smack: clean up xattr handling
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 5/19 smack: restrict getxattr() SMACK64TRANSMUTE to directories
In reply to Konstantin AndreevSince [1], every filesystem object in the system has a security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr attached:
regular files, FIFOs, sockets, device nodes, and directories.
# getfattr -n security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE /etc/passwd security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE="" # getfattr -n security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE /run/initctl security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE="" # getfattr -n security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE /run/udev/control security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE="" # getfattr -n security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE /dev/null security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE="" # getfattr -n security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE /etc security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE=""
Most of these values are blank (""), because the xattr is not set for most directories, and is irrelevant for anything else. Additionally,
blank is not a valid value for SMACK64TRANSMUTE.
Having an irrelevant xattr with an invalid value
on every filesystem object seems odd.
It is more appropriate to return -ENODATA
(no such attribute) for SMACK64TRANSMUTE,
if it is not set or irrelevant,
like for any other non-existent attribute.
[1] 2023-05-08 roberto.sassu
commit 3a3d8fce31a4 ("smack: Retrieve transmuting information in
smack_inode_getsecurity()")
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1 -1
@@ -1661,7 +1661,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,if (ispp->smk_flags &SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE ) label =TRANS_TRUE ;else - label ="" ; +return -ENODATA ; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 ||strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT ) ==0 ) {/*
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 6/19 smack: fix bug: getxattr() returns invalid SMACK64EXEC/MMAP
In reply to Konstantin AndreevThe Smack inode_getsecurity hook, smack_inode_getsecurity(), does not provide the values of the SMACK64EXEC and SMACK64MMAP xattrs from the inode. Instead, it returns -EOPNOTSUPP to signal that these xattrs are not handled.
Since [1], the -EOPNOTSUPP return value
from the inode_getsecurity LSM hook
has been interpreted by security_inode_getsecurity() as a signal to "continue polling other LSMs".
As a result, security_inode_getsecurity() continues querying other LSMs and eventually returns control to vfs_getxattr(), which attempts to read these xattrs from disk
via __vfs_getxattr()
There are two issues here:
1) querying a Smack property from other LSMs
is incorrect, as Smack does own these xattrs.
2) the on-disk xattrs may differ from the in-memory labels actually associated with the inode.
The SMACK64EXEC/MMAP xattr on disk may contain an invalid label (e.g. foo/bar, see [2]), a forbidden one (*, @), or even corrupted data.
Such values are treated somehow during inode instantiation and may produce a valid Smack label or no label at all, but, anyway, one that differs from the on-disk value
This change ensures that getxattr() returns the actual in-memory label associated with the inode, not the raw xattr from disk.
[1] 2016-05-31 Casey Schaufler
commit 2885c1e3e0c2 ("LSM: Fix for security_inode_getsecurity
and -EOPNOTSUPP")
[2] 2025-07 andreev
commit ("smack: fix bug: setting label-containing xattrs
silently ignores input garbage")
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +21 -15
@@ -1649,17 +1649,20 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { - struct smack_known *isp; -struct inode_smack *ispp; -size_t label_len; -char *label =NULL ; + const struct smack_known *skp; +const struct inode_smack *const isp =smack_inode (inode); +const char *value =NULL ; +int value_len;if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX ) ==0 ) { - isp =smk_of_inode (inode); + skp = isp->smk_inode; + }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_EXEC ) ==0 ) { + skp = isp->smk_task; + }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_MMAP ) ==0 ) { + skp = isp->smk_mmap; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) { - ispp =smack_inode (inode); -if (ispp->smk_flags &SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE ) - label =TRANS_TRUE ; +if (isp->smk_flags &SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE ) + value =TRANS_TRUE ;else return -ENODATA ; } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0 ||
@@ -1680,24 +1683,27 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, ssp =smack_sock (sk);if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 ) - isp = ssp->smk_in; + skp = ssp->smk_in;else - isp = ssp->smk_out; + skp = ssp->smk_out; }else return -EOPNOTSUPP ; -if (!label) - label = isp->smk_known; +if (!value) { +if (!skp) +return -ENODATA ; + value = skp->smk_known; + } - label_len =strlen (label); + value_len =strlen (value);if (alloc) { - *buffer =kstrdup (label,GFP_KERNEL ); + *buffer =kmemdup (value, value_len,GFP_KERNEL );if (*buffer ==NULL )return -ENOMEM ; } -return label_len; +return value_len; }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 7/19 smack: deduplicate task label validation
In reply to Konstantin AndreevThe part of the description of smk_task_invalid_label() ("Smack prohibits ... explicitly.")
was taken verbatim from the commit message of:
2013-12-16 Casey Schaufler
commit 19760ad03cc6 ("Smack: Prevent the * and @ labels
from being used in SMACK64EXEC")
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +26 -21
@@ -1369,6 +1369,21 @@ static int smack_inode_xattr_skipcap(const char *name)return 0 ; } +/* +* Smack prohibits processes from using the star ("*") and web ("@") labels +* because we don't want files with those labels getting created implicitly. +* All setting of those labels should be done explicitly. +* +* Comparing smack_known's assumes label has been imported. Until only builtin +* labels are prohibited, just imported label is not eligible for rejection. +*/ +static bool +smk_task_invalid_label (const struct smack_known *const skp) +{ +return skp == &smack_known_web || + skp == &smack_known_star; +} +/** * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs * @idmap: idmap of the mount
@@ -1387,7 +1402,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { bool label_inside = true; -int check_star =0 ; +bool task_label = false;struct inode *const inode =d_backing_inode (dentry);umode_t const i_mode = inode->i_mode;
@@ -1403,7 +1418,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, ; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC ) ==0 ||strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP ) ==0 ) { - check_star =1 ; + task_label = true; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) { if (!S_ISDIR(i_mode) || size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
@@ -1436,10 +1451,10 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,if (IS_ERR (skp))return PTR_ERR (skp); -if (check_star && - (skp == &smack_known_star || - skp == &smack_known_web)) -return -EINVAL ; +if (task_label) { +if (smk_task_invalid_label (skp)) +return -EINVAL ; + } }return 0 ;
@@ -3726,14 +3741,12 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)* Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@". */ skp =smk_fetch (XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC , inode, dp); -if (IS_ERR (skp) || skp == &smack_known_star || - skp == &smack_known_web) +if (IS_ERR (skp) ||smk_task_invalid_label (skp)) skp =NULL ; isp->smk_task = skp; skp =smk_fetch (XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP , inode, dp); -if (IS_ERR (skp) || skp == &smack_known_star || - skp == &smack_known_web) +if (IS_ERR (skp) ||smk_task_invalid_label (skp)) skp =NULL ; isp->smk_mmap = skp;
@@ -3830,17 +3843,6 @@ static int do_setattr(unsigned int attr, void *value, size_t size)*/ if (smk_parse_label (value, size))return -EINVAL ; -/* -* No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label -* and the star ("*") label. -*/ -if (size ==1 /* '@', '*' */ ) { -const char c = *(const char *)value; - -if (c == *smack_known_web.smk_known || - c == *smack_known_star.smk_known) -return -EPERM ; - }if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) {const struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
@@ -3860,6 +3862,9 @@ static int do_setattr(unsigned int attr, void *value, size_t size)if (IS_ERR (skp))return PTR_ERR (skp); +if (smk_task_invalid_label (skp)) +return -EPERM ; + new =prepare_creds ();if (new ==NULL )return -ENOMEM ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 8/19 smack: smack_inode_setsecurity: prevent setting SMACK64EXEC/MMAP in other LSMs
In reply to Konstantin Andreevsmack_inode_setsecurity() does not support setting the SMACK64EXEC and SMACK64MMAP xattrs, and returns -EOPNOTSUPP if an attempt is made to set them.
However, since [1], the -EOPNOTSUPP return value from the inode_setsecurity LSM hook
has been interpreted by security_inode_setsecurity() as a signal to "continue polling other LSMs".
As a result, security_inode_setsecurity() proceeds to query other LSMs and attempts to store the SMACK64EXEC/MMAP xattrs there.
Passing a Smack property to other LSMs is incorrect, as Smack owns these xattrs.
Returning -ENODATA instead of -EOPNOTSUPP is not ideal, but it makes sense and prevents fallback to other LSMs.
[1] 2016-05-31 Casey Schaufler
commit 2885c1e3e0c2 ("LSM: Fix for security_inode_getsecurity
and -EOPNOTSUPP")
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +4 -0
@@ -3000,6 +3000,10 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, nsp->smk_flags |=SMK_INODE_INSTANT ;return 0 ; } + +if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_EXEC ) ==0 || +strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_MMAP ) ==0 ) +return -ENODATA ;/* * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets. */
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 9/19 smack: smack_inode_setsecurity: prevent setting SMACK64IPIN/OUT in other LSMs
In reply to Konstantin Andreevsmack_inode_setsecurity() equally returns -EOPNOTSUPP either the inode does not come from socket (sockfs inode) or the xattr is a security.NOT-SMACK-XATTR
This did make no difference until [1]. Since [1] -EOPNOTSUPP is reserved by security_inode_setsecurity() as a signal to "continue polling other LSMs".
When xattr is SMACK64IPIN or SMACK64IPOUT and inode is not from socket then return code is -EOPNOTSUPP, and the security_inode_setsecurity() proceeds to query other LSMs and attempts to store the xattr there.
Passing a Smack property to other LSMs is incorrect, as Smack owns these xattrs.
This change returns -ENODATA if inode does not come from sockfs and the xattr is SMACK64IPIN/OUT. This causes change from
# setfattr -n security.SMACK64IPIN -v foo /sys/kernel/debug/sleep_time setfattr: /sys/kernel/debug/sleep_time: Operation not supported
to
# setfattr -n security.SMACK64IPIN -v foo /sys/kernel/debug/sleep_time setfattr: /sys/kernel/debug/sleep_time: No such attribute
not ideal, but it makes sense and prevents fallback to other LSMs.
[1] 2016-05-31 Casey Schaufler
commit 2885c1e3e0c2 ("LSM: Fix for security_inode_getsecurity
and -EOPNOTSUPP")
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +9 -6
@@ -3004,21 +3004,25 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_EXEC ) ==0 ||strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_MMAP ) ==0 )return -ENODATA ; + +if (!(strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 || +strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT ) ==0 )) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;/* * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets. */ if (inode->i_sb->s_magic !=SOCKFS_MAGIC ) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return -ENODATA ; sock =SOCKET_I (inode); -if (sock ==NULL || sock->sk ==NULL ) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +if (sock->sk ==NULL ) +return -ENODATA ; ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk);if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 ) ssp->smk_in = skp; -else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT ) ==0 ) { +else { ssp->smk_out = skp;if (sock->sk->sk_family ==PF_INET ) { rc =smack_netlbl_add (sock->sk);
@@ -3027,8 +3031,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,"Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n" , __func__, -rc); } - }else -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + }#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING if (sock->sk->sk_family ==PF_INET6 )
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 10/19 smack: fix bug: smack_inode_setsecurity() imports alien xattrs as labels
In reply to Konstantin AndreevCurrently, smack_inode_setsecurity() calls smk_import_entry() to import the xattr value as a label before checking whether the xattr is actually a Smack xattr.
For example, attempting to set security.foo=bar on a socket fails as expected, but the value 'bar' is still imported into Smack as a label.
This change ensures that the xattr is recognized
as a Smack xattr before importing its value.
2008-02-04 Casey Schaufler
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +8 -4
@@ -2991,6 +2991,14 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,return 0 ; } +if (!(strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX ) ==0 || +strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_EXEC ) ==0 || +strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_MMAP ) ==0 || +strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 || +strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT ) ==0 + )) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + skp =smk_import_entry (value, size);if (IS_ERR (skp))return PTR_ERR (skp);
@@ -3004,10 +3012,6 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_EXEC ) ==0 ||strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_MMAP ) ==0 )return -ENODATA ; - -if (!(strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT ) ==0 )) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ;/* * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets. */
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 11/19 smack: fix bug: smack_inode_setsecurity() false EINVAL for alien xattrs
In reply to Konstantin AndreevCurrently, smack_inode_setsecurity() checks
the validity of the xattr value before checking
whether the xattr is actually a Smack xattr.
This was correct when only one LSM
could be active in the system.
Since [1] this is no longer incorrect.
When Smack mistakenly EINVALidates a non-Smack xattr, Smack may prevent owner LSM from seeing the xattr.
The change ensures that the xattr is recognized
as a Smack xattr before looking into the value.
[1] 2015-05-02 Casey Schaufler
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +9 -8
@@ -2979,6 +2979,15 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,struct socket *sock;int rc =0 ; +if (!(strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX ) ==0 || +strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE ) ==0 || +strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_EXEC ) ==0 || +strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_MMAP ) ==0 || +strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 || +strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT ) ==0 + )) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +if (value ==NULL || size >SMK_LONGLABEL || size ==0 )return -EINVAL ;
@@ -2991,14 +3000,6 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,return 0 ; } -if (!(strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_EXEC ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_MMAP ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT ) ==0 - )) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; - skp =smk_import_entry (value, size);if (IS_ERR (skp))return PTR_ERR (skp);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 12/19 smack: restrict setxattr() SMACK64IPIN/IPOUT to sockets
In reply to Konstantin AndreevThe SMACK64IPIN and SMACK64IPOUT xattrs apply only to sockets. However, smack_inode_setxattr() currently allows setting them on any filesystem object, including regular files, FIFOs, and others.
These xattrs are even written to disk by the
underlying filesystem. E.g. you can
# setfattr -n security.SMACK64IPIN -v foo /etc/passwd # # no error
and have SMACK64IPIN on disk.
This change restricts setting SMACK64IPIN/IPOUT
in smack_inode_setxattr() to socket inodes only.
Given that, the corresponding check insmack_inode_setsecurity() may be omitted,
as it called after smack_inode_setxattr()
for SMACK64IPIN/IPOUT:
fs/xattr.c:
...
` __vfs_setxattr_locked
` security_inode_setxattr
` __vfs_setxattr_noperm
` security_inode_setsecurityAdditionally, with this change the error code returned by setxattr() for unsupported SMACK64IPIN/OUT xattrs
changes from -ENODATA [1]:
# setfattr -n security.SMACK64IPIN -v foo /sys/kernel/debug/sleep_time setfattr: /sys/kernel/debug/sleep_time: No such attribute
back to -EOPNOTSUPP:
# setfattr -n security.SMACK64IPIN -v foo /sys/kernel/debug/sleep_time setfattr: /sys/kernel/debug/sleep_time: Operation not supported
[1] 2025-07 andreev
commit ("smack: smack_inode_setsecurity:
prevent setting SMACK64IPIN/OUT in other LSMs")
--- Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Smack.rst | 3 ++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 16 +++++++++------- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Smack.rst +2 -1
@@ -693,7 +693,8 @@ can only be set by privileged tasks, but any task can read them for their own sockets. SMACK64IPIN: - The Smack label of the task object. A privileged + The Smack label of incoming packets must have write access to the + Smack label, specified in the SMACK64IPIN attribute. A privileged program that will enforce policy may set this to the star label. SMACK64IPOUT:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +9 -7
@@ -1415,7 +1415,14 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,return -EINVAL ; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN ) ==0 ||strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT ) ==0 ) { - ; +/* +* inode of socket file descriptor (sockfs inode) only +*/ +if (inode->i_sb->s_magic !=SOCKFS_MAGIC ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + +if (SOCKET_I (inode)->sk ==NULL ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC ) ==0 ||strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP ) ==0 ) { task_label = true;
@@ -3015,14 +3022,9 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,return -ENODATA ;/* * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets. +* smack_inode_setxattr() has checked that inode is sockfs */ -if (inode->i_sb->s_magic !=SOCKFS_MAGIC ) -return -ENODATA ; - sock =SOCKET_I (inode); -if (sock->sk ==NULL ) -return -ENODATA ; - ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk);if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 13/19 smack: restrict setxattr() SMACK64EXEC/MMAP to regular files
In reply to Konstantin AndreevThe SMACK64EXEC and SMACK64MMAP xattrs apply only to regular files. However, setxattr() currently allows setting them on any filesystem object, including FIFOs, device nodes, and others. E.g.
root# setfattr -n security.SMACK64EXEC -v foo /dev/null
root# getfattr -hn security.SMACK64EXEC /dev/null
# file: dev/null
security.SMACK64EXEC="foo"
This change restricts setting SMACK64EXEC and SMACK64MMAP to regular files only.
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +12 -8
@@ -1425,6 +1425,8 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC ) ==0 ||strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP ) ==0 ) { +if (!S_ISREG (i_mode)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; task_label = true; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) { if (!S_ISDIR(i_mode) ||
@@ -3754,15 +3756,17 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)/* * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@". */ - skp =smk_fetch (XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC , inode, dp); -if (IS_ERR (skp) ||smk_task_invalid_label (skp)) - skp =NULL ; - isp->smk_task = skp; +if (S_ISREG (inode->i_mode)) { + skp =smk_fetch (XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC , inode, dp); +if (IS_ERR (skp) ||smk_task_invalid_label (skp)) + skp =NULL ; + isp->smk_task = skp; - skp =smk_fetch (XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP , inode, dp); -if (IS_ERR (skp) ||smk_task_invalid_label (skp)) - skp =NULL ; - isp->smk_mmap = skp; + skp =smk_fetch (XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP , inode, dp); +if (IS_ERR (skp) ||smk_task_invalid_label (skp)) + skp =NULL ; + isp->smk_mmap = skp; + }dput (dp);break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 14/19 smack: return EOPNOTSUPP for setxattr() unsupported SMACK64(TRANSMUTE)
In reply to Konstantin AndreevThe SMACK64TRANSMUTE is supported only for directories.
"The standard return value for unsupported attribute names is
-EOPNOTSUPP, as opposed to undefined but supported attributes (-ENODATA)" [3]
Smack follows [4] the convention
for get/setxattr() SMACK64IPIN/IPOUT
It is more appropriate to return -EOPNOTSUPP instead of -EINVAL when attempting to set SMACK64TRANSMUTE on a non-directory object.
A Unix domain socket (UDS) with a BSD address, and the inode of a socket file descriptor (sockfs inode) have fixed (*) nominal SMACK64 label [2]
Likewise, it is more appropriate to return -EOPNOTSUPP instead of -EINVAL when attempting to set
the SMACK64 xattr on either type of socket inode.
The commits being fixed [1,2] are recent enough so this change should not break userspace.
[1] 2023-11-16 roberto.sassu
[2] 2025-06-16 andreev
[3] 2016-09-29 agruenba
commit 971df15bd54a ("sockfs: getxattr: Fail with -EOPNOTSUPP
for invalid attribute names")
[4] 2008-02-04 casey
commit e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +4 -3
@@ -1412,7 +1412,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,* UDS inode have fixed label */ if (S_ISSOCK (i_mode)) -return -EINVAL ; +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN ) ==0 ||strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT ) ==0 ) {/*
@@ -1429,8 +1429,9 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,return -EOPNOTSUPP ; task_label = true; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) { -if (!S_ISDIR (i_mode) || - size !=TRANS_TRUE_SIZE || +if (!S_ISDIR (i_mode)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +if (size !=TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||strncmp (value,TRANS_TRUE ,TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ) !=0 )return -EINVAL ; label_inside = false;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 15/19 smack: smack_inode_setsecurity(): skip checks for SMACK64TRANSMUTE
In reply to Konstantin AndreevLike smack_inode_post_setxattr(), smack_inode_setsecurity() is called after smack_inode_setxattr()
for the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr:
fs/xattr.c:
...
` __vfs_setxattr_locked
` security_inode_setxattr
` __vfs_setxattr_noperm
|
` security_inode_post_setxattr
| ^
| }- one of them is called
| v
` security_inode_setsecurityLike smack_inode_post_setxattr(), smack_inode_setsecurity() does not need to check
the applicability of the SMACK64TRANSMUTE or its value, as they have already been checked by smack_inode_setxattr()
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +0 -4
@@ -3002,10 +3002,6 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,return -EINVAL ;if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) { -if (!S_ISDIR (inode->i_mode) || size !=TRANS_TRUE_SIZE || -strncmp (value,TRANS_TRUE ,TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ) !=0 ) -return -EINVAL ; - nsp->smk_flags |=SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE ;return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 16/19 smack: smack_inode_notifysecctx(): reject invalid labels
In reply to Konstantin AndreevExactly the same issue as described in [1,2].
smack_inode_notifysecctx()
` smack_inode_setsecurity
` smk_import_entry
uses an unsuitable parsing
function: smk_import_entry(), which acquires only that part from the beginning of the input that looks like a label.
[1] 2025-06-17 andreev
commit 674e2b24791c ("smack: fix bug: setting task label
silently ignores input garbage")
[2] 2025-07 andreev
commit ("smack: fix bug: setting label-containing xattrs
silently ignores input garbage")
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +6 -0
@@ -5003,11 +5003,17 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)static int smack_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen) { +const struct smack_known *skp;/* * UDS inode has fixed label. Ignore nfs label. */ if (S_ISSOCK (inode->i_mode))return 0 ; + + skp =smk_import_label (ctx, ctxlen); +if (IS_ERR (skp)) +return PTR_ERR (skp); +return smack_inode_setsecurity (inode,XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX , ctx, ctxlen,0 ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 17/19 smack: smack_inode_post_setxattr(): find label instead of import
In reply to Konstantin AndreevEfforts were made in [1]
to ensure that smk_import_entry() can not fail when called by smack_inode_post_setxattr():
label is imported in advance by smack_inode_setxattr().
However,
- smk_import_entry() can still fail
due to memory allocation
- its use is misleading here,
as no actual import is needed
Using smk_find_entry() instead of smk_import_entry() should be sufficient for smack_inode_post_setxattr().
However, smk_find_entry() takes a \0-terminated string, while we have a (non-\0-terminated string, length) tuple.
To resolve this, I added smk_find_label_rcu(), which accepts such a tuple and
is otherwise identical to smk_find_entry().
It is now used in smack_inode_post_setxattr().
smack_inode_post_setxattr() can no longer fail.
[1] 2009-04-16 etienne.basset
commit defc433ba3bc ("Smack: check for SMACK xattr validity
in smack_inode_setxattr")
--- security/smack/smack.h | 2 ++ security/smack/smack_access.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 26 ++++++++++++-------------- 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack.h +2 -0
@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_valid_label(const char *label, int label_len, gfp_t gfp);void smk_insert_entry (struct smack_known *skp);struct smack_known *smk_find_entry (const char *); +struct smack_known *smk_find_label_rcu (const char *string,size_t string_len); +struct smack_known *smk_find_label (const char *string,size_t string_len);bool smack_privileged (int cap);bool smack_privileged_cred (int cap,const struct cred *cred);void smk_destroy_label_list (struct list_head *list);
security/smack/smack_access.c +20 -2
@@ -427,21 +427,39 @@ void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp)* matches the passed string or NULL if not found. */ struct smack_known *smk_find_entry (const char *string) +{ +return smk_find_label_rcu (string,strlen (string)); +} + +struct smack_known * +smk_find_label_rcu (const char *string,size_t string_len) {unsigned int hash;struct hlist_head *head;struct smack_known *skp; - hash =full_name_hash (NULL , string,strlen (string)); + hash =full_name_hash (NULL , string, string_len); head = &smack_known_hash[hash & (SMACK_HASH_SLOTS -1 )];hlist_for_each_entry_rcu (skp, head, smk_hashed) -if (strcmp (skp->smk_known, string) ==0 ) +if (strlen (skp->smk_known) == string_len && +strncmp (skp->smk_known, string, string_len) ==0 )return skp;return NULL ; } +struct smack_known * +smk_find_label (const char *string,size_t string_len) +{ +struct smack_known *skp; + +rcu_read_lock (); + skp =smk_find_label_rcu (string, string_len); +rcu_read_unlock (); +return skp; +} +/** * smk_parse_label_len - calculate the length of the starting segment * in the string that constitutes a valid smack label
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +12 -14
@@ -1484,7 +1484,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,static void smack_inode_post_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags) { -struct smack_known *skp; +struct smack_known **skpp =NULL ;struct inode_smack *isp =smack_inode (d_backing_inode (dentry));if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) {
@@ -1492,19 +1492,17 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,return ; } -if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) ==0 ) { - skp =smk_import_entry (value, size); -if (!IS_ERR (skp)) - isp->smk_inode = skp; - }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC ) ==0 ) { - skp =smk_import_entry (value, size); -if (!IS_ERR (skp)) - isp->smk_task = skp; - }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP ) ==0 ) { - skp =smk_import_entry (value, size); -if (!IS_ERR (skp)) - isp->smk_mmap = skp; - } +if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) ==0 ) + skpp = &isp->smk_inode; +else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC ) ==0 ) + skpp = &isp->smk_task; +else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP ) ==0 ) + skpp = &isp->smk_mmap; +/* +* Label has been imported by smack_inode_setxattr, just find it +*/ +if (skpp) + *skpp =smk_find_label (value, size);return ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 18/19 smack: smack_inode_setsecurity(): find label instead of import
In reply to Konstantin Andreevsmack_inode_setsecurity() is called
for label-containing xattrs either
after smack_inode_setxattr():
fs/xattr.c:
...
` __vfs_setxattr_locked
` security_inode_setxattr
` __vfs_setxattr_noperm
` security_inode_setsecurity
or
...
` smack_inode_notifysecctx
` smack_inode_setsecurityIn both cases - via security_inode_setxattr()
or smack_inode_notifysecctx() -
the label is imported in advance.
There is no need to validate and import
the input value again; looking it up is sufficient.
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 14 +++++--------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +5 -9
@@ -2996,17 +2996,16 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, ))return -EOPNOTSUPP ; -if (value ==NULL || size >SMK_LONGLABEL || size ==0 ) -return -EINVAL ; -if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) { nsp->smk_flags |=SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE ;return 0 ; } - skp =smk_import_entry (value, size); -if (IS_ERR (skp)) -return PTR_ERR (skp); +if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_EXEC ) ==0 || +strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_MMAP ) ==0 ) +return -ENODATA ; + + skp =smk_find_label (value, size);if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX ) ==0 ) { nsp->smk_inode = skp;
@@ -3014,9 +3013,6 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,return 0 ; } -if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_EXEC ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_MMAP ) ==0 ) -return -ENODATA ;/* * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets. * smack_inode_setxattr() has checked that inode is sockfs
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 19/19 smack: deduplicate strcmp(name, XATTR_{,NAME_}SMACK*)
In reply to Konstantin Andreev--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 170 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 109 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +109 -61
@@ -96,6 +96,49 @@ static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)return Opt_error; } +enum smack_xa { +SMK_XA_OBJECT ,// security.SMACK64 +SMK_XA_IPIN ,// security.SMACK64IPIN +SMK_XA_IPOUT ,// security.SMACK64IPOUT +SMK_XA_EXEC ,// security.SMACK64EXEC +SMK_XA_MMAP ,// security.SMACK64MMAP +SMK_XA_TRANSMUTE ,// security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE +}; + +static const char *const +smk_xa_suffix[] = { + [SMK_XA_OBJECT ] ="" , + [SMK_XA_IPIN ] ="IPIN" , + [SMK_XA_IPOUT ] ="IPOUT" , + [SMK_XA_EXEC ] ="EXEC" , + [SMK_XA_MMAP ] ="MMAP" , + [SMK_XA_TRANSMUTE ] ="TRANSMUTE" , +}; + +static int +smk_xa_suffix_to_id (const char *suffix) +{ +return match_string (smk_xa_suffix,ARRAY_SIZE (smk_xa_suffix), suffix); +} + +static int +smk_xa_name_to_id (const char *name) +{ +if (strncmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ,sizeof (XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) -1 )) +return -EINVAL ; + +return smk_xa_suffix_to_id (name + (sizeof (XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) -1 )); +} + +static int +smk_xa_secname_to_id (const char *name) +{ +if (strncmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX ,sizeof (XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX ) -1 )) +return -EINVAL ; + +return smk_xa_suffix_to_id (name + (sizeof (XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX ) -1 )); +} +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP static char *smk_bu_mess[] = { "Bringup Error", /* Unused */
@@ -1355,18 +1398,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)*/ static int smack_inode_xattr_skipcap (const char *name) { -if (strncmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ,sizeof (XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) -1 )) -return 0 ; - -if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) -return 1 ; - -return 0 ; +return (smk_xa_name_to_id (name) >=0 ); }/*
@@ -1406,15 +1438,17 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,struct inode *const inode =d_backing_inode (dentry);umode_t const i_mode = inode->i_mode; -if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) ==0 ) { +switch (smk_xa_name_to_id (name)) { +case SMK_XA_OBJECT :/* * inode of socket file descriptor (sockfs inode) and * UDS inode have fixed label */ if (S_ISSOCK (i_mode))return -EOPNOTSUPP ; - }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT ) ==0 ) { +break ; +case SMK_XA_IPIN : +case SMK_XA_IPOUT :/* * inode of socket file descriptor (sockfs inode) only */
@@ -1423,19 +1457,22 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,if (SOCKET_I (inode)->sk ==NULL )return -EOPNOTSUPP ; - }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP ) ==0 ) { +break ; +case SMK_XA_EXEC : +case SMK_XA_MMAP :if (!S_ISREG (i_mode))return -EOPNOTSUPP ; task_label = true; - }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) { +break ; +case SMK_XA_TRANSMUTE :if (!S_ISDIR (i_mode))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;if (size !=TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||strncmp (value,TRANS_TRUE ,TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ) !=0 )return -EINVAL ; label_inside = false; - }else { +break ; +default : {/* * treat other xattrs as labeled data */
@@ -1447,6 +1484,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,return smk_bu_inode (inode,MAY_WRITE ,smk_curacc (smk_of_inode (inode),MAY_WRITE , &ad)); } + }if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;
@@ -1487,17 +1525,21 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,struct smack_known **skpp =NULL ;struct inode_smack *isp =smack_inode (d_backing_inode (dentry)); -if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) { +switch (smk_xa_name_to_id (name)) { +case SMK_XA_TRANSMUTE : isp->smk_flags |=SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE ;return ; +case SMK_XA_OBJECT : + skpp = &isp->smk_inode; +break ; +case SMK_XA_EXEC : + skpp = &isp->smk_task; +break ; +case SMK_XA_MMAP : + skpp = &isp->smk_mmap; +break ; } -if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) ==0 ) - skpp = &isp->smk_inode; -else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC ) ==0 ) - skpp = &isp->smk_task; -else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP ) ==0 ) - skpp = &isp->smk_mmap;/* * Label has been imported by smack_inode_setxattr, just find it */
@@ -1545,16 +1587,9 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, {const struct inode *const inode =d_backing_inode (dentry);struct inode_smack *const isp =smack_inode (inode); +int const xa_id =smk_xa_name_to_id (name); -if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP ) ==0 ) { -if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; - }else { +if (xa_id <0 ) {/* * treat other xattrs as labeled data */
@@ -1567,25 +1602,34 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, smk_curacc(isp->smk_inode, MAY_WRITE, &ad)); } +if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; +/* * Don't do anything special for these. * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT * XATTR_NAME_SMACK if S_ISSOCK (UDS inode has fixed label) */ -if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) ==0 ) { +switch (xa_id) { +case SMK_XA_OBJECT :if (!S_ISSOCK (inode->i_mode)) {struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;struct superblock_smack *sbsp =smack_superblock (sbp); isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default; } - }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC ) ==0 ) +break ; +case SMK_XA_EXEC : isp->smk_task =NULL ; -else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP ) ==0 ) +break ; +case SMK_XA_MMAP : isp->smk_mmap =NULL ; -else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) +break ; +case SMK_XA_TRANSMUTE : isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE ; +break ; + }return 0 ; }
@@ -1676,20 +1720,26 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,const struct inode_smack *const isp =smack_inode (inode);const char *value =NULL ;int value_len; +int const xa_id =smk_xa_secname_to_id (name); -if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX ) ==0 ) { +switch (xa_id) { +case SMK_XA_OBJECT : skp = isp->smk_inode; - }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_EXEC ) ==0 ) { +break ; +case SMK_XA_EXEC : skp = isp->smk_task; - }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_MMAP ) ==0 ) { +break ; +case SMK_XA_MMAP : skp = isp->smk_mmap; - }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) { +break ; +case SMK_XA_TRANSMUTE :if (isp->smk_flags &SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE ) value =TRANS_TRUE ;else return -ENODATA ; - }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT ) ==0 ) { +break ; +case SMK_XA_IPIN : +case SMK_XA_IPOUT : {/* * These Smack xattrs are only on sockets. */
@@ -1705,12 +1755,15 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, ssp =smack_sock (sk); -if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 ) +if (xa_id ==SMK_XA_IPIN ) skp = ssp->smk_in;else skp = ssp->smk_out; - }else +break ; + } +default :return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + }if (!value) {if (!skp)
@@ -2986,28 +3039,23 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,struct socket_smack *ssp;struct socket *sock;int rc =0 ; +int const xa_id =smk_xa_secname_to_id (name); -if (!(strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_EXEC ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_MMAP ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT ) ==0 - )) +if (xa_id <0 )return -EOPNOTSUPP ; -if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) { +switch (xa_id) { +case SMK_XA_TRANSMUTE : nsp->smk_flags |=SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE ;return 0 ; - } - -if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_EXEC ) ==0 || -strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_MMAP ) ==0 ) +case SMK_XA_EXEC : +case SMK_XA_MMAP :return -ENODATA ; + } skp =smk_find_label (value, size); -if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX ) ==0 ) { +if (xa_id ==SMK_XA_OBJECT ) { nsp->smk_inode = skp; nsp->smk_flags |=SMK_INODE_INSTANT ;return 0 ;
@@ -3020,7 +3068,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, sock =SOCKET_I (inode); ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk); -if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 ) +if (xa_id ==SMK_XA_IPIN ) ssp->smk_in = skp;else { ssp->smk_out = skp;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
cover smack: clean up xattr handling
A set of minor bug fixes and optimizations in Smack xattr handling. Logically independent, but with the code dependencies.
The patch set applies on top of:
https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next/commits/next
commit 6ddd169d0288
Konstantin Andreev (19):
smack: fix bug: changing Smack xattrs requires cap_sys_admin
smack: fix bug: changing Smack xattrs requires cap_mac_override
smack: fix bug: setting label-containing xattrs silently ignores input garbage
smack: stop polling other LSMs & VFS to getxattr() unsupported SMACK64IPIN/OUT
smack: restrict getxattr() SMACK64TRANSMUTE to directories
smack: fix bug: getxattr() returns invalid SMACK64EXEC/MMAP
smack: deduplicate task label validation
smack: smack_inode_setsecurity: prevent setting SMACK64EXEC/MMAP in other LSMs
smack: smack_inode_setsecurity: prevent setting SMACK64IPIN/OUT in other LSMs
smack: fix bug: smack_inode_setsecurity() imports alien xattrs as labels
smack: fix bug: smack_inode_setsecurity() false EINVAL for alien xattrs
smack: restrict setxattr() SMACK64IPIN/IPOUT to sockets
smack: restrict setxattr() SMACK64EXEC/MMAP to regular files
smack: return EOPNOTSUPP for setxattr() unsupported SMACK64(TRANSMUTE)
smack: smack_inode_setsecurity(): skip checks for SMACK64TRANSMUTE
smack: smack_inode_notifysecctx(): reject invalid labels
smack: smack_inode_post_setxattr(): find label instead of import
smack: smack_inode_setsecurity(): find label instead of import
smack: deduplicate strcmp(name, XATTR_{,NAME_}SMACK*)
Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Smack.rst | 3 +- security/smack/smack.h | 2 + security/smack/smack_access.c | 22 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 492 +++++++++++++++--------- 4 files changed, 324 insertions(+), 195 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 1/19 smack: fix bug: changing Smack xattrs requires cap_sys_admin
[1] introduced a new LSM hook, inode_xattr_skipcap. This hook is intended to identify security xattrs for which the LSM takes responsibility for access control.
However, the Smack implementation, smack_inode_xattr_skipcap(), has never worked as intended. It mistakenly does not recognize the security.SMACK64* xattrs it owns.
As a result, Smack does not inform the common security layer (security/security.c) that Smack is responsible for security.SMACK64* xattrs. Consequently, the generic access control functions (cap_inode_removexattr, cap_inode_setxattr) are invoked, and they require cap_sys_admin to be effective.
This change corrects smack_inode_xattr_skipcap(), allowing Smack xattrs to skip cap_inode_*xattr() calls.
[1] 2024-05-02, Paul Moore
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1 -1
@@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)*/ static int smack_inode_xattr_skipcap (const char *name) { -if (strncmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX ,strlen (XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX ))) +if (strncmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ,sizeof (XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) -1 ))return 0 ; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 2/19 smack: fix bug: changing Smack xattrs requires cap_mac_override
In reply to Konstantin AndreevThe xattr-changing hooks (smack_inode_setxattr, smack_inode_removexattr) treat Smack xattrs (security.SMACK64*) like any other xattrs, but additionally require the subject process to possess cap_mac_admin.
These hooks treat "any other xattr" as if it is just labeled data, so changing a Smack xattr, like changing any other xattr,
requires the subject process to either possess cap_mac_override or have a rule allowing it to write to the object.
A curious effect arises here: the rule 'foo bar w' allows subject 'foo' to relabel object 'bar' to any label 8-O - clearly not what the rules are designed for.
According to the Smack documentation [1,2], possessing cap_mac_admin is necessary and sufficient to change Smack xattrs (security.SMACK64*).
Treating Smack xattrs as labeled data
appears to be incorrect.
This change excludes the "labeled data check" for Smack xattrs from the aforementioned hooks, making cap_mac_admin sufficient to change Smack xattrs.
(2008-02-04 Casey Schaufler)
[1] Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Smack.rst
[2] 2012-06-05 Casey Schaufler
commit 1880eff77e7a ("Smack: onlycap limits on CAP_MAC_ADMIN")
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +54 -51
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)#endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP -static int smk_bu_inode (struct inode *inode,int mode,int rc) +static int smk_bu_inode (const struct inode *const inode,int mode,int rc) {struct task_smack *tsp =smack_cred (current_cred ());struct inode_smack *isp =smack_inode (inode);
@@ -1343,65 +1343,67 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { - struct smk_audit_info ad; -struct smack_known *skp; -int check_priv =0 ; int check_import = 0;int check_star =0 ; -int rc =0 ; -umode_t const i_mode =d_backing_inode (dentry)->i_mode; +struct inode *const inode =d_backing_inode (dentry); +umode_t const i_mode = inode->i_mode;/* * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr */ if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) ==0 ) {/* -* UDS inode has fixed label +* inode of socket file descriptor (sockfs inode) and +* UDS inode have fixed label */ -if (S_ISSOCK (i_mode)) { - rc = -EINVAL ; - }else { - check_priv =1 ; - check_import =1 ; - } +if (S_ISSOCK (i_mode)) +return -EINVAL ; + check_import =1 ; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN ) ==0 ||strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT ) ==0 ) { - check_priv =1 ; check_import =1 ; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC ) ==0 ||strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP ) ==0 ) { - check_priv =1 ; check_import =1 ; check_star =1 ; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) { - check_priv =1 ;if (!S_ISDIR (i_mode) || size !=TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||strncmp (value,TRANS_TRUE ,TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ) !=0 ) - rc = -EINVAL ; +return -EINVAL ; + }else { +/* +* treat other xattrs as labeled data +*/ +struct smk_audit_info ad; + +smk_ad_init (&ad, __func__,LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY ); +smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry (&ad, dentry); + +return smk_bu_inode (inode,MAY_WRITE , +smk_curacc (smk_of_inode (inode),MAY_WRITE , &ad)); } -if (check_priv && !smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) - rc = -EPERM ; +if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; -if (rc ==0 && check_import) { - skp = size ?smk_import_entry (value, size) :NULL ; +if (check_import) { +const struct smack_known *skp; + +if (size ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + + skp =smk_import_entry (value, size);if (IS_ERR (skp)) - rc =PTR_ERR (skp); -else if (skp ==NULL || (check_star && - (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web))) - rc = -EINVAL ; +return PTR_ERR (skp); + +if (check_star && + (skp == &smack_known_star || + skp == &smack_known_web)) +return -EINVAL ; } -smk_ad_init (&ad, __func__,LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY ); -smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry (&ad, dentry); - -if (rc ==0 ) { - rc =smk_curacc (smk_of_inode (d_backing_inode (dentry)),MAY_WRITE , &ad); - rc =smk_bu_inode (d_backing_inode (dentry),MAY_WRITE , rc); - } - -return rc; +return 0 ; }/**
@@ -1452,6 +1454,9 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,*/ static int smack_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name) { +/* +* treat all xattrs as labeled data +*/ struct smk_audit_info ad;int rc;
@@ -1476,9 +1481,8 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)static int smack_inode_removexattr (struct mnt_idmap *idmap,struct dentry *dentry,const char *name) { -struct inode_smack *isp; -struct smk_audit_info ad; -int rc =0 ; +const struct inode *const inode =d_backing_inode (dentry); +struct inode_smack *const isp =smack_inode (inode); if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
@@ -1487,21 +1491,20 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) - rc = -EPERM ; + return -EPERM; + } else { +/* +* treat other xattrs as labeled data +*/ +struct smk_audit_info ad; + +smk_ad_init (&ad, __func__,LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY ); +smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry (&ad, dentry); + +return smk_bu_inode (inode,MAY_WRITE , +smk_curacc (isp->smk_inode,MAY_WRITE , &ad)); } -if (rc !=0 ) -return rc; - -smk_ad_init (&ad, __func__,LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY ); -smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry (&ad, dentry); - - rc =smk_curacc (smk_of_inode (d_backing_inode (dentry)),MAY_WRITE , &ad); - rc =smk_bu_inode (d_backing_inode (dentry),MAY_WRITE , rc); -if (rc !=0 ) -return rc; - - isp =smack_inode (d_backing_inode (dentry));/* * Don't do anything special for these. * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
@@ -1509,7 +1512,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,* XATTR_NAME_SMACK if S_ISSOCK (UDS inode has fixed label) */ if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) ==0 ) { -if (!S_ISSOCK (d_backing_inode (dentry)->i_mode)) { +if (!S_ISSOCK (inode->i_mode)) {struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;struct superblock_smack *sbsp =smack_superblock (sbp);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 3/19 smack: fix bug: setting label-containing xattrs silently ignores input garbage
In reply to Konstantin AndreevThe following command:
# setfattr -n security.SMACK64 -v foo/bar FILE
sets the label of FILE to 'foo' w/o indication that label does not match input.
This happens due to the use of an unsuitable parsing
function: smk_import_entry(), which acquires only that part from the beginning of the input that looks like a label.
This is exactly the same issue as described in [1], but it occurs with Smack label-containing xattrs instead of /proc/PID/attr/smack/current.
Curiously,
# setfattr -n security.SMACK64 -v foo/bar FILE
# setfattr -n security.SMACK64EXEC -v fo2/ba2 FILE
# setfattr -n security.SMACK64MMAP -v fo3/ba3 FILE
# getfattr -hd -m - FILE
security.SMACK64="foo" // garbage ignored
security.SMACK64EXEC="fo2/ba2" // garbage taken?!
security.SMACK64MMAP="fo3/ba3" // garbage taken?!It looks like label-containing xattrs SMACK64EXEC and SMACK64MMAP can acquire invalid Smack label.
In fact, inode contains the labels fo2' and fo3', but, due to another Smack bug [2] we do not see them - instead we see the on-disk content of the SMACK64EXEC and SMACK64MMAP xattrs, that is, indeed, fo2/ba2' and fo3/ba3'
This change detects input garbage by adding a check:
taken label length == input length
and indicates -EINVAL to the caller if they do not match
(2008-02-04 Casey Schaufler)
[1] 2025-06-17 andreev
commit 674e2b24791c ("smack: fix bug: setting task label
silently ignores input garbage")
[2] 2025-07 andreev (forward reference)
commit ("smack: fix bug: getxattr() returns invalid SMACK64EXEC/MMAP")
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +57 -24
@@ -263,6 +263,49 @@ static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,#define smk_bu_credfile (cred, file, mode,RC ) (RC)#endif +/** +* smk_parse_label - check @string (not \0-terminated) is a valid Smack label +* @string: a string to check, not \0-terminated +* @string_len: the length of the @string +* +* Return: 0 or an error code +*/ +static int +smk_parse_label (const char *string,size_t string_len) +{ +int label_len; + +if (unlikely (string ==NULL || string_len ==0 || + string_len >=SMK_LONGLABEL )) +return -EINVAL ; + + label_len =smk_parse_label_len (string, string_len); +if (label_len <0 ||/* invalid label */ + label_len != string_len)/* garbage after label */ +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} + +/** +* smk_import_label - import a label, return the list entry +* @string: a text string that may be a valid Smack label, not \0-terminated +* @string_len: the length of the text string in the @string +* +* Contrast to smk_import_entry(), the full @string_len of the @string +* must constitute a valid Smack label to be imported. +* +* Return: see description of smk_import_entry() +*/ +static struct smack_known * +smk_import_label (const char *string,int string_len) +{ +if (smk_parse_label (string, string_len)) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + +return smk_import_valid_label (string, string_len,GFP_NOFS ); +} +/** * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file. * @name: type of the label (attribute)
@@ -1343,14 +1386,11 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { - int check_import = 0; + bool label_inside = true;int check_star =0 ;struct inode *const inode =d_backing_inode (dentry);umode_t const i_mode = inode->i_mode; -/* -* Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr -*/ if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) ==0 ) {/* * inode of socket file descriptor (sockfs inode) and
@@ -1358,19 +1398,18 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,*/ if (S_ISSOCK (i_mode))return -EINVAL ; - check_import =1 ; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN ) ==0 ||strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT ) ==0 ) { - check_import =1 ; + ; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC ) ==0 ||strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP ) ==0 ) { - check_import =1 ; check_star =1 ; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) {if (!S_ISDIR (i_mode) || size !=TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||strncmp (value,TRANS_TRUE ,TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ) !=0 )return -EINVAL ; + label_inside = false; }else {/* * treat other xattrs as labeled data
@@ -1387,13 +1426,13 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ; -if (check_import) { -const struct smack_known *skp; +/* +* Import label now, so import won't fail in smack_inode_post_setxattr +*/ +if (label_inside) { +const struct smack_known *const skp = +smk_import_label (value, size); -if (size ==0 ) -return -EINVAL ; - - skp =smk_import_entry (value, size);if (IS_ERR (skp))return PTR_ERR (skp);
@@ -3781,23 +3820,17 @@ static int do_setattr(unsigned int attr, void *value, size_t size)struct task_smack *tsp =smack_cred (current_cred ());struct cred *new;struct smack_known *skp; -int label_len;/* * let unprivileged user validate input, check permissions later */ -if (value ==NULL || size ==0 || size >=SMK_LONGLABEL ) +if (smk_parse_label (value, size))return -EINVAL ; - - label_len =smk_parse_label_len (value, size); -if (label_len <0 || label_len != size) -return -EINVAL ; -/* * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label * and the star ("*") label. */ -if (label_len ==1 /* '@', '*' */ ) { +if (size ==1 /* '@', '*' */ ) {const char c = *(const char *)value; if (c == *smack_known_web.smk_known ||
@@ -3810,8 +3843,8 @@ static int do_setattr(unsigned int attr, void *value, size_t size)list_for_each_entry (sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list) {const char *cp = sklep->smk_label->smk_known; -if (strlen (cp) == label_len && -strncmp (cp, value, label_len) ==0 ) +if (strlen (cp) == size && +strncmp (cp, value, size) ==0 ) goto in_relabel; }return -EPERM ;
@@ -3819,7 +3852,7 @@ static int do_setattr(unsigned int attr, void *value, size_t size) ; } - skp =smk_import_valid_label (value, label_len,GFP_KERNEL ); + skp =smk_import_valid_label (value, size,GFP_KERNEL );if (IS_ERR (skp))return PTR_ERR (skp);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 4/19 smack: stop polling other LSMs & VFS to getxattr() unsupported SMACK64IPIN/OUT
In reply to Konstantin Andreevsmack_inode_getsecurity() returns -EOPNOTSUPP
for the SMACK64IPIN and SMACK64IPOUT xattrs
if the inode is not a socket.
Since [1], the -EOPNOTSUPP return value
from the inode_getsecurity LSM hook
has been interpreted by security_inode_getsecurity() as a signal to "continue polling other LSMs".
As a result, security_inode_getsecurity() queries
other LSMs for these Smack xattrs.
Furthermore, the VFS layer is also aware of the convention and attempts to read SMACK64IPIN and SMACK64IPOUT from disk via __vfs_getxattr() if all LSMs return -EOPNOTSUPP.
Looking for Smack propertу in these places is incorrect, as Smack does own these xattrs - even if
they are irrelevant for a particular inode.
Returning -ENODATA (no such attribute) instead of -EOPNOTSUPP is more appropriate, as it stops further fallback to other LSMs and the filesystem.
This appears safe, since __vfs_getxattr() also returns -ENODATA when the attribute does not exist.
[1] 2016-05-31 Casey Schaufler
commit 2885c1e3e0c2 ("LSM: Fix for security_inode_getsecurity
and -EOPNOTSUPP")
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 32 +++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +15 -17
@@ -1649,10 +1649,6 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { - struct socket_smack *ssp; -struct socket *sock; -struct super_block *sbp; -struct inode *ip = inode; struct smack_known *isp;struct inode_smack *ispp;size_t label_len;
@@ -1666,27 +1662,29 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, label =TRANS_TRUE ; else label ="" ; - }else { + }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 || +strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT ) ==0 ) {/* -* The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets. +* These Smack xattrs are only on sockets. */ - sbp = ip->i_sb; -if (sbp->s_magic !=SOCKFS_MAGIC ) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +const struct socket_smack *ssp; +const struct sock *sk; - sock =SOCKET_I (ip); -if (sock ==NULL || sock->sk ==NULL ) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +if (inode->i_sb->s_magic !=SOCKFS_MAGIC ) +return -ENODATA ; - ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk); + sk =SOCKET_I (inode)->sk; +if (sk ==NULL ) +return -ENODATA ; + + ssp =smack_sock (sk);if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 ) isp = ssp->smk_in; -else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT ) ==0 ) - isp = ssp->smk_out;else -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; - } + isp = ssp->smk_out; + }else +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;if (!label) label = isp->smk_known;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Casey Schaufler
maintainerQuoted 2 lines · Konstantin Andreev
A set of minor bug fixes and optimizations in Smack xattr handling. Logically independent, but with the code dependencies.
Please break this into two (or more) patch sets. The patches regarding restrictions on getting and setting the file type specific attributes should be presented independently of the xattr "fixes".
There appears to be a misunderstanding regarding "valid" Smack labels. A Smack label is a text string. The intention is that a label is "valid" if the system is exposed to it. For example,
# echo Oatmeal > /proc/self/attr/smack/current
should introduce "Oatmeal" as a Smack label if is has never been used before. After a reboot the system may find the label "Bacon" on a file, and if the label isn't known it is imported. Similarly, if a CIPSO packet includes a label that has not been seen in is added.
This policy is necessary in part because there is a valid use case for a Smack label with no explicit access rules.
I tried out the combined set and encountered many unexpected failures.
Quoted 32 lines
The patch set applies on top of:
https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next/commits/next
commit6ddd169d0288Konstantin Andreev (19):
smack: fix bug: changing Smack xattrs requirescap_sys_admin
smack: fix bug: changing Smack xattrs requirescap_mac_override
smack: fix bug: setting label-containing xattrs silently ignores input garbage
smack: stop polling other LSMs & VFS togetxattr()unsupported SMACK64IPIN/OUT
smack: restrictgetxattr()SMACK64TRANSMUTE to directories
smack: fix bug:getxattr()returns invalid SMACK64EXEC/MMAP
smack: deduplicate task label validation
smack:smack_inode_setsecurity: prevent setting SMACK64EXEC/MMAP in other LSMs
smack:smack_inode_setsecurity: prevent setting SMACK64IPIN/OUT in other LSMs
smack: fix bug:smack_inode_setsecurity()imports alien xattrs as labels
smack: fix bug:smack_inode_setsecurity()false EINVAL for alien xattrs
smack: restrictsetxattr()SMACK64IPIN/IPOUT to sockets
smack: restrictsetxattr()SMACK64EXEC/MMAP to regular files
smack: return EOPNOTSUPP forsetxattr()unsupported SMACK64(TRANSMUTE)
smack:smack_inode_setsecurity(): skip checks for SMACK64TRANSMUTE
smack:smack_inode_notifysecctx(): reject invalid labels
smack:smack_inode_post_setxattr(): find label instead of import
smack:smack_inode_setsecurity(): find label instead of import
smack: deduplicatestrcmp(name, XATTR_{,NAME_}SMACK*)Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Smack.rst | 3 +- security/smack/smack.h | 2 + security/smack/smack_access.c | 22 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 492 +++++++++++++++--------- 4 files changed, 324 insertions(+), 195 deletions(-)
Casey Schaufler, 26 Jul 2025:
Quoted 7 lines · Konstantin Andreev
Quoted 2 lines
A set of minor bug fixes and optimizations in Smack xattr handling. Logically independent, but with the code dependencies.
Please break this into two (or more) patch sets. The patches regarding restrictions on getting and setting the file type specific attributes should be presented independently of the xattr "fixes".
Hi, Casey.
Each patch in the set is finite by itself, addresses an independend issue, and I ought to send them separately. There are several reasons why I ended up to collect them into the set:
1) they are very small and have common subject
2) they have code dependencies
3) the feedback time for Smack patches may be high, and sending patches one-by-one may be long.
4) to give you an overview of the offered changes
May it be suitable for you to consider this set
as independent patches, that require, however,
the specific order of applying?
With this approach you could stop considering the sequence at the 1st unacceptable/wrong/failed patch.
Else, I can collect them into two (or more) patch sets.
Quoted 9 lines
There appears to be a misunderstanding regarding "valid" Smack labels. A Smack label is a text string. The intention is that a label is "valid" if the system is exposed to it. For example,
# echo Oatmeal > /proc/self/attr/smack/currentshould introduce "Oatmeal" as a Smack label if is has never been used before. After a reboot the system may find the label "Bacon" on a file, and if the label isn't known it is imported.
I think I understand this.
Quoted 2 lines
Similarly, if a CIPSO packet
includes a label that has not been seen in is added.
I have never seen this. The unseen CIPSO label is not added, instead, the incoming packet is marked with `*' label.
Just rechecked, it's so. E.g., tcp/ipv4 connection, listener side writes the audit record like:
| lsm=SMACK fn=smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb action=denied subject="*" object="foo" requested=w ...
when incoming CIPSO has [bar 250/2,3,7,10,11,16,18,19,20,23] at the initiator, but unseen at the listener side.
The documentation does not define either way of processing of the unseen Cipso labels, but current implementation looks reasonable, as sheer import of network-provided labels has no limits and opens the door for denial of service.
Quoted 5 lines
This policy is necessary in part because there is a valid use case for a Smack label with no explicit access rules.
I tried out the combined set and encountered many unexpected failures.
[... skip ...]