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xen/x86-64: clean up warnings about IST-using traps

PATCH In review Jeremy Fitzhardinge 3 participants 6 messages May 7, 2009 – May 8, 2009

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 2/5 xen/x86-64: clean up warnings about IST-using traps

Ignore known IST-using traps. Aside from the debugger traps, they're low-level faults which Xen will handle for us, so the kernel needn't worry about them. Keep warning in case unknown trap starts using IST.

---
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--

1 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c +0 -0
index cb49f57..88f3aa4 100644
@@ -439,12 +439,30 @@ static int cvt_gate_to_trap(int vector, const gate_desc *val,
 
	addr = gate_offset(*val);

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ /*
+ * Look for known traps using IST, and substitute them
+ * appropriately. The debugger ones are the only ones we care
+ * about. Xen will handle faults like double_fault and
+ * machine_check, so we should never see them. Warn if
+ * there's an unexpected IST-using fault handler.
+ */

	if (addr == (unsigned long)debug)
		addr = (unsigned long)xen_debug;
	else if (addr == (unsigned long)int3)
		addr = (unsigned long)xen_int3;

- else
- WARN_ON(val->ist != 0);
+ else if (addr == (unsigned long)double_fault ||
+ addr == (unsigned long)stack_segment) {
+ /* Don't need to handle these */
+ return 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
+ } else if (addr == (unsigned long)machine_check) {
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ } else {
+ /* Some other trap using IST? */
+ if (WARN_ON(val->ist != 0))
+ return 0;
+ }

#endif	/* CONFIG_X86_64 */
	info->address = addr;
Signature · 1 line
1.6.0.6
#1 lore raw

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/5] xen/x86-64: clean up warnings aboutIST-using traps

Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

Jeremy Fitzhardinge <[email protected]> 07.05.09 20:56 >>>

Ignore known IST-using traps. Aside from the debugger traps, they're low-level faults which Xen will handle for us, so the kernel needn't worry about them. Keep warning in case unknown trap starts using IST.

---
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--

1 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c +5 -0
index cb49f57..88f3aa4 100644
@@ -439,12 +439,30 @@ static int cvt_gate_to_trap(int vector, const gate_desc *val,
 
 	addr = gate_offset(*val);
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/*
+	 * Look for known traps using IST, and substitute them
+	 * appropriately.  The debugger ones are the only ones we care
+	 * about.  Xen will handle faults like double_fault and
+	 * machine_check, so we should never see them.  Warn if

arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c static int cvt_gate_to_trap(int vector, const gate_desc *val, · line 454

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c +4 -2
+	 * there's an unexpected IST-using fault handler.
+	 */
 	if (addr == (unsigned long)debug)
 		addr = (unsigned long)xen_debug;
 	else if (addr == (unsigned long)int3)
 		addr = (unsigned long)xen_int3;
-	else
-		WARN_ON(val->ist != 0);
+	else if (addr == (unsigned long)double_fault ||
+		 addr == (unsigned long)stack_segment) {

I don't think you want to exclude handling stack faults: Ordinary memory references using rsp or rbp as the base register will cause these instead of general protection faults when the resulting effective address is non- canonical.

Quoted 16 lines
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c +11 -0
+		/* Don't need to handle these */
+		return 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
+	} else if (addr == (unsigned long)machine_check) {
+		return 0;
+#endif
+	} else {
+		/* Some other trap using IST? */
+		if (WARN_ON(val->ist != 0))
+			return 0;
+	}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 	info->address = addr;
 
Signature · 1 line
1.6.0.6

Jan

#2 lore raw

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/5] xen/x86-64: clean up warnings aboutIST-using traps

Quoted 30 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

Jeremy Fitzhardinge <[email protected]> 07.05.09 20:56 >>>

Ignore known IST-using traps. Aside from the debugger traps, they're low-level faults which Xen will handle for us, so the kernel needn't worry about them. Keep warning in case unknown trap starts using IST.

---
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--

1 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c +7 -1
index cb49f57..88f3aa4 100644
@@ -439,12 +439,30 @@ static int cvt_gate_to_trap(int vector, const gate_desc *val,
 
 	addr = gate_offset(*val);
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/*
+	 * Look for known traps using IST, and substitute them
+	 * appropriately.  The debugger ones are the only ones we care
+	 * about.  Xen will handle faults like double_fault and
+	 * machine_check, so we should never see them.  Warn if
+	 * there's an unexpected IST-using fault handler.
+	 */
 	if (addr == (unsigned long)debug)
 		addr = (unsigned long)xen_debug;
 	else if (addr == (unsigned long)int3)
 		addr = (unsigned long)xen_int3;
-	else
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c static int cvt_gate_to_trap(int vector, const gate_desc *val, · line 454

Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c +2 -1
-		WARN_ON(val->ist != 0);
+	else if (addr == (unsigned long)double_fault ||
+		 addr == (unsigned long)stack_segment) {

I don't think you want to exclude handling stack faults: Ordinary memory references using rsp or rbp as the base register will cause these instead of general protection faults when the resulting effective address is non- canonical.

Yes. Also, patches 1-2-3 really just do the same thing, one fixes the other one. Would be nice to have a single patch for that whole ugly topic of 64-bit Xen not handling ISTs properly.

If this was a CPU we'd say "sorry, dont run Linux on it then" ...

I've applied the reservation fix to x86/urgent, and the #5 patch to x86/xen (it's more of a cleanup, not a fix for .30, right?).

Ingo

#4 lore raw

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/5] xen/x86-64: clean up warnings aboutIST-using traps

In reply to Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines

else if (addr == (unsigned long)int3)

		addr = (unsigned long)xen_int3;
(quoted diff) +0 -2
-	else
-		WARN_ON(val->ist != 0);
Quoted 9 lines

Review

Quoted 3 lines
(quoted diff) +2 -0
+	else if (addr == (unsigned long)double_fault ||
+		 addr == (unsigned long)stack_segment) {

I don't think you want to exclude handling stack faults: Ordinary memory references using rsp or rbp as the base register will cause these instead of general protection faults when the resulting effective address is non- canonical.

So even usermode memory accesses? Ew. Well, we can run the trap handler on the normal kernel stack in that case. I'll cook something up.

J

#5 lore raw

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/5] xen/x86-64: clean up warnings aboutIST-usingtraps

Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

Jeremy Fitzhardinge <[email protected]> 08.05.09 17:23 >>>

Quoted 4 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines

else if (addr == (unsigned long)int3)

		addr = (unsigned long)xen_int3;
(quoted diff) +0 -2
-	else
-		WARN_ON(val->ist != 0);
Quoted 9 lines

Review

Quoted 3 lines
(quoted diff) +2 -0
+	else if (addr == (unsigned long)double_fault ||
+		 addr == (unsigned long)stack_segment) {

I don't think you want to exclude handling stack faults: Ordinary memory references using rsp or rbp as the base register will cause these instead of general protection faults when the resulting effective address is non- canonical.

Quoted 1 line

So even usermode memory accesses? Ew.

Yes, just try it out - you'll observe them generate SIGBUS instead of SIGSEGV.

Jan

#3 lore raw

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/5] xen/x86-64: clean up warnings aboutIST-using traps

In reply to Ingo Molnar
Quoted 2 lines · Ingo Molnar

Yes. Also, patches 1-2-3 really just do the same thing, one fixes the other one. Would be nice to have a single patch for that whole ugly topic of 64-bit Xen not handling ISTs properly.

Well, 1 is sufficient on its own to fix the breakpoint/watchpoint problem. Looks like I need to do something similar with stack. The 2,3 are more general cleanups that aren't essential to the functional fix, and should definitely be folded together.

Quoted 2 lines

If this was a CPU we'd say "sorry, dont run Linux on it then" ...

?? Guests don't really need IST because all the tricky traps that really require it (NMI, MCE, etc) are handled by Xen. The stack exception was an oversight on my part, because I thought it was something that would only happen with a bad kernel stack (but I guess that's doublefault).

Quoted 2 lines

I've applied the reservation fix to x86/urgent, and the #5 patch to x86/xen (it's more of a cleanup, not a fix for .30, right?).

Right.

J