arm64: split ARM64_PTR_AUTH option to userspace and kernel
Subsystems (3)
v3 cover arm64: split ARM64_PTR_AUTH option to userspace and kernel
This patch series is to support pointer authentication in userspace independently from the kernel use.
Use of pointer authentication in kernel depends on toolchain suppport and might not be desired in production due to deployment problems. Debugging the kernel also a bit harder with PAC. Let the distributions choose where the pointer authentication is used.
Config structure for BTI is similar.
This patch series can be cleanly applied on v5.12.rc6
The patch series has been tested on Arm FVP in all three config combinations.
Changes from v2:
* Moved the toolchain version check under ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL.
Changes from v1:
* Keep the A key in register while running in the kernel.
Daniel Kiss (2):
arm64: Add ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config option
arm64: Conditionally configure PTR_AUTH key of the kernel.
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 33 +++++++----- arch/arm64/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 63 +++++++++++++---------- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 20 +++++-- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 4 ++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 6 +-- 7 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
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2.25.1 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v3 1/2 arm64: Add ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config option
This patch add the ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config and deals with the build aspect of it.
Userspace support has no dependency on the toolchain therefore all toolchain checks and build flags are controlled the new config option.
The default config behavior will not be changed.
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 33 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- arch/arm64/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 2 ++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 6 +++--- 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +19 -14
@@ -1474,12 +1474,6 @@ menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features" config ARM64_PTR_AUTH bool "Enable support for pointer authentication" default y - depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC - # Modern compilers insert a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC - # which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1. - depends on LD_IS_LLD || LD_VERSION >= 233010000 || (CC_IS_GCC && GCC_VERSION < 90100) - depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || AS_HAS_CFI_NEGATE_RA_STATE - depends on (!FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS) help Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secret
@@ -1491,13 +1485,6 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH for each process at exec() time, with these keys being context-switched along with the process. - If the compiler supports the -mbranch-protection or - -msign-return-address flag (e.g. GCC 7 or later), then this option - will also cause the kernel itself to be compiled with return address - protection. In this case, and if the target hardware is known to - support pointer authentication, then CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR can be - disabled with minimal loss of protection. - The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it be enabled.
@@ -1508,6 +1495,24 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH but with the feature disabled. On such a system, this option should not be selected. +config ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL + bool "Use pointer authentication for kernel" + default y + depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH + depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC + # Modern compilers insert a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC + # which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1. + depends on LD_IS_LLD || LD_VERSION >= 233010000 || (CC_IS_GCC && GCC_VERSION < 90100) + depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || AS_HAS_CFI_NEGATE_RA_STATE + depends on (!FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS) + help + If the compiler supports the -mbranch-protection or + -msign-return-address flag (e.g. GCC 7 or later), then this option + will cause the kernel itself to be compiled with return address + protection. In this case, and if the target hardware is known to + support pointer authentication, then CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR can be + disabled with minimal loss of protection. + This feature works with FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER option only if DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS is enabled.
@@ -1599,7 +1604,7 @@ config ARM64_BTI_KERNEL bool "Use Branch Target Identification for kernel" default y depends on ARM64_BTI - depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH + depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL depends on CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET_BTI # https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=94697 depends on !CC_IS_GCC || GCC_VERSION >= 100100
arch/arm64/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ endif # off, this will be overridden if we are using branch protection. branch-prot-flags-y += $(call cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none) -ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) +ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL),y) branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all # We enable additional protection for leaf functions as there is some # narrow potential for ROP protection benefits and no substantial
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +2 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ int main(void) DEFINE(THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.cpu_context));#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_USER, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_user)); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_kernel));#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +3 -3
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ void lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT(void)#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 static noinline void change_pac_parameters(void) { -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH )) { +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL )) {/* Reset the keys of current task */ ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (current);ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel (current);
@@ -460,8 +460,8 @@ noinline void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC(void)#define CORRUPT_PAC_ITERATE 10int i; -if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH )) -pr_err ("FAIL: kernel not built with CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH\n" ); +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL )) +pr_err ("FAIL: kernel not built with CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL\n" );if (!system_supports_address_auth ()) {pr_err ("FAIL: CPU lacks pointer authentication feature\n" );
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2.25.1 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] arm64: Add ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config option
Quoted 8 lines · Daniel Kiss
This patch add the
ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNELconfig and deals with the build aspect of it.Userspace support has no dependency on the toolchain therefore all toolchain checks and build flags are controlled the new config option.
The default config behavior will not be changed.
Quoted 7 lines
Signed-off-by Daniel Kiss <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 33 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- arch/arm64/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 2 ++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 6 +++--- 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Looks good to me:
Will
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PATCH v3 2/2 arm64: Conditionally configure PTR_AUTH key of the kernel.
In reply to Daniel KissIf the kernel is not compiled with CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL=y, then no PACI/AUTI instructions are expected while the kernel is running so the kernel's key will not be used. Write of a system regiters is expensive therefore avoid it not required.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 63 +++++++++++++---------- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 20 +++++-- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 2 + 4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +35 -28
@@ -7,6 +7,38 @@#include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/sysreg.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL + .macro __ptrauth_keys_install_kernel_nosync tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL + add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 + ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA] + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 + .endm + + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel_nosync tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + __ptrauth_keys_install_kernel_nosync \tsk, \tmp1, \tmp2, \tmp3 +alternative_else_nop_endif + .endm + + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH + __ptrauth_keys_install_kernel_nosync \tsk, \tmp1, \tmp2, \tmp3 + isb +alternative_else_nop_endif + .endm + +#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL */ + + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel_nosync tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .endm + + .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 + .endm + +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL */ + #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH/* * thread.keys_user.ap* as offset exceeds the #imm offset range
@@ -39,27 +71,6 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH alternative_else_nop_endif .endm - .macro __ptrauth_keys_install_kernel_nosync tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 - mov \tmp1, #THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL - add \tmp1, \tsk, \tmp1 - ldp \tmp2, \tmp3, [\tmp1, #PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA] - msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \tmp2 - msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \tmp3 - .endm - - .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel_nosync tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 -alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH - __ptrauth_keys_install_kernel_nosync \tsk, \tmp1, \tmp2, \tmp3 -alternative_else_nop_endif - .endm - - .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 -alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH - __ptrauth_keys_install_kernel_nosync \tsk, \tmp1, \tmp2, \tmp3 - isb -alternative_else_nop_endif - .endm - .macro __ptrauth_keys_init_cpu tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 mrs \tmp1, id_aa64isar1_el1 ubfx \tmp1, \tmp1, #ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, #8
@@ -69,7 +80,9 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif mrs \tmp2, sctlr_el1 orr \tmp2, \tmp2, \tmp1 msr sctlr_el1, \tmp2 +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL __ptrauth_keys_install_kernel_nosync \tsk, \tmp1, \tmp2, \tmp3 +#endif isb .Lno_addr_auth\@: .endm
@@ -82,17 +95,11 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif .Lno_addr_auth\@: .endm -#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ +#else /* !CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ .macro ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 .endm - .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel_nosync tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 - .endm - - .macro ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3 - .endm -#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #endif /* __ASM_ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +15 -5
@@ -30,9 +30,11 @@ struct ptrauth_keys_user {struct ptrauth_key apga; }; +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL struct ptrauth_keys_kernel {struct ptrauth_key apia; }; +#endif static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) {
@@ -54,6 +56,8 @@ do { \ write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \ } while (0) +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL + static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ())
@@ -69,6 +73,8 @@ static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kerne isb(); } +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL */ +extern int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (struct task_struct *tsk,unsigned long arg);static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (unsigned long ptr)
@@ -78,17 +84,21 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) \ ptrauth_keys_init_user(&(tsk)->thread.keys_user) -#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk) \ - ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel) -#define ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel (tsk) \ - ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel)#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ #define ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys (tsk, arg) (-EINVAL)#define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac (lr) (lr)#define ptrauth_thread_init_user (tsk) +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL +#define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk) \ + ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel) +#define ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel (tsk) \ + ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(&(tsk)->thread.keys_kernel) +#else #define ptrauth_thread_init_kernel (tsk)#define ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel (tsk) -#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */ +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL */ #endif /* __ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +2 -0
@@ -148,8 +148,10 @@ struct thread_struct {struct debug_info debug;/* debugging */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH struct ptrauth_keys_user keys_user; +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL struct ptrauth_keys_kernel keys_kernel;#endif +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE u64 sctlr_tcf0;u64 gcr_user_excl;
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +2 -0
@@ -150,7 +150,9 @@ int main(void)DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apda));DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APDB , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apdb));DEFINE (PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APGA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user , apga)); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL DEFINE (PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA , offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel , apia)); +#endif BLANK ();#endif return 0 ;
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2.25.1 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Will Deacon
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 2/2] arm64: Conditionally configure PTR_AUTH key of the kernel.
Quoted 4 lines · Daniel Kiss
If the kernel is not compiled with
CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL=y, then no PACI/AUTI instructions are expected while the kernel is running so the kernel's key will not be used. Write of a system regiters is expensive therefore avoid it not required.
What happens if somebody tries to load a module built with PAC into a kernel where CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL=n? Do we reject the module?
I'm not sure how much we care, but I'm a bit worried that it might not go "obviously" wrong.
Quoted 7 lines
Signed-off-by Daniel Kiss <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 63 +++++++++++++---------- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 20 +++++-- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 2 + 4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
[...]
Quoted 26 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +4
-0@@ -30,9 +30,11 @@ struct ptrauth_keys_user {struct ptrauth_key apga; }; +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL struct ptrauth_keys_kernel {struct ptrauth_key apia; }; +#endif static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) {@@ -54,6 +56,8 @@ do { \ write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \ } while (0) +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL + static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ())
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kerne · line 76
Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +1
-0@@ -69,6 +73,8 @@ static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kerne isb(); } +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL */
Can you group this with the struct and avoid having two #ifdef blocks?
Will
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Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] arm64: Conditionally configure PTR_AUTH key of the kernel.
Quoted 12 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 4 lines · Daniel Kiss
If the kernel is not compiled with
CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL=y, then no PACI/AUTI instructions are expected while the kernel is running so the kernel's key will not be used. Write of a system regiters is expensive therefore avoid it not required.What happens if somebody tries to load a module built with PAC into a kernel where
CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL=n? Do we reject the module?
I think it will be loaded, but actually nothing will happen because then the instruction will be just NOPs. Other way will work as well.
Enforcement will be trick because module might sneak the compiler flag in that overrides the kconfig.
Quoted 42 lines
I'm not sure how much we care, but I'm a bit worried that it might not go "obviously" wrong.
Quoted 7 lines
Signed-off-by Daniel Kiss <[email protected]>---
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 63 +++++++++++++---------- arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 20 +++++-- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 2 + 4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)[...]
Quoted 29 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +4
-0@@ -30,9 +30,11 @@ struct ptrauth_keys_user {struct ptrauth_key apga; }; +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL struct ptrauth_keys_kernel {struct ptrauth_key apia; }; +#endif static inline void ptrauth_keys_init_user (struct ptrauth_keys_user *keys) {@@ -54,6 +56,8 @@ do { \ write_sysreg_s(__pki_v.hi, SYS_ ## k ## KEYHI_EL1); \ } while (0) +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL + static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_init_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel *keys) {if (system_supports_address_auth ())@@ -69,6 +73,8 @@ static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kerneisb (); }
Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h static __always_inline void ptrauth_keys_switch_kernel(struct ptrauth_keys_kerne · line 76
Quoted 1 line
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +1
-0+#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL */ Can you group this with the struct and avoid having two #ifdef blocks?
Sure, I'll send a version.
Quoted 2 lines
Will
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