Remove some hardcoded SEV-SNP guest policy checks during guest launch
cover Remove some hardcoded SEV-SNP guest policy checks during guest launch
This series removes some guest policy checks that can be better controlled by the SEV firmware.
- Remove the check for the SMT policy bit. Currently, a check is made to ensure the SMT policy bit is set to 1. However, there is no reason for KVM to do this. The SMT policy bit, when 0, is used to ensure that SMT has been disabled *in the BIOS.* As this does not require any special support within KVM, the check can be safely removed to allow the SEV firmware to determine whether the system meets the policy.
- Remove the check for the SINGLE_SOCKET policy bit. Currently, a check is made to ensure the SINGLE_SOCKET policy bit is set to 0. However, there is no reason for KVM to do this. The SINGLE_SOCKET policy bit, when 1, is used to ensure that an SNP guest is only run on a single socket. When the system only consists of a single socket, the SEV firmware allows guest activation to succeed. However, if the system has more than one socket, the SEV firmware will fail guest activation when the SNP_ACTIVATE command is used (which is the activation command used by KVM).
The SMT policy patch should not be controversial. The SINGLE_SOCKET policy patch could be a bit controversial, since, when you have the SINGLE_SOCKET policy bit set, you can have a guest that can run without issue on a single socket system, but suddenly fail when attempted to be started on a system with more than one socket. But, as this is opt-in behavior from userspace, this could be viewed as providing the protection that the guest owner desires.
In order to support use of the SINGLE_SOCKET policy bit on a system with more than one socket, the SNP_ACTIVATE_EX command must be used and proper scheduling support performed.
The series is based off of:
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux.git next
Tom Lendacky (2):
KVM: SVM: Allow SNP guest policy disallow running with SMT enabled
KVM: SVM: Allow SNP guest policy to specify SINGLE_SOCKET
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
base-commit: 3f7b307757ecffc1c18ede9ee3cf9ce8101f3cc9
Signature · 1 line
2.46.2
PATCH 1/2 KVM: SVM: Allow SNP guest policy disallow running with SMT enabled
KVM currently returns -EINVAL when it attempts to create an SNP guest if the SMT guest policy bit is not set. However, there is no reason to check this, as there is no specific support in KVM that is required to support this. The SEV firmware will determine if SMT has been enabled or disabled in the BIOS and process the policy in the proper way:
- SMT enabled in BIOS
- Guest policy SMT == 0 ==> SNP_LAUNCH_START fails with POLICY_FAILURE
- Guest policy SMT == 1 ==> SNP_LAUNCH_START succeeds
- SMT disabled in BIOS
- Guest policy SMT == 0 ==> SNP_LAUNCH_START succeeds
- Guest policy SMT == 1 ==> SNP_LAUNCH_START succeeds
Remove the check for the SMT policy bit from snp_launch_start() and allow the firmware to perform the proper checking.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1 -2
@@ -2194,8 +2194,7 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)return -EINVAL ;/* Check for policy bits that must be set */ -if (!(params.policy &SNP_POLICY_MASK_RSVD_MBO ) || - !(params.policy &SNP_POLICY_MASK_SMT )) +if (!(params.policy &SNP_POLICY_MASK_RSVD_MBO ))return -EINVAL ;if (params.policy &SNP_POLICY_MASK_SINGLE_SOCKET )
Signature · 1 line
2.46.2
PATCH 2/2 KVM: SVM: Allow SNP guest policy to specify SINGLE_SOCKET
In reply to Tom LendackyKVM currently returns -EINVAL when it attempts to create an SNP guest if the SINGLE_SOCKET guest policy bit is set. The reason for this action is that KVM would need specific support (SNP_ACTIVATE_EX command support) to achieve this when running on a system with more than one socket. However, the SEV firmware will make the proper check and return POLICY_FAILURE during SNP_ACTIVATE if the single socket guest policy bit is set and the system has more than one socket:
- System with one socket
- Guest policy SINGLE_SOCKET == 0 ==> SNP_ACTIVATE succeeds
- Guest policy SINGLE_SOCKET == 1 ==> SNP_ACTIVATE succeeds
- System with more than one socket
- Guest policy SINGLE_SOCKET == 0 ==> SNP_ACTIVATE succeeds
- Guest policy SINGLE_SOCKET == 1 ==> SNP_ACTIVATE fails with POLICY_FAILURE
Remove the check for the SINGLE_SOCKET policy bit from snp_launch_start() and allow the firmware to perform the proper checking.
This does have the effect of allowing an SNP guest with the SINGLE_SOCKET policy bit set to run on a single socket system, but fail when run on a system with more than one socket. However, this should not affect existing SNP guests as setting the SINGLE_SOCKET policy bit is not allowed today.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0 -3
@@ -2197,9 +2197,6 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)if (!(params.policy &SNP_POLICY_MASK_RSVD_MBO ))return -EINVAL ; -if (params.policy &SNP_POLICY_MASK_SINGLE_SOCKET ) -return -EINVAL ; - sev->policy = params.policy; sev->snp_context =snp_context_create (kvm, argp);
Signature · 1 line
2.46.2
Sean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · Tom Lendacky
This series removes some guest policy checks that can be better controlled by the SEV firmware.
- Remove the check for the SMT policy bit. Currently, a check is made to ensure the SMT policy bit is set to 1. However, there is no reason for KVM to do this. The SMT policy bit, when 0, is used to ensure that SMT has been disabled *in the BIOS.* As this does not require any special support within KVM, the check can be safely removed to allow the SEV firmware to determine whether the system meets the policy.
[...]
Applied to kvm-x86 svm. FWIW, I'm not entirely sure I love the idea of doing nothing, e.g. it'd be nice to enumerate support to userspace. But adding a bunch of code to regurgitate information that's likely available to userspace (or more likely, the platform admin/orchestrator) doesn't seem worthwile either.
I'll make sure to flag this for Paolo's eyeballs.
[1/2] KVM: SVM: Allow SNP guest policy disallow running with SMT enabled
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/9f4701e05fae [2/2] KVM: SVM: Allow SNP guest policy to specify SINGLE_SOCKET https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/24be2b7956a5
Quoted 11 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 10 lines · Tom Lendacky
This series removes some guest policy checks that can be better controlled by the SEV firmware.
- Remove the check for the SMT policy bit. Currently, a check is made to ensure the SMT policy bit is set to 1. However, there is no reason for KVM to do this. The SMT policy bit, when 0, is used to ensure that SMT has been disabled *in the BIOS.* As this does not require any special support within KVM, the check can be safely removed to allow the SEV firmware to determine whether the system meets the policy.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
[...]
Applied to kvm-x86 svm. FWIW, I'm not entirely sure I love the idea of doing nothing, e.g. it'd be nice to enumerate support to userspace. But adding a bunch of code to regurgitate information that's likely available to userspace (or more likely, the platform admin/orchestrator) doesn't seem worthwile either.
I'll make sure to flag this for Paolo's eyeballs.
Sounds good, thanks Sean!
Tom
Quoted 8 lines
[1/2] KVM: SVM: Allow SNP guest policy disallow running with SMT enabled
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/9f4701e05fae [2/2] KVM: SVM: Allow SNP guest policy to specify SINGLE_SOCKET https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/24be2b7956a5