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smb: client: fix integer underflow in receive_encrypted_read()

PATCH In review Dudu Lu 2 participants 2 messages Apr 15

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Dudu Lu

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 smb: client: fix integer underflow in receive_encrypted_read()

In receive_encrypted_read(), the length of data to read from the socket is computed as:

len = le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize) -

        server->vals->read_rsp_size;

OriginalMessageSize comes from the server's transform header and is untrusted. If a malicious server sends a value smaller than read_rsp_size, the unsigned subtraction wraps to a very large value (~4GB). This value is then passed to netfs_alloc_folioq_buffer() and cifs_read_iter_from_socket(), causing either a massive allocation attempt that fails with -ENOMEM (DoS), or under extreme memory pressure, potential heap corruption.

Fix by adding a check that OriginalMessageSize is at least read_rsp_size before the subtraction. On failure, jump to discard_data to drain the remaining PDU from the socket, preventing desync of subsequent reads on the connection.

---
 fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +8 -0
index 509fcea28a42..a2105f4b54db 100644
@@ -4943,6 +4943,14 @@ receive_encrypted_read(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct mid_q_entry **mid,
 		goto free_dw;
 	server->total_read += rc;
 
+	if (le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize) <
+	    server->vals->read_rsp_size) {
+		cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "OriginalMessageSize %u too small for read response (%zu)\n",
+			le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize),
+			server->vals->read_rsp_size);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto discard_data;
+	}
 	len = le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize) -
 		server->vals->read_rsp_size;
 	dw->len = len;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.3 (Apple Git-145)
#1 lore raw
Quoted 30 lines · Dudu Lu

In receive_encrypted_read(), the length of data to read from the socket is computed as:

len = le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize) -

       server->vals->read_rsp_size;

OriginalMessageSize comes from the server's transform header and is untrusted. If a malicious server sends a value smaller than read_rsp_size, the unsigned subtraction wraps to a very large value (~4GB). This value is then passed to netfs_alloc_folioq_buffer() and cifs_read_iter_from_socket(), causing either a massive allocation attempt that fails with -ENOMEM (DoS), or under extreme memory pressure, potential heap corruption.

Fix by adding a check that OriginalMessageSize is at least read_rsp_size before the subtraction. On failure, jump to discard_data to drain the remaining PDU from the socket, preventing desync of subsequent reads on the connection.

---
fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 8 ++++++++

1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +0 -0
index 509fcea28a42..a2105f4b54db 100644
@@ -4943,6 +4943,14 @@ receive_encrypted_read(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct mid_q_entry **mid,
 		goto free_dw;

fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c receive_encrypted_read(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct mid_q_entry **mid, · line 4953

Quoted 10 lines
fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +8 -0
 	server->total_read += rc;
 
+	if (le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize) <
+	    server->vals->read_rsp_size) {
+		cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "OriginalMessageSize %u too small for read response (%zu)\n",
+			le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize),
+			server->vals->read_rsp_size);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto discard_data;
+	}

You could replace it with:

	if (check_sub_overflow(le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize),
			       server->vals->read_rsp_size, &len) {
		...
	}

for subtraction + check in one shot.

Patch is ok nonetheless.

Cheers,

Enzo