Indicate that a client is in pull mode in IV_PROTO
PATCH 1/9 Indicate that a client is in pull mode in IV_PROTO
This allows us to skip waiting for the first PUSH_REQUEST message from the client to send the response.
--- src/openvpn/multi.c | 12 ++++++++++-- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/multi.c +10 -2
@@ -1795,10 +1795,18 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) {int proto =0 ;int r =sscanf (optstr,"IV_PROTO=%d" , &proto); -if ((r ==1 ) && (proto >=2 )) +if (r ==1 ) { - tls_multi->use_peer_id = true; +if (proto >=2 ) + { + tls_multi->use_peer_id = true; + } +if (proto &IV_PROTO_REQUEST_PUSH ) + { + c->c2.push_request_received = true; + } } + }/* Select cipher if client supports Negotiable Crypto Parameters */
src/openvpn/ssl.c +13 -2
@@ -2299,8 +2299,19 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)buf_printf (&out,"IV_PLAT=win\n" );#endif -/* support for P_DATA_V2 */ -buf_printf (&out,"IV_PROTO=2\n" ); +/* support for P_DATA_V2*/ +int iv_proto =IV_PROTO_DATA_V2 ; + +/* support for receiving push_reply before sending +* push request, also signal that the client wants +* to get push-reply messages without without requiring a round +* trip for a push request message*/ +if (session->opt->pull) + { + iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_REQUEST_PUSH ; + } + +buf_printf (&out,"IV_PROTO=%d\n" , iv_proto);/* support for Negotiable Crypto Parameters */ if (session->opt->ncp_enabled
src/openvpn/ssl.h +7 -0
@@ -99,6 +99,13 @@/* Maximum length of OCC options string passed as part of auth handshake */ #define TLS_OPTIONS_LEN 512 +/* Definitions of the bits in the IV_PROTO bitfield */ +#define IV_PROTO_DATA_V2 (1<<1)/**< Support P_DATA_V2 */ +#define IV_PROTO_REQUEST_PUSH (1<<2)/**< Assume client will send a push +* request and server does not need +* to wait for a push-request to send +* a push-reply */ +/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN"
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v2 2/9 Drop support for OpenSSL 1.0.1
OpenSSL 1.0.1 was supported until 2016-12-31. Rhel6/Centos6 still use this version but considering that RHEL7 and RHEL8 are already out, these versions can also stay with OpenVPN 2.4.
All the supported Debian based distributions also come with at least 1.0.2.
We (accidently) unconditionally compiled some key exporter code on OpenSSL 1.0.2+ without problems. So always compile the whole key exporter feature for OpenSSL.
This also allows the tls groups commit to be applied without adding ifdefs to disable that functionality on OpenSSL 1.0.1
--- .travis.yml | 8 ----- Changes.rst | 2 ++ INSTALL | 9 +++--- configure.ac | 14 +++------ src/openvpn/crypto.c | 7 ----- src/openvpn/openssl_compat.h | 14 --------- src/openvpn/options.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c | 60 ++---------------------------------- 9 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-)
.travis.yml +0 -8
@@ -35,10 +35,6 @@ jobs: env: SSLLIB="openssl" RUN_COVERITY="1" os: linux compiler: gcc - - name: gcc | openssl-1.0.1u - env: SSLLIB="openssl" OPENSSL_VERSION="1.0.1u" - os: linux - compiler: gcc - name: gcc | openssl-1.1.1d env: SSLLIB="openssl" OPENSSL_VERSION="1.1.1d" os: linux
@@ -87,10 +83,6 @@ jobs: env: SSLLIB="mbedtls" os: osx compiler: clang - - name: mingw64 | openssl-1.0.1u - env: SSLLIB="openssl" CHOST=x86_64-w64-mingw32 OPENSSL_VERSION="1.0.1u" - os: linux - compiler: ": Win64 build only" - name: mingw64 | openssl-1.1.1d env: SSLLIB="openssl" CHOST=x86_64-w64-mingw32 OPENSSL_VERSION="1.1.1d" os: linux
Changes.rst +2 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/wiki/DeprecatedOptions With the improved and matured data channel cipher negotiation, the use of ``ncp-disable`` should not be necessary anymore. +- Support for building with OpenSSL 1.0.1 has been removed. The minimum + supported OpenSSL version is now 1.0.2. Overview of changes in 2.4 ==========================
INSTALL +5 -4
@@ -71,12 +71,13 @@ REQUIRES: (1) TUN and/or TAP driver to allow user-space programs to control a virtual point-to-point IP or Ethernet device. See TUN/TAP Driver Configuration section below for more info. - -OPTIONAL (but recommended): - (1) OpenSSL library, necessary for encryption, version 1.0.1 or higher + (2) OpenSSL library, necessary for encryption, version 1.0.2 or higher required, available from http://www.openssl.org/ - (2) mbed TLS library, an alternative for encryption, version 2.0 or higher + or + (3) mbed TLS library, an alternative for encryption, version 2.0 or higher required, available from https://tls.mbed.org/ + +OPTIONAL: (3) LZO real-time compression library, required for link compression, available from http://www.oberhumer.com/opensource/lzo/ OpenBSD users can use ports or packages to install lzo, but remember
configure.ac +5 -9
@@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "openssl"; then # if the user did not explicitly specify flags, try to autodetect PKG_CHECK_MODULES( [OPENSSL], - [openssl >= 1.0.1], + [openssl >= 1.0.2], [have_openssl="yes"], [] # If this fails, we will do another test next )
@@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "openssl"; then # If pkgconfig check failed or OPENSSL_CFLAGS/OPENSSL_LIBS env vars # are used, check the version directly in the OpenSSL include file if test "${have_openssl}" != "yes"; then - AC_MSG_CHECKING([additionally if OpenSSL is available and version >= 1.0.1]) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([additionally if OpenSSL is available and version >= 1.0.2]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( [[
@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "openssl"; then ]], [[ /* Version encoding: MNNFFPPS - see opensslv.h for details */ -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10001000L +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000L #error OpenSSL too old #endif ]]
@@ -912,12 +912,9 @@ if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "openssl"; then [have_crypto_aead_modes="no"] ) + # All supported OpenSSL version (>= 1.0.2) + # have this feature have_export_keying_material="yes" - AC_CHECK_FUNC( - [SSL_export_keying_material], - , - [have_export_keying_material="no"] - ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS( [ \
@@ -938,7 +935,6 @@ if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "openssl"; then X509_STORE_get0_objects \ X509_OBJECT_free \ X509_OBJECT_get_type \ - EVP_PKEY_id \ EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA \ EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA \ EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY \
src/openvpn/crypto.c +0 -7
@@ -428,13 +428,6 @@ openvpn_decrypt_aead(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work, tag_ptr =BPTR (buf);ASSERT (buf_advance (buf, tag_size));dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT ,"DECRYPT MAC: %s" ,format_hex (tag_ptr, tag_size,0 , &gc)); -#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL ) &&OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <0x10001040L -/* OpenSSL <= 1.0.1c bug requires set tag before processing ciphertext */ -if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl (ctx->cipher,EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG , tag_size, tag_ptr)) - { -CRYPT_ERROR ("setting tag failed" ); - } -#endif if (buf->len <1 ) {
src/openvpn/openssl_compat.h +0 -14
@@ -271,20 +271,6 @@ EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey) }#endif -#if !defined(HAVE_EVP_PKEY_ID ) -/** -* Get the PKEY type -* -* @param pkey Public key object -* @return The key type -*/ -static inline int -EVP_PKEY_id (const EVP_PKEY *pkey) -{ -return pkey ? pkey->type :EVP_PKEY_NONE ; -} -#endif -#if !defined(HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DSA )/** * Get the DSA object of a public key
src/openvpn/options.c +1 -1
@@ -8671,7 +8671,7 @@ add_option(struct options *options, options->keying_material_exporter_label = p[1 ]; options->keying_material_exporter_length = ekm_length; } -#endif /* if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10001000 */ +#endif /* HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL */ else if (streq(p[0], "allow-recursive-routing") && !p[1]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL );
src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c +1 -1
@@ -1108,7 +1108,7 @@ key_state_ssl_init(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, } } -#if HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL +#ifdef HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL /* Initialize keying material exporter */ if (session->opt->ekm_size) {
src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c +2 -58
119 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Drop support for OpenSSL 1.0.1
Your patch has been applied to the master branch.
Whitespace fixed on-the-go.
Sanity-tested on Linux / 1.1.1g and FreeBSD / 1.0.2s (client only).
commit ec7d0e8e0f8cd8f1c5fab58c795a59828eba6ae7
Author: Arne Schwabe Date: Fri Jul 17 15:47:32 2020 +0200
Drop support for OpenSSL 1.0.1
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg20441.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
PATCH 3/9 Require AEAD support in the crypto library
In reply to Arne SchwabeAll supported crypto libraries have AEAD support and with our ncp/de facto default cipher AES-256-GCM we do not want to support the obscure corner case of a library with disabled AEAD.
--- configure.ac | 7 ++----- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 11 ----------- src/openvpn/crypto_mbedtls.c | 14 -------------- src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c | 16 ---------------- src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.h | 4 ---- src/openvpn/options.c | 6 ------ 6 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
configure.ac +2 -5
@@ -905,11 +905,10 @@ if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "openssl"; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE], [1], [OpenSSL engine support available]) fi - have_crypto_aead_modes="yes" AC_CHECK_FUNC( [EVP_aes_256_gcm], , - [have_crypto_aead_modes="no"] + [AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL check for AES-256-GCM support failed])] ) # All supported OpenSSL version (>= 1.0.2)
@@ -1003,14 +1002,13 @@ elif test "${with_crypto_library}" = "mbedtls"; then [AC_MSG_ERROR([mbed TLS 2.y.z required])] ) - have_crypto_aead_modes="yes" AC_CHECK_FUNCS( [ \ mbedtls_cipher_write_tag \ mbedtls_cipher_check_tag \ ], , - [have_crypto_aead_modes="no"; break] + [AC_MSG_ERROR([mbed TLS check for AEAD support failed])] ) have_export_keying_material="yes"
@@ -1225,7 +1223,6 @@ test "${enable_pf}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PF], [1], [Enable internal pack test "${enable_strict_options}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_STRICT_OPTIONS_CHECK], [1], [Enable strict options check between peers]) test "${enable_crypto_ofb_cfb}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_OFB_CFB_MODE], [1], [Enable OFB and CFB cipher modes]) -test "${have_crypto_aead_modes}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES], [1], [Use crypto library]) if test "${have_export_keying_material}" = "yes"; then AC_DEFINE( [HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL], [1],
src/openvpn/crypto.c +0 -11
@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ static void openvpn_encrypt_aead(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work, struct crypto_options *opt) { -#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES struct gc_arena gc;int outlen =0 ;const struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.encrypt;
@@ -152,9 +151,6 @@ err: buf->len =0 ;gc_free (&gc);return ; -#else /* HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */ -ASSERT (0 ); -#endif /* ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */ } static void
@@ -361,7 +357,6 @@ openvpn_decrypt_aead(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work, struct crypto_options *opt, const struct frame *frame, const uint8_t *ad_start) { -#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES static const char error_prefix[] = "AEAD Decrypt error";struct packet_id_net pin = {0 };const struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
@@ -482,10 +477,6 @@ error_exit: buf->len =0 ;gc_free (&gc);return false; -#else /* HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */ -ASSERT (0 ); -return false; -#endif /* ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */ }/*
@@ -1104,7 +1095,6 @@ test_crypto(struct crypto_options *co, struct frame *frame)/* init work */ ASSERT (buf_init (&work,FRAME_HEADROOM (frame))); -#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES /* init implicit IV */ { const cipher_kt_t *cipher =
@@ -1126,7 +1116,6 @@ test_crypto(struct crypto_options *co, struct frame *frame) co->key_ctx_bi.decrypt.implicit_iv_len = impl_iv_len; } } -#endif /* ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */ msg (M_INFO ,"Entering " PACKAGE_NAME " crypto self-test mode." );for (i =1 ; i <=TUN_MTU_SIZE (frame); ++i)
src/openvpn/crypto_mbedtls.c +0 -14
@@ -530,12 +530,10 @@ cipher_kt_block_size(const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_kt)int cipher_kt_tag_size (const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_kt) { -#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES if (cipher_kt &&cipher_kt_mode_aead (cipher_kt)) {return OPENVPN_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH ; } -#endif return 0 ; }
@@ -632,7 +630,6 @@ cipher_ctx_iv_length(const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)int cipher_ctx_get_tag (cipher_ctx_t *ctx,uint8_t *tag,int tag_len) { -#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES if (tag_len >SIZE_MAX ) {return 0 ;
@@ -644,9 +641,6 @@ cipher_ctx_get_tag(cipher_ctx_t *ctx, uint8_t *tag, int tag_len) }return 1 ; -#else /* ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */ -ASSERT (0 ); -#endif /* HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */ }int
@@ -688,7 +682,6 @@ cipher_ctx_reset(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const uint8_t *iv_buf)int cipher_ctx_update_ad (cipher_ctx_t *ctx,const uint8_t *src,int src_len) { -#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES if (src_len >SIZE_MAX ) {return 0 ;
@@ -700,9 +693,6 @@ cipher_ctx_update_ad(cipher_ctx_t *ctx, const uint8_t *src, int src_len) }return 1 ; -#else /* ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */ -ASSERT (0 ); -#endif /* HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */ }int
@@ -741,7 +731,6 @@ intcipher_ctx_final_check_tag (mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, uint8_t *dst, int *dst_len, uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_len) { -#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES size_t olen =0 ;if (MBEDTLS_DECRYPT != ctx->operation)
@@ -773,9 +762,6 @@ cipher_ctx_final_check_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, uint8_t *dst, }return 1 ; -#else /* ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */ -ASSERT (0 ); -#endif /* HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */ }void
src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c +0 -16
@@ -301,9 +301,7 @@ show_available_ciphers(void)#ifdef ENABLE_OFB_CFB_MODE || cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb(cipher)#endif -#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES || cipher_kt_mode_aead(cipher) -#endif )) { cipher_list[num_ciphers++] = cipher;
@@ -732,7 +730,6 @@ cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb(const cipher_kt_t *cipher)bool cipher_kt_mode_aead (const cipher_kt_t *cipher) { -#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES if (cipher) { switch (EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher))
@@ -746,7 +743,6 @@ cipher_kt_mode_aead(const cipher_kt_t *cipher)return true; } } -#endif return false; }
@@ -806,11 +802,7 @@ cipher_ctx_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)int cipher_ctx_get_tag (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,uint8_t *tag_buf,int tag_size) { -#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl (ctx,EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG , tag_size, tag_buf); -#else -ASSERT (0 ); -#endif }int
@@ -841,16 +833,12 @@ cipher_ctx_reset(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *iv_buf)int cipher_ctx_update_ad (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,const uint8_t *src,int src_len) { -#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES int len;if (!EVP_CipherUpdate (ctx,NULL , &len, src, src_len)) {crypto_msg (M_FATAL ,"%s: EVP_CipherUpdate() failed" , __func__); }return 1 ; -#else /* ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */ -ASSERT (0 ); -#endif }int
@@ -874,7 +862,6 @@ intcipher_ctx_final_check_tag (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *dst, int *dst_len, uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_len) { -#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES ASSERT (tag_len <SIZE_MAX );if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl (ctx,EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG , tag_len, tag)) {
@@ -882,9 +869,6 @@ cipher_ctx_final_check_tag(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *dst, int *dst_len, }return cipher_ctx_final (ctx, dst, dst_len); -#else /* ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */ -ASSERT (0 ); -#endif }void
src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.h +0 -4
@@ -61,13 +61,9 @@ typedef HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx_t;/** Cipher is in CFB mode */ #define OPENVPN_MODE_CFB EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE -#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES -/** Cipher is in GCM mode */ #define OPENVPN_MODE_GCM EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE -#endif /* HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */ -/** Cipher should encrypt */ #define OPENVPN_OP_ENCRYPT 1
src/openvpn/options.c +0 -6
@@ -104,9 +104,7 @@ const char title_string[] = " [MH/RECVDA]"#endif #endif -#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES " [AEAD]" -#endif " built on " __DATE__ ;
@@ -871,11 +869,7 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc) o->scheduled_exit_interval =5 ;#endif o->ciphername ="BF-CBC" ; -#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES /* IV_NCP=2 requires GCM support */ o->ncp_enabled = true; -#else - o->ncp_enabled = false; -#endif o->ncp_ciphers ="AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM" ; o->authname ="SHA1" ; o->prng_hash ="SHA1" ;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v5 4/9 Implement tls-groups option to specify eliptic curves/groups
In reply to Arne SchwabeBy default OpenSSL 1.1+ only allows signatures and ecdh/ecdhx from the default list of X25519:secp256r1:X448:secp521r1:secp384r1. In TLS1.3 key exchange is independent from the signature/key of the certificates, so allowing all groups per default is not a sensible choice anymore and instead a shorter list is reasonable.
However, when using certificates with exotic curves that are not on the group list, the signatures of these certificates will no longer be accepted.
The tls-groups option allows to modify the group list to account for these corner cases.
Patch V2: Uses local gc_arena instead of malloc/free, reword commit
message. Fix other typos/clarify messages
Patch V3: Style fixes, adjust code to changes from mbed tls session
fix
Patch V5: Fix compilation with OpenSSL 1.0.2
--- README.ec | 7 ++-- configure.ac | 1 + doc/man-sections/encryption-options.rst | 6 +-- doc/man-sections/tls-options.rst | 27 +++++++++++- src/openvpn/openssl_compat.h | 6 +++ src/openvpn/options.c | 10 ++++- src/openvpn/options.h | 1 + src/openvpn/ssl.c | 6 +++ src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 10 +++++ src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++ src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.h | 1 + src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 12 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
README.ec +4 -3
@@ -12,14 +12,15 @@ OpenVPN 2.4.0 and newer automatically initialize ECDH parameters. When ECDSA is used for authentication, the curve used for the server certificate will be used for ECDH too. When autodetection fails (e.g. when using RSA certificates) OpenVPN lets the crypto library decide if possible, or falls back to the -secp384r1 curve. +secp384r1 curve. The list of groups/curves that the crypto library will choose +from can be set with the --tls-groups <grouplist> option. An administrator can force an OpenVPN/OpenSSL server to use a specific curve using the --ecdh-curve <curvename> option with one of the curves listed as -available by the --show-curves option. Clients will use the same curve as +available by the --show-groups option. Clients will use the same curve as selected by the server. -Note that not all curves listed by --show-curves are available for use with TLS; +Note that not all curves listed by --show-groups are available for use with TLS; in that case connecting will fail with a 'no shared cipher' TLS error. Authentication (ECDSA)
configure.ac +1 -0
@@ -927,6 +927,7 @@ if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "openssl"; then OpenSSL_version \ SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb \ SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata \ + SSL_CTX_set1_groups \ SSL_CTX_set_security_level \ X509_get0_notBefore \ X509_get0_notAfter \
doc/man-sections/encryption-options.rst +3 -3
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ SSL Library information (Standalone) Show currently available hardware-based crypto acceleration engines supported by the OpenSSL library. ---show-curves - (Standalone) Show all available elliptic curves to use with the - ``--ecdh-curve`` option. +--show-groups + (Standalone) Show all available elliptic curves/groups to use with the + ``--ecdh-curve`` and ``tls-groups`` options. Generating key material -----------------------
doc/man-sections/tls-options.rst +26 -1
@@ -338,6 +338,31 @@ certificates and keys: https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa Use ``--tls-crypt`` instead if you want to use the key file to not only authenticate, but also encrypt the TLS control channel. +--tls-groups list + A list of allowable groups/curves in order of preference. + + Set the allowed elictipic curves/groups for the TLS session. + These groups are allowed to be used in signatures and key exchange. + + mbed TLS currently allows all known curves per default. + + OpenSSL 1.1+ restricts the list per default to + :: + + "X25519:secp256r1:X448:secp521r1:secp384r1". + + If you use certificates that use non-standard curves, you + might need to add them here. If you do not force the ecdh curve + by using ``--ecdh-curve``, the groups for ecdh will also be picked + from this list. + + OpenVPN maps the curve name `secp256r1` to `prime256v1` to allow + specifying the same tls-groups option for mbed TLS and OpenSSL. + + Warning: this option not only affects eliptic curve certificates + but also the key exchange in TLS 1.3 and using this option improperly + will disable TLS 1.3. + --tls-cert-profile profile Set the allowed cryptographic algorithms for certificates according to ``profile``.
@@ -368,7 +393,7 @@ certificates and keys: https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa OpenVPN will migrate to 'preferred' as default in the future. Please ensure that your keys already comply. -*WARNING:* ``--tls-ciphers`` and ``--tls-ciphersuites`` +*WARNING:* ``--tls-ciphers``, ``--tls-ciphersuites`` and ``tls-groups`` These options are expert features, which - if used correctly - can improve the security of your VPN connection. But it is also easy to unwittingly use them to carefully align a gun with your foot, or just
src/openvpn/openssl_compat.h +6 -0
@@ -183,6 +183,12 @@ SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx) }#endif +/* This function is implemented as macro, so the configure check for the +* function may fail, so we check for both variants here */ +#if !defined(HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET1_GROUPS ) && !defined(SSL_CTX_set1_groups) +#define SSL_CTX_set1_groups SSL_CTX_set1_curves +#endif +#if !defined(HAVE_X509_GET0_PUBKEY )/** * Get the public key from a X509 certificate
src/openvpn/options.c +9 -1
@@ -8058,7 +8058,7 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->show_tls_ciphers = true; } -else if (streq (p[0 ],"show-curves" ) && !p[1 ]) +else if ((streq (p[0 ],"show-curves" ) ||streq (p[0 ],"show-groups" )) && !p[1 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->show_curves = true;
@@ -8066,6 +8066,9 @@ add_option(struct options *options,else if (streq (p[0 ],"ecdh-curve" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); +msg (M_WARN ,"Consider setting groups/curves preference with " +"tls-groups instead of forcing a specific curve with " +"ecdh-curve." ); options->ecdh_curve = p[1 ]; }else if (streq (p[0 ],"tls-server" ) && !p[1 ])
@@ -8236,6 +8239,11 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->cipher_list_tls13 = p[1 ]; } +else if (streq (p[0 ],"tls-groups" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) + { +VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); + options->tls_groups = p[1 ]; + }else if (streq (p[0 ],"crl-verify" ) && p[1 ] && ((p[2 ] &&streq (p[2 ],"dir" )) || !p[2 ])) {
src/openvpn/options.h +1 -0
@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ struct optionsbool pkcs12_file_inline;const char *cipher_list;const char *cipher_list_tls13; +const char *tls_groups;const char *tls_cert_profile;const char *ecdh_curve;const char *tls_verify;
src/openvpn/ssl.c +6 -0
@@ -630,6 +630,12 @@ init_ssl(const struct options *options, struct tls_root_ctx *new_ctx)tls_ctx_restrict_ciphers (new_ctx, options->cipher_list);tls_ctx_restrict_ciphers_tls13 (new_ctx, options->cipher_list_tls13); +/* Set the allow groups/curves for TLS if we want to override them */ +if (options->tls_groups) + { +tls_ctx_set_tls_groups (new_ctx, options->tls_groups); + } +if (!tls_ctx_set_options (new_ctx, options->ssl_flags)) { goto err;
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +10 -0
@@ -198,6 +198,16 @@ void tls_ctx_restrict_ciphers_tls13(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *cipher*/ void tls_ctx_set_cert_profile (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx,const char *profile); +/** +* Set the allowed (eliptic curve) group allowed for signatures and +* key exchange. +* +* @param ctx TLS context to restrict, must be valid. +* @param groups List of groups that will be allowed, in priority, +* separated by : +*/ +void tls_ctx_set_tls_groups (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx,const char *groups); +/** * Check our certificate notBefore and notAfter fields, and warn if the cert is * either not yet valid or has expired. Note that this is a non-fatal error,
src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c +46 -0
64 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.h +1 -0
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ struct tls_root_ctx {#endif struct external_context external_key;/**< External key context */ int *allowed_ciphers;/**< List of allowed ciphers for this connection */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id *groups;/**< List of allowed groups for this connection */ mbedtls_x509_crt_profile cert_profile;/**< Allowed certificate types */ };
src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c +54 -1
73 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v5 4/9] Implement tls-groups option to specify eliptic curves/groups
Hi,
I think a comment in my previous review was overlooked.
Quoted 23 lines · Arne Schwabe
src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c +19
-0@@ -343,6 +348,42 @@ tls_ctx_set_cert_profile(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *profile) } } +void +tls_ctx_set_tls_groups (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx,const char *groups) +{ +ASSERT (ctx); +struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); + +/* Get number of groups and allocate an array in ctx */ +int groups_count =get_num_elements (groups,':' ); +ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR (ctx->groups, mbedtls_ecp_group_id, groups_count +1 ) + + /* Parse allowed ciphers, getting IDs */ +int i =0 ; +char *tmp_groups =string_alloc (groups, &gc); + +const char *token; +while ((token =strsep (&tmp_groups,":" ))) + { +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *ci = +mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name (token);
src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c tls_ctx_set_cert_profile(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *profile) · line 379
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c +10
-0+if (!ci) + { +msg (M_WARN ,"Warning unknown curve/group specified: %s" , token); + } +else + { + ctx->groups[i] = ci->grp_id; + i++; + } + token =strsep (&tmp_groups,":" );
Aren't we calling strsep() twice in a row now?
Once in the while() condition and once at the end of the cycle?
I think Arne agreed on the issue on IRC, but maybe forgot to fix the patch?
Regards,
Signature · 1 line
Antonio Quartulli
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v5 4/9] Implement tls-groups option to specify eliptic curves/groups
Quoted 6 lines · Antonio Quartulli
Aren't we calling
strsep()twice in a row now?
Once in thewhile()condition and once at the end of the cycle?I think Arne agreed on the issue on IRC, but maybe forgot to fix the patch?
However, please note that now the patch compiles on my gitlab-ci test bench.
Signature · 1 line
Antonio Quartulli
PATCH v6 4/9 Implement tls-groups option to specify eliptic curves/groups
In reply to Antonio QuartulliBy default OpenSSL 1.1+ only allows signatures and ecdh/ecdhx from the default list of X25519:secp256r1:X448:secp521r1:secp384r1. In TLS1.3 key exchange is independent from the signature/key of the certificates, so allowing all groups per default is not a sensible choice anymore and instead a shorter list is reasonable.
However, when using certificates with exotic curves that are not on the group list, the signatures of these certificates will no longer be accepted.
The tls-groups option allows to modify the group list to account for these corner cases.
Patch V2: Uses local gc_arena instead of malloc/free, reword commit
message. Fix other typos/clarify messages
Patch V3: Style fixes, adjust code to changes from mbed tls session
fix
Patch V5: Fix compilation with OpenSSL 1.0.2
Patch V6: Redo the 'while((token = strsep(&tmp_groups, ":"))' change
that accidently got lost.
--- README.ec | 7 ++-- configure.ac | 1 + doc/man-sections/encryption-options.rst | 6 +-- doc/man-sections/tls-options.rst | 27 +++++++++++- src/openvpn/openssl_compat.h | 6 +++ src/openvpn/options.c | 10 ++++- src/openvpn/options.h | 1 + src/openvpn/ssl.c | 6 +++ src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 10 +++++ src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++ src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.h | 1 + src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 5 +-- src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 13 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
README.ec +4 -3
@@ -12,14 +12,15 @@ OpenVPN 2.4.0 and newer automatically initialize ECDH parameters. When ECDSA is used for authentication, the curve used for the server certificate will be used for ECDH too. When autodetection fails (e.g. when using RSA certificates) OpenVPN lets the crypto library decide if possible, or falls back to the -secp384r1 curve. +secp384r1 curve. The list of groups/curves that the crypto library will choose +from can be set with the --tls-groups <grouplist> option. An administrator can force an OpenVPN/OpenSSL server to use a specific curve using the --ecdh-curve <curvename> option with one of the curves listed as -available by the --show-curves option. Clients will use the same curve as +available by the --show-groups option. Clients will use the same curve as selected by the server. -Note that not all curves listed by --show-curves are available for use with TLS; +Note that not all curves listed by --show-groups are available for use with TLS; in that case connecting will fail with a 'no shared cipher' TLS error. Authentication (ECDSA)
configure.ac +1 -0
@@ -929,6 +929,7 @@ if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "openssl"; then OpenSSL_version \ SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb \ SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata \ + SSL_CTX_set1_groups \ SSL_CTX_set_security_level \ X509_get0_notBefore \ X509_get0_notAfter \
doc/man-sections/encryption-options.rst +3 -3
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ SSL Library information (Standalone) Show currently available hardware-based crypto acceleration engines supported by the OpenSSL library. ---show-curves - (Standalone) Show all available elliptic curves to use with the - ``--ecdh-curve`` option. +--show-groups + (Standalone) Show all available elliptic curves/groups to use with the + ``--ecdh-curve`` and ``tls-groups`` options. Generating key material -----------------------
doc/man-sections/tls-options.rst +26 -1
@@ -338,6 +338,31 @@ certificates and keys: https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa Use ``--tls-crypt`` instead if you want to use the key file to not only authenticate, but also encrypt the TLS control channel. +--tls-groups list + A list of allowable groups/curves in order of preference. + + Set the allowed elictipic curves/groups for the TLS session. + These groups are allowed to be used in signatures and key exchange. + + mbed TLS currently allows all known curves per default. + + OpenSSL 1.1+ restricts the list per default to + :: + + "X25519:secp256r1:X448:secp521r1:secp384r1". + + If you use certificates that use non-standard curves, you + might need to add them here. If you do not force the ecdh curve + by using ``--ecdh-curve``, the groups for ecdh will also be picked + from this list. + + OpenVPN maps the curve name `secp256r1` to `prime256v1` to allow + specifying the same tls-groups option for mbed TLS and OpenSSL. + + Warning: this option not only affects eliptic curve certificates + but also the key exchange in TLS 1.3 and using this option improperly + will disable TLS 1.3. + --tls-cert-profile profile Set the allowed cryptographic algorithms for certificates according to ``profile``.
@@ -368,7 +393,7 @@ certificates and keys: https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa OpenVPN will migrate to 'preferred' as default in the future. Please ensure that your keys already comply. -*WARNING:* ``--tls-ciphers`` and ``--tls-ciphersuites`` +*WARNING:* ``--tls-ciphers``, ``--tls-ciphersuites`` and ``tls-groups`` These options are expert features, which - if used correctly - can improve the security of your VPN connection. But it is also easy to unwittingly use them to carefully align a gun with your foot, or just
src/openvpn/openssl_compat.h +6 -0
@@ -183,6 +183,12 @@ SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx) }#endif +/* This function is implemented as macro, so the configure check for the +* function may fail, so we check for both variants here */ +#if !defined(HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET1_GROUPS ) && !defined(SSL_CTX_set1_groups) +#define SSL_CTX_set1_groups SSL_CTX_set1_curves +#endif +#if !defined(HAVE_X509_GET0_PUBKEY )/** * Get the public key from a X509 certificate
src/openvpn/options.c +9 -1
@@ -8057,7 +8057,7 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->show_tls_ciphers = true; } -else if (streq (p[0 ],"show-curves" ) && !p[1 ]) +else if ((streq (p[0 ],"show-curves" ) ||streq (p[0 ],"show-groups" )) && !p[1 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->show_curves = true;
@@ -8065,6 +8065,9 @@ add_option(struct options *options,else if (streq (p[0 ],"ecdh-curve" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); +msg (M_WARN ,"Consider setting groups/curves preference with " +"tls-groups instead of forcing a specific curve with " +"ecdh-curve." ); options->ecdh_curve = p[1 ]; }else if (streq (p[0 ],"tls-server" ) && !p[1 ])
@@ -8235,6 +8238,11 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->cipher_list_tls13 = p[1 ]; } +else if (streq (p[0 ],"tls-groups" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) + { +VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); + options->tls_groups = p[1 ]; + }else if (streq (p[0 ],"crl-verify" ) && p[1 ] && ((p[2 ] &&streq (p[2 ],"dir" )) || !p[2 ])) {
src/openvpn/options.h +1 -0
@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ struct optionsbool pkcs12_file_inline;const char *cipher_list;const char *cipher_list_tls13; +const char *tls_groups;const char *tls_cert_profile;const char *ecdh_curve;const char *tls_verify;
src/openvpn/ssl.c +6 -0
@@ -630,6 +630,12 @@ init_ssl(const struct options *options, struct tls_root_ctx *new_ctx)tls_ctx_restrict_ciphers (new_ctx, options->cipher_list);tls_ctx_restrict_ciphers_tls13 (new_ctx, options->cipher_list_tls13); +/* Set the allow groups/curves for TLS if we want to override them */ +if (options->tls_groups) + { +tls_ctx_set_tls_groups (new_ctx, options->tls_groups); + } +if (!tls_ctx_set_options (new_ctx, options->ssl_flags)) { goto err;
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +10 -0
@@ -198,6 +198,16 @@ void tls_ctx_restrict_ciphers_tls13(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *cipher*/ void tls_ctx_set_cert_profile (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx,const char *profile); +/** +* Set the allowed (eliptic curve) group allowed for signatures and +* key exchange. +* +* @param ctx TLS context to restrict, must be valid. +* @param groups List of groups that will be allowed, in priority, +* separated by : +*/ +void tls_ctx_set_tls_groups (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx,const char *groups); +/** * Check our certificate notBefore and notAfter fields, and warn if the cert is * either not yet valid or has expired. Note that this is a non-fatal error,
src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c +45 -0
63 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.h +1 -0
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ struct tls_root_ctx {#endif struct external_context external_key;/**< External key context */ int *allowed_ciphers;/**< List of allowed ciphers for this connection */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id *groups;/**< List of allowed groups for this connection */ mbedtls_x509_crt_profile cert_profile;/**< Allowed certificate types */ };
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +2 -3
@@ -233,15 +233,14 @@ ncp_get_best_cipher(const char *server_list, const char *server_cipher,char *tmp_ciphers =string_alloc (server_list, &gc_tmp); -const char *token =strsep (&tmp_ciphers,":" ); -while (token) +const char *token; +while ((token =strsep (&tmp_ciphers,":" ))) {if (tls_item_in_cipher_list (token, peer_ncp_list) ||streq (token, remote_cipher)) {break ; } - token =strsep (&tmp_ciphers,":" ); }/* We have not found a common cipher, as a last resort check if the * server cipher can be used
src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c +54 -1
73 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v6 4/9] Implement tls-groups option to specify eliptic curves/groups
Hi,
Quoted 19 lines · Arne Schwabe
By default OpenSSL 1.1+ only allows signatures and ecdh/ecdhx from the default list of X25519:secp256r1:X448:secp521r1:secp384r1. In TLS1.3 key exchange is independent from the signature/key of the certificates, so allowing all groups per default is not a sensible choice anymore and instead a shorter list is reasonable.
However, when using certificates with exotic curves that are not on the group list, the signatures of these certificates will no longer be accepted.
The tls-groups option allows to modify the group list to account for these corner cases.
Patch V2: Uses local
gc_arenainstead of malloc/free, reword commit
message. Fix other typos/clarify messagesPatch V3: Style fixes, adjust code to changes from mbed tls session
fix
Quoted 6 lines
Patch V5: Fix compilation with OpenSSL 1.0.2
Patch V6: Redo the 'while((token =
strsep(&tmp_groups, ":"))' change
that accidently got lost.Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Much better now.
Signature · 1 line
Antonio Quartulli
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v6 4/9] Implement tls-groups option to specify eliptic curves/groups
In reply to Arne Schwabe8x fix - 2x suggestion
Quoted 6 lines · Arne Schwabe
By default OpenSSL 1.1+ only allows signatures and ecdh/ecdhx from the default list of X25519:secp256r1:X448:secp521r1:secp384r1. In TLS1.3 key exchange is independent from the signature/key of the certificates, so allowing all groups per default is not a sensible choice anymore and instead a shorter list is reasonable.
Quoted 6 lines
However, when using certificates with exotic curves that are not on the group list, the signatures of these certificates will no longer be accepted.
The tls-groups option allows to modify the group list to account for these corner cases.
The tls-groups option ->
The tls-groups option
Quoted 6 lines
Patch V2: Uses local
gc_arenainstead of malloc/free, reword commit
message. Fix other typos/clarify messagesPatch V3: Style fixes, adjust code to changes from mbed tls session
fix
mbed tls ->
mbedTLS
Quoted 5 lines
Patch V5: Fix compilation with OpenSSL 1.0.2
Patch V6: Redo the 'while((token =
strsep(&tmp_groups, ":"))' change
that accidently got lost.
that accidently ->
which accidentally
Quoted 75 lines
Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>--- README.ec | 7 ++-- configure.ac | 1 + doc/man-sections/encryption-options.rst | 6 +-- doc/man-sections/tls-options.rst | 27 +++++++++++- src/openvpn/openssl_compat.h | 6 +++ src/openvpn/options.c | 10 ++++- src/openvpn/options.h | 1 + src/openvpn/ssl.c | 6 +++ src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 10 +++++ src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++ src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.h | 1 + src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 5 +-- src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 13 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)README.ec +4
-3@@ -12,14 +12,15 @@ OpenVPN 2.4.0 and newer automatically initialize ECDH parameters. When ECDSA is used for authentication, the curve used for the server certificate will be used for ECDH too. When autodetection fails (e.g. when using RSA certificates) OpenVPN lets the crypto library decide if possible, or falls back to the -secp384r1 curve. +secp384r1 curve. The list of groups/curves that the crypto library will choose +from can be set with the --tls-groups <grouplist> option. An administrator can force an OpenVPN/OpenSSL server to use a specific curve using the --ecdh-curve <curvename> option with one of the curves listed as -available by the --show-curves option. Clients will use the same curve as +available by the --show-groups option. Clients will use the same curve as selected by the server. -Note that not all curves listed by --show-curves are available for use with TLS; +Note that not all curves listed by --show-groups are available for use with TLS; in that case connecting will fail with a 'no shared cipher' TLS error. Authentication (ECDSA)configure.ac +1
-0@@ -929,6 +929,7 @@ if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "openssl"; then OpenSSL_version \ SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb \ SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata \ + SSL_CTX_set1_groups \ SSL_CTX_set_security_level \ X509_get0_notBefore \ X509_get0_notAfter \doc/man-sections/encryption-options.rst +3
-3@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ SSL Library information (Standalone) Show currently available hardware-based crypto acceleration engines supported by the OpenSSL library. ---show-curves - (Standalone) Show all available elliptic curves to use with the - ``--ecdh-curve`` option. +--show-groups + (Standalone) Show all available elliptic curves/groups to use with the + ``--ecdh-curve`` and ``tls-groups`` options. Generating key material -----------------------doc/man-sections/tls-options.rst +0
-0
doc/man-sections/tls-options.rst certificates and keys: https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa · line 344
Quoted 7 lines
doc/man-sections/tls-options.rst +4
-0@@ -338,6 +338,31 @@ certificates and keys: https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa Use ``--tls-crypt`` instead if you want to use the key file to not only authenticate, but also encrypt the TLS control channel. +--tls-groups list + A list of allowable groups/curves in order of preference. + + Set the allowed elictipic curves/groups for the TLS session.
elictipic ->
elliptic
doc/man-sections/tls-options.rst certificates and keys: https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa · line 347
Quoted 3 lines
doc/man-sections/tls-options.rst +3
-0+ These groups are allowed to be used in signatures and key exchange. + + mbed TLS currently allows all known curves per default.
mbedTLS
doc/man-sections/tls-options.rst certificates and keys: https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa · line 360
Quoted 13 lines
doc/man-sections/tls-options.rst +13
-0+ + OpenSSL 1.1+ restricts the list per default to + :: + + "X25519:secp256r1:X448:secp521r1:secp384r1". + + If you use certificates that use non-standard curves, you + might need to add them here. If you do not force the ecdh curve + by using ``--ecdh-curve``, the groups for ecdh will also be picked + from this list. + + OpenVPN maps the curve name `secp256r1` to `prime256v1` to allow + specifying the same tls-groups option for mbed TLS and OpenSSL.
mbedTLS
doc/man-sections/tls-options.rst certificates and keys: https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa · line 362
Quoted 2 lines
doc/man-sections/tls-options.rst +2
-0+ + Warning: this option not only affects eliptic curve certificates
elliptic
Quoted 20 lines
doc/man-sections/tls-options.rst +4
-1+ but also the key exchange in TLS 1.3 and using this option improperly + will disable TLS 1.3. + --tls-cert-profile profile Set the allowed cryptographic algorithms for certificates according to ``profile``.@@ -368,7 +393,7 @@ certificates and keys: https://github.com/OpenVPN/easy-rsa OpenVPN will migrate to 'preferred' as default in the future. Please ensure that your keys already comply. -*WARNING:* ``--tls-ciphers`` and ``--tls-ciphersuites`` +*WARNING:* ``--tls-ciphers``, ``--tls-ciphersuites`` and ``tls-groups`` These options are expert features, which - if used correctly - can improve the security of your VPN connection. But it is also easy to unwittingly use them to carefully align a gun with your foot, or justsrc/openvpn/openssl_compat.h +0
-0
src/openvpn/openssl_compat.h SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx) · line 186
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/openssl_compat.h +1
-0@@ -183,6 +183,12 @@ SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx) }#endif +/* This function is implemented as macro, so the configure check for the
as a macro (not important)
Quoted 77 lines
src/openvpn/openssl_compat.h +5
-0+* function may fail, so we check for both variants here */ +#if !defined(HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET1_GROUPS ) && !defined(SSL_CTX_set1_groups) +#define SSL_CTX_set1_groups SSL_CTX_set1_curves +#endif +#if !defined(HAVE_X509_GET0_PUBKEY )/** * Get the public key from a X509 certificate src/openvpn/options.c +9
-1@@ -8057,7 +8057,7 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->show_tls_ciphers = true; } -else if (streq (p[0 ],"show-curves" ) && !p[1 ]) +else if ((streq (p[0 ],"show-curves" ) ||streq (p[0 ],"show-groups" )) && !p[1 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->show_curves = true;@@ -8065,6 +8065,9 @@ add_option(struct options *options,else if (streq (p[0 ],"ecdh-curve" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); +msg (M_WARN ,"Consider setting groups/curves preference with " +"tls-groups instead of forcing a specific curve with " +"ecdh-curve." ); options->ecdh_curve = p[1 ]; }else if (streq (p[0 ],"tls-server" ) && !p[1 ])@@ -8235,6 +8238,11 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->cipher_list_tls13 = p[1 ]; } +else if (streq (p[0 ],"tls-groups" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) + { +VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); + options->tls_groups = p[1 ]; + }else if (streq (p[0 ],"crl-verify" ) && p[1 ] && ((p[2 ] &&streq (p[2 ],"dir" )) || !p[2 ])) {src/openvpn/options.h +1
-0@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ struct optionsbool pkcs12_file_inline;const char *cipher_list;const char *cipher_list_tls13; +const char *tls_groups;const char *tls_cert_profile;const char *ecdh_curve;const char *tls_verify;src/openvpn/ssl.c +6
-0@@ -630,6 +630,12 @@ init_ssl(const struct options *options, struct tls_root_ctx *new_ctx)tls_ctx_restrict_ciphers (new_ctx, options->cipher_list);tls_ctx_restrict_ciphers_tls13 (new_ctx, options->cipher_list_tls13); +/* Set the allow groups/curves for TLS if we want to override them */ +if (options->tls_groups) + { +tls_ctx_set_tls_groups (new_ctx, options->tls_groups); + } +if (!tls_ctx_set_options (new_ctx, options->ssl_flags)) { goto err;src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +0
-0
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h void tls_ctx_restrict_ciphers_tls13(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *cipher · line 202
Quoted 5 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +2
-0@@ -198,6 +198,16 @@ void tls_ctx_restrict_ciphers_tls13(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *cipher*/ void tls_ctx_set_cert_profile (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx,const char *profile); +/** +* Set the allowed (eliptic curve) group allowed for signatures and
elliptic (spell checked also missed this)
Extra allowed .. not important.
Quoted 196 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +8
-0+* key exchange. +* +* @param ctx TLS context to restrict, must be valid. +* @param groups List of groups that will be allowed, in priority, +* separated by : +*/ +void tls_ctx_set_tls_groups (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx,const char *groups); +/** * Check our certificate notBefore and notAfter fields, and warn if the cert is * either not yet valid or has expired. Note that this is a non-fatal error, src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c +45
-0@@ -176,6 +176,11 @@ tls_ctx_free(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx)free (ctx->allowed_ciphers); } +if (ctx->groups) + { +free (ctx->groups); + } +CLEAR (*ctx); ctx->initialised = false;@@ -343,6 +348,41 @@ tls_ctx_set_cert_profile(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *profile) } } +void +tls_ctx_set_tls_groups (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx,const char *groups) +{ +ASSERT (ctx); +struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); + +/* Get number of groups and allocate an array in ctx */ +int groups_count =get_num_elements (groups,':' ); +ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR (ctx->groups, mbedtls_ecp_group_id, groups_count +1 ) + + /* Parse allowed ciphers, getting IDs */ +int i =0 ; +char *tmp_groups =string_alloc (groups, &gc); + +const char *token; +while ((token =strsep (&tmp_groups,":" ))) + { +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *ci = +mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name (token); +if (!ci) + { +msg (M_WARN ,"Warning unknown curve/group specified: %s" , token); + } +else + { + ctx->groups[i] = ci->grp_id; + i++; + } + } + ctx->groups[i] =MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ; + +gc_free (&gc); +} + +void tls_ctx_check_cert_time (const struct tls_root_ctx *ctx) {@@ -1043,6 +1083,11 @@ key_state_ssl_init(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl,mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites (ks_ssl->ssl_config, ssl_ctx->allowed_ciphers); } +if (ssl_ctx->groups) + { +mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves (ks_ssl->ssl_config, ssl_ctx->groups); + } +/* Disable record splitting (for now). OpenVPN assumes records are sent * unfragmented, and changing that will require thorough review and * testing. Since OpenVPN is not susceptible to BEAST, we can just src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.h +1
-0@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ struct tls_root_ctx {#endif struct external_context external_key;/**< External key context */ int *allowed_ciphers;/**< List of allowed ciphers for this connection */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id *groups;/**< List of allowed groups for this connection */ mbedtls_x509_crt_profile cert_profile;/**< Allowed certificate types */ };src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +2
-3@@ -233,15 +233,14 @@ ncp_get_best_cipher(const char *server_list, const char *server_cipher,char *tmp_ciphers =string_alloc (server_list, &gc_tmp); -const char *token =strsep (&tmp_ciphers,":" ); -while (token) +const char *token; +while ((token =strsep (&tmp_ciphers,":" ))) {if (tls_item_in_cipher_list (token, peer_ncp_list) ||streq (token, remote_cipher)) {break ; } - token =strsep (&tmp_ciphers,":" ); }/* We have not found a common cipher, as a last resort check if the * server cipher can be used src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c +54
-1@@ -563,6 +563,57 @@ tls_ctx_set_cert_profile(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *profile)#endif /* ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_SECURITY_LEVEL */ } +void +tls_ctx_set_tls_groups (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx,const char *groups) +{ +ASSERT (ctx); +struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); +/* This method could be as easy as +* SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx->ctx, groups) +* but OpenSSL does not like the name secp256r1 for prime256v1 +* This is one of the important curves. +* To support the same name for OpenSSL and mbedTLS, we do +* this dance. +*/ + +int groups_count =get_num_elements (groups,':' ); + +int *glist; +/* Allocate an array for them */ +ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (glist, int, groups_count, &gc); + +/* Parse allowed ciphers, getting IDs */ +int glistlen =0 ; +char *tmp_groups =string_alloc (groups, &gc); + +const char *token; +while ((token =strsep (&tmp_groups,":" ))) + { +if (streq (token,"secp256r1" )) + { + token ="prime256v1" ; + } +int nid =OBJ_sn2nid (token); + +if (nid ==0 ) + { +msg (M_WARN ,"Warning unknown curve/group specified: %s" , token); + } +else + { + glist[glistlen] = nid; + glistlen++; + } + } + +if (!SSL_CTX_set1_groups (ctx->ctx, glist, glistlen)) + { +crypto_msg (M_FATAL ,"Failed to set allowed TLS group list: %s" , + groups); + } +gc_free (&gc); +} +void tls_ctx_check_cert_time (const struct tls_root_ctx *ctx) {@@ -2135,6 +2186,8 @@ show_available_tls_ciphers_list(const char *cipher_list,void show_available_curves (void ) { +printf ("Consider using openssl 'ecparam -list_curves' as\n" +"alternative to running this command.\n" );#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EC_builtin_curve *curves =NULL ;size_t crv_len =0 ;@@ -2144,7 +2197,7 @@ show_available_curves(void)ALLOC_ARRAY (curves, EC_builtin_curve, crv_len);if (EC_get_builtin_curves (curves, crv_len)) { -printf ("Available Elliptic curves:\n" ); +printf ("\nAvailable Elliptic curves/groups:\n" );for (n =0 ; n < crv_len; n++) {const char *sname;
[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Implement tls-groups option to specify eliptic curves/groups
In reply to Arne SchwabeYour patch has been applied to the master branch.
I have not actually tested EC functionality in any way, just made sure it compiles and passes basic (scripted) testing.
commit 8353ae8075fb25d1935258a2f007e024c5e2c43f
Author: Arne Schwabe Date: Tue Jul 21 17:49:22 2020 +0200
Implement tls-groups option to specify eliptic curves/groups
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: Antonio Quartulli <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg20521.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
PATCH v2 5/9 Remove key-method 1
In reply to Arne SchwabeKey-method 1 is only needed to talk to pre OpenVPN 2.0 clients.
Patch V2: Fix style. Make V1 op codes illegal, remove all code handling
v1 op codes and give a good warning message if we encounter them in the legal op codes pre-check.
--- doc/doxygen/doc_control_processor.h | 6 +- doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h | 6 +- doc/doxygen/doc_protocol_overview.h | 2 +- src/openvpn/forward.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/helper.c | 5 - src/openvpn/init.c | 1 - src/openvpn/options.c | 35 +---- src/openvpn/options.h | 4 - src/openvpn/ssl.c | 230 ++++------------------------ src/openvpn/ssl.h | 19 +-- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 1 - 11 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 269 deletions(-)
doc/doxygen/doc_control_processor.h +1 -5
@@ -175,11 +175,7 @@* appropriate messages to be sent. * * @par Functions which control data channel key generation -* - Key method 1 key exchange functions: -* - \c key_method_1_write(), generates and processes key material to -* be sent to the remote OpenVPN peer. -* - \c key_method_1_read(), processes key material received from the -* remote OpenVPN peer. +* - Key method 1 key exchange functions were removed from OpenVPN 2.5 * - Key method 2 key exchange functions: * - \c key_method_2_write(), generates and processes key material to * be sent to the remote OpenVPN peer.
doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h +1 -5
@@ -131,11 +131,7 @@ S_ACTIVE S_ACTIVE* control_processor Control Channel Processor module's\endlink \c * tls_process() function and control the %key generation and exchange * process as follows: -* - %Key method 1: -* - \c key_method_1_write(): generate random material locally, and load -* as "sending" keys. -* - \c key_method_1_read(): read random material received from remote -* peer, and load as "receiving" keys. +* - %Key method 1 has been removed in OpenVPN 2.5 * - %Key method 2: * - \c key_method_2_write(): generate random material locally, and if * in server mode generate %key expansion.
doc/doxygen/doc_protocol_overview.h +1 -1
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@* * @subsection network_protocol_control_plaintext Structure of plaintext control channel messages * -* - %Key method 1: +* - %Key method 1 (support removed in OpenVPN 2.5): * - Cipher %key length in bytes (1 byte). * - Cipher %key (n bytes). * - HMAC %key length in bytes (1 byte).
src/openvpn/forward.c +1 -1
@@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@ process_incoming_link_part1(struct context *c, struct link_socket_info *lsi, boo floated, &ad_start)) {/* Restore pre-NCP frame parameters */ -if (is_hard_reset (opcode, c->options.key_method)) +if (is_hard_reset_method2 (opcode)) { c->c2.frame = c->c2.frame_initial;#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT
src/openvpn/helper.c +0 -5
@@ -490,11 +490,6 @@ helper_client_server(struct options *o)*/ if (o->client) { -if (o->key_method !=2 ) - { -msg (M_USAGE ,"--client requires --key-method 2" ); - } - o->pull = true; o->tls_client = true; }
src/openvpn/init.c +0 -1
@@ -2852,7 +2852,6 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) to.ssl_ctx = c->c1.ks.ssl_ctx; to.key_type = c->c1.ks.key_type; to.server = options->tls_server; - to.key_method = options->key_method; to.replay = options->replay; to.replay_window = options->replay_window; to.replay_time = options->replay_time;
src/openvpn/options.c +1 -34
@@ -881,7 +881,6 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc)#ifdef ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE o->use_prediction_resistance = false;#endif - o->key_method =2 ; o->tls_timeout =2 ; o->renegotiate_bytes =-1 ; o->renegotiate_seconds =3600 ;
@@ -1715,7 +1714,6 @@ show_settings(const struct options *o)SHOW_BOOL (tls_server);SHOW_BOOL (tls_client); -SHOW_INT (key_method);SHOW_STR (ca_file);SHOW_STR (ca_path);SHOW_STR (dh_file);
@@ -2376,10 +2374,6 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, const struct connec {msg (M_USAGE ,"--ccd-exclusive must be used with --client-config-dir" ); } -if (options->key_method !=2 ) - { -msg (M_USAGE ,"--mode server requires --key-method 2" ); - }if (options->auth_token_generate && !options->renegotiate_seconds) { msg(M_USAGE, "--auth-gen-token needs a non-infinite "
@@ -2546,13 +2540,6 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, const struct connec "may accept clients which do not present a certificate"); } -if (options->key_method ==1 ) - { -msg (M_WARN ,"WARNING: --key-method 1 is deprecated and will be removed " -"in OpenVPN 2.5. By default --key-method 2 will be used if not set " -"in the configuration file, which is the recommended approach." ); - } -const int tls_version_max = (options->ssl_flags >>SSLF_TLS_VERSION_MAX_SHIFT ) &SSLF_TLS_VERSION_MAX_MASK ;
@@ -2794,7 +2781,6 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, const struct connecMUST_BE_UNDEF (push_peer_info);MUST_BE_UNDEF (tls_exit);MUST_BE_UNDEF (crl_file); -MUST_BE_UNDEF (key_method);MUST_BE_UNDEF (ns_cert_type);MUST_BE_UNDEF (remote_cert_ku[0 ]);MUST_BE_UNDEF (remote_cert_eku);
@@ -3823,10 +3809,7 @@ options_string(const struct options *o,* tls-auth/tls-crypt does not match. Removing tls-auth here would * break stuff, so leaving that in place. */ -if (o->key_method >1 ) - { -buf_printf (&out,",key-method %d" , o->key_method); - } +buf_printf (&out,",key-method %d" ,KEY_METHOD_2 ); }if (remote)
@@ -8477,22 +8460,6 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->tls_crypt_v2_verify_script = p[1 ]; } -else if (streq (p[0 ],"key-method" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) - { -int key_method; - -VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); - key_method =atoi (p[1 ]); -if (key_method <KEY_METHOD_MIN || key_method >KEY_METHOD_MAX ) - { -msg (msglevel,"key_method parameter (%d) must be >= %d and <= %d" , - key_method, -KEY_METHOD_MIN , -KEY_METHOD_MAX ); - goto err; - } - options->key_method = key_method; - }else if (streq (p[0 ],"x509-track" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL );
src/openvpn/options.h +0 -4
@@ -572,10 +572,6 @@ struct options#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI const char *cryptoapi_cert;#endif - -/* data channel key exchange method */ -int key_method; -/* Per-packet timeout on control channel */ int tls_timeout;
src/openvpn/ssl.c +29 -201
351 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/ssl.h +8 -11
@@ -66,8 +66,10 @@/* indicates key_method >= 2 and client-specific tls-crypt key */ #define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 10/* initial key from client, forget previous state */ -/* define the range of legal opcodes */ -#define P_FIRST_OPCODE 1 +/* define the range of legal opcodes +* Since we do no longer support key-method 1 we consider +* the v1 op codes invalid */ +#define P_FIRST_OPCODE 3#define P_LAST_OPCODE 10/*
@@ -109,11 +111,7 @@/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN" -/* -* Range of key exchange methods -*/ -#define KEY_METHOD_MIN 1 -#define KEY_METHOD_MAX 2 +#define KEY_METHOD_2 2/* key method taken from lower 4 bits */ #define KEY_METHOD_MASK 0x0F
@@ -585,12 +583,11 @@ void show_tls_performance_stats(void);void extract_x509_field_test (void );/** -* Given a key_method, return true if opcode represents the required form of -* hard_reset. +* Given a key_method, return true if opcode represents the one of the +* hard_reset op codes for key-method 2 * -* If key_method == 0, return true if any form of hard reset is used. */ -bool is_hard_reset (int op,int key_method); +bool is_hard_reset_method2 (int op);void delayed_auth_pass_purge (void );
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +0 -1
@@ -262,7 +262,6 @@ struct tls_options#endif /* from command line */ -int key_method;bool replay;bool single_session;#ifdef ENABLE_OCC
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2 5/9] Remove key-method 1
Quoted 20 lines · Arne Schwabe
Key-method 1 is only needed to talk to pre OpenVPN 2.0 clients.
Patch V2: Fix style. Make V1 op codes illegal, remove all code handling
v1 op codes and give a good warning message if we encounter them in the legal op codes pre-check.Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>--- doc/doxygen/doc_control_processor.h | 6 +- doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h | 6 +- doc/doxygen/doc_protocol_overview.h | 2 +- src/openvpn/forward.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/helper.c | 5 - src/openvpn/init.c | 1 - src/openvpn/options.c | 35 +---- src/openvpn/options.h | 4 - src/openvpn/ssl.c | 230 ++++------------------------ src/openvpn/ssl.h | 19 +-- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 1 - 11 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 269 deletions(-)
[...snip...]
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +0
-0
[...snip...]
src/openvpn/ssl.c read_string_alloc(struct buffer *buf) · line 2231
Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +0
-4@@ -2225,52 +2205,6 @@ read_string_alloc(struct buffer *buf)return str; } -/* -* Handle the reading and writing of key data to and from -* the TLS control channel (cleartext). -*/
Is it needed to remove this comment? Or move it after the push_peer_info() function?
Quoted 3 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +0
-3-static bool -key_method_1_write (struct buffer *buf,struct tls_session *session) -{
[...snip...]
Quoted 15 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +1
-3-} -static bool push_peer_info (struct buffer *buf,struct tls_session *session) {@@ -2312,7 +2246,7 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)* push request, also signal that the client wants * to get push-reply messages without without requiring a round * trip for a push request message*/ -if (session->opt->pull) +if (session->opt->pull) { iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_REQUEST_PUSH ; }@@ -2394,7 +2328,6 @@ key_method_2_write(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)
[...snip...]
Quoted 40 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +4
-14@@ -3470,14 +3316,12 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, }/* hard reset ? */ -if (is_hard_reset (op,0 )) +if (is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) {/* verify client -> server or server -> client connection */ -if (((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 - || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 +if (((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 ) && !multi->opt.server) - || ((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 - || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ) && multi->opt.server)) + || ((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ) && multi->opt.server)) { msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: client->client or server->server connection attempted from %s",@@ -3542,19 +3386,11 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,* Initial packet received. */ -if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset (op,0 )) +if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) {struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE ];struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; -if (!is_hard_reset (op, multi->opt.key_method)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS ERROR: initial packet local/remote key_method mismatch, local key_method=%d, op=%s" , - multi->opt.key_method, -packet_opcode_name (op)); - goto error; - } -/* * If we have no session currently in progress, the initial packet will * open a new session in TM_ACTIVE rather than TM_UNTRUSTED.
src/openvpn/ssl.c tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, · line 3433
Quoted 5 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +1
-1@@ -3594,7 +3430,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, } } -if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset (op,0 )) +if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op))
Do we need this if() block? Considering it is exactly the same if() statement as the previous if() block. I would suggest merging them, but you might hit a challenge with reuse of struct tls_session *session, where one is referring to TM_ACTIVE vs TM_UNTRUSTED.
Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +0
-1{/* * No match with existing sessions, @@ -3614,14 +3450,6 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, goto error; } -if (!is_hard_reset (op, multi->opt.key_method))
src/openvpn/ssl.c tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, · line 3455
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +0
-7- { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS ERROR: new session local/remote key_method mismatch, local key_method=%d, op=%s" , - multi->opt.key_method, -packet_opcode_name (op)); - goto error; - } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, session->opt)) {
I had already started my own approach of removing --key-method when I was made aware of this patch. Considering the size of it, my own barely tested changes is about 90% similar to this patch. But this patch has some improvements I didn't consider in my work.
I've done a quick 'make check' as well, and it works fine. There are just a couple of minor things to consider, otherwise I will happily ACK this patch.
Signature · 4 lines
kind regards, David Sommerseth OpenVPN Inc
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2 5/9] Remove key-method 1
Am 20.07.20 um 15:16 schrieb David Sommerseth:
Quoted 35 lines · Arne Schwabe
Quoted 20 lines
Key-method 1 is only needed to talk to pre OpenVPN 2.0 clients.
Patch V2: Fix style. Make V1 op codes illegal, remove all code handling
v1 op codes and give a good warning message if we encounter them in the legal op codes pre-check.Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>--- doc/doxygen/doc_control_processor.h | 6 +- doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h | 6 +- doc/doxygen/doc_protocol_overview.h | 2 +- src/openvpn/forward.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/helper.c | 5 - src/openvpn/init.c | 1 - src/openvpn/options.c | 35 +---- src/openvpn/options.h | 4 - src/openvpn/ssl.c | 230 ++++------------------------ src/openvpn/ssl.h | 19 +-- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 1 - 11 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 269 deletions(-)[...snip...]
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +0
-0[...snip...]
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +0
-0@@ -2225,52 +2205,6 @@ read_string_alloc(struct buffer *buf)return str; }
Quoted 7 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c read_string_alloc(struct buffer *buf) · line 2231
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +0
-4-/* -* Handle the reading and writing of key data to and from -* the TLS control channel (cleartext). -*/ Is it needed to remove this comment? Or move it after the
push_peer_info()function?
Yeah, we can move the comment.
Quoted 66 lines
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +0
-3-static bool -key_method_1_write (struct buffer *buf,struct tls_session *session) -{[...snip...]
Quoted 15 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +1
-3-} -static bool push_peer_info (struct buffer *buf,struct tls_session *session) {@@ -2312,7 +2246,7 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)* push request, also signal that the client wants * to get push-reply messages without without requiring a round * trip for a push request message*/ -if (session->opt->pull) +if (session->opt->pull) { iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_REQUEST_PUSH ; }@@ -2394,7 +2328,6 @@ key_method_2_write(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)[...snip...]
Quoted 43 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +4
-14@@ -3470,14 +3316,12 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, }/* hard reset ? */ -if (is_hard_reset (op,0 )) +if (is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) {/* verify client -> server or server -> client connection */ -if (((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 - || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 +if (((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 ) && !multi->opt.server) - || ((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 - || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ) && multi->opt.server)) + || ((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ) && multi->opt.server)) { msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: client->client or server->server connection attempted from %s",@@ -3542,19 +3386,11 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,* Initial packet received. */ -if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset (op,0 )) +if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) {struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE ];struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; -if (!is_hard_reset (op, multi->opt.key_method)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS ERROR: initial packet local/remote key_method mismatch, local key_method=%d, op=%s" , - multi->opt.key_method, -packet_opcode_name (op)); - goto error; - } -/* * If we have no session currently in progress, the initial packet will * open a new session in TM_ACTIVE rather than TM_UNTRUSTED. @@ -3594,7 +3430,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, } }
Quoted 7 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, · line 3433
Quoted 2 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +1
-1-if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset (op,0 )) +if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op))Do we need this
if()block? Considering it is exactly the sameif()statement as the previousif()block. I would suggest merging them, but you might hit a challenge with reuse of structtls_session*session, where one is referring toTM_ACTIVEvsTM_UNTRUSTED.
That is something that might be possible but I would consider outside of patch. The first block actually modifies i (i = TM_ACTIVE;), so that needs a separate patch with an explaination why/how we simplify the logic here.
Arne
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2 5/9] Remove key-method 1
Quoted 44 lines · Arne Schwabe
Am 20.07.20 um 15:16 schrieb David Sommerseth:
Quoted 35 lines · Arne Schwabe
Quoted 20 lines
Key-method 1 is only needed to talk to pre OpenVPN 2.0 clients.
Patch V2: Fix style. Make V1 op codes illegal, remove all code handling
v1 op codes and give a good warning message if we encounter them in the legal op codes pre-check.Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>--- doc/doxygen/doc_control_processor.h | 6 +- doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h | 6 +- doc/doxygen/doc_protocol_overview.h | 2 +- src/openvpn/forward.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/helper.c | 5 - src/openvpn/init.c | 1 - src/openvpn/options.c | 35 +---- src/openvpn/options.h | 4 - src/openvpn/ssl.c | 230 ++++------------------------ src/openvpn/ssl.h | 19 +-- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 1 - 11 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 269 deletions(-)[...snip...]
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +0
-0[...snip...]
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +0
-0@@ -2225,52 +2205,6 @@ read_string_alloc(struct buffer *buf)return str; }Quoted 7 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c read_string_alloc(struct buffer *buf) · line 2231
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +0
-4-/* -* Handle the reading and writing of key data to and from -* the TLS control channel (cleartext). -*/ Is it needed to remove this comment? Or move it after the
push_peer_info()function?
Quoted 1 line
Yeah, we can move the comment.
Yes, please ... Since it's not a bad comment, I don't like loosing helpful pointers in comments :)
Quoted 74 lines
Quoted 66 lines
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +0
-3-static bool -key_method_1_write (struct buffer *buf,struct tls_session *session) -{[...snip...]
Quoted 15 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +1
-3-} -static bool push_peer_info (struct buffer *buf,struct tls_session *session) {@@ -2312,7 +2246,7 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)* push request, also signal that the client wants * to get push-reply messages without without requiring a round * trip for a push request message*/ -if (session->opt->pull) +if (session->opt->pull) { iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_REQUEST_PUSH ; }@@ -2394,7 +2328,6 @@ key_method_2_write(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)[...snip...]
Quoted 43 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +4
-14@@ -3470,14 +3316,12 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, }/* hard reset ? */ -if (is_hard_reset (op,0 )) +if (is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) {/* verify client -> server or server -> client connection */ -if (((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 - || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 +if (((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 ) && !multi->opt.server) - || ((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 - || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ) && multi->opt.server)) + || ((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ) && multi->opt.server)) { msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: client->client or server->server connection attempted from %s",@@ -3542,19 +3386,11 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,* Initial packet received. */ -if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset (op,0 )) +if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) {struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE ];struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; -if (!is_hard_reset (op, multi->opt.key_method)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS ERROR: initial packet local/remote key_method mismatch, local key_method=%d, op=%s" , - multi->opt.key_method, -packet_opcode_name (op)); - goto error; - } -/* * If we have no session currently in progress, the initial packet will * open a new session in TM_ACTIVE rather than TM_UNTRUSTED. @@ -3594,7 +3430,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, } }Quoted 7 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, · line 3433
Quoted 2 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +1
-1-if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset (op,0 )) +if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op))Do we need this
if()block? Considering it is exactly the sameif()statement as the previousif()block. I would suggest merging them, but you might hit a challenge with reuse of structtls_session*session, where one is referring toTM_ACTIVEvsTM_UNTRUSTED.
Quoted 4 lines
That is something that might be possible but I would consider outside of patch. The first block actually modifies i (i =
TM_ACTIVE;), so that needs a separate patch with an explaination why/how we simplify the logic here.
Alright, I can see the argument of not touching it now.
Could we then just add a comment to these two sections for now, indicating why they have been kept separate despite the if() statement being identical? Something like "This section processes {TM_ACTIVE, TM_UNTRUSTED} sessions" and elaborate a little bit around that, which may help refactoring this code later on.
Signature · 4 lines
kind regards, David Sommerseth OpenVPN Inc
PATCH v3 5/9 Remove key-method 1
Key-method 1 is only needed to talk to pre OpenVPN 2.0 clients.
Patch V2: Fix style. Make V1 op codes illegal, remove all code handling
v1 op codes and give a good warning message if we encounter them in the legal op codes pre-check.
Patch V3: Add a bit more comments in the existing methods.
--- doc/doxygen/doc_control_processor.h | 6 +- doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h | 6 +- doc/doxygen/doc_protocol_overview.h | 2 +- src/openvpn/forward.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/helper.c | 5 - src/openvpn/init.c | 1 - src/openvpn/options.c | 35 +--- src/openvpn/options.h | 4 - src/openvpn/ssl.c | 240 +++++----------------------- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 19 +-- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 1 - 11 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 268 deletions(-)
doc/doxygen/doc_control_processor.h +1 -5
@@ -175,11 +175,7 @@* appropriate messages to be sent. * * @par Functions which control data channel key generation -* - Key method 1 key exchange functions: -* - \c key_method_1_write(), generates and processes key material to -* be sent to the remote OpenVPN peer. -* - \c key_method_1_read(), processes key material received from the -* remote OpenVPN peer. +* - Key method 1 key exchange functions were removed from OpenVPN 2.5 * - Key method 2 key exchange functions: * - \c key_method_2_write(), generates and processes key material to * be sent to the remote OpenVPN peer.
doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h +1 -5
@@ -131,11 +131,7 @@ S_ACTIVE S_ACTIVE* control_processor Control Channel Processor module's\endlink \c * tls_process() function and control the %key generation and exchange * process as follows: -* - %Key method 1: -* - \c key_method_1_write(): generate random material locally, and load -* as "sending" keys. -* - \c key_method_1_read(): read random material received from remote -* peer, and load as "receiving" keys. +* - %Key method 1 has been removed in OpenVPN 2.5 * - %Key method 2: * - \c key_method_2_write(): generate random material locally, and if * in server mode generate %key expansion.
doc/doxygen/doc_protocol_overview.h +1 -1
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@* * @subsection network_protocol_control_plaintext Structure of plaintext control channel messages * -* - %Key method 1: +* - %Key method 1 (support removed in OpenVPN 2.5): * - Cipher %key length in bytes (1 byte). * - Cipher %key (n bytes). * - HMAC %key length in bytes (1 byte).
src/openvpn/forward.c +1 -1
@@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@ process_incoming_link_part1(struct context *c, struct link_socket_info *lsi, boo floated, &ad_start)) {/* Restore pre-NCP frame parameters */ -if (is_hard_reset (opcode, c->options.key_method)) +if (is_hard_reset_method2 (opcode)) { c->c2.frame = c->c2.frame_initial;#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT
src/openvpn/helper.c +0 -5
@@ -490,11 +490,6 @@ helper_client_server(struct options *o)*/ if (o->client) { -if (o->key_method !=2 ) - { -msg (M_USAGE ,"--client requires --key-method 2" ); - } - o->pull = true; o->tls_client = true; }
src/openvpn/init.c +0 -1
@@ -2852,7 +2852,6 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) to.ssl_ctx = c->c1.ks.ssl_ctx; to.key_type = c->c1.ks.key_type; to.server = options->tls_server; - to.key_method = options->key_method; to.replay = options->replay; to.replay_window = options->replay_window; to.replay_time = options->replay_time;
src/openvpn/options.c +1 -34
@@ -881,7 +881,6 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc)#ifdef ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE o->use_prediction_resistance = false;#endif - o->key_method =2 ; o->tls_timeout =2 ; o->renegotiate_bytes =-1 ; o->renegotiate_seconds =3600 ;
@@ -1719,7 +1718,6 @@ show_settings(const struct options *o)SHOW_BOOL (tls_server);SHOW_BOOL (tls_client); -SHOW_INT (key_method);SHOW_STR_INLINE (ca_file);SHOW_STR (ca_path);SHOW_STR (dh_file);
@@ -2380,10 +2378,6 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, const struct connec {msg (M_USAGE ,"--ccd-exclusive must be used with --client-config-dir" ); } -if (options->key_method !=2 ) - { -msg (M_USAGE ,"--mode server requires --key-method 2" ); - }if (options->auth_token_generate && !options->renegotiate_seconds) { msg(M_USAGE, "--auth-gen-token needs a non-infinite "
@@ -2550,13 +2544,6 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, const struct connec "may accept clients which do not present a certificate"); } -if (options->key_method ==1 ) - { -msg (M_WARN ,"WARNING: --key-method 1 is deprecated and will be removed " -"in OpenVPN 2.5. By default --key-method 2 will be used if not set " -"in the configuration file, which is the recommended approach." ); - } -const int tls_version_max = (options->ssl_flags >>SSLF_TLS_VERSION_MAX_SHIFT ) &SSLF_TLS_VERSION_MAX_MASK ;
@@ -2798,7 +2785,6 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, const struct connecMUST_BE_UNDEF (push_peer_info);MUST_BE_UNDEF (tls_exit);MUST_BE_UNDEF (crl_file); -MUST_BE_UNDEF (key_method);MUST_BE_UNDEF (ns_cert_type);MUST_BE_UNDEF (remote_cert_ku[0 ]);MUST_BE_UNDEF (remote_cert_eku);
@@ -3827,10 +3813,7 @@ options_string(const struct options *o,* tls-auth/tls-crypt does not match. Removing tls-auth here would * break stuff, so leaving that in place. */ -if (o->key_method >1 ) - { -buf_printf (&out,",key-method %d" , o->key_method); - } +buf_printf (&out,",key-method %d" ,KEY_METHOD_2 ); }if (remote)
@@ -8476,22 +8459,6 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->tls_crypt_v2_verify_script = p[1 ]; } -else if (streq (p[0 ],"key-method" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) - { -int key_method; - -VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); - key_method =atoi (p[1 ]); -if (key_method <KEY_METHOD_MIN || key_method >KEY_METHOD_MAX ) - { -msg (msglevel,"key_method parameter (%d) must be >= %d and <= %d" , - key_method, -KEY_METHOD_MIN , -KEY_METHOD_MAX ); - goto err; - } - options->key_method = key_method; - }else if (streq (p[0 ],"x509-track" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL );
src/openvpn/options.h +0 -4
@@ -572,10 +572,6 @@ struct options#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI const char *cryptoapi_cert;#endif - -/* data channel key exchange method */ -int key_method; -/* Per-packet timeout on control channel */ int tls_timeout;
src/openvpn/ssl.c +40 -200
361 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/ssl.h +8 -11
@@ -66,8 +66,10 @@/* indicates key_method >= 2 and client-specific tls-crypt key */ #define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 10/* initial key from client, forget previous state */ -/* define the range of legal opcodes */ -#define P_FIRST_OPCODE 1 +/* define the range of legal opcodes +* Since we do no longer support key-method 1 we consider +* the v1 op codes invalid */ +#define P_FIRST_OPCODE 3#define P_LAST_OPCODE 10/*
@@ -118,11 +120,7 @@/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN" -/* -* Range of key exchange methods -*/ -#define KEY_METHOD_MIN 1 -#define KEY_METHOD_MAX 2 +#define KEY_METHOD_2 2/* key method taken from lower 4 bits */ #define KEY_METHOD_MASK 0x0F
@@ -594,12 +592,11 @@ void show_tls_performance_stats(void);void extract_x509_field_test (void );/** -* Given a key_method, return true if opcode represents the required form of -* hard_reset. +* Given a key_method, return true if opcode represents the one of the +* hard_reset op codes for key-method 2 * -* If key_method == 0, return true if any form of hard reset is used. */ -bool is_hard_reset (int op,int key_method); +bool is_hard_reset_method2 (int op);void delayed_auth_pass_purge (void );
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +0 -1
@@ -262,7 +262,6 @@ struct tls_options#endif /* from command line */ -int key_method;bool replay;bool single_session;#ifdef ENABLE_OCC
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v3 5/9] Remove key-method 1
1x typo
Quoted 568 lines · Arne Schwabe
Key-method 1 is only needed to talk to pre OpenVPN 2.0 clients.
Patch V2: Fix style. Make V1 op codes illegal, remove all code handling
v1 op codes and give a good warning message if we encounter them in the legal op codes pre-check.Patch V3: Add a bit more comments in the existing methods.
Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>--- doc/doxygen/doc_control_processor.h | 6 +- doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h | 6 +- doc/doxygen/doc_protocol_overview.h | 2 +- src/openvpn/forward.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/helper.c | 5 - src/openvpn/init.c | 1 - src/openvpn/options.c | 35 +--- src/openvpn/options.h | 4 - src/openvpn/ssl.c | 240 +++++----------------------- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 19 +-- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 1 - 11 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 268 deletions(-)doc/doxygen/doc_control_processor.h +1
-5@@ -175,11 +175,7 @@* appropriate messages to be sent. * * @par Functions which control data channel key generation -* - Key method 1 key exchange functions: -* - \c key_method_1_write(), generates and processes key material to -* be sent to the remote OpenVPN peer. -* - \c key_method_1_read(), processes key material received from the -* remote OpenVPN peer. +* - Key method 1 key exchange functions were removed from OpenVPN 2.5 * - Key method 2 key exchange functions: * - \c key_method_2_write(), generates and processes key material to * be sent to the remote OpenVPN peer. doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h +1
-5@@ -131,11 +131,7 @@ S_ACTIVE S_ACTIVE* control_processor Control Channel Processor module's\endlink \c * tls_process() function and control the %key generation and exchange * process as follows: -* - %Key method 1: -* - \c key_method_1_write(): generate random material locally, and load -* as "sending" keys. -* - \c key_method_1_read(): read random material received from remote -* peer, and load as "receiving" keys. +* - %Key method 1 has been removed in OpenVPN 2.5 * - %Key method 2: * - \c key_method_2_write(): generate random material locally, and if * in server mode generate %key expansion. doc/doxygen/doc_protocol_overview.h +1
-1@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@* * @subsection network_protocol_control_plaintext Structure of plaintext control channel messages * -* - %Key method 1: +* - %Key method 1 (support removed in OpenVPN 2.5): * - Cipher %key length in bytes (1 byte). * - Cipher %key (n bytes). * - HMAC %key length in bytes (1 byte). src/openvpn/forward.c +1
-1@@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@ process_incoming_link_part1(struct context *c, struct link_socket_info *lsi, boo floated, &ad_start)) {/* Restore pre-NCP frame parameters */ -if (is_hard_reset (opcode, c->options.key_method)) +if (is_hard_reset_method2 (opcode)) { c->c2.frame = c->c2.frame_initial;#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT src/openvpn/helper.c +0
-5@@ -490,11 +490,6 @@ helper_client_server(struct options *o)*/ if (o->client) { -if (o->key_method !=2 ) - { -msg (M_USAGE ,"--client requires --key-method 2" ); - } - o->pull = true; o->tls_client = true; }src/openvpn/init.c +0
-1@@ -2852,7 +2852,6 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) to.ssl_ctx = c->c1.ks.ssl_ctx; to.key_type = c->c1.ks.key_type; to.server = options->tls_server; - to.key_method = options->key_method; to.replay = options->replay; to.replay_window = options->replay_window; to.replay_time = options->replay_time;src/openvpn/options.c +1
-34@@ -881,7 +881,6 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc)#ifdef ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE o->use_prediction_resistance = false;#endif - o->key_method =2 ; o->tls_timeout =2 ; o->renegotiate_bytes =-1 ; o->renegotiate_seconds =3600 ;@@ -1719,7 +1718,6 @@ show_settings(const struct options *o)SHOW_BOOL (tls_server);SHOW_BOOL (tls_client); -SHOW_INT (key_method);SHOW_STR_INLINE (ca_file);SHOW_STR (ca_path);SHOW_STR (dh_file);@@ -2380,10 +2378,6 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, const struct connec {msg (M_USAGE ,"--ccd-exclusive must be used with --client-config-dir" ); } -if (options->key_method !=2 ) - { -msg (M_USAGE ,"--mode server requires --key-method 2" ); - }if (options->auth_token_generate && !options->renegotiate_seconds) { msg(M_USAGE, "--auth-gen-token needs a non-infinite "@@ -2550,13 +2544,6 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, const struct connec "may accept clients which do not present a certificate"); } -if (options->key_method ==1 ) - { -msg (M_WARN ,"WARNING: --key-method 1 is deprecated and will be removed " -"in OpenVPN 2.5. By default --key-method 2 will be used if not set " -"in the configuration file, which is the recommended approach." ); - } -const int tls_version_max = (options->ssl_flags >>SSLF_TLS_VERSION_MAX_SHIFT ) &SSLF_TLS_VERSION_MAX_MASK ;@@ -2798,7 +2785,6 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, const struct connecMUST_BE_UNDEF (push_peer_info);MUST_BE_UNDEF (tls_exit);MUST_BE_UNDEF (crl_file); -MUST_BE_UNDEF (key_method);MUST_BE_UNDEF (ns_cert_type);MUST_BE_UNDEF (remote_cert_ku[0 ]);MUST_BE_UNDEF (remote_cert_eku);@@ -3827,10 +3813,7 @@ options_string(const struct options *o,* tls-auth/tls-crypt does not match. Removing tls-auth here would * break stuff, so leaving that in place. */ -if (o->key_method >1 ) - { -buf_printf (&out,",key-method %d" , o->key_method); - } +buf_printf (&out,",key-method %d" ,KEY_METHOD_2 ); }if (remote)@@ -8476,22 +8459,6 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->tls_crypt_v2_verify_script = p[1 ]; } -else if (streq (p[0 ],"key-method" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) - { -int key_method; - -VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); - key_method =atoi (p[1 ]); -if (key_method <KEY_METHOD_MIN || key_method >KEY_METHOD_MAX ) - { -msg (msglevel,"key_method parameter (%d) must be >= %d and <= %d" , - key_method, -KEY_METHOD_MIN , -KEY_METHOD_MAX ); - goto err; - } - options->key_method = key_method; - }else if (streq (p[0 ],"x509-track" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL );src/openvpn/options.h +0
-4@@ -572,10 +572,6 @@ struct options#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI const char *cryptoapi_cert;#endif - -/* data channel key exchange method */ -int key_method; -/* Per-packet timeout on control channel */ int tls_timeout;src/openvpn/ssl.c +35
-191@@ -861,23 +861,12 @@ print_key_id(struct tls_multi *multi, struct gc_arena *gc) }bool -is_hard_reset (int op,int key_method) +is_hard_reset_method2 (int op) { -if (!key_method || key_method ==1 ) +if (op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 + || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 ) { -if (op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 ) - { -return true; - } - } - -if (!key_method || key_method >=2 ) - { -if (op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 - || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 ) - { -return true; - } +return true; }return false;@@ -1097,23 +1086,14 @@ tls_session_init(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) }/* Are we a TLS server or client? */ -ASSERT (session->opt->key_method >=1 ); -if (session->opt->key_method ==1 ) +if (session->opt->server) { - session->initial_opcode = session->opt->server ? -P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 :P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 ; + session->initial_opcode =P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ; } -else /* session->opt->key_method >= 2 */ +else { -if (session->opt->server) - { - session->initial_opcode =P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ; - } -else - { - session->initial_opcode = session->opt->tls_crypt_v2 ? -P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 :P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 ; - } + session->initial_opcode = session->opt->tls_crypt_v2 ? +P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 :P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 ; }/* Initialize control channel authentication parameters */ @@ -2225,52 +2205,6 @@ read_string_alloc(struct buffer *buf)return str; } -/* -* Handle the reading and writing of key data to and from -* the TLS control channel (cleartext). -*/ - -static bool -key_method_1_write (struct buffer *buf,struct tls_session *session) -{ -struct key key; -struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ];/* primary key */ - -ASSERT (session->opt->key_method ==1 ); -ASSERT (buf_init (buf,0 )); - -generate_key_random (&key, &session->opt->key_type); -if (!check_key (&key, &session->opt->key_type)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: Bad encrypting key generated" ); -return false; - } - -if (!write_key (&key, &session->opt->key_type, buf)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: write_key failed" ); -return false; - } - -init_key_ctx (&ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi.encrypt, &key, - &session->opt->key_type,OPENVPN_OP_ENCRYPT , -"Data Channel Encrypt" ); -secure_memzero (&key,sizeof (key)); - -/* send local options string */ - { -const char *local_options =local_options_string (session); -const int optlen =strlen (local_options) +1 ; -if (!buf_write (buf, local_options, optlen)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: KM1 write options failed" ); -return false; - } - } - -return true; -} -static bool push_peer_info (struct buffer *buf,struct tls_session *session) {@@ -2312,7 +2246,7 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)* push request, also signal that the client wants * to get push-reply messages without without requiring a round * trip for a push request message*/ -if (session->opt->pull) +if (session->opt->pull) { iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_REQUEST_PUSH ; }@@ -2389,12 +2323,15 @@ error:return ret; } +/** +* Handle the writing of key data, peer-info, username/password, OCC +* to the TLS control channel (cleartext). +*/ static bool key_method_2_write (struct buffer *buf,struct tls_session *session) {struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ];/* primary key */ -ASSERT (session->opt->key_method ==2 );ASSERT (buf_init (buf,0 ));/* write a uint32 0 */ @@ -2404,7 +2341,7 @@ key_method_2_write(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session) }/* write key_method + flags */ -if (!buf_write_u8 (buf, (session->opt->key_method &KEY_METHOD_MASK ))) +if (!buf_write_u8 (buf,KEY_METHOD_2 )) { goto error; }@@ -2506,73 +2443,15 @@ error:return false; } -static bool -key_method_1_read (struct buffer *buf,struct tls_session *session) -{ -int status; -struct key key; -struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ];/* primary key */ - -ASSERT (session->opt->key_method ==1 ); - -if (!session->verified) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: Certificate verification failed (key-method 1)" ); - goto error; - } - - status =read_key (&key, &session->opt->key_type, buf); -if (status !=1 ) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: Error reading data channel key from plaintext buffer" ); - goto error; - } - -if (!check_key (&key, &session->opt->key_type)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: Bad decrypting key received from peer" ); - goto error; - } - -if (buf->len <1 ) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: Missing options string" ); - goto error; - } - -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC -/* compare received remote options string -* with our locally computed options string */ -if (!session->opt->disable_occ - && !options_cmp_equal_safe ((char *)BPTR (buf), session->opt->remote_options, buf->len)) - { -options_warning_safe ((char *)BPTR (buf), session->opt->remote_options, buf->len); - } -#endif - -buf_clear (buf); - -init_key_ctx (&ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi.decrypt, &key, - &session->opt->key_type,OPENVPN_OP_DECRYPT , -"Data Channel Decrypt" ); -secure_memzero (&key,sizeof (key)); - ks->authenticated =KS_AUTH_TRUE ; -return true; - -error: -buf_clear (buf); -secure_memzero (&key,sizeof (key)); -return false; -} - +/** +* Handle reading key data, peer-info, username/password, OCC +* from the TLS control channel (cleartext). +*/ static bool key_method_2_read (struct buffer *buf,struct tls_multi *multi,struct tls_session *session) {struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ];/* primary key */ -int key_method_flags;bool username_status, password_status;struct gc_arena gc =gc_new ();@@ -2582,8 +2461,6 @@ key_method_2_read(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_sessio/* allocate temporary objects */ ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (options, char,TLS_OPTIONS_LEN , &gc); -ASSERT (session->opt->key_method ==2 ); -/* discard leading uint32 */ if (!buf_advance (buf,4 )) {@@ -2593,7 +2470,7 @@ key_method_2_read(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_sessio }/* get key method */ - key_method_flags =buf_read_u8 (buf); +int key_method_flags =buf_read_u8 (buf);if ((key_method_flags &KEY_METHOD_MASK ) !=2 ) { msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,@@ -3003,23 +2880,9 @@ tls_process(struct tls_multi *multi,if (!buf->len && ((ks->state ==S_START && !session->opt->server) || (ks->state ==S_GOT_KEY && session->opt->server))) { -if (session->opt->key_method ==1 ) - { -if (!key_method_1_write (buf, session)) - { - goto error; - } - } -else if (session->opt->key_method ==2 ) - { -if (!key_method_2_write (buf, session)) - { - goto error; - } - } -else +if (!key_method_2_write (buf, session)) { -ASSERT (0 ); + goto error; } state_change = true;@@ -3033,23 +2896,9 @@ tls_process(struct tls_multi *multi, && ((ks->state == S_SENT_KEY && !session->opt->server) || (ks->state == S_START && session->opt->server))) { -if (session->opt->key_method ==1 ) - { -if (!key_method_1_read (buf, session)) - { - goto error; - } - } -else if (session->opt->key_method ==2 ) - { -if (!key_method_2_read (buf, multi, session)) - { - goto error; - } - } -else +if (!key_method_2_read (buf, multi, session)) { -ASSERT (0 ); + goto error; } state_change = true;@@ -3463,6 +3312,11 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,/* verify legal opcode */ if (op <P_FIRST_OPCODE || op >P_LAST_OPCODE ) { +if (op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 + || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 ) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"Peer tried unsupported key-method 1" ); + }msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: unknown opcode received from %s op=%d" ,print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), op);@@ -3470,14 +3324,12 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, }/* hard reset ? */ -if (is_hard_reset (op,0 )) +if (is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) {/* verify client -> server or server -> client connection */ -if (((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 - || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 +if (((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 ) && !multi->opt.server) - || ((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 - || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ) && multi->opt.server)) + || ((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ) && multi->opt.server)) { msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: client->client or server->server connection attempted from %s",@@ -3539,22 +3391,14 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, }/* -* Initial packet received. +* Hard reset and session id does not match any session in +* multi->session: Possible initial packet */ - -if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset (op,0 )) +if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) {struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE ];struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; -if (!is_hard_reset (op, multi->opt.key_method)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS ERROR: initial packet local/remote key_method mismatch, local key_method=%d, op=%s" , - multi->opt.key_method, -packet_opcode_name (op)); - goto error; - } -/* * If we have no session currently in progress, the initial packet will * open a new session in TM_ACTIVE rather than TM_UNTRUSTED.
src/openvpn/ssl.c tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, · line 3442
Quoted 6 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +2
-1@@ -3594,7 +3438,11 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, } } -if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset (op,0 )) +/* +* If we detected new session in the last if block, i has
block, i has ->
block, it has
Quoted 80 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +3
-8+* changed to TM_ACTIVE, so check the condition again. +*/ +if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) {/* * No match with existing sessions, @@ -3614,14 +3462,6 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, goto error; } -if (!is_hard_reset (op, multi->opt.key_method)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS ERROR: new session local/remote key_method mismatch, local key_method=%d, op=%s" , - multi->opt.key_method, -packet_opcode_name (op)); - goto error; - } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, session->opt)) {src/openvpn/ssl.h +8
-11@@ -66,8 +66,10 @@/* indicates key_method >= 2 and client-specific tls-crypt key */ #define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 10/* initial key from client, forget previous state */ -/* define the range of legal opcodes */ -#define P_FIRST_OPCODE 1 +/* define the range of legal opcodes +* Since we do no longer support key-method 1 we consider +* the v1 op codes invalid */ +#define P_FIRST_OPCODE 3#define P_LAST_OPCODE 10/* @@ -118,11 +120,7 @@/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN" -/* -* Range of key exchange methods -*/ -#define KEY_METHOD_MIN 1 -#define KEY_METHOD_MAX 2 +#define KEY_METHOD_2 2/* key method taken from lower 4 bits */ #define KEY_METHOD_MASK 0x0F@@ -594,12 +592,11 @@ void show_tls_performance_stats(void);void extract_x509_field_test (void );/** -* Given a key_method, return true if opcode represents the required form of -* hard_reset. +* Given a key_method, return true if opcode represents the one of the +* hard_reset op codes for key-method 2 * -* If key_method == 0, return true if any form of hard reset is used. */ -bool is_hard_reset (int op,int key_method); +bool is_hard_reset_method2 (int op);void delayed_auth_pass_purge (void );src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +0
-1@@ -262,7 +262,6 @@ struct tls_options#endif /* from command line */ -int key_method;bool replay;bool single_session;#ifdef ENABLE_OCC
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v3 5/9] Remove key-method 1
In reply to Arne SchwabeQuoted 9 lines · Arne Schwabe
Key-method 1 is only needed to talk to pre OpenVPN 2.0 clients.
Patch V2: Fix style. Make V1 op codes illegal, remove all code handling
v1 op codes and give a good warning message if we encounter them in the legal op codes pre-check.Patch V3: Add a bit more comments in the existing methods.
Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Quoted 14 lines
--- doc/doxygen/doc_control_processor.h | 6 +- doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h | 6 +- doc/doxygen/doc_protocol_overview.h | 2 +- src/openvpn/forward.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/helper.c | 5 - src/openvpn/init.c | 1 - src/openvpn/options.c | 35 +--- src/openvpn/options.h | 4 - src/openvpn/ssl.c | 240 +++++----------------------- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 19 +-- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 1 - 11 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 268 deletions(-)
This LGTM now. Thanks for the updates and adjustments!
I've done light local build testing (applying just this patch on git master commit 08469ca1eccc). Builds fine, 'make check' looks good.
Signature · 4 lines
kind regards, David Sommerseth OpenVPN Inc
[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Remove key-method 1
In reply to Arne SchwabeYour patch has been applied to the master branch.
I have run a t_client test on FreeBSD/OpenSSL and Linux/mbedTLS, and a full server side test. Just to be sure. This is surprisingly large changes in crypto code... the changes look good, but...!
All tests pass :-)
Test sets succeeded: 1 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 2 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 3 4 5 5a 5b 5c 5v1 5v2 5v3 5w1 5w2 5w3 5w4 5x1 5x2 5x3 5x4 6 7 7x 8 8a 9 2f 4b. Test sets failed: none.
I have ignored that hunk from the patch:
@@ -2312,7 +2246,7 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session +*session)
* push request, also signal that the client wants
* to get push-reply messages without without requiring a round
* trip for a push request message*/
- if(session->opt->pull)
+ if (session->opt->pull)
{
iv_proto |= IV_PROTO_REQUEST_PUSH;
}because it fixes whitespace in code that is not there yet - so I'll fix the whitespace on the fly when applying *that* patch (if we're not at v8 by then, with the whitespace fix included).
commit 36bef1b52b49ebbc3790635be230e2f30f0532a7
Author: Arne Schwabe Date: Tue Jul 21 12:01:28 2020 +0200
Remove key-method 1
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: David Sommerseth <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg20516.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
PATCH 6/9 Remove ENABLE_OCC #define
In reply to Arne SchwabeCommit 037669f3dd already made occ being unconditionally on. This commit only removes the #ifdefs
--- src/openvpn/forward.c | 8 -------- src/openvpn/init.c | 16 +--------------- src/openvpn/occ.c | 9 --------- src/openvpn/occ.h | 3 --- src/openvpn/openvpn.h | 7 +------ src/openvpn/options.c | 30 ------------------------------ src/openvpn/options.h | 8 -------- src/openvpn/sig.c | 6 ------ src/openvpn/sig.h | 3 --- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 21 +-------------------- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 4 ---- src/openvpn/syshead.h | 5 ----- 12 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/forward.c +0 -8
@@ -822,7 +822,6 @@ process_coarse_timers(struct context *c) }#endif -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC /* Should we send an OCC_REQUEST message? */ check_send_occ_req (c);
@@ -834,7 +833,6 @@ process_coarse_timers(struct context *c) {process_explicit_exit_notification_timer_wakeup (c); } -#endif /* Should we ping the remote? */ check_ping_send (c);
@@ -983,14 +981,12 @@ read_incoming_link(struct context *c) }else { -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC if (event_timeout_defined (&c->c2.explicit_exit_notification_interval)) {msg (D_STREAM_ERRORS ,"Connection reset during exit notification period, ignoring [%d]" , status);management_sleep (1 ); }else -#endif {register_signal (c,SIGUSR1 ,"connection-reset" );/* SOFT-SIGUSR1 -- TCP connection reset */ msg (D_STREAM_ERRORS ,"Connection reset, restarting [%d]" , status);
@@ -1214,13 +1210,11 @@ process_incoming_link_part2(struct context *c, struct link_socket_info *lsi, con c->c2.buf.len =0 ;/* drop packet */ } -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC /* Did we just receive an OCC packet? */ if (is_occ_msg (&c->c2.buf)) {process_received_occ_msg (c); } -#endif buffer_turnover (orig_buf, &c->c2.to_tun, &c->c2.buf, &c->c2.buffers->read_link_buf);
@@ -1992,10 +1986,8 @@ pre_select(struct context *c)/* check for incoming configuration info on the control channel */ check_incoming_control_channel (c); -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC /* Should we send an OCC message? */ check_send_occ_msg (c); -#endif #ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT /* Should we deliver a datagram fragment to remote? */
src/openvpn/init.c +1 -15
@@ -1419,7 +1419,6 @@ do_init_timers(struct context *c, bool deferred)/* initialize connection establishment timer */ event_timeout_init (&c->c2.wait_for_connect,1 , now); -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC /* initialize occ timers */ if (c->options.occ
@@ -1433,7 +1432,6 @@ do_init_timers(struct context *c, bool deferred) {event_timeout_init (&c->c2.occ_mtu_load_test_interval,OCC_MTU_LOAD_INTERVAL_SECONDS , now); } -#endif /* initialize packet_id persistence timer */ if (c->options.packet_id_file)
@@ -2279,7 +2277,6 @@ do_deferred_options(struct context *c, const unsigned int found)msg (D_PUSH ,"OPTIONS IMPORT: timers and/or timeouts modified" ); } -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC if (found &OPT_P_EXPLICIT_NOTIFY ) {if (!proto_is_udp (c->options.ce.proto) && c->options.ce.explicit_exit_notification)
@@ -2292,7 +2289,6 @@ do_deferred_options(struct context *c, const unsigned int found)msg (D_PUSH ,"OPTIONS IMPORT: explicit notify parm(s) modified" ); } } -#endif #ifdef USE_COMP if (found &OPT_P_COMP )
@@ -2901,9 +2897,7 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) to.xmit_hold = true; } -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC to.disable_occ = !options->occ; -#endif to.verify_command = options->tls_verify; to.verify_export_cert = options->tls_export_cert;
@@ -3193,7 +3187,7 @@ do_init_frame(struct context *c) c->c2.frame_fragment_initial = c->c2.frame_fragment;#endif -#if defined(ENABLE_FRAGMENT ) && defined(ENABLE_OCC ) +#if defined(ENABLE_FRAGMENT )/* * MTU advisories */
@@ -3478,7 +3472,6 @@ do_print_data_channel_mtu_parms(struct context *c)#endif } -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC /* * Get local and remote options compatibility strings. */
@@ -3510,7 +3503,6 @@ do_compute_occ_strings(struct context *c)gc_free (&gc); } -#endif /* ifdef ENABLE_OCC */ /* * These things can only be executed once per program instantiation.
@@ -3586,7 +3578,6 @@ do_close_tls(struct context *c) c->c2.tls_multi =NULL ; } -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC /* free options compatibility strings */ if (c->c2.options_string_local) {
@@ -3597,7 +3588,6 @@ do_close_tls(struct context *c)free (c->c2.options_string_remote); } c->c2.options_string_local = c->c2.options_string_remote =NULL ; -#endif if (c->c2.pulled_options_state) {
@@ -4256,13 +4246,11 @@ init_instance(struct context *c, const struct env_set *env, const unsigned int fdo_open_ifconfig_pool_persist (c); } -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC /* reset OCC state */ if (c->mode ==CM_P2P || child) { c->c2.occ_op =occ_reset_op (); } -#endif /* our wait-for-i/o objects, different for posix vs. win32 */ if (c->mode ==CM_P2P )
@@ -4362,13 +4350,11 @@ init_instance(struct context *c, const struct env_set *env, const unsigned int f/* print MTU info */ do_print_data_channel_mtu_parms (c); -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC /* get local and remote options compatibility strings */ if (c->mode ==CM_P2P || child) {do_compute_occ_strings (c); } -#endif /* initialize output speed limiter */ if (c->mode ==CM_P2P )
src/openvpn/occ.c +0 -9
@@ -29,8 +29,6 @@#include "syshead.h" -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC -#include "occ.h" #include "forward.h" #include "memdbg.h"
@@ -424,10 +422,3 @@ process_received_occ_msg(struct context *c) } c->c2.buf.len =0 ;/* don't pass packet on */ } - -#else /* ifdef ENABLE_OCC */ -static void -dummy (void ) -{ -} -#endif /* ifdef ENABLE_OCC */
src/openvpn/occ.h +0 -3
@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@#ifndef OCC_H #define OCC_H -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC -#include "forward.h" /* OCC_STRING_SIZE must be set to sizeof (occ_magic) */
@@ -155,5 +153,4 @@ check_send_occ_msg(struct context *c) } } -#endif /* ifdef ENABLE_OCC */ #endif /* ifndef OCC_H */
src/openvpn/openvpn.h +1 -6
@@ -325,7 +325,6 @@ struct context_2struct event_timeout inactivity_interval;int inactivity_bytes; -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC /* the option strings must match across peers */ char *options_string_local;char *options_string_remote;
@@ -333,7 +332,6 @@ struct context_2int occ_op;/* INIT to -1 */ int occ_n_tries;struct event_timeout occ_interval; -#endif /* * Keep track of maximum packet size received so far
@@ -345,13 +343,12 @@ struct context_2int max_send_size_local;/* max packet size sent */ int max_send_size_remote;/* max packet size sent by remote */ -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC +/* remote wants us to send back a load test packet of this size */ int occ_mtu_load_size;struct event_timeout occ_mtu_load_test_interval;int occ_mtu_load_n_tries; -#endif /* * TLS-mode crypto objects.
@@ -438,13 +435,11 @@ struct context_2/* indicates that the do_up_delay function has run */ bool do_up_ran; -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC /* indicates that we have received a SIGTERM when * options->explicit_exit_notification is enabled, * but we have not exited yet */ time_t explicit_exit_notification_time_wait;struct event_timeout explicit_exit_notification_interval; -#endif /* environmental variables to pass to scripts */ struct env_set *es;
src/openvpn/options.c +0 -30
@@ -277,9 +277,7 @@ static const char usage_message[] =" 'no' -- Never send DF (Don't Fragment) frames\n" " 'maybe' -- Use per-route hints\n" " 'yes' -- Always DF (Don't Fragment)\n" -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC"--mtu-test : Empirically measure and report MTU.\n" -#endif #ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT"--fragment max : Enable internal datagram fragmentation so that no UDP\n" " datagrams are sent which are larger than max bytes.\n"
@@ -350,9 +348,7 @@ static const char usage_message[] ="--status file n : Write operational status to file every n seconds.\n" "--status-version [n] : Choose the status file format version number.\n" " Currently, n can be 1, 2, or 3 (default=1).\n" -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC"--disable-occ : Disable options consistency check between peers.\n" -#endif #ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG"--gremlin mask : Special stress testing mode (for debugging only).\n" #endif
@@ -522,10 +518,8 @@ static const char usage_message[] ="--allow-recursive-routing : When this option is set, OpenVPN will not drop\n" " incoming tun packets with same destination as host.\n"#endif /* if P2MP */ -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC "--explicit-exit-notify [n] : On exit/restart, send exit signal to\n" " server/remote. n = # of retries, default=1.\n" -#endif "\n" "Data Channel Encryption Options (must be compatible between peers):\n" "(These options are meaningful for both Static Key & TLS-mode)\n"
@@ -832,9 +826,7 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc) o->resolve_retry_seconds =RESOLV_RETRY_INFINITE ; o->resolve_in_advance = false; o->proto_force =-1 ; -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC o->occ = true; -#endif #ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT o->management_log_history_cache =250 ; o->management_echo_buffer_size =100 ;
@@ -1483,9 +1475,7 @@ show_connection_entry(const struct connection_entry *o)#endif SHOW_INT (mssfix); -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC SHOW_INT (explicit_exit_notification); -#endif SHOW_STR (tls_auth_file); SHOW_PARM(key_direction, keydirection2ascii(o->key_direction, false, true),
@@ -1579,9 +1569,7 @@ show_settings(const struct options *o)#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER SHOW_INT (shaper);#endif -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC SHOW_INT (mtu_test); -#endif SHOW_BOOL (mlock);
@@ -1633,9 +1621,7 @@ show_settings(const struct options *o)SHOW_INT (status_file_version);SHOW_INT (status_file_update_freq); -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC SHOW_BOOL (occ); -#endif SHOW_INT (rcvbuf);SHOW_INT (sndbuf);#if defined(TARGET_LINUX ) &&HAVE_DECL_SO_MARK
@@ -2079,12 +2065,10 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, const struct connecmsg (M_USAGE ,"only one of --tun-mtu or --link-mtu may be defined (note that --ifconfig implies --link-mtu %d)" ,LINK_MTU_DEFAULT ); } -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC if (!proto_is_udp (ce->proto) && options->mtu_test) {msg (M_USAGE ,"--mtu-test only makes sense with --proto udp" ); } -#endif /* will we be pulling options from server? */ #if P2MP
@@ -2217,12 +2201,10 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, const struct connec }#endif -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC if (!proto_is_udp (ce->proto) && ce->explicit_exit_notification) {msg (M_USAGE ,"--explicit-exit-notify can only be used with --proto udp" ); } -#endif if (!ce->remote && ce->proto ==PROTO_TCP_CLIENT ) {
@@ -3587,9 +3569,6 @@ pre_pull_restore(struct options *o, struct gc_arena *gc) }#endif /* if P2MP */ - -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC -/** * Calculate the link-mtu to advertise to our peer. The actual value is not * relevant, because we will possibly perform data channel cipher negotiation
@@ -3619,7 +3598,6 @@ calc_options_string_link_mtu(const struct options *o, const struct frame *frame) }return link_mtu; } -/* * Build an options string to represent data channel encryption options. * This string must match exactly between peers. The keysize is checked
@@ -4027,8 +4005,6 @@ options_string_version(const char *s, struct gc_arena *gc)return BSTR (&out); } -#endif /* ENABLE_OCC */ -char *options_string_extract_option (const char *options_string,const char *opt_name,struct gc_arena *gc)
@@ -6028,13 +6004,11 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_MTU |OPT_P_CONNECTION ); options->ce.mtu_discover_type =translate_mtu_discover_type_name (p[1 ]); } -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC else if (streq (p[0 ],"mtu-test" ) && !p[1 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->mtu_test = true; } -#endif else if (streq (p[0 ],"nice" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_NICE );
@@ -6345,7 +6319,6 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_TIMER ); options->ping_timer_remote = true; } -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC else if (streq (p[0 ],"explicit-exit-notify" ) && !p[2 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL |OPT_P_CONNECTION |OPT_P_EXPLICIT_NOTIFY );
@@ -6358,7 +6331,6 @@ add_option(struct options *options, options->ce.explicit_exit_notification =1 ; } } -#endif else if (streq (p[0 ],"persist-tun" ) && !p[1 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_PERSIST );
@@ -6682,13 +6654,11 @@ add_option(struct options *options, } } -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC else if (streq (p[0 ],"disable-occ" ) && !p[1 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->occ = false; } -#endif #if P2MP else if (streq(p[0], "server") && p[1] && p[2] && !p[4]) {
src/openvpn/options.h +0 -8
@@ -262,9 +262,7 @@ struct optionsint proto_force; -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC bool mtu_test; -#endif #ifdef ENABLE_MEMSTATS char *memstats_fn;
@@ -375,10 +373,8 @@ struct optionsbool allow_pull_fqdn;/* as a client, allow server to push a FQDN for certain parameters */ struct client_nat_option_list *client_nat; -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC /* Enable options consistency check between peers */ bool occ; -#endif #ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT const char *management_addr;
@@ -756,8 +752,6 @@ void show_settings(const struct options *o);bool string_defined_equal (const char *s1,const char *s2); -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC -const char *options_string_version (const char *s,struct gc_arena *gc); char *options_string(const struct options *o,
@@ -775,8 +769,6 @@ bool options_cmp_equal(char *actual, const char *expected);void options_warning (char *actual,const char *expected); -#endif -/** * Given an OpenVPN options string, extract the value of an option. *
src/openvpn/sig.c +0 -6
@@ -330,7 +330,6 @@ print_status(const struct context *c, struct status_output *so)gc_free (&gc); } -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC /* * Handle the triggering and time-wait of explicit * exit notification.
@@ -367,7 +366,6 @@ process_explicit_exit_notification_timer_wakeup(struct context *c) } } } -#endif /* ifdef ENABLE_OCC */ /* * Process signals
@@ -395,14 +393,12 @@ static bool process_sigterm(struct context *c) {bool ret = true; -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC if (c->options.ce.explicit_exit_notification && !c->c2.explicit_exit_notification_time_wait) {process_explicit_exit_notification_init (c); ret = false; } -#endif return ret; }
@@ -415,7 +411,6 @@ static bool ignore_restart_signals(struct context *c) {bool ret = false; -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC if ( (c->sig->signal_received ==SIGUSR1 || c->sig->signal_received ==SIGHUP ) &&event_timeout_defined (&c->c2.explicit_exit_notification_interval) ) {
@@ -434,7 +429,6 @@ ignore_restart_signals(struct context *c) ret = false; } } -#endif return ret; }
src/openvpn/sig.h +0 -3
@@ -81,11 +81,8 @@ bool process_signal(struct context *c);void register_signal (struct context *c,int sig,const char *text); -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC void process_explicit_exit_notification_timer_wakeup (struct context *c); -#endif -#ifdef _WIN32 static inline void
src/openvpn/ssl.c +1 -20
@@ -64,21 +64,6 @@#include "memdbg.h" -#ifndef ENABLE_OCC -static const char ssl_default_options_string[] ="V0 UNDEF" ; -#endif - - -static inline const char * -local_options_string (const struct tls_session *session) -{ -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC -return session->opt->local_options; -#else -return ssl_default_options_string; -#endif -} -#ifdef MEASURE_TLS_HANDSHAKE_STATS static int tls_handshake_success;/* GLOBAL */
@@ -1319,11 +1304,9 @@ tls_multi_init_set_options(struct tls_multi *multi,const char *local, const char *remote) { -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC/* initialize options string */ multi->opt.local_options = local; multi->opt.remote_options = remote; -#endif }/*
@@ -2350,7 +2333,7 @@ key_method_2_write(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)/* write options string */ { -if (!write_string (buf,local_options_string (session),TLS_OPTIONS_LEN )) +if (!write_string (buf, session->opt->local_options,TLS_OPTIONS_LEN )) { goto error; }
@@ -2543,7 +2526,6 @@ key_method_2_read(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_sessioverify_final_auth_checks (multi, session); } -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC /* check options consistency */ if (!session->opt->disable_occ && !options_cmp_equal (options, session->opt->remote_options))
@@ -2555,7 +2537,6 @@ key_method_2_read(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_sessio ks->authenticated =KS_AUTH_FALSE ; } } -#endif buf_clear (buf);
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +0 -4
@@ -254,19 +254,15 @@ struct tls_options/* if true, don't xmit until first packet from peer is received */ bool xmit_hold; -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC /* local and remote options strings * that must match between client and server */ const char *local_options;const char *remote_options; -#endif /* from command line */ bool replay;bool single_session; -#ifdef ENABLE_OCC bool disable_occ; -#endif int mode;bool pull;int push_peer_info_detail;
src/openvpn/syshead.h +0 -5
@@ -569,11 +569,6 @@ socket_defined(const socket_descriptor_t sd)#define UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT 0#endif -/* -* Should we include OCC (options consistency check) code? -*/ -#define ENABLE_OCC -/* * Should we include NTLM proxy functionality */
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 6/9] Remove ENABLE_OCC #define
Hi,
Quoted 4 lines · Arne Schwabe
Commit
037669f3ddalready made occ being unconditionally on. This commit only removes the #ifdefsSigned-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
This generally looks good, and does what it says on the tin, so
I have tried to apply it out of sequence, but that leads to compile-time errors
ld: ssl.o: in function `key_method_1_write':
.../ssl.c:2239: undefined reference to `local_options_string'
... so the "remove key-method 1" patch must be applied first.
(This is not a show-stopper, just an explanation why I ACK this and not merge it right away)
gert
Signature · 6 lines
"If was one thing all people took for granted, was conviction that if you
feed honest figures into a computer, honest figures come out. Never doubted
it myself till I met a computer with a sense of humor."
Robert A. Heinlein, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress
Gert Doering - Munich, Germany [email protected]...[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Remove ENABLE_OCC #define
In reply to Arne SchwabeNOW I can finally merge this, since key-method v1 is gone and this compiles without unresolveds \o/
Stared-at-code, test compiled, ship.
Your patch has been applied to the master branch.
commit ba66faad5608233f792c3679ebade09ff324a4b3
Author: Arne Schwabe Date: Fri Jul 17 15:47:36 2020 +0200
Remove ENABLE_OCC #define
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg20442.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
PATCH 7/9 Avoid sending --cipher to clients not supporting NCP
In reply to Arne SchwabeThe NCP rework introduced a regression of sending a --cipher command as part of the push message when the client does not support NCP. This is is more a cosmetic issue since the client will log that as warning in the log and ignore it.
--- src/openvpn/push.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/push.c +8 -2
@@ -472,9 +472,15 @@ prepare_push_reply(struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc,/* * Push the selected cipher, at this point the cipher has been -* already negotiated and been fixed +* already negotiated and been fixed. +* +* We avoid pushing the cipher to clients not supporting NCP +* to avoid error messages in their logs */ -push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"cipher %s" , o->ciphername); +if (tls_peer_supports_ncp (c->c2.tls_multi->peer_info)) + { +push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"cipher %s" , o->ciphername); + }return true; }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Avoid sending --cipher to clients not supporting NCP
Verify by staring at the testbed. 2.2/2.3 clients or 2.4 or master with --ncp-disable won't get cipher pushed, the rest will.
Works!
Your patch has been applied to the master branch.
commit 4b59e2644a978074f0eed492d6541ba7b30b01a7
Author: Arne Schwabe Date: Fri Jul 17 15:47:37 2020 +0200
Avoid sending --cipher to clients not supporting NCP
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg20437.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
PATCH 8/9 Rename ncp-ciphers to data-ciphers
In reply to Arne SchwabeThe change in name signals that data-ciphers is the preferred way to configure data channel (and not --cipher). The data prefix is chosen to avoid ambiguity and make it distinct from tls-cipher for the TLS ciphers.
--- Changes.rst | 13 ++++++++++--- doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst | 11 +++++++---- doc/man-sections/server-options.rst | 4 ++-- sample/sample-config-files/client.conf | 2 +- src/openvpn/multi.c | 4 ++-- src/openvpn/options.c | 5 +++-- src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 4 ++-- 7 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
Changes.rst +10 -3
@@ -14,12 +14,19 @@ ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher support channel. Improved Data channel cipher negotiation + The option ``ncp-ciphers`` has been renamed to ``data-ciphers``. + The old name is still accepted. The change in name signals that + ``data-ciphers`` is the preferred way to configure data channel + ciphers and the data prefix is chosen to avoid the ambiguity that + exists with ``--cipher`` for the data cipher and ``tls-cipher`` + for the TLS ciphers. + OpenVPN clients will now signal all supported ciphers from the - ``ncp-ciphers`` option to the server via ``IV_CIPHERS``. OpenVPN - servers will select the first common cipher from the ``ncp-ciphers`` + ``data-ciphers`` option to the server via ``IV_CIPHERS``. OpenVPN + servers will select the first common cipher from the ``data-ciphers`` list instead of blindly pushing the first cipher of the list. This allows to use a configuration like - ``ncp-ciphers ChaCha20-Poly1305:AES-256-GCM`` on the server that + ``data-ciphers ChaCha20-Poly1305:AES-256-GCM`` on the server that prefers ChaCha20-Poly1305 but uses it only if the client supports it. Asynchronous (deferred) authentication support for auth-pam plugin.
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +7 -4
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. The default is :code:`BF-CBC`, an abbreviation for Blowfish in Cipher Block Chaining mode. When cipher negotiation (NCP) is allowed, OpenVPN 2.4 and newer on both client and server side will automatically - upgrade to :code:`AES-256-GCM`. See ``--ncp-ciphers`` and + upgrade to :code:`AES-256-GCM`. See ``--data-ciphers`` and ``--ncp-disable`` for more details on NCP. Using :code:`BF-CBC` is no longer recommended, because of its 64-bit
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. non-standard key lengths, and a larger key may offer no real guarantee of greater security, or may even reduce security. ---ncp-ciphers cipher-list +--data-ciphers cipher-list Restrict the allowed ciphers to be negotiated to the ciphers in ``cipher-list``. ``cipher-list`` is a colon-separated list of ciphers, and defaults to :code:`AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM`.
@@ -189,9 +189,9 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. Additionally, to allow for more smooth transition, if NCP is enabled, OpenVPN will inherit the cipher of the peer if that cipher is different from the local ``--cipher`` setting, but the peer cipher is one of the - ciphers specified in ``--ncp-ciphers``. E.g. a non-NCP client (<=v2.3, + ciphers specified in ``--data-ciphers``. E.g. a non-NCP client (<=v2.3, or with --ncp-disabled set) connecting to a NCP server (v2.4+) with - ``--cipher BF-CBC`` and ``--ncp-ciphers AES-256-GCM:AES-256-CBC`` set can + ``--cipher BF-CBC`` and ``--data-ciphers AES-256-GCM:AES-256-CBC`` set can either specify ``--cipher BF-CBC`` or ``--cipher AES-256-CBC`` and both will work.
@@ -201,6 +201,9 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. This list is restricted to be 127 chars long after conversion to OpenVPN ciphers. + This option was called ``ncp-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.4 but has been renamed + to ``data-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.5 to more accurately reflect its meaning. + --ncp-disable Disable "Negotiable Crypto Parameters". This completely disables cipher negotiation.
doc/man-sections/server-options.rst +2 -2
@@ -473,8 +473,8 @@ fast hardware. SSL/TLS authentication must be used in this mode. *AES-GCM-128* and *AES-GCM-256*. :code:`IV_CIPHERS=<ncp-ciphers>` - The client pushes the list of configured ciphers with the - ``--ciphers`` option to the server. + The client announces the list of supported ciphers configured with the + ``--data-ciphers`` option to the server. :code:`IV_GUI_VER=<gui_id> <version>` The UI version of a UI if one is running, for example
sample/sample-config-files/client.conf +1 -1
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ tls-auth ta.key 1 # then you must also specify it here. # Note that v2.4 client/server will automatically # negotiate AES-256-GCM in TLS mode. -# See also the ncp-cipher option in the manpage +# See also the data-ciphers option in the manpage cipher AES-256-CBC # Enable compression on the VPN link.
src/openvpn/multi.c +2 -2
@@ -1827,7 +1827,7 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c)else {/* -* Push the first cipher from --ncp-ciphers to the client that +* Push the first cipher from --data-ciphers to the client that * the client announces to be supporting. */ char *push_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(o->ncp_ciphers, o->ciphername,
@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) {msg (M_INFO ,"PUSH: No common cipher between server and " "client. Expect this connection not to work. Server " -"ncp-ciphers: '%s', client supported ciphers '%s'" , +"data-ciphers: '%s', client supported ciphers '%s'" , o->ncp_ciphers, peer_ciphers); } else
src/openvpn/options.c +3 -2
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static const char usage_message[] ="--cipher alg : Encrypt packets with cipher algorithm alg\n" " (default=%s).\n" " Set alg=none to disable encryption.\n" -"--ncp-ciphers list : List of ciphers that are allowed to be negotiated.\n" +"--data-ciphers list : List of ciphers that are allowed to be negotiated.\n" "--ncp-disable : (DEPRECATED) Disable cipher negotiation.\n" "--prng alg [nsl] : For PRNG, use digest algorithm alg, and\n" " nonce_secret_len=nsl. Set alg=none to disable PRNG.\n"
@@ -7866,7 +7866,8 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_NCP |OPT_P_INSTANCE ); options->ciphername = p[1 ]; } -else if (streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) +else if ((streq (p[0 ],"data-ciphers" ) ||streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" )) + && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL |OPT_P_INSTANCE ); options->ncp_ciphers = p[1 ];
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +2 -2
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ mutate_ncp_cipher_list(const char *list, struct gc_arena *gc)const cipher_kt_t *ktc =cipher_kt_get (token);if (!ktc) { -msg (M_WARN ,"Unsupported cipher in --ncp-ciphers: %s" , token); +msg (M_WARN ,"Unsupported cipher in --data-ciphers: %s" , token); error_found = true; }else
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ mutate_ncp_cipher_list(const char *list, struct gc_arena *gc)if (!(buf_forward_capacity (&new_list) >strlen (ovpn_cipher_name) +2 )) { -msg (M_WARN ,"Length of --ncp-ciphers is over the " +msg (M_WARN ,"Length of --data-ciphers is over the " "limit of 127 chars" ); error_found = true; }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 8/9] Rename ncp-ciphers to data-ciphers
Quoted 16 lines · Arne Schwabe
The change in name signals that data-ciphers is the preferred way to configure data channel (and not --cipher). The data prefix is chosen to avoid ambiguity and make it distinct from tls-cipher for the TLS ciphers.
Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>--- Changes.rst | 13 ++++++++++--- doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst | 11 +++++++---- doc/man-sections/server-options.rst | 4 ++-- sample/sample-config-files/client.conf | 2 +- src/openvpn/multi.c | 4 ++-- src/openvpn/options.c | 5 +++-- src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 4 ++-- 7 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
[...snip...]
Quoted 14 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +1
-1@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static const char usage_message[] ="--cipher alg : Encrypt packets with cipher algorithm alg\n" " (default=%s).\n" " Set alg=none to disable encryption.\n" -"--ncp-ciphers list : List of ciphers that are allowed to be negotiated.\n" +"--data-ciphers list : List of ciphers that are allowed to be negotiated.\n" "--ncp-disable : (DEPRECATED) Disable cipher negotiation.\n" "--prng alg [nsl] : For PRNG, use digest algorithm alg, and\n" " nonce_secret_len=nsl. Set alg=none to disable PRNG.\n"
src/openvpn/options.c add_option(struct options *options, · line 7870
Quoted 6 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +2
-1@@ -7866,7 +7866,8 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_NCP |OPT_P_INSTANCE ); options->ciphername = p[1 ]; } -else if (streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) +else if ((streq (p[0 ],"data-ciphers" ) ||streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" )) + && p[1 ] && !p[2 ])
I do agree to using --data-ciphers instead of --ncp-ciphers, that is far more user-friendly naming of this feature. NCP is a more technical "under-the-hood" terminology which users don't really need to relate to, where --data-ciphers better explains what it is used for.
But I do reject NOT adding a deprecation path for --ncp-ciphers. We should support --ncp-ciphers for 1-2 major releases, but after that it should be removed. We have too many options and we certainly should avoid duplicating options with the exact same functionality.
Signature · 4 lines
kind regards, David Sommerseth OpenVPN Inc
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 8/9] Rename ncp-ciphers to data-ciphers
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 12 lines
+++
b/src/openvpn/options.csrc/openvpn/options.c +1
-1@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static const char usage_message[] ="--cipher alg : Encrypt packets with cipher algorithm alg\n" " (default=%s).\n" " Set alg=none to disable encryption.\n" -"--ncp-ciphers list : List of ciphers that are allowed to be negotiated.\n" +"--data-ciphers list : List of ciphers that are allowed to be negotiated.\n" "--ncp-disable : (DEPRECATED) Disable cipher negotiation.\n" "--prng alg [nsl] : For PRNG, use digest algorithm alg, and\n" " nonce_secret_len=nsl. Set alg=none to disable PRNG.\n" src/openvpn/options.c add_option(struct options *options, · line 7870
Quoted 6 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +2
-1@@ -7866,7 +7866,8 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_NCP |OPT_P_INSTANCE ); options->ciphername = p[1 ]; } -else if (streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) +else if ((streq (p[0 ],"data-ciphers" ) ||streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" )) + && p[1 ] && !p[2 ])I do agree to using --data-ciphers instead of --ncp-ciphers, that is far more user-friendly naming of this feature. NCP is a more technical "under-the-hood" terminology which users don't really need to relate to, where --data-ciphers better explains what it is used for.
Quoted 4 lines
But I do reject NOT adding a deprecation path for --ncp-ciphers. We should support --ncp-ciphers for 1-2 major releases, but after that it should be removed. We have too many options and we certainly should avoid duplicating options with the exact same functionality.
This was a deliberate decision. We really want to people to move towards ncp and putting another hurdle with having an option that works better on but gives a warning and a option that does not work on 2.4 does not help here. If we decide that really aliases are a no-go in OpenVPN then I would rather drop data-ciphers and stay with ncp-ciphers forever for this reason.
Arne
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 8/9] Rename ncp-ciphers to data-ciphers
Quoted 24 lines · Arne Schwabe
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 12 lines
+++
b/src/openvpn/options.csrc/openvpn/options.c +1
-1@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static const char usage_message[] ="--cipher alg : Encrypt packets with cipher algorithm alg\n" " (default=%s).\n" " Set alg=none to disable encryption.\n" -"--ncp-ciphers list : List of ciphers that are allowed to be negotiated.\n" +"--data-ciphers list : List of ciphers that are allowed to be negotiated.\n" "--ncp-disable : (DEPRECATED) Disable cipher negotiation.\n" "--prng alg [nsl] : For PRNG, use digest algorithm alg, and\n" " nonce_secret_len=nsl. Set alg=none to disable PRNG.\n" src/openvpn/options.c add_option(struct options *options, · line 7870
Quoted 6 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +2
-1@@ -7866,7 +7866,8 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_NCP |OPT_P_INSTANCE ); options->ciphername = p[1 ]; } -else if (streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) +else if ((streq (p[0 ],"data-ciphers" ) ||streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" )) + && p[1 ] && !p[2 ])I do agree to using --data-ciphers instead of --ncp-ciphers, that is far more user-friendly naming of this feature. NCP is a more technical "under-the-hood" terminology which users don't really need to relate to, where --data-ciphers better explains what it is used for.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
But I do reject NOT adding a deprecation path for --ncp-ciphers. We should support --ncp-ciphers for 1-2 major releases, but after that it should be removed. We have too many options and we certainly should avoid duplicating options with the exact same functionality.
Just let me clarify .... the "1-2 major releases" was too hasty and not well thought numbers. Please read my reasoning below for what I really intended to say.
Quoted 6 lines
This was a deliberate decision. We really want to people to move towards ncp and putting another hurdle with having an option that works better on but gives a warning and a option that does not work on 2.4 does not help here. If we decide that really aliases are a no-go in OpenVPN then I would rather drop data-ciphers and stay with ncp-ciphers forever for this reason.
Lets take a few steps back try to see a broader picture.
* --ncp-ciphers was introduced in OpenVPN 2.4 as a brand new option.
* Steffan has suggested to add --data-ciphers alias into the next v2.4 release; to which I agree(!).
* I propose we add a warning whenever --ncp-ciphers used, recommending the user to switch to --data-ciphers as soon as possible.
* We keep both --ncp-ciphers *and* --data-ciphers in v2.5 and v2.6.
* When v2.5 is released v2.4 goes into "old stable support" - where both alternatives will work. v2.4 is guaranteed to be supported by the community for at least 6 months with full support [0] after v2.5 is released.
* When 2.6 is released, v2.4 goes into "git tree only" support but will have a
12 month "old stable support" guarantee [0].
* 12 months *after* the v2.6 release is out, we can remove --ncp-ciphers. But since we will not do option changes mid-release easily, it might be natural to remove this in OpenVPN 2.7 at earliest.
This means --ncp-ciphers will be supported in 2.4 for the life time of that release. And v2.4 is supported for *at least* 18 months after v2.5 is released. It also guarantees --ncp-ciphers will first be removed when we release OpenVPN 2.7.
What would be a problem with such a schedule? Because I don't understand the real objection you have to remove options which ends up duplicating other options.
At the same time ... it is also important for me that we try to see this at from an even bigger perspective than just --ncp-ciphers/--data-ciphers or even --udp-mtu alone. Now I'm shifting the discussion to a more generic product life cycle perspective.
If we skimp through this and just allow whatever option duplications we head into, just because we're too concerned about various breakages with old configurations or setups - it will not be the last time we might end up in such discussions UNLESS we can find a proper and reasonable process for deprecation (which we in fact already defined for feature deprecation 10 years ago! [1]).
If we cannot remove options during the whole life time of OpenVPN, we cannot touch compression options or possibly even deprecate any compression at all - because we need to support both compression and decompression for the whole lifetime of OpenVPN. This also extends into how to ensure proper OpenVPN 3 compatibility as well.
And if we cannot remove any options during the eternal life time of OpenVPN, I will see no other alternative to being even more critical and rejective to add new options. We already have pretty close to 300 options in OpenVPN. That is an insane amount - where a typical common OpenVPN setup might need up to 20 of these options, the rest are for all kinds of special cases. And we have several competing solutions which are far simpler in many aspects which new users might just as well prefer.
Even though I highlight the number of options we have, I do NOT say that we should swipe them all out and reduce the amount to 50 or so; for some users they have a _real_ value and provides really useful features. But I want us to save the options which do have a REAL value, not because unsupported OpenVPN versions might break or "10 bytes extra source code" is too heavy to carry around for an alias option. I'm arguing for keeping options covering _REAL_ USE CASE for users. And no, breaking unsupported OpenVPN releases is NOT a real use case from my point of view.
But back to the deprecated options ... If we cannot remove options, we also need to consider bringing back the --tls-remote option, and --compat-names - both with the capability to break client configs (in fact, it already did for several Fedora EPEL users [2]). The proposal to remove --remote-nopull needs to be reconsidered, as well as --secret, --max-routes, and possibly even --ncp-disable. Maybe even more of these deprecated options needs to be reconsidered [3].
We really need a proper and sane processes to allow the development of OpenVPN to have a chance to move on and leave things behind when appropriate, to be able to evolve and grow with the future - without being strangled by what existed in the far past (meaning: no longer community supported releases). Otherwise I do fear for the future of OpenVPN 2.x.
By having a clear strategy and adhering to a process of feature/option management in OpenVPN, we give clearly defined time-window for stability and functionality for our users. This predictability is, in my experience, much more important to users than if a specifically named option is supported or not.
[0] <https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/wiki/SupportedVersions>
[1] <https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/wiki/FRP>
[2]
<https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openvpn/c/c738486b3576df4829c9cef5ccd12c10c4fb7b84?branch=epel7>
[3] <https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/wiki/DeprecatedOptions>
Signature · 4 lines
kind regards, David Sommerseth OpenVPN Inc
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 8/9] Rename ncp-ciphers to data-ciphers
Hi,
Quoted 17 lines · David Sommerseth
Quoted 6 lines
This was a deliberate decision. We really want to people to move towards ncp and putting another hurdle with having an option that works better on but gives a warning and a option that does not work on 2.4 does not help here. If we decide that really aliases are a no-go in OpenVPN then I would rather drop data-ciphers and stay with ncp-ciphers forever for this reason.
Lets take a few steps back try to see a broader picture.
[..snip..]
We really need a proper and sane processes to allow the development of OpenVPN to have a chance to move on and leave things behind when appropriate, to be able to evolve and grow with the future - without being strangled by what existed in the far past (meaning: no longer community supported releases). Otherwise I do fear for the future of OpenVPN 2.x.
Quoted 4 lines
By having a clear strategy and adhering to a process of feature/option management in OpenVPN, we give clearly defined time-window for stability and functionality for our users. This predictability is, in my experience, much more important to users than if a specifically named option is supported or not.
Yes, you've made these points clear earlier on IRC. I (and with me Arne and Gert) just don't agree with you on some of the details, resulting in a different verdict on this patch.
None of us has trouble with deprecating options. We appreciate the work you've put into the DeprecatedOptions page, and all of us have sent and/or acked patched to remove dangerous or obsolete options.
This difference is in how we weigh the pros and cons per option. So I'll leave the broader picture for now, and summarize why I'm going to ACK Arne's patch exactly because is *doesn't* print a warning when the old name is used.
Option name aliases add negligible code complexity and are trivial to maintain. (Just look at --udp-mtu.) Keeping them in allows users to write configs that work well and do not produce any warnings on both older and newer versions. (Printing warnings for harmless things reduces the value of the other warnings we print.)
Let's focus our time and effort on reducing actual complexity.
-Steffan
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 8/9] Rename ncp-ciphers to data-ciphers
In reply to David SommersethFirst of all I did not want to reply to this since we had a lengthy discussion on IRC.
Quoted 6 lines
Lets take a few steps back try to see a broader picture.
* --ncp-ciphers was introduced in OpenVPN 2.4 as a brand new option.
* Steffan has suggested to add --data-ciphers alias into the next v2.4 release; to which I agree(!).
Yes, this sounds like a simple idea but also has the danger of creating more confusion.
I feel it better to have ncp-cipher and data-ciphers coexist. Then you also have the understand that ncp-cipher is an older/less capable version of data-ciphers.
OpenVPN 2.4 has a number of oddities in NCP support:
- the client always announces AES-GCM support even if disabled in ncp-ciphers
- the server will always push the first cipher of its ncp-ciphers list to the client.
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 8/9] Rename ncp-ciphers to data-ciphers
Quoted 17 lines · Arne Schwabe
First of all I did not want to reply to this since we had a lengthy discussion on IRC.
Quoted 6 lines
Lets take a few steps back try to see a broader picture.
* --ncp-ciphers was introduced in OpenVPN 2.4 as a brand new option.
* Steffan has suggested to add --data-ciphers alias into the next v2.4 release; to which I agree(!).
Yes, this sounds like a simple idea but also has the danger of creating more confusion.
I feel it better to have ncp-cipher and data-ciphers coexist. Then you also have the understand that ncp-cipher is an older/less capable version of data-ciphers.
Quoted 6 lines
OpenVPN 2.4 has a number of oddities in NCP support:
- the client always announces AES-GCM support even if disabled in ncp-ciphers
- the server will always push the first cipher of its ncp-ciphers list to the client.
These oddities, they sounds like bugs, or? If I try to put on my Never-used-NCP-before-hat, this would not be what I would expect. Why haven't we resolved this within the current 2.4 scope without changing options?
Quoted 11 lines
From a user perspective data-ciphers is a true superset of ncp-ciphers. All existing ncp-ciphers setup will continue to work on 2.5 but the data-ciphers option from 2.5 is likely to break on 2.5 if you don't take into account the 2.4 oddities.
Quoted 2 lines
* I propose we add a warning whenever --ncp-ciphers used, recommending the user to switch to --data-ciphers as soon as possible.
As compromise maybe something like
NOTE: Rewriting old-option x y z to new new-option x y z
As mentioned on IRC, yes. I am willing to accept
msg(M_INFO, "Rewriting deprecated option X to the replacement Y" ...
[...]
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
* 12 months *after* the v2.6 release is out, we can remove --ncp-ciphers. But since we will not do option changes mid-release easily, it might be natural to remove this in OpenVPN 2.7 at earliest.
This means --ncp-ciphers will be supported in 2.4 for the life time of that release. And v2.4 is supported for *at least* 18 months after v2.5 is released. It also guarantees --ncp-ciphers will first be removed when we release OpenVPN 2.7.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
What would be a problem with such a schedule? Because I don't understand the real objection you have to remove options which ends up duplicating other options.
My general problem is that I don't see a real advantage in removing ncp-cipher but see a lot of downsides removing it.
I hear about you seeing downsides ... but I have not seen any argument here convincing me otherwise. This overall process should take care of supporting all reasonable OpenVPN 2.x versions.
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
At the same time ... it is also important for me that we try to see this at from an even bigger perspective than just --ncp-ciphers/--data-ciphers or even --udp-mtu alone. Now I'm shifting the discussion to a more generic product life cycle perspective.
If we skimp through this and just allow whatever option duplications we head into, just because we're too concerned about various breakages with old configurations or setups - it will not be the last time we might end up in such discussions UNLESS we can find a proper and reasonable process for deprecation (which we in fact already defined for feature deprecation 10 years ago! [1]).
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
If we cannot remove options during the whole life time of OpenVPN, we cannot touch compression options or possibly even deprecate any compression at all - because we need to support both compression and decompression for the whole lifetime of OpenVPN. This also extends into how to ensure proper OpenVPN 3 compatibility as well.
The amount of time we spend on testing/developing etc on compression and the complexity it introduces is vastly different from ncp-cipher
That is true. But at the same time, if we do not have a proper deprecation process where we draw the line in which OpenVPN versions we are willing to support (from a functional perspective), we cannot touch compression.
Which is why I'm trying to raise the points of a bigger picture. We need to find a reasonable solution to which OpenVPN versions we are willing to support, and when those versions enters the unsupported side we should be free to cleanup code and options related to the behavior and functionality only these now not supported releases provided.
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 8 lines
And if we cannot remove any options during the eternal life time of OpenVPN, I will see no other alternative to being even more critical and rejective to add new options. We already have pretty close to 300 options in OpenVPN. That is an insane amount - where a typical common OpenVPN setup might need up to 20 of these options, the rest are for all kinds of special cases. And we have several competing solutions which are far simpler in many aspects which new users might just as well prefer.
Quoted 8 lines
Even though I highlight the number of options we have, I do NOT say that we should swipe them all out and reduce the amount to 50 or so; for some users they have a _real_ value and provides really useful features. But I want us to save the options which do have a REAL value, not because unsupported OpenVPN versions might break or "10 bytes extra source code" is too heavy to carry around for an alias option. I'm arguing for keeping options covering _REAL_ USE CASE for users. And no, breaking unsupported OpenVPN releases is NOT a real use case from my point of view.
Quoted 4 lines
This is the point where we disagree. I still think that we should weigh the pros and cons if we still want have compatibility. And also to consider if there are alternatives/workaround for the setups/users affected.
This is again the same issue, to be able to draw the line somewhere to what we are willing to support. What kind of life cycles do we want for OpenVPN?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
But back to the deprecated options ... If we cannot remove options, we also need to consider bringing back the --tls-remote option, and --compat-names - both with the capability to break client configs (in fact, it already did for several Fedora EPEL users [2]).
Well if weighing the pros of bringing it back outwights the cons, then the decision to compeletly remove it might have been wrong.
So the question is ... do we care about broken OpenVPN 2.3 (or older) configurations today? Which is technically supported by us another 12 months after the v2.5 release.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines
The proposal to remove --remote-nopull needs
to be reconsidered, as well as --secret, --max-routes, and possibly even --ncp-disable. Maybe even more of these deprecated options needs to be reconsidered [3].For ncp-disable I did the weighing of pros and cons and answer that question. ncp-disable add complexity to the code paths and is in conflict which the direction we want to go. And for users that currently use the option the workable workaround is to just remove that options as it should not be necessary in 2.5 anymore.
But it still will break users configs without any prior warning in 2.4. It was added to our git master only in 15 days ago. Including potential client configurations.
Again, this exemplifies that we are lacking a proper product life cycle process and even adhering to a feature deprecation process.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
We really need a proper and sane processes to allow the development of OpenVPN to have a chance to move on and leave things behind when appropriate, to be able to evolve and grow with the future - without being strangled by what existed in the far past (meaning: no longer community supported releases). Otherwise I do fear for the future of OpenVPN 2.x.
Quoted 6 lines
There is more a to software than the development. There is also how it is used/etc. And we should not make it harder than it needs to be. And even for our own company internal use case of Access server the reality is that we even though we do not like supporting the old clients (back to 2.2 in some cases), we still have to do it because there is demand for it.
Why Access Server supports such old OpenVPN releases is a completely different discussion not belong here in the community. There might be valid use cases for these customers, but in such situations additional (and often fairly expensive) support contracts are required by the vast majority of vendor agreements I've seen. And these corporate special needs should not end up in the community.
The community needs to be decoupled to be fully functional. I say this as a OpenVPN Inc hire - and has also said this internally to the management over the years I've been there. From what I experience, there is a general understanding for the need of this separation.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
By having a clear strategy and adhering to a process of feature/option management in OpenVPN, we give clearly defined time-window for stability and functionality for our users. This predictability is, in my experience, much more important to users than if a specifically named option is supported or not.
Yes. If we decide to remove an option we should have this predictable removal process. But if we remove an option/drop support for something something that should still be a weighing of pros and cons.
Quoted 5 lines
For this specific option of ncp-ciphers/data-ciphers. This not just a fringe option. This is an option that affects one of the core things of OpenVPN, the chosen chipher. I want to make the transition to NCP as painless as possible and keeping ncp-cipher as alias to data-cipher is just the better choice in my opinion.
I agree that --data-cipher is a better name for it; I have not rejected that.
But that doesn't mean we should have two thoughts active at the same time: a) NCP improvements, and b) product life cycle, what we support and how we support OpenVPN in the long run ... in this case they do impact each other.
But when we only focus on a) without properly considering b), that is the point where I object.
Signature · 4 lines
kind regards, David Sommerseth OpenVPN Inc
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 8/9] Rename ncp-ciphers to data-ciphers
In reply to Arne SchwabeHi,
Quoted 175 lines · Arne Schwabe
The change in name signals that data-ciphers is the preferred way to configure data channel (and not --cipher). The data prefix is chosen to avoid ambiguity and make it distinct from tls-cipher for the TLS ciphers.
Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>--- Changes.rst | 13 ++++++++++--- doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst | 11 +++++++---- doc/man-sections/server-options.rst | 4 ++-- sample/sample-config-files/client.conf | 2 +- src/openvpn/multi.c | 4 ++-- src/openvpn/options.c | 5 +++-- src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 4 ++-- 7 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)Changes.rst +10
-3@@ -14,12 +14,19 @@ ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher support channel. Improved Data channel cipher negotiation + The option ``ncp-ciphers`` has been renamed to ``data-ciphers``. + The old name is still accepted. The change in name signals that + ``data-ciphers`` is the preferred way to configure data channel + ciphers and the data prefix is chosen to avoid the ambiguity that + exists with ``--cipher`` for the data cipher and ``tls-cipher`` + for the TLS ciphers. + OpenVPN clients will now signal all supported ciphers from the - ``ncp-ciphers`` option to the server via ``IV_CIPHERS``. OpenVPN - servers will select the first common cipher from the ``ncp-ciphers`` + ``data-ciphers`` option to the server via ``IV_CIPHERS``. OpenVPN + servers will select the first common cipher from the ``data-ciphers`` list instead of blindly pushing the first cipher of the list. This allows to use a configuration like - ``ncp-ciphers ChaCha20-Poly1305:AES-256-GCM`` on the server that + ``data-ciphers ChaCha20-Poly1305:AES-256-GCM`` on the server that prefers ChaCha20-Poly1305 but uses it only if the client supports it. Asynchronous (deferred) authentication support for auth-pam plugin.doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +7
-4@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. The default is :code:`BF-CBC`, an abbreviation for Blowfish in Cipher Block Chaining mode. When cipher negotiation (NCP) is allowed, OpenVPN 2.4 and newer on both client and server side will automatically - upgrade to :code:`AES-256-GCM`. See ``--ncp-ciphers`` and + upgrade to :code:`AES-256-GCM`. See ``--data-ciphers`` and ``--ncp-disable`` for more details on NCP. Using :code:`BF-CBC` is no longer recommended, because of its 64-bit@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. non-standard key lengths, and a larger key may offer no real guarantee of greater security, or may even reduce security. ---ncp-ciphers cipher-list +--data-ciphers cipher-list Restrict the allowed ciphers to be negotiated to the ciphers in ``cipher-list``. ``cipher-list`` is a colon-separated list of ciphers, and defaults to :code:`AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM`.@@ -189,9 +189,9 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. Additionally, to allow for more smooth transition, if NCP is enabled, OpenVPN will inherit the cipher of the peer if that cipher is different from the local ``--cipher`` setting, but the peer cipher is one of the - ciphers specified in ``--ncp-ciphers``. E.g. a non-NCP client (<=v2.3, + ciphers specified in ``--data-ciphers``. E.g. a non-NCP client (<=v2.3, or with --ncp-disabled set) connecting to a NCP server (v2.4+) with - ``--cipher BF-CBC`` and ``--ncp-ciphers AES-256-GCM:AES-256-CBC`` set can + ``--cipher BF-CBC`` and ``--data-ciphers AES-256-GCM:AES-256-CBC`` set can either specify ``--cipher BF-CBC`` or ``--cipher AES-256-CBC`` and both will work.@@ -201,6 +201,9 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. This list is restricted to be 127 chars long after conversion to OpenVPN ciphers. + This option was called ``ncp-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.4 but has been renamed + to ``data-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.5 to more accurately reflect its meaning. + --ncp-disable Disable "Negotiable Crypto Parameters". This completely disables cipher negotiation.doc/man-sections/server-options.rst +2
-2@@ -473,8 +473,8 @@ fast hardware. SSL/TLS authentication must be used in this mode. *AES-GCM-128* and *AES-GCM-256*. :code:`IV_CIPHERS=<ncp-ciphers>` - The client pushes the list of configured ciphers with the - ``--ciphers`` option to the server. + The client announces the list of supported ciphers configured with the + ``--data-ciphers`` option to the server. :code:`IV_GUI_VER=<gui_id> <version>` The UI version of a UI if one is running, for examplesample/sample-config-files/client.conf +1
-1@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ tls-auth ta.key 1 # then you must also specify it here. # Note that v2.4 client/server will automatically # negotiate AES-256-GCM in TLS mode. -# See also the ncp-cipher option in the manpage +# See also the data-ciphers option in the manpage cipher AES-256-CBC # Enable compression on the VPN link.src/openvpn/multi.c +2
-2@@ -1827,7 +1827,7 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c)else {/* -* Push the first cipher from --ncp-ciphers to the client that +* Push the first cipher from --data-ciphers to the client that * the client announces to be supporting. */ char *push_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(o->ncp_ciphers, o->ciphername,@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) {msg (M_INFO ,"PUSH: No common cipher between server and " "client. Expect this connection not to work. Server " -"ncp-ciphers: '%s', client supported ciphers '%s'" , +"data-ciphers: '%s', client supported ciphers '%s'" , o->ncp_ciphers, peer_ciphers); } elsesrc/openvpn/options.c +3
-2@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static const char usage_message[] ="--cipher alg : Encrypt packets with cipher algorithm alg\n" " (default=%s).\n" " Set alg=none to disable encryption.\n" -"--ncp-ciphers list : List of ciphers that are allowed to be negotiated.\n" +"--data-ciphers list : List of ciphers that are allowed to be negotiated.\n" "--ncp-disable : (DEPRECATED) Disable cipher negotiation.\n" "--prng alg [nsl] : For PRNG, use digest algorithm alg, and\n" " nonce_secret_len=nsl. Set alg=none to disable PRNG.\n" @@ -7866,7 +7866,8 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_NCP |OPT_P_INSTANCE ); options->ciphername = p[1 ]; } -else if (streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) +else if ((streq (p[0 ],"data-ciphers" ) ||streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" )) + && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL |OPT_P_INSTANCE ); options->ncp_ciphers = p[1 ];src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +1
-1@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ mutate_ncp_cipher_list(const char *list, struct gc_arena *gc)const cipher_kt_t *ktc =cipher_kt_get (token);if (!ktc) { -msg (M_WARN ,"Unsupported cipher in --ncp-ciphers: %s" , token); +msg (M_WARN ,"Unsupported cipher in --data-ciphers: %s" , token); error_found = true; }else
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c mutate_ncp_cipher_list(const char *list, struct gc_arena *gc) · line 136
Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +1
-1@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ mutate_ncp_cipher_list(const char *list, struct gc_arena *gc)if (!(buf_forward_capacity (&new_list) >strlen (ovpn_cipher_name) +2 )) { -msg (M_WARN ,"Length of --ncp-ciphers is over the " +msg (M_WARN ,"Length of --data-ciphers is over the " "limit of 127 chars" ); error_found = true; }
Thanks. Patch looks good, and passes manual tests.
-Steffan
David Sommerseth
NAKRe: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 8/9] Rename ncp-ciphers to data-ciphers
Quoted 189 lines · Steffan Karger
Hi,
Quoted 175 lines · Arne Schwabe
The change in name signals that data-ciphers is the preferred way to configure data channel (and not --cipher). The data prefix is chosen to avoid ambiguity and make it distinct from tls-cipher for the TLS ciphers.
Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>--- Changes.rst | 13 ++++++++++--- doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst | 11 +++++++---- doc/man-sections/server-options.rst | 4 ++-- sample/sample-config-files/client.conf | 2 +- src/openvpn/multi.c | 4 ++-- src/openvpn/options.c | 5 +++-- src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 4 ++-- 7 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)Changes.rst +10
-3@@ -14,12 +14,19 @@ ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher support channel. Improved Data channel cipher negotiation + The option ``ncp-ciphers`` has been renamed to ``data-ciphers``. + The old name is still accepted. The change in name signals that + ``data-ciphers`` is the preferred way to configure data channel + ciphers and the data prefix is chosen to avoid the ambiguity that + exists with ``--cipher`` for the data cipher and ``tls-cipher`` + for the TLS ciphers. + OpenVPN clients will now signal all supported ciphers from the - ``ncp-ciphers`` option to the server via ``IV_CIPHERS``. OpenVPN - servers will select the first common cipher from the ``ncp-ciphers`` + ``data-ciphers`` option to the server via ``IV_CIPHERS``. OpenVPN + servers will select the first common cipher from the ``data-ciphers`` list instead of blindly pushing the first cipher of the list. This allows to use a configuration like - ``ncp-ciphers ChaCha20-Poly1305:AES-256-GCM`` on the server that + ``data-ciphers ChaCha20-Poly1305:AES-256-GCM`` on the server that prefers ChaCha20-Poly1305 but uses it only if the client supports it. Asynchronous (deferred) authentication support for auth-pam plugin.doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +7
-4@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. The default is :code:`BF-CBC`, an abbreviation for Blowfish in Cipher Block Chaining mode. When cipher negotiation (NCP) is allowed, OpenVPN 2.4 and newer on both client and server side will automatically - upgrade to :code:`AES-256-GCM`. See ``--ncp-ciphers`` and + upgrade to :code:`AES-256-GCM`. See ``--data-ciphers`` and ``--ncp-disable`` for more details on NCP. Using :code:`BF-CBC` is no longer recommended, because of its 64-bit@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. non-standard key lengths, and a larger key may offer no real guarantee of greater security, or may even reduce security. ---ncp-ciphers cipher-list +--data-ciphers cipher-list Restrict the allowed ciphers to be negotiated to the ciphers in ``cipher-list``. ``cipher-list`` is a colon-separated list of ciphers, and defaults to :code:`AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM`.@@ -189,9 +189,9 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. Additionally, to allow for more smooth transition, if NCP is enabled, OpenVPN will inherit the cipher of the peer if that cipher is different from the local ``--cipher`` setting, but the peer cipher is one of the - ciphers specified in ``--ncp-ciphers``. E.g. a non-NCP client (<=v2.3, + ciphers specified in ``--data-ciphers``. E.g. a non-NCP client (<=v2.3, or with --ncp-disabled set) connecting to a NCP server (v2.4+) with - ``--cipher BF-CBC`` and ``--ncp-ciphers AES-256-GCM:AES-256-CBC`` set can + ``--cipher BF-CBC`` and ``--data-ciphers AES-256-GCM:AES-256-CBC`` set can either specify ``--cipher BF-CBC`` or ``--cipher AES-256-CBC`` and both will work.@@ -201,6 +201,9 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. This list is restricted to be 127 chars long after conversion to OpenVPN ciphers. + This option was called ``ncp-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.4 but has been renamed + to ``data-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.5 to more accurately reflect its meaning. + --ncp-disable Disable "Negotiable Crypto Parameters". This completely disables cipher negotiation.doc/man-sections/server-options.rst +2
-2@@ -473,8 +473,8 @@ fast hardware. SSL/TLS authentication must be used in this mode. *AES-GCM-128* and *AES-GCM-256*. :code:`IV_CIPHERS=<ncp-ciphers>` - The client pushes the list of configured ciphers with the - ``--ciphers`` option to the server. + The client announces the list of supported ciphers configured with the + ``--data-ciphers`` option to the server. :code:`IV_GUI_VER=<gui_id> <version>` The UI version of a UI if one is running, for examplesample/sample-config-files/client.conf +1
-1@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ tls-auth ta.key 1 # then you must also specify it here. # Note that v2.4 client/server will automatically # negotiate AES-256-GCM in TLS mode. -# See also the ncp-cipher option in the manpage +# See also the data-ciphers option in the manpage cipher AES-256-CBC # Enable compression on the VPN link.src/openvpn/multi.c +2
-2@@ -1827,7 +1827,7 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c)else {/* -* Push the first cipher from --ncp-ciphers to the client that +* Push the first cipher from --data-ciphers to the client that * the client announces to be supporting. */ char *push_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(o->ncp_ciphers, o->ciphername,@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) {msg (M_INFO ,"PUSH: No common cipher between server and " "client. Expect this connection not to work. Server " -"ncp-ciphers: '%s', client supported ciphers '%s'" , +"data-ciphers: '%s', client supported ciphers '%s'" , o->ncp_ciphers, peer_ciphers); } elsesrc/openvpn/options.c +3
-2@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static const char usage_message[] ="--cipher alg : Encrypt packets with cipher algorithm alg\n" " (default=%s).\n" " Set alg=none to disable encryption.\n" -"--ncp-ciphers list : List of ciphers that are allowed to be negotiated.\n" +"--data-ciphers list : List of ciphers that are allowed to be negotiated.\n" "--ncp-disable : (DEPRECATED) Disable cipher negotiation.\n" "--prng alg [nsl] : For PRNG, use digest algorithm alg, and\n" " nonce_secret_len=nsl. Set alg=none to disable PRNG.\n" @@ -7866,7 +7866,8 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_NCP |OPT_P_INSTANCE ); options->ciphername = p[1 ]; } -else if (streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) +else if ((streq (p[0 ],"data-ciphers" ) ||streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" )) + && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL |OPT_P_INSTANCE ); options->ncp_ciphers = p[1 ];src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +1
-1@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ mutate_ncp_cipher_list(const char *list, struct gc_arena *gc)const cipher_kt_t *ktc =cipher_kt_get (token);if (!ktc) { -msg (M_WARN ,"Unsupported cipher in --ncp-ciphers: %s" , token); +msg (M_WARN ,"Unsupported cipher in --data-ciphers: %s" , token); error_found = true; }else src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c mutate_ncp_cipher_list(const char *list, struct gc_arena *gc) · line 136
Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +1
-1@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ mutate_ncp_cipher_list(const char *list, struct gc_arena *gc)if (!(buf_forward_capacity (&new_list) >strlen (ovpn_cipher_name) +2 )) { -msg (M_WARN ,"Length of --ncp-ciphers is over the " +msg (M_WARN ,"Length of --data-ciphers is over the " "limit of 127 chars" ); error_found = true; }Thanks. Patch looks good, and passes manual tests.
Quoted 1 line
NAK.
Signature · 4 lines
kind regards, David Sommerseth OpenVPN Inc
[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Rename ncp-ciphers to data-ciphers
In reply to Arne SchwabeYour patch has been applied to the master branch.
I have not done more than basic compile-time testing and a quick glance at "git show" here.
Patch 10/9 with the message will follow right away.
commit 30d19c6ebee05de4cc35155a6c7742ccbf021a82
Author: Arne Schwabe Date: Fri Jul 17 15:47:38 2020 +0200
Rename ncp-ciphers to data-ciphers
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg20444.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
PATCH 9/9 Rework NCP compability logic and drop BF-CBC support by default
In reply to Arne SchwabeThis reworks the NCP logic to be more strict about what is considered an acceptable result of an NCP negotiation. It also us to finally drop BF-CBC support by default.
All new behaviour is currently limited to server/client mode with pull enabled. P2p mode without pull does not change.
New Server behaviour:
- when a client announces its supported ciphers through either OCC or IV_CIPHER/IV_NCP we reject the client with a AUTH_FAILED message if we have no common cipher.
- When a client does not announce any cipher in either OCC or NCP we by reject it unless fallback-cipher is specified in either ccd or config.
New client behaviour:
- When no cipher is pushed (or a cipher we refused to support) and we also cannot support the server's server announced in OCC we fail the connection and log why
- If fallback-cipher is specified we will in the case that cipher is missing from occ use the fallback cipher instead of failing the connection
Both client and server behaviour:
- We only announce --cipher xyz in occ if we are willing to support that cipher.
It means that we only announce the fallback-cipher if it is also contained in --data-ciphers
Compatiblity behaviour:
In 2.5 both client and server will automatically set fallback-cipher xyz if --cipher xyz is in the config and also add append the cipher to the end of data-ciphers.
We log a warn user about this and point to --data-ciphers and --fallback-cipher. This also happens if the configuration contains an explicit --cipher BF-CBC.
If --cipher is not set, we only warn that previous versions allowed BF-CBC and point how to reenable BF-CBC. This might break very few config where someone connects a very old client to a 2.5 server but at some point we need to drop the BF-CBC and those affected use will already have a the scary SWEET32 warning in their logs.
In short: If --cipher is explicitly set 2.6 will work the same as 2.4 did. When --cipher is not set, BF-CBC support is dropped and we warn about it.
Examples how breaking the default BF-CBC will be logged:
Client side:
- Client connecting to server that does not push cipher but has --cipher in OCC
OPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotiate cipher with server. Add the server's cipher ('BF-CBC') to --data-ciphers (currently 'AES-256-GCM:AES-128-CBC') if you want to connect to this server.
- Client connecting to a server that does not support OCC:
OPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotioate cipher with server. Configure --fallback-cipher if you want connect to this server.
Server Side:
- Server has a client only supporting BF-CBC connecting:
styx/IP PUSH: No common cipher between server and client. Server data-ciphers: 'CHACHA20-POLY1305:AES-128-GCM:AES-256-GCM:AES-256-CBC:AES-128-CBC', client supports cipher 'BF-CBC'.
- Client without OCC:
styx/IP PUSH:No NCP or OCC cipher data received from peer.
styx/IP Use --fallback-cipher with the cipher the client is using if you want to allow the client to connect
In all reject cases on the client:
AUTH: Received control message: AUTH_FAILED,Data channel cipher negotiation failed (no shared cipher)
--- doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst | 16 ++- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 3 +- src/openvpn/init.c | 25 ++++- src/openvpn/multi.c | 136 ++++++++++++++++---------- src/openvpn/options.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++---- src/openvpn/options.h | 2 + src/openvpn/ssl.c | 11 ++- src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 20 ++-- src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h | 10 +- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_ncp.c | 26 +++-- 10 files changed, 253 insertions(+), 105 deletions(-)
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +14 -2
@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. http://www.cs.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/hmac.html --cipher alg + This option is deprecated for server-client mode and ``--data-ciphers`` + or rarely `--fallback-cipher`` should be used instead. + Encrypt data channel packets with cipher algorithm ``alg``. The default is :code:`BF-CBC`, an abbreviation for Blowfish in Cipher
@@ -183,8 +186,9 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. ``--server`` ), or if ``--pull`` is specified (client-side, implied by setting --client). - If both peers support and do not disable NCP, the negotiated cipher will - override the cipher specified by ``--cipher``. + If no common cipher is found is found during cipher negotiation, the + connection is terminated. To support old clients/server that do not + provide any cipher support see ``fallback-cipher``. Additionally, to allow for more smooth transition, if NCP is enabled, OpenVPN will inherit the cipher of the peer if that cipher is different
@@ -204,6 +208,14 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. This option was called ``ncp-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.4 but has been renamed to ``data-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.5 to more accurately reflect its meaning. +--fallback-cipher alg + + Configure a cipher that is used to fall back to if the peer does announce + the cipher in OCC. + + This option should normally not be needed. It only exists to allow + connecting to old servers or if supporting old clients as server. + --ncp-disable Disable "Negotiable Crypto Parameters". This completely disables cipher negotiation.
src/openvpn/crypto.c +2 -1
@@ -727,7 +727,8 @@ warn_insecure_key_type(const char *ciphername, const cipher_kt_t *cipher) {msg (M_WARN ,"WARNING: INSECURE cipher (%s) with block size less than 128" " bit (%d bit). This allows attacks like SWEET32. Mitigate by " -"using a --cipher with a larger block size (e.g. AES-256-CBC)." , +"using a --cipher with a larger block size (e.g. AES-256-CBC). " +"Support for these insecure cipher will be removed in OpenVPN 2.6." , ciphername,cipher_kt_block_size (cipher)*8 ); } }
src/openvpn/init.c +24 -1
@@ -2374,7 +2374,30 @@ do_deferred_options(struct context *c, const unsigned int found) {/* If the server did not push a --cipher, we will switch to the * remote cipher if it is in our ncp-ciphers list */ -tls_poor_mans_ncp (&c->options, c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername); +bool useremotecipher =tls_poor_mans_ncp (&c->options, + c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername); + +if (!useremotecipher && !c->options.enable_ncp_fallback) + { +/* Give appropiate error message */ +if (c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"OPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotiate " +"cipher with server. Add the server's " +"cipher ('%s') to --data-ciphers (currently '%s') if " +"you want to connect to this server." , + c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername, + c->options.ncp_ciphers); + } +else + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"OPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotioate " +"cipher with server. Configure " +"--fallback-cipher if you want connect " +"to this server." ); + } +return false; + } }struct frame *frame_fragment =NULL ;#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT
src/openvpn/multi.c +85 -51
180 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/options.c +92 -17
169 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/options.h +2 -0
@@ -503,6 +503,8 @@ struct optionsbool shared_secret_file_inline;int key_direction;const char *ciphername; +bool enable_ncp_fallback;/**< If defined fall back to +* ciphername if NCP fails */ bool ncp_enabled;const char *ncp_ciphers;const char *authname;
src/openvpn/ssl.c +6 -5
@@ -1932,13 +1932,14 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params(struct tls_session *session,return true; } -if (!session->opt->server - &&0 !=strcmp (options->ciphername, session->opt->config_ciphername) +bool cipher_allowed_as_fallback = options->enable_ncp_fallback + &&streq (options->ciphername, session->opt->config_ciphername); + +if (!session->opt->server && !cipher_allowed_as_fallback && !tls_item_in_cipher_list (options->ciphername, options->ncp_ciphers)) { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"Error: pushed cipher not allowed - %s not in %s or %s" , - options->ciphername, session->opt->config_ciphername, - options->ncp_ciphers); +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"Error: pushed cipher not allowed - %s not in %s" , + options->ciphername, options->ncp_ciphers);/* undo cipher push, abort connection setup */ options->ciphername = session->opt->config_ciphername;return false;
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +6 -14
@@ -211,9 +211,8 @@ tls_peer_ncp_list(const char *peer_info, struct gc_arena *gc) }char * -ncp_get_best_cipher (const char *server_list,const char *server_cipher, -const char *peer_info,const char *remote_cipher, -struct gc_arena *gc) +ncp_get_best_cipher (const char *server_list,const char *peer_info, +const char *remote_cipher,struct gc_arena *gc) {/* * The gc of the parameter is tied to the VPN session, create a
@@ -243,15 +242,6 @@ ncp_get_best_cipher(const char *server_list, const char *server_cipher, } token =strsep (&tmp_ciphers,":" ); } -/* We have not found a common cipher, as a last resort check if the -* server cipher can be used -*/ -if (token ==NULL - && (tls_item_in_cipher_list (server_cipher, peer_ncp_list) - ||streq (server_cipher, remote_cipher))) - { - token = server_cipher; - }char *ret =NULL ;if (token !=NULL )
@@ -263,16 +253,18 @@ ncp_get_best_cipher(const char *server_list, const char *server_cipher,return ret; } -void +bool tls_poor_mans_ncp (struct options *o,const char *remote_ciphername) { -if (o->ncp_enabled && remote_ciphername +if (remote_ciphername &&0 !=strcmp (o->ciphername, remote_ciphername)) {if (tls_item_in_cipher_list (remote_ciphername, o->ncp_ciphers)) { o->ciphername =string_alloc (remote_ciphername, &o->gc);msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW ,"Using peer cipher '%s'" , o->ciphername); +return true; } } +return false; }
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h +6 -4
@@ -44,10 +44,13 @@ tls_peer_supports_ncp(const char *peer_info);* "Poor man's NCP": Use peer cipher if it is an allowed (NCP) cipher. * Allows non-NCP peers to upgrade their cipher individually. * +* Returns true if we switched to the peer's cipher +* * Make sure to call tls_session_update_crypto_params() after calling this * function. */ -void tls_poor_mans_ncp (struct options *o,const char *remote_ciphername); +bool +tls_poor_mans_ncp (struct options *o,const char *remote_ciphername);/** * Iterates through the ciphers in server_list and return the first
@@ -67,9 +70,8 @@ void tls_poor_mans_ncp(struct options *o, const char *remote_ciphername);* cipher */ char * -ncp_get_best_cipher (const char *server_list,const char *server_cipher, -const char *peer_info,const char *remote_cipher, -struct gc_arena *gc); +ncp_get_best_cipher (const char *server_list,const char *peer_info, +const char *remote_cipher,struct gc_arena *gc);/**
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_ncp.c +16 -10
@@ -139,21 +139,29 @@ test_poor_man(void **state)char *best_cipher;const char *serverlist ="CHACHA20_POLY1305:AES-128-GCM" ; +const char *serverlistbfcbc ="CHACHA20_POLY1305:AES-128-GCM:BF-CBC" ; - best_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (serverlist,"BF-CBC" , + best_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (serverlist, +"IV_YOLO=NO\nIV_BAR=7" , +"BF-CBC" , &gc); + +assert_ptr_equal (best_cipher,NULL ); + + + best_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (serverlistbfcbc,"IV_YOLO=NO\nIV_BAR=7" ,"BF-CBC" , &gc);assert_string_equal (best_cipher,"BF-CBC" ); - best_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (serverlist,"BF-CBC" , + + best_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (serverlist,"IV_NCP=1\nIV_BAR=7" ,"AES-128-GCM" , &gc);assert_string_equal (best_cipher,"AES-128-GCM" ); - best_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (serverlist,"BF-CBC" , -NULL , + best_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (serverlist,NULL ,"AES-128-GCM" , &gc);assert_string_equal (best_cipher,"AES-128-GCM" );
@@ -170,29 +178,27 @@ test_ncp_best(void **state)const char *serverlist ="CHACHA20_POLY1305:AES-128-GCM:AES-256-GCM" ; - best_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (serverlist,"BF-CBC" , + best_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (serverlist,"IV_YOLO=NO\nIV_NCP=2\nIV_BAR=7" ,"BF-CBC" , &gc);assert_string_equal (best_cipher,"AES-128-GCM" );/* Best cipher is in --cipher of client */ - best_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (serverlist,"BF-CBC" , -"IV_NCP=2\nIV_BAR=7" , + best_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (serverlist,"IV_NCP=2\nIV_BAR=7" ,"CHACHA20_POLY1305" , &gc);assert_string_equal (best_cipher,"CHACHA20_POLY1305" );/* Best cipher is in --cipher of client */ - best_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (serverlist,"BF-CBC" , -"IV_CIPHERS=AES-128-GCM" , + best_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (serverlist,"IV_CIPHERS=AES-128-GCM" ,"AES-256-CBC" , &gc);assert_string_equal (best_cipher,"AES-128-GCM" );/* IV_NCP=2 should be ignored if IV_CIPHERS is sent */ - best_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (serverlist,"BF-CBC" , + best_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (serverlist,"IV_FOO=7\nIV_CIPHERS=AES-256-GCM\nIV_NCP=2" ,"AES-256-CBC" , &gc);
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 9/9] Rework NCP compability logic and drop BF-CBC support by default
Hi,
This is awesome in many ways. Better behaviour, better code and a nice way forward to really get rid of the BF-CBC default cipher.
It's also somewhat tricky, so here goes for a review purely based on stare-at-code:
Quoted 61 lines · Arne Schwabe
This reworks the NCP logic to be more strict about what is considered an acceptable result of an NCP negotiation. It also us to finally drop BF-CBC support by default.
All new behaviour is currently limited to server/client mode with pull enabled. P2p mode without pull does not change.
New Server behaviour:
- when a client announces its supported ciphers through either OCC or IV_CIPHER/IV_NCP we reject the client with aAUTH_FAILEDmessage if we have no common cipher.- When a client does not announce any cipher in either OCC or NCP we by reject it unless fallback-cipher is specified in either ccd or config.
New client behaviour:
- When no cipher is pushed (or a cipher we refused to support) and we also cannot support the server's server announced in OCC we fail the connection and log why- If fallback-cipher is specified we will in the case that cipher is missing from occ use the fallback cipher instead of failing the connection
Both client and server behaviour:
- We only announce --cipher xyz in occ if we are willing to support that cipher.It means that we only announce the fallback-cipher if it is also contained in --data-ciphers
Compatiblity behaviour:
In 2.5 both client and server will automatically set fallback-cipher xyz if --cipher xyz is in the config and also add append the cipher to the end of data-ciphers.
We log a warn user about this and point to --data-ciphers and --fallback-cipher. This also happens if the configuration contains an explicit --cipher BF-CBC.
If --cipher is not set, we only warn that previous versions allowed BF-CBC and point how to reenable BF-CBC. This might break very few config where someone connects a very old client to a 2.5 server but at some point we need to drop the BF-CBC and those affected use will already have a the scary SWEET32 warning in their logs.
In short: If --cipher is explicitly set 2.6 will work the same as 2.4 did. When --cipher is not set, BF-CBC support is dropped and we warn about it.
Examples how breaking the default BF-CBC will be logged:
Client side:
- Client connecting to server that does not push cipher but has --cipher in OCCOPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotiate cipher with server. Add the server's cipher ('BF-CBC') to --data-ciphers (currently 'AES-256-GCM:AES-128-CBC') if you want to connect to this server.
Quoted 7 lines
- Client connecting to a server that does not support OCC:
OPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotioate cipher with server. Configure --fallback-cipher if you want connect to this server.
Server Side:
- Server has a client only supporting BF-CBC connecting:> diff --git
a/doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst
b/doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst
[ Used the output of "git diff -w" to review, so pasting that here is "original" too. ]
Quoted 15 lines
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +3
-0@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. http://www.cs.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/hmac.html --cipher alg + This option is deprecated for server-client mode and ``--data-ciphers`` + or rarely `--data-ciphers-fallback`` should be used instead. + Encrypt data channel packets with cipher algorithm ``alg``. The default is :code:`BF-CBC`, an abbreviation for Blowfish in Cipher
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. · line 189
Quoted 6 lines
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +1
-2@@ -183,8 +186,9 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. ``--server`` ), or if ``--pull`` is specified (client-side, implied by setting --client). - If both peers support and do not disable NCP, the negotiated cipher will - override the cipher specified by ``--cipher``. + If no common cipher is found is found during cipher negotiation, the
Duplicate "is found".
Quoted 8 lines
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +2
-0+ connection is terminated. To support old clients/server that do not + provide any cipher support see ``data-ciphers-fallback``. Additionally, to allow for more smooth transition, if NCP is enabled, OpenVPN will inherit the cipher of the peer if that cipher is different@@ -201,8 +205,18 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. This list is restricted to be 127 chars long after conversion to OpenVPN ciphers.
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. · line 214
Quoted 10 lines
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +7
-2- This option was called ``ncp-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.4 but has been renamed - to ``data-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.5 to more accurately reflect its meaning. + This option was called ``--ncp-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.4 but has been renamed + to ``--data-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.5 to more accurately reflect its meaning. + +--data-ciphers-fallback alg + + Configure a cipher that is used to fall back to if the peer does announce + the cipher in OCC.
Isn't OCC to much detail here? I'd suggest something like "if we could not determine which cipher the peer is willing to use".
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side.
Quoted 4 lines
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +4
-0+ This option should normally not be needed. It only exists to allow + connecting to old servers or if supporting old clients as server. + The are only OpenVPN 2.3 and older version that have configured with + `--enable-small`.
I find this somewhat hard to read and understand, probably because it /is/ not so easy to understand but... A sugestion (native speakers, please help improve!):
This option should only be needed when connecting to peers which run OpenVPN 2.3 or earlier, and are compiled with the --enable-small flag (typically used on routers or other embedded devices).
src/openvpn/crypto.c warn_insecure_key_type(const char *ciphername, const cipher_kt_t *cipher) · line 731
Quoted 13 lines
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +0
-0--ncp-disable Disable "Negotiable Crypto Parameters". This completely disables ciphersrc/openvpn/crypto.c +2
-1@@ -727,7 +727,8 @@ warn_insecure_key_type(const char *ciphername, const cipher_kt_t *cipher) { msg(M_WARN, "WARNING: INSECURE cipher (%s) with block size less than 128" " bit (%d bit). This allows attacks like SWEET32. Mitigate by " - "using a --cipher with a larger block size (e.g. AES-256-CBC).", + "using a --cipher with a larger block size (e.g. AES-256-CBC). " + "Support for these insecure cipher will be removed in OpenVPN 2.6.",
These insecure cipher*s*.
Quoted 15 lines
src/openvpn/init.c +8
-1@@ -2374,7 +2374,30 @@ do_deferred_options(struct context *c, const unsigned int found) {/* If the server did not push a --cipher, we will switch to the * remote cipher if it is in our ncp-ciphers list */ -tls_poor_mans_ncp (&c->options, c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername); +bool useremotecipher =tls_poor_mans_ncp (&c->options, + c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername); + +if (!useremotecipher && !c->options.enable_ncp_fallback) + { +/* Give appropiate error message */ +if (c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername) + {
src/openvpn/init.c do_deferred_options(struct context *c, const unsigned int found) · line 2394
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/init.c +10
-0+msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"OPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotiate " +"cipher with server. Add the server's " +"cipher ('%s') to --data-ciphers (currently '%s') if " +"you want to connect to this server." , + c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername, + c->options.ncp_ciphers); + } +else + { + msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "OPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotioate "
Typo: negotiate.
src/openvpn/init.c do_deferred_options(struct context *c, const unsigned int found) · line 2396
Quoted 2 lines
src/openvpn/init.c +2
-0+"cipher with server. Configure " +"--data-ciphers-fallback if you want connect "
Typo: if you want *to* connect.
src/openvpn/init.c do_deferred_options(struct context *c, const unsigned int found) · line 2400
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/init.c +4
-0+ "to this server."); + } +return false; + }
This block seems to use more indentation levels than needed. Consider something like:
else if (ncp_enabled) {
if (!remote_ciphername) {
msg("Failed to negotiate, configure --data-ciphers-fallback");
return false;
}
if (!tls_poor_mans_ncp) {
msg("Failed to negotiate, add cipher xxx to --data-ciphers");
return false;
}
}Quoted 17 lines
src/openvpn/init.c +0
-0}struct frame *frame_fragment =NULL ;#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT src/openvpn/multi.c +1
-1@@ -1777,7 +1777,7 @@ multi_client_connect_setenv(struct multi_context *m,* - choosen cipher * - peer id */ -static void +static bool multi_client_set_protocol_options (struct context *c) {
src/openvpn/multi.c multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) · line 1814
Quoted 9 lines
src/openvpn/multi.c +4
-1@@ -1807,8 +1807,11 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) }/* Select cipher if client supports Negotiable Crypto Parameters */ -if (o->ncp_enabled) +if (!o->ncp_enabled) { +return true; + } +
Hm, in this case I don't think this improves things. This turns
if (foo) {
do_foo_stuff;
}
if (bar) {
do_bar_stuff;
}into
if (foo) {
do_foo_stuff;
}
if (!bar) {
return;
}
do_bar_stuff;I think the orignal code flow is easier to understand. If there's too much indentation for you liking, you can split part of it into a separate function.
(This is just about this first if, I totally agree about the flow change below.)
Quoted 123 lines
src/openvpn/multi.c +47
-17/* if we have already created our key, we cannot *change* our own * cipher -> so log the fact and push the "what we have now" cipher * (so the client is always told what we expect it to use) @@ -1820,43 +1823,69 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c)"server has already generated data channel keys, " "re-sending previously negotiated cipher '%s'" , o->ciphername ); +return true; } -else - { +/* * Push the first cipher from --data-ciphers to the client that * the client announces to be supporting. */ -char *push_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (o->ncp_ciphers, o->ciphername, - peer_info, +char *push_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (o->ncp_ciphers, peer_info, tls_multi->remote_ciphername, &o->gc);if (push_cipher) { o->ciphername = push_cipher; +return true; } -else - { + +/* NCP cipher negotiation failed. Try to figure out why exactly it +* failed and give good error messages and potentially do a fallback +* for non NCP clients */ struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); +bool ret = false; +const char *peer_ciphers =tls_peer_ncp_list (peer_info, &gc); +/* If we are in a situation where we know the client ciphers, there is no +* reason to fall back to a cipher that will not be accepted by the other +* side, in this situation we fail the auth*/ if (strlen (peer_ciphers) >0 ) { -msg (M_INFO ,"PUSH: No common cipher between server and " -"client. Expect this connection not to work. Server " -"data-ciphers: '%s', client supported ciphers '%s'" , +msg (M_INFO ,"PUSH: No common cipher between server and client. " +"Server data-ciphers: '%s', client supported ciphers '%s'" , o->ncp_ciphers, peer_ciphers); } +else if (tls_multi->remote_ciphername) + { +msg (M_INFO ,"PUSH: No common cipher between server and client. " +"Server data-ciphers: '%s', client supports cipher '%s'" , + o->ncp_ciphers, tls_multi->remote_ciphername); + }else { -msg (M_INFO ,"No NCP data received from peer, falling back " -"to --cipher '%s'. Peer reports in OCC --cipher '%s'" , - o->ciphername,np (tls_multi->remote_ciphername)); +msg (M_INFO ,"PUSH: No NCP or OCC cipher data received from peer." ); + +if (o->enable_ncp_fallback && !tls_multi->remote_ciphername) + { +msg (M_INFO ,"Using data channel cipher '%s' since " +"--data-ciphers-fallback is set." , o->ciphername); + ret = true; } -gc_free (&gc); +else + { +msg (M_INFO ,"Use --data-ciphers-fallback with the cipher the " +"client is using if you want to allow the client to connect" ); } } +if (!ret) + { +auth_set_client_reason (tls_multi,"Data channel cipher negotiation " +"failed (no shared cipher)" ); } + +gc_free (&gc); +return ret; }/** @@ -2394,13 +2423,17 @@ multi_client_connect_late_setup(struct multi_context *m, mi->context.c2.context_auth =CAS_SUCCEEDED ;/* authentication complete, calculate dynamic client specific options */ -multi_client_set_protocol_options (&mi->context); - -/* Generate data channel keys */ -if (!multi_client_generate_tls_keys (&mi->context)) +if (!multi_client_set_protocol_options (&mi->context)) { mi->context.c2.context_auth =CAS_FAILED ; } +/* Generate data channel keys only if setting protocol options +* has not failed */ +else if (!multi_client_generate_tls_keys (&mi->context)) + { + + mi->context.c2.context_auth =CAS_FAILED ; + }/* send push reply if ready */ if (mi->context.c2.push_request_received)src/openvpn/options.c +0
-1@@ -855,7 +855,6 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc)#if P2MP o->scheduled_exit_interval =5 ;#endif - o->ciphername ="BF-CBC" ; o->ncp_enabled = true; o->ncp_ciphers ="AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM" ; o->authname ="SHA1" ;@@ -3041,6 +3040,69 @@ options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) } }
src/openvpn/options.c options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) · line 3051
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +9
-0+static void +options_postprocess_cipher (struct options *o) +{ +if (!o->pull && !(o->mode ==MODE_SERVER )) + { +/* we are in the classic P2P mode */ +/* cipher negotiation (NCP) currently assumes --pull or --mode server */ + o->ncp_enabled = false; + msg( M_WARN, "Dynamic cipher negioation is disabled since neither "
Typo: negoatiation. Also "dynamic" seems redundant, "negotiation" already implies that.
As a side note: this warning message should be good enough for devs too, so we probably don't need the comments above that say the same.
src/openvpn/options.c options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) · line 3053
Quoted 1 line
src/openvpn/options.c +1
-0+ "P2MP client nor server mode is enabled" );
Was already in the orignal code, but: no space needed after msg(.
src/openvpn/options.c options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) · line 3057
Quoted 3 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +3
-0+/* If the cipher is not set default to BF-CBC, we will warn that this +* is deprecated on cipher initialisation, no need to warn here as +* well */
I had to read this twice to understand meaning. Maybe something like "if the cipher is not set, we set it to the old default value 'BF-CBC'." or so?
src/openvpn/options.c options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) · line 3065
Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +8
-0+if (!o->ciphername) + { + o->ciphername ="BF-CBC" ; + } +return ; + } + +/* M2P mode */
I think this is "P2MP mode"?
Quoted 27 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +27
-0+if (!o->ciphername) + { +msg (M_WARN ,"--cipher is not set. Previous OpenVPN version defaulted to " +"BF-CBC as fallback when dynamic cipher negotiation failed " +" in this case. If you need this fallback please " +"add '--data-ciphers-fallback BF-CBC' to your configuration " +"and/or add BF-CBC to --data-ciphers" ); + +/* We still need to set the ciphername to BF-CBC since various other +* parts of OpenVPN assert that the ciphername is set */ + o->ciphername ="BF-CBC" ; + +if (!o->ncp_enabled) + { +msg (M_USAGE ,"--ncp-disable needs an explicit --cipher or " +"--data-ciphers-fallback config option" ); + } + } +else if (!o->enable_ncp_fallback + && !tls_item_in_cipher_list (o->ciphername, o->ncp_ciphers)) + { + msg(M_WARN, "DEPRECATED OPTION: --cipher set to '%s' but missing in" + " --ncp-ciphers (%s). Future OpenVPN version will " + "ignore --cipher for dynamic cipher negotiations. " + "Add '%s' to --data-ciphers or change --cipher '%s' to " + "--data-ciphers-fallback '%s' to silence this warning.", + o->ciphername, o->ncp_ciphers, o->ciphername,
src/openvpn/options.c options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) · line 3102
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +10
-0+ o->ciphername, o->ciphername); + o->enable_ncp_fallback = true; + +/* Append the --cipher to ncp_ciphers to allow it in NCP */ +char *ncp_ciphers =gc_malloc (strlen (o->ncp_ciphers) + +strlen (o->ciphername) +1 , false, &o->gc); + +strcpy (ncp_ciphers, o->ncp_ciphers); +strcat (ncp_ciphers,":" ); +strcat (ncp_ciphers, o->ciphername);
Can we please avoid using strcpy and strcat? Using openvpn_snprintf() should result in simpler code, and makes it easier to ensure that we won't overflow.
Actually, looks like this already overflows, since there is no space for the null-byte in ncp_ciphers.
Quoted 33 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +5
-10+ o->ncp_ciphers = ncp_ciphers; + } +} +static void options_postprocess_mutate (struct options *o) {@@ -3053,6 +3115,7 @@ options_postprocess_mutate(struct options *o)helper_keepalive (o);helper_tcp_nodelay (o); +options_postprocess_cipher (o);options_postprocess_mutate_invariant (o);if (o->ncp_enabled)@@ -3113,16 +3176,6 @@ options_postprocess_mutate(struct options *o) "include this in your server configuration"); o->dh_file =NULL ; } - -/* cipher negotiation (NCP) currently assumes --pull or --mode server */ -if (o->ncp_enabled - && !(o->pull || o->mode ==MODE_SERVER ) ) - { -msg (M_WARN ,"disabling NCP mode (--ncp-disable) because not " -"in P2MP client or server mode" ); - o->ncp_enabled = false; - } -#if ENABLE_MANAGEMENT if (o->http_proxy_override) {
src/openvpn/options.c options_string(const struct options *o, · line 3718
Quoted 9 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +5
-1@@ -3658,14 +3711,22 @@ options_string(const struct options *o,*/ buf_printf (&out,",dev-type %s" ,dev_type_string (o->dev, o->dev_type)); -buf_printf (&out,",link-mtu %u" , (unsigned int )calc_options_string_link_mtu (o, frame)); +if (o->ciphername) + { +/* the link-mtu that we send has only a meaning if have a fixed +* cipher (p2p) or have a fallback cipher for older non ncp +* clients. If we do have a fallback cipher, do not send it */
This confuses me. The code reads like it's dependent on --cipher, rather than --fallbck-cipher. Also shouldn't this be "If we *don't* have a fallback cipher"?
Quoted 26 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +6
-2+buf_printf (&out,",link-mtu %u" , + (unsigned int )calc_options_string_link_mtu (o, frame)); + }buf_printf (&out,",tun-mtu %d" ,PAYLOAD_SIZE (frame));buf_printf (&out,",proto %s" ,proto_remote (o->ce.proto, remote)); +bool p2p_nopull = o->mode ==MODE_POINT_TO_POINT && !PULL_DEFINED (o);/* send tun_ipv6 only in peer2peer mode - in client/server mode, it * is usually pushed by the server, triggering a non-helpful warning */ -if (o->ifconfig_ipv6_local && o->mode ==MODE_POINT_TO_POINT && !PULL_DEFINED (o)) +if (o->ifconfig_ipv6_local && p2p_nopull) {buf_printf (&out,",tun-ipv6" ); }@@ -3695,7 +3756,7 @@ options_string(const struct options *o, } } -if (tt && o->mode ==MODE_POINT_TO_POINT && !PULL_DEFINED (o)) +if (tt && p2p_nopull) {const char *ios =ifconfig_options_string (tt, remote, o->ifconfig_nowarn, gc);if (ios &&strlen (ios))@@ -3751,8 +3812,15 @@ options_string(const struct options *o,
src/openvpn/options.c options_string(const struct options *o, · line 3820
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +6
-2init_key_type (&kt, o->ciphername, o->authname, o->keysize, true, false); - -buf_printf (&out,",cipher %s" ,cipher_kt_name (kt.cipher)); +/* Only announce the cipher to our peer if we are willing to +* support it */ +const char *ciphername =cipher_kt_name (kt.cipher); +if (p2p_nopull || !o->ncp_enabled + || (o->ncp_enabled + &&tls_item_in_cipher_list (ciphername, o->ncp_ciphers)))
This second check for o->ncp_enabled is not needed. You already ensured it's true before. (Saves you a line wrap.)
I wonder though, isn't it too soon to stop sending cipher? Looks like both 2.3 and 2.4 clients will currently print options warnings if cipher is missing from OCC. The earlier NCP versions carefully tries to send what the peer expected here to prevent bogus warnings.
Quoted 125 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +11
-1+ { +buf_printf (&out,",cipher %s" , ciphername); + }buf_printf (&out,",auth %s" ,md_kt_name (kt.digest));buf_printf (&out,",keysize %d" , kt.cipher_length *8 );if (o->shared_secret_file)@@ -3870,7 +3938,8 @@ options_warning_safe_scan2(const int msglevel, || strprefix(p1, "keydir ") || strprefix(p1, "proto ") || strprefix(p1, "tls-auth ") - || strprefix(p1, "tun-ipv6")) + || strprefix(p1, "tun-ipv6") + || strprefix(p1, "cipher ")) {return ; }@@ -7860,6 +7929,12 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_NCP |OPT_P_INSTANCE ); options->ciphername = p[1 ]; } +else if (streq (p[0 ],"data-ciphers-fallback" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) + { +VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_INSTANCE ); + options->ciphername = p[1 ]; + options->enable_ncp_fallback = true; + }else if ((streq (p[0 ],"data-ciphers" ) ||streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" )) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) {src/openvpn/options.h +2
-0@@ -503,6 +503,8 @@ struct optionsbool shared_secret_file_inline;int key_direction;const char *ciphername; +bool enable_ncp_fallback;/**< If defined fall back to +* ciphername if NCP fails */ bool ncp_enabled;const char *ncp_ciphers;const char *authname;src/openvpn/ssl.c +6
-5@@ -1932,13 +1932,14 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params(struct tls_session *session,return true; } -if (!session->opt->server - &&0 !=strcmp (options->ciphername, session->opt->config_ciphername) +bool cipher_allowed_as_fallback = options->enable_ncp_fallback + &&streq (options->ciphername, session->opt->config_ciphername); + +if (!session->opt->server && !cipher_allowed_as_fallback && !tls_item_in_cipher_list (options->ciphername, options->ncp_ciphers)) { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"Error: pushed cipher not allowed - %s not in %s or %s" , - options->ciphername, session->opt->config_ciphername, - options->ncp_ciphers); +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"Error: pushed cipher not allowed - %s not in %s" , + options->ciphername, options->ncp_ciphers);/* undo cipher push, abort connection setup */ options->ciphername = session->opt->config_ciphername;return false;src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +6
-14@@ -211,9 +211,8 @@ tls_peer_ncp_list(const char *peer_info, struct gc_arena *gc) }char * -ncp_get_best_cipher (const char *server_list,const char *server_cipher, -const char *peer_info,const char *remote_cipher, -struct gc_arena *gc) +ncp_get_best_cipher (const char *server_list,const char *peer_info, +const char *remote_cipher,struct gc_arena *gc) {/* * The gc of the parameter is tied to the VPN session, create a @@ -242,15 +241,6 @@ ncp_get_best_cipher(const char *server_list, const char *server_cipher,break ; } } -/* We have not found a common cipher, as a last resort check if the -* server cipher can be used -*/ -if (token ==NULL - && (tls_item_in_cipher_list (server_cipher, peer_ncp_list) - ||streq (server_cipher, remote_cipher))) - { - token = server_cipher; - }char *ret =NULL ;if (token !=NULL )@@ -262,16 +252,18 @@ ncp_get_best_cipher(const char *server_list, const char *server_cipher,return ret; } -void +bool tls_poor_mans_ncp (struct options *o,const char *remote_ciphername) { -if (o->ncp_enabled && remote_ciphername +if (remote_ciphername &&0 !=strcmp (o->ciphername, remote_ciphername)) {if (tls_item_in_cipher_list (remote_ciphername, o->ncp_ciphers)) { o->ciphername =string_alloc (remote_ciphername, &o->gc);msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW ,"Using peer cipher '%s'" , o->ciphername); +return true; } } +return false; }src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h +0
-0@@ -44,10 +44,13 @@ tls_peer_supports_ncp(const char *peer_info);* "Poor man's NCP": Use peer cipher if it is an allowed (NCP) cipher.
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h tls_peer_supports_ncp(const char *peer_info); · line 53
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h +4
-1* Allows non-NCP peers to upgrade their cipher individually. * +* Returns true if we switched to the peer's cipher +* * Make sure to call tls_session_update_crypto_params() after calling this * function. */ -void tls_poor_mans_ncp (struct options *o,const char *remote_ciphername); +bool +tls_poor_mans_ncp (struct options *o,const char *remote_ciphername);
I think we almost always put the return type on the same line in header files. (Don't know why, but it seems quite consistent.) -Steffan
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 9/9] Rework NCP compability logic and drop BF-CBC support by default
10x more wee pointers
Quoted 42 lines · Steffan Karger
Hi,
This is awesome in many ways. Better behaviour, better code and a nice way forward to really get rid of the BF-CBC default cipher.
It's also somewhat tricky, so here goes for a review purely based on stare-at-code:
Quoted 33 lines · Arne Schwabe
This reworks the NCP logic to be more strict about what is considered an acceptable result of an NCP negotiation. It also us to finally drop BF-CBC support by default.
All new behaviour is currently limited to server/client mode with pull enabled. P2p mode without pull does not change.
New Server behaviour:
- when a client announces its supported ciphers through either OCC or IV_CIPHER/IV_NCP we reject the client with aAUTH_FAILEDmessage if we have no common cipher.- When a client does not announce any cipher in either OCC or NCP we by reject it unless fallback-cipher is specified in either ccd or config.
New client behaviour:
- When no cipher is pushed (or a cipher we refused to support) and we also cannot support the server's server announced in OCC we fail the connection and log why- If fallback-cipher is specified we will in the case that cipher is missing from occ use the fallback cipher instead of failing the connection
Both client and server behaviour:
- We only announce --cipher xyz in occ if we are willing to support that cipher.It means that we only announce the fallback-cipher if it is also contained in --data-ciphers
Compatiblity behaviour:
Compatiblity -> Compatibility
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
In 2.5 both client and server will automatically set fallback-cipher xyz if --cipher xyz is in the config and also add append the cipher to the end of data-ciphers.
We log a warn user about this and point to --data-ciphers and --fallback-cipher. This also happens if the configuration contains an explicit --cipher BF-CBC.
If --cipher is not set, we only warn that previous versions allowed BF-CBC and point how to reenable BF-CBC. This might
reenable -> re-enable
(technicality only)
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines
break very few config where someone connects a very old client to a 2.5 server but at some point we need to drop the BF-CBC and those affected use will already have a the scary SWEET32 warning in their logs.
In short: If --cipher is explicitly set 2.6 will work the same as 2.4 did. When --cipher is not set, BF-CBC support is dropped and we warn about it.
Examples how breaking the default BF-CBC will be logged:
Client side:
- Client connecting to server that does not push cipher buthas --cipher in OCC
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
OPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotiate cipher with server. Add the server's cipher ('BF-CBC') to --data-ciphers (currently 'AES-256-GCM:AES-128-CBC') if you want to connect to this server.
- Client connecting to a server that does not support OCC:
OPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotioate cipher with server. Configure --fallback-cipher if you want connect to this server.
negotioate !!!
Quoted 55 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Server Side:
- Server has a client only supporting BF-CBC connecting:> diff --git
a/doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst
b/doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst[ Used the output of "git diff -w" to review, so pasting that here is "original" too. ]
Quoted 15 lines
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +3
-0@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. http://www.cs.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/hmac.html --cipher alg + This option is deprecated for server-client mode and ``--data-ciphers`` + or rarely `--data-ciphers-fallback`` should be used instead. + Encrypt data channel packets with cipher algorithm ``alg``. The default is :code:`BF-CBC`, an abbreviation for Blowfish in Cipherdoc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. · line 189
Quoted 6 lines
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +1
-2@@ -183,8 +186,9 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. ``--server`` ), or if ``--pull`` is specified (client-side, implied by setting --client). - If both peers support and do not disable NCP, the negotiated cipher will - override the cipher specified by ``--cipher``. + If no common cipher is found is found during cipher negotiation, theDuplicate "is found".
Quoted 8 lines
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +2
-0+ connection is terminated. To support old clients/server that do not + provide any cipher support see ``data-ciphers-fallback``. Additionally, to allow for more smooth transition, if NCP is enabled, OpenVPN will inherit the cipher of the peer if that cipher is different@@ -201,8 +205,18 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. This list is restricted to be 127 chars long after conversion to OpenVPN ciphers.doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. · line 214
Quoted 10 lines
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +7
-2- This option was called ``ncp-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.4 but has been renamed - to ``data-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.5 to more accurately reflect its meaning. + This option was called ``--ncp-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.4 but has been renamed + to ``--data-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.5 to more accurately reflect its meaning. + +--data-ciphers-fallback alg + + Configure a cipher that is used to fall back to if the peer does announce + the cipher in OCC.Isn't OCC to much detail here? I'd suggest something like "if we could not determine which cipher the peer is willing to use".
Quoted 8 lines
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side.
Quoted 4 lines
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +4
-0+ This option should normally not be needed. It only exists to allow + connecting to old servers or if supporting old clients as server. + The are only OpenVPN 2.3 and older version that have configured with + `--enable-small`.I find this somewhat hard to read and understand, probably because it /is/ not so easy to understand but... A sugestion (native speakers, please help improve!):
sugestion ;-)
(i know, this is not in the code)
Quoted 4 lines
This option should only be needed when connecting to peers which run OpenVPN 2.3 or earlier, and are compiled with the --enable-small flag (typically used on routers or other embedded devices).
LGTM
(The comma is technically incorrect, commas should not be followed by 'and' or 'but' but it is not important, if you prefer to use them here).
Quoted 282 lines
Quoted 8 lines
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +0
-0--ncp-disable Disable "Negotiable Crypto Parameters". This completely disables ciphersrc/openvpn/crypto.c +0
-0src/openvpn/crypto.c warn_insecure_key_type(const char *ciphername, const cipher_kt_t *cipher) · line 731
Quoted 6 lines
src/openvpn/crypto.c +2
-1@@ -727,7 +727,8 @@ warn_insecure_key_type(const char *ciphername, const cipher_kt_t *cipher) { msg(M_WARN, "WARNING: INSECURE cipher (%s) with block size less than 128" " bit (%d bit). This allows attacks like SWEET32. Mitigate by " - "using a --cipher with a larger block size (e.g. AES-256-CBC).", + "using a --cipher with a larger block size (e.g. AES-256-CBC). " + "Support for these insecure cipher will be removed in OpenVPN 2.6.",These insecure cipher*s*.
Quoted 15 lines
src/openvpn/init.c +8
-1@@ -2374,7 +2374,30 @@ do_deferred_options(struct context *c, const unsigned int found) {/* If the server did not push a --cipher, we will switch to the * remote cipher if it is in our ncp-ciphers list */ -tls_poor_mans_ncp (&c->options, c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername); +bool useremotecipher =tls_poor_mans_ncp (&c->options, + c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername); + +if (!useremotecipher && !c->options.enable_ncp_fallback) + { +/* Give appropiate error message */ +if (c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername) + {src/openvpn/init.c do_deferred_options(struct context *c, const unsigned int found) · line 2394
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/init.c +10
-0+msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"OPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotiate " +"cipher with server. Add the server's " +"cipher ('%s') to --data-ciphers (currently '%s') if " +"you want to connect to this server." , + c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername, + c->options.ncp_ciphers); + } +else + { + msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "OPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotioate "Typo: negotiate.
src/openvpn/init.c do_deferred_options(struct context *c, const unsigned int found) · line 2396
Quoted 2 lines
src/openvpn/init.c +2
-0+"cipher with server. Configure " +"--data-ciphers-fallback if you want connect " Typo: if you want *to* connect.
src/openvpn/init.c do_deferred_options(struct context *c, const unsigned int found) · line 2400
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/init.c +4
-0+ "to this server."); + } +return false; + }This block seems to use more indentation levels than needed. Consider something like:
else if (ncp_enabled) { if (!remote_ciphername) { msg("Failed to negotiate, configure --data-ciphers-fallback"); return false; } if (!tls_poor_mans_ncp) { msg("Failed to negotiate, add cipher xxx to --data-ciphers"); return false; } }Quoted 17 lines
src/openvpn/init.c +0
-0}struct frame *frame_fragment =NULL ;#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT src/openvpn/multi.c +1
-1@@ -1777,7 +1777,7 @@ multi_client_connect_setenv(struct multi_context *m,* - choosen cipher * - peer id */ -static void +static bool multi_client_set_protocol_options (struct context *c) {src/openvpn/multi.c multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) · line 1814
Quoted 9 lines
src/openvpn/multi.c +4
-1@@ -1807,8 +1807,11 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) }/* Select cipher if client supports Negotiable Crypto Parameters */ -if (o->ncp_enabled) +if (!o->ncp_enabled) { +return true; + } +Hm, in this case I don't think this improves things. This turns
if (foo) { do_foo_stuff; } if (bar) { do_bar_stuff; }into
if (foo) { do_foo_stuff; } if (!bar) { return; } do_bar_stuff;I think the orignal code flow is easier to understand. If there's too much indentation for you liking, you can split part of it into a separate function.
(This is just about this first if, I totally agree about the flow change below.)
Quoted 123 lines
src/openvpn/multi.c +47
-17/* if we have already created our key, we cannot *change* our own * cipher -> so log the fact and push the "what we have now" cipher * (so the client is always told what we expect it to use) @@ -1820,43 +1823,69 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c)"server has already generated data channel keys, " "re-sending previously negotiated cipher '%s'" , o->ciphername ); +return true; } -else - { +/* * Push the first cipher from --data-ciphers to the client that * the client announces to be supporting. */ -char *push_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (o->ncp_ciphers, o->ciphername, - peer_info, +char *push_cipher =ncp_get_best_cipher (o->ncp_ciphers, peer_info, tls_multi->remote_ciphername, &o->gc);if (push_cipher) { o->ciphername = push_cipher; +return true; } -else - { + +/* NCP cipher negotiation failed. Try to figure out why exactly it +* failed and give good error messages and potentially do a fallback +* for non NCP clients */ struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); +bool ret = false; +const char *peer_ciphers =tls_peer_ncp_list (peer_info, &gc); +/* If we are in a situation where we know the client ciphers, there is no +* reason to fall back to a cipher that will not be accepted by the other +* side, in this situation we fail the auth*/ if (strlen (peer_ciphers) >0 ) { -msg (M_INFO ,"PUSH: No common cipher between server and " -"client. Expect this connection not to work. Server " -"data-ciphers: '%s', client supported ciphers '%s'" , +msg (M_INFO ,"PUSH: No common cipher between server and client. " +"Server data-ciphers: '%s', client supported ciphers '%s'" , o->ncp_ciphers, peer_ciphers); } +else if (tls_multi->remote_ciphername) + { +msg (M_INFO ,"PUSH: No common cipher between server and client. " +"Server data-ciphers: '%s', client supports cipher '%s'" , + o->ncp_ciphers, tls_multi->remote_ciphername); + }else { -msg (M_INFO ,"No NCP data received from peer, falling back " -"to --cipher '%s'. Peer reports in OCC --cipher '%s'" , - o->ciphername,np (tls_multi->remote_ciphername)); +msg (M_INFO ,"PUSH: No NCP or OCC cipher data received from peer." ); + +if (o->enable_ncp_fallback && !tls_multi->remote_ciphername) + { +msg (M_INFO ,"Using data channel cipher '%s' since " +"--data-ciphers-fallback is set." , o->ciphername); + ret = true; } -gc_free (&gc); +else + { +msg (M_INFO ,"Use --data-ciphers-fallback with the cipher the " +"client is using if you want to allow the client to connect" ); } } +if (!ret) + { +auth_set_client_reason (tls_multi,"Data channel cipher negotiation " +"failed (no shared cipher)" ); } + +gc_free (&gc); +return ret; }/** @@ -2394,13 +2423,17 @@ multi_client_connect_late_setup(struct multi_context *m, mi->context.c2.context_auth =CAS_SUCCEEDED ;/* authentication complete, calculate dynamic client specific options */ -multi_client_set_protocol_options (&mi->context); - -/* Generate data channel keys */ -if (!multi_client_generate_tls_keys (&mi->context)) +if (!multi_client_set_protocol_options (&mi->context)) { mi->context.c2.context_auth =CAS_FAILED ; } +/* Generate data channel keys only if setting protocol options +* has not failed */ +else if (!multi_client_generate_tls_keys (&mi->context)) + { + + mi->context.c2.context_auth =CAS_FAILED ; + }/* send push reply if ready */ if (mi->context.c2.push_request_received)src/openvpn/options.c +0
-1@@ -855,7 +855,6 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc)#if P2MP o->scheduled_exit_interval =5 ;#endif - o->ciphername ="BF-CBC" ; o->ncp_enabled = true; o->ncp_ciphers ="AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM" ; o->authname ="SHA1" ;@@ -3041,6 +3040,69 @@ options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) } }src/openvpn/options.c options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) · line 3051
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +9
-0+static void +options_postprocess_cipher (struct options *o) +{ +if (!o->pull && !(o->mode ==MODE_SERVER )) + { +/* we are in the classic P2P mode */ +/* cipher negotiation (NCP) currently assumes --pull or --mode server */ + o->ncp_enabled = false; + msg( M_WARN, "Dynamic cipher negioation is disabled since neither "Typo: negoatiation. Also "dynamic" seems redundant, "negotiation" already implies that.
As a side note: this warning message should be good enough for devs too, so we probably don't need the comments above that say the same.
src/openvpn/options.c options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) · line 3053
Quoted 1 line
src/openvpn/options.c +1
-0+ "P2MP client nor server mode is enabled" );Was already in the orignal code, but: no space needed after msg(.
src/openvpn/options.c options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) · line 3057
Quoted 3 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +3
-0+/* If the cipher is not set default to BF-CBC, we will warn that this +* is deprecated on cipher initialisation, no need to warn here as +* well */ I had to read this twice to understand meaning. Maybe something like "if the cipher is not set, we set it to the old default value 'BF-CBC'." or so?
src/openvpn/options.c options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) · line 3065
Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +8
-0+if (!o->ciphername) + { + o->ciphername ="BF-CBC" ; + } +return ; + } + +/* M2P mode */
Quoted 6 lines
I think this is "P2MP mode"?
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +4
-0+if (!o->ciphername) + { +msg (M_WARN ,"--cipher is not set. Previous OpenVPN version defaulted to " + "BF-CBC as fallback when dynamic cipher negotiation failed "
unnecessary use of dynamic again.
Quoted 5 lines
src/openvpn/options.c options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) · line 3074
Quoted 5 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +5
-0+" in this case. If you need this fallback please " +"add '--data-ciphers-fallback BF-CBC' to your configuration " + "and/or add BF-CBC to --data-ciphers"); + +/* We still need to set the ciphername to BF-CBC since various other
*cipher name*
Quoted 1 line
src/openvpn/options.c options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) · line 3075
Quoted 1 line
src/openvpn/options.c +1
-0+* parts of OpenVPN assert that the ciphername is set */
*cipher name*
(just a suggestion)
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +6
-0+ o->ciphername ="BF-CBC" ; + +if (!o->ncp_enabled) + { +msg (M_USAGE ,"--ncp-disable needs an explicit --cipher or " +"--data-ciphers-fallback config option" );
Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/options.c options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) · line 3089
Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +8
-0+ } + } +else if (!o->enable_ncp_fallback + && !tls_item_in_cipher_list (o->ciphername, o->ncp_ciphers)) + { +msg (M_WARN ,"DEPRECATED OPTION: --cipher set to '%s' but missing in" +" --ncp-ciphers (%s). Future OpenVPN version will " + "ignore --cipher for dynamic cipher negotiations. "
unnecessary use of dynamic again.
Quoted 56 lines
src/openvpn/options.c options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) · line 3102
Quoted 13 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +13
-0+"Add '%s' to --data-ciphers or change --cipher '%s' to " +"--data-ciphers-fallback '%s' to silence this warning." , + o->ciphername, o->ncp_ciphers, o->ciphername, + o->ciphername, o->ciphername); + o->enable_ncp_fallback = true; + +/* Append the --cipher to ncp_ciphers to allow it in NCP */ +char *ncp_ciphers =gc_malloc (strlen (o->ncp_ciphers) + +strlen (o->ciphername) +1 , false, &o->gc); + +strcpy (ncp_ciphers, o->ncp_ciphers); +strcat (ncp_ciphers,":" ); +strcat (ncp_ciphers, o->ciphername);Can we please avoid using strcpy and strcat? Using
openvpn_snprintf()should result in simpler code, and makes it easier to ensure that we won't overflow.Actually, looks like this already overflows, since there is no space for the null-byte in
ncp_ciphers.Quoted 35 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +5
-10+ o->ncp_ciphers = ncp_ciphers; + } +} +static void options_postprocess_mutate (struct options *o) {@@ -3053,6 +3115,7 @@ options_postprocess_mutate(struct options *o)helper_keepalive (o);helper_tcp_nodelay (o); +options_postprocess_cipher (o);options_postprocess_mutate_invariant (o);if (o->ncp_enabled)@@ -3113,16 +3176,6 @@ options_postprocess_mutate(struct options *o) "include this in your server configuration"); o->dh_file =NULL ; } - -/* cipher negotiation (NCP) currently assumes --pull or --mode server */ -if (o->ncp_enabled - && !(o->pull || o->mode ==MODE_SERVER ) ) - { -msg (M_WARN ,"disabling NCP mode (--ncp-disable) because not " -"in P2MP client or server mode" ); - o->ncp_enabled = false; - } -#if ENABLE_MANAGEMENT if (o->http_proxy_override) {@@ -3658,14 +3711,22 @@ options_string(const struct options *o,*/
Quoted 5 lines
src/openvpn/options.c options_string(const struct options *o, · line 3717
Quoted 5 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +3
-1buf_printf (&out,",dev-type %s" ,dev_type_string (o->dev, o->dev_type)); -buf_printf (&out,",link-mtu %u" , (unsigned int )calc_options_string_link_mtu (o, frame)); +if (o->ciphername) + { +/* the link-mtu that we send has only a meaning if have a fixed
*only has meaning if we have*
Quoted 6 lines
src/openvpn/options.c options_string(const struct options *o, · line 3719
Quoted 2 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +2
-0+* cipher (p2p) or have a fallback cipher for older non ncp +* clients. If we do have a fallback cipher, do not send it */ This confuses me. The code reads like it's dependent on --cipher, rather than --fallbck-cipher. Also shouldn't this be "If we *don't* have a fallback cipher"?
I guess a rewrite then ..
Quoted 177 lines
Quoted 27 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +6
-2+buf_printf (&out,",link-mtu %u" , + (unsigned int )calc_options_string_link_mtu (o, frame)); + }buf_printf (&out,",tun-mtu %d" ,PAYLOAD_SIZE (frame));buf_printf (&out,",proto %s" ,proto_remote (o->ce.proto, remote)); +bool p2p_nopull = o->mode ==MODE_POINT_TO_POINT && !PULL_DEFINED (o);/* send tun_ipv6 only in peer2peer mode - in client/server mode, it * is usually pushed by the server, triggering a non-helpful warning */ -if (o->ifconfig_ipv6_local && o->mode ==MODE_POINT_TO_POINT && !PULL_DEFINED (o)) +if (o->ifconfig_ipv6_local && p2p_nopull) {buf_printf (&out,",tun-ipv6" ); }@@ -3695,7 +3756,7 @@ options_string(const struct options *o, } } -if (tt && o->mode ==MODE_POINT_TO_POINT && !PULL_DEFINED (o)) +if (tt && p2p_nopull) {const char *ios =ifconfig_options_string (tt, remote, o->ifconfig_nowarn, gc);if (ios &&strlen (ios))@@ -3751,8 +3812,15 @@ options_string(const struct options *o,src/openvpn/options.c options_string(const struct options *o, · line 3820
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +6
-2init_key_type (&kt, o->ciphername, o->authname, o->keysize, true, false); - -buf_printf (&out,",cipher %s" ,cipher_kt_name (kt.cipher)); +/* Only announce the cipher to our peer if we are willing to +* support it */ +const char *ciphername =cipher_kt_name (kt.cipher); +if (p2p_nopull || !o->ncp_enabled + || (o->ncp_enabled + &&tls_item_in_cipher_list (ciphername, o->ncp_ciphers)))This second check for
o->ncp_enabledis not needed. You already ensured it's true before. (Saves you a line wrap.)I wonder though, isn't it too soon to stop sending cipher? Looks like both 2.3 and 2.4 clients will currently print options warnings if cipher is missing from OCC. The earlier NCP versions carefully tries to send what the peer expected here to prevent bogus warnings.
Quoted 131 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +11
-1+ { +buf_printf (&out,",cipher %s" , ciphername); + }buf_printf (&out,",auth %s" ,md_kt_name (kt.digest));buf_printf (&out,",keysize %d" , kt.cipher_length *8 );if (o->shared_secret_file)@@ -3870,7 +3938,8 @@ options_warning_safe_scan2(const int msglevel, || strprefix(p1, "keydir ") || strprefix(p1, "proto ") || strprefix(p1, "tls-auth ") - || strprefix(p1, "tun-ipv6")) + || strprefix(p1, "tun-ipv6") + || strprefix(p1, "cipher ")) {return ; }@@ -7860,6 +7929,12 @@ add_option(struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_NCP |OPT_P_INSTANCE ); options->ciphername = p[1 ]; } +else if (streq (p[0 ],"data-ciphers-fallback" ) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) + { +VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_INSTANCE ); + options->ciphername = p[1 ]; + options->enable_ncp_fallback = true; + }else if ((streq (p[0 ],"data-ciphers" ) ||streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" )) && p[1 ] && !p[2 ]) {src/openvpn/options.h +2
-0@@ -503,6 +503,8 @@ struct optionsbool shared_secret_file_inline;int key_direction;const char *ciphername; +bool enable_ncp_fallback;/**< If defined fall back to +* ciphername if NCP fails */ bool ncp_enabled;const char *ncp_ciphers;const char *authname;src/openvpn/ssl.c +6
-5@@ -1932,13 +1932,14 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params(struct tls_session *session,return true; } -if (!session->opt->server - &&0 !=strcmp (options->ciphername, session->opt->config_ciphername) +bool cipher_allowed_as_fallback = options->enable_ncp_fallback + &&streq (options->ciphername, session->opt->config_ciphername); + +if (!session->opt->server && !cipher_allowed_as_fallback && !tls_item_in_cipher_list (options->ciphername, options->ncp_ciphers)) { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"Error: pushed cipher not allowed - %s not in %s or %s" , - options->ciphername, session->opt->config_ciphername, - options->ncp_ciphers); +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"Error: pushed cipher not allowed - %s not in %s" , + options->ciphername, options->ncp_ciphers);/* undo cipher push, abort connection setup */ options->ciphername = session->opt->config_ciphername;return false;src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +6
-14@@ -211,9 +211,8 @@ tls_peer_ncp_list(const char *peer_info, struct gc_arena *gc) }char * -ncp_get_best_cipher (const char *server_list,const char *server_cipher, -const char *peer_info,const char *remote_cipher, -struct gc_arena *gc) +ncp_get_best_cipher (const char *server_list,const char *peer_info, +const char *remote_cipher,struct gc_arena *gc) {/* * The gc of the parameter is tied to the VPN session, create a @@ -242,15 +241,6 @@ ncp_get_best_cipher(const char *server_list, const char *server_cipher,break ; } } -/* We have not found a common cipher, as a last resort check if the -* server cipher can be used -*/ -if (token ==NULL - && (tls_item_in_cipher_list (server_cipher, peer_ncp_list) - ||streq (server_cipher, remote_cipher))) - { - token = server_cipher; - }char *ret =NULL ;if (token !=NULL )@@ -262,16 +252,18 @@ ncp_get_best_cipher(const char *server_list, const char *server_cipher,return ret; } -void +bool tls_poor_mans_ncp (struct options *o,const char *remote_ciphername) { -if (o->ncp_enabled && remote_ciphername +if (remote_ciphername &&0 !=strcmp (o->ciphername, remote_ciphername)) {if (tls_item_in_cipher_list (remote_ciphername, o->ncp_ciphers)) { o->ciphername =string_alloc (remote_ciphername, &o->gc);msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW ,"Using peer cipher '%s'" , o->ciphername); +return true; } } +return false; }src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h +2
-0@@ -44,10 +44,13 @@ tls_peer_supports_ncp(const char *peer_info);* "Poor man's NCP": Use peer cipher if it is an allowed (NCP) cipher. * Allows non-NCP peers to upgrade their cipher individually. * +* Returns true if we switched to the peer's cipher +* * Make sure to call tls_session_update_crypto_params() after calling this * function.
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h tls_peer_supports_ncp(const char *peer_info); · line 53
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h +2
-1*/ -void tls_poor_mans_ncp (struct options *o,const char *remote_ciphername); +bool +tls_poor_mans_ncp (struct options *o,const char *remote_ciphername);I think we almost always put the return type on the same line in header files. (Don't know why, but it seems quite consistent.) -Steffan
HTH
Richard
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 9/9] Rework NCP compability logic and drop BF-CBC support by default
In reply to Steffan KargerAm 28.07.20 um 14:27 schrieb Steffan Karger:
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
* - peer id
*/src/openvpn/multi.c +1
-1-static void +static bool multi_client_set_protocol_options (struct context *c) {@@ -1807,8 +1807,11 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) }
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/multi.c multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) · line 1817
Quoted 7 lines
src/openvpn/multi.c +4
-1/* Select cipher if client supports Negotiable Crypto Parameters */ -if (o->ncp_enabled) +if (!o->ncp_enabled) { +return true; + } +Hm, in this case I don't think this improves things. This turns
Yes. But this code will also be removed as soon as we hit 2.6 master and remove ncp-disable and then the flow should be good.
Quoted 7 lines
Can we please avoid using strcpy and strcat? Using
openvpn_snprintf()should result in simpler code, and makes it easier to ensure that we won't overflow.Actually, looks like this already overflows, since there is no space for the null-byte in
ncp_ciphers.
Yes, I still hate string handling in C. I hope my next attempt is better...
Quoted 9 lines
src/openvpn/options.c options_string(const struct options *o, · line 3719
Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +5
-1buf_printf (&out,",dev-type %s" ,dev_type_string (o->dev, o->dev_type)); -buf_printf (&out,",link-mtu %u" , (unsigned int )calc_options_string_link_mtu (o, frame)); +if (o->ciphername) + { +/* the link-mtu that we send has only a meaning if have a fixed +* cipher (p2p) or have a fallback cipher for older non ncp +* clients. If we do have a fallback cipher, do not send it */
Quoted 3 lines
This confuses me. The code reads like it's dependent on --cipher, rather than --fallbck-cipher. Also shouldn't this be "If we *don't* have a fallback cipher"?
Good catch. First I wanted to set ciphername == NULL in case we don't have a ciphername but to be to difficult for the time being. This an oversight from that try.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
{ const char *ios = ifconfig_options_string(tt, remote, o->ifconfig_nowarn, gc); if (ios && strlen(ios))(quoted diff) +0
-0@@ -3751,8 +3812,15 @@ options_string(const struct options *o,
Quoted 13 lines
src/openvpn/options.c options_string(const struct options *o, · line 3821
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +6
-2init_key_type (&kt, o->ciphername, o->authname, o->keysize, true, false); - -buf_printf (&out,",cipher %s" ,cipher_kt_name (kt.cipher)); +/* Only announce the cipher to our peer if we are willing to +* support it */ +const char *ciphername =cipher_kt_name (kt.cipher); +if (p2p_nopull || !o->ncp_enabled + || (o->ncp_enabled + &&tls_item_in_cipher_list (ciphername, o->ncp_ciphers)))This second check for
o->ncp_enabledis not needed. You already ensured it's true before. (Saves you a line wrap.)
I added to make the condition a bit clearer but I will remove it.
Quoted 4 lines
I wonder though, isn't it too soon to stop sending cipher? Looks like both 2.3 and 2.4 clients will currently print options warnings if cipher is missing from OCC. The earlier NCP versions carefully tries to send what the peer expected here to prevent bogus warnings.
The main reason that I added it that sending it would break compatibility with 2.5 master servers. Since --cipher BF-CBC, a server would assume that it was supported. But I think we can keep sending and instead assume that a client that sends IV_CIPHERS will only support those and not necessarily the one in the OCC cipher. Basically disabling Poor man's NCP when we see a 2.5 client. I would need to fix OpenVPN3 to also include its --cipher in the IV_CIPHERS string but that is doable.
That would bascially break support of David's currently released openpvn3-linux clients since they use openvpn3 master that has currently has the hardcoded list
IV_CIPHERS=CHACHA20-POLY1305:AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM
and we would ignore the OCC cipher. But I think that is acceptable because you need to actively set a ncp-ciphers option on the server to something that removes the GCM ciphers.
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
(quoted diff) +0
-0}src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h +2
-0@@ -44,10 +44,13 @@ tls_peer_supports_ncp(const char *peer_info);* "Poor man's NCP": Use peer cipher if it is an allowed (NCP) cipher. * Allows non-NCP peers to upgrade their cipher individually. * +* Returns true if we switched to the peer's cipher +* * Make sure to call tls_session_update_crypto_params() after calling this * function.
Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h tls_peer_supports_ncp(const char *peer_info); · line 53
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h +2
-1*/ -void tls_poor_mans_ncp (struct options *o,const char *remote_ciphername); +bool +tls_poor_mans_ncp (struct options *o,const char *remote_ciphername);I think we almost always put the return type on the same line in header files. (Don't know why, but it seems quite consistent.) -Steffan
Depends on the header, but you are right.
Arne
Hi,
Quoted 15 lines · Arne Schwabe
This allows us to skip waiting for the first
PUSH_REQUESTmessage from the client to send the response.Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>--- src/openvpn/multi.c | 12 ++++++++++-- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)src/openvpn/multi.c +0
-0
src/openvpn/multi.c multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) · line 1800
Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/multi.c +2
-2@@ -1795,10 +1795,18 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) {int proto =0 ;int r =sscanf (optstr,"IV_PROTO=%d" , &proto); -if ((r ==1 ) && (proto >=2 )) +if (r ==1 ) { - tls_multi->use_peer_id = true; +if (proto >=2 )
I thought it was agreed (but I may be wrong) to substitute this check with a bitwise AND, since this variable is now treated as a bitfield.
Regards,
Quoted 57 lines
src/openvpn/multi.c +8
-0+ { + tls_multi->use_peer_id = true; + } +if (proto &IV_PROTO_REQUEST_PUSH ) + { + c->c2.push_request_received = true; + } } + }/* Select cipher if client supports Negotiable Crypto Parameters */ src/openvpn/ssl.c +13
-2@@ -2299,8 +2299,19 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)buf_printf (&out,"IV_PLAT=win\n" );#endif -/* support for P_DATA_V2 */ -buf_printf (&out,"IV_PROTO=2\n" ); +/* support for P_DATA_V2*/ +int iv_proto =IV_PROTO_DATA_V2 ; + +/* support for receiving push_reply before sending +* push request, also signal that the client wants +* to get push-reply messages without without requiring a round +* trip for a push request message*/ +if (session->opt->pull) + { + iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_REQUEST_PUSH ; + } + +buf_printf (&out,"IV_PROTO=%d\n" , iv_proto);/* support for Negotiable Crypto Parameters */ if (session->opt->ncp_enabledsrc/openvpn/ssl.h +7
-0@@ -99,6 +99,13 @@/* Maximum length of OCC options string passed as part of auth handshake */ #define TLS_OPTIONS_LEN 512 +/* Definitions of the bits in the IV_PROTO bitfield */ +#define IV_PROTO_DATA_V2 (1<<1)/**< Support P_DATA_V2 */ +#define IV_PROTO_REQUEST_PUSH (1<<2)/**< Assume client will send a push +* request and server does not need +* to wait for a push-request to send +* a push-reply */ +/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN"
Signature · 1 line
Antonio Quartulli
PATCH 10/10 Add a note that ncp-ciphers is replaced by data-ciphers
In reply to Arne SchwabeThis patch adds a message that informs the user that the ncp-cipher is renamed to data-ciphers. This should address the following concerns:
- Users being confused by old options.
- Nudge users to use the modern variant of an option
The man page already documents ncp-ciphers as an old name for data-ciphers, so looking it up in the man page will also work.
Note that I did not add "deprecated old option" to this message since I still think that eventually removing the option will only break configs and we gain almost nothing from that.
Also still accepting the option even though we do not recommend usage of it also follows the robustness principle of:
"be strict in what you send and tolerant in what you receive"
--- src/openvpn/options.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
src/openvpn/options.c +5 -0
@@ -7939,6 +7939,11 @@ add_option(struct options *options, && p[1] && !p[2]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL |OPT_P_INSTANCE ); +if (streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" )) + { +msg (M_INFO ,"Note: Rewriting option '--ncp-ciphers' to " +" '--data-ciphers'" ); + } options->ncp_ciphers = p[1 ]; } else if (streq(p[0], "ncp-disable") && !p[1])
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 10/10] Add a note that ncp-ciphers is replaced by data-ciphers
Am 24.07.20 um 16:04 schrieb Arne Schwabe:
Quoted 29 lines
This patch adds a message that informs the user that the ncp-cipher is renamed to data-ciphers. This should address the following concerns:
- Users being confused by old options.
- Nudge users to use the modern variant of an optionThe man page already documents ncp-ciphers as an old name for data-ciphers, so looking it up in the man page will also work.
Note that I did not add "deprecated old option" to this message since I still think that eventually removing the option will only break configs and we gain almost nothing from that.
Also still accepting the option even though we do not recommend usage of it also follows the robustness principle of:
"be strict in what you send and tolerant in what you receive"Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>--- src/openvpn/options.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)src/openvpn/options.c +0
-0@@ -7939,6 +7939,11 @@ add_option(struct options *options, && p[1] && !p[2])
src/openvpn/options.c add_option(struct options *options, · line 7949
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +5
-0{VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL |OPT_P_INSTANCE ); +if (streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" )) + { +msg (M_INFO ,"Note: Rewriting option '--ncp-ciphers' to " +" '--data-ciphers'" ); + } options->ncp_ciphers = p[1 ]; } else if (streq(p[0], "ncp-disable") && !p[1])
Sorry, send out an old version. V2 incoming.
Arne
PATCH v2 10/10 Add a note that ncp-ciphers is replaced by data-ciphers
In reply to Arne SchwabeThis patch adds a message that informs the user that the ncp-cipher is renamed to data-ciphers. This should address the following concerns:
- Users being confused by old options.
- Nudge users to use the modern variant of an option
The man page already documents ncp-ciphers as an old name for data-ciphers, so looking it up in the man page will also work.
Note that I did not add "deprecated old option" to this message since I still think that eventually removing the option will only break configs and we gain almost nothing from that.
Also still accepting the option even though we do not recommend usage of it also follows the robustness principle of:
"be strict in what you send and tolerant in what you receive"
--- src/openvpn/options.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
src/openvpn/options.c +5 -0
@@ -7939,7 +7939,11 @@ add_option(struct options *options, && p[1] && !p[2]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL |OPT_P_INSTANCE ); +if (streq (p[0 ],"ncp-ciphers" )) + { +msg (M_INFO ,"Note: Treating option '--ncp-ciphers' as " +" '--data-ciphers' (renamed in OpenVPN 2.5)." ); + } options->ncp_ciphers = p[1 ]; } else if (streq(p[0], "ncp-disable") && !p[1])
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Add a note that ncp-ciphers is replaced by data-ciphers
From the discussions and mails in the 8/9 thread, I understand that this is acceptable to everyone involved. So, move forward with improving our common project!
Code looks good, and compiles. Even tested it. Works.
Your patch has been applied to the master branch.
commit 342f9b78f107530f67581d6247d38af0792e4243
Author: Arne Schwabe Date: Fri Jul 24 16:25:57 2020 +0200
Add a note that ncp-ciphers is replaced by data-ciphers
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg20573.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering