amd/msr: implement MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests
v5 cover amd/msr: implement MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests
Hello,
The following series implements support for MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (VIRT_SSBD) on different AMD CPU families.
Note that the support is added backwards, starting with the newer CPUs that support MSR_SPEC_CTRL and moving to the older ones either using MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL or the SSBD bit in LS_CFG.
Xen is still free to use it's own SSBD setting, as the selection is context switched on vm{entry,exit}.
On Zen2 and later, SPEC_CTRL.SSBD should exist and should be used in preference to VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD. However, for migration compatibility, Xen offers VIRT_SSBD to guests (in the max cpuid policy, not default) implemented in terms of SPEC_CTRL.SSBD.
On Fam15h thru Zen1, Xen exposes VIRT_SSBD to guests by default to abstract away the model and/or hypervisor specific differences in MSR_LS_CFG/MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.
So the implementation of VIRT_SSBD exposed to HVM guests will use one of the following underlying mechanisms, in the preference order listed below:
* SPEC_CTRL.SSBD: patch 1
* VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD: patch 2.
* Non-architectural way using LS_CFG: patch 3.
NB: patch 3 introduces some logic in GIF=0 context, such logic has been kept to a minimum due to the special context it's running on.
Roger Pau Monne (3):
amd/msr: implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests on top of SPEC_CTRL amd/msr: allow passthrough of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests amd/msr: implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests using legacy SSBD
CHANGELOG.md | 3 + xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++--- xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c | 17 +++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S | 8 ++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 39 +++++++ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/amd.h | 4 + xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 14 +++ xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 26 +++++ xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 12 +- xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 2 +- 12 files changed, 229 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
PATCH v5 1/3 amd/msr: implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests on top of SPEC_CTRL
Use the logic to set shadow SPEC_CTRL values in order to implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (signaled by VIRT_SSBD CPUID flag) for HVM guests. This includes using the spec_ctrl vCPU MSR variable to store the guest set value of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD, which will be OR'ed with any SPEC_CTRL values being set by the guest.
On hardware having SPEC_CTRL VIRT_SPEC_CTRL will not be offered by default to guests. VIRT_SPEC_CTRL will only be part of the max CPUID policy so it can be enabled for compatibility purposes.
Use '!' to annotate the feature in order to express that the presence of the bit is not directly tied to its value in the host policy.
---
Changes since v3:
- Use '!' to annotate the feature.
Changes since v2:
- Reword reasoning for using '!s'.
- Trim comment about only setting SSBD bit in spec_ctrl.raw.
Changes since v1:
- Only expose VIRT_SSBD if AMD_SSBD is available on the host.
- Revert change to msr-sc= command line option documentation.
- Only set or clear the SSBD bit of spec_ctrl.
--- xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c | 7 +++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 4 ++++ xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 3 ++- xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 2 +- 6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +7 -0
@@ -550,6 +550,13 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void)__clear_bit (X86_FEATURE_IBRSB , hvm_featureset);__clear_bit (X86_FEATURE_IBRS , hvm_featureset); } +else if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD ) ) +/* +* If SPEC_CTRL.SSBD is available VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD can be exposed +* and implemented using the former. Expose in the max policy only as +* the preference is for guests to use SPEC_CTRL.SSBD if available. +*/ +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset);/* * With VT-x, some features are only supported by Xen if dedicated
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +1 -0
@@ -1334,6 +1334,7 @@ static const uint32_t msrs_to_send[] = {MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES ,MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS ,MSR_IA32_XSS , +MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL ,MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK ,MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK , MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK,
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h +4 -0
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ struct vcpu_msrs {/* * 0x00000048 - MSR_SPEC_CTRL +* 0xc001011f - MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (if X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD) * * For PV guests, this holds the guest kernel value. It is accessed on * every entry/exit path.
@@ -306,6 +307,9 @@ struct vcpu_msrs* We must clear/restore Xen's value before/after VMRUN to avoid unduly * influencing the guest. In order to support "behind the guest's back" * protections, we load this value (commonly 0) before VMRUN. +* +* Once of such "behind the guest's back" usages is setting SPEC_CTRL.SSBD +* if the guest sets VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD. */ struct {uint32_t raw;
xen/arch/x86/msr.c +18 -0
@@ -383,6 +383,13 @@ int guest_rdmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val) ? K8_HWCR_TSC_FREQ_SEL : 0;break ; +case MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL : +if ( !cp->extd.virt_ssbd ) + goto gp_fault; + + *val = msrs->spec_ctrl.raw &SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; +break ; +case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG :if ( !(cp->x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD |X86_VENDOR_HYGON )) ) goto gp_fault;
@@ -668,6 +675,17 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val)wrmsr_tsc_aux (val);break ; +case MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL : +if ( !cp->extd.virt_ssbd ) + goto gp_fault; + +/* Only supports SSBD bit, the rest are ignored. */ +if ( val &SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ) + msrs->spec_ctrl.raw |=SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; +else + msrs->spec_ctrl.raw &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; +break ; +case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG :/* * OpenBSD 6.7 will panic if writing to DE_CFG triggers a #GP:
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +2 -1
@@ -402,12 +402,13 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)* mitigation support for guests. */ #ifdef CONFIG_HVM -printk (" Support for HVM VMs:%s%s%s%s%s\n" , +printk (" Support for HVM VMs:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n" , (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ) ||boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM ) ||boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR ) || opt_eager_fpu) ?"" :" None" ,boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ) ?" MSR_SPEC_CTRL" :"" , +boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ) ?" MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL" :"" ,boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM ) ?" RSB" :"" , opt_eager_fpu ?" EAGER_FPU" :"" ,boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR ) ?" MD_CLEAR" :"" );
xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h +1 -1
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBRS_SAME_MODE, 8*32+19) /*S IBRS provides same-mode protection XEN_CPUFEATURE(NO_LMSL, 8*32+20) /*S EFER.LMSLE no longer supported. */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(AMD_PPIN, 8*32+23) /* Protected Processor Inventory Number */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(AMD_SSBD, 8*32+24) /*S MSR_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD available */ -XEN_CPUFEATURE(VIRT_SSBD, 8*32+25) /* MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD */ +XEN_CPUFEATURE(VIRT_SSBD, 8*32+25) /*! MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SSB_NO, 8*32+26) /*A Hardware not vulnerable to SSB */XEN_CPUFEATURE (PSFD ,8 *32 +28 )/*S MSR_SPEC_CTRL.PSFD */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
PATCH v5 2/3 amd/msr: allow passthrough of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests
In reply to Roger Pau MonneAllow HVM guests access to MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL if the platform Xen is running on has support for it. This requires adding logic in the vm{entry,exit} paths for SVM in order to context switch between the hypervisor value and the guest one. The added handlers for context switch will also be used for the legacy SSBD support.
Introduce a new synthetic feature leaf (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM) to signal whether VIRT_SPEC_CTRL needs to be handled on guest vm{entry,exit}.
---
Changes since v4:
- Fix exposing in the max policy.
Changes since v3:
- Always trap write accesses to VIRT_SPEC_CTRL in order to cache the guest setting.
- Do not use the 'S' annotation for the VIRT_SSBD feature.
Changes since v2:
- Reword part of the commit message regarding annotation change.
- Fix MSR intercept.
- Add handling of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL to guest_{rd,wr}msr when using VIRT_SSBD also.
Changes since v1:
- Introduce virt_spec_ctrl vCPU field.
- Context switch VIRT_SPEC_CTRL on vmentry/vmexit separately from SPEC_CTRL.
--- xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c | 10 ++++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S | 8 ++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 10 ++++++++ xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 16 +++++++++--- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 9 ++++++- 7 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +10 -0
@@ -541,6 +541,9 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void) raw_cpuid_policy.basic.sep )__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_SEP , hvm_featureset); +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) ) +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset); +/* * If Xen isn't virtualising MSR_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests (functional * availability, or admin choice), hide the feature.
@@ -597,6 +600,13 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_def_policy(void)guest_common_feature_adjustments (hvm_featureset);guest_common_default_feature_adjustments (hvm_featureset); +/* +* Only expose VIRT_SSBD if AMD_SSBD is not available, and thus +* VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM is set. +*/ +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) ) +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset); +sanitise_featureset (hvm_featureset);cpuid_featureset_to_policy (hvm_featureset, p);recalculate_xstate (p);
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S +8 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ .file "svm/entry.S" +#include <xen/lib.h> + #include <asm/asm_defns.h> #include <asm/page.h>
@@ -57,6 +59,9 @@ __UNLIKELY_END(nsvm_hap) clgi + ALTERNATIVE "", STR(call vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl), \ + X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM + /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe beyond this point. */ /* SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_SVM Req: b=curr %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */ .macro svm_vmentry_spec_ctrl
@@ -114,6 +119,9 @@ __UNLIKELY_END(nsvm_hap) ALTERNATIVE "", svm_vmexit_spec_ctrl, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */ + ALTERNATIVE "", STR(call vmexit_virt_spec_ctrl), \ + X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM + stgi GLOBAL(svm_stgi_label) mov %rsp,%rdi
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c +35 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@#include <asm/hvm/svm/svmdebug.h> #include <asm/hvm/svm/nestedsvm.h> #include <asm/hvm/nestedhvm.h> +#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h> #include <asm/x86_emulate.h> #include <public/sched.h> #include <asm/hvm/vpt.h>
@@ -610,6 +611,16 @@ static void cf_check svm_cpuid_policy_changed(struct vcpu *v)svm_intercept_msr (v,MSR_SPEC_CTRL , cp->extd.ibrs ?MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE :MSR_INTERCEPT_RW ); +/* +* Always trap write accesses to VIRT_SPEC_CTRL in order to cache the guest +* setting and avoid having to perform a rdmsr on vmexit to get the guest +* setting even if VIRT_SSBD is offered to Xen itself. +*/ +svm_intercept_msr (v,MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , + cp->extd.virt_ssbd && cpu_has_virt_ssbd && + !cpu_has_amd_ssbd ? +MSR_INTERCEPT_WRITE :MSR_INTERCEPT_RW ); +/* Give access to MSR_PRED_CMD if the guest has been told about it. */ svm_intercept_msr (v,MSR_PRED_CMD , cp->extd.ibpb ?MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE :MSR_INTERCEPT_RW );
@@ -3105,6 +3116,30 @@ void svm_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)vmcb_set_vintr (vmcb, intr); } +/* Called with GIF=0. */ +void vmexit_virt_spec_ctrl (void ) +{ +unsigned int val = opt_ssbd ?SPEC_CTRL_SSBD :0 ; + +if ( val == current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw ) +return ; + +if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) +wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , val,0 ); +} + +/* Called with GIF=0. */ +void vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl (void ) +{ +unsigned int val = opt_ssbd ?SPEC_CTRL_SSBD :0 ; + +if ( val == current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw ) +return ; + +if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) +wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw,0 ); +} +/* * Local variables: * mode: C
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_HVM, X86_SYNTH(24)) /* VERW used by Xen for HVM */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_IDLE, X86_SYNTH(25)) /* VERW used by Xen for idle */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SHSTK, X86_SYNTH(26)) /* Xen uses CET Shadow Stacks */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_IBT, X86_SYNTH(27)) /* Xen uses CET Indirect Branch Tracking */ +XEN_CPUFEATURE (VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ,X86_SYNTH (28 ))/* MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL exposed to HVM */ /* Bug words follow the synthetic words. */#define X86_NR_BUG 1
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h +10 -0
@@ -375,6 +375,16 @@ struct vcpu_msrs*/ uint32_t tsc_aux; +/* +* 0xc001011f - MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (if !X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD) +* +* AMD only. Guest selected value, saved and restored on guest VM +* entry/exit. +*/ +struct { +uint32_t raw; + } virt_spec_ctrl; +/* * 0xc00110{27,19-1b} MSR_AMD64_DR{0-3}_ADDRESS_MASK *
xen/arch/x86/msr.c +12 -4
@@ -387,7 +387,10 @@ int guest_rdmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)if ( !cp->extd.virt_ssbd ) goto gp_fault; - *val = msrs->spec_ctrl.raw &SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; +if ( cpu_has_amd_ssbd ) + *val = msrs->spec_ctrl.raw &SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; +else + *val = msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw;break ;case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG :
@@ -680,10 +683,15 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val) goto gp_fault;/* Only supports SSBD bit, the rest are ignored. */ -if ( val &SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ) - msrs->spec_ctrl.raw |=SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; +if ( cpu_has_amd_ssbd ) + { +if ( val &SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ) + msrs->spec_ctrl.raw |=SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; +else + msrs->spec_ctrl.raw &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; + }else - msrs->spec_ctrl.raw &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; + msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw = val &SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ;break ;case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG :
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +8 -1
@@ -406,9 +406,12 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ) ||boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM ) ||boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR ) || +boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) || opt_eager_fpu) ?"" :" None" ,boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ) ?" MSR_SPEC_CTRL" :"" , -boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ) ?" MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL" :"" , + (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ) || +boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM )) ?" MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL" + :"" ,boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM ) ?" RSB" :"" , opt_eager_fpu ?" EAGER_FPU" :"" , boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) ? " MD_CLEAR" : "");
@@ -1069,6 +1072,10 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ); } +/* Support VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD if AMD_SSBD is not available. */ +if ( opt_msr_sc_hvm && !cpu_has_amd_ssbd && cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ); +/* If we have IBRS available, see whether we should use it. */ if ( has_spec_ctrl && ibrs ) default_xen_spec_ctrl |=SPEC_CTRL_IBRS ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] amd/msr: allow passthrough of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void) · line 549
Quoted 12 lines · Roger Pau Monne
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +3
-0@@ -541,6 +541,9 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void) raw_cpuid_policy.basic.sep )__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_SEP , hvm_featureset); +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) ) +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset); +/* * If Xen isn't virtualising MSR_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests (functional * availability, or admin choice), hide the feature.
Especially with the setting of VIRT_SSBD below here (from patch 1) I don't think this can go without comment. The more that the other instance ...
Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +0
-0@@ -597,6 +600,13 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_def_policy(void)guest_common_feature_adjustments (hvm_featureset);guest_common_default_feature_adjustments (hvm_featureset);
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c static void __init calculate_hvm_def_policy(void) · line 612
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +7
-0+/* +* Only expose VIRT_SSBD if AMD_SSBD is not available, and thus +* VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM is set. +*/ +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) ) +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset); +sanitise_featureset (hvm_featureset);cpuid_featureset_to_policy (hvm_featureset, p);recalculate_xstate (p);
... here is about default exposure, so cannot really be extended to the condition under which this is put in "max" (except that of course "max" needs to include everything "def" has).
Quoted 17 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +13
-0@@ -3105,6 +3116,30 @@ void svm_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)vmcb_set_vintr (vmcb, intr); } +/* Called with GIF=0. */ +void vmexit_virt_spec_ctrl (void ) +{ +unsigned int val = opt_ssbd ?SPEC_CTRL_SSBD :0 ; + +if ( val == current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw ) +return ; + +if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) +wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , val,0 ); +} + +/* Called with GIF=0. */
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c void svm_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) · line 3141
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +10
-0+void vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl (void ) +{ +unsigned int val = opt_ssbd ?SPEC_CTRL_SSBD :0 ; + +if ( val == current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw ) +return ; + +if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) +wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw,0 ); +}
I guess the double use of current makes it difficult for the compiler to CSE both uses. Furthermore for symmetry with the other function how about
void vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl(void)
{
unsigned int val = current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw;
if ( val == (opt_ssbd ? SPEC_CTRL_SSBD : 0) )
return;
if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd )
wrmsr(MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, val, 0);
}i.e. "val" always representing the value we want to write?
With at least a comment added above, and preferably with the change to the function (unless that gets in the way of the 3rd patch)
Jan
Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] amd/msr: allow passthrough of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests
Quoted 22 lines · Jan Beulich
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void) · line 549
Quoted 12 lines · Roger Pau Monne
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +3
-0@@ -541,6 +541,9 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void) raw_cpuid_policy.basic.sep )__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_SEP , hvm_featureset); +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) ) +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset); +/* * If Xen isn't virtualising MSR_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests (functional * availability, or admin choice), hide the feature. Especially with the setting of
VIRT_SSBDbelow here (from patch 1) I don't think this can go without comment. The more that the other instance ...Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +0
-0@@ -597,6 +600,13 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_def_policy(void)guest_common_feature_adjustments (hvm_featureset);guest_common_default_feature_adjustments (hvm_featureset);
Quoted 14 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c static void __init calculate_hvm_def_policy(void) · line 612
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +7
-0+/* +* Only expose VIRT_SSBD if AMD_SSBD is not available, and thus +* VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM is set. +*/ +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) ) +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset); +sanitise_featureset (hvm_featureset);cpuid_featureset_to_policy (hvm_featureset, p);recalculate_xstate (p);... here is about default exposure, so cannot really be extended to the condition under which this is put in "max" (except that of course "max" needs to include everything "def" has).
Would you be OK with adding:
/*
* VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ensures the selection of SSBD is context
* switched between the hypervisor and guest selected values for
* HVM when the platform doesn't expose AMD_SSBD support. */
Quoted 43 lines
Quoted 17 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +13
-0@@ -3105,6 +3116,30 @@ void svm_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)vmcb_set_vintr (vmcb, intr); } +/* Called with GIF=0. */ +void vmexit_virt_spec_ctrl (void ) +{ +unsigned int val = opt_ssbd ?SPEC_CTRL_SSBD :0 ; + +if ( val == current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw ) +return ; + +if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) +wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , val,0 ); +} + +/* Called with GIF=0. */ xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c void svm_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) · line 3141
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +10
-0+void vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl (void ) +{ +unsigned int val = opt_ssbd ?SPEC_CTRL_SSBD :0 ; + +if ( val == current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw ) +return ; + +if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) +wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw,0 ); +}I guess the double use of current makes it difficult for the compiler to CSE both uses. Furthermore for symmetry with the other function how about
void
vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl(void){ unsigned int val = current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw; if ( val == (opt_ssbd ? SPEC_CTRL_SSBD : 0) ) return; if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) wrmsr(MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, val, 0); }
Quoted 1 line
i.e. "val" always representing the value we want to write?
Yes, that's fine. I've adjusted the function.
Quoted 3 lines
With at least a comment added above, and preferably with the change to the function (unless that gets in the way of the 3rd patch)
Reviewed-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Thanks, will wait for confirmation that the proposed comment is fine.
Roger.
Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] amd/msr: allow passthrough of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests
Quoted 38 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 22 lines · Jan Beulich
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void) · line 549
Quoted 12 lines · Roger Pau Monne
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +3
-0@@ -541,6 +541,9 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void) raw_cpuid_policy.basic.sep )__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_SEP , hvm_featureset); +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) ) +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset); +/* * If Xen isn't virtualising MSR_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests (functional * availability, or admin choice), hide the feature. Especially with the setting of
VIRT_SSBDbelow here (from patch 1) I don't think this can go without comment. The more that the other instance ...Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +0
-0@@ -597,6 +600,13 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_def_policy(void)guest_common_feature_adjustments (hvm_featureset);guest_common_default_feature_adjustments (hvm_featureset);Quoted 14 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c static void __init calculate_hvm_def_policy(void) · line 612
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +7
-0+/* +* Only expose VIRT_SSBD if AMD_SSBD is not available, and thus +* VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM is set. +*/ +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) ) +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset); +sanitise_featureset (hvm_featureset);cpuid_featureset_to_policy (hvm_featureset, p);recalculate_xstate (p);... here is about default exposure, so cannot really be extended to the condition under which this is put in "max" (except that of course "max" needs to include everything "def" has).
Quoted 7 lines
Would you be OK with adding:
/*
*VIRT_SC_MSR_HVMensures the selection of SSBD is context
* switched between the hypervisor and guest selected values for
* HVM when the platform doesn't exposeAMD_SSBDsupport. */
I'm afraid this doesn't explain what I'm after. In calculate_hvm_def_policy() the comment explains why / when the feature is exposed by _default_. Taking into account patch 1 (where another maximum exposure of the feature was introduced), I'd like the comment in calculate_hvm_max_policy() to focus on the difference between default and maximum exposure (which could be as simple as "if exposed by default, also needs exposing in max, irrespective of the further max exposure below(?)").
Jan
Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] amd/msr: allow passthrough of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests
Quoted 47 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 38 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 22 lines · Jan Beulich
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void) · line 549
Quoted 12 lines · Roger Pau Monne
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +3
-0@@ -541,6 +541,9 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void) raw_cpuid_policy.basic.sep )__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_SEP , hvm_featureset); +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) ) +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset); +/* * If Xen isn't virtualising MSR_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests (functional * availability, or admin choice), hide the feature. Especially with the setting of
VIRT_SSBDbelow here (from patch 1) I don't think this can go without comment. The more that the other instance ...Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +0
-0@@ -597,6 +600,13 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_def_policy(void)guest_common_feature_adjustments (hvm_featureset);guest_common_default_feature_adjustments (hvm_featureset);Quoted 14 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c static void __init calculate_hvm_def_policy(void) · line 612
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +7
-0+/* +* Only expose VIRT_SSBD if AMD_SSBD is not available, and thus +* VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM is set. +*/ +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) ) +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset); +sanitise_featureset (hvm_featureset);cpuid_featureset_to_policy (hvm_featureset, p);recalculate_xstate (p);... here is about default exposure, so cannot really be extended to the condition under which this is put in "max" (except that of course "max" needs to include everything "def" has).
Quoted 7 lines
Would you be OK with adding:
/*
*VIRT_SC_MSR_HVMensures the selection of SSBD is context
* switched between the hypervisor and guest selected values for
* HVM when the platform doesn't exposeAMD_SSBDsupport. */
Quoted 8 lines
I'm afraid this doesn't explain what I'm after. In
calculate_hvm_def_policy()the comment explains why / when the feature is exposed by _default_. Taking into account patch 1 (where another maximum exposure of the feature was introduced), I'd like the comment incalculate_hvm_max_policy()to focus on the difference between default and maximum exposure (which could be as simple as "if exposed by default, also needs exposing in max, irrespective of the further max exposure below(?)").
So something like:
/*
* When VIRT_SSBD is exposed in the default policy as a result of
* VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM being set also needs exposing in the max policy. */
Would address your concerns?
Thanks, Roger.
Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] amd/msr: allow passthrough of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests
Quoted 57 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 47 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 38 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 22 lines · Jan Beulich
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void) · line 549
Quoted 12 lines · Roger Pau Monne
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +3
-0@@ -541,6 +541,9 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void) raw_cpuid_policy.basic.sep )__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_SEP , hvm_featureset); +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) ) +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset); +/* * If Xen isn't virtualising MSR_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests (functional * availability, or admin choice), hide the feature. Especially with the setting of
VIRT_SSBDbelow here (from patch 1) I don't think this can go without comment. The more that the other instance ...Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +0
-0@@ -597,6 +600,13 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_def_policy(void)guest_common_feature_adjustments (hvm_featureset);guest_common_default_feature_adjustments (hvm_featureset);Quoted 14 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c static void __init calculate_hvm_def_policy(void) · line 612
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +7
-0+/* +* Only expose VIRT_SSBD if AMD_SSBD is not available, and thus +* VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM is set. +*/ +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) ) +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset); +sanitise_featureset (hvm_featureset);cpuid_featureset_to_policy (hvm_featureset, p);recalculate_xstate (p);... here is about default exposure, so cannot really be extended to the condition under which this is put in "max" (except that of course "max" needs to include everything "def" has).
Quoted 7 lines
Would you be OK with adding:
/*
*VIRT_SC_MSR_HVMensures the selection of SSBD is context
* switched between the hypervisor and guest selected values for
* HVM when the platform doesn't exposeAMD_SSBDsupport. */Quoted 8 lines
I'm afraid this doesn't explain what I'm after. In
calculate_hvm_def_policy()the comment explains why / when the feature is exposed by _default_. Taking into account patch 1 (where another maximum exposure of the feature was introduced), I'd like the comment incalculate_hvm_max_policy()to focus on the difference between default and maximum exposure (which could be as simple as "if exposed by default, also needs exposing in max, irrespective of the further max exposure below(?)").
Quoted 8 lines
So something like:
/*
* WhenVIRT_SSBDis exposed in the default policy as a result of
*VIRT_SC_MSR_HVMbeing set also needs exposing in the max policy. */Would address your concerns?
Yes (with - nit - the double blank dealt with, perhaps by inserting "it" and maybe a comma).
Jan
PATCH v5 3/3 amd/msr: implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests using legacy SSBD
In reply to Roger Pau MonneExpose VIRT_SSBD to guests if the hardware supports setting SSBD in the LS_CFG MSR (a.k.a. non-architectural way). Different AMD CPU families use different bits in LS_CFG, so exposing VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD allows for an unified way of exposing SSBD support to guests on AMD hardware that's compatible migration wise, regardless of what underlying mechanism is used to set SSBD.
Note that on AMD Family 17h and Hygon Family 18h processors the value of SSBD in LS_CFG is shared between threads on the same core, so there's extra logic in order to synchronize the value and have SSBD set as long as one of the threads in the core requires it to be set. Such logic also requires extra storage for each thread state, which is allocated at initialization time.
Do the context switching of the SSBD selection in LS_CFG between hypervisor and guest in the same handler that's already used to switch the value of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.
---
Changes since v4:
- Slightly change usage of val/opt_ssbd in vm{exit,entry}_virt_spec_ctrl.
- Pull opt_ssbd outside of the for loop in amd_setup_legacy_ssbd().
- Fix indentation.
- Remove ASSERTs/BUG_ONs from GIF=0 context.
Changes since v3:
- Align ssbd per-core struct to a cache line.
- Open code a simple spinlock to avoid playing tricks with the lock detector.
- s/ssbd_core/ssbd_ls_cfg/.
- Fix log message wording.
- Fix define name and remove comment.
- Also handle Hygon processors (Fam18h).
- Add changelog entry.
Changes since v2:
- Fix codding style issues.
- Use AMD_ZEN1_MAX_SOCKETS to define the max number of possible sockets in Zen1 systems.
Changes since v1:
- Report legacy SSBD support using a global variable.
- Use ro_after_init for ssbd_max_cores.
- Handle boot_cpu_data.x86_num_siblings < 1.
- Add comment regarding _irqsave usage in amd_set_legacy_ssbd.
--- CHANGELOG.md | 3 + xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 4 ++ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/amd.h | 4 ++ xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 4 +- 5 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
CHANGELOG.md +3 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/) ### Removed / support downgraded - dropped support for the (x86-only) "vesa-mtrr" and "vesa-remap" command line options +### Added + - Support VIRT_SSBD feature for HVM guests on AMD. + ## [4.16.0](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=shortlog;h=staging) - 2021-12-02 ### Removed
xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +104 -17
153 lines not on this page · raw message
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c +4 -0
@@ -3126,6 +3126,8 @@ void vmexit_virt_spec_ctrl(void)if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd )wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , val,0 ); +else +amd_set_legacy_ssbd (val); }/* Called with GIF=0. */
@@ -3138,6 +3140,8 @@ void vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl(void)if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd )wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw,0 ); +else +amd_set_legacy_ssbd (!val); }/*
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/amd.h +4 -0
@@ -151,4 +151,8 @@ void check_enable_amd_mmconf_dmi(void);extern bool amd_acpi_c1e_quirk;void amd_check_disable_c1e (unsigned int port,u8 value); +extern bool amd_legacy_ssbd; +bool amd_setup_legacy_ssbd (void ); +void amd_set_legacy_ssbd (bool enable); +#endif /* __AMD_H__ */
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +3 -1
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#include <xen/param.h> #include <xen/warning.h> +#include <asm/amd.h> #include <asm/hvm/svm/svm.h> #include <asm/microcode.h> #include <asm/msr.h>
@@ -1073,7 +1074,8 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) }/* Support VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD if AMD_SSBD is not available. */ -if ( opt_msr_sc_hvm && !cpu_has_amd_ssbd && cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) +if ( opt_msr_sc_hvm && !cpu_has_amd_ssbd && + (cpu_has_virt_ssbd || (amd_legacy_ssbd &&amd_setup_legacy_ssbd ())) )setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM );/* If we have IBRS available, see whether we should use it. */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] amd/msr: implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests using legacy SSBD
Quoted 14 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Expose
VIRT_SSBDto guests if the hardware supports setting SSBD in theLS_CFGMSR (a.k.a. non-architectural way). Different AMD CPU families use different bits inLS_CFG, so exposing VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD allows for an unified way of exposing SSBD support to guests on AMD hardware that's compatible migration wise, regardless of what underlying mechanism is used to set SSBD.Note that on AMD Family 17h and Hygon Family 18h processors the value of SSBD in
LS_CFGis shared between threads on the same core, so there's extra logic in order to synchronize the value and have SSBD set as long as one of the threads in the core requires it to be set. Such logic also requires extra storage for each thread state, which is allocated at initialization time.
Quoted 6 lines
Do the context switching of the SSBD selection in
LS_CFGbetween hypervisor and guest in the same handler that's already used to switch the value ofVIRT_SPEC_CTRL.Suggested-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
with one nit:
Quoted 11 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +11
-0+void amd_set_legacy_ssbd (bool enable) +{ +const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = ¤t_cpu_data; +struct ssbd_ls_cfg *status; + +if ((c->x86 !=0x17 && c->x86 !=0x18 ) || c->x86_num_siblings <=1 ) { +set_legacy_ssbd (c, enable); +return ; + } + + status = &ssbd_ls_cfg[c->phys_proc_id * ssbd_max_cores +
xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 812
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +10
-0+ c->cpu_core_id]; + +/* +* Open code a very simple spinlock: this function is used with GIF==0 +* and different IF values, so would trigger the checklock detector. +* Instead of trying to workaround the detector, use a very simple lock +* implementation: it's better to reduce the amount of code executed +* with GIF==0. +*/ +while (test_and_set_bool (status->locked) )
Nit: A bit of Xen style slipped into here.
Quoted 12 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c +2
-0@@ -3126,6 +3126,8 @@ void vmexit_virt_spec_ctrl(void)if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd )wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , val,0 ); +else +amd_set_legacy_ssbd (val); }/* Called with GIF=0. */
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c void vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl(void) · line 3145
Quoted 6 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c +2
-0@@ -3138,6 +3140,8 @@ void vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl(void)if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd )wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw,0 ); +else +amd_set_legacy_ssbd (!val); }
Aiui the adjustment suggested for patch 2 will not really get in the way of this, by only requiring to drop the ! .
Jan