therefore, have an initialized memmap.

Add a check against pfn_to_online_page() and similarly return -EIO.

Fixes f1dd2cd13c4b ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") [visible after d0dc12e86b319]
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc "Rafael J. Wysocki" <[email protected]>
Cc <[email protected]> [4.13+]
---
 drivers/base/memory.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/base/memory.c +3 -0
@@ -552,6 +552,9 @@ store_soft_offline_page(struct device *d
 	pfn >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
 	if (!pfn_valid(pfn))
 		return -ENXIO;
+	/* Only online pages can be soft-offlined (esp., not ZONE_DEVICE). */
+	if (!pfn_to_online_page(pfn))
+		return -EIO;
 	ret = soft_offline_page(pfn_to_page(pfn), 0);
 	return ret == 0 ? count : ret;
 }
author maintainer
#127 lore raw

PATCH 117/119 kvm: apic: Flush TLB after APIC mode/address change if VPIDs are in use

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Junaid Shahid <[email protected]>

commit a468f2dbf921d02f5107378501693137a812999b upstream.

Currently, KVM flushes the TLB after a change to the APIC access page address or the APIC mode when EPT mode is enabled. However, even in shadow paging mode, a TLB flush is needed if VPIDs are being used, as specified in the Intel SDM Section 29.4.5.

So replace vmx_flush_tlb_ept_only() with vmx_flush_tlb(), which will flush if either EPT or VPIDs are in use.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |   14 ++++----------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +4 -10
@@ -4444,12 +4444,6 @@ static void vmx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcp
 	__vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, to_vmx(vcpu)->vpid, invalidate_gpa);
 }
 
-static void vmx_flush_tlb_ept_only(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-	if (enable_ept)
-		vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
-}
-
 static void vmx_decache_cr0_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	ulong cr0_guest_owned_bits = vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits;
@@ -9320,7 +9314,7 @@ static void vmx_set_virtual_x2apic_mode(
 	} else {
 		sec_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
 		sec_exec_control |= SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
-		vmx_flush_tlb_ept_only(vcpu);
+		vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
 	}
 	vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, sec_exec_control);
 
@@ -9348,7 +9342,7 @@ static void vmx_set_apic_access_page_add
 	    !nested_cpu_has2(get_vmcs12(&vmx->vcpu),
 			     SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) {
 		vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, hpa);
-		vmx_flush_tlb_ept_only(vcpu);
+		vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -11243,7 +11237,7 @@ static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcp
 		}
 	} else if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
 				   SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) {
-		vmx_flush_tlb_ept_only(vcpu);
+		vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -12198,7 +12192,7 @@ static void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm
 	} else if (!nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12) &&
 		   nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
 				   SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) {
-		vmx_flush_tlb_ept_only(vcpu);
+		vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
 	}
 
 	/* This is needed for same reason as it was needed in prepare_vmcs02 */
author maintainer
#128 lore raw

PATCH 118/119 kvm: vmx: Basic APIC virtualization controls have three settings

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>

commit 8d860bbeedef97fe981d28fa7b71d77f3b29563f upstream.

Previously, we toggled between SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE and SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES, depending on whether or not the EXTD bit was set in MSR_IA32_APICBASE. However, if the local APIC is disabled, we should not set either of these APIC virtualization control bits.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |    2 -
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c            |   12 ++++------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c              |    4 +--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c              |   48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	void (*hwapic_irr_update)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_irr);
 	void (*hwapic_isr_update)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int isr);
 	void (*load_eoi_exitmap)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap);
-	void (*set_virtual_x2apic_mode)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool set);
+	void (*set_virtual_apic_mode)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 	void (*set_apic_access_page_addr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t hpa);
 	void (*deliver_posted_interrupt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector);
 	int (*sync_pir_to_irr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +5 -7
@@ -1967,13 +1967,11 @@ void kvm_lapic_set_base(struct kvm_vcpu
 		}
 	}
 
-	if ((old_value ^ value) & X2APIC_ENABLE) {
-		if (value & X2APIC_ENABLE) {
-			kvm_apic_set_x2apic_id(apic, vcpu->vcpu_id);
-			kvm_x86_ops->set_virtual_x2apic_mode(vcpu, true);
-		} else
-			kvm_x86_ops->set_virtual_x2apic_mode(vcpu, false);
-	}
+	if (((old_value ^ value) & X2APIC_ENABLE) && (value & X2APIC_ENABLE))
+		kvm_apic_set_x2apic_id(apic, vcpu->vcpu_id);
+
+	if ((old_value ^ value) & (MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | X2APIC_ENABLE))
+		kvm_x86_ops->set_virtual_apic_mode(vcpu);
 
 	apic->base_address = apic->vcpu->arch.apic_base &
 			     MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BASE;
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +2 -2
@@ -4589,7 +4589,7 @@ static void update_cr8_intercept(struct
 		set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
 }
 
-static void svm_set_virtual_x2apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool set)
+static void svm_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return;
 }
@@ -5713,7 +5713,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __
 	.enable_nmi_window = enable_nmi_window,
 	.enable_irq_window = enable_irq_window,
 	.update_cr8_intercept = update_cr8_intercept,
-	.set_virtual_x2apic_mode = svm_set_virtual_x2apic_mode,
+	.set_virtual_apic_mode = svm_set_virtual_apic_mode,
 	.get_enable_apicv = svm_get_enable_apicv,
 	.refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = svm_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
 	.load_eoi_exitmap = svm_load_eoi_exitmap,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +30 -18

85 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#129 lore raw

PATCH 119/119 RDMA/cxgb4: Do not dma memory off of the stack

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Greg KH <[email protected]>

commit 3840c5b78803b2b6cc1ff820100a74a092c40cbb upstream.

Nicolas pointed out that the cxgb4 driver is doing dma off of the stack, which is generally considered a very bad thing. On some architectures it could be a security problem, but odds are none of them actually run this driver, so it's just a "normal" bug.

Resolve this by allocating the memory for a message off of the heap instead of the stack. kmalloc() always will give us a proper memory location that DMA will work correctly from.

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c |   28 +++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c +17 -11
@@ -260,13 +260,17 @@ static int write_tpt_entry(struct c4iw_r
 			   struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err;
-	struct fw_ri_tpte tpt;
+	struct fw_ri_tpte *tpt;
 	u32 stag_idx;
 	static atomic_t key;
 
 	if (c4iw_fatal_error(rdev))
 		return -EIO;
 
+	tpt = kmalloc(sizeof(*tpt), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tpt)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	stag_state = stag_state > 0;
 	stag_idx = (*stag) >> 8;
 
@@ -276,6 +280,7 @@ static int write_tpt_entry(struct c4iw_r
 			mutex_lock(&rdev->stats.lock);
 			rdev->stats.stag.fail++;
 			mutex_unlock(&rdev->stats.lock);
+			kfree(tpt);
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
 		mutex_lock(&rdev->stats.lock);
@@ -290,28 +295,28 @@ static int write_tpt_entry(struct c4iw_r
 
 	/* write TPT entry */
 	if (reset_tpt_entry)
-		memset(&tpt, 0, sizeof(tpt));
+		memset(tpt, 0, sizeof(*tpt));
 	else {
-		tpt.valid_to_pdid = cpu_to_be32(FW_RI_TPTE_VALID_F |
+		tpt->valid_to_pdid = cpu_to_be32(FW_RI_TPTE_VALID_F |
 			FW_RI_TPTE_STAGKEY_V((*stag & FW_RI_TPTE_STAGKEY_M)) |
 			FW_RI_TPTE_STAGSTATE_V(stag_state) |
 			FW_RI_TPTE_STAGTYPE_V(type) | FW_RI_TPTE_PDID_V(pdid));
-		tpt.locread_to_qpid = cpu_to_be32(FW_RI_TPTE_PERM_V(perm) |
+		tpt->locread_to_qpid = cpu_to_be32(FW_RI_TPTE_PERM_V(perm) |
 			(bind_enabled ? FW_RI_TPTE_MWBINDEN_F : 0) |
 			FW_RI_TPTE_ADDRTYPE_V((zbva ? FW_RI_ZERO_BASED_TO :
 						      FW_RI_VA_BASED_TO))|
 			FW_RI_TPTE_PS_V(page_size));
-		tpt.nosnoop_pbladdr = !pbl_size ? 0 : cpu_to_be32(
+		tpt->nosnoop_pbladdr = !pbl_size ? 0 : cpu_to_be32(
 			FW_RI_TPTE_PBLADDR_V(PBL_OFF(rdev, pbl_addr)>>3));
-		tpt.len_lo = cpu_to_be32((u32)(len & 0xffffffffUL));
-		tpt.va_hi = cpu_to_be32((u32)(to >> 32));
-		tpt.va_lo_fbo = cpu_to_be32((u32)(to & 0xffffffffUL));
-		tpt.dca_mwbcnt_pstag = cpu_to_be32(0);
-		tpt.len_hi = cpu_to_be32((u32)(len >> 32));
+		tpt->len_lo = cpu_to_be32((u32)(len & 0xffffffffUL));
+		tpt->va_hi = cpu_to_be32((u32)(to >> 32));
+		tpt->va_lo_fbo = cpu_to_be32((u32)(to & 0xffffffffUL));
+		tpt->dca_mwbcnt_pstag = cpu_to_be32(0);
+		tpt->len_hi = cpu_to_be32((u32)(len >> 32));
 	}
 	err = write_adapter_mem(rdev, stag_idx +
 				(rdev->lldi.vr->stag.start >> 5),
-				sizeof(tpt), &tpt, skb);
+				sizeof(*tpt), tpt, skb);
 
 	if (reset_tpt_entry) {
 		c4iw_put_resource(&rdev->resource.tpt_table, stag_idx);
@@ -319,6 +324,7 @@ static int write_tpt_entry(struct c4iw_r
 		rdev->stats.stag.cur -= 32;
 		mutex_unlock(&rdev->stats.lock);
 	}
+	kfree(tpt);
 	return err;
 }
 
author maintainer
#109 lore raw

PATCH 99/119 fs/proc/page.c: dont access uninitialized memmaps in fs/proc/page.c

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>

commit aad5f69bc161af489dbb5934868bd347282f0764 upstream.

There are three places where we access uninitialized memmaps, namely:
- /proc/kpagecount
- /proc/kpageflags
- /proc/kpagecgroup

We have initialized memmaps either when the section is online or when the page was initialized to the ZONE_DEVICE. Uninitialized memmaps contain garbage and in the worst case trigger kernel BUGs, especially with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING.

For example, not onlining a DIMM during boot and calling /proc/kpagecount with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING:

  :/# cat /proc/kpagecount > tmp.test
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffffe
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 114616067 P4D 114616067 PUD 114618067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 469 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004+ #11
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.4
  RIP: 0010:kpagecount_read+0xce/0x1e0
  Code: e8 09 83 e0 3f 48 0f a3 02 73 2d 4c 89 e7 48 c1 e7 06 48 03 3d ab 51 01 01 74 1d 48 8b 57 08 480
  RSP: 0018:ffffa14e409b7e78 EFLAGS: 00010202
  RAX: fffffffffffffffe RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007f76b5595000 RDI: fffff35645000000
  RBP: 00007f76b5595000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000140000
  R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 00007f76b5595000 R15: ffffa14e409b7f08
  FS:  00007f76b577d580(0000) GS:ffff8f41bd400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: fffffffffffffffe CR3: 0000000078960000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
  Call Trace:
   proc_reg_read+0x3c/0x60
   vfs_read+0xc5/0x180
   ksys_read+0x68/0xe0
   do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xa0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

For now, let's drop support for ZONE_DEVICE from the three pseudo files in order to fix this. To distinguish offline memory (with garbage memmap) from ZONE_DEVICE memory with properly initialized memmaps, we would have to check get_dev_pagemap() and pfn_zone_device_reserved() right now. The usage of both (especially, special casing devmem) is frowned upon and needs to be reworked.

The fundamental issue we have is:

	if (pfn_to_online_page(pfn)) {
		/* memmap initialized */
	} else if (pfn_valid(pfn)) {
		/*
		 * ???
		 * a) offline memory. memmap garbage.
		 * b) devmem: memmap initialized to ZONE_DEVICE.
		 * c) devmem: reserved for driver. memmap garbage.
		 * (d) devmem: memmap currently initializing - garbage)
		 */
	}

We'll leave the pfn_zone_device_reserved() check in stable_page_flags() in place as that function is also used from memory failure. We now no longer dump information about pages that are not in use anymore - offline.

Fixes f1dd2cd13c4b ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") [visible after d0dc12e86b319]
Cc Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Cc Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]>
Cc Toshiki Fukasawa <[email protected]>
Cc Pankaj gupta <[email protected]>
Cc Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc Anthony Yznaga <[email protected]>
Cc "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <[email protected]>
Cc <[email protected]> [4.13+]
---
 fs/proc/page.c |   28 ++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
fs/proc/page.c +16 -12
@@ -42,10 +42,12 @@ static ssize_t kpagecount_read(struct fi
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	while (count > 0) {
-		if (pfn_valid(pfn))
-			ppage = pfn_to_page(pfn);
-		else
-			ppage = NULL;
+		/*
+		 * TODO: ZONE_DEVICE support requires to identify
+		 * memmaps that were actually initialized.
+		 */
+		ppage = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
+
 		if (!ppage || PageSlab(ppage))
 			pcount = 0;
 		else
@@ -214,10 +216,11 @@ static ssize_t kpageflags_read(struct fi
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	while (count > 0) {
-		if (pfn_valid(pfn))
-			ppage = pfn_to_page(pfn);
-		else
-			ppage = NULL;
+		/*
+		 * TODO: ZONE_DEVICE support requires to identify
+		 * memmaps that were actually initialized.
+		 */
+		ppage = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
 
 		if (put_user(stable_page_flags(ppage), out)) {
 			ret = -EFAULT;
@@ -259,10 +262,11 @@ static ssize_t kpagecgroup_read(struct f
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	while (count > 0) {
-		if (pfn_valid(pfn))
-			ppage = pfn_to_page(pfn);
-		else
-			ppage = NULL;
+		/*
+		 * TODO: ZONE_DEVICE support requires to identify
+		 * memmaps that were actually initialized.
+		 */
+		ppage = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
 
 		if (ppage)
 			ino = page_cgroup_ino(ppage);
author maintainer
#110 lore raw

PATCH 100/119 scsi: zfcp: fix reaction on bit error threshold notification

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Steffen Maier <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2190168aaea42c31bff7b9a967e7b045f07df095 ]

On excessive bit errors for the FCP channel ingress fibre path, the channel notifies us. Previously, we only emitted a kernel message and a trace record. Since performance can become suboptimal with I/O timeouts due to bit errors, we now stop using an FCP device by default on channel notification so multipath on top can timely failover to other paths. A new module parameter zfcp.ber_stop can be used to get zfcp old behavior.

User explanation of new kernel message:

* Description:
* The FCP channel reported that its bit error threshold has been exceeded.
* These errors might result from a problem with the physical components
* of the local fibre link into the FCP channel.
* The problem might be damage or malfunction of the cable or
* cable connection between the FCP channel and
* the adjacent fabric switch port or the point-to-point peer.
* Find details about the errors in the HBA trace for the FCP device.
* The zfcp device driver closed down the FCP device
* to limit the performance impact from possible I/O command timeouts.
* User action:
* Check for problems on the local fibre link, ensure that fibre optics are
* clean and functional, and all cables are properly plugged.
* After the repair action, you can manually recover the FCP device by
* writing "0" into its "failed" sysfs attribute.
* If recovery through sysfs is not possible, set the CHPID of the device
* offline and back online on the service element.

---
 drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_fsf.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_fsf.c +13 -3
index 00fb98f7b2cd0..94d1bcc83fa2e 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,11 @@
 
 struct kmem_cache *zfcp_fsf_qtcb_cache;
 
+static bool ber_stop = true;
+module_param(ber_stop, bool, 0600);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(ber_stop,
+		 "Shuts down FCP devices for FCP channels that report a bit-error count in excess of its threshold (default on)");
+
 static void zfcp_fsf_request_timeout_handler(unsigned long data)
 {
 	struct zfcp_adapter *adapter = (struct zfcp_adapter *) data;
@@ -230,10 +235,15 @@ static void zfcp_fsf_status_read_handler(struct zfcp_fsf_req *req)
 	case FSF_STATUS_READ_SENSE_DATA_AVAIL:
 		break;
 	case FSF_STATUS_READ_BIT_ERROR_THRESHOLD:
-		dev_warn(&adapter->ccw_device->dev,
-			 "The error threshold for checksum statistics "
-			 "has been exceeded\n");
 		zfcp_dbf_hba_bit_err("fssrh_3", req);
+		if (ber_stop) {
+			dev_warn(&adapter->ccw_device->dev,
+				 "All paths over this FCP device are disused because of excessive bit errors\n");
+			zfcp_erp_adapter_shutdown(adapter, 0, "fssrh_b");
+		} else {
+			dev_warn(&adapter->ccw_device->dev,
+				 "The error threshold for checksum statistics has been exceeded\n");
+		}
 		break;
 	case FSF_STATUS_READ_LINK_DOWN:
 		zfcp_fsf_status_read_link_down(req);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#111 lore raw

PATCH 101/119 mm/slub: fix a deadlock in show_slab_objects()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Qian Cai <[email protected]>

commit e4f8e513c3d353c134ad4eef9fd0bba12406c7c8 upstream.

A long time ago we fixed a similar deadlock in show_slab_objects() [1]. However, it is apparently due to the commits like 01fb58bcba63 ("slab:
remove synchronous synchronize_sched() from memcg cache deactivation path") and 03afc0e25f7f ("slab: get_online_mems for kmem_cache_{create,destroy,shrink}"), this kind of deadlock is back by just reading files in /sys/kernel/slab which will generate a lockdep splat below.

Since the "mem_hotplug_lock" here is only to obtain a stable online node mask while racing with NUMA node hotplug, in the worst case, the results may me miscalculated while doing NUMA node hotplug, but they shall be corrected by later reads of the same files.

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
------------------------------------------------------
cat/5224 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff900012ac3120 (mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at:
show_slab_objects+0x94/0x3a8

but task is already holding lock:
b8ff009693eee398 (kn->count#45){++++}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x44/0xf0

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 (kn->count#45){++++}:

         lock_acquire+0x31c/0x360
         __kernfs_remove+0x290/0x490
         kernfs_remove+0x30/0x44
         sysfs_remove_dir+0x70/0x88
         kobject_del+0x50/0xb0
         sysfs_slab_unlink+0x2c/0x38
         shutdown_cache+0xa0/0xf0
         kmemcg_cache_shutdown_fn+0x1c/0x34
         kmemcg_workfn+0x44/0x64
         process_one_work+0x4f4/0x950
         worker_thread+0x390/0x4bc
         kthread+0x1cc/0x1e8
         ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

-> #1 (slab_mutex){+.+.}:

         lock_acquire+0x31c/0x360
         __mutex_lock_common+0x16c/0xf78
         mutex_lock_nested+0x40/0x50
         memcg_create_kmem_cache+0x38/0x16c
         memcg_kmem_cache_create_func+0x3c/0x70
         process_one_work+0x4f4/0x950
         worker_thread+0x390/0x4bc
         kthread+0x1cc/0x1e8
         ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

-> #0 (mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}:

         validate_chain+0xd10/0x2bcc
         __lock_acquire+0x7f4/0xb8c
         lock_acquire+0x31c/0x360
         get_online_mems+0x54/0x150
         show_slab_objects+0x94/0x3a8
         total_objects_show+0x28/0x34
         slab_attr_show+0x38/0x54
         sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x198/0x2d4
         kernfs_seq_show+0xa4/0xcc
         seq_read+0x30c/0x8a8
         kernfs_fop_read+0xa8/0x314
         __vfs_read+0x88/0x20c
         vfs_read+0xd8/0x10c
         ksys_read+0xb0/0x120
         __arm64_sys_read+0x54/0x88
         el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240
         el0_svc+0x8/0xc

other info that might help us debug this:

  Chain exists of:
    mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem --> slab_mutex --> kn->count#45

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:
         CPU0                    CPU1
         ----                    ----
    lock(kn->count#45);
                                 lock(slab_mutex);
                                 lock(kn->count#45);
    lock(mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem);

*** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by cat/5224:
#0: 9eff00095b14b2a0 (&p->lock){+.+.}, at: seq_read+0x4c/0x8a8 #1: 0eff008997041480 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x34/0xf0 #2: b8ff009693eee398 (kn->count#45){++++}, at:

  kernfs_seq_start+0x44/0xf0

  stack backtrace:
  Call trace:
   dump_backtrace+0x0/0x248
   show_stack+0x20/0x2c
   dump_stack+0xd0/0x140
   print_circular_bug+0x368/0x380
   check_noncircular+0x248/0x250
   validate_chain+0xd10/0x2bcc
   __lock_acquire+0x7f4/0xb8c
   lock_acquire+0x31c/0x360
   get_online_mems+0x54/0x150
   show_slab_objects+0x94/0x3a8
   total_objects_show+0x28/0x34
   slab_attr_show+0x38/0x54
   sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x198/0x2d4
   kernfs_seq_show+0xa4/0xcc
   seq_read+0x30c/0x8a8
   kernfs_fop_read+0xa8/0x314
   __vfs_read+0x88/0x20c
   vfs_read+0xd8/0x10c
   ksys_read+0xb0/0x120
   __arm64_sys_read+0x54/0x88
   el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240
   el0_svc+0x8/0xc

I think it is important to mention that this doesn't expose the show_slab_objects to use-after-free. There is only a single path that might really race here and that is the slab hotplug notifier callback __kmem_cache_shrink (via slab_mem_going_offline_callback) but that path doesn't really destroy kmem_cache_node data structures.

[1] http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1101.0/02850.html

[[email protected]: add comment explaining why we don't need mem_hotplug_lock]
Fixes 01fb58bcba63 ("slab: remove synchronous synchronize_sched() from memcg cache deactivation path")
Fixes 03afc0e25f7f ("slab: get_online_mems for kmem_cache_{create,destroy,shrink}")
Cc Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]>
Cc Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
---
 mm/slub.c |   13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/slub.c +11 -2
@@ -4790,7 +4790,17 @@ static ssize_t show_slab_objects(struct
 		}
 	}
 
-	get_online_mems();
+	/*
+	 * It is impossible to take "mem_hotplug_lock" here with "kernfs_mutex"
+	 * already held which will conflict with an existing lock order:
+	 *
+	 * mem_hotplug_lock->slab_mutex->kernfs_mutex
+	 *
+	 * We don't really need mem_hotplug_lock (to hold off
+	 * slab_mem_going_offline_callback) here because slab's memory hot
+	 * unplug code doesn't destroy the kmem_cache->node[] data.
+	 */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
 	if (flags & SO_ALL) {
 		struct kmem_cache_node *n;
@@ -4831,7 +4841,6 @@ static ssize_t show_slab_objects(struct
 			x += sprintf(buf + x, " N%d=%lu",
 					node, nodes[node]);
 #endif
-	put_online_mems();
 	kfree(nodes);
 	return x + sprintf(buf + x, "\n");
 }
author maintainer
#112 lore raw

PATCH 102/119 mm/page_owner: dont access uninitialized memmaps when reading /proc/pagetypeinfo

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Qian Cai <[email protected]>

commit a26ee565b6cd8dc2bf15ff6aa70bbb28f928b773 upstream.

Uninitialized memmaps contain garbage and in the worst case trigger kernel BUGs, especially with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING. They should not get touched.

For example, when not onlining a memory block that is spanned by a zone and reading /proc/pagetypeinfo with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGFLAGS and CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING, we can trigger a kernel BUG:

  :/# echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory40/online
  :/# echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory42/online
  :/# cat /proc/pagetypeinfo > test.file
   page:fffff2c585200000 is uninitialized and poisoned
   raw: ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff
   raw: ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff
   page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(p))
   There is not page extension available.
   ------------[ cut here ]------------
   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1107!
   invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI

Please note that this change does not affect ZONE_DEVICE, because pagetypeinfo_showmixedcount_print() is called from mm/vmstat.c:pagetypeinfo_showmixedcount() only for populated zones, and ZONE_DEVICE is never populated (zone->present_pages always 0).

[[email protected]: move check to outer loop, add comment, rephrase description]
Fixes f1dd2cd13c4b ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") # visible after d0dc12e86b319
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <[email protected]>
Cc Miles Chen <[email protected]>
Cc Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc Qian Cai <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc <[email protected]> [4.13+]
---
 mm/page_owner.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/page_owner.c +3 -2
@@ -273,7 +273,8 @@ void pagetypeinfo_showmixedcount_print(s
 	 * not matter as the mixed block count will still be correct
 	 */
 	for (; pfn < end_pfn; ) {
-		if (!pfn_valid(pfn)) {
+		page = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
+		if (!page) {
 			pfn = ALIGN(pfn + 1, MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES);
 			continue;
 		}
@@ -281,13 +282,13 @@ void pagetypeinfo_showmixedcount_print(s
 		block_end_pfn = ALIGN(pfn + 1, pageblock_nr_pages);
 		block_end_pfn = min(block_end_pfn, end_pfn);
 
-		page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
 		pageblock_mt = get_pageblock_migratetype(page);
 
 		for (; pfn < block_end_pfn; pfn++) {
 			if (!pfn_valid_within(pfn))
 				continue;
 
+			/* The pageblock is online, no need to recheck. */
 			page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
 
 			if (page_zone(page) != zone)
author maintainer
#114 lore raw

PATCH 104/119 xtensa: drop EXPORT_SYMBOL for outs*/ins*

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Max Filippov <[email protected]>

commit 8b39da985194aac2998dd9e3a22d00b596cebf1e upstream.

Custom outs*/ins* implementations are long gone from the xtensa port, remove matching EXPORT_SYMBOLs.
This fixes the following build warnings issued by modpost since commit 15bfc2348d54 ("modpost: check for static EXPORT_SYMBOL* functions"):

WARNING: "insb" [vmlinux] is a static EXPORT_SYMBOL
WARNING: "insw" [vmlinux] is a static EXPORT_SYMBOL
WARNING: "insl" [vmlinux] is a static EXPORT_SYMBOL
WARNING: "outsb" [vmlinux] is a static EXPORT_SYMBOL
WARNING: "outsw" [vmlinux] is a static EXPORT_SYMBOL
WARNING: "outsl" [vmlinux] is a static EXPORT_SYMBOL

Fixes d38efc1f150f ("xtensa: adopt generic io routines")
---
 arch/xtensa/kernel/xtensa_ksyms.c |    7 -------
 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
arch/xtensa/kernel/xtensa_ksyms.c +0 -7
@@ -114,13 +114,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__invalidate_icache_range)
 // FIXME EXPORT_SYMBOL(screen_info);
 #endif
 
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(outsb);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(outsw);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(outsl);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(insb);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(insw);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(insl);
-
 extern long common_exception_return;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(common_exception_return);
 
author maintainer
#115 lore raw

PATCH 105/119 parisc: Fix vmap memory leak in ioremap()/iounmap()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>

commit 513f7f747e1cba81f28a436911fba0b485878ebd upstream.

Sven noticed that calling ioremap() and iounmap() multiple times leads to a vmap memory leak:
vmap allocation for size 4198400 failed:
use vmalloc=<size> to increase size

It seems we missed calling vunmap() in iounmap().

---
 arch/parisc/mm/ioremap.c |   12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/parisc/mm/ioremap.c +7 -5
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * arch/parisc/mm/ioremap.c
  *
  * (C) Copyright 1995 1996 Linus Torvalds
- * (C) Copyright 2001-2006 Helge Deller <[email protected]>
+ * (C) Copyright 2001-2019 Helge Deller <[email protected]>
  * (C) Copyright 2005 Kyle McMartin <[email protected]>
  */
 
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ void __iomem * __ioremap(unsigned long p
 	addr = (void __iomem *) area->addr;
 	if (ioremap_page_range((unsigned long)addr, (unsigned long)addr + size,
 			       phys_addr, pgprot)) {
-		vfree(addr);
+		vunmap(addr);
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
@@ -92,9 +92,11 @@ void __iomem * __ioremap(unsigned long p
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ioremap);
 
-void iounmap(const volatile void __iomem *addr)
+void iounmap(const volatile void __iomem *io_addr)
 {
-	if (addr > high_memory)
-		return vfree((void *) (PAGE_MASK & (unsigned long __force) addr));
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)io_addr & PAGE_MASK;
+
+	if (is_vmalloc_addr((void *)addr))
+		vunmap((void *)addr);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(iounmap);
author maintainer
#106 lore raw

PATCH 96/119 drm/edid: Add 6 bpc quirk for SDC panel in Lenovo G50

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>

commit 11bcf5f78905b90baae8fb01e16650664ed0cb00 upstream.

Another panel that needs 6BPC quirk.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid.c +3 -0
@@ -164,6 +164,9 @@ static const struct edid_quirk {
 	/* Medion MD 30217 PG */
 	{ "MED", 0x7b8, EDID_QUIRK_PREFER_LARGE_75 },
 
+	/* Lenovo G50 */
+	{ "SDC", 18514, EDID_QUIRK_FORCE_6BPC },
+
 	/* Panel in Samsung NP700G7A-S01PL notebook reports 6bpc */
 	{ "SEC", 0xd033, EDID_QUIRK_FORCE_8BPC },
 
author maintainer
#113 lore raw

PATCH 103/119 hugetlbfs: dont access uninitialized memmaps in pfn_range_valid_gigantic()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>

commit f231fe4235e22e18d847e05cbe705deaca56580a upstream.

Uninitialized memmaps contain garbage and in the worst case trigger kernel BUGs, especially with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING. They should not get touched.

Let's make sure that we only consider online memory (managed by the buddy) that has initialized memmaps. ZONE_DEVICE is not applicable.

page_zone() will call page_to_nid(), which will trigger VM_BUG_ON_PGFLAGS(PagePoisoned(page), page) with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING and CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGFLAGS when called on uninitialized memmaps. This can be the case when an offline memory block (e.g., never onlined) is spanned by a zone.

Note: As explained by Michal in [1], alloc_contig_range() will verify the range. So it boils down to the wrong access in this function.

[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Fixes f1dd2cd13c4b ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") [visible after d0dc12e86b319]
Cc Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>
Cc <[email protected]> [4.13+]
---
 mm/hugetlb.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/hugetlb.c +2 -3
@@ -1081,11 +1081,10 @@ static bool pfn_range_valid_gigantic(str
 	struct page *page;
 
 	for (i = start_pfn; i < end_pfn; i++) {
-		if (!pfn_valid(i))
+		page = pfn_to_online_page(i);
+		if (!page)
 			return false;
 
-		page = pfn_to_page(i);
-
 		if (page_zone(page) != z)
 			return false;
 
author maintainer
#126 lore raw

PATCH 116/119 kvm: vmx: Introduce lapic_mode enumeration

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>

commit 588716494258899389206fa50426e78cc9df89b9 upstream.

The local APIC can be in one of three modes: disabled, xAPIC or x2APIC. (A fourth mode, "invalid," is included for completeness.)

Using the new enumeration can make some of the APIC mode logic easier to read. In kvm_set_apic_base, for instance, it is clear that one cannot transition directly from x2APIC mode to xAPIC mode or directly from APIC disabled to x2APIC mode.

[Check invalid bits even if msr_info->host_initiated. Reported by
Wanpeng Li. - Paolo]

---
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h |   14 ++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c   |   26 +++++++++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h +14 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,13 @@
 #define APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS       1
 #define APIC_BUS_FREQUENCY      (1000000000ULL / APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS)
 
+enum lapic_mode {
+	LAPIC_MODE_DISABLED = 0,
+	LAPIC_MODE_INVALID = X2APIC_ENABLE,
+	LAPIC_MODE_XAPIC = MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE,
+	LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC = MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | X2APIC_ENABLE,
+};
+
 struct kvm_timer {
 	struct hrtimer timer;
 	s64 period; 				/* unit: ns */
@@ -89,6 +96,7 @@ u64 kvm_get_apic_base(struct kvm_vcpu *v
 int kvm_set_apic_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info);
 int kvm_apic_get_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_lapic_state *s);
 int kvm_apic_set_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_lapic_state *s);
+enum lapic_mode kvm_get_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 u64 kvm_get_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -220,4 +228,10 @@ void kvm_lapic_switch_to_hv_timer(struct
 void kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 bool kvm_lapic_hv_timer_in_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvm_lapic_restart_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+static inline enum lapic_mode kvm_apic_mode(u64 apic_base)
+{
+	return apic_base & (MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | X2APIC_ENABLE);
+}
+
 #endif
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +15 -11
@@ -306,23 +306,27 @@ u64 kvm_get_apic_base(struct kvm_vcpu *v
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_apic_base);
 
+enum lapic_mode kvm_get_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_apic_mode(kvm_get_apic_base(vcpu));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_apic_mode);
+
 int kvm_set_apic_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 {
-	u64 old_state = vcpu->arch.apic_base &
-		(MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | X2APIC_ENABLE);
-	u64 new_state = msr_info->data &
-		(MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | X2APIC_ENABLE);
+	enum lapic_mode old_mode = kvm_get_apic_mode(vcpu);
+	enum lapic_mode new_mode = kvm_apic_mode(msr_info->data);
 	u64 reserved_bits = ((~0ULL) << cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu)) | 0x2ff |
 		(guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_X2APIC) ? 0 : X2APIC_ENABLE);
 
-	if ((msr_info->data & reserved_bits) || new_state == X2APIC_ENABLE)
-		return 1;
-	if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
-	    ((new_state == MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE &&
-	      old_state == (MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | X2APIC_ENABLE)) ||
-	     (new_state == (MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | X2APIC_ENABLE) &&
-	      old_state == 0)))
+	if ((msr_info->data & reserved_bits) != 0 || new_mode == LAPIC_MODE_INVALID)
 		return 1;
+	if (!msr_info->host_initiated) {
+		if (old_mode == LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC && new_mode == LAPIC_MODE_XAPIC)
+			return 1;
+		if (old_mode == LAPIC_MODE_DISABLED && new_mode == LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC)
+			return 1;
+	}
 
 	kvm_lapic_set_base(vcpu, msr_info->data);
 	return 0;
author maintainer
#121 lore raw

PATCH 111/119 memstick: jmb38x_ms: Fix an error handling path in jmb38x_ms_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

commit 28c9fac09ab0147158db0baeec630407a5e9b892 upstream.

If 'jmb38x_ms_count_slots()' returns 0, we must undo the previous 'pci_request_regions()' call.

Goto 'err_out_int' to fix it.

Fixes 60fdd931d577 ("memstick: add support for JMicron jmb38x MemoryStick host controller")
---
 drivers/memstick/host/jmb38x_ms.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/memstick/host/jmb38x_ms.c +1 -1
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ static int jmb38x_ms_probe(struct pci_de
 	if (!cnt) {
 		rc = -ENODEV;
 		pci_dev_busy = 1;
-		goto err_out;
+		goto err_out_int;
 	}
 
 	jm = kzalloc(sizeof(struct jmb38x_ms)
author maintainer
#119 lore raw

PATCH 109/119 pinctrl: armada-37xx: swap polarity on LED group

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Patrick Williams <[email protected]>

commit b835d6953009dc350d61402a854b5a7178d8c615 upstream.

The configuration registers for the LED group have inverted polarity, which puts the GPIO into open-drain state when used in GPIO mode. Switch to '0' for GPIO and '1' for LED modes.

Fixes 87466ccd9401 ("pinctrl: armada-37xx: Add pin controller support for Armada 37xx")
---
 drivers/pinctrl/mvebu/pinctrl-armada-37xx.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/pinctrl/mvebu/pinctrl-armada-37xx.c +4 -4
@@ -170,10 +170,10 @@ static struct armada_37xx_pin_group arma
 	PIN_GRP_EXTRA("uart2", 9, 2, BIT(1) | BIT(13) | BIT(14) | BIT(19),
 		      BIT(1) | BIT(13) | BIT(14), BIT(1) | BIT(19),
 		      18, 2, "gpio", "uart"),
-	PIN_GRP_GPIO("led0_od", 11, 1, BIT(20), "led"),
-	PIN_GRP_GPIO("led1_od", 12, 1, BIT(21), "led"),
-	PIN_GRP_GPIO("led2_od", 13, 1, BIT(22), "led"),
-	PIN_GRP_GPIO("led3_od", 14, 1, BIT(23), "led"),
+	PIN_GRP_GPIO_2("led0_od", 11, 1, BIT(20), BIT(20), 0, "led"),
+	PIN_GRP_GPIO_2("led1_od", 12, 1, BIT(21), BIT(21), 0, "led"),
+	PIN_GRP_GPIO_2("led2_od", 13, 1, BIT(22), BIT(22), 0, "led"),
+	PIN_GRP_GPIO_2("led3_od", 14, 1, BIT(23), BIT(23), 0, "led"),
 
 };
 
author maintainer
#64 lore raw

PATCH 54/119 arm64: capabilities: Split the processing of errata work arounds

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d69fe9a7e7214d49fe157ec20889892388d0fe23 ]

Right now we run through the errata workarounds check on all boot active CPUs, with SCOPE_ALL. This wouldn't help for detecting erratum workarounds with a SYSTEM_SCOPE. There are none yet, but we plan to introduce some: let us clean this up so that such workarounds can be detected and enabled correctly.

So, we run the checks with SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU on all CPUs and SCOPE_SYSTEM checks are run only once after all the boot time CPUs are active.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +4 -2
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ void __init init_cpu_features(struct cpu
 	 * Run the errata work around checks on the boot CPU, once we have
 	 * initialised the cpu feature infrastructure.
 	 */
-	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_ALL,
+	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
 				"enabling workaround for");
 }
 
@@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ void check_local_cpu_capabilities(void)
 	 * advertised capabilities.
 	 */
 	if (!sys_caps_initialised)
-		update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_ALL,
+		update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
 					"enabling workaround for");
 	else
 		verify_local_cpu_capabilities();
@@ -1383,6 +1383,8 @@ void __init setup_cpu_features(void)
 
 	/* Set the CPU feature capabilies */
 	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_ALL, "detected:");
+	update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_SYSTEM,
+				"enabling workaround for");
 	enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, SCOPE_ALL);
 	enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, SCOPE_ALL);
 	mark_const_caps_ready();
author maintainer
#104 lore raw

PATCH 94/119 cfg80211: wext: avoid copying malformed SSIDs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

commit 4ac2813cc867ae563a1ba5a9414bfb554e5796fa upstream.

Ensure the SSID element is bounds-checked prior to invoking memcpy() with its length field, when copying to userspace.

---
 net/wireless/wext-sme.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/wireless/wext-sme.c +6 -2
@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ int cfg80211_mgd_wext_giwessid(struct ne
 			       struct iw_point *data, char *ssid)
 {
 	struct wireless_dev *wdev = dev->ieee80211_ptr;
+	int ret = 0;
 
 	/* call only for station! */
 	if (WARN_ON(wdev->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION))
@@ -219,7 +220,10 @@ int cfg80211_mgd_wext_giwessid(struct ne
 		if (ie) {
 			data->flags = 1;
 			data->length = ie[1];
-			memcpy(ssid, ie + 2, data->length);
+			if (data->length > IW_ESSID_MAX_SIZE)
+				ret = -EINVAL;
+			else
+				memcpy(ssid, ie + 2, data->length);
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	} else if (wdev->wext.connect.ssid && wdev->wext.connect.ssid_len) {
@@ -229,7 +233,7 @@ int cfg80211_mgd_wext_giwessid(struct ne
 	}
 	wdev_unlock(wdev);
 
-	return 0;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 int cfg80211_mgd_wext_siwap(struct net_device *dev,
author maintainer
#101 lore raw

PATCH 91/119 Input: da9063 - fix capability and drop KEY_SLEEP

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marco Felsch <[email protected]>

commit afce285b859cea91c182015fc9858ea58c26cd0e upstream.

Since commit f889beaaab1c ("Input: da9063 - report KEY_POWER instead of KEY_SLEEP during power key-press") KEY_SLEEP isn't supported anymore. This caused input device to not generate any events if "dlg,disable-key-power" is set.

Fix this by unconditionally setting KEY_POWER capability, and not declaring KEY_SLEEP.

Fixes f889beaaab1c ("Input: da9063 - report KEY_POWER instead of KEY_SLEEP during power key-press")
---
 drivers/input/misc/da9063_onkey.c |    5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/input/misc/da9063_onkey.c +1 -4
@@ -248,10 +248,7 @@ static int da9063_onkey_probe(struct pla
 	onkey->input->phys = onkey->phys;
 	onkey->input->dev.parent = &pdev->dev;
 
-	if (onkey->key_power)
-		input_set_capability(onkey->input, EV_KEY, KEY_POWER);
-
-	input_set_capability(onkey->input, EV_KEY, KEY_SLEEP);
+	input_set_capability(onkey->input, EV_KEY, KEY_POWER);
 
 	INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&onkey->work, da9063_poll_on);
 
author maintainer
#98 lore raw

PATCH 88/119 scsi: core: save/restore command resid for error handling

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>

commit 8f8fed0cdbbd6cdbf28d9ebe662f45765d2f7d39 upstream.

When a non-passthrough command is terminated with CHECK CONDITION, request sense is executed by hijacking the command descriptor. Since scsi_eh_prep_cmnd() and scsi_eh_restore_cmnd() do not save/restore the original command resid, the value returned on failure of the original command is lost and replaced with the value set by the execution of the request sense command. This value may in many instances be unaligned to the device sector size, causing sd_done() to print a warning message about the incorrect unaligned resid before the command is retried.

Fix this problem by saving the original command residual in struct scsi_eh_save using scsi_eh_prep_cmnd() and restoring it in scsi_eh_restore_cmnd(). In addition, to make sure that the request sense command is executed with a correctly initialized command structure, also reset the residual to 0 in scsi_eh_prep_cmnd() after saving the original command value in struct scsi_eh_save.

---
 drivers/scsi/scsi_error.c |    3 +++
 include/scsi/scsi_eh.h    |    1 +
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/scsi_error.c +3 -0
@@ -935,6 +935,7 @@ void scsi_eh_prep_cmnd(struct scsi_cmnd
 	ses->sdb = scmd->sdb;
 	ses->next_rq = scmd->request->next_rq;
 	ses->result = scmd->result;
+	ses->resid_len = scmd->req.resid_len;
 	ses->underflow = scmd->underflow;
 	ses->prot_op = scmd->prot_op;
 	ses->eh_eflags = scmd->eh_eflags;
@@ -946,6 +947,7 @@ void scsi_eh_prep_cmnd(struct scsi_cmnd
 	memset(&scmd->sdb, 0, sizeof(scmd->sdb));
 	scmd->request->next_rq = NULL;
 	scmd->result = 0;
+	scmd->req.resid_len = 0;
 
 	if (sense_bytes) {
 		scmd->sdb.length = min_t(unsigned, SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE,
@@ -999,6 +1001,7 @@ void scsi_eh_restore_cmnd(struct scsi_cm
 	scmd->sdb = ses->sdb;
 	scmd->request->next_rq = ses->next_rq;
 	scmd->result = ses->result;
+	scmd->req.resid_len = ses->resid_len;
 	scmd->underflow = ses->underflow;
 	scmd->prot_op = ses->prot_op;
 	scmd->eh_eflags = ses->eh_eflags;
include/scsi/scsi_eh.h +1 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ extern int scsi_ioctl_reset(struct scsi_
 struct scsi_eh_save {
 	/* saved state */
 	int result;
+	unsigned int resid_len;
 	int eh_eflags;
 	enum dma_data_direction data_direction;
 	unsigned underflow;
author maintainer
#92 lore raw

PATCH 82/119 arm64: Force SSBS on context switch

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cbdf8a189a66001c36007bf0f5c975d0376c5c3a ]

On a CPU that doesn't support SSBS, PSTATE[12] is RES0. In a system where only some of the CPUs implement SSBS, we end-up losing track of the SSBS bit across task migration.

To address this issue, let's force the SSBS bit on context switch.

Fixes 8f04e8e6e29c ("arm64: ssbd: Add support for PSTATE.SSBS rather than trapping to EL3")
[will: inverted logic and added comments]
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h |   14 ++++++++++++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/process.c        |   29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +12 -2
@@ -148,6 +148,16 @@ static inline void start_thread_common(s
 	regs->pc = pc;
 }
 
+static inline void set_ssbs_bit(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	regs->pstate |= PSR_SSBS_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline void set_compat_ssbs_bit(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	regs->pstate |= PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT;
+}
+
 static inline void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc,
 				unsigned long sp)
 {
@@ -155,7 +165,7 @@ static inline void start_thread(struct p
 	regs->pstate = PSR_MODE_EL0t;
 
 	if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() != ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE)
-		regs->pstate |= PSR_SSBS_BIT;
+		set_ssbs_bit(regs);
 
 	regs->sp = sp;
 }
@@ -174,7 +184,7 @@ static inline void compat_start_thread(s
 #endif
 
 	if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() != ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE)
-		regs->pstate |= PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT;
+		set_compat_ssbs_bit(regs);
 
 	regs->compat_sp = sp;
 }
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +28 -1
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flag
 			childregs->pstate |= PSR_UAO_BIT;
 
 		if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE)
-			childregs->pstate |= PSR_SSBS_BIT;
+			set_ssbs_bit(childregs);
 
 		p->thread.cpu_context.x19 = stack_start;
 		p->thread.cpu_context.x20 = stk_sz;
@@ -340,6 +340,32 @@ void uao_thread_switch(struct task_struc
 }
 
 /*
+ * Force SSBS state on context-switch, since it may be lost after migrating
+ * from a CPU which treats the bit as RES0 in a heterogeneous system.
+ */
+static void ssbs_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next)
+{
+	struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(next);
+
+	/*
+	 * Nothing to do for kernel threads, but 'regs' may be junk
+	 * (e.g. idle task) so check the flags and bail early.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(next->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
+		return;
+
+	/* If the mitigation is enabled, then we leave SSBS clear. */
+	if ((arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE) ||
+	    test_tsk_thread_flag(next, TIF_SSBD))
+		return;
+
+	if (compat_user_mode(regs))
+		set_compat_ssbs_bit(regs);
+	else if (user_mode(regs))
+		set_ssbs_bit(regs);
+}
+
+/*
  * We store our current task in sp_el0, which is clobbered by userspace. Keep a
  * shadow copy so that we can restore this upon entry from userspace.
  *
@@ -367,6 +393,7 @@ __notrace_funcgraph struct task_struct *
 	contextidr_thread_switch(next);
 	entry_task_switch(next);
 	uao_thread_switch(next);
+	ssbs_thread_switch(next);
 
 	/*
 	 * Complete any pending TLB or cache maintenance on this CPU in case
author maintainer
#88 lore raw

PATCH 78/119 arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8c1e3d2bb44cbb998cb28ff9a18f105fee7f1eb3 ]

Ensure we are always able to detect whether or not the CPU is affected by Spectre-v2, so that we can later advertise this to userspace.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c |   15 ++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +8 -7
@@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(const struct
 	config_sctlr_el1(SCTLR_EL1_UCT, 0);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 
@@ -217,11 +216,11 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
 	    ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1))
 		cb = qcom_link_stack_sanitization;
 
-	install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR))
+		install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
 
 	return 1;
 }
-#endif	/* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
 
 DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
 
@@ -457,7 +456,6 @@ out_printmsg:
 	.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,			\
 	CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 /*
  * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all.
  */
@@ -489,6 +487,12 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm6
 	if (!need_wa)
 		return false;
 
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
+		pr_warn_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
+		__hardenbp_enab = false;
+		return false;
+	}
+
 	/* forced off */
 	if (__nospectre_v2) {
 		pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
@@ -500,7 +504,6 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm6
 
 	return (need_wa > 0);
 }
-#endif
 
 const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
 #if	defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_826319) || \
@@ -640,13 +643,11 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 		ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
 	},
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
 		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
 		.matches = check_branch_predictor,
 	},
-#endif
 	{
 		.desc = "Speculative Store Bypass Disable",
 		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
author maintainer
#84 lore raw

PATCH 74/119 arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 61ae1321f06c4489c724c803e9b8363dea576da3 ]

Enable CPU vulnerabilty show functions for spectre_v1, spectre_v2, meltdown and store-bypass.

---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ config ARM64
 	select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS
 	select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
 	select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE
+	select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
 	select GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP
 	select GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP
 	select GENERIC_IRQ_PROBE
author maintainer
#76 lore raw

PATCH 66/119 arm64: dont zero DIT on signal return

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1265132127b63502d34e0f58c8bdef3a4dc927c2 ]

Currently valid_user_regs() treats SPSR_ELx.DIT as a RES0 bit, causing it to be zeroed upon exception return, rather than preserved. Thus, code relying on DIT will not function as expected, and may expose an unexpected timing sidechannel.

Let's remove DIT from the set of RES0 bits, such that it is preserved. At the same time, the related comment is updated to better describe the situation, and to take into account the most recent documentation of SPSR_ELx, in ARM DDI 0487C.a.

Fixes 7206dc93a58fb764 ("arm64: Expose Arm v8.4 features")
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c |   12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +8 -4
@@ -1402,15 +1402,19 @@ asmlinkage void syscall_trace_exit(struc
 }
 
 /*
- * Bits which are always architecturally RES0 per ARM DDI 0487A.h
+ * SPSR_ELx bits which are always architecturally RES0 per ARM DDI 0487C.a
+ * We also take into account DIT (bit 24), which is not yet documented, and
+ * treat PAN and UAO as RES0 bits, as they are meaningless at EL0, and may be
+ * allocated an EL0 meaning in future.
  * Userspace cannot use these until they have an architectural meaning.
+ * Note that this follows the SPSR_ELx format, not the AArch32 PSR format.
  * We also reserve IL for the kernel; SS is handled dynamically.
  */
 #define SPSR_EL1_AARCH64_RES0_BITS \
-	(GENMASK_ULL(63,32) | GENMASK_ULL(27, 22) | GENMASK_ULL(20, 10) | \
-	 GENMASK_ULL(5, 5))
+	(GENMASK_ULL(63,32) | GENMASK_ULL(27, 25) | GENMASK_ULL(23, 22) | \
+	 GENMASK_ULL(20, 10) | GENMASK_ULL(5, 5))
 #define SPSR_EL1_AARCH32_RES0_BITS \
-	(GENMASK_ULL(63,32) | GENMASK_ULL(24, 22) | GENMASK_ULL(20,20))
+	(GENMASK_ULL(63,32) | GENMASK_ULL(23, 22) | GENMASK_ULL(20,20))
 
 static int valid_compat_regs(struct user_pt_regs *regs)
 {
author maintainer
#72 lore raw

PATCH 62/119 arm64: Add helpers for checking CPU MIDR against a range

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1df310505d6d544802016f6bae49aab836ae8510 ]

Add helpers for checking if the given CPU midr falls in a range of variants/revisions for a given model.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |    4 ++--
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h    |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c      |   18 +++++++-----------
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +2 -2
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #define __ASM_CPUFEATURE_H
 
 #include <asm/cpucaps.h>
+#include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/hwcap.h>
 #include <asm/sysreg.h>
 
@@ -302,8 +303,7 @@ struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {
 	void (*cpu_enable)(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap);
 	union {
 		struct {	/* To be used for erratum handling only */
-			u32 midr_model;
-			u32 midr_range_min, midr_range_max;
+			struct midr_range midr_range;
 		};
 
 		struct {	/* Feature register checking */
arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +30 -0
@@ -126,6 +126,36 @@
 #define read_cpuid(reg)			read_sysreg_s(SYS_ ## reg)
 
 /*
+ * Represent a range of MIDR values for a given CPU model and a
+ * range of variant/revision values.
+ *
+ * @model	- CPU model as defined by MIDR_CPU_MODEL
+ * @rv_min	- Minimum value for the revision/variant as defined by
+ *		  MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV
+ * @rv_max	- Maximum value for the variant/revision for the range.
+ */
+struct midr_range {
+	u32 model;
+	u32 rv_min;
+	u32 rv_max;
+};
+
+#define MIDR_RANGE(m, v_min, r_min, v_max, r_max)		\
+	{							\
+		.model = m,					\
+		.rv_min = MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(v_min, r_min),	\
+		.rv_max = MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(v_max, r_max),	\
+	}
+
+#define MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(m) MIDR_RANGE(m, 0, 0, 0xf, 0xf)
+
+static inline bool is_midr_in_range(u32 midr, struct midr_range const *range)
+{
+	return MIDR_IS_CPU_MODEL_RANGE(midr, range->model,
+				 range->rv_min, range->rv_max);
+}
+
+/*
  * The CPU ID never changes at run time, so we might as well tell the
  * compiler that it's constant.  Use this function to read the CPU ID
  * rather than directly reading processor_id or read_cpuid() directly.
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +7 -11
@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@
 static bool __maybe_unused
 is_affected_midr_range(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
 {
+	u32 midr = read_cpuid_id();
+
 	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
-	return MIDR_IS_CPU_MODEL_RANGE(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_model,
-				       entry->midr_range_min,
-				       entry->midr_range_max);
+	return is_midr_in_range(midr, &entry->midr_range);
 }
 
 static bool __maybe_unused
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ is_kryo_midr(const struct arm64_cpu_capa
 	model &= MIDR_IMPLEMENTOR_MASK | (0xf00 << MIDR_PARTNUM_SHIFT) |
 		 MIDR_ARCHITECTURE_MASK;
 
-	return model == entry->midr_model;
+	return model == entry->midr_range.model;
 }
 
 static bool
@@ -407,15 +407,11 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
 
 #define CAP_MIDR_RANGE(model, v_min, r_min, v_max, r_max)	\
 	.matches = is_affected_midr_range,			\
-	.midr_model = model,					\
-	.midr_range_min = MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(v_min, r_min),	\
-	.midr_range_max = MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(v_max, r_max)
+	.midr_range = MIDR_RANGE(model, v_min, r_min, v_max, r_max)
 
 #define CAP_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(model)					\
 	.matches = is_affected_midr_range,				\
-	.midr_model = model,						\
-	.midr_range_min = MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0),			\
-	.midr_range_max = (MIDR_VARIANT_MASK | MIDR_REVISION_MASK)
+	.midr_range = MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(model)
 
 #define MIDR_FIXED(rev, revidr_mask) \
 	.fixed_revs = (struct arm64_midr_revidr[]){{ (rev), (revidr_mask) }, {}}
@@ -556,7 +552,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 		.desc = "Qualcomm Technologies Kryo erratum 1003",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003,
 		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
-		.midr_model = MIDR_QCOM_KRYO,
+		.midr_range.model = MIDR_QCOM_KRYO,
 		.matches = is_kryo_midr,
 	},
 #endif
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/119 nl80211: fix null pointer dereference

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Miaoqing Pan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b501426cf86e70649c983c52f4c823b3c40d72a3 ]

If the interface is not in MESH mode, the command 'iw wlanx mpath del' will cause kernel panic.

The root cause is null pointer access in mpp_flush_by_proxy(), as the pointer 'sdata->u.mesh.mpp_paths' is NULL for non MESH interface.

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000068

[...]
PC is at _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x20/0x5c
LR is at mesh_path_del+0x1c/0x17c [mac80211]
[...]
Process iw (pid: 4537, stack limit = 0xd83e0238)
[...]
[<c021211c>] (_raw_spin_lock_bh) from [<bf8c7648>] (mesh_path_del+0x1c/0x17c [mac80211]) [<bf8c7648>] (mesh_path_del [mac80211]) from [<bf6cdb7c>] (extack_doit+0x20/0x68 [compat]) [<bf6cdb7c>] (extack_doit [compat]) from [<c05c309c>] (genl_rcv_msg+0x274/0x30c) [<c05c309c>] (genl_rcv_msg) from [<c05c25d8>] (netlink_rcv_skb+0x58/0xac) [<c05c25d8>] (netlink_rcv_skb) from [<c05c2e14>] (genl_rcv+0x20/0x34) [<c05c2e14>] (genl_rcv) from [<c05c1f90>] (netlink_unicast+0x11c/0x204) [<c05c1f90>] (netlink_unicast) from [<c05c2420>] (netlink_sendmsg+0x30c/0x370) [<c05c2420>] (netlink_sendmsg) from [<c05886d0>] (sock_sendmsg+0x70/0x84) [<c05886d0>] (sock_sendmsg) from [<c0589f4c>] (___sys_sendmsg.part.3+0x188/0x228) [<c0589f4c>] (___sys_sendmsg.part.3) from [<c058add4>] (__sys_sendmsg+0x4c/0x70) [<c058add4>] (__sys_sendmsg) from [<c0208c80>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x44)

Code: e2822c02 e2822001 e5832004 f590f000 (e1902f9f)
---[ end trace bbd717600f8f884d ]---
---
 net/wireless/nl80211.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/wireless/nl80211.c +3 -0
index ec504c4a397b4..ff31feeee8e3b 100644
@@ -5504,6 +5504,9 @@ static int nl80211_del_mpath(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	if (!rdev->ops->del_mpath)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
+	if (dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	return rdev_del_mpath(rdev, dev, dst);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#56 lore raw

PATCH 46/119 arm64: capabilities: Update prototype for enable call back

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dave Martin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c0cda3b8ee6b4b6851b2fd8b6db91fd7b0e2524a ]

We issue the enable() call back for all CPU hwcaps capabilities available on the system, on all the CPUs. So far we have ignored the argument passed to the call back, which had a prototype to accept a "void *" for use with on_each_cpu() and later with stop_machine(). However, with commit 0a0d111d40fd1
("arm64: cpufeature: Pass capability structure to ->enable callback"), there are some users of the argument who wants the matching capability struct pointer where there are multiple matching criteria for a single capability. Clean up the declaration of the call back to make it clear.

1) Renamed to cpu_enable(), to imply taking necessary actions on the called CPU for the entry.
2) Pass const pointer to the capability, to allow the call back to check the entry. (e.,g to check if any action is needed on the CPU)
3) We don't care about the result of the call back, turning this to a void.

Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Andre Przywara <[email protected]>
Cc James Morse <[email protected]>
[suzuki: convert more users, rename call back and drop results]
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |    7 +++-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h  |    5 +--
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c      |   55 +++++++++++++++++-------------------
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c      |   34 +++++++++++++---------
 arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c          |    1 
 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c           |    4 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c               |    3 -
 7 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +6 -1
@@ -96,7 +96,12 @@ struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {
 	u16 capability;
 	int def_scope;			/* default scope */
 	bool (*matches)(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps, int scope);
-	int (*enable)(void *);		/* Called on all active CPUs */
+	/*
+	 * Take the appropriate actions to enable this capability for this CPU.
+	 * For each successfully booted CPU, this method is called for each
+	 * globally detected capability.
+	 */
+	void (*cpu_enable)(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap);
 	union {
 		struct {	/* To be used for erratum handling only */
 			u32 midr_model;
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +3 -2
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include <linux/string.h>
 
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/fpsimd.h>
 #include <asm/hw_breakpoint.h>
 #include <asm/lse.h>
@@ -222,8 +223,8 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(co
 
 #endif
 
-int cpu_enable_pan(void *__unused);
-int cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(void *__unused);
+void cpu_enable_pan(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused);
+void cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused);
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 #endif /* __ASM_PROCESSOR_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +26 -29

178 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +21 -13
@@ -859,7 +859,8 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const st
 						     ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT);
 }
 
-static int kpti_install_ng_mappings(void *__unused)
+static void
+kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 {
 	typedef void (kpti_remap_fn)(int, int, phys_addr_t);
 	extern kpti_remap_fn idmap_kpti_install_ng_mappings;
@@ -869,7 +870,7 @@ static int kpti_install_ng_mappings(void
 	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
 
 	if (kpti_applied)
-		return 0;
+		return;
 
 	remap_fn = (void *)__pa_symbol(idmap_kpti_install_ng_mappings);
 
@@ -880,7 +881,7 @@ static int kpti_install_ng_mappings(void
 	if (!cpu)
 		kpti_applied = true;
 
-	return 0;
+	return;
 }
 
 static int __init parse_kpti(char *str)
@@ -897,7 +898,7 @@ static int __init parse_kpti(char *str)
 early_param("kpti", parse_kpti);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
 
-static int cpu_copy_el2regs(void *__unused)
+static void cpu_copy_el2regs(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 {
 	/*
 	 * Copy register values that aren't redirected by hardware.
@@ -909,8 +910,6 @@ static int cpu_copy_el2regs(void *__unus
 	 */
 	if (!alternatives_applied)
 		write_sysreg(read_sysreg(tpidr_el1), tpidr_el2);
-
-	return 0;
 }
 
 static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
@@ -934,7 +933,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 		.field_pos = ID_AA64MMFR1_PAN_SHIFT,
 		.sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
 		.min_field_value = 1,
-		.enable = cpu_enable_pan,
+		.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_pan,
 	},
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PAN */
 #if defined(CONFIG_AS_LSE) && defined(CONFIG_ARM64_LSE_ATOMICS)
@@ -982,7 +981,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN,
 		.def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM,
 		.matches = runs_at_el2,
-		.enable = cpu_copy_el2regs,
+		.cpu_enable = cpu_copy_el2regs,
 	},
 	{
 		.desc = "32-bit EL0 Support",
@@ -1006,7 +1005,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 		.capability = ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0,
 		.def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM,
 		.matches = unmap_kernel_at_el0,
-		.enable = kpti_install_ng_mappings,
+		.cpu_enable = kpti_install_ng_mappings,
 	},
 #endif
 	{
@@ -1169,6 +1168,14 @@ void update_cpu_capabilities(const struc
 	}
 }
 
+static int __enable_cpu_capability(void *arg)
+{
+	const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap = arg;
+
+	cap->cpu_enable(cap);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Run through the enabled capabilities and enable() it on all active
  * CPUs
@@ -1184,14 +1191,15 @@ void __init enable_cpu_capabilities(cons
 		/* Ensure cpus_have_const_cap(num) works */
 		static_branch_enable(&cpu_hwcap_keys[num]);
 
-		if (caps->enable) {
+		if (caps->cpu_enable) {
 			/*
 			 * Use stop_machine() as it schedules the work allowing
 			 * us to modify PSTATE, instead of on_each_cpu() which
 			 * uses an IPI, giving us a PSTATE that disappears when
 			 * we return.
 			 */
-			stop_machine(caps->enable, (void *)caps, cpu_online_mask);
+			stop_machine(__enable_cpu_capability, (void *)caps,
+				     cpu_online_mask);
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -1249,8 +1257,8 @@ verify_local_cpu_features(const struct a
 					smp_processor_id(), caps->desc);
 			cpu_die_early();
 		}
-		if (caps->enable)
-			caps->enable((void *)caps);
+		if (caps->cpu_enable)
+			caps->cpu_enable(caps);
 	}
 }
 
arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c +1 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/signal.h>
 
 #include <asm/fpsimd.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/simd.h>
 
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +2 -2
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 
 #include <asm/atomic.h>
 #include <asm/bug.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
 #include <asm/esr.h>
 #include <asm/insn.h>
@@ -436,10 +437,9 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_undefinst
 	force_signal_inject(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, regs, 0);
 }
 
-int cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(void *__unused)
+void cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 {
 	config_sctlr_el1(SCTLR_EL1_UCI, 0);
-	return 0;
 }
 
 #define __user_cache_maint(insn, address, res)			\
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +1 -2
@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ asmlinkage int __exception do_debug_exce
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_debug_exception);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PAN
-int cpu_enable_pan(void *__unused)
+void cpu_enable_pan(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 {
 	/*
 	 * We modify PSTATE. This won't work from irq context as the PSTATE
@@ -885,6 +885,5 @@ int cpu_enable_pan(void *__unused)
 
 	config_sctlr_el1(SCTLR_EL1_SPAN, 0);
 	asm(SET_PSTATE_PAN(1));
-	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PAN */
author maintainer
#52 lore raw

PATCH 42/119 arm64: Expose Arm v8.4 features

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7206dc93a58fb76421c4411eefa3c003337bcb2d ]

Expose the new features introduced by Arm v8.4 extensions to Arm v8-A profile.

These include :

1) Data indpendent timing of instructions. (DIT, exposed as HWCAP_DIT)
2) Unaligned atomic instructions and Single-copy atomicity of loads and stores. (AT, expose as HWCAP_USCAT)
3) LDAPR and STLR instructions with immediate offsets (extension to LRCPC, exposed as HWCAP_ILRCPC)
4) Flag manipulation instructions (TS, exposed as HWCAP_FLAGM).

Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
[ardb: fix up context for missing SVE]
---
 Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.txt |   10 ++++++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h               |    3 +++
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h           |    4 ++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                |    7 +++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c                   |    4 ++++
 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.txt +10 -0
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ infrastructure:
      x--------------------------------------------------x
      | Name                         |  bits   | visible |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
+     | TS                           | [55-52] |    y    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
      | FHM                          | [51-48] |    y    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@ infrastructure:
      x--------------------------------------------------x
      | Name                         |  bits   | visible |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
+     | DIT                          | [51-48] |    y    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
      | SVE                          | [35-32] |    y    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
@@ -191,6 +193,14 @@ infrastructure:
      | DPB                          | [3-0]   |    y    |
      x--------------------------------------------------x
 
+  5) ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1 - Memory model feature register 2
+
+     x--------------------------------------------------x
+     | Name                         |  bits   | visible |
+     |--------------------------------------------------|
+     | AT                           | [35-32] |    y    |
+     x--------------------------------------------------x
+
 Appendix I: Example
 ---------------------------
 
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +3 -0
@@ -375,6 +375,7 @@
 #define SCTLR_EL1_BUILD_BUG_ON_MISSING_BITS	BUILD_BUG_ON((SCTLR_EL1_SET ^ SCTLR_EL1_CLEAR) != ~0)
 
 /* id_aa64isar0 */
+#define ID_AA64ISAR0_TS_SHIFT		52
 #define ID_AA64ISAR0_FHM_SHIFT		48
 #define ID_AA64ISAR0_DP_SHIFT		44
 #define ID_AA64ISAR0_SM4_SHIFT		40
@@ -396,6 +397,7 @@
 /* id_aa64pfr0 */
 #define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT		60
 #define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT		56
+#define ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_SHIFT		48
 #define ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT		24
 #define ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT		20
 #define ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT		16
@@ -441,6 +443,7 @@
 #define ID_AA64MMFR1_VMIDBITS_16	2
 
 /* id_aa64mmfr2 */
+#define ID_AA64MMFR2_AT_SHIFT		32
 #define ID_AA64MMFR2_LVA_SHIFT		16
 #define ID_AA64MMFR2_IESB_SHIFT		12
 #define ID_AA64MMFR2_LSM_SHIFT		8
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h +4 -0
@@ -44,5 +44,9 @@
 #define HWCAP_SHA512		(1 << 21)
 #define HWCAP_SVE		(1 << 22)
 #define HWCAP_ASIMDFHM		(1 << 23)
+#define HWCAP_DIT		(1 << 24)
+#define HWCAP_USCAT		(1 << 25)
+#define HWCAP_ILRCPC		(1 << 26)
+#define HWCAP_FLAGM		(1 << 27)
 
 #endif /* _UAPI__ASM_HWCAP_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +7 -0
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ cpufeature_pan_not_uao(const struct arm6
  * sync with the documentation of the CPU feature register ABI.
  */
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar0[] = {
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_TS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_FHM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_DP_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM4_SHIFT, 4, 0),
@@ -132,6 +133,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_i
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0[] = {
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_NI),
 	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_NI),
@@ -171,6 +173,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_i
 };
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr2[] = {
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_AT_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_LVA_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_IESB_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_LSM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
@@ -1054,14 +1057,18 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM4_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SM4),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_DP_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ASIMDDP),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_FHM_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ASIMDFHM),
+	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_TS_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_FLAGM),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 0, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_FP),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_FPHP),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 0, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ASIMD),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ASIMDHP),
+	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_DIT),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_DCPOP),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_JSCVT),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_FCMA),
 	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR1_LRCPC_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_LRCPC),
+	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR1_LRCPC_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 2, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ILRCPC),
+	HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1, ID_AA64MMFR2_AT_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_USCAT),
 	{},
 };
 
arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c +4 -0
@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ static const char *const hwcap_str[] = {
 	"sha512",
 	"sve",
 	"asimdfhm",
+	"dit",
+	"uscat",
+	"ilrcpc",
+	"flagm",
 	NULL
 };
 
author maintainer
#51 lore raw

PATCH 41/119 arm64: Documentation: cpu-feature-registers: Remove RES0 fields

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 847ecd3fa311cde0f10a1b66c572abb136742b1d ]

Remove the invisible RES0 field entries from the table, listing fields in CPU ID feature registers, as :
1) We are only interested in the user visible fields.
2) The field description may not be up-to-date, as the field could be assigned a new meaning.
3) We already explain the rules of the fields which are not visible.

---
 Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.txt |    8 ++------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.txt +2 -6
@@ -110,7 +110,6 @@ infrastructure:
      x--------------------------------------------------x
      | Name                         |  bits   | visible |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
-     | RES0                         | [63-52] |    n    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
      | FHM                          | [51-48] |    y    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
@@ -124,8 +123,6 @@ infrastructure:
      |--------------------------------------------------|
      | RDM                          | [31-28] |    y    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
-     | RES0                         | [27-24] |    n    |
-     |--------------------------------------------------|
      | ATOMICS                      | [23-20] |    y    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
      | CRC32                        | [19-16] |    y    |
@@ -135,8 +132,6 @@ infrastructure:
      | SHA1                         | [11-8]  |    y    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
      | AES                          | [7-4]   |    y    |
-     |--------------------------------------------------|
-     | RES0                         | [3-0]   |    n    |
      x--------------------------------------------------x
 
 
@@ -144,7 +139,8 @@ infrastructure:
      x--------------------------------------------------x
      | Name                         |  bits   | visible |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
-     | RES0                         | [63-28] |    n    |
+     |--------------------------------------------------|
+     | SVE                          | [35-32] |    y    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
      | GIC                          | [27-24] |    n    |
      |--------------------------------------------------|
author maintainer
#42 lore raw

PATCH 32/119 usb: udc: lpc32xx: fix bad bit shift operation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>

commit b987b66ac3a2bc2f7b03a0ba48a07dc553100c07 upstream.

It seems that the right variable to use in this case is *i*, instead of *n*, otherwise there is an undefined behavior when right shifiting by more than 31 bits when multiplying n by 8; notice that *n* can take values equal or greater than 4 (4, 8, 16, ...).

Also, notice that under the current conditions (bl = 3), we are skiping the handling of bytes 3, 7, 31... So, fix this by updating this logic and limit *bl* up to 4 instead of up to 3.

This fix is based on function udc_stuff_fifo().

Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1454834 ("Bad bit shift operation")

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c +3 -3
@@ -1178,11 +1178,11 @@ static void udc_pop_fifo(struct lpc32xx_
 			tmp = readl(USBD_RXDATA(udc->udp_baseaddr));
 
 			bl = bytes - n;
-			if (bl > 3)
-				bl = 3;
+			if (bl > 4)
+				bl = 4;
 
 			for (i = 0; i < bl; i++)
-				data[n + i] = (u8) ((tmp >> (n * 8)) & 0xFF);
+				data[n + i] = (u8) ((tmp >> (i * 8)) & 0xFF);
 		}
 		break;
 
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 18/119 ocfs2: fix panic due to ocfs2_wq is null

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yi Li <[email protected]>

commit b918c43021baaa3648de09e19a4a3dd555a45f40 upstream.

mount.ocfs2 failed when reading ocfs2 filesystem superblock encounters an error. ocfs2_initialize_super() returns before allocating ocfs2_wq. ocfs2_dismount_volume() triggers the following panic.

  Oct 15 16:09:27 cnwarekv-205120 kernel: On-disk corruption discovered.Please run fsck.ocfs2 once the filesystem is unmounted.
  Oct 15 16:09:27 cnwarekv-205120 kernel: (mount.ocfs2,22804,44): ocfs2_read_locked_inode:537 ERROR: status = -30
  Oct 15 16:09:27 cnwarekv-205120 kernel: (mount.ocfs2,22804,44): ocfs2_init_global_system_inodes:458 ERROR: status = -30
  Oct 15 16:09:27 cnwarekv-205120 kernel: (mount.ocfs2,22804,44): ocfs2_init_global_system_inodes:491 ERROR: status = -30
  Oct 15 16:09:27 cnwarekv-205120 kernel: (mount.ocfs2,22804,44): ocfs2_initialize_super:2313 ERROR: status = -30
  Oct 15 16:09:27 cnwarekv-205120 kernel: (mount.ocfs2,22804,44): ocfs2_fill_super:1033 ERROR: status = -30
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 1 PID: 11753 Comm: mount.ocfs2 Tainted: G  E
        4.14.148-200.ckv.x86_64 #1
  Hardware name: Sugon H320-G30/35N16-US, BIOS 0SSDX017 12/21/2018
  task: ffff967af0520000 task.stack: ffffa5f05484000
  RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x19/0x20
  Call Trace:
    flush_workqueue+0x81/0x460
    ocfs2_shutdown_local_alloc+0x47/0x440 [ocfs2]
    ocfs2_dismount_volume+0x84/0x400 [ocfs2]
    ocfs2_fill_super+0xa4/0x1270 [ocfs2]
    ? ocfs2_initialize_super.isa.211+0xf20/0xf20 [ocfs2]
    mount_bdev+0x17f/0x1c0
    mount_fs+0x3a/0x160
---
 fs/ocfs2/journal.c    |    3 ++-
 fs/ocfs2/localalloc.c |    3 ++-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ocfs2/journal.c +2 -1
@@ -231,7 +231,8 @@ void ocfs2_recovery_exit(struct ocfs2_su
 	/* At this point, we know that no more recovery threads can be
 	 * launched, so wait for any recovery completion work to
 	 * complete. */
-	flush_workqueue(osb->ocfs2_wq);
+	if (osb->ocfs2_wq)
+		flush_workqueue(osb->ocfs2_wq);
 
 	/*
 	 * Now that recovery is shut down, and the osb is about to be
fs/ocfs2/localalloc.c +2 -1
@@ -391,7 +391,8 @@ void ocfs2_shutdown_local_alloc(struct o
 	struct ocfs2_dinode *alloc = NULL;
 
 	cancel_delayed_work(&osb->la_enable_wq);
-	flush_workqueue(osb->ocfs2_wq);
+	if (osb->ocfs2_wq)
+		flush_workqueue(osb->ocfs2_wq);
 
 	if (osb->local_alloc_state == OCFS2_LA_UNUSED)
 		goto out;
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 14/119 r8152: Set macpassthru in reset_resume callback

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a54cdeeb04fc719e4c7f19d6e28dba7ea86cee5b ]

r8152 may fail to establish network connection after resume from system suspend.

If the USB port connects to r8152 lost its power during system suspend, the MAC address was written before is lost. The reason is that The MAC address doesn't get written again in its reset_resume callback.

So let's set MAC address again in reset_resume callback. Also remove unnecessary lock as no other locking attempt will happen during reset_resume.

---
 drivers/net/usb/r8152.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/r8152.c +1 -2
index 455eec3c46942..c0964281ab983 100644
@@ -4465,10 +4465,9 @@ static int rtl8152_reset_resume(struct usb_interface *intf)
 	struct r8152 *tp = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
 
 	clear_bit(SELECTIVE_SUSPEND, &tp->flags);
-	mutex_lock(&tp->control);
 	tp->rtl_ops.init(tp);
 	queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq, &tp->hw_phy_work, 0);
-	mutex_unlock(&tp->control);
+	set_ethernet_addr(tp);
 	return rtl8152_resume(intf);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1

Greg Kroah-Hartman

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover 4.14.151-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.151 release. There are 119 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue 29 Oct 2019 08:27:02 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.151-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.14.151-rc1

Greg KH <[email protected]>
RDMA/cxgb4: Do not dma memory off of the stack

Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
kvm: vmx: Basic APIC virtualization controls have three settings

Junaid Shahid <[email protected]>
kvm: apic: Flush TLB after APIC mode/address change if VPIDs are in use

Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
kvm: vmx: Introduce lapic_mode enumeration

Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
KVM: X86: introduce invalidate_gpa argument to tlb flush

Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
PCI: PM: Fix pci_power_up()

Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
xen/netback: fix error path of xenvif_connect_data()

Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
cpufreq: Avoid cpufreq_suspend() deadlock on system shutdown

Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>
memstick: jmb38x_ms: Fix an error handling path in 'jmb38x_ms_probe()'

Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
btrfs: block-group: Fix a memory leak due to missing btrfs_put_block_group()

Patrick Williams <[email protected]>
pinctrl: armada-37xx: swap polarity on LED group

Patrick Williams <[email protected]>
pinctrl: armada-37xx: fix control of pins 32 and up

Steve Wahl <[email protected]>
x86/boot/64: Make level2_kernel_pgt pages invalid outside kernel area

Roberto Bergantinos Corpas <[email protected]>

    CIFS: avoid using MID 0xFFFF

Helge Deller <[email protected]>
parisc: Fix vmap memory leak in ioremap()/iounmap()

Max Filippov <[email protected]>
xtensa: drop EXPORT_SYMBOL for outs*/ins*

David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
hugetlbfs: don't access uninitialized memmaps in pfn_range_valid_gigantic()

Qian Cai <[email protected]>
mm/page_owner: don't access uninitialized memmaps when reading /proc/pagetypeinfo

Qian Cai <[email protected]>
mm/slub: fix a deadlock in show_slab_objects()

Steffen Maier <[email protected]>
scsi: zfcp: fix reaction on bit error threshold notification

David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
fs/proc/page.c: don't access uninitialized memmaps in fs/proc/page.c

David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
drivers/base/memory.c: don't access uninitialized memmaps in soft_offline_page_store()

Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
drm/amdgpu: Bail earlier when amdgpu.cik_/si_support is not set to 1

Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>
drm/edid: Add 6 bpc quirk for SDC panel in Lenovo G50

Will Deacon <[email protected]>
mac80211: Reject malformed SSID elements

Will Deacon <[email protected]>
cfg80211: wext: avoid copying malformed SSIDs

Junya Monden <[email protected]>
ASoC: rsnd: Reinitialize bit clock inversion flag for every format setting

Evan Green <[email protected]>
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - avoid processing unknown IRQs

Marco Felsch <[email protected]>
Input: da9063 - fix capability and drop KEY_SLEEP

Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
scsi: ch: Make it possible to open a ch device multiple times again

Yufen Yu <[email protected]>
scsi: core: try to get module before removing device

Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
scsi: core: save/restore command resid for error handling

Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
scsi: sd: Ignore a failure to sync cache due to lack of authorization

Colin Ian King <[email protected]>

    staging: wlan-ng: fix exit return when sme->key_idx >= NUM_WEPKEYS

Paul Burton <[email protected]>
MIPS: tlbex: Fix build_restore_pagemask KScratch restore

Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2

Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
arm64: Force SSBS on context switch

Will Deacon <[email protected]>
arm64: ssbs: Don't treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB

Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>
arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass

Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>
arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2

Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>
arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection

Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof

Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>
arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation

Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>
arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection

Mian Yousaf Kaukab <[email protected]>
arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support

Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>
arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown

Mian Yousaf Kaukab <[email protected]>
arm64: Add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v1

Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
arm64: fix SSBS sanitization

Will Deacon <[email protected]>
KVM: arm64: Set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD is forcefully disabled and !vhe

Will Deacon <[email protected]>
arm64: ssbd: Add support for PSTATE.SSBS rather than trapping to EL3

Will Deacon <[email protected]>
arm64: cpufeature: Detect SSBS and advertise to userspace

Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
arm64: Get rid of __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_*

Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
arm64: don't zero DIT on signal return

Shanker Donthineni <[email protected]>
arm64: KVM: Use SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 for Falkor BP hardening

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Add support for checks based on a list of MIDRs

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: Add MIDR encoding for Arm Cortex-A55 and Cortex-A35

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: Add helpers for checking CPU MIDR against a range

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Clean up midr range helpers

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Change scope of VHE to Boot CPU feature

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Add support for features enabled early

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Restrict KPTI detection to boot-time CPUs

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Introduce weak features based on local CPU

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Group handling of features and errata workarounds

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Allow features based on local CPU scope

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Split the processing of errata work arounds

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Prepare for grouping features and errata work arounds

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Filter the entries based on a given mask

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Unify the verification

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Add flags to handle the conflicts on late CPU

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Prepare for fine grained capabilities

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Move errata processing code

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Move errata work around check on boot CPU

Dave Martin <[email protected]>
arm64: capabilities: Update prototype for enable call back

Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
arm64: Introduce sysreg_clear_set()

Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
arm64: add PSR_AA32_* definitions

Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
arm64: move SCTLR_EL{1,2} assertions to <asm/sysreg.h>

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: Expose Arm v8.4 features

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: Documentation: cpu-feature-registers: Remove RES0 fields

Dongjiu Geng <[email protected]>
arm64: v8.4: Support for new floating point multiplication instructions

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: Fix the feature type for ID register fields

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: Expose support for optional ARMv8-A features

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: sysreg: Move to use definitions for all the SCTLR bits

Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
USB: ldusb: fix read info leaks

Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
USB: usblp: fix use-after-free on disconnect

Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
USB: ldusb: fix memleak on disconnect

Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

    USB: serial: ti_usb_3410_5052: fix port-close races

Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
usb: udc: lpc32xx: fix bad bit shift operation

Kailang Yang <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/realtek - Add support for ALC711

Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
USB: legousbtower: fix memleak on disconnect

Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
memfd: Fix locking when tagging pins

Alessio Balsini <[email protected]>
loop: Add LOOP_SET_DIRECT_IO to compat ioctl

Jiaxun Yang <[email protected]>
MIPS: elf_hwcap: Export userspace ASEs

Jiaxun Yang <[email protected]>
MIPS: Treat Loongson Extensions as ASEs

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
net: avoid potential infinite loop in tc_ctl_action()

Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: change sctp_prot .no_autobind with true

Biao Huang <[email protected]>
net: stmmac: disable/enable ptp_ref_clk in suspend/resume flow

Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]>

    net: i82596: fix dma_alloc_attr for sni_82596

Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>

    net: bcmgenet: Set phydev->dev_flags only for internal PHYs

Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
net: bcmgenet: Fix RGMII_MODE_EN value for GENET v1/2/3

Stefano Brivio <[email protected]>
ipv4: Return -ENETUNREACH if we can't create route but saddr is valid

Yi Li <[email protected]>
ocfs2: fix panic due to ocfs2_wq is null

Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Revert "drm/radeon: Fix EEH during kexec"

Song Liu <[email protected]>
md/raid0: fix warning message for parameter default_layout

Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
namespace: fix namespace.pl script to support relative paths

Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>
r8152: Set macpassthru in reset_resume callback

Yizhuo <[email protected]>
net: hisilicon: Fix usage of uninitialized variable in function mdio_sc_cfg_reg_write()

Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>
mips: Loongson: Fix the link time qualifier of 'serial_exit()'

Miaoqing Pan <[email protected]>
mac80211: fix txq null pointer dereference

Miaoqing Pan <[email protected]>
nl80211: fix null pointer dereference

Ross Lagerwall <[email protected]>
xen/efi: Set nonblocking callbacks

Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]>
MIPS: dts: ar9331: fix interrupt-controller size

Michal Vokáč <[email protected]>
net: dsa: qca8k: Use up to 7 ports for all operations

Peter Ujfalusi <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: am4372: Set memory bandwidth limit for DISPC

Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>

    ieee802154: ca8210: prevent memory leak

Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
ARM: OMAP2+: Fix missing reset done flag for am3 and am43

Quinn Tran <[email protected]>
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix unbound sleep in fcport delete path.

Xiang Chen <[email protected]>
scsi: megaraid: disable device when probe failed after enabled device

Stanley Chu <[email protected]>
scsi: ufs: skip shutdown if hba is not powered

-------------

Diffstat:

 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt    |  16 +-
 Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.txt      |  26 +-
 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/am4372.dtsi                      |   2 +
 .../mach-omap2/omap_hwmod_33xx_43xx_ipblock_data.c |   3 +-
 arch/arm/xen/efi.c                                 |   2 +
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                                 |   1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h                   |   6 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h                | 250 +++++++++-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h                   |  43 ++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h                   |   2 -
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h                  |  11 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h                 |  22 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h                    |  58 ++-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h                    |  95 +++-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/virt.h                      |   6 -
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h                |  12 +
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h               |   1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S                            |  19 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                     | 495 ++++++++++++--------
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                     | 517 +++++++++++++++------
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c                        |  12 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c                         |   1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/head.S                           |  13 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/process.c                        |  31 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c                         |  13 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c                            |  44 --
 arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c                           |  22 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c                          |   4 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S                         |  12 -
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c                        |  10 -
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c                     |  11 +
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                              |   3 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/proc.S                               |  24 +-
 arch/mips/boot/dts/qca/ar9331.dtsi                 |   2 +-
 arch/mips/include/asm/cpu-features.h               |  16 +
 arch/mips/include/asm/cpu.h                        |   4 +
 arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h                 |  11 +
 arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c                       |  37 ++
 arch/mips/kernel/proc.c                            |   4 +
 arch/mips/loongson64/common/serial.c               |   2 +-
 arch/mips/mm/tlbex.c                               |  23 +-
 arch/parisc/mm/ioremap.c                           |  12 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h                    |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c                           |  22 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c                               |  12 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h                               |  14 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                                 |  18 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                                 |  79 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                                 |  32 +-
 arch/x86/xen/efi.c                                 |   2 +
 arch/xtensa/kernel/xtensa_ksyms.c                  |   7 -
 drivers/base/core.c                                |   3 +
 drivers/base/memory.c                              |   3 +
 drivers/block/loop.c                               |   1 +
 drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c                          |  10 -
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c            |  35 ++
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_kms.c            |  35 --
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid.c                         |   3 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_drv.c                |   8 -
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c                  |  28 +-
 drivers/input/misc/da9063_onkey.c                  |   5 +-
 drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c                    |   6 +-
 drivers/md/raid0.c                                 |   2 +-
 drivers/memstick/host/jmb38x_ms.c                  |   2 +-
 drivers/net/dsa/qca8k.c                            |   4 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.h     |   1 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmmii.c       |  11 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns_mdio.c          |   6 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/i825xx/lasi_82596.c           |   4 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/i825xx/lib82596.c             |   4 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/i825xx/sni_82596.c            |   4 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c  |  12 +-
 drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c                    |   2 +-
 drivers/net/usb/r8152.c                            |   3 +-
 drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c                |   1 -
 drivers/pci/pci.c                                  |  24 +-
 drivers/pinctrl/mvebu/pinctrl-armada-37xx.c        |  26 +-
 drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_fsf.c                       |  16 +-
 drivers/scsi/ch.c                                  |   1 -
 drivers/scsi/megaraid.c                            |   4 +-
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_target.c                  |   4 +
 drivers/scsi/scsi_error.c                          |   3 +
 drivers/scsi/scsi_sysfs.c                          |  11 +-
 drivers/scsi/sd.c                                  |   3 +-
 drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c                          |   3 +
 drivers/staging/wlan-ng/cfg80211.c                 |   6 +-
 drivers/usb/class/usblp.c                          |   4 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c               |   6 +-
 drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c                           |  20 +-
 drivers/usb/misc/legousbtower.c                    |   5 +-
 drivers/usb/serial/ti_usb_3410_5052.c              |  10 +-
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c                             |   1 +
 fs/cifs/smb1ops.c                                  |   3 +
 fs/ocfs2/journal.c                                 |   3 +-
 fs/ocfs2/localalloc.c                              |   3 +-
 fs/proc/page.c                                     |  28 +-
 include/scsi/scsi_eh.h                             |   1 +
 mm/hugetlb.c                                       |   5 +-
 mm/page_owner.c                                    |   5 +-
 mm/shmem.c                                         |  18 +-
 mm/slub.c                                          |  13 +-
 net/ipv4/route.c                                   |   9 +-
 net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c                      |  11 +-
 net/mac80211/mlme.c                                |   5 +-
 net/sched/act_api.c                                |  13 +-
 net/sctp/socket.c                                  |   4 +-
 net/wireless/nl80211.c                             |   3 +
 net/wireless/wext-sme.c                            |   8 +-
 scripts/namespace.pl                               |  13 +-
 sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c                      |   3 +
 sound/soc/sh/rcar/core.c                           |   1 +
 112 files changed, 1773 insertions(+), 808 deletions(-)
#130 lore raw
stable-rc/linux-4.14.y boot: 117 boots: 0 failed, 110 passed with 7 offline (v4.14.150-120-gea1df089eebe)

stable-rc/linux-4.14.y boot: 117 boots: 0 failed, 110 passed with 7 offline (v4.14.150-120-gea1df089eebe)

Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.14.y/kernel/v4.14.150-120-gea1df089eebe/
Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.14.y/kernel/v4.14.150-120-gea1df089eebe/

Tree: stable-rc
Branch: linux-4.14.y
Git Describe: v4.14.150-120-gea1df089eebe
Git Commit: ea1df089eebe2babf969ff53de3fefe3898c2362
Git URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Tested: 63 unique boards, 21 SoC families, 13 builds out of 201

Offline Platforms:

arm:

    multi_v7_defconfig:
        gcc-8
            qcom-apq8064-cm-qs600: 1 offline lab
            sun5i-r8-chip: 1 offline lab
            sun7i-a20-bananapi: 1 offline lab

    sunxi_defconfig:
        gcc-8
            sun5i-r8-chip: 1 offline lab
            sun7i-a20-bananapi: 1 offline lab

    davinci_all_defconfig:
        gcc-8
            dm365evm,legacy: 1 offline lab

    qcom_defconfig:
        gcc-8
            qcom-apq8064-cm-qs600: 1 offline lab

---
For more info write to <[email protected]>

#131 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.151 release. There are 119 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue 29 Oct 2019 08:27:02 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.151-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled, booted, and no regressions found on my x86_64 system.

Thanks,
Didik Setiawan

#132 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.151 release. There are 119 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue 29 Oct 2019 08:27:02 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 172 pass: 159 fail: 13
Failed builds:
	All mips
Qemu test results:
	total: 372 pass: 312 fail: 60

Failed tests:
All mips

Guenter

maintainer
#133 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.151 release. There are 119 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue 29 Oct 2019 08:27:02 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.151-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

All tests are passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v4.14:

    8 builds:	8 pass, 0 fail
    16 boots:	16 pass, 0 fail
    24 tests:	24 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 4.14.151-rc1-g22148a87efce
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,

                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Cheers
Jon

Signature · 1 line
nvpublic
#134 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.151 release. There are 119 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue 29 Oct 2019 08:27:02 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.151-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Results from Linaro?s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Note:
The new test case from LTP version upgrade syscalls sync_file_range02 is an intermittent failure. We are investigating this case.
The listed fixes in the below section are due to LTP upgrade to v20190930.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.14.151-rc2
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.14.y
git commit: 80117985de0635c8d7fa58fa198b7bbbd465542d
git describe: v4.14.150-118-g80117985de06
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.14-oe/build/v4.14.150-118-g80117985de06

No regressions (compared to build v4.14.149-66-g66f69184d722)

Fixes (compared to build v4.14.149-66-g66f69184d722)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

ltp-syscalls-tests:
* ustat02
* ioctl_ns05
* ioctl_ns06

Ran 17364 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64

Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* v4l2-compliance
* network-basic-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ssuite
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
* kvm-unit-tests

Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
#33 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.14 027/119] MIPS: elf_hwcap: Export userspace ASEs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 67 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiaxun Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 38dffe1e4dde1d3174fdce09d67370412843ebb5 ]

A Golang developer reported MIPS hwcap isn't reflecting instructions that the processor actually supported so programs can't apply optimized code at runtime.

Thus we export the ASEs that can be used in userspace programs.

---
  arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 11 ++++++++++
  arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c       | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h +11 -0
index 600ad8fd68356..2475294c3d185 100644
@@ -5,5 +5,16 @@
  /* HWCAP flags */
  #define HWCAP_MIPS_R6		(1 << 0)
  #define HWCAP_MIPS_MSA		(1 << 1)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16	(1 << 3)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MDMX     (1 << 4)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS3D   (1 << 5)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_SMARTMIPS (1 << 6)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP      (1 << 7)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP2     (1 << 8)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP3     (1 << 9)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16E2 (1 << 10)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_MMI  (1 << 11)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT  (1 << 12)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT2 (1 << 13)
 
  #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_HWCAP_H */
arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c +16 -0
index 3007ae1bb616a..c38cd62879f4e 100644
@@ -2080,6 +2080,39 @@ void cpu_probe(void)
  		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MSA;
  	}
 
+	if (cpu_has_mips16)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16;
+
+	if (cpu_has_mdmx)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MDMX;
+
+	if (cpu_has_mips3d)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS3D;
+
+	if (cpu_has_smartmips)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_SMARTMIPS;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp2)

arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c void cpu_probe(void) · line 2108

Quoted 10 lines
arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c +10 -0
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP2;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp3)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP3;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_mmi)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_MMI;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_mmi)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_CAM;

Hi:

Sorry, there is a typo causing build failure.

Should be:

---
 arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 11 ++++++++++
 arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c       | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h +11 -0
index a2aba4b059e6..1ade1daa4921 100644
@@ -6,5 +6,16 @@
 #define HWCAP_MIPS_R6		(1 << 0)
 #define HWCAP_MIPS_MSA		(1 << 1)
 #define HWCAP_MIPS_CRC32	(1 << 2)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16	(1 << 3)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MDMX     (1 << 4)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS3D   (1 << 5)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_SMARTMIPS (1 << 6)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP      (1 << 7)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP2     (1 << 8)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP3     (1 << 9)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16E2 (1 << 10)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_MMI  (1 << 11)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT  (1 << 12)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT2 (1 << 13)
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_HWCAP_H */
arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c +33 -0
index c2eb392597bf..f521cbf934e7 100644
@@ -2180,6 +2180,39 @@ void cpu_probe(void)
 		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MSA;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_has_mips16)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16;
+
+	if (cpu_has_mdmx)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MDMX;
+
+	if (cpu_has_mips3d)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS3D;
+
+	if (cpu_has_smartmips)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_SMARTMIPS;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp2)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP2;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp3)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP3;
+
+	if (cpu_has_mips16e2)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16E2;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_mmi)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_MMI;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_ext)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_ext2)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT2;
+
 	if (cpu_has_vz)
 		cpu_probe_vz(c);
 

-- 2.23.0

author maintainer
#34 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.14 027/119] MIPS: elf_hwcap: Export userspace ASEs

Quoted 80 lines · Jiaxun Yang
Quoted 65 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiaxun Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 38dffe1e4dde1d3174fdce09d67370412843ebb5 ]

A Golang developer reported MIPS hwcap isn't reflecting instructions that the processor actually supported so programs can't apply optimized code at runtime.

Thus we export the ASEs that can be used in userspace programs.

---
  arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 11 ++++++++++
  arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c       | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h +11 -0
index 600ad8fd68356..2475294c3d185 100644
@@ -5,5 +5,16 @@
  /* HWCAP flags */
  #define HWCAP_MIPS_R6		(1 << 0)
  #define HWCAP_MIPS_MSA		(1 << 1)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16	(1 << 3)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MDMX     (1 << 4)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS3D   (1 << 5)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_SMARTMIPS (1 << 6)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP      (1 << 7)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP2     (1 << 8)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP3     (1 << 9)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16E2 (1 << 10)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_MMI  (1 << 11)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT  (1 << 12)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT2 (1 << 13)
  #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_HWCAP_H */
arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c +16 -0
index 3007ae1bb616a..c38cd62879f4e 100644
@@ -2080,6 +2080,39 @@ void cpu_probe(void)
  		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MSA;
  	}
+	if (cpu_has_mips16)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16;
+
+	if (cpu_has_mdmx)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MDMX;
+
+	if (cpu_has_mips3d)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS3D;
+
+	if (cpu_has_smartmips)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_SMARTMIPS;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp2)

arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c void cpu_probe(void) · line 2107

Quoted 10 lines
arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c +10 -0
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP2;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp3)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP3;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_mmi)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_MMI;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_mmi)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_CAM;

Hi:

Quoted 3 lines

Sorry, there is a typo causing build failure.

Should be:

Can you resend this in a format we can apply it in?

thanks,

greg k-h

#35 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 MIPS: elf_hwcap: Export userspace ASEs

A Golang developer reported MIPS hwcap isn't reflecting instructions that the processor actually supported so programs can't apply optimized code at runtime.

Thus we export the ASEs that can be used in userspace programs.

---
 arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 11 ++++++++++
 arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c       | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h +11 -0
index a2aba4b059e63..1ade1daa49210 100644
@@ -6,5 +6,16 @@
 #define HWCAP_MIPS_R6		(1 << 0)
 #define HWCAP_MIPS_MSA		(1 << 1)
 #define HWCAP_MIPS_CRC32	(1 << 2)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16	(1 << 3)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MDMX     (1 << 4)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS3D   (1 << 5)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_SMARTMIPS (1 << 6)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP      (1 << 7)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP2     (1 << 8)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP3     (1 << 9)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16E2 (1 << 10)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_MMI  (1 << 11)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT  (1 << 12)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT2 (1 << 13)
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_HWCAP_H */
arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c +33 -0
index c2eb392597bf6..f521cbf934e76 100644
@@ -2180,6 +2180,39 @@ void cpu_probe(void)
 		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MSA;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_has_mips16)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16;
+
+	if (cpu_has_mdmx)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MDMX;
+
+	if (cpu_has_mips3d)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS3D;
+
+	if (cpu_has_smartmips)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_SMARTMIPS;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp2)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP2;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp3)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP3;
+
+	if (cpu_has_mips16e2)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16E2;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_mmi)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_MMI;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_ext)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_ext2)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT2;
+
 	if (cpu_has_vz)
 		cpu_probe_vz(c);
 
#36 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 MIPS: elf_hwcap: Export userspace ASEs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

A Golang developer reported MIPS hwcap isn't reflecting instructions that the processor actually supported so programs can't apply optimized code at runtime.

Thus we export the ASEs that can be used in userspace programs.

---
 arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 11 ++++++++++
 arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c       | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h +11 -0
index a2aba4b059e63..1ade1daa49210 100644
@@ -6,5 +6,16 @@
 #define HWCAP_MIPS_R6		(1 << 0)
 #define HWCAP_MIPS_MSA		(1 << 1)
 #define HWCAP_MIPS_CRC32	(1 << 2)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16	(1 << 3)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MDMX     (1 << 4)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS3D   (1 << 5)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_SMARTMIPS (1 << 6)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP      (1 << 7)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP2     (1 << 8)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_DSP3     (1 << 9)
+#define HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16E2 (1 << 10)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_MMI  (1 << 11)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT  (1 << 12)
+#define HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT2 (1 << 13)
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_HWCAP_H */
arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c +33 -0
index c2eb392597bf6..f521cbf934e76 100644
@@ -2180,6 +2180,39 @@ void cpu_probe(void)
 		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MSA;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_has_mips16)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16;
+
+	if (cpu_has_mdmx)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MDMX;
+
+	if (cpu_has_mips3d)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS3D;
+
+	if (cpu_has_smartmips)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_SMARTMIPS;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp2)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP2;
+
+	if (cpu_has_dsp3)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_DSP3;
+
+	if (cpu_has_mips16e2)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_MIPS_MIPS16E2;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_mmi)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_MMI;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_ext)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT;
+
+	if (cpu_has_loongson_ext2)
+		elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_LOONGSON_EXT2;
+
 	if (cpu_has_vz)
 		cpu_probe_vz(c);
 
#25 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.14 024/119] sctp: change sctp_prot .no_autobind with true

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 28 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 63dfb7938b13fa2c2fbcb45f34d065769eb09414 ]

syzbot reported a memory leak:

  BUG: memory leak, unreferenced object 0xffff888120b3d380 (size 64):
  backtrace:
    [...] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3319 [inline]
    [...] kmem_cache_alloc+0x13f/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3483
    [...] sctp_bucket_create net/sctp/socket.c:8523 [inline]
    [...] sctp_get_port_local+0x189/0x5a0 net/sctp/socket.c:8270
    [...] sctp_do_bind+0xcc/0x200 net/sctp/socket.c:402
    [...] sctp_bindx_add+0x4b/0xd0 net/sctp/socket.c:497
    [...] sctp_setsockopt_bindx+0x156/0x1b0 net/sctp/socket.c:1022
    [...] sctp_setsockopt net/sctp/socket.c:4641 [inline]
    [...] sctp_setsockopt+0xaea/0x2dc0 net/sctp/socket.c:4611
    [...] sock_common_setsockopt+0x38/0x50 net/core/sock.c:3147
    [...] __sys_setsockopt+0x10f/0x220 net/socket.c:2084
    [...] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2100 [inline]

It was caused by when sending msgs without binding a port, in the path:
inet_sendmsg() -> inet_send_prepare() -> inet_autobind() -> .get_port/sctp_get_port(), sp->bind_hash will be set while bp->port is not. Later when binding another port by sctp_setsockopt_bindx(), a new bucket will be created as bp->port is not set.

Quoted 8 lines

sctp's autobind is supposed to call sctp_autobind() where it does all things including setting bp->port. Since sctp_autobind() is called in sctp_sendmsg() if the sk is not yet bound, it should have skipped the auto bind.

THis patch is to avoid calling inet_autobind() in inet_send_prepare() by changing sctp_prot .no_autobind with true, also remove the unused .get_port.

Hi,

I'm seeing SCTP oops in 4.14.151, reproducible easily with iperf:

# iperf3 -s -1 &
# iperf3 -c localhost --sctp

This patch was also included in 4.19.81, but there it seems to be working fine.

Any ideas if this patch is valid for 4.14, or what's missing in 4.14 to make this work?

[   29.179116] sctp: Hash tables configured (bind 256/256)
[   29.188846] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference
at           (null)
[   29.190189] IP:           (null)
[   29.190758] PGD 0 P4D 0 
[   29.191224] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP PTI
[   29.191786] Modules linked in: hmac sctp libcrc32c isofs kvm_intel kvm
irqbypass sch_fq_codel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd
glue_helper ata_piix dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod dax autofs4
[   29.194585] CPU: 5 PID: 733 Comm: iperf3 Not tainted 4.14.151-1.x86_64
#1
[   29.195689] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.12.0-2.fc30 04/01/2014
[   29.197009] task: ffff93edb0e65bc0 task.stack: ffff9fcdc11b8000
[   29.197916] RIP: 0010:          (null)
[   29.198532] RSP: 0018:ffff9fcdc11bbe50 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   29.199349] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93edb02d0680 RCX:
0000000000000002
[   29.200426] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI:
ffff93edb02d0680
[   29.201497] RBP: 000000000000001c R08: 0100000000000000 R09:
0000564277abb4e8
[   29.202577] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
ffff9fcdc11bbe90
[   29.203656] R13: 0000564277abb4e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15:
0000000000000000
[   29.204737] FS:  00007f0f6242cb80(0000) GS:ffff93edbfd40000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[   29.205967] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   29.206863] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000023037c002 CR4:
00000000003606e0
[   29.207958] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
[   29.209079] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
[   29.210162] Call Trace:
[   29.210577]  inet_autobind+0x2c/0x60
[   29.211172]  inet_dgram_connect+0x45/0x80
[   29.211808]  SYSC_connect+0x89/0xb0
[   29.212384]  ? sock_map_fd+0x3d/0x60
[   29.212960]  do_syscall_64+0x74/0x190
[   29.213517]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
[   29.214212] RIP: 0033:0x7f0f626b5758
[   29.214710] RSP: 002b:00007ffc7ca624f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002a
[   29.215727] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564277aba260 RCX:
00007f0f626b5758
[   29.216660] RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000564277abb4e0 RDI:
0000000000000005
[   29.217613] RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 0000564277abc9d0 R09:
0000564277abb4e8
[   29.218604] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
00007f0f627a7170
[   29.219606] R13: 00007ffc7ca62520 R14: 0000564277aba260 R15:
0000000000000001
[   29.220596] Code:  Bad RIP value.
[   29.221075] RIP:           (null) RSP: ffff9fcdc11bbe50
[   29.221772] CR2: 0000000000000000
[   29.222260] ---[ end trace 831c4c1f11109ca0 ]---
Quoted 31 lines
---
 net/sctp/socket.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/sctp/socket.c +2 -2
@@ -8313,7 +8313,7 @@ struct proto sctp_prot = {
 	.backlog_rcv =	sctp_backlog_rcv,
 	.hash        =	sctp_hash,
 	.unhash      =	sctp_unhash,
-	.get_port    =	sctp_get_port,
+	.no_autobind =	true,
 	.obj_size    =  sizeof(struct sctp_sock),
 	.sysctl_mem  =  sysctl_sctp_mem,
 	.sysctl_rmem =  sysctl_sctp_rmem,
@@ -8352,7 +8352,7 @@ struct proto sctpv6_prot = {
 	.backlog_rcv	= sctp_backlog_rcv,
 	.hash		= sctp_hash,
 	.unhash		= sctp_unhash,
-	.get_port	= sctp_get_port,
+	.no_autobind	= true,
 	.obj_size	= sizeof(struct sctp6_sock),
 	.sysctl_mem	= sysctl_sctp_mem,
 	.sysctl_rmem	= sysctl_sctp_rmem,
#26 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.14 024/119] sctp: change sctp_prot .no_autobind with true

Quoted 43 lines · Tommi T. (Nokia - FI/Espoo)
Quoted 28 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 63dfb7938b13fa2c2fbcb45f34d065769eb09414 ]

syzbot reported a memory leak:

  BUG: memory leak, unreferenced object 0xffff888120b3d380 (size 64):
  backtrace:
    [...] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3319 [inline]
    [...] kmem_cache_alloc+0x13f/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3483
    [...] sctp_bucket_create net/sctp/socket.c:8523 [inline]
    [...] sctp_get_port_local+0x189/0x5a0 net/sctp/socket.c:8270
    [...] sctp_do_bind+0xcc/0x200 net/sctp/socket.c:402
    [...] sctp_bindx_add+0x4b/0xd0 net/sctp/socket.c:497
    [...] sctp_setsockopt_bindx+0x156/0x1b0 net/sctp/socket.c:1022
    [...] sctp_setsockopt net/sctp/socket.c:4641 [inline]
    [...] sctp_setsockopt+0xaea/0x2dc0 net/sctp/socket.c:4611
    [...] sock_common_setsockopt+0x38/0x50 net/core/sock.c:3147
    [...] __sys_setsockopt+0x10f/0x220 net/socket.c:2084
    [...] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2100 [inline]

It was caused by when sending msgs without binding a port, in the path:
inet_sendmsg() -> inet_send_prepare() -> inet_autobind() -> .get_port/sctp_get_port(), sp->bind_hash will be set while bp->port is not. Later when binding another port by sctp_setsockopt_bindx(), a new bucket will be created as bp->port is not set.

Quoted 8 lines

sctp's autobind is supposed to call sctp_autobind() where it does all things including setting bp->port. Since sctp_autobind() is called in sctp_sendmsg() if the sk is not yet bound, it should have skipped the auto bind.

THis patch is to avoid calling inet_autobind() in inet_send_prepare() by changing sctp_prot .no_autobind with true, also remove the unused .get_port.

Hi,

I'm seeing SCTP oops in 4.14.151, reproducible easily with iperf:

Quoted 8 lines
# iperf3 -s -1 &
# iperf3 -c localhost --sctp

This patch was also included in 4.19.81, but there it seems to be working fine.

Any ideas if this patch is valid for 4.14, or what's missing in 4.14 to make this work?

pls get this commit into 4.14, which has been in 4.19:

commit 644fbdeacf1d3edd366e44b8ba214de9d1dd66a9

Author: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Date:   Sun May 20 16:39:10 2018 +0800

sctp: fix the issue that flags are ignored when using kernel_connect

Quoted 95 lines

[   29.179116] sctp: Hash tables configured (bind 256/256)
[   29.188846] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference
at           (null)
[   29.190189] IP:           (null)
[   29.190758] PGD 0 P4D 0
[   29.191224] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP PTI
[   29.191786] Modules linked in: hmac sctp libcrc32c isofs kvm_intel kvm
irqbypass sch_fq_codel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd
glue_helper ata_piix dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod dax autofs4
[   29.194585] CPU: 5 PID: 733 Comm: iperf3 Not tainted 4.14.151-1.x86_64
#1
[   29.195689] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.12.0-2.fc30 04/01/2014
[   29.197009] task: ffff93edb0e65bc0 task.stack: ffff9fcdc11b8000
[   29.197916] RIP: 0010:          (null)
[   29.198532] RSP: 0018:ffff9fcdc11bbe50 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   29.199349] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93edb02d0680 RCX:
0000000000000002
[   29.200426] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI:
ffff93edb02d0680
[   29.201497] RBP: 000000000000001c R08: 0100000000000000 R09:
0000564277abb4e8
[   29.202577] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
ffff9fcdc11bbe90
[   29.203656] R13: 0000564277abb4e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15:
0000000000000000
[   29.204737] FS:  00007f0f6242cb80(0000) GS:ffff93edbfd40000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[   29.205967] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   29.206863] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000023037c002 CR4:
00000000003606e0
[   29.207958] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
[   29.209079] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
[   29.210162] Call Trace:
[   29.210577]  inet_autobind+0x2c/0x60
[   29.211172]  inet_dgram_connect+0x45/0x80
[   29.211808]  SYSC_connect+0x89/0xb0
[   29.212384]  ? sock_map_fd+0x3d/0x60
[   29.212960]  do_syscall_64+0x74/0x190
[   29.213517]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
[   29.214212] RIP: 0033:0x7f0f626b5758
[   29.214710] RSP: 002b:00007ffc7ca624f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002a
[   29.215727] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564277aba260 RCX:
00007f0f626b5758
[   29.216660] RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000564277abb4e0 RDI:
0000000000000005
[   29.217613] RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 0000564277abc9d0 R09:
0000564277abb4e8
[   29.218604] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
00007f0f627a7170
[   29.219606] R13: 00007ffc7ca62520 R14: 0000564277aba260 R15:
0000000000000001
[   29.220596] Code:  Bad RIP value.
[   29.221075] RIP:           (null) RSP: ffff9fcdc11bbe50
[   29.221772] CR2: 0000000000000000
[   29.222260] ---[ end trace 831c4c1f11109ca0 ]---
Quoted 31 lines
---
 net/sctp/socket.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/sctp/socket.c +2 -2
@@ -8313,7 +8313,7 @@ struct proto sctp_prot = {
      .backlog_rcv =  sctp_backlog_rcv,
      .hash        =  sctp_hash,
      .unhash      =  sctp_unhash,
-     .get_port    =  sctp_get_port,
+     .no_autobind =  true,
      .obj_size    =  sizeof(struct sctp_sock),
      .sysctl_mem  =  sysctl_sctp_mem,
      .sysctl_rmem =  sysctl_sctp_rmem,
@@ -8352,7 +8352,7 @@ struct proto sctpv6_prot = {
      .backlog_rcv    = sctp_backlog_rcv,
      .hash           = sctp_hash,
      .unhash         = sctp_unhash,
-     .get_port       = sctp_get_port,
+     .no_autobind    = true,
      .obj_size       = sizeof(struct sctp6_sock),
      .sysctl_mem     = sysctl_sctp_mem,
      .sysctl_rmem    = sysctl_sctp_rmem,
maintainer
#27 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.14 024/119] sctp: change sctp_prot .no_autobind with true

Quoted 53 lines · Xin Long
Quoted 43 lines · Tommi T. (Nokia - FI/Espoo)
Quoted 28 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 63dfb7938b13fa2c2fbcb45f34d065769eb09414 ]

syzbot reported a memory leak:

  BUG: memory leak, unreferenced object 0xffff888120b3d380 (size 64):
  backtrace:
    [...] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3319 [inline]
    [...] kmem_cache_alloc+0x13f/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3483
    [...] sctp_bucket_create net/sctp/socket.c:8523 [inline]
    [...] sctp_get_port_local+0x189/0x5a0 net/sctp/socket.c:8270
    [...] sctp_do_bind+0xcc/0x200 net/sctp/socket.c:402
    [...] sctp_bindx_add+0x4b/0xd0 net/sctp/socket.c:497
    [...] sctp_setsockopt_bindx+0x156/0x1b0 net/sctp/socket.c:1022
    [...] sctp_setsockopt net/sctp/socket.c:4641 [inline]
    [...] sctp_setsockopt+0xaea/0x2dc0 net/sctp/socket.c:4611
    [...] sock_common_setsockopt+0x38/0x50 net/core/sock.c:3147
    [...] __sys_setsockopt+0x10f/0x220 net/socket.c:2084
    [...] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2100 [inline]

It was caused by when sending msgs without binding a port, in the path:
inet_sendmsg() -> inet_send_prepare() -> inet_autobind() -> .get_port/sctp_get_port(), sp->bind_hash will be set while bp->port is not. Later when binding another port by sctp_setsockopt_bindx(), a new bucket will be created as bp->port is not set.

Quoted 8 lines

sctp's autobind is supposed to call sctp_autobind() where it does all things including setting bp->port. Since sctp_autobind() is called in sctp_sendmsg() if the sk is not yet bound, it should have skipped the auto bind.

THis patch is to avoid calling inet_autobind() in inet_send_prepare() by changing sctp_prot .no_autobind with true, also remove the unused .get_port.

Hi,

I'm seeing SCTP oops in 4.14.151, reproducible easily with iperf:

Quoted 8 lines
# iperf3 -s -1 &
# iperf3 -c localhost --sctp

This patch was also included in 4.19.81, but there it seems to be working fine.

Any ideas if this patch is valid for 4.14, or what's missing in 4.14 to make this work?

Quoted 7 lines

pls get this commit into 4.14, which has been in 4.19:

commit 644fbdeacf1d3edd366e44b8ba214de9d1dd66a9

Author: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Date:   Sun May 20 16:39:10 2018 +0800

sctp: fix the issue that flags are ignored when using kernel_connect

Care to send a backport?

Signature · 2 lines
Thanks,
Sasha
#28 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.14 024/119] sctp: change sctp_prot .no_autobind with true

Quoted 57 lines · Sasha Levin
Quoted 55 lines · Xin Long
Quoted 43 lines · Tommi T. (Nokia - FI/Espoo)
Quoted 28 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 63dfb7938b13fa2c2fbcb45f34d065769eb09414 ]

syzbot reported a memory leak:

  BUG: memory leak, unreferenced object 0xffff888120b3d380 (size 64):
  backtrace:
    [...] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3319 [inline]
    [...] kmem_cache_alloc+0x13f/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3483
    [...] sctp_bucket_create net/sctp/socket.c:8523 [inline]
    [...] sctp_get_port_local+0x189/0x5a0 net/sctp/socket.c:8270
    [...] sctp_do_bind+0xcc/0x200 net/sctp/socket.c:402
    [...] sctp_bindx_add+0x4b/0xd0 net/sctp/socket.c:497
    [...] sctp_setsockopt_bindx+0x156/0x1b0 net/sctp/socket.c:1022
    [...] sctp_setsockopt net/sctp/socket.c:4641 [inline]
    [...] sctp_setsockopt+0xaea/0x2dc0 net/sctp/socket.c:4611
    [...] sock_common_setsockopt+0x38/0x50 net/core/sock.c:3147
    [...] __sys_setsockopt+0x10f/0x220 net/socket.c:2084
    [...] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2100 [inline]

It was caused by when sending msgs without binding a port, in the path:
inet_sendmsg() -> inet_send_prepare() -> inet_autobind() -> .get_port/sctp_get_port(), sp->bind_hash will be set while bp->port is not. Later when binding another port by sctp_setsockopt_bindx(), a new bucket will be created as bp->port is not set.

Quoted 8 lines

sctp's autobind is supposed to call sctp_autobind() where it does all things including setting bp->port. Since sctp_autobind() is called in sctp_sendmsg() if the sk is not yet bound, it should have skipped the auto bind.

THis patch is to avoid calling inet_autobind() in inet_send_prepare() by changing sctp_prot .no_autobind with true, also remove the unused .get_port.

Hi,

I'm seeing SCTP oops in 4.14.151, reproducible easily with iperf:

Quoted 8 lines
# iperf3 -s -1 &
# iperf3 -c localhost --sctp

This patch was also included in 4.19.81, but there it seems to be working fine.

Any ideas if this patch is valid for 4.14, or what's missing in 4.14 to make this work?

pls get this commit into 4.14, which has been in 4.19:

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

commit 644fbdeacf1d3edd366e44b8ba214de9d1dd66a9

Author: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Date:   Sun May 20 16:39:10 2018 +0800

sctp: fix the issue that flags are ignored when using kernel_connect

Care to send a backport?

Sure, I haven't yet sent a backport for 4.14.y
After I do the cherry-pick, what's the next step? Post it upstream with CCing someone ?

Quoted 4 lines

--
Thanks,
Sasha

maintainer
#29 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.14 024/119] sctp: change sctp_prot .no_autobind with true

Quoted 62 lines · Xin Long
Quoted 61 lines · Sasha Levin
Quoted 59 lines · Xin Long
Quoted 43 lines · Tommi T. (Nokia - FI/Espoo)
Quoted 28 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 63dfb7938b13fa2c2fbcb45f34d065769eb09414 ]

syzbot reported a memory leak:

  BUG: memory leak, unreferenced object 0xffff888120b3d380 (size 64):
  backtrace:
    [...] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3319 [inline]
    [...] kmem_cache_alloc+0x13f/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3483
    [...] sctp_bucket_create net/sctp/socket.c:8523 [inline]
    [...] sctp_get_port_local+0x189/0x5a0 net/sctp/socket.c:8270
    [...] sctp_do_bind+0xcc/0x200 net/sctp/socket.c:402
    [...] sctp_bindx_add+0x4b/0xd0 net/sctp/socket.c:497
    [...] sctp_setsockopt_bindx+0x156/0x1b0 net/sctp/socket.c:1022
    [...] sctp_setsockopt net/sctp/socket.c:4641 [inline]
    [...] sctp_setsockopt+0xaea/0x2dc0 net/sctp/socket.c:4611
    [...] sock_common_setsockopt+0x38/0x50 net/core/sock.c:3147
    [...] __sys_setsockopt+0x10f/0x220 net/socket.c:2084
    [...] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2100 [inline]

It was caused by when sending msgs without binding a port, in the path:
inet_sendmsg() -> inet_send_prepare() -> inet_autobind() -> .get_port/sctp_get_port(), sp->bind_hash will be set while bp->port is not. Later when binding another port by sctp_setsockopt_bindx(), a new bucket will be created as bp->port is not set.

Quoted 8 lines

sctp's autobind is supposed to call sctp_autobind() where it does all things including setting bp->port. Since sctp_autobind() is called in sctp_sendmsg() if the sk is not yet bound, it should have skipped the auto bind.

THis patch is to avoid calling inet_autobind() in inet_send_prepare() by changing sctp_prot .no_autobind with true, also remove the unused .get_port.

Hi,

I'm seeing SCTP oops in 4.14.151, reproducible easily with iperf:

Quoted 8 lines
# iperf3 -s -1 &
# iperf3 -c localhost --sctp

This patch was also included in 4.19.81, but there it seems to be working fine.

Any ideas if this patch is valid for 4.14, or what's missing in 4.14 to make this work?

pls get this commit into 4.14, which has been in 4.19:

commit 644fbdeacf1d3edd366e44b8ba214de9d1dd66a9

Author: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Date:   Sun May 20 16:39:10 2018 +0800
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

sctp: fix the issue that flags are ignored when using kernel_connect

Care to send a backport?

Sure, I haven't yet sent a backport for 4.14.y
After I do the cherry-pick, what's the next step? Post it upstream with CCing someone ?

Just make sure [email protected] is Cc'ed.

Signature · 2 lines
Thanks,
Sasha
author maintainer
#37 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] MIPS: elf_hwcap: Export userspace ASEs

In reply to Jiaxun Yang
Quoted 12 lines · Jiaxun Yang

A Golang developer reported MIPS hwcap isn't reflecting instructions that the processor actually supported so programs can't apply optimized code at runtime.

Thus we export the ASEs that can be used in userspace programs.

Quoted 4 lines
---
 arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 11 ++++++++++
 arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c       | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)

This fails to apply to the current 4.14.y tree:

checking file arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h Hunk #1 FAILED at 6.
1 out of 1 hunk FAILED
checking file arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c Hunk #1 succeeded at 2076 (offset -104 lines).

Can you refresh it and resend? Also remember to include the git id that this patch is in Linus's tree, I had to look it up by hand :(

thanks,

greg k-h