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KVM: s390: Don't use %pK through tracepoints

PATCH New Sasha Levin 1 participant 11 messages Apr 14, 2025

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Sasha Levin

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/11 KVM: s390: Don't use %pK through tracepoints

From: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c9567e0850be2f0f94ab64fa6512413fd1a1eb1 ]

Restricted pointers ("%pK") are not meant to be used through TP_format(). It can unintentionally expose security sensitive, raw pointer values.

Use regular pointer formatting instead.

Message-ID: <20250217-restricted-pointers-s390-v1-1-0e4ace75d8aa@linutronix.de>

---
 arch/s390/kvm/trace-s390.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kvm/trace-s390.h +2 -2
index 6f0209d45164f..9c5f546a2e1a3 100644
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_s390_create_vcpu,
 		    __entry->sie_block = sie_block;
 		    ),
 
-	    TP_printk("create cpu %d at 0x%pK, sie block at 0x%pK",
+	    TP_printk("create cpu %d at 0x%p, sie block at 0x%p",
 		      __entry->id, __entry->vcpu, __entry->sie_block)
 	);
 
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_s390_enable_css,
 		    __entry->kvm = kvm;
 		    ),
 
-	    TP_printk("enabling channel I/O support (kvm @ %pK)\n",
+	    TP_printk("enabling channel I/O support (kvm @ %p)\n",
 		      __entry->kvm)
 	);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/11 udmabuf: fix a buf size overflow issue during udmabuf creation

From: Xiaogang Chen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 021ba7f1babd029e714d13a6bf2571b08af96d0f ]

by casting size_limit_mb to u64 when calculate pglimit.

---
 drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c +1 -1
index 14b79458ac7f4..597a92438afc1 100644
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static long udmabuf_create(struct miscdevice *device,
 	if (!ubuf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	pglimit = (size_limit_mb * 1024 * 1024) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	pglimit = ((u64)size_limit_mb * 1024 * 1024) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	for (i = 0; i < head->count; i++) {
 		if (!IS_ALIGNED(list[i].offset, PAGE_SIZE))
 			goto err;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/11 selftests: ublk: fix test_stripe_04

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ming Lei <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 72070e57b0a518ec8e562a2b68fdfc796ef5c040 ]

Commit 57ed58c13256 ("selftests: ublk: enable zero copy for stripe target") added test entry of test_stripe_04, but forgot to add the test script.

So fix the test by adding the script file.

---
 .../testing/selftests/ublk/test_stripe_04.sh  | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
 create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/ublk/test_stripe_04.sh
tools/testing/selftests/ublk/test_stripe_04.sh new file +24 -0
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000000..1f2b642381d17
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+. "$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"/test_common.sh
+
+TID="stripe_04"
+ERR_CODE=0
+
+_prep_test "stripe" "mkfs & mount & umount on zero copy"
+
+backfile_0=$(_create_backfile 256M)
+backfile_1=$(_create_backfile 256M)
+dev_id=$(_add_ublk_dev -t stripe -z -q 2 "$backfile_0" "$backfile_1")
+_check_add_dev $TID $? "$backfile_0" "$backfile_1"
+
+_mkfs_mount_test /dev/ublkb"${dev_id}"
+ERR_CODE=$?
+
+_cleanup_test "stripe"
+
+_remove_backfile "$backfile_0"
+_remove_backfile "$backfile_1"
+
+_show_result $TID $ERR_CODE
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/11 nvme: requeue namespace scan on missed AENs

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9546ad1a9bda7362492114f5866b95b0ac4a100e ]

Scanning for namespaces can take some time, so if the target is reconfigured while the scan is running we may miss a Attached Namespace Attribute Changed AEN.

Check if the NVME_AER_NOTICE_NS_CHANGED bit is set once the scan has finished, and requeue scanning to pick up any missed change.

---
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/nvme/host/core.c +4 -0
index 5f16fc9111a9f..b3ca27b78f030 100644
@@ -4265,6 +4265,10 @@ static void nvme_scan_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	if (nvme_scan_ns_list(ctrl) != 0)
 		nvme_scan_ns_sequential(ctrl);
 	mutex_unlock(&ctrl->scan_lock);
+
+	/* Requeue if we have missed AENs */
+	if (test_bit(NVME_AER_NOTICE_NS_CHANGED, &ctrl->events))
+		nvme_queue_scan(ctrl);
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/11 ACPI PPTT: Fix coding mistakes in a couple of sizeof() calls

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jean-Marc Eurin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7ab4f0e37a0f4207e742a8de69be03984db6ebf0 ]

The end of table checks should be done with the structure size, but 2 of the 3 similar calls use the pointer size.

---
 drivers/acpi/pptt.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/acpi/pptt.c +2 -2
index 4ae93350b70de..38581001811b4 100644
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static int acpi_pptt_leaf_node(struct acpi_table_header *table_hdr,
 	node_entry = ACPI_PTR_DIFF(node, table_hdr);
 	entry = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct acpi_subtable_header, table_hdr,
 			     sizeof(struct acpi_table_pptt));
-	proc_sz = sizeof(struct acpi_pptt_processor *);
+	proc_sz = sizeof(struct acpi_pptt_processor);
 
 	while ((unsigned long)entry + proc_sz < table_end) {
 		cpu_node = (struct acpi_pptt_processor *)entry;
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static struct acpi_pptt_processor *acpi_find_processor_node(struct acpi_table_he
 	table_end = (unsigned long)table_hdr + table_hdr->length;
 	entry = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct acpi_subtable_header, table_hdr,
 			     sizeof(struct acpi_table_pptt));
-	proc_sz = sizeof(struct acpi_pptt_processor *);
+	proc_sz = sizeof(struct acpi_pptt_processor);
 
 	/* find the processor structure associated with this cpuid */
 	while ((unsigned long)entry + proc_sz < table_end) {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 6/11 nvme: re-read ANA log page after ns scan completes

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 62baf70c327444338c34703c71aa8cc8e4189bd6 ]

When scanning for new namespaces we might have missed an ANA AEN.

The NVMe base spec (NVMe Base Specification v2.1, Figure 151 'Asynchonous Event Information - Notice': Asymmetric Namespace Access Change) states:

A controller shall not send this even if an Attached Namespace Attribute Changed asynchronous event [...] is sent for the same event.

so we need to re-read the ANA log page after we rescanned the namespace list to update the ANA states of the new namespaces.

---
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/nvme/host/core.c +5 -0
index b3ca27b78f030..ada9ec02e9b53 100644
@@ -4269,6 +4269,11 @@ static void nvme_scan_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	/* Requeue if we have missed AENs */
 	if (test_bit(NVME_AER_NOTICE_NS_CHANGED, &ctrl->events))
 		nvme_queue_scan(ctrl);
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_MULTIPATH
+	else
+		/* Re-read the ANA log page to not miss updates */
+		queue_work(nvme_wq, &ctrl->ana_work);
+#endif
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 7/11 objtool: Stop UNRET validation on UD2

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9f9cc012c2cbac4833746a0182e06a8eec940d19 ]

In preparation for simplifying INSN_SYSCALL, make validate_unret() terminate control flow on UD2 just like validate_branch() already does.

---
 tools/objtool/check.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
tools/objtool/check.c +3 -0
index bcc9948645a00..20ccdd60353be 100644
@@ -3249,6 +3249,9 @@ static int validate_entry(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn)
 			break;
 		}
 
+		if (insn->dead_end)
+			return 0;
+
 		if (!next) {
 			WARN_FUNC("teh end!", insn->sec, insn->offset);
 			return -1;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 8/11 selftests/mincore: Allow read-ahead pages to reach the end of the file

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qiuxu Zhuo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 197c1eaa7ba633a482ed7588eea6fd4aa57e08d4 ]

When running the mincore_selftest on a system with an XFS file system, it failed the "check_file_mmap" test case due to the read-ahead pages reaching the end of the file. The failure log is as below:

RUN global.check_file_mmap ...
mincore_selftest.c:264:check_file_mmap:Expected i (1024) < vec_size (1024) mincore_selftest.c:265:check_file_mmap:Read-ahead pages reached the end of the file
check_file_mmap: Test failed
FAIL global.check_file_mmap

This is because the read-ahead window size of the XFS file system on this machine is 4 MB, which is larger than the size from the #PF address to the end of the file. As a result, all the pages for this file are populated.

  blockdev --getra /dev/nvme0n1p5
    8192
  blockdev --getbsz /dev/nvme0n1p5
    512

This issue can be fixed by extending the current FILE_SIZE 4MB to a larger number, but it will still fail if the read-ahead window size of the file system is larger enough. Additionally, in the real world, read-ahead pages reaching the end of the file can happen and is an expected behavior. Therefore, allowing read-ahead pages to reach the end of the file is a better choice for the "check_file_mmap" test case.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/mincore/mincore_selftest.c | 3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/mincore/mincore_selftest.c +0 -3
index 2cf6f2f277ab8..31820435825b1 100644
@@ -262,9 +262,6 @@ TEST(check_file_mmap)
 		TH_LOG("No read-ahead pages found in memory");
 	}
 
-	EXPECT_LT(i, vec_size) {
-		TH_LOG("Read-ahead pages reached the end of the file");
-	}
 	/*
 	 * End of the readahead window. The rest of the pages shouldn't
 	 * be in memory.
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 9/11 x86/bugs: Use SBPB in write_ibpb() if applicable

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fc9fd3f98423367c79e0bd85a9515df26dc1b3cc ]

write_ibpb() does IBPB, which (among other things) flushes branch type predictions on AMD. If the CPU has SRSO_NO, or if the SRSO mitigation has been disabled, branch type flushing isn't needed, in which case the lighter-weight SBPB can be used.

The 'x86_pred_cmd' variable already keeps track of whether IBPB or SBPB should be used. Use that instead of hardcoding IBPB.

---
 arch/x86/entry/entry.S | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/entry/entry.S +1 -1
index f4419afc7147d..bda217961172b 100644
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 
 SYM_FUNC_START(entry_ibpb)
 	movl	$MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, %ecx
-	movl	$PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax
+	movl	_ASM_RIP(x86_pred_cmd), %eax
 	xorl	%edx, %edx
 	wrmsr
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 10/11 x86/bugs: Don't fill RSB on VMEXIT with eIBRS+retpoline

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 18bae0dfec15b24ec14ca17dc18603372f5f254f ]

eIBRS protects against guest->host RSB underflow/poisoning attacks. Adding retpoline to the mix doesn't change that. Retpoline has a balanced CALL/RET anyway.

So the current full RSB filling on VMEXIT with eIBRS+retpoline is overkill. Disable it or do the VMEXIT_LITE mitigation if needed.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4 -4
index 725f827718a71..045ab6d0a98bb 100644
@@ -1543,20 +1543,20 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_
 	case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
 		return;
 
-	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
 		if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
-			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
 			pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n");
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
 		}
 		return;
 
-	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
 		pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n");
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
 		return;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 11/11 ext4: make block validity check resistent to sb bh corruption

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ojaswin Mujoo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ccad447a3d331a239477c281533bacb585b54a98 ]

Block validity checks need to be skipped in case they are called for journal blocks since they are part of system's protected zone.

Currently, this is done by checking inode->ino against sbi->s_es->s_journal_inum, which is a direct read from the ext4 sb buffer head. If someone modifies this underneath us then the s_journal_inum field might get corrupted. To prevent against this, change the check to directly compare the inode with journal->j_inode.

**Slight change in behavior**: During journal init path, check_block_validity etc might be called for journal inode when sbi->s_journal is not set yet. In this case we now proceed with ext4_inode_block_valid() instead of returning early. Since systems zones have not been set yet, it is okay to proceed so we can perform basic checks on the blocks.

---
 fs/ext4/block_validity.c | 5 ++---
 fs/ext4/inode.c          | 7 ++++---
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/block_validity.c +2 -3
index 295e89d93295e..5d5befac5622b 100644
@@ -353,10 +353,9 @@ int ext4_check_blockref(const char *function, unsigned int line,
 {
 	__le32 *bref = p;
 	unsigned int blk;
+	journal_t *journal = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal;
 
-	if (ext4_has_feature_journal(inode->i_sb) &&
-	    (inode->i_ino ==
-	     le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es->s_journal_inum)))
+	if (journal && inode == journal->j_inode)
 		return 0;
 
 	while (bref < p+max) {
fs/ext4/inode.c +4 -3
index c991955412a49..7d31506deb9e5 100644
@@ -409,10 +409,11 @@ static int __check_block_validity(struct inode *inode, const char *func,
 				unsigned int line,
 				struct ext4_map_blocks *map)
 {
-	if (ext4_has_feature_journal(inode->i_sb) &&
-	    (inode->i_ino ==
-	     le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es->s_journal_inum)))
+	journal_t *journal = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal;
+
+	if (journal && inode == journal->j_inode)
 		return 0;
+
 	if (!ext4_inode_block_valid(inode, map->m_pblk, map->m_len)) {
 		ext4_error_inode(inode, func, line, map->m_pblk,
 				 "lblock %lu mapped to illegal pblock %llu "
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5