Introduce capable_noaudit
Subsystems (5)
[email protected]
maintainercover Introduce capable_noaudit
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
In some cases - filesystems quota specifically here - we'd like to check for effective capabilities without issuing spurious audit messages and without the need to specify a namespace for that.
This series introduce capable_noaudit() which has the same goal as capable() but without firing audit messages.
Also, this updates both generic quota and xfs quota code to use that.
The last patch unexports has_capability_noaudit() which was originally exported to be used in xfs but turns out it does not meet our needs.
Note this is based on top of a current series I have to remove has_capability_noaudit() calls from xfs so the xfs patch won't apply cleanly without that series.
If adding this helper is acceptable, I'll turn this into a non-rfc series with the required changes to apply properly.
Comments? Flames?
Cheers
Carlos Maiolino (4):
capabily: Add new capable_noaudit
quota: Don't issue audit messages on quota enforcing
xfs: replace ns_capable_noaudit()
capability: unexport has_capability_noaudit
fs/quota/dquot.c | 2 +- fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c | 2 +- include/linux/capability.h | 5 +++++ kernel/capability.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
maintainerRFC PATCH 1/4 capabily: Add new capable_noaudit
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
In some situations (quota enforcement bypass in this case) we'd like to check for a specific capability without triggering spurious audit messages from security modules like selinux.
Add a new helper so we don't need to use ns_capable_noaudit() directly.
--- include/linux/capability.h | 5 +++++ kernel/capability.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
include/linux/capability.h +5 -0
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit (struct task_struct *t,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool capable (int cap); +extern bool capable_noaudit (int cap);extern bool ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool ns_capable_noaudit (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool ns_capable_setid (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);
@@ -167,6 +168,10 @@ static inline bool capable(int cap) {return true; } +static inline bool capable_noaudit (int cap) +{ +return true; +}static inline bool ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap) {return true;
kernel/capability.c +17 -0
@@ -416,6 +416,23 @@ bool capable(int cap) return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (capable); + +/** +* capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior +* capability in effect (unaudited). +* @cap: The capability to be tested for +* +* This is the same as capable(), except it uses CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT as to prevent +* issuing spurious audit messages. +* +* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the +* assumption that it's about to be used. +*/ +bool capable_noaudit (int cap) +{ +return ns_capable_noaudit (&init_user_ns, cap); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (capable_noaudit);#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ /**
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
maintainerRFC PATCH 2/4 quota: Don't issue audit messages on quota enforcing
In reply to [email protected]From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
Calling capable() to determine if we can bypass quota enforcement or not can trigger spurious audit messages. We don't really require it here so just use the capable_noaudit() version.
--- fs/quota/dquot.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/quota/dquot.c +1 -1
@@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ static int ignore_hardlimit(struct dquot *dquot) {struct mem_dqinfo *info = &sb_dqopt (dquot->dq_sb)->info[dquot->dq_id.type]; -return capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && +return capable_noaudit (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && (info->dqi_format->qf_fmt_id !=QFMT_VFS_OLD || !(info->dqi_flags &DQF_ROOT_SQUASH )); }
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
maintainerRFC PATCH 3/4 xfs: replace ns_capable_noaudit()
In reply to [email protected]From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
We don't need to use ns_capable_noaudit() as all we care is the initial user namespace, use capable_noaudit() instead.
--- fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c +1 -1
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ xfs_trans_dqresv(if ((flags &XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES ) ==0 && dqp->q_id &&xfs_dquot_is_enforced (dqp) && - !ns_capable_noaudit (&init_user_ns,CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) { + !capable_noaudit (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) {int quota_nl;bool fatal;
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
maintainerRFC PATCH 4/4 capability: unexport has_capability_noaudit
In reply to [email protected]From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
This has been originally exported to be used in xfs. Givin we are not using it anymore, unexport for consistency.
--- kernel/capability.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
kernel/capability.c +0 -1
@@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) {return has_ns_capability_noaudit (t, &init_user_ns, cap); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (has_capability_noaudit); static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap,
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] capabily: Add new capable_noaudit
In reply to [email protected]s/capabily/capability/ in the subject even if the typo actually makes it easier to find the thread.
Quoted 46 lines · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 01:45:20PM +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
In some situations (quota enforcement bypass in this case) we'd like to check for a specific capability without triggering spurious audit messages from security modules like selinux.
Add a new helper so we don't need to use
ns_capable_noaudit()directly.Signed-off-by Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>--- include/linux/capability.h | 5 +++++ kernel/capability.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)include/linux/capability.h +5
-0@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit (struct task_struct *t,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool capable (int cap); +extern bool capable_noaudit (int cap);extern bool ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool ns_capable_noaudit (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool ns_capable_setid (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);@@ -167,6 +168,10 @@ static inline bool capable(int cap) {return true; } +static inline bool capable_noaudit (int cap) +{ +return true; +}static inline bool ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap) {return true;kernel/capability.c +1
-0@@ -416,6 +416,23 @@ bool capable(int cap)return ns_capable (&init_user_ns, cap); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (capable); +
kernel/capability.c bool capable(int cap) · line 429
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/capability.c +10
-0+/** +* capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior +* capability in effect (unaudited). +* @cap: The capability to be tested for +* +* This is the same as capable(), except it uses CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT as to prevent +* issuing spurious audit messages. +* +* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the +* assumption that it's about to be used.
Can you mention that this checks the current process' effective capabilities (as opposed to the real ones)? So that nobody else has to suffer the confusion I pointed out in [1] which was the source of the security bugs in the first place?
(I do like the wrapper though)
--D
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-xfs/20260625160317.GY6078@frogsfrogsfrogs/
Quoted 13 lines
kernel/capability.c +6
-0+*/ +bool capable_noaudit (int cap) +{ +return ns_capable_noaudit (&init_user_ns, cap); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (capable_noaudit);#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ /** Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/4] quota: Don't issue audit messages on quota enforcing
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 16 lines · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 01:45:21PM +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
Calling
capable()to determine if we can bypass quota enforcement or not can trigger spurious audit messages. We don't really require it here so just use thecapable_noaudit()version.Signed-off-by Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>--- fs/quota/dquot.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/quota/dquot.c +0
-0
fs/quota/dquot.c static int ignore_hardlimit(struct dquot *dquot) · line 1311
Quoted 5 lines
fs/quota/dquot.c +1
-1@@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ static int ignore_hardlimit(struct dquot *dquot) {struct mem_dqinfo *info = &sb_dqopt (dquot->dq_sb)->info[dquot->dq_id.type]; - return capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && + return capable_noaudit(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
Yeah, we're just checking if we're going to enforce hardlimits, not actually denying something based on lack of capability. For all we know the user is well under their disk quota limit.
--D
Quoted 7 lines
fs/quota/dquot.c +0
-0(info->dqi_format->qf_fmt_id !=QFMT_VFS_OLD || !(info->dqi_flags &DQF_ROOT_SQUASH )); }Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Re: [RFC PATCH 3/4] xfs: replace ns_capable_noaudit()
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 4 lines · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 01:45:22PM +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
We don't need to use
ns_capable_noaudit()as all we care is the initial user namespace, usecapable_noaudit()instead.
Might as well do the one in xfs_fsmap.c too, since it was originally a capable() call.
--D
Quoted 22 lines
Signed-off-by Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>--- fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c +1
-1@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ xfs_trans_dqresv(if ((flags &XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES ) ==0 && dqp->q_id &&xfs_dquot_is_enforced (dqp) && - !ns_capable_noaudit (&init_user_ns,CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) { + !capable_noaudit (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) {int quota_nl;bool fatal;Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] capability: unexport has_capability_noaudit
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 15 lines · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 01:45:23PM +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
This has been originally exported to be used in xfs. Givin we are not using it anymore, unexport for consistency.
Signed-off-by Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>--- kernel/capability.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)kernel/capability.c +0
-0
kernel/capability.c bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) · line 329
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/capability.c +0
-1@@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) {return has_ns_capability_noaudit (t, &init_user_ns, cap); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (has_capability_noaudit);
Please update the kerneldoc for this function to mention that it only checks real capability, not effective capability. I'd like to prevent someone else from making the same mistakes I did with these functions that sound the same in documentation but have very different behaviors.
--D
Quoted 7 lines
kernel/capability.c +0
-0static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap,Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH 1/4] capabily: Add new capable_noaudit
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 7 lines · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 7:49 AM <[email protected]> wrote:
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
In some situations (quota enforcement bypass in this case) we'd like to check for a specific capability without triggering spurious audit messages from security modules like selinux.
Quoted 7 lines
Add a new helper so we don't need to use
ns_capable_noaudit()directly.Signed-off-by Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>--- include/linux/capability.h | 5 +++++ kernel/capability.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
This is Serge's call, not mine, but FWIW, I somewhat prefer to see code use the ns_capable_XXX() variants directly as I like to think it means some thought went into ensuring the capability check is being done in the right namespace. Yes, we all know that capable() just uses the init namespace, but I like to think that having to type that out in the parameter list might be a good double check ;)
Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH 1/4] capabily: Add new capable_noaudit
Quoted 16 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 7 lines · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 7:49 AM <[email protected]> wrote:
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
In some situations (quota enforcement bypass in this case) we'd like to check for a specific capability without triggering spurious audit messages from security modules like selinux.
Quoted 7 lines
Add a new helper so we don't need to use
ns_capable_noaudit()directly.Signed-off-by Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>--- include/linux/capability.h | 5 +++++ kernel/capability.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
Quoted 6 lines
This is Serge's call, not mine, but FWIW, I somewhat prefer to see code use the
ns_capable_XXX()variants directly as I like to think it means some thought went into ensuring the capability check is being done in the right namespace. Yes, we all know thatcapable()just uses the init namespace, but I like to think that having to type that out in the parameter list might be a good double check ;)
Hm, yeah, on he one hand it seems like a nice shortcut, but I still see people confusing what 'capable' really does, so standardizing on ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, x) might be worthwhile.
(and then patch 3 can go)
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] capabily: Add new capable_noaudit
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 1 line · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 01:45:20PM +0200, [email protected] wrote:
+extern bool
capable_noaudit(int cap);
No need for the extern.
Otherwise this does look nice an clean to me:
But if the security folks don't like we can live with the more verbose version of it I guess.
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/4] quota: Don't issue audit messages on quota enforcing
In reply to [email protected]Looks good:
(and that would carry over the the more verbose version if we don't get the helper)
Re: [RFC PATCH 3/4] xfs: replace ns_capable_noaudit()
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 4 lines · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 01:45:22PM +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
We don't need to use
ns_capable_noaudit()as all we care is the initial user namespace, usecapable_noaudit()instead.
Looks good:
Re: [RFC PATCH 3/4] xfs: replace ns_capable_noaudit()
In reply to Darrick J. WongQuoted 8 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 4 lines · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 01:45:22PM +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
We don't need to use
ns_capable_noaudit()as all we care is the initial user namespace, usecapable_noaudit()instead.Might as well do the one in
xfs_fsmap.ctoo, since it was originally acapable()call.
Yes, we should do that one as well. But that's a separate patch.
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] capability: unexport has_capability_noaudit
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 4 lines · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 01:45:23PM +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
This has been originally exported to be used in xfs. Givin we are not using it anymore, unexport for consistency.
Looks good:
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] capability: unexport has_capability_noaudit
In reply to Darrick J. WongQuoted 4 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Please update the kerneldoc for this function to mention that it only checks real capability, not effective capability. I'd like to prevent someone else from making the same mistakes I did with these functions that sound the same in documentation but have very different behaviors.
Yes, that would be useful. But make it a separate patch please, it's not related to the unexporting in any way.
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] capabily: Add new capable_noaudit
In reply to Christoph HellwigQuoted 11 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 1 line · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 01:45:20PM +0200, [email protected] wrote:
+extern bool
capable_noaudit(int cap);No need for the extern.
Otherwise this does look nice an clean to me:
Reviewed-by Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>But if the security folks don't like we can live with the more verbose version of it I guess.
Honestly I'm ok either way. If people misunderstand the shortcut, and ove-ruse it, that's safer than the other way. The one that scare me more is ns_capable(¤t_user_ns, X). I need to do an audit of the current users of that.
So I'm happy to put
on the set.
Christian Brauner
maintainerQuoted 14 lines · On 2026-06-26 13:45 +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
In some cases - filesystems quota specifically here - we'd like to check for effective capabilities without issuing spurious audit messages and without the need to specify a namespace for that.
This series introduce
capable_noaudit()which has the same goal ascapable()but without firing audit messages.Also, this updates both generic quota and xfs quota code to use that.
The last patch unexports
has_capability_noaudit()which was originally exported to be used in xfs but turns out it does not meet our needs.
Quoted 8 lines
Note this is based on top of a current series I have to remove
has_capability_noaudit()calls from xfs so the xfs patch won't apply cleanly without that series.If adding this helper is acceptable, I'll turn this into a non-rfc series with the required changes to apply properly.
Comments? Flames?
Convert more, please.
Carlos Maiolino
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH 1/4] capabily: Add new capable_noaudit
In reply to Christoph HellwigQuoted 4 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 1 line · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 01:45:20PM +0200, [email protected] wrote:
+extern bool
capable_noaudit(int cap);No need for the extern.
Indeed, I was just being consistent with the rest of the file :P
Quoted 9 lines
Otherwise this does look nice an clean to me:
Reviewed-by Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>But if the security folks don't like we can live with the more verbose version of it I guess.
Carlos Maiolino
maintainerQuoted 19 lines · Christian Brauner
Quoted 18 lines · On 2026-06-26 13:45 +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
In some cases - filesystems quota specifically here - we'd like to check for effective capabilities without issuing spurious audit messages and without the need to specify a namespace for that.
This series introduce
capable_noaudit()which has the same goal ascapable()but without firing audit messages.Also, this updates both generic quota and xfs quota code to use that.
The last patch unexports
has_capability_noaudit()which was originally exported to be used in xfs but turns out it does not meet our needs.Note this is based on top of a current series I have to remove
has_capability_noaudit()calls from xfs so the xfs patch won't apply cleanly without that series.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
If adding this helper is acceptable, I'll turn this into a non-rfc series with the required changes to apply properly.
Comments? Flames?
Convert more, please.
Convert what? :) more callers from capable() to capable_noaudit()?
Christian Brauner
maintainerQuoted 23 lines · Carlos Maiolino
Quoted 22 lines · Christian Brauner
Quoted 21 lines · On 2026-06-26 13:45 +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
In some cases - filesystems quota specifically here - we'd like to check for effective capabilities without issuing spurious audit messages and without the need to specify a namespace for that.
This series introduce
capable_noaudit()which has the same goal ascapable()but without firing audit messages.Also, this updates both generic quota and xfs quota code to use that.
The last patch unexports
has_capability_noaudit()which was originally exported to be used in xfs but turns out it does not meet our needs.Note this is based on top of a current series I have to remove
has_capability_noaudit()calls from xfs so the xfs patch won't apply cleanly without that series.If adding this helper is acceptable, I'll turn this into a non-rfc series with the required changes to apply properly.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Comments? Flames?
Convert more, please.
Convert what? :) more callers from
capable()tocapable_noaudit()?
Yes, there's more code that should use the noaudit variant. Future work...
Carlos Maiolino
maintainerQuoted 26 lines · Christian Brauner
Quoted 25 lines · Carlos Maiolino
Quoted 24 lines · Christian Brauner
Quoted 22 lines · On 2026-06-26 13:45 +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
In some cases - filesystems quota specifically here - we'd like to check for effective capabilities without issuing spurious audit messages and without the need to specify a namespace for that.
This series introduce
capable_noaudit()which has the same goal ascapable()but without firing audit messages.Also, this updates both generic quota and xfs quota code to use that.
The last patch unexports
has_capability_noaudit()which was originally exported to be used in xfs but turns out it does not meet our needs.Note this is based on top of a current series I have to remove
has_capability_noaudit()calls from xfs so the xfs patch won't apply cleanly without that series.If adding this helper is acceptable, I'll turn this into a non-rfc series with the required changes to apply properly.
Comments? Flames?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Convert more, please.
Convert what? :) more callers from
capable()tocapable_noaudit()?Yes, there's more code that should use the noaudit variant. Future work...
/me writes to his todo list
Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH 3/4] xfs: replace ns_capable_noaudit()
In reply to [email protected]Quoted 4 lines · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 01:45:22PM +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
We don't need to use
ns_capable_noaudit()as all we care is the initial user namespace, usecapable_noaudit()instead.
Looks like some of your other xfs fixes conflict with this. Do you mind sending out a new set, and I'll pull them into the caps-next branch?
thanks,
-serge
Quoted 20 lines
Signed-off-by Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>--- fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c +1
-1@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ xfs_trans_dqresv(if ((flags &XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES ) ==0 && dqp->q_id &&xfs_dquot_is_enforced (dqp) && - !ns_capable_noaudit (&init_user_ns,CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) { + !capable_noaudit (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) {int quota_nl;bool fatal;Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Carlos Maiolino
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH 3/4] xfs: replace ns_capable_noaudit()
Quoted 9 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 4 lines · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 01:45:22PM +0200, [email protected] wrote:
From: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
We don't need to use
ns_capable_noaudit()as all we care is the initial user namespace, usecapable_noaudit()instead.Looks like some of your other xfs fixes conflict with this. Do you mind sending out a new set, and I'll pull them into the caps-next branch?
I will Serge, thanks. I was hoping to send a new series this week but I couldn't, and I'm out next week, so I'll come back to this in a couple weeks.
Thanks for the heads up!
Carlos
Quoted 24 lines
thanks,
-sergeQuoted 20 lines
Signed-off-by Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>--- fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/xfs/xfs_trans_dquot.c +1
-1@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ xfs_trans_dqresv(if ((flags &XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES ) ==0 && dqp->q_id &&xfs_dquot_is_enforced (dqp) && - !ns_capable_noaudit (&init_user_ns,CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) { + !capable_noaudit (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE )) {int quota_nl;bool fatal;Signature · 1 line
2.54.0