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selinux-notebook: describe nosuid and NNP transitions

PATCH Superseded Topi Miettinen 2 participants 7 messages Jun 12, 2021 – Jun 21, 2021 SELinux security module

v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 selinux-notebook: describe nosuid and NNP transitions

Describe cases where nosuid_transition or nnp_transition are needed.

---
 src/computing_security_contexts.md | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/computing_security_contexts.md +8 -1
index bb946b5..7bd1d87 100644
@@ -84,7 +84,14 @@ Processes inherit their security context as follows:
    *default_type* (policy version 28) or if a security-aware process,
    by calling ***setexeccon**(3)* if permitted by policy prior to
    invoking exec.
-3. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to
+3. If the file system is mounted with *nosuid* flag, type transitions
+   require permission *nosuid_transition*. If the thread has
+   *no_new_privs* attribute set, the transition requires
+   *nnp_transition*. For both transitions, policy capability
+   *nnp_nosuid_transition* is also required. See also
+   [**Linux Security Module and SELinux**](lsm_selinux.md#linux-security-module-and-selinux)
+   section.
+4. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to
    switch its security context (if permitted by policy) although this
    practice is generally discouraged - exec-based transitions are
    preferred.
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 14 lines · Topi Miettinen

Describe cases where nosuid_transition or nnp_transition are needed.

---
 src/computing_security_contexts.md | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/computing_security_contexts.md +0 -0
index bb946b5..7bd1d87 100644
@@ -84,7 +84,14 @@ Processes inherit their security context as follows:
    *default_type* (policy version 28) or if a security-aware process,

src/computing_security_contexts.md Processes inherit their security context as follows: · line 93

Quoted 10 lines
src/computing_security_contexts.md +7 -1
    by calling ***setexeccon**(3)* if permitted by policy prior to
    invoking exec.
-3. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to
+3. If the file system is mounted with *nosuid* flag, type transitions
+   require permission *nosuid_transition*. If the thread has
+   *no_new_privs* attribute set, the transition requires
+   *nnp_transition*. For both transitions, policy capability
+   *nnp_nosuid_transition* is also required. See also
+   [**Linux Security Module and SELinux**](lsm_selinux.md#linux-security-module-and-selinux)
+   section.

Thanks for adding this text, however I might suggest the following changes:

"If the loaded SELinux policy has the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability enabled there are potentially two additional permissions that are required to permit a domain transition: nosuid_transition for nosuid mounted filesystems, and nnp_transition for for threads with the no_new_privs flag."

... does that make sense?

Quoted 6 lines
src/computing_security_contexts.md +1 -1
+4. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to
    switch its security context (if permitted by policy) although this
    practice is generally discouraged - exec-based transitions are
    preferred.
--

2.30.2

Signature · 2 lines
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
#2 lore raw
Quoted 28 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 14 lines · Topi Miettinen

Describe cases where nosuid_transition or nnp_transition are needed.

---
  src/computing_security_contexts.md | 9 ++++++++-
  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/computing_security_contexts.md +0 -0
index bb946b5..7bd1d87 100644
@@ -84,7 +84,14 @@ Processes inherit their security context as follows:
     *default_type* (policy version 28) or if a security-aware process,

src/computing_security_contexts.md Processes inherit their security context as follows: · line 93

Quoted 10 lines
src/computing_security_contexts.md +7 -1
     by calling ***setexeccon**(3)* if permitted by policy prior to
     invoking exec.
-3. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to
+3. If the file system is mounted with *nosuid* flag, type transitions
+   require permission *nosuid_transition*. If the thread has
+   *no_new_privs* attribute set, the transition requires
+   *nnp_transition*. For both transitions, policy capability
+   *nnp_nosuid_transition* is also required. See also
+   [**Linux Security Module and SELinux**](lsm_selinux.md#linux-security-module-and-selinux)
+   section.

Thanks for adding this text, however I might suggest the following changes:

Quoted 7 lines

"If the loaded SELinux policy has the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability enabled there are potentially two additional permissions that are required to permit a domain transition: nosuid_transition for nosuid mounted filesystems, and nnp_transition for for threads with the no_new_privs flag."

... does that make sense?

Yes. I'd then add:

"If nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is disabled, such domain transitions are denied."

-Topi

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
src/computing_security_contexts.md +1 -1
+4. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to
     switch its security context (if permitted by policy) although this
     practice is generally discouraged - exec-based transitions are
     preferred.
--

2.30.2

maintainer
#3 lore raw
Quoted 35 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 34 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 14 lines · Topi Miettinen

Describe cases where nosuid_transition or nnp_transition are needed.

---
  src/computing_security_contexts.md | 9 ++++++++-
  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/computing_security_contexts.md +0 -0
index bb946b5..7bd1d87 100644
@@ -84,7 +84,14 @@ Processes inherit their security context as follows:
     *default_type* (policy version 28) or if a security-aware process,

src/computing_security_contexts.md Processes inherit their security context as follows: · line 93

Quoted 10 lines
src/computing_security_contexts.md +7 -1
     by calling ***setexeccon**(3)* if permitted by policy prior to
     invoking exec.
-3. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to
+3. If the file system is mounted with *nosuid* flag, type transitions
+   require permission *nosuid_transition*. If the thread has
+   *no_new_privs* attribute set, the transition requires
+   *nnp_transition*. For both transitions, policy capability
+   *nnp_nosuid_transition* is also required. See also
+   [**Linux Security Module and SELinux**](lsm_selinux.md#linux-security-module-and-selinux)
+   section.

Thanks for adding this text, however I might suggest the following changes:

"If the loaded SELinux policy has the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability enabled there are potentially two additional permissions that are required to permit a domain transition: nosuid_transition for nosuid mounted filesystems, and nnp_transition for for threads with the no_new_privs flag."

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

... does that make sense?

Yes. I'd then add:

"If nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is disabled, such domain transitions are denied."

In most cases, yes that is correct, but bounded domain transitions are still allowed in the case where the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is not enabled.

Did you want to respin the patch with the above changes?

Signature · 2 lines
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
#4 lore raw
Quoted 38 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 37 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 35 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 14 lines · Topi Miettinen

Describe cases where nosuid_transition or nnp_transition are needed.

---
   src/computing_security_contexts.md | 9 ++++++++-
   1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/computing_security_contexts.md +0 -0
index bb946b5..7bd1d87 100644
@@ -84,7 +84,14 @@ Processes inherit their security context as follows:
      *default_type* (policy version 28) or if a security-aware process,

src/computing_security_contexts.md Processes inherit their security context as follows: · line 93

Quoted 10 lines
src/computing_security_contexts.md +7 -1
      by calling ***setexeccon**(3)* if permitted by policy prior to
      invoking exec.
-3. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to
+3. If the file system is mounted with *nosuid* flag, type transitions
+   require permission *nosuid_transition*. If the thread has
+   *no_new_privs* attribute set, the transition requires
+   *nnp_transition*. For both transitions, policy capability
+   *nnp_nosuid_transition* is also required. See also
+   [**Linux Security Module and SELinux**](lsm_selinux.md#linux-security-module-and-selinux)
+   section.

Thanks for adding this text, however I might suggest the following changes:

"If the loaded SELinux policy has the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability enabled there are potentially two additional permissions that are required to permit a domain transition: nosuid_transition for nosuid mounted filesystems, and nnp_transition for for threads with the no_new_privs flag."

... does that make sense?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Yes. I'd then add:

"If nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is disabled, such domain transitions are denied."

In most cases, yes that is correct, but bounded domain transitions are still allowed in the case where the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is not enabled.

I see. May I propose then:

"If nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is disabled, such domain
transitions are denied but bounded domain transitions are still allowed. In bounded transitions, target domain is only allowed a subset of the permissions of the source domain."

-Topi

#5 lore raw
Quoted 47 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 46 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 44 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 31 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 19 lines · Topi Miettinen

Describe cases where nosuid_transition or nnp_transition are needed.

---
   src/computing_security_contexts.md | 9 ++++++++-

   1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/computing_security_contexts.md +0 -0
index bb946b5..7bd1d87 100644
@@ -84,7 +84,14 @@ Processes inherit their security context as 

follows:
      *default_type* (policy version 28) or if a security-aware process, by calling ***setexeccon**(3)* if permitted by policy prior to invoking exec.
-3. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to

Quoted 8 lines

+3. If the file system is mounted with *nosuid* flag, type transitions +   require permission *nosuid_transition*. If the thread has +   *no_new_privs* attribute set, the transition requires
+   *nnp_transition*. For both transitions, policy capability +   *nnp_nosuid_transition* is also required. See also
+   [**Linux Security Module and SELinux**](lsm_selinux.md#linux-security-module-and-selinux) +   section.

Thanks for adding this text, however I might suggest the following changes:

Quoted 7 lines

"If the loaded SELinux policy has the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability enabled there are potentially two additional permissions that are required to permit a domain transition: nosuid_transition for nosuid mounted filesystems, and nnp_transition for for threads with the no_new_privs flag."

... does that make sense?

Yes. I'd then add:

"If nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is disabled, such domain transitions are denied."

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

In most cases, yes that is correct, but bounded domain transitions are still allowed in the case where the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is not enabled.

I see. May I propose then:

"If nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is disabled, such domain
transitions are denied but bounded domain transitions are still allowed. In bounded transitions, target domain is only allowed a subset of the permissions of the source domain."

By the way, the background for this patch (and others for mount(2), mount(8) and selinux(8)) was that I recently proposed new heuristics for systemd where in case no_new_privileges would be implied (for example, due to use of seccomp), all file systems would be mounted nosuid since setuid/setgid wouldn't be allowed anyway. The heuristics patch was applied but later reverted because of problems it may cause for SELinux. I didn't know then how SELinux uses the flag to also control domain transitions. Also the case seems to be underdocumented, which I'm trying to improve with the patches.

Regarding the heuristics, perhaps instead of tying MAC behavior (also FS capabilities) to a DAC concept of setuid/setgid with MS_NOSUID, there should be new mount flags which would allow more precise handling of all combinations of SUID, SELinux domain transitions and FS capabilities. For example "nosuid,security=selinux=domain_transitions_allowed:capability=fs_caps_allowed". Then systemd could safely mount all file systems "nosuid" (when NNP is already going to be enforced) while keeping behavior of SELinux domain transitions and FS capabilities unchanged.

-Topi

maintainer
#6 lore raw
In reply to Topi Miettinen
Quoted 48 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 38 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 37 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 35 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 14 lines · Topi Miettinen

Describe cases where nosuid_transition or nnp_transition are needed.

---
   src/computing_security_contexts.md | 9 ++++++++-
   1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/computing_security_contexts.md +0 -0
index bb946b5..7bd1d87 100644
@@ -84,7 +84,14 @@ Processes inherit their security context as follows:
      *default_type* (policy version 28) or if a security-aware process,

src/computing_security_contexts.md Processes inherit their security context as follows: · line 93

Quoted 10 lines
src/computing_security_contexts.md +7 -1
      by calling ***setexeccon**(3)* if permitted by policy prior to
      invoking exec.
-3. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to
+3. If the file system is mounted with *nosuid* flag, type transitions
+   require permission *nosuid_transition*. If the thread has
+   *no_new_privs* attribute set, the transition requires
+   *nnp_transition*. For both transitions, policy capability
+   *nnp_nosuid_transition* is also required. See also
+   [**Linux Security Module and SELinux**](lsm_selinux.md#linux-security-module-and-selinux)
+   section.

Thanks for adding this text, however I might suggest the following changes:

"If the loaded SELinux policy has the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability enabled there are potentially two additional permissions that are required to permit a domain transition: nosuid_transition for nosuid mounted filesystems, and nnp_transition for for threads with the no_new_privs flag."

... does that make sense?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Yes. I'd then add:

"If nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is disabled, such domain transitions are denied."

In most cases, yes that is correct, but bounded domain transitions are still allowed in the case where the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is not enabled.

Quoted 6 lines

I see. May I propose then:

"If nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is disabled, such domain transitions are denied but bounded domain transitions are still allowed. In bounded transitions, target domain is only allowed a subset of the permissions of the source domain."

That sounds good to me.

Signature · 2 lines
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com