usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()
PATCH 1/1 usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()
From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>
The check_command_size_in_blocks() function calculates the data size in bytes by left shifting common->data_size_from_cmnd by the block size (common->curlun->blkbits). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.
Initially, the block size is set up in fsg_lun_open() , and the common->data_size_from_cmnd is set up in do_scsi_command(). During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.
So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (common->data_size_from_cmnd), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.
Fix this by ensuring that common->data_size_from_cmnd is not greater than (U32_MAX >> common->curlun->blkbits) before performing the shift.
--- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +12 -2
@@ -1853,8 +1853,18 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir, unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name) { - if (common->curlun) - common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits; + unsigned int blkbits; + +if (common->curlun) { + blkbits = common->curlun->blkbits; +if (cmnd_size >10 && + common->data_size_from_cmnd > (U32_MAX >> blkbits)) { + common->phase_error =1 ; +return -EINVAL ; + } + common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= blkbits; + } +return check_command (common, cmnd_size, data_dir, mask, needs_medium, name); }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 18 lines · pip-izony
From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>
The
check_command_size_in_blocks()function calculates the data size in bytes by left shiftingcommon->data_size_from_cmndby the block size (common->curlun->blkbits). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.Initially, the block size is set up in
fsg_lun_open(), and thecommon->data_size_from_cmndis set up indo_scsi_command(). During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (
common->data_size_from_cmnd), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.
Quoted 6 lines
Fix this by ensuring that
common->data_size_from_cmndis not greater than(U32_MAX >> common->curlun->blkbits)before performing the shift.Fixes 144974e7f9e3 ("usb: gadget: mass_storage: support multi-luns with different logic block size")Signed-off-by Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>---
Good catch.
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +0
-0
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, · line 1860
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +5
-2@@ -1853,8 +1853,18 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir, unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name) { - if (common->curlun) - common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits; + unsigned int blkbits; + +if (common->curlun) { + blkbits = common->curlun->blkbits; + if (cmnd_size > 10 &&
I would remove this test. The check is valid even when cmnd_size is 6, and doing the test and conditional branch probably takes more time than you would save by avoiding the shift and comparison below.
Otherwise this is fine.
Alan Stern
Quoted 12 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +7
-0+ common->data_size_from_cmnd > (U32_MAX >> blkbits)) { + common->phase_error =1 ; +return -EINVAL ; + } + common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= blkbits; + } +return check_command (common, cmnd_size, data_dir, mask, needs_medium, name); }Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 39 lines · pip-izony
From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>
The
check_command_size_in_blocks()function calculates the data size in bytes by left shiftingcommon->data_size_from_cmndby the block size (common->curlun->blkbits). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.Initially, the block size is set up in
fsg_lun_open(), and thecommon->data_size_from_cmndis set up indo_scsi_command(). During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (
common->data_size_from_cmnd), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.Fix this by ensuring that
common->data_size_from_cmndis not greater than(U32_MAX >> common->curlun->blkbits)before performing the shift.Fixes 144974e7f9e3 ("usb: gadget: mass_storage: support multi-luns with different logic block size")Signed-off-by Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>--- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +2
-2@@ -1853,8 +1853,18 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir, unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name) { - if (common->curlun) - common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits; + unsigned int blkbits; +
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, · line 1867
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +10
-0+if (common->curlun) { + blkbits = common->curlun->blkbits; +if (cmnd_size >10 && + common->data_size_from_cmnd > (U32_MAX >> blkbits)) { + common->phase_error =1 ; +return -EINVAL ; + } + common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= blkbits; + } +
Can check_shl_overflow() be used here to make this easier?
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +0
-0return check_command (common, cmnd_size, data_dir, mask, needs_medium, name); }Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
2026년 2월 25일 (수) PM 4:00, Kees Cook <[email protected]>님이 작성:
Quoted 45 lines · pip-izony
Quoted 43 lines
From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>
The
check_command_size_in_blocks()function calculates the data size in bytes by left shiftingcommon->data_size_from_cmndby the block size (common->curlun->blkbits). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.Initially, the block size is set up in
fsg_lun_open(), and thecommon->data_size_from_cmndis set up indo_scsi_command(). During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (
common->data_size_from_cmnd), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.Fix this by ensuring that
common->data_size_from_cmndis not greater than(U32_MAX >> common->curlun->blkbits)before performing the shift.Fixes 144974e7f9e3 ("usb: gadget: mass_storage: support multi-luns with different logic block size")Signed-off-by Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>--- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +6
-2@@ -1853,8 +1853,18 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir, unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name) { - if (common->curlun) - common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits; + unsigned int blkbits; + +if (common->curlun) { + blkbits = common->curlun->blkbits; +if (cmnd_size >10 && + common->data_size_from_cmnd > (U32_MAX >> blkbits)) {
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, · line 1867
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +6
-0+ common->phase_error =1 ; +return -EINVAL ; + } + common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= blkbits; + } +Can
check_shl_overflow()be used here to make this easier?
Yes, definitely.
I will update the code to use it in v2.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +0
-1return check_command (common, cmnd_size, data_dir, mask, needs_medium, name); } --2.43.0
--
Kees Cook