btrfs: validate ROOT_BACKREF name before copying subvolume info
PATCH 1/1 btrfs: validate ROOT_BACKREF name before copying subvolume info
btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info() derives the copied subvolume name length from btrfs_item_size() and copies it into subvol_info->name, which is only BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX + 1 bytes long. A malformed ROOT_BACKREF can therefore make the length underflow or exceed the fixed ioctl buffer.
Validate that the item is large enough for struct btrfs_root_ref, that the on-disk name_len fits inside the remaining payload, and that the copied name does not exceed BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX. If any of those checks fail, return -EUCLEAN instead of copying from corrupted metadata. After validation, copy only name_len bytes and terminate the result explicitly.
Sanitizer validation reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_extent_buffer() Write of size 505 at addr ffff88810936d608 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl() (?:?) print_address_description() (mm/kasan/report.c:373) read_extent_buffer() (?:?) print_report() (?:?) __virt_addr_valid() (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk() (arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h:375) kasan_addr_to_slab() (mm/kasan/common.c:45) kasan_report() (?:?) kasan_check_range() (?:?) __asan_memcpy() (mm/kasan/shadow.c:103) btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info() (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2034) btrfs_get_32() (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:?) btrfs_set_16() (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:?) btrfs_test_get_subvol_info_name_oob() (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:?) btrfs_run_sanity_tests() (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:?) init_btrfs_fs() (fs/btrfs/super.c:2690) do_one_initcall() (init/main.c:1382) __kasan_kmalloc() (?:?) rcu_is_watching() (?:?) do_initcalls() (init/main.c:1457) kernel_init_freeable() (init/main.c:1674) kernel_init() (init/main.c:1584) ret_from_fork() (?:?) __switch_to() (?:?) ret_from_fork_asm() (?:?) kasan_save_stack() (mm/kasan/common.c:52) kasan_save_track() (mm/kasan/common.c:74)
---
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +19 -6
@@ -1956,7 +1956,8 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)struct btrfs_root_ref *rref;struct extent_buffer *leaf;unsigned long item_off; -unsigned long item_len; +u32 item_size; +u16 name_len;int slot;int ret =0 ;
@@ -2034,14 +2035,26 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp) subvol_info->parent_id = key.offset; rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref); + item_size =btrfs_item_size (leaf, slot); +if (item_size <sizeof (*rref)) { + ret = -EUCLEAN ; + goto out; + } + + name_len =btrfs_root_ref_name_len (leaf, rref); +if (name_len > item_size -sizeof (*rref) || + name_len >BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX ) { + ret = -EUCLEAN ; + goto out; + } + subvol_info->dirid =btrfs_root_ref_dirid (leaf, rref); - item_off =btrfs_item_ptr_offset (leaf, slot) - +sizeof (struct btrfs_root_ref ); - item_len =btrfs_item_size (leaf, slot) - -sizeof (struct btrfs_root_ref ); + item_off =btrfs_item_ptr_offset (leaf, slot) + +sizeof (*rref);read_extent_buffer (leaf, subvol_info->name, - item_off, item_len); + item_off, name_len); + subvol_info->name[name_len] ='\0' ; }else { ret = -ENOENT ; goto out;
Quoted 6 lines · Zhang Cen
btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info()derives the copied subvolume name length frombtrfs_item_size()and copies it intosubvol_info->name, which is onlyBTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX+ 1 bytes long. A malformedROOT_BACKREFcan therefore make the length underflow or exceed the fixed ioctl buffer.
Quoted 6 lines
Validate that the item is large enough for struct
btrfs_root_ref, that the on-diskname_lenfits inside the remaining payload, and that the copied name does not exceedBTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX. If any of those checks fail, return-EUCLEANinstead of copying from corrupted metadata. After validation, copy onlyname_lenbytes and terminate the result explicitly.
The validation is too late.
btrfs subvolume creation only accept BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX + 1 (for the terminating \0).
This means a subvolume ref/backref should not have a name longer than BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX in the first place.
Such independent checks should all be done inside tree-checker.
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): qu-root-backref-20260510-161800@local
Quoted 9 lines · Qu Wenruo
The validation is too late.
btrfs subvolume creation only accept
BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX+ 1 (for the terminating \0).This means a subvolume ref/backref should not have a name longer than
BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAXin the first place.Such independent checks should all be done inside tree-checker.
Agreed, thanks for the review.
I'll move the on-disk ROOT_REF/ROOT_BACKREF validation into tree-checker for v2 and cover both key types there. The v2 change will reject items smaller than struct btrfs_root_ref, reject records where name_len does not match the item payload, and reject names longer than BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX.
I'll keep the BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO-side BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX check only as the local guard for its fixed-size UAPI output buffer before copying the already validated name.
Thanks,
Zhang
PATCH v2 1/1 btrfs: validate root ref names in tree-checker
In reply to Zhang CenROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items contain a struct btrfs_root_ref followed by the subvolume name. Several readers assume that this layout is already valid and then use the on-disk name length directly. A corrupted item can therefore make those readers address bytes outside the item, and BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO can copy too many bytes into its fixed-size UAPI name buffer.
Validate ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items in tree-checker before any reader uses them. Reject items smaller than struct btrfs_root_ref, reject records whose name_len does not exactly describe the remaining item payload, and reject names longer than BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX.
For BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO, copy only the validated on-disk name_len and keep a local BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX guard for the fixed ioctl output field. Terminate the copied name explicitly.
Sanitizer validation reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_extent_buffer() Write of size 505 at addr ffff88810936d608 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl() (?:?) print_address_description() (mm/kasan/report.c:373) read_extent_buffer() (?:?) print_report() (?:?) __virt_addr_valid() (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk() (arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h:375) kasan_addr_to_slab() (mm/kasan/common.c:45) kasan_report() (?:?) kasan_check_range() (?:?) __asan_memcpy() (mm/kasan/shadow.c:103) btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info() (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1948) btrfs_get_32() (?:?) btrfs_set_16() (?:?) btrfs_test_get_subvol_info_name_oob() (?:?) btrfs_run_sanity_tests() (?:?) init_btrfs_fs() (fs/btrfs/super.c:2690) do_one_initcall() (init/main.c:1382) __kasan_kmalloc() (?:?) rcu_is_watching() (?:?) do_initcalls() (init/main.c:1457) kernel_init_freeable() (init/main.c:1674) kernel_init() (init/main.c:1584) ret_from_fork() (?:?) __switch_to() (?:?) ret_from_fork_asm() (?:?) kasan_save_stack() (mm/kasan/common.c:52) kasan_save_track() (mm/kasan/common.c:74)
---
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
References: <[email protected]> <qu-root-backref-20260510-161800@local>
From: Zhang Cen <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, 10 May 2026 17:05:00 +0800
Subject: [PATCH v2] btrfs: validate root ref names in tree-checker
To: Chris Mason <[email protected]>,
David Sterba <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected],
Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>,
[email protected],
[email protected],
Zhang Cen <[email protected]>
ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items contain a struct btrfs_root_ref followed by the subvolume name. Several readers assume that this layout is already valid and then use the on-disk name length directly. A corrupted item can therefore make those readers address bytes outside the item, and BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO can copy too many bytes into its fixed-size UAPI name buffer.
Validate ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items in tree-checker before any reader uses them. Reject items smaller than struct btrfs_root_ref, reject records whose name_len does not exactly describe the remaining item payload, and reject names longer than BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX.
For BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO, copy only the validated on-disk name_len and keep a local BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX guard for the fixed ioctl output field. Terminate the copied name explicitly.
Sanitizer validation reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_extent_buffer() Write of size 505 at addr ffff88810936d608 Call trace: read_extent_buffer() btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info()
---
Changes since v1:
- Move ROOT_REF/ROOT_BACKREF structural validation into tree-checker.
- Validate both forward and backward root refs instead of only the ioctl path.
- Keep the ioctl-side BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX check as a destination-buffer guard.
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +14 -6
@@ -1956,7 +1956,8 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)struct btrfs_root_ref *rref;struct extent_buffer *leaf;unsigned long item_off; -unsigned long item_len; +u32 item_size; +u16 name_len;int slot;int ret =0 ;
@@ -2034,14 +2035,21 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp) subvol_info->parent_id = key.offset; rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref); + item_size =btrfs_item_size (leaf, slot); + name_len =btrfs_root_ref_name_len (leaf, rref); +if (name_len > item_size -sizeof (*rref) || + name_len >BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX ) { + ret = -EUCLEAN ; + goto out; + } + subvol_info->dirid =btrfs_root_ref_dirid (leaf, rref); - item_off =btrfs_item_ptr_offset (leaf, slot) - +sizeof (struct btrfs_root_ref ); - item_len =btrfs_item_size (leaf, slot) - -sizeof (struct btrfs_root_ref ); + item_off =btrfs_item_ptr_offset (leaf, slot) + +sizeof (*rref);read_extent_buffer (leaf, subvol_info->name, - item_off, item_len); + item_off, name_len); + subvol_info->name[name_len] ='\0' ; }else { ret = -ENOENT ; goto out;
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c +36 -0
@@ -1371,6 +1371,38 @@ static int check_root_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key,return 0 ; } +static int check_root_ref (struct extent_buffer *leaf,struct btrfs_key *key, +int slot) +{ +struct btrfs_root_ref *rref; +u32 item_size =btrfs_item_size (leaf, slot); +u32 name_len; + +if (unlikely (item_size <sizeof (*rref))) { +generic_err (leaf, slot, +"invalid root ref item size for key type %u, have %u expect >= %zu" , + key->type, item_size,sizeof (*rref)); +return -EUCLEAN ; + } + + rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref); + name_len =btrfs_root_ref_name_len (leaf, rref); +if (unlikely (name_len >BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX )) { +generic_err (leaf, slot, +"root ref name too long for key type %u, have %u max %u" , + key->type, name_len,BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX ); +return -EUCLEAN ; + } +if (unlikely (item_size !=sizeof (*rref) + name_len)) { +generic_err (leaf, slot, +"invalid root ref item size for key type %u, have %u expect %zu" , + key->type, item_size,sizeof (*rref) + name_len); +return -EUCLEAN ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + __printf(3,4)__cold static void extent_err(const struct extent_buffer *eb, int slot,
@@ -2226,6 +2258,10 @@ static enum btrfs_tree_block_status check_leaf_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf,case BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY : ret =check_root_item (leaf, key, slot);break ; +case BTRFS_ROOT_REF_KEY : +case BTRFS_ROOT_BACKREF_KEY : + ret =check_root_ref (leaf, key, slot); +break ;case BTRFS_EXTENT_ITEM_KEY :case BTRFS_METADATA_ITEM_KEY : ret =check_extent_item (leaf, key, slot, prev_key);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCH v2] btrfs: validate root ref names in tree-checker
I'm so sorry, I sent the wrong message.
Best regards,
Zhang Cen
Quoted 196 lines · Zhang Cen <[email protected]> 于2026年5月10日周日 22:42写道:
ROOT_REFandROOT_BACKREFitems contain a structbtrfs_root_reffollowed by the subvolume name. Several readers assume that this layout is already valid and then use the on-disk name length directly. A corrupted item can therefore make those readers address bytes outside the item, andBTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFOcan copy too many bytes into its fixed-size UAPI name buffer.Validate
ROOT_REFandROOT_BACKREFitems in tree-checker before any reader uses them. Reject items smaller than structbtrfs_root_ref, reject records whosename_lendoes not exactly describe the remaining item payload, and reject names longer thanBTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX.For
BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO, copy only the validated on-diskname_lenand keep a localBTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAXguard for the fixed ioctl output field. Terminate the copied name explicitly.Sanitizer validation reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_extent_buffer() Write of size 505 at addr ffff88810936d608 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl() (?:?) print_address_description() (mm/kasan/report.c:373) read_extent_buffer() (?:?) print_report() (?:?) __virt_addr_valid() (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk() (arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h:375) kasan_addr_to_slab() (mm/kasan/common.c:45) kasan_report() (?:?) kasan_check_range() (?:?) __asan_memcpy() (mm/kasan/shadow.c:103) btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info() (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1948) btrfs_get_32() (?:?) btrfs_set_16() (?:?) btrfs_test_get_subvol_info_name_oob() (?:?) btrfs_run_sanity_tests() (?:?) init_btrfs_fs() (fs/btrfs/super.c:2690) do_one_initcall() (init/main.c:1382) __kasan_kmalloc() (?:?) rcu_is_watching() (?:?) do_initcalls() (init/main.c:1457) kernel_init_freeable() (init/main.c:1674) kernel_init() (init/main.c:1584) ret_from_fork() (?:?) __switch_to() (?:?) ret_from_fork_asm() (?:?) kasan_save_stack() (mm/kasan/common.c:52) kasan_save_track() (mm/kasan/common.c:74)Signed-off-by Zhang Cen <[email protected]>---
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
References: <[email protected]> <qu-root-backref-20260510-161800@local>
From: Zhang Cen <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, 10 May 2026 17:05:00 +0800
Subject: [PATCH v2] btrfs: validate root ref names in tree-checker
To: Chris Mason <[email protected]>,
David Sterba <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected],
Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>,
[email protected],
[email protected],
Zhang Cen <[email protected]>
ROOT_REFandROOT_BACKREFitems contain a structbtrfs_root_reffollowed by the subvolume name. Several readers assume that this layout is already valid and then use the on-disk name length directly. A corrupted item can therefore make those readers address bytes outside the item, andBTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFOcan copy too many bytes into its fixed-size UAPI name buffer.Validate
ROOT_REFandROOT_BACKREFitems in tree-checker before any reader uses them. Reject items smaller than structbtrfs_root_ref, reject records whosename_lendoes not exactly describe the remaining item payload, and reject names longer thanBTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX.For
BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO, copy only the validated on-diskname_lenand keep a localBTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAXguard for the fixed ioctl output field. Terminate the copied name explicitly.Sanitizer validation reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_extent_buffer() Write of size 505 at addr ffff88810936d608 Call trace: read_extent_buffer() btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info()Signed-off-by Zhang Cen <[email protected]>---
Changes since v1:
- Move ROOT_REF/ROOT_BACKREF structural validation into tree-checker.
- Validate both forward and backward root refs instead of only the ioctl path.
- Keep the ioctl-sideBTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAXcheck as a destination-buffer guard.fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +14
-6@@ -1956,7 +1956,8 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)struct btrfs_root_ref *rref;struct extent_buffer *leaf;unsigned long item_off; -unsigned long item_len; +u32 item_size; +u16 name_len;int slot;int ret =0 ;@@ -2034,14 +2035,21 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp) subvol_info->parent_id = key.offset; rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref); + item_size =btrfs_item_size (leaf, slot); + name_len =btrfs_root_ref_name_len (leaf, rref); +if (name_len > item_size -sizeof (*rref) || + name_len >BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX ) { + ret = -EUCLEAN ; + goto out; + } + subvol_info->dirid =btrfs_root_ref_dirid (leaf, rref); - item_off =btrfs_item_ptr_offset (leaf, slot) - +sizeof (struct btrfs_root_ref ); - item_len =btrfs_item_size (leaf, slot) - -sizeof (struct btrfs_root_ref ); + item_off =btrfs_item_ptr_offset (leaf, slot) + +sizeof (*rref);read_extent_buffer (leaf, subvol_info->name, - item_off, item_len); + item_off, name_len); + subvol_info->name[name_len] ='\0' ; }else { ret = -ENOENT ; goto out;fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c +36
-1@@ -1371,6 +1371,38 @@ static int check_root_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key,return 0 ; } +static int check_root_ref (struct extent_buffer *leaf,struct btrfs_key *key, +int slot) +{ +struct btrfs_root_ref *rref; +u32 item_size =btrfs_item_size (leaf, slot); +u32 name_len; + +if (unlikely (item_size <sizeof (*rref))) { +generic_err (leaf, slot, +"invalid root ref item size for key type %u, have %u expect >= %zu" , + key->type, item_size,sizeof (*rref)); +return -EUCLEAN ; + } + + rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref); + name_len =btrfs_root_ref_name_len (leaf, rref); +if (unlikely (name_len >BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX )) { +generic_err (leaf, slot, +"root ref name too long for key type %u, have %u max %u" , + key->type, name_len,BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX ); +return -EUCLEAN ; + } +if (unlikely (item_size !=sizeof (*rref) + name_len)) { +generic_err (leaf, slot, +"invalid root ref item size for key type %u, have %u expect %zu" , + key->type, item_size,sizeof (*rref) + name_len); +return -EUCLEAN ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + __printf(3,4)__cold static void extent_err(const struct extent_buffer *eb, int slot,@@ -2226,6 +2258,10 @@ static enum btrfs_tree_block_status check_leaf_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf,case BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY : ret =check_root_item (leaf, key, slot);break ; +case BTRFS_ROOT_REF_KEY : +case BTRFS_ROOT_BACKREF_KEY : + ret =check_root_ref (leaf, key, slot); +break ;case BTRFS_EXTENT_ITEM_KEY :case BTRFS_METADATA_ITEM_KEY : ret =check_extent_item (leaf, key, slot, prev_key); --2.43.0
PATCH v3 1/1 btrfs: validate root ref names in tree-checker
In reply to Zhang CenROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items contain a struct btrfs_root_ref followed by the subvolume name. Several readers assume that this layout is already valid and then use the on-disk name length directly. A corrupted item can therefore make those readers address bytes outside the item, and BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO can copy too many bytes into its fixed-size UAPI name buffer.
Validate ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items in tree-checker before any reader uses them. Reject items smaller than struct btrfs_root_ref, reject records whose name_len does not exactly describe the remaining item payload, and reject names longer than BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX.
For BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO, copy only the validated on-disk name_len and keep a local BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX guard for the fixed ioctl output field. Terminate the copied name explicitly.
Sanitizer validation reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_extent_buffer() Write of size 505 at addr ffff88810936d608 Call trace: read_extent_buffer() btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info()
---
Changes since v2:
- Regenerate the mail-ready patch without the nested mbox wrapper.
- No code changes beyond the v2 fix.
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +14 -6
@@ -1956,7 +1956,8 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)struct btrfs_root_ref *rref;struct extent_buffer *leaf;unsigned long item_off; -unsigned long item_len; +u32 item_size; +u16 name_len;int slot;int ret =0 ;
@@ -2034,14 +2035,21 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp) subvol_info->parent_id = key.offset; rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref); + item_size =btrfs_item_size (leaf, slot); + name_len =btrfs_root_ref_name_len (leaf, rref); +if (name_len > item_size -sizeof (*rref) || + name_len >BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX ) { + ret = -EUCLEAN ; + goto out; + } + subvol_info->dirid =btrfs_root_ref_dirid (leaf, rref); - item_off =btrfs_item_ptr_offset (leaf, slot) - +sizeof (struct btrfs_root_ref ); - item_len =btrfs_item_size (leaf, slot) - -sizeof (struct btrfs_root_ref ); + item_off =btrfs_item_ptr_offset (leaf, slot) + +sizeof (*rref);read_extent_buffer (leaf, subvol_info->name, - item_off, item_len); + item_off, name_len); + subvol_info->name[name_len] ='\0' ; }else { ret = -ENOENT ; goto out;
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c +36 -0
@@ -1371,6 +1371,38 @@ static int check_root_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key,return 0 ; } +static int check_root_ref (struct extent_buffer *leaf,struct btrfs_key *key, +int slot) +{ +struct btrfs_root_ref *rref; +u32 item_size =btrfs_item_size (leaf, slot); +u32 name_len; + +if (unlikely (item_size <sizeof (*rref))) { +generic_err (leaf, slot, +"invalid root ref item size for key type %u, have %u expect >= %zu" , + key->type, item_size,sizeof (*rref)); +return -EUCLEAN ; + } + + rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref); + name_len =btrfs_root_ref_name_len (leaf, rref); +if (unlikely (name_len >BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX )) { +generic_err (leaf, slot, +"root ref name too long for key type %u, have %u max %u" , + key->type, name_len,BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX ); +return -EUCLEAN ; + } +if (unlikely (item_size !=sizeof (*rref) + name_len)) { +generic_err (leaf, slot, +"invalid root ref item size for key type %u, have %u expect %zu" , + key->type, item_size,sizeof (*rref) + name_len); +return -EUCLEAN ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + __printf(3,4)__cold static void extent_err(const struct extent_buffer *eb, int slot,
@@ -2226,6 +2258,10 @@ static enum btrfs_tree_block_status check_leaf_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf,case BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY : ret =check_root_item (leaf, key, slot);break ; +case BTRFS_ROOT_REF_KEY : +case BTRFS_ROOT_BACKREF_KEY : + ret =check_root_ref (leaf, key, slot); +break ;case BTRFS_EXTENT_ITEM_KEY :case BTRFS_METADATA_ITEM_KEY : ret =check_extent_item (leaf, key, slot, prev_key);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCH v3] btrfs: validate root ref names in tree-checker
Quoted 37 lines · Zhang Cen
ROOT_REFandROOT_BACKREFitems contain a structbtrfs_root_reffollowed by the subvolume name. Several readers assume that this layout is already valid and then use the on-disk name length directly. A corrupted item can therefore make those readers address bytes outside the item, andBTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFOcan copy too many bytes into its fixed-size UAPI name buffer.Validate
ROOT_REFandROOT_BACKREFitems in tree-checker before any reader uses them. Reject items smaller than structbtrfs_root_ref, reject records whosename_lendoes not exactly describe the remaining item payload, and reject names longer thanBTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX.For
BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO, copy only the validated on-diskname_lenand keep a localBTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAXguard for the fixed ioctl output field. Terminate the copied name explicitly.Sanitizer validation reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_extent_buffer() Write of size 505 at addr ffff88810936d608 Call trace: read_extent_buffer() btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info()Signed-off-by Zhang Cen <[email protected]>---
Changes since v2:
- Regenerate the mail-ready patch without the nested mbox wrapper.
- No code changes beyond the v2 fix.fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +0
-0
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp) · line 1959
Quoted 5 lines
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +1
-1@@ -1956,7 +1956,8 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)struct btrfs_root_ref *rref;struct extent_buffer *leaf;unsigned long item_off; -unsigned long item_len; +u32 item_size;
Move the declaration where it's really used, aka, the if () branch where it's first utilized.
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp) · line 2041
Quoted 12 lines
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +5
-0+u16 name_len;int slot;int ret =0 ;@@ -2034,14 +2035,21 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp) subvol_info->parent_id = key.offset; rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref); + item_size =btrfs_item_size (leaf, slot); + name_len =btrfs_root_ref_name_len (leaf, rref); +if (name_len > item_size -sizeof (*rref) || + name_len >BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX ) {
Those conditions are already checked in tree-checker. And you return -EUCLEAN without any error message.
An ASSERT() will be more than enough, and I even prefer not to have an ASSERT().
And that's the idea of tree-checker, we validate everything (that we can validate) in tree-checker, so that callers won't need to bother re-checking them at random location again and again.
Quoted 6 lines
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +4
-0+ ret = -EUCLEAN ; + goto out; + } + subvol_info->dirid =btrfs_root_ref_dirid (leaf, rref);
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp) · line 2052
Quoted 10 lines
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +4
-5- item_off =btrfs_item_ptr_offset (leaf, slot) - +sizeof (struct btrfs_root_ref ); - item_len =btrfs_item_size (leaf, slot) - -sizeof (struct btrfs_root_ref ); + item_off =btrfs_item_ptr_offset (leaf, slot) + +sizeof (*rref);read_extent_buffer (leaf, subvol_info->name, - item_off, item_len); + item_off, name_len); + subvol_info->name[name_len] ='\0' ;
No need to manually add terminating \0.
subvol_info is allocated by kzalloc_obj(), all members in subvol_info->name[] should be zero, and the BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX check ensured there is at least one byte left in name[] that is not touched.
Quoted 9 lines
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +0
-0}else { ret = -ENOENT ; goto out;fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c +0
-0@@ -1371,6 +1371,38 @@ static int check_root_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key,return 0 ;
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c static int check_root_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key, · line 1381
Quoted 10 lines
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c +8
-0} +static int check_root_ref (struct extent_buffer *leaf,struct btrfs_key *key, +int slot) +{ +struct btrfs_root_ref *rref; +u32 item_size =btrfs_item_size (leaf, slot); +u32 name_len; + +if (unlikely (item_size <sizeof (*rref))) {
There should be a name_len that is not zero. So the check should be (item_size <= sizeof(*ref)).
Thanks,
Qu