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usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()

PATCH Superseded pip-izony 3 participants 4 messages Feb 25 – Feb 26 USB

v1 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()

From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>

The check_command_size_in_blocks() function calculates the data size in bytes by left shifting common->data_size_from_cmnd by the block size (common->curlun->blkbits). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.

Initially, the block size is set up in fsg_lun_open() , and the common->data_size_from_cmnd is set up in do_scsi_command(). During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.

So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (common->data_size_from_cmnd), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.

Fix this by ensuring that common->data_size_from_cmnd is not greater than (U32_MAX >> common->curlun->blkbits) before performing the shift.

Fixes 144974e7f9e3 ("usb: gadget: mass_storage: support multi-luns with different logic block size")
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +12 -2
index 6af96e2b44eb..12e7ef2e074e 100644
@@ -1853,8 +1853,18 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common,
 		int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir,
 		unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name)
 {
-	if (common->curlun)
-		common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits;
+	unsigned int blkbits;
+
+	if (common->curlun) {
+		blkbits = common->curlun->blkbits;
+		if (cmnd_size > 10 &&
+			common->data_size_from_cmnd > (U32_MAX >> blkbits)) {
+			common->phase_error = 1;
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= blkbits;
+	}
+
 	return check_command(common, cmnd_size, data_dir,
 			mask, needs_medium, name);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#1 lore raw
Quoted 18 lines · pip-izony

From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>

The check_command_size_in_blocks() function calculates the data size in bytes by left shifting common->data_size_from_cmnd by the block size (common->curlun->blkbits). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.

Initially, the block size is set up in fsg_lun_open() , and the common->data_size_from_cmnd is set up in do_scsi_command(). During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.

So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (common->data_size_from_cmnd), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.

Quoted 6 lines

Fix this by ensuring that common->data_size_from_cmnd is not greater than (U32_MAX >> common->curlun->blkbits) before performing the shift.

Fixes 144974e7f9e3 ("usb: gadget: mass_storage: support multi-luns with different logic block size")

---

Good catch.

Quoted 8 lines
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +0 -0
index 6af96e2b44eb..12e7ef2e074e 100644

drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, · line 1860

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +5 -2
@@ -1853,8 +1853,18 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common,
 		int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir,
 		unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name)
 {
-	if (common->curlun)
-		common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits;
+	unsigned int blkbits;
+
+	if (common->curlun) {
+		blkbits = common->curlun->blkbits;
+		if (cmnd_size > 10 &&

I would remove this test. The check is valid even when cmnd_size is 6, and doing the test and conditional branch probably takes more time than you would save by avoiding the shift and comparison below.

Otherwise this is fine.

Alan Stern

Quoted 12 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +7 -0
+			common->data_size_from_cmnd > (U32_MAX >> blkbits)) {
+			common->phase_error = 1;
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= blkbits;
+	}
+
 	return check_command(common, cmnd_size, data_dir,
 			mask, needs_medium, name);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#2 lore raw
In reply to pip-izony
Quoted 39 lines · pip-izony

From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>

The check_command_size_in_blocks() function calculates the data size in bytes by left shifting common->data_size_from_cmnd by the block size (common->curlun->blkbits). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.

Initially, the block size is set up in fsg_lun_open() , and the common->data_size_from_cmnd is set up in do_scsi_command(). During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.

So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (common->data_size_from_cmnd), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.

Fix this by ensuring that common->data_size_from_cmnd is not greater than (U32_MAX >> common->curlun->blkbits) before performing the shift.

Fixes 144974e7f9e3 ("usb: gadget: mass_storage: support multi-luns with different logic block size")
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +2 -2
index 6af96e2b44eb..12e7ef2e074e 100644
@@ -1853,8 +1853,18 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common,
 		int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir,
 		unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name)
 {
-	if (common->curlun)
-		common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits;
+	unsigned int blkbits;
+

drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, · line 1867

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +10 -0
+	if (common->curlun) {
+		blkbits = common->curlun->blkbits;
+		if (cmnd_size > 10 &&
+			common->data_size_from_cmnd > (U32_MAX >> blkbits)) {
+			common->phase_error = 1;
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= blkbits;
+	}
+

Can check_shl_overflow() be used here to make this easier?

Quoted 5 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +0 -0
 	return check_command(common, cmnd_size, data_dir,
 			mask, needs_medium, name);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
#3 lore raw

2026년 2월 25일 (수) PM 4:00, Kees Cook <[email protected]>님이 작성:

Quoted 45 lines · pip-izony
Quoted 43 lines

From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>

The check_command_size_in_blocks() function calculates the data size in bytes by left shifting common->data_size_from_cmnd by the block size (common->curlun->blkbits). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.

Initially, the block size is set up in fsg_lun_open() , and the common->data_size_from_cmnd is set up in do_scsi_command(). During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.

So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (common->data_size_from_cmnd), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.

Fix this by ensuring that common->data_size_from_cmnd is not greater than (U32_MAX >> common->curlun->blkbits) before performing the shift.

Fixes 144974e7f9e3 ("usb: gadget: mass_storage: support multi-luns with different logic block size")
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +6 -2
index 6af96e2b44eb..12e7ef2e074e 100644
@@ -1853,8 +1853,18 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common,
              int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir,
              unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name)
 {
-     if (common->curlun)
-             common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits;
+     unsigned int blkbits;
+
+     if (common->curlun) {
+             blkbits = common->curlun->blkbits;
+             if (cmnd_size > 10 &&
+                     common->data_size_from_cmnd > (U32_MAX >> blkbits)) {
Quoted 8 lines

drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, · line 1867

Quoted 6 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +6 -0
+                     common->phase_error = 1;
+                     return -EINVAL;
+             }
+             common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= blkbits;
+     }
+

Can check_shl_overflow() be used here to make this easier?

Yes, definitely.
I will update the code to use it in v2.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +0 -1
      return check_command(common, cmnd_size, data_dir,
                      mask, needs_medium, name);
 }
--

2.43.0

--
Kees Cook