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btrfs: validate ROOT_BACKREF name before copying subvolume info

PATCH In review Zhang Cen 2 participants 7 messages May 10 1 message not in the archive Btrfs file system

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Zhang Cen

author
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 btrfs: validate ROOT_BACKREF name before copying subvolume info

btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info() derives the copied subvolume name length from btrfs_item_size() and copies it into subvol_info->name, which is only BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX + 1 bytes long. A malformed ROOT_BACKREF can therefore make the length underflow or exceed the fixed ioctl buffer.

Validate that the item is large enough for struct btrfs_root_ref, that the on-disk name_len fits inside the remaining payload, and that the copied name does not exceed BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX. If any of those checks fail, return -EUCLEAN instead of copying from corrupted metadata. After validation, copy only name_len bytes and terminate the result explicitly.

Sanitizer validation reported:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_extent_buffer()
Write of size 505 at addr ffff88810936d608
Call trace:
  dump_stack_lvl() (?:?)
  print_address_description() (mm/kasan/report.c:373)
  read_extent_buffer() (?:?)
  print_report() (?:?)
  __virt_addr_valid() (?:?)
  srso_alias_return_thunk() (arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h:375)
  kasan_addr_to_slab() (mm/kasan/common.c:45)
  kasan_report() (?:?)
  kasan_check_range() (?:?)
  __asan_memcpy() (mm/kasan/shadow.c:103)
  btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info() (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2034)
  btrfs_get_32() (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:?)
  btrfs_set_16() (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:?)
  btrfs_test_get_subvol_info_name_oob() (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:?)
  btrfs_run_sanity_tests() (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:?)
  init_btrfs_fs() (fs/btrfs/super.c:2690)
  do_one_initcall() (init/main.c:1382)
  __kasan_kmalloc() (?:?)
  rcu_is_watching() (?:?)
  do_initcalls() (init/main.c:1457)
  kernel_init_freeable() (init/main.c:1674)
  kernel_init() (init/main.c:1584)
  ret_from_fork() (?:?)
  __switch_to() (?:?)
  ret_from_fork_asm() (?:?)
  kasan_save_stack() (mm/kasan/common.c:52)
  kasan_save_track() (mm/kasan/common.c:74)

---

fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +19 -6
index a39460bf68a7..0647e672464a 100644
@@ -1956,7 +1956,8 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
 	struct btrfs_root_ref *rref;
 	struct extent_buffer *leaf;
 	unsigned long item_off;
-	unsigned long item_len;
+	u32 item_size;
+	u16 name_len;
 	int slot;
 	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -2034,14 +2035,26 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
 			subvol_info->parent_id = key.offset;
 
 			rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref);
+			item_size = btrfs_item_size(leaf, slot);
+			if (item_size < sizeof(*rref)) {
+				ret = -EUCLEAN;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			name_len = btrfs_root_ref_name_len(leaf, rref);
+			if (name_len > item_size - sizeof(*rref) ||
+			    name_len > BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX) {
+				ret = -EUCLEAN;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
 			subvol_info->dirid = btrfs_root_ref_dirid(leaf, rref);
 
-			item_off = btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot)
-					+ sizeof(struct btrfs_root_ref);
-			item_len = btrfs_item_size(leaf, slot)
-					- sizeof(struct btrfs_root_ref);
+			item_off = btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot) +
+				   sizeof(*rref);
 			read_extent_buffer(leaf, subvol_info->name,
-					   item_off, item_len);
+					   item_off, name_len);
+			subvol_info->name[name_len] = '\0';
 		} else {
 			ret = -ENOENT;
 			goto out;
#1 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Zhang Cen

btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info() derives the copied subvolume name length from btrfs_item_size() and copies it into subvol_info->name, which is only BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX + 1 bytes long. A malformed ROOT_BACKREF can therefore make the length underflow or exceed the fixed ioctl buffer.

Quoted 6 lines

Validate that the item is large enough for struct btrfs_root_ref, that the on-disk name_len fits inside the remaining payload, and that the copied name does not exceed BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX. If any of those checks fail, return -EUCLEAN instead of copying from corrupted metadata. After validation, copy only name_len bytes and terminate the result explicitly.

The validation is too late.

btrfs subvolume creation only accept BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX + 1 (for the terminating \0).

This means a subvolume ref/backref should not have a name longer than BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX in the first place.

Such independent checks should all be done inside tree-checker.

author
#3 lore raw
In reply to a message not in the archive
Quoted 9 lines · Qu Wenruo

The validation is too late.

btrfs subvolume creation only accept BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX + 1 (for the terminating \0).

This means a subvolume ref/backref should not have a name longer than BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX in the first place.

Such independent checks should all be done inside tree-checker.

Agreed, thanks for the review.

I'll move the on-disk ROOT_REF/ROOT_BACKREF validation into tree-checker for v2 and cover both key types there. The v2 change will reject items smaller than struct btrfs_root_ref, reject records where name_len does not match the item payload, and reject names longer than BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX.

I'll keep the BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO-side BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX check only as the local guard for its fixed-size UAPI output buffer before copying the already validated name.

Thanks,
Zhang

author
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 btrfs: validate root ref names in tree-checker

In reply to Zhang Cen

ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items contain a struct btrfs_root_ref followed by the subvolume name. Several readers assume that this layout is already valid and then use the on-disk name length directly. A corrupted item can therefore make those readers address bytes outside the item, and BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO can copy too many bytes into its fixed-size UAPI name buffer.

Validate ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items in tree-checker before any reader uses them. Reject items smaller than struct btrfs_root_ref, reject records whose name_len does not exactly describe the remaining item payload, and reject names longer than BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX.

For BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO, copy only the validated on-disk name_len and keep a local BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX guard for the fixed ioctl output field. Terminate the copied name explicitly.

Sanitizer validation reported:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_extent_buffer()
Write of size 505 at addr ffff88810936d608
Call trace:
  dump_stack_lvl() (?:?)
  print_address_description() (mm/kasan/report.c:373)
  read_extent_buffer() (?:?)
  print_report() (?:?)
  __virt_addr_valid() (?:?)
  srso_alias_return_thunk() (arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h:375)
  kasan_addr_to_slab() (mm/kasan/common.c:45)
  kasan_report() (?:?)
  kasan_check_range() (?:?)
  __asan_memcpy() (mm/kasan/shadow.c:103)
  btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info() (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1948)
  btrfs_get_32() (?:?)
  btrfs_set_16() (?:?)
  btrfs_test_get_subvol_info_name_oob() (?:?)
  btrfs_run_sanity_tests() (?:?)
  init_btrfs_fs() (fs/btrfs/super.c:2690)
  do_one_initcall() (init/main.c:1382)
  __kasan_kmalloc() (?:?)
  rcu_is_watching() (?:?)
  do_initcalls() (init/main.c:1457)
  kernel_init_freeable() (init/main.c:1674)
  kernel_init() (init/main.c:1584)
  ret_from_fork() (?:?)
  __switch_to() (?:?)
  ret_from_fork_asm() (?:?)
  kasan_save_stack() (mm/kasan/common.c:52)
  kasan_save_track() (mm/kasan/common.c:74)

---
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
References: <[email protected]> <qu-root-backref-20260510-161800@local>
From: Zhang Cen <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, 10 May 2026 17:05:00 +0800
Subject: [PATCH v2] btrfs: validate root ref names in tree-checker
To: Chris Mason <[email protected]>,
David Sterba <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected],
Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>,
[email protected],
[email protected],
Zhang Cen <[email protected]>

ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items contain a struct btrfs_root_ref followed by the subvolume name. Several readers assume that this layout is already valid and then use the on-disk name length directly. A corrupted item can therefore make those readers address bytes outside the item, and BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO can copy too many bytes into its fixed-size UAPI name buffer.

Validate ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items in tree-checker before any reader uses them. Reject items smaller than struct btrfs_root_ref, reject records whose name_len does not exactly describe the remaining item payload, and reject names longer than BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX.

For BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO, copy only the validated on-disk name_len and keep a local BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX guard for the fixed ioctl output field. Terminate the copied name explicitly.

Sanitizer validation reported:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_extent_buffer()
Write of size 505 at addr ffff88810936d608
Call trace:
  read_extent_buffer()
  btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info()

---
Changes since v1:
- Move ROOT_REF/ROOT_BACKREF structural validation into tree-checker.
- Validate both forward and backward root refs instead of only the ioctl path.
- Keep the ioctl-side BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX check as a destination-buffer guard.

 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c       | 17 +++++++++++++----
 fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +14 -6
index a39460bf68a7..b43d33eaea07 100644
@@ -1956,7 +1956,8 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
 	struct btrfs_root_ref *rref;
 	struct extent_buffer *leaf;
 	unsigned long item_off;
-	unsigned long item_len;
+	u32 item_size;
+	u16 name_len;
 	int slot;
 	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -2034,14 +2035,21 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
 			subvol_info->parent_id = key.offset;
 
 			rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref);
+			item_size = btrfs_item_size(leaf, slot);
+			name_len = btrfs_root_ref_name_len(leaf, rref);
+			if (name_len > item_size - sizeof(*rref) ||
+			    name_len > BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX) {
+				ret = -EUCLEAN;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
 			subvol_info->dirid = btrfs_root_ref_dirid(leaf, rref);
 
-			item_off = btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot)
-					+ sizeof(struct btrfs_root_ref);
-			item_len = btrfs_item_size(leaf, slot)
-					- sizeof(struct btrfs_root_ref);
+			item_off = btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot) +
+				   sizeof(*rref);
 			read_extent_buffer(leaf, subvol_info->name,
-					   item_off, item_len);
+					   item_off, name_len);
+			subvol_info->name[name_len] = '\0';
 		} else {
 			ret = -ENOENT;
 			goto out;
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c +36 -0
index 1f15d0793a9c..41417b2df32d 100644
@@ -1371,6 +1371,38 @@ static int check_root_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int check_root_ref(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key,
+				  int slot)
+{
+	struct btrfs_root_ref *rref;
+	u32 item_size = btrfs_item_size(leaf, slot);
+	u32 name_len;
+
+	if (unlikely(item_size < sizeof(*rref))) {
+		generic_err(leaf, slot,
+			    "invalid root ref item size for key type %u, have %u expect >= %zu",
+			    key->type, item_size, sizeof(*rref));
+		return -EUCLEAN;
+	}
+
+	rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref);
+	name_len = btrfs_root_ref_name_len(leaf, rref);
+	if (unlikely(name_len > BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX)) {
+		generic_err(leaf, slot,
+			    "root ref name too long for key type %u, have %u max %u",
+			    key->type, name_len, BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX);
+		return -EUCLEAN;
+	}
+	if (unlikely(item_size != sizeof(*rref) + name_len)) {
+		generic_err(leaf, slot,
+			    "invalid root ref item size for key type %u, have %u expect %zu",
+			    key->type, item_size, sizeof(*rref) + name_len);
+		return -EUCLEAN;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 __printf(3,4)
 __cold
 static void extent_err(const struct extent_buffer *eb, int slot,
@@ -2226,6 +2258,10 @@ static enum btrfs_tree_block_status check_leaf_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf,
 	case BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY:
 		ret = check_root_item(leaf, key, slot);
 		break;
+	case BTRFS_ROOT_REF_KEY:
+	case BTRFS_ROOT_BACKREF_KEY:
+		ret = check_root_ref(leaf, key, slot);
+		break;
 	case BTRFS_EXTENT_ITEM_KEY:
 	case BTRFS_METADATA_ITEM_KEY:
 		ret = check_extent_item(leaf, key, slot, prev_key);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2] btrfs: validate root ref names in tree-checker

I'm so sorry, I sent the wrong message.

Best regards,
Zhang Cen

Quoted 196 lines · Zhang Cen <[email protected]> 于2026年5月10日周日 22:42写道:

ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items contain a struct btrfs_root_ref followed by the subvolume name. Several readers assume that this layout is already valid and then use the on-disk name length directly. A corrupted item can therefore make those readers address bytes outside the item, and BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO can copy too many bytes into its fixed-size UAPI name buffer.

Validate ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items in tree-checker before any reader uses them. Reject items smaller than struct btrfs_root_ref, reject records whose name_len does not exactly describe the remaining item payload, and reject names longer than BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX.

For BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO, copy only the validated on-disk name_len and keep a local BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX guard for the fixed ioctl output field. Terminate the copied name explicitly.

Sanitizer validation reported:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_extent_buffer()
Write of size 505 at addr ffff88810936d608
Call trace:
  dump_stack_lvl() (?:?)
  print_address_description() (mm/kasan/report.c:373)
  read_extent_buffer() (?:?)
  print_report() (?:?)
  __virt_addr_valid() (?:?)
  srso_alias_return_thunk() (arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h:375)
  kasan_addr_to_slab() (mm/kasan/common.c:45)
  kasan_report() (?:?)
  kasan_check_range() (?:?)
  __asan_memcpy() (mm/kasan/shadow.c:103)
  btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info() (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1948)
  btrfs_get_32() (?:?)
  btrfs_set_16() (?:?)
  btrfs_test_get_subvol_info_name_oob() (?:?)
  btrfs_run_sanity_tests() (?:?)
  init_btrfs_fs() (fs/btrfs/super.c:2690)
  do_one_initcall() (init/main.c:1382)
  __kasan_kmalloc() (?:?)
  rcu_is_watching() (?:?)
  do_initcalls() (init/main.c:1457)
  kernel_init_freeable() (init/main.c:1674)
  kernel_init() (init/main.c:1584)
  ret_from_fork() (?:?)
  __switch_to() (?:?)
  ret_from_fork_asm() (?:?)
  kasan_save_stack() (mm/kasan/common.c:52)
  kasan_save_track() (mm/kasan/common.c:74)

---
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
References: <[email protected]> <qu-root-backref-20260510-161800@local>
From: Zhang Cen <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, 10 May 2026 17:05:00 +0800
Subject: [PATCH v2] btrfs: validate root ref names in tree-checker
To: Chris Mason <[email protected]>,
David Sterba <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected],
Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>,
[email protected],
[email protected],
Zhang Cen <[email protected]>

ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items contain a struct btrfs_root_ref followed by the subvolume name. Several readers assume that this layout is already valid and then use the on-disk name length directly. A corrupted item can therefore make those readers address bytes outside the item, and BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO can copy too many bytes into its fixed-size UAPI name buffer.

Validate ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items in tree-checker before any reader uses them. Reject items smaller than struct btrfs_root_ref, reject records whose name_len does not exactly describe the remaining item payload, and reject names longer than BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX.

For BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO, copy only the validated on-disk name_len and keep a local BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX guard for the fixed ioctl output field. Terminate the copied name explicitly.

Sanitizer validation reported:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_extent_buffer()
Write of size 505 at addr ffff88810936d608
Call trace:
  read_extent_buffer()
  btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info()

---
Changes since v1:
- Move ROOT_REF/ROOT_BACKREF structural validation into tree-checker.
- Validate both forward and backward root refs instead of only the ioctl path.
- Keep the ioctl-side BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX check as a destination-buffer guard.

 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c       | 17 +++++++++++++----
 fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +14 -6
index a39460bf68a7..b43d33eaea07 100644
@@ -1956,7 +1956,8 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
        struct btrfs_root_ref *rref;
        struct extent_buffer *leaf;
        unsigned long item_off;
-       unsigned long item_len;
+       u32 item_size;
+       u16 name_len;
        int slot;
        int ret = 0;
 
@@ -2034,14 +2035,21 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
                        subvol_info->parent_id = key.offset;
 
                        rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref);
+                       item_size = btrfs_item_size(leaf, slot);
+                       name_len = btrfs_root_ref_name_len(leaf, rref);
+                       if (name_len > item_size - sizeof(*rref) ||
+                           name_len > BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX) {
+                               ret = -EUCLEAN;
+                               goto out;
+                       }
+
                        subvol_info->dirid = btrfs_root_ref_dirid(leaf, rref);
 
-                       item_off = btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot)
-                                       + sizeof(struct btrfs_root_ref);
-                       item_len = btrfs_item_size(leaf, slot)
-                                       - sizeof(struct btrfs_root_ref);
+                       item_off = btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot) +
+                                  sizeof(*rref);
                        read_extent_buffer(leaf, subvol_info->name,
-                                          item_off, item_len);
+                                          item_off, name_len);
+                       subvol_info->name[name_len] = '\0';
                } else {
                        ret = -ENOENT;
                        goto out;
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c +36 -1
index 1f15d0793a9c..41417b2df32d 100644
@@ -1371,6 +1371,38 @@ static int check_root_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key,
        return 0;
 }
 
+static int check_root_ref(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key,
+                                 int slot)
+{
+       struct btrfs_root_ref *rref;
+       u32 item_size = btrfs_item_size(leaf, slot);
+       u32 name_len;
+
+       if (unlikely(item_size < sizeof(*rref))) {
+               generic_err(leaf, slot,
+                           "invalid root ref item size for key type %u, have %u expect >= %zu",
+                           key->type, item_size, sizeof(*rref));
+               return -EUCLEAN;
+       }
+
+       rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref);
+       name_len = btrfs_root_ref_name_len(leaf, rref);
+       if (unlikely(name_len > BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX)) {
+               generic_err(leaf, slot,
+                           "root ref name too long for key type %u, have %u max %u",
+                           key->type, name_len, BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX);
+               return -EUCLEAN;
+       }
+       if (unlikely(item_size != sizeof(*rref) + name_len)) {
+               generic_err(leaf, slot,
+                           "invalid root ref item size for key type %u, have %u expect %zu",
+                           key->type, item_size, sizeof(*rref) + name_len);
+               return -EUCLEAN;
+       }
+
+       return 0;
+}
+
 __printf(3,4)
 __cold
 static void extent_err(const struct extent_buffer *eb, int slot,
@@ -2226,6 +2258,10 @@ static enum btrfs_tree_block_status check_leaf_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf,
        case BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY:
                ret = check_root_item(leaf, key, slot);
                break;
+       case BTRFS_ROOT_REF_KEY:
+       case BTRFS_ROOT_BACKREF_KEY:
+               ret = check_root_ref(leaf, key, slot);
+               break;
        case BTRFS_EXTENT_ITEM_KEY:
        case BTRFS_METADATA_ITEM_KEY:
                ret = check_extent_item(leaf, key, slot, prev_key);
--

2.43.0

author
#6 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/1 btrfs: validate root ref names in tree-checker

In reply to Zhang Cen

ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items contain a struct btrfs_root_ref followed by the subvolume name. Several readers assume that this layout is already valid and then use the on-disk name length directly. A corrupted item can therefore make those readers address bytes outside the item, and BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO can copy too many bytes into its fixed-size UAPI name buffer.

Validate ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items in tree-checker before any reader uses them. Reject items smaller than struct btrfs_root_ref, reject records whose name_len does not exactly describe the remaining item payload, and reject names longer than BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX.

For BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO, copy only the validated on-disk name_len and keep a local BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX guard for the fixed ioctl output field. Terminate the copied name explicitly.

Sanitizer validation reported:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_extent_buffer()
Write of size 505 at addr ffff88810936d608
Call trace:
  read_extent_buffer()
  btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info()

---
Changes since v2:
- Regenerate the mail-ready patch without the nested mbox wrapper.
- No code changes beyond the v2 fix.

 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c       | 17 +++++++++++++----
 fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +14 -6
index a39460bf68a7..b43d33eaea07 100644
@@ -1956,7 +1956,8 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
 	struct btrfs_root_ref *rref;
 	struct extent_buffer *leaf;
 	unsigned long item_off;
-	unsigned long item_len;
+	u32 item_size;
+	u16 name_len;
 	int slot;
 	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -2034,14 +2035,21 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
 			subvol_info->parent_id = key.offset;
 
 			rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref);
+			item_size = btrfs_item_size(leaf, slot);
+			name_len = btrfs_root_ref_name_len(leaf, rref);
+			if (name_len > item_size - sizeof(*rref) ||
+			    name_len > BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX) {
+				ret = -EUCLEAN;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
 			subvol_info->dirid = btrfs_root_ref_dirid(leaf, rref);
 
-			item_off = btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot)
-					+ sizeof(struct btrfs_root_ref);
-			item_len = btrfs_item_size(leaf, slot)
-					- sizeof(struct btrfs_root_ref);
+			item_off = btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot) +
+				   sizeof(*rref);
 			read_extent_buffer(leaf, subvol_info->name,
-					   item_off, item_len);
+					   item_off, name_len);
+			subvol_info->name[name_len] = '\0';
 		} else {
 			ret = -ENOENT;
 			goto out;
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c +36 -0
index 1f15d0793a9c..41417b2df32d 100644
@@ -1371,6 +1371,38 @@ static int check_root_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int check_root_ref(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key,
+				  int slot)
+{
+	struct btrfs_root_ref *rref;
+	u32 item_size = btrfs_item_size(leaf, slot);
+	u32 name_len;
+
+	if (unlikely(item_size < sizeof(*rref))) {
+		generic_err(leaf, slot,
+			    "invalid root ref item size for key type %u, have %u expect >= %zu",
+			    key->type, item_size, sizeof(*rref));
+		return -EUCLEAN;
+	}
+
+	rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref);
+	name_len = btrfs_root_ref_name_len(leaf, rref);
+	if (unlikely(name_len > BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX)) {
+		generic_err(leaf, slot,
+			    "root ref name too long for key type %u, have %u max %u",
+			    key->type, name_len, BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX);
+		return -EUCLEAN;
+	}
+	if (unlikely(item_size != sizeof(*rref) + name_len)) {
+		generic_err(leaf, slot,
+			    "invalid root ref item size for key type %u, have %u expect %zu",
+			    key->type, item_size, sizeof(*rref) + name_len);
+		return -EUCLEAN;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 __printf(3,4)
 __cold
 static void extent_err(const struct extent_buffer *eb, int slot,
@@ -2226,6 +2258,10 @@ static enum btrfs_tree_block_status check_leaf_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf,
 	case BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY:
 		ret = check_root_item(leaf, key, slot);
 		break;
+	case BTRFS_ROOT_REF_KEY:
+	case BTRFS_ROOT_BACKREF_KEY:
+		ret = check_root_ref(leaf, key, slot);
+		break;
 	case BTRFS_EXTENT_ITEM_KEY:
 	case BTRFS_METADATA_ITEM_KEY:
 		ret = check_extent_item(leaf, key, slot, prev_key);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3] btrfs: validate root ref names in tree-checker

Quoted 37 lines · Zhang Cen

ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items contain a struct btrfs_root_ref followed by the subvolume name. Several readers assume that this layout is already valid and then use the on-disk name length directly. A corrupted item can therefore make those readers address bytes outside the item, and BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO can copy too many bytes into its fixed-size UAPI name buffer.

Validate ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items in tree-checker before any reader uses them. Reject items smaller than struct btrfs_root_ref, reject records whose name_len does not exactly describe the remaining item payload, and reject names longer than BTRFS_SUBVOL_NAME_MAX.

For BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO, copy only the validated on-disk name_len and keep a local BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX guard for the fixed ioctl output field. Terminate the copied name explicitly.

Sanitizer validation reported:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_extent_buffer()
Write of size 505 at addr ffff88810936d608
Call trace:
   read_extent_buffer()
   btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info()

---
Changes since v2:
- Regenerate the mail-ready patch without the nested mbox wrapper.
- No code changes beyond the v2 fix.

  fs/btrfs/ioctl.c       | 17 +++++++++++++----
  fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +0 -0
index a39460bf68a7..b43d33eaea07 100644

fs/btrfs/ioctl.c static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp) · line 1959

Quoted 5 lines
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +1 -1
@@ -1956,7 +1956,8 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
  	struct btrfs_root_ref *rref;
  	struct extent_buffer *leaf;
  	unsigned long item_off;
-	unsigned long item_len;
+	u32 item_size;

Move the declaration where it's really used, aka, the if () branch where it's first utilized.

fs/btrfs/ioctl.c static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp) · line 2041

Quoted 12 lines
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +5 -0
+	u16 name_len;
  	int slot;
  	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -2034,14 +2035,21 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
  			subvol_info->parent_id = key.offset;
 
  			rref = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_root_ref);
+			item_size = btrfs_item_size(leaf, slot);
+			name_len = btrfs_root_ref_name_len(leaf, rref);
+			if (name_len > item_size - sizeof(*rref) ||
+			    name_len > BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX) {

Those conditions are already checked in tree-checker. And you return -EUCLEAN without any error message.

An ASSERT() will be more than enough, and I even prefer not to have an ASSERT().

And that's the idea of tree-checker, we validate everything (that we can validate) in tree-checker, so that callers won't need to bother re-checking them at random location again and again.

Quoted 6 lines
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +4 -0
+				ret = -EUCLEAN;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
  			subvol_info->dirid = btrfs_root_ref_dirid(leaf, rref);
 

fs/btrfs/ioctl.c static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp) · line 2052

Quoted 10 lines
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +4 -5
-			item_off = btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot)
-					+ sizeof(struct btrfs_root_ref);
-			item_len = btrfs_item_size(leaf, slot)
-					- sizeof(struct btrfs_root_ref);
+			item_off = btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot) +
+				   sizeof(*rref);
  			read_extent_buffer(leaf, subvol_info->name,
-					   item_off, item_len);
+					   item_off, name_len);
+			subvol_info->name[name_len] = '\0';

No need to manually add terminating \0.

subvol_info is allocated by kzalloc_obj(), all members in subvol_info->name[] should be zero, and the BTRFS_VOL_NAME_MAX check ensured there is at least one byte left in name[] that is not touched.

Quoted 9 lines
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +0 -0
  		} else {
  			ret = -ENOENT;
  			goto out;
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c +0 -0
index 1f15d0793a9c..41417b2df32d 100644
@@ -1371,6 +1371,38 @@ static int check_root_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key,
  	return 0;

fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c static int check_root_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key, · line 1381

Quoted 10 lines
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c +8 -0
  }
 
+static int check_root_ref(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key,
+				  int slot)
+{
+	struct btrfs_root_ref *rref;
+	u32 item_size = btrfs_item_size(leaf, slot);
+	u32 name_len;
+
+	if (unlikely(item_size < sizeof(*rref))) {

There should be a name_len that is not zero. So the check should be (item_size <= sizeof(*ref)).

Thanks,
Qu