selinux-notebook: describe nosuid and NNP transitions
PATCH 1/1 selinux-notebook: describe nosuid and NNP transitions
Describe cases where nosuid_transition or nnp_transition are needed.
--- src/computing_security_contexts.md | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/computing_security_contexts.md +8 -1
@@ -84,7 +84,14 @@ Processes inherit their security context as follows: *default_type* (policy version 28) or if a security-aware process, by calling ***setexeccon**(3)* if permitted by policy prior to invoking exec. -3. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to +3. If the file system is mounted with *nosuid* flag, type transitions + require permission *nosuid_transition*. If the thread has + *no_new_privs* attribute set, the transition requires + *nnp_transition*. For both transitions, policy capability + *nnp_nosuid_transition* is also required. See also + [**Linux Security Module and SELinux**](lsm_selinux.md#linux-security-module-and-selinux) + section. +4. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to switch its security context (if permitted by policy) although this practice is generally discouraged - exec-based transitions are preferred.
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 14 lines · Topi Miettinen
Describe cases where
nosuid_transitionornnp_transitionare needed.Signed-off-by Topi Miettinen <[email protected]>--- src/computing_security_contexts.md | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)src/computing_security_contexts.md +0
-0@@ -84,7 +84,14 @@ Processes inherit their security context as follows: *default_type* (policy version 28) or if a security-aware process,
src/computing_security_contexts.md Processes inherit their security context as follows: · line 93
Quoted 10 lines
src/computing_security_contexts.md +7
-1by calling ***setexeccon**(3)* if permitted by policy prior to invoking exec. -3. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to +3. If the file system is mounted with *nosuid* flag, type transitions + require permission *nosuid_transition*. If the thread has + *no_new_privs* attribute set, the transition requires + *nnp_transition*. For both transitions, policy capability + *nnp_nosuid_transition* is also required. See also + [**Linux Security Module and SELinux**](lsm_selinux.md#linux-security-module-and-selinux) + section.
Thanks for adding this text, however I might suggest the following changes:
"If the loaded SELinux policy has the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability enabled there are potentially two additional permissions that are required to permit a domain transition: nosuid_transition for nosuid mounted filesystems, and nnp_transition for for threads with the no_new_privs flag."
... does that make sense?
Quoted 6 lines
src/computing_security_contexts.md +1
-1+4. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to switch its security context (if permitted by policy) although this practice is generally discouraged - exec-based transitions are preferred. --2.30.2
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Quoted 28 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 14 lines · Topi Miettinen
Describe cases where
nosuid_transitionornnp_transitionare needed.Signed-off-by Topi Miettinen <[email protected]>--- src/computing_security_contexts.md | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)src/computing_security_contexts.md +0
-0@@ -84,7 +84,14 @@ Processes inherit their security context as follows: *default_type* (policy version 28) or if a security-aware process,src/computing_security_contexts.md Processes inherit their security context as follows: · line 93
Quoted 10 lines
src/computing_security_contexts.md +7
-1by calling ***setexeccon**(3)* if permitted by policy prior to invoking exec. -3. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to +3. If the file system is mounted with *nosuid* flag, type transitions + require permission *nosuid_transition*. If the thread has + *no_new_privs* attribute set, the transition requires + *nnp_transition*. For both transitions, policy capability + *nnp_nosuid_transition* is also required. See also + [**Linux Security Module and SELinux**](lsm_selinux.md#linux-security-module-and-selinux) + section.Thanks for adding this text, however I might suggest the following changes:
Quoted 7 lines
"If the loaded SELinux policy has the
nnp_nosuid_transitionpolicy capability enabled there are potentially two additional permissions that are required to permit a domain transition:nosuid_transitionfor nosuid mounted filesystems, andnnp_transitionfor for threads with theno_new_privsflag."... does that make sense?
Yes. I'd then add:
"If nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is disabled, such domain transitions are denied."
-Topi
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
src/computing_security_contexts.md +1
-1+4. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to switch its security context (if permitted by policy) although this practice is generally discouraged - exec-based transitions are preferred. --2.30.2
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 35 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 34 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 14 lines · Topi Miettinen
Describe cases where
nosuid_transitionornnp_transitionare needed.Signed-off-by Topi Miettinen <[email protected]>--- src/computing_security_contexts.md | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)src/computing_security_contexts.md +0
-0@@ -84,7 +84,14 @@ Processes inherit their security context as follows: *default_type* (policy version 28) or if a security-aware process,src/computing_security_contexts.md Processes inherit their security context as follows: · line 93
Quoted 10 lines
src/computing_security_contexts.md +7
-1by calling ***setexeccon**(3)* if permitted by policy prior to invoking exec. -3. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to +3. If the file system is mounted with *nosuid* flag, type transitions + require permission *nosuid_transition*. If the thread has + *no_new_privs* attribute set, the transition requires + *nnp_transition*. For both transitions, policy capability + *nnp_nosuid_transition* is also required. See also + [**Linux Security Module and SELinux**](lsm_selinux.md#linux-security-module-and-selinux) + section.Thanks for adding this text, however I might suggest the following changes:
"If the loaded SELinux policy has the
nnp_nosuid_transitionpolicy capability enabled there are potentially two additional permissions that are required to permit a domain transition:nosuid_transitionfor nosuid mounted filesystems, andnnp_transitionfor for threads with theno_new_privsflag."
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
... does that make sense?
Yes. I'd then add:
"If
nnp_nosuid_transitionpolicy capability is disabled, such domain transitions are denied."
In most cases, yes that is correct, but bounded domain transitions are still allowed in the case where the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is not enabled.
Did you want to respin the patch with the above changes?
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Quoted 38 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 37 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 35 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 14 lines · Topi Miettinen
Describe cases where
nosuid_transitionornnp_transitionare needed.Signed-off-by Topi Miettinen <[email protected]>--- src/computing_security_contexts.md | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)src/computing_security_contexts.md +0
-0@@ -84,7 +84,14 @@ Processes inherit their security context as follows: *default_type* (policy version 28) or if a security-aware process,src/computing_security_contexts.md Processes inherit their security context as follows: · line 93
Quoted 10 lines
src/computing_security_contexts.md +7
-1by calling ***setexeccon**(3)* if permitted by policy prior to invoking exec. -3. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to +3. If the file system is mounted with *nosuid* flag, type transitions + require permission *nosuid_transition*. If the thread has + *no_new_privs* attribute set, the transition requires + *nnp_transition*. For both transitions, policy capability + *nnp_nosuid_transition* is also required. See also + [**Linux Security Module and SELinux**](lsm_selinux.md#linux-security-module-and-selinux) + section.Thanks for adding this text, however I might suggest the following changes:
"If the loaded SELinux policy has the
nnp_nosuid_transitionpolicy capability enabled there are potentially two additional permissions that are required to permit a domain transition:nosuid_transitionfor nosuid mounted filesystems, andnnp_transitionfor for threads with theno_new_privsflag."... does that make sense?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes. I'd then add:
"If
nnp_nosuid_transitionpolicy capability is disabled, such domain transitions are denied."In most cases, yes that is correct, but bounded domain transitions are still allowed in the case where the
nnp_nosuid_transitionpolicy capability is not enabled.
I see. May I propose then:
"If nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is disabled, such domain
transitions are denied but bounded domain transitions are still allowed. In bounded transitions, target domain is only allowed a subset of the permissions of the source domain."
-Topi
Quoted 47 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 46 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 44 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 31 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 19 lines · Topi Miettinen
Describe cases where
nosuid_transitionornnp_transitionare needed.Signed-off-by Topi Miettinen <[email protected]>---
src/computing_security_contexts.md| 9 ++++++++-1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)src/computing_security_contexts.md +0
-0@@ -84,7 +84,14 @@ Processes inherit their security context asfollows:
*default_type* (policy version 28) or if a security-aware process, by calling ***setexeccon**(3)* if permitted by policy prior to invoking exec.
-3. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* toQuoted 8 lines
+3. If the file system is mounted with *nosuid* flag, type transitions + require permission *nosuid_transition*. If the thread has + *no_new_privs* attribute set, the transition requires
+ *nnp_transition*. For both transitions, policy capability + *nnp_nosuid_transition* is also required. See also
+ [**Linux Security Module and SELinux**](lsm_selinux.md#linux-security-module-and-selinux) + section.Thanks for adding this text, however I might suggest the following changes:
Quoted 7 lines
"If the loaded SELinux policy has the
nnp_nosuid_transitionpolicy capability enabled there are potentially two additional permissions that are required to permit a domain transition:nosuid_transitionfor nosuid mounted filesystems, andnnp_transitionfor for threads with theno_new_privsflag."... does that make sense?
Yes. I'd then add:
"If
nnp_nosuid_transitionpolicy capability is disabled, such domain transitions are denied."
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
In most cases, yes that is correct, but bounded domain transitions are still allowed in the case where the
nnp_nosuid_transitionpolicy capability is not enabled.I see. May I propose then:
"If
nnp_nosuid_transitionpolicy capability is disabled, such domain
transitions are denied but bounded domain transitions are still allowed. In bounded transitions, target domain is only allowed a subset of the permissions of the source domain."
By the way, the background for this patch (and others for mount(2), mount(8) and selinux(8)) was that I recently proposed new heuristics for systemd where in case no_new_privileges would be implied (for example, due to use of seccomp), all file systems would be mounted nosuid since setuid/setgid wouldn't be allowed anyway. The heuristics patch was applied but later reverted because of problems it may cause for SELinux. I didn't know then how SELinux uses the flag to also control domain transitions. Also the case seems to be underdocumented, which I'm trying to improve with the patches.
Regarding the heuristics, perhaps instead of tying MAC behavior (also FS capabilities) to a DAC concept of setuid/setgid with MS_NOSUID, there should be new mount flags which would allow more precise handling of all combinations of SUID, SELinux domain transitions and FS capabilities. For example "nosuid,security=selinux=domain_transitions_allowed:capability=fs_caps_allowed". Then systemd could safely mount all file systems "nosuid" (when NNP is already going to be enforced) while keeping behavior of SELinux domain transitions and FS capabilities unchanged.
-Topi
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 48 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 38 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 37 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 35 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 14 lines · Topi Miettinen
Describe cases where
nosuid_transitionornnp_transitionare needed.Signed-off-by Topi Miettinen <[email protected]>--- src/computing_security_contexts.md | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)src/computing_security_contexts.md +0
-0@@ -84,7 +84,14 @@ Processes inherit their security context as follows: *default_type* (policy version 28) or if a security-aware process,src/computing_security_contexts.md Processes inherit their security context as follows: · line 93
Quoted 10 lines
src/computing_security_contexts.md +7
-1by calling ***setexeccon**(3)* if permitted by policy prior to invoking exec. -3. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to +3. If the file system is mounted with *nosuid* flag, type transitions + require permission *nosuid_transition*. If the thread has + *no_new_privs* attribute set, the transition requires + *nnp_transition*. For both transitions, policy capability + *nnp_nosuid_transition* is also required. See also + [**Linux Security Module and SELinux**](lsm_selinux.md#linux-security-module-and-selinux) + section.Thanks for adding this text, however I might suggest the following changes:
"If the loaded SELinux policy has the
nnp_nosuid_transitionpolicy capability enabled there are potentially two additional permissions that are required to permit a domain transition:nosuid_transitionfor nosuid mounted filesystems, andnnp_transitionfor for threads with theno_new_privsflag."... does that make sense?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes. I'd then add:
"If
nnp_nosuid_transitionpolicy capability is disabled, such domain transitions are denied."In most cases, yes that is correct, but bounded domain transitions are still allowed in the case where the
nnp_nosuid_transitionpolicy capability is not enabled.
Quoted 6 lines
I see. May I propose then:
"If
nnp_nosuid_transitionpolicy capability is disabled, such domain transitions are denied but bounded domain transitions are still allowed. In bounded transitions, target domain is only allowed a subset of the permissions of the source domain."
That sounds good to me.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com