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PAES - Fix rc handling at skcipher_walk_done

PATCH In review Harald Freudenberger 3 participants 7 messages Aug 5 – Aug 11

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Harald Freudenberger

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

v2 cover PAES - Fix rc handling at skcipher_walk_done

All the 4 PAES cipher processing loops were not checking the return value of skcipher_walk_done() immediately after calling it. This could lead to error masking when both the walk operation failed and a subsequent key conversion was needed (k < n condition).

Add immediate error checks after skcipher_walk_done() in all main processing loops (ECB, CBC, CTR, XTS modes) to ensure walk errors are properly propagated and not masked by subsequent operations.

Patch #2 deals with a not scrubbed temp buffer.

Changelog:

v1: initial patch
v2: - Sashiko found that now there is a possibility to double
de-allocate resources held by the walk. So another check if the walk has already been finalized is now part of the patch.
- Sashiko also stumbled over a not scrubbed temp buffer with the PAES ctr mode implementation. So another patch added which scrubs this buffer.

Harald Freudenberger (2):
s390/crypto: Fix return code handling at skcipher_walk_done in PAES
algorithms
s390/crypto: Explicit scrub temp buffer in PAES ctr mode algorithm

 arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--
2.43.0

author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/2 s390/crypto: Explicit scrub temp buffer in PAES ctr mode algorithm

In function ctr_paes_do_crypt() there is a buffer used to process remaining bytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE. This buffer was not scrubbed and thus could lead to expose of unwanted data.

On exit of the function unconditionally scrub this buffer to avoid exposure of maybe sensitive data.

Fixes 6cd87cb5ef6c ("s390/crypto: Rework protected key AES for true asynch support")
---
 arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c +1 -0
index 89785ab95e6b..c95cc80b4205 100644
@@ -1026,6 +1026,7 @@ static int ctr_paes_do_crypt(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx,
 	}
 
 out:
+	memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf));
 	pr_debug("rc=%d\n", rc);
 	return rc;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/2 s390/crypto: Fix return code handling at skcipher_walk_done in PAES algorithms

In reply to Harald Freudenberger

All the 4 PAES cipher processing loops were not checking the return value of skcipher_walk_done() immediately after calling it. This could lead to error masking when both the walk operation failed and a subsequent key conversion was needed (k < n condition).

Add immediate error checks after skcipher_walk_done() in all main processing loops (ECB, CBC, CTR, XTS modes) to ensure walk errors are properly propagated and not masked by subsequent operations.

With that comes a slight rework around the skcipher_walk_done() invocation. It is now necessary to check if the walk has already been finalized (walk->nbytes is then 0) or not to avoid double de-allocation of resources held by the walk.

Fixes 6cd87cb5ef6c ("s390/crypto: Rework protected key AES for true asynch support")
---
 arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c +27 -11
index 973436592318..89785ab95e6b 100644
@@ -432,8 +432,11 @@ static int ecb_paes_do_crypt(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx,
 		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
 		k = cpacf_km(ctx->fc | req_ctx->modifier, param,
 			     walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
-		if (k)
+		if (k) {
 			rc = skcipher_walk_done(walk, nbytes - k);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
 		if (k < n) {
 			if (!maysleep) {
 				rc = -EKEYEXPIRED;
@@ -495,7 +498,7 @@ static int ecb_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier)
 			atomic_dec(&ctx->via_engine_ctr);
 	}
 
-	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS)
+	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && walk->nbytes)
 		skcipher_walk_done(walk, rc);
 
 out:
@@ -549,7 +552,7 @@ static int ecb_paes_do_one_request(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *areq)
 	rc = ecb_paes_do_crypt(ctx, req_ctx, tested, true);
 	if (rc == -EKEYEXPIRED) {
 		return pkey_handle_expired();
-	} else if (rc) {
+	} else if (rc && walk->nbytes) {
 		skcipher_walk_done(walk, rc);
 	}
 
@@ -690,6 +693,8 @@ static int cbc_paes_do_crypt(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx,
 		if (k) {
 			memcpy(walk->iv, param->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 			rc = skcipher_walk_done(walk, nbytes - k);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
 		}
 		if (k < n) {
 			if (!maysleep) {
@@ -752,7 +757,7 @@ static int cbc_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long modifier)
 			atomic_dec(&ctx->via_engine_ctr);
 	}
 
-	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS)
+	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && walk->nbytes)
 		skcipher_walk_done(walk, rc);
 
 out:
@@ -806,7 +811,7 @@ static int cbc_paes_do_one_request(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *areq)
 	rc = cbc_paes_do_crypt(ctx, req_ctx, tested, true);
 	if (rc == -EKEYEXPIRED) {
 		return pkey_handle_expired();
-	} else if (rc) {
+	} else if (rc && walk->nbytes) {
 		skcipher_walk_done(walk, rc);
 	}
 
@@ -968,6 +973,11 @@ static int ctr_paes_do_crypt(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx,
 				       AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 			crypto_inc(walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 			rc = skcipher_walk_done(walk, nbytes - k);
+			if (rc) {
+				if (locked)
+					mutex_unlock(&ctrblk_lock);
+				goto out;
+			}
 		}
 		if (k < n) {
 			if (!maysleep) {
@@ -1061,7 +1071,7 @@ static int ctr_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 			atomic_dec(&ctx->via_engine_ctr);
 	}
 
-	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS)
+	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && walk->nbytes)
 		skcipher_walk_done(walk, rc);
 
 out:
@@ -1105,7 +1115,7 @@ static int ctr_paes_do_one_request(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *areq)
 	rc = ctr_paes_do_crypt(ctx, req_ctx, tested, true);
 	if (rc == -EKEYEXPIRED) {
 		return pkey_handle_expired();
-	} else if (rc) {
+	} else if (rc && walk->nbytes) {
 		skcipher_walk_done(walk, rc);
 	}
 
@@ -1283,8 +1293,11 @@ static int xts_paes_do_crypt_fullkey(struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx,
 		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
 		k = cpacf_km(ctx->fc | req_ctx->modifier, param->key + offset,
 			     walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
-		if (k)
+		if (k) {
 			rc = skcipher_walk_done(walk, nbytes - k);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
 		if (k < n) {
 			if (!maysleep) {
 				rc = -EKEYEXPIRED;
@@ -1377,8 +1390,11 @@ static int xts_paes_do_crypt_2keys(struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx,
 		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
 		k = cpacf_km(ctx->fc | req_ctx->modifier, param->key + offset,
 			     walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
-		if (k)
+		if (k) {
 			rc = skcipher_walk_done(walk, nbytes - k);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
 		if (k < n) {
 			if (!maysleep) {
 				rc = -EKEYEXPIRED;
@@ -1485,7 +1501,7 @@ static inline int xts_paes_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, unsigned long mod
 			atomic_dec(&ctx->via_engine_ctr);
 	}
 
-	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS)
+	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && walk->nbytes)
 		skcipher_walk_done(walk, rc);
 
 out:
@@ -1539,7 +1555,7 @@ static int xts_paes_do_one_request(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *areq)
 	rc = xts_paes_do_crypt(ctx, req_ctx, tested, true);
 	if (rc == -EKEYEXPIRED) {
 		return pkey_handle_expired();
-	} else if (rc) {
+	} else if (rc && walk->nbytes) {
 		skcipher_walk_done(walk, rc);
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Reviewed-by on v2 1/2
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] s390/crypto: Fix return code handling at skcipher_walk_done in PAES algorithms

Quoted 14 lines · Harald Freudenberger

All the 4 PAES cipher processing loops were not checking the return value of skcipher_walk_done() immediately after calling it. This could lead to error masking when both the walk operation failed and a subsequent key conversion was needed (k < n condition).

Add immediate error checks after skcipher_walk_done() in all main processing loops (ECB, CBC, CTR, XTS modes) to ensure walk errors are properly propagated and not masked by subsequent operations.

With that comes a slight rework around the skcipher_walk_done() invocation. It is now necessary to check if the walk has already been finalized (walk->nbytes is then 0) or not to avoid double de-allocation of resources held by the walk.

Quoted 6 lines
Fixes 6cd87cb5ef6c ("s390/crypto: Rework protected key AES for true asynch support")
---
  arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
  1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

[ snip ]

LGTM

Reviewed-by on v2 2/2
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] s390/crypto: Explicit scrub temp buffer in PAES ctr mode algorithm

In reply to Harald Freudenberger
Quoted 7 lines · Harald Freudenberger

In function ctr_paes_do_crypt() there is a buffer used to process remaining bytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE. This buffer was not scrubbed and thus could lead to expose of unwanted data.

On exit of the function unconditionally scrub this buffer to avoid exposure of maybe sensitive data.

Quoted 6 lines
Fixes 6cd87cb5ef6c ("s390/crypto: Rework protected key AES for true asynch support")
---
  arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c | 1 +
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

[ snip ]

LGTM

maintainer Reviewed-by on v2 1/2
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] s390/crypto: Fix return code handling at skcipher_walk_done in PAES algorithms

In reply to Harald Freudenberger
Quoted 9 lines · Harald Freudenberger

All the 4 PAES cipher processing loops were not checking the return value of skcipher_walk_done() immediately after calling it. This could lead to error masking when both the walk operation failed and a subsequent key conversion was needed (k < n condition).

Add immediate error checks after skcipher_walk_done() in all main processing loops (ECB, CBC, CTR, XTS modes) to ensure walk errors are properly propagated and not masked by subsequent operations.

Quoted 8 lines

With that comes a slight rework around the skcipher_walk_done() invocation. It is now necessary to check if the walk has already been finalized (walk->nbytes is then 0) or not to avoid double de-allocation of resources held by the walk.

Fixes 6cd87cb5ef6c ("s390/crypto: Rework protected key AES for true asynch support")
Signature · 2 lines
Mit freundlichen Grüßen / Kind regards
Holger Dengler
maintainer Reviewed-by on v2 2/2
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] s390/crypto: Explicit scrub temp buffer in PAES ctr mode algorithm

In reply to Harald Freudenberger
Quoted 10 lines · Harald Freudenberger

In function ctr_paes_do_crypt() there is a buffer used to process remaining bytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE. This buffer was not scrubbed and thus could lead to expose of unwanted data.

On exit of the function unconditionally scrub this buffer to avoid exposure of maybe sensitive data.

Fixes 6cd87cb5ef6c ("s390/crypto: Rework protected key AES for true asynch support")

I would've preferred the scrub buf only if it is used. But your solution is also ok for me.

Signature · 2 lines
Mit freundlichen Grüßen / Kind regards
Holger Dengler