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KVM: s390: Don't use %pK through tracepoints

PATCH New Sasha Levin 1 participant 15 messages Apr 14, 2025

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Sasha Levin

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/15 KVM: s390: Don't use %pK through tracepoints

From: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c9567e0850be2f0f94ab64fa6512413fd1a1eb1 ]

Restricted pointers ("%pK") are not meant to be used through TP_format(). It can unintentionally expose security sensitive, raw pointer values.

Use regular pointer formatting instead.

Message-ID: <20250217-restricted-pointers-s390-v1-1-0e4ace75d8aa@linutronix.de>

---
 arch/s390/kvm/trace-s390.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kvm/trace-s390.h +2 -2
index 6f0209d45164f..9c5f546a2e1a3 100644
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_s390_create_vcpu,
 		    __entry->sie_block = sie_block;
 		    ),
 
-	    TP_printk("create cpu %d at 0x%pK, sie block at 0x%pK",
+	    TP_printk("create cpu %d at 0x%p, sie block at 0x%p",
 		      __entry->id, __entry->vcpu, __entry->sie_block)
 	);
 
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_s390_enable_css,
 		    __entry->kvm = kvm;
 		    ),
 
-	    TP_printk("enabling channel I/O support (kvm @ %pK)\n",
+	    TP_printk("enabling channel I/O support (kvm @ %p)\n",
 		      __entry->kvm)
 	);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/15 udmabuf: fix a buf size overflow issue during udmabuf creation

From: Xiaogang Chen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 021ba7f1babd029e714d13a6bf2571b08af96d0f ]

by casting size_limit_mb to u64 when calculate pglimit.

---
 drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c +1 -1
index a8094d57d2d06..84f7611c765b9 100644
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static long udmabuf_create(struct miscdevice *device,
 	if (!ubuf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	pglimit = (size_limit_mb * 1024 * 1024) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	pglimit = ((u64)size_limit_mb * 1024 * 1024) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	for (i = 0; i < head->count; i++) {
 		if (!IS_ALIGNED(list[i].offset, PAGE_SIZE))
 			goto err;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/15 selftests: ublk: fix test_stripe_04

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ming Lei <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 72070e57b0a518ec8e562a2b68fdfc796ef5c040 ]

Commit 57ed58c13256 ("selftests: ublk: enable zero copy for stripe target") added test entry of test_stripe_04, but forgot to add the test script.

So fix the test by adding the script file.

---
 .../testing/selftests/ublk/test_stripe_04.sh  | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
 create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/ublk/test_stripe_04.sh
tools/testing/selftests/ublk/test_stripe_04.sh new file +24 -0
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000000..1f2b642381d17
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+. "$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"/test_common.sh
+
+TID="stripe_04"
+ERR_CODE=0
+
+_prep_test "stripe" "mkfs & mount & umount on zero copy"
+
+backfile_0=$(_create_backfile 256M)
+backfile_1=$(_create_backfile 256M)
+dev_id=$(_add_ublk_dev -t stripe -z -q 2 "$backfile_0" "$backfile_1")
+_check_add_dev $TID $? "$backfile_0" "$backfile_1"
+
+_mkfs_mount_test /dev/ublkb"${dev_id}"
+ERR_CODE=$?
+
+_cleanup_test "stripe"
+
+_remove_backfile "$backfile_0"
+_remove_backfile "$backfile_1"
+
+_show_result $TID $ERR_CODE
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/15 xen: Change xen-acpi-processor dom0 dependency

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jason Andryuk <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0f2946bb172632e122d4033e0b03f85230a29510 ]

xen-acpi-processor functions under a PVH dom0 with only a xen_initial_domain() runtime check. Change the Kconfig dependency from PV dom0 to generic dom0 to reflect that.

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 drivers/xen/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/xen/Kconfig +1 -1
index 1b2c3aca6887c..474b0173323a6 100644
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ config XEN_PRIVCMD
 
 config XEN_ACPI_PROCESSOR
 	tristate "Xen ACPI processor"
-	depends on XEN && XEN_PV_DOM0 && X86 && ACPI_PROCESSOR && CPU_FREQ
+	depends on XEN && XEN_DOM0 && X86 && ACPI_PROCESSOR && CPU_FREQ
 	default m
 	help
 	  This ACPI processor uploads Power Management information to the Xen
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/15 nvme: requeue namespace scan on missed AENs

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9546ad1a9bda7362492114f5866b95b0ac4a100e ]

Scanning for namespaces can take some time, so if the target is reconfigured while the scan is running we may miss a Attached Namespace Attribute Changed AEN.

Check if the NVME_AER_NOTICE_NS_CHANGED bit is set once the scan has finished, and requeue scanning to pick up any missed change.

---
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/nvme/host/core.c +4 -0
index 6748532c776b8..85d965fe8838c 100644
@@ -4221,6 +4221,10 @@ static void nvme_scan_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	if (nvme_scan_ns_list(ctrl) != 0)
 		nvme_scan_ns_sequential(ctrl);
 	mutex_unlock(&ctrl->scan_lock);
+
+	/* Requeue if we have missed AENs */
+	if (test_bit(NVME_AER_NOTICE_NS_CHANGED, &ctrl->events))
+		nvme_queue_scan(ctrl);
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 6/15 ACPI PPTT: Fix coding mistakes in a couple of sizeof() calls

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jean-Marc Eurin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7ab4f0e37a0f4207e742a8de69be03984db6ebf0 ]

The end of table checks should be done with the structure size, but 2 of the 3 similar calls use the pointer size.

---
 drivers/acpi/pptt.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/acpi/pptt.c +2 -2
index fe69dc518f31e..9fa339639d0c0 100644
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static int acpi_pptt_leaf_node(struct acpi_table_header *table_hdr,
 	node_entry = ACPI_PTR_DIFF(node, table_hdr);
 	entry = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct acpi_subtable_header, table_hdr,
 			     sizeof(struct acpi_table_pptt));
-	proc_sz = sizeof(struct acpi_pptt_processor *);
+	proc_sz = sizeof(struct acpi_pptt_processor);
 
 	while ((unsigned long)entry + proc_sz < table_end) {
 		cpu_node = (struct acpi_pptt_processor *)entry;
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static struct acpi_pptt_processor *acpi_find_processor_node(struct acpi_table_he
 	table_end = (unsigned long)table_hdr + table_hdr->length;
 	entry = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct acpi_subtable_header, table_hdr,
 			     sizeof(struct acpi_table_pptt));
-	proc_sz = sizeof(struct acpi_pptt_processor *);
+	proc_sz = sizeof(struct acpi_pptt_processor);
 
 	/* find the processor structure associated with this cpuid */
 	while ((unsigned long)entry + proc_sz < table_end) {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 7/15 nvme: re-read ANA log page after ns scan completes

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 62baf70c327444338c34703c71aa8cc8e4189bd6 ]

When scanning for new namespaces we might have missed an ANA AEN.

The NVMe base spec (NVMe Base Specification v2.1, Figure 151 'Asynchonous Event Information - Notice': Asymmetric Namespace Access Change) states:

A controller shall not send this even if an Attached Namespace Attribute Changed asynchronous event [...] is sent for the same event.

so we need to re-read the ANA log page after we rescanned the namespace list to update the ANA states of the new namespaces.

---
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/nvme/host/core.c +5 -0
index 85d965fe8838c..68d4546dda3bb 100644
@@ -4225,6 +4225,11 @@ static void nvme_scan_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	/* Requeue if we have missed AENs */
 	if (test_bit(NVME_AER_NOTICE_NS_CHANGED, &ctrl->events))
 		nvme_queue_scan(ctrl);
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_MULTIPATH
+	else
+		/* Re-read the ANA log page to not miss updates */
+		queue_work(nvme_wq, &ctrl->ana_work);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 8/15 objtool: Stop UNRET validation on UD2

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9f9cc012c2cbac4833746a0182e06a8eec940d19 ]

In preparation for simplifying INSN_SYSCALL, make validate_unret() terminate control flow on UD2 just like validate_branch() already does.

---
 tools/objtool/check.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
tools/objtool/check.c +3 -0
index c2596b1e1fb1e..d2366ec61edc4 100644
@@ -3416,6 +3416,9 @@ static int validate_entry(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn)
 			break;
 		}
 
+		if (insn->dead_end)
+			return 0;
+
 		if (!next) {
 			WARN_FUNC("teh end!", insn->sec, insn->offset);
 			return -1;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 9/15 selftests/mincore: Allow read-ahead pages to reach the end of the file

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qiuxu Zhuo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 197c1eaa7ba633a482ed7588eea6fd4aa57e08d4 ]

When running the mincore_selftest on a system with an XFS file system, it failed the "check_file_mmap" test case due to the read-ahead pages reaching the end of the file. The failure log is as below:

RUN global.check_file_mmap ...
mincore_selftest.c:264:check_file_mmap:Expected i (1024) < vec_size (1024) mincore_selftest.c:265:check_file_mmap:Read-ahead pages reached the end of the file
check_file_mmap: Test failed
FAIL global.check_file_mmap

This is because the read-ahead window size of the XFS file system on this machine is 4 MB, which is larger than the size from the #PF address to the end of the file. As a result, all the pages for this file are populated.

  blockdev --getra /dev/nvme0n1p5
    8192
  blockdev --getbsz /dev/nvme0n1p5
    512

This issue can be fixed by extending the current FILE_SIZE 4MB to a larger number, but it will still fail if the read-ahead window size of the file system is larger enough. Additionally, in the real world, read-ahead pages reaching the end of the file can happen and is an expected behavior. Therefore, allowing read-ahead pages to reach the end of the file is a better choice for the "check_file_mmap" test case.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/mincore/mincore_selftest.c | 3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/mincore/mincore_selftest.c +0 -3
index 4c88238fc8f05..c0ae86c28d7f3 100644
@@ -261,9 +261,6 @@ TEST(check_file_mmap)
 		TH_LOG("No read-ahead pages found in memory");
 	}
 
-	EXPECT_LT(i, vec_size) {
-		TH_LOG("Read-ahead pages reached the end of the file");
-	}
 	/*
 	 * End of the readahead window. The rest of the pages shouldn't
 	 * be in memory.
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 10/15 x86/bugs: Use SBPB in write_ibpb() if applicable

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fc9fd3f98423367c79e0bd85a9515df26dc1b3cc ]

write_ibpb() does IBPB, which (among other things) flushes branch type predictions on AMD. If the CPU has SRSO_NO, or if the SRSO mitigation has been disabled, branch type flushing isn't needed, in which case the lighter-weight SBPB can be used.

The 'x86_pred_cmd' variable already keeps track of whether IBPB or SBPB should be used. Use that instead of hardcoding IBPB.

---
 arch/x86/entry/entry.S | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/entry/entry.S +1 -1
index f4419afc7147d..bda217961172b 100644
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 
 SYM_FUNC_START(entry_ibpb)
 	movl	$MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, %ecx
-	movl	$PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax
+	movl	_ASM_RIP(x86_pred_cmd), %eax
 	xorl	%edx, %edx
 	wrmsr
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 11/15 x86/bugs: Don't fill RSB on VMEXIT with eIBRS+retpoline

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 18bae0dfec15b24ec14ca17dc18603372f5f254f ]

eIBRS protects against guest->host RSB underflow/poisoning attacks. Adding retpoline to the mix doesn't change that. Retpoline has a balanced CALL/RET anyway.

So the current full RSB filling on VMEXIT with eIBRS+retpoline is overkill. Disable it or do the VMEXIT_LITE mitigation if needed.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4 -4
index dfc02fb32375c..018ef230f02ce 100644
@@ -1579,20 +1579,20 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_
 	case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
 		return;
 
-	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
 		if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
-			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
 			pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n");
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
 		}
 		return;
 
-	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
 		pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n");
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
 		return;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 12/15 x86/bugs: Don't fill RSB on context switch with eIBRS

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 27ce8299bc1ec6df8306073785ff82b30b3cc5ee ]

User->user Spectre v2 attacks (including RSB) across context switches are already mitigated by IBPB in cond_mitigation(), if enabled globally or if either the prev or the next task has opted in to protection. RSB filling without IBPB serves no purpose for protecting user space, as indirect branches are still vulnerable.

User->kernel RSB attacks are mitigated by eIBRS. In which case the RSB filling on context switch isn't needed, so remove it.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c          |  6 +++---
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +12 -12
index 018ef230f02ce..75cd45f2338dc 100644
@@ -1553,7 +1553,7 @@ static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void)
 	rrsba_disabled = true;
 }
 
-static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_rsb_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
 {
 	/*
 	 * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks
@@ -1577,7 +1577,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_
 	 */
 	switch (mode) {
 	case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
-		return;
+		break;
 
 	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
@@ -1586,18 +1586,21 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_
 			pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n");
 			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
 		}
-		return;
+		break;
 
 	case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
-		pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n");
+		pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB: Filling RSB on context switch and VMEXIT\n");
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
-		return;
-	}
+		break;
 
-	pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation at VM exit");
-	dump_stack();
+	default:
+		pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation\n");
+		dump_stack();
+		break;
+	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1822,10 +1825,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	 *
 	 * FIXME: Is this pointless for retbleed-affected AMD?
 	 */
-	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
-	pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
-
-	spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(mode);
+	spectre_v2_select_rsb_mitigation(mode);
 
 	/*
 	 * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware.  IBRS
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +3 -3
index 19d083ad2de79..94a23fcb20737 100644
@@ -384,9 +384,9 @@ static void cond_mitigation(struct task_struct *next)
 	prev_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec);
 
 	/*
-	 * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch predictor
-	 * when switching between processes. This stops one process from
-	 * doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another.
+	 * Avoid user->user BTB/RSB poisoning by flushing them when switching
+	 * between processes. This stops one process from doing Spectre-v2
+	 * attacks on another.
 	 *
 	 * Both, the conditional and the always IBPB mode use the mm
 	 * pointer to avoid the IBPB when switching between tasks of the
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 13/15 nvmet-fc: take tgtport reference only once

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Daniel Wagner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b0b26ad0e1943de25ce82a7e5af3574f31b1cf99 ]

The reference counting code can be simplified. Instead taking a tgtport refrerence at the beginning of nvmet_fc_alloc_hostport and put it back if not a new hostport object is allocated, only take it when a new hostport object is allocated.

---
 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c | 22 +++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/target/fc.c +7 -15
index d3ca59ae4c7af..606fdde21d629 100644
@@ -1044,33 +1044,24 @@ nvmet_fc_alloc_hostport(struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport, void *hosthandle)
 	struct nvmet_fc_hostport *newhost, *match = NULL;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
+	/*
+	 * Caller holds a reference on tgtport.
+	 */
+
 	/* if LLDD not implemented, leave as NULL */
 	if (!hosthandle)
 		return NULL;
 
-	/*
-	 * take reference for what will be the newly allocated hostport if
-	 * we end up using a new allocation
-	 */
-	if (!nvmet_fc_tgtport_get(tgtport))
-		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&tgtport->lock, flags);
 	match = nvmet_fc_match_hostport(tgtport, hosthandle);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags);
 
-	if (match) {
-		/* no new allocation - release reference */
-		nvmet_fc_tgtport_put(tgtport);
+	if (match)
 		return match;
-	}
 
 	newhost = kzalloc(sizeof(*newhost), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!newhost) {
-		/* no new allocation - release reference */
-		nvmet_fc_tgtport_put(tgtport);
+	if (!newhost)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-	}
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&tgtport->lock, flags);
 	match = nvmet_fc_match_hostport(tgtport, hosthandle);
@@ -1079,6 +1070,7 @@ nvmet_fc_alloc_hostport(struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport, void *hosthandle)
 		kfree(newhost);
 		newhost = match;
 	} else {
+		nvmet_fc_tgtport_get(tgtport);
 		newhost->tgtport = tgtport;
 		newhost->hosthandle = hosthandle;
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&newhost->host_list);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 14/15 nvmet-fc: put ref when assoc->del_work is already scheduled

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Daniel Wagner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 70289ae5cac4d3a39575405aaf63330486cea030 ]

Do not leak the tgtport reference when the work is already scheduled.

---
 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nvme/target/fc.c +2 -1
index 606fdde21d629..3fb51fef64733 100644
@@ -1105,7 +1105,8 @@ static void
 nvmet_fc_schedule_delete_assoc(struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *assoc)
 {
 	nvmet_fc_tgtport_get(assoc->tgtport);
-	queue_work(nvmet_wq, &assoc->del_work);
+	if (!queue_work(nvmet_wq, &assoc->del_work))
+		nvmet_fc_tgtport_put(assoc->tgtport);
 }
 
 static struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 15/15 ext4: make block validity check resistent to sb bh corruption

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ojaswin Mujoo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ccad447a3d331a239477c281533bacb585b54a98 ]

Block validity checks need to be skipped in case they are called for journal blocks since they are part of system's protected zone.

Currently, this is done by checking inode->ino against sbi->s_es->s_journal_inum, which is a direct read from the ext4 sb buffer head. If someone modifies this underneath us then the s_journal_inum field might get corrupted. To prevent against this, change the check to directly compare the inode with journal->j_inode.

**Slight change in behavior**: During journal init path, check_block_validity etc might be called for journal inode when sbi->s_journal is not set yet. In this case we now proceed with ext4_inode_block_valid() instead of returning early. Since systems zones have not been set yet, it is okay to proceed so we can perform basic checks on the blocks.

---
 fs/ext4/block_validity.c | 5 ++---
 fs/ext4/inode.c          | 7 ++++---
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/block_validity.c +2 -3
index 6fe3c941b5651..4d6ba140276b5 100644
@@ -351,10 +351,9 @@ int ext4_check_blockref(const char *function, unsigned int line,
 {
 	__le32 *bref = p;
 	unsigned int blk;
+	journal_t *journal = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal;
 
-	if (ext4_has_feature_journal(inode->i_sb) &&
-	    (inode->i_ino ==
-	     le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es->s_journal_inum)))
+	if (journal && inode == journal->j_inode)
 		return 0;
 
 	while (bref < p+max) {
fs/ext4/inode.c +4 -3
index 87e6187e6584b..88992594b4724 100644
@@ -409,10 +409,11 @@ static int __check_block_validity(struct inode *inode, const char *func,
 				unsigned int line,
 				struct ext4_map_blocks *map)
 {
-	if (ext4_has_feature_journal(inode->i_sb) &&
-	    (inode->i_ino ==
-	     le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es->s_journal_inum)))
+	journal_t *journal = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal;
+
+	if (journal && inode == journal->j_inode)
 		return 0;
+
 	if (!ext4_inode_block_valid(inode, map->m_pblk, map->m_len)) {
 		ext4_error_inode(inode, func, line, map->m_pblk,
 				 "lblock %lu mapped to illegal pblock %llu "
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5