usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()
PATCH v3 1/1 usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()
From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>
The check_command_size_in_blocks() function calculates the data size in bytes by left shifting common->data_size_from_cmnd by the block size (common->curlun->blkbits). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.
Initially, the block size is set up in fsg_lun_open() , and the common->data_size_from_cmnd is set up in do_scsi_command(). During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.
So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (common->data_size_from_cmnd), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.
Fix this by using the check_shl_overflow() macro to safely perform the shift and catch any overflows.
---
v1 -> v2: Removed cmnd_size check and applied check_shl_overflow() macro v2 -> v3: Fix indentation of continuation line and drop local variable
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +10 -2
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@#include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/limits.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/rwsem.h> #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -1853,8 +1854,15 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir, unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name) { - if (common->curlun) - common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits; + if (common->curlun) { + if (check_shl_overflow(common->data_size_from_cmnd, + common->curlun->blkbits, + &common->data_size_from_cmnd)) { + common->phase_error = 1; +return -EINVAL ; + } + } +return check_command (common, cmnd_size, data_dir, mask, needs_medium, name); }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 18 lines · pip-izony
From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>
The
check_command_size_in_blocks()function calculates the data size in bytes by left shiftingcommon->data_size_from_cmndby the block size (common->curlun->blkbits). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.Initially, the block size is set up in
fsg_lun_open(), and thecommon->data_size_from_cmndis set up indo_scsi_command(). During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (
common->data_size_from_cmnd), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.
Quoted 6 lines
Fix this by using the
check_shl_overflow()macro to safely perform the shift and catch any overflows.Fixes 144974e7f9e3 ("usb: gadget: mass_storage: support multi-luns with different logic block size")Signed-off-by Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>---
Quoted 39 lines
v1 -> v2: Removed
cmnd_sizecheck and appliedcheck_shl_overflow()macro v2 -> v3: Fix indentation of continuation line and drop local variabledrivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +10
-2@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@#include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/limits.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/rwsem.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -1853,8 +1854,15 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir, unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name) { - if (common->curlun) - common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits; + if (common->curlun) { + if (check_shl_overflow(common->data_size_from_cmnd, + common->curlun->blkbits, + &common->data_size_from_cmnd)) { + common->phase_error = 1; +return -EINVAL ; + } + } +return check_command (common, cmnd_size, data_dir, mask, needs_medium, name); }Signature · 1 line
2.43.0