Secure boot for BMC
Hi everyone
Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe? Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
thx - brad
Hi Brad,
We added a verified-boot implementation to Facebook's flavor a few years ago, based on U-boot's and Chromium's designs. It is not well documented publically but you can see the unit and cont-build test harnesses here:
https://github.com/facebook/openbmc/tree/helium/tests/verified-boot
I'm happy to collaborate on future designs. At the very least I could provide lessons learned and potential improvements. Amithash and Sai could provide valuable input too.
-Teddy
Quoted 8 lines · Brad Bishop
Hi everyone
Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe? Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
thx - brad
--
Teddy Reed V
Brad,
We (Daniil and me from Arm) are happy to collaborate on Secure BMC Boot Design/Implementation.
Thanks,
Supreeth
-----Original Message-----
From: openbmc <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Brad Bishop
Sent: Tuesday, February 5, 2019 8:14 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Secure boot for BMC
Hi everyone
Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe? Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
thx - brad
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Quoted 6 lines · Brad Bishop
Hi everyone
Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe? Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
I am interested in working on this.
Cheers,
Joel
Hello Brad,
I would like join this.
Cheers,
Ryan
-----Original Message-----
From: openbmc [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Brad Bishop
Sent: Tuesday, February 5, 2019 10:14 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Secure boot for BMC
Hi everyone
Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe? Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
thx - brad
I would also like to contribute to this effort.
Regards
-Vijay
On 2/6/19, 6:05 PM, "openbmc on behalf of Ryan Chen" <[email protected] on behalf of [email protected]> wrote:
Hello Brad,
I would like join this.
Cheers,
Ryan
-----Original Message-----
From: openbmc [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Brad Bishop
Sent: Tuesday, February 5, 2019 10:14 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Secure boot for BMC
Hi everyone
Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe? Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
thx - brad
Hi Brad
ASPEED team wants to join this development.
Thanks.
從我的 iPhone 傳送
Quoted 9 lines
Brad Bishop <[email protected]> 於 2019年2月5日 22:14 寫道:
Hi everyone
Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe? Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
thx - brad
Quoted 5 lines · Brad Bishop
Hi everyone
Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe? Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
I would like to collaborate as well. I can share the ideas that we are working on for a two-flash secure boot model.
--Vernon
Quoted 7 lines · Brad Bishop
Hi everyone
Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe? Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
thx - brad
I'm interested in secureboot discussions.
Andrew
We are working on secure boot, but we have a requirement for a Google HW root of trust so I'm not sure if that fits in with these discussions.
----------
Nancy
Quoted 13 lines · Andrew Jeffery
Quoted 7 lines · Brad Bishop
Hi everyone
Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe? Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
thx - brad
I'm interested in secureboot discussions.
Andrew
Quoted 2 lines · Nancy Yuen
We are working on secure boot, but we have a requirement for a Google HW root of trust so I'm not sure if that fits in with these discussions.
I think it would help to have some idea of Google's requirements so the project can accommodate them where we can, if you can reveal any details. It may also help inform others (me?) on strategies to secure firmware.
Andrew
Quoted 7 lines · Andrew Jeffery
Quoted 2 lines · Nancy Yuen
We are working on secure boot, but we have a requirement for a Google HW root of trust so I'm not sure if that fits in with these discussions.
I think it would help to have some idea of Google's requirements so the project can accommodate them where we can, if you can reveal any details. It may also help inform others (me?) on strategies to secure firmware.
The OpenBMC security working group has discussed various "root of trust" ideas. The way I understand it, OpenBMC community members are looking into different solutions including "Secure Boot" and "Trusted Platform Module" (TPM) solutions, including Google's OpenTitan chip. See the meeting minutes for details:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b7x9BaxsfcukQDqbvZsU2ehMq4xoJRQvLxxsDUWmAOI
My understanding of the "Secure Boot" concept is that some chip validates the boot loader's digital signature after loading it and before jumping into it. Then the boot loader would validate the code it loads before jumping into it. Etc. A validation failure could either (a) cause the BMC to fail to boot, or (b) boot the BMC in failsafe mode where it could not write to its flash or talk to its host. OpenBMC may also need some way to talk to the chip.
My understanding of TPMs is much more limited. So we are waiting for proposals.
- Joseph
Quoted 1 line
Andrew
Quoted 27 lines · Joseph Reynolds
Quoted 10 lines · Andrew Jeffery
Quoted 3 lines · Nancy Yuen
We are working on secure boot, but we have a requirement for a Google HW
root of trust so I'm not sure if that fits in with these discussions.I think it would help to have some idea of Google's requirements so the project
can accommodate them where we can, if you can reveal any details. It may also
help inform others (me?) on strategies to secure firmware.The OpenBMC security working group has discussed various "root of trust" ideas. The way I understand it, OpenBMC community members are looking into different solutions including
"Secure Boot" and "Trusted Platform Module" (TPM) solutions, including Google's OpenTitan chip. See the meeting minutes for details:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b7x9BaxsfcukQDqbvZsU2ehMq4xoJRQvLxxsDUWmAOIMy understanding of the "Secure Boot" concept is that some chip validates the boot loader's digital signature after loading it and before jumping into it. Then the boot loader would validate the code it loads before jumping into it. Etc. A validation failure could either
(a) cause the BMC to fail to boot, or (b) boot the BMC in failsafe mode where it could not write to its flash or talk to its host. OpenBMC may also need some way to talk to the chip.
Quoted 2 lines
My understanding of TPMs is much more limited. So we are waiting for proposals.
On OpenPOWER systems I think we need the TPM approach, as we can't restrict our customers by burning e.g. IBM keys into the ASPEED OTP key slots (... in the 2600).
Andrew
Hi Joseph, Brad and all,
We (Nuvoton) followed the Secure Boot thread discussion and want to contribute from our experience with NPCM7xx (Poleg) BMC security. Joseph, we believe your secure boot view is fully supported by our Poleg and is already used in mass production.
The Poleg BMC implements Root Of Trust (RoT) in its on-chip ROM code which is the anchor to start a Chain Of Trust (CoT) to boot up a secure system.
The CoT starts from ROM that authenticates and boots the other parts of the system e.g. Boot block -> UBOOT -> Linux .
The RoT framework has up to 3 x RSA keys maintained in a protected OTP storage which are used by the ROM code to authenticate the next stage of the boot.
The ROM code implements recovery options and configurable security policies for un-authenticated boot scenarios (e.g. limitted operational mode or full halt mode).
The RoT allows SW development of various security schemes such as NIST 800-193.
We have uploaded our Security generation tools to the GitHub
https://github.com/Nuvoton-Israel/igps
The tools are OpenSSL based and are capable to take a Private Key + Image Binary and create a signed image.
An XML description flies are used to describe the layout of the flash and the OTP, and Python scripts generates the images based on the XML files.
We are open to discuss about BMC Secure Boot in the next Hackathon if this is of an interest to the group.
Thanks,
Avi
Quoted 35 lines · Joseph Reynolds
Quoted 10 lines · Andrew Jeffery
Quoted 3 lines · Nancy Yuen
We are working on secure boot, but we have a requirement for a Google HW
root of trust so I'm not sure if that fits in with these discussions.I think it would help to have some idea of Google's requirements so the project
can accommodate them where we can, if you can reveal any details. It may also
help inform others (me?) on strategies to secure firmware.The OpenBMC security working group has discussed various "root of trust" ideas. The way I understand it, OpenBMC community members are looking into different solutions including
"Secure Boot" and "Trusted Platform Module" (TPM) solutions, including Google's OpenTitan chip. See the meeting minutes for details:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b7x9BaxsfcukQDqbvZsU2ehMq4xoJRQvLxxsDUWmAOIMy understanding of the "Secure Boot" concept is that some chip validates the boot loader's digital signature after loading it and before jumping into it. Then the boot loader would validate the code it loads before jumping into it. Etc. A validation failure could either
(a) cause the BMC to fail to boot, or (b) boot the BMC in failsafe mode where it could not write to its flash or talk to its host. OpenBMC may also need some way to talk to the chip.My understanding of TPMs is much more limited. So we are waiting for proposals.
- Joseph
Quoted 1 line
Andrew
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Avi
I am also interested in secure boot discussion for BMC.
Ratan
Quoted 12 lines · Andrew Jeffery
Quoted 7 lines · Brad Bishop
Hi everyone
Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe? Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
thx - brad
I'm interested in secureboot discussions.
Andrew
From: Brad Bishop <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Date: 02/05/2019 07:44 PM Subject: Secure boot for BMC Sent by: "openbmc"
Hi everyone
Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe? Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
thx - brad
Quoted 3 lines
I'm interested in secureboot discussion.
Thnx- George
Quoted 7 lines · Brad Bishop
Hi everyone
Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe? Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
thx - brad
I just wanted to quick say thanks to the many that have responded to this.
It is likely someone besides me at IBM will be carrying this forward for us. I don't have anything to offer at this point other than suggesting you keep sharing your ideas for secure BMC boot in this thread.
thx - brad