spl: allow board_spl_fit_post_load() to fail
Subsystems (3)
PATCH v3 1/1 spl: allow board_spl_fit_post_load() to fail
On i.MX platforms board_spl_fit_post_load() can check the loaded SPL image for authenticity using its HAB engine. U-Boot's SPL mechanism allows booting images from other sources as well, but in the current setup the SPL would just hang if it encounters an image that does not pass scrutiny. Allowing the function to return an error, allows the SPL to try booting from another source as a fallback instead of ending up as a brick.
---
Changes in v3:
- use EINVAL as return value to have a proper errno
Changes in v2:
- set SPL_FIT_FOUND only after successful post load
arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c | 6 ++++-- common/spl/spl_fit.c | 10 ++++++---- include/spl.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c +4 -2
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ ulong board_spl_fit_size_align(ulong size)return size; } -void board_spl_fit_post_load (ulong load_addr,size_t length) +int board_spl_fit_post_load (ulong load_addr,size_t length) {u32 offset = length -CONFIG_CSF_SIZE ;
@@ -321,8 +321,10 @@ void board_spl_fit_post_load(ulong load_addr, size_t length) offset + IVT_SIZE + CSF_PAD_SIZE, offset)) {puts ("spl: ERROR: image authentication unsuccessful\n" ); -hang (); +return -EINVAL ; } + + return 0; }#endif
common/spl/spl_fit.c +6 -4
@@ -26,8 +26,9 @@ DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;#define CONFIG_SYS_BOOTM_LEN (64 << 20)#endif -__weak void board_spl_fit_post_load (ulong load_addr,size_t length) +__weak int board_spl_fit_post_load (ulong load_addr,size_t length) { +return 0 ; }__weak ulong board_spl_fit_size_align (ulong size)
@@ -677,11 +678,12 @@ int spl_load_simple_fit(struct spl_image_info *spl_image,if (spl_image->entry_point ==FDT_ERROR || spl_image->entry_point ==0 ) spl_image->entry_point = spl_image->load_addr; - spl_image->flags |=SPL_FIT_FOUND ; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMX_HAB -board_spl_fit_post_load ((ulong )fit, size); + ret =board_spl_fit_post_load ((ulong )fit, size); +if (ret) +return ret;#endif + spl_image->flags |=SPL_FIT_FOUND ;return 0 ; }
include/spl.h +1 -1
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ int board_return_to_bootrom(struct spl_image_info *spl_image,* board_spl_fit_post_load - allow process images after loading finished * */ -void board_spl_fit_post_load (ulong load_addr,size_t length); +int board_spl_fit_post_load (ulong load_addr,size_t length);/** * board_spl_fit_size_align - specific size align before processing payload
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v3 1/1 spl: allow board_spl_fit_post_load() to fail
Quoted 9 lines · Patrick Wildt
On i.MX platforms
board_spl_fit_post_load()can check the loaded SPL image for authenticity using its HAB engine. U-Boot's SPL mechanism allows booting images from other sources as well, but in the current setup the SPL would just hang if it encounters an image that does not pass scrutiny. Allowing the function to return an error, allows the SPL to try booting from another source as a fallback instead of ending up as a brick.Signed-off-by Patrick Wildt <[email protected]>
PATCH v3 1/1 spl: allow board_spl_fit_post_load() to fail
In reply to Patrick WildtQuoted 6 lines
Subject: [PATCH v3] spl: allow
board_spl_fit_post_load()to failOn i.MX platforms
board_spl_fit_post_load()can check the loaded SPL image for authenticity using its HAB engine. U-Boot's SPL mechanism allows booting images from other sources as well, but in the current setup the SPL would just hang if it encounters an image that does not pass scrutiny.
security.
Quoted 2 lines
Allowing the function to return an error, allows the SPL to try booting from another source as a fallback instead of ending up as a brick.
This will break secure boot chain.
Regards,
Peng.
Quoted 88 lines
Signed-off-by Patrick Wildt <[email protected]>---
Changes in v3:
- use EINVAL as return value to have a proper errnoChanges in v2:
- setSPL_FIT_FOUNDonly after successful post loadarch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c | 6 ++++-- common/spl/spl_fit.c | 10 ++++++---- include/spl.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c index renamed from arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c +0
-0
1a231c67f5a..1a0d979e2d0100644arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c +4
-2@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ ulong board_spl_fit_size_align(ulong size)return size; } -void board_spl_fit_post_load (ulong load_addr,size_t length) +int board_spl_fit_post_load (ulong load_addr,size_t length) {u32 offset = length -CONFIG_CSF_SIZE ;@@ -321,8 +321,10 @@ void board_spl_fit_post_load(ulong load_addr, size_t length) offset + IVT_SIZE + CSF_PAD_SIZE, offset)) {puts ("spl: ERROR: image authentication unsuccessful\n" ); -hang (); +return -EINVAL ; } + + return 0; }#endif common/spl/spl_fit.c index renamed from common/spl/spl_fit.c +0
-0
f581a224213..ead4c6713af100644common/spl/spl_fit.c +2
-1@@ -26,8 +26,9 @@ DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;#define CONFIG_SYS_BOOTM_LEN (64 << 20)#endif -__weak void board_spl_fit_post_load (ulong load_addr,size_t length) +__weak int board_spl_fit_post_load (ulong load_addr,size_t length) { +return 0 ; } __weak ulong board_spl_fit_size_align(ulong size) @@ -677,11 +678,12 @@int spl_load_simple_fit(struct
spl_image_info*spl_image,
if (spl_image->entry_point==FDT_ERROR||spl_image->entry_point==
0)common/spl/spl_fit.c +4
-3spl_image->entry_point = spl_image->load_addr; - spl_image->flags |=SPL_FIT_FOUND ; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMX_HAB -board_spl_fit_post_load ((ulong )fit, size); + ret =board_spl_fit_post_load ((ulong )fit, size); +if (ret) +return ret;#endif + spl_image->flags |=SPL_FIT_FOUND ;return 0 ; }include/spl.h index b31c9bb4ab2..2607767d940 renamed from include/spl.h +0
-0100644
include/spl.h +1
-1@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ int board_return_to_bootrom(struct spl_image_info*spl_image, * board_spl_fit_post_load - allow process images after loading finished * */ -void board_spl_fit_post_load (ulong load_addr,size_t length); +int board_spl_fit_post_load (ulong load_addr,size_t length);/** *
board_spl_fit_size_align- specific size align before processing payload
--
2.26.2
PATCH v3 1/1 spl: allow board_spl_fit_post_load() to fail
Quoted 7 lines · Peng Fan
Quoted 6 lines
Subject: [PATCH v3] spl: allow
board_spl_fit_post_load()to failOn i.MX platforms
board_spl_fit_post_load()can check the loaded SPL image for authenticity using its HAB engine. U-Boot's SPL mechanism allows booting images from other sources as well, but in the current setup the SPL would just hang if it encounters an image that does not pass scrutiny.
Quoted 6 lines
security.
Quoted 2 lines
Allowing the function to return an error, allows the SPL to try booting from another source as a fallback instead of ending up as a brick.
This will break secure boot chain.
How? Please elaborate.
jump_to_image_no_args() will authenticate the image before starting it, so I don't think so. However, that is still prone to time-of-check/time-of-use attack anyway.
PATCH v3 1/1 spl: allow board_spl_fit_post_load() to fail
Quoted 13 lines · Marek Vasut
Quoted 12 lines · Peng Fan
Quoted 6 lines
Subject: [PATCH v3] spl: allow
board_spl_fit_post_load()to failOn i.MX platforms
board_spl_fit_post_load()can check the loaded SPL image for authenticity using its HAB engine. U-Boot's SPL mechanism allows booting images from other sources as well, but in the current setup the SPL would just hang if it encounters an image that does not pass scrutiny.security.
Quoted 2 lines
Allowing the function to return an error, allows the SPL to try booting from another source as a fallback instead of ending up as a brick.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
This will break secure boot chain.
How? Please elaborate.
jump_to_image_no_args()will authenticate the image before starting it, so I don't think so. However, that is still prone to time-of-check/time-of-use attack anyway.
Yes, please elaborate, thanks!
Signature · 8 lines
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PATCH v3 1/1 spl: allow board_spl_fit_post_load() to fail
Quoted 16 lines · Tom Rini
Quoted 15 lines · Marek Vasut
Quoted 13 lines · Peng Fan
Quoted 6 lines
Subject: [PATCH v3] spl: allow
board_spl_fit_post_load()to failOn i.MX platforms
board_spl_fit_post_load()can check the loaded SPL image for authenticity using its HAB engine. U-Boot's SPL mechanism allows booting images from other sources as well, but in the current setup the SPL would just hang if it encounters an image that does not pass scrutiny.security.
Quoted 2 lines
Allowing the function to return an error, allows the SPL to try booting from another source as a fallback instead of ending up as a brick.
This will break secure boot chain.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
How? Please elaborate.
jump_to_image_no_args()will authenticate the image before starting it, so I don't think so. However, that is still prone to time-of-check/time-of-use attack anyway.Yes, please elaborate, thanks!
Ping? How will this break the secure boot chain?
PATCH v3 1/1 spl: allow board_spl_fit_post_load() to fail
Hi Patrick,
Quoted 19 lines · Patrick Wildt
Quoted 18 lines · Tom Rini
Quoted 17 lines · Marek Vasut
Quoted 7 lines · Peng Fan
Quoted 6 lines
Subject: [PATCH v3] spl: allow
board_spl_fit_post_load()to failOn i.MX platforms
board_spl_fit_post_load()can check the loaded SPL image for authenticity using its HAB engine. U-Boot's SPL mechanism allows booting images from other sources as well, but in the current setup the SPL would just hang if it encounters an image that does not pass scrutiny.Quoted 6 lines
security.
Quoted 2 lines
Allowing the function to return an error, allows the SPL to try booting from another source as a fallback instead of ending up as a brick.
This will break secure boot chain.
How? Please elaborate.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
jump_to_image_no_args()will authenticate the image before starting it, so I don't think so. However, that is still prone to time-of-check/time-of-use attack anyway.Yes, please elaborate, thanks!
Ping? How will this break the secure boot chain?
To be honest: I had merged this one (after the discussion with Marek and his patch calling panic()), but I worried if there is a hidden reason to break secure boot. I do not know the reason, I am curious, too, which is the reason because I will see this patch in (this helps to provide a safe update of bootloader).
Best regards,
Stefano
Signature · 5 lines
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