smb: client: fix integer underflow in receive_encrypted_read()
Subsystems (2)
PATCH v2 1/1 smb: client: fix integer underflow in receive_encrypted_read()
In receive_encrypted_read(), the length of data to read from the socket is computed as:
len = le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize) -
server->vals->read_rsp_size;
OriginalMessageSize comes from the server's transform header and is untrusted. If a malicious server sends a value smaller than read_rsp_size, the unsigned subtraction wraps to a very large value (~4GB). This value is then passed to netfs_alloc_folioq_buffer() and cifs_read_iter_from_socket(), causing either a massive allocation attempt that fails with -ENOMEM (DoS), or under extreme memory pressure, potential heap corruption.
Fix by adding a check that OriginalMessageSize is at least read_rsp_size before the subtraction. On failure, jump to discard_data to drain the remaining PDU from the socket, preventing desync of subsequent reads on the connection.
--- fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +8 -0
@@ -4943,6 +4943,14 @@ receive_encrypted_read(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct mid_q_entry **mid, goto free_dw; server->total_read += rc; +if (le32_to_cpu (tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize) < + server->vals->read_rsp_size) { +cifs_server_dbg (VFS ,"OriginalMessageSize %u too small for read response (%zu)\n" , +le32_to_cpu (tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize), + server->vals->read_rsp_size); + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto discard_data; + } len =le32_to_cpu (tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize) - server->vals->read_rsp_size; dw->len = len;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.3 (Apple Git-145)
Quoted 30 lines · Dudu Lu
In
receive_encrypted_read(), the length of data to read from the socket is computed as:len =
le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize)-server->vals->read_rsp_size;OriginalMessageSize comes from the server's transform header and is untrusted. If a malicious server sends a value smaller than
read_rsp_size, the unsigned subtraction wraps to a very large value (~4GB). This value is then passed tonetfs_alloc_folioq_buffer()andcifs_read_iter_from_socket(), causing either a massive allocation attempt that fails with-ENOMEM(DoS), or under extreme memory pressure, potential heap corruption.Fix by adding a check that OriginalMessageSize is at least
read_rsp_sizebefore the subtraction. On failure, jump todiscard_datato drain the remaining PDU from the socket, preventing desync of subsequent reads on the connection.Signed-off-by Dudu Lu <[email protected]>---
fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c| 8 ++++++++1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +0
-0@@ -4943,6 +4943,14 @@ receive_encrypted_read(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct mid_q_entry **mid, goto free_dw;
fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c receive_encrypted_read(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct mid_q_entry **mid, · line 4953
Quoted 10 lines
fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +8
-0server->total_read += rc; +if (le32_to_cpu (tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize) < + server->vals->read_rsp_size) { +cifs_server_dbg (VFS ,"OriginalMessageSize %u too small for read response (%zu)\n" , +le32_to_cpu (tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize), + server->vals->read_rsp_size); + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto discard_data; + }
You could replace it with:
if (check_sub_overflow(le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize),
server->vals->read_rsp_size, &len) {
...
}for subtraction + check in one shot.
Patch is ok nonetheless.
Cheers,
Enzo