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x86/traps: 'Fix' safety of read_registers() in #DF path

PATCH In review Andrew Cooper 2 participants 10 messages Oct 12, 2020 – Oct 16, 2020

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 x86/traps: 'Fix' safety of read_registers() in #DF path

All interrupts and exceptions pass a struct cpu_user_regs up into C. This contains the legacy vm86 fields from 32bit days, which are beyond the hardware-pushed frame.

Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.

Unfortunately, the #DF handler uses these fields as part of preparing the state dump, and being IST, accesses the adjacent stack frame.

This has been broken forever, but c/s 6001660473 "x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks" repositioned the #DF stack to be adjacent to the guard page, which turns this OoB write into a fatal pagefault:

(XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT ***

  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable  x86_64  debug=y   Tainted:  C   ]----
  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable  x86_64  debug=y   Tainted:  C   ]----
  (XEN) CPU:    4
  (XEN) RIP:    e008:[<ffff82d04031fd4f>] traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1
  (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000050086   CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0)
  ...
  (XEN) Xen call trace:
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d04031fd4f>] R traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d0403207b3>] F do_double_fault+0x3d/0x7e
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d04039acd7>] F double_fault+0x107/0x110
  (XEN)
  (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830236f6d008:
  (XEN)  L4[0x106] = 80000000bfa9b063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L3[0x008] = 0000000236ffd063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L2[0x1b7] = 0000000236ffc063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L1[0x16d] = 8000000236f6d161 ffffffffffffffff

(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 4:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0003]
(XEN) Faulting linear address: ffff830236f6d008
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)

and rendering the main #DF analysis broken.

The proper fix is to delete cpu_user_regs.es and later, so no interrupt/exception path can access OoB, but this needs disentangling from the PV ABI first.

Not-really-fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks")

---
CC: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
CC: Wei Liu <[email protected]>
CC: Julien Grall <[email protected]>

---
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c +7 -1
index da74172776..a684519a20 100644
@@ -770,7 +770,13 @@ void load_system_tables(void)
 	tss->ist[IST_MCE - 1] = stack_top + (1 + IST_MCE) * PAGE_SIZE;
 	tss->ist[IST_NMI - 1] = stack_top + (1 + IST_NMI) * PAGE_SIZE;
 	tss->ist[IST_DB  - 1] = stack_top + (1 + IST_DB)  * PAGE_SIZE;
-	tss->ist[IST_DF  - 1] = stack_top + (1 + IST_DF)  * PAGE_SIZE;
+	/*
+	 * Gross bodge.  The #DF handler uses the vm86 fields of cpu_user_regs
+	 * beyond the hardware frame.  Adjust the stack entrypoint so this
+	 * doesn't manifest as an OoB write which hits the guard page.
+	 */
+	tss->ist[IST_DF  - 1] = stack_top + (1 + IST_DF)  * PAGE_SIZE -
+		(sizeof(struct cpu_user_regs) - offsetof(struct cpu_user_regs, es));
 	tss->bitmap = IOBMP_INVALID_OFFSET;
 
 	/* All other stack pointers poisioned. */
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 40 lines · Andrew Cooper

All interrupts and exceptions pass a struct cpu_user_regs up into C. This contains the legacy vm86 fields from 32bit days, which are beyond the hardware-pushed frame.

Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.

Unfortunately, the #DF handler uses these fields as part of preparing the state dump, and being IST, accesses the adjacent stack frame.

This has been broken forever, but c/s 6001660473 "x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks" repositioned the #DF stack to be adjacent to the guard page, which turns this OoB write into a fatal pagefault:

(XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT ***

  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable  x86_64  debug=y   Tainted:  C   ]----
  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable  x86_64  debug=y   Tainted:  C   ]----
  (XEN) CPU:    4
  (XEN) RIP:    e008:[<ffff82d04031fd4f>] traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1
  (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000050086   CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0)
  ...
  (XEN) Xen call trace:
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d04031fd4f>] R traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d0403207b3>] F do_double_fault+0x3d/0x7e
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d04039acd7>] F double_fault+0x107/0x110
  (XEN)
  (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830236f6d008:
  (XEN)  L4[0x106] = 80000000bfa9b063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L3[0x008] = 0000000236ffd063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L2[0x1b7] = 0000000236ffc063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L1[0x16d] = 8000000236f6d161 ffffffffffffffff

(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 4:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0003]
(XEN) Faulting linear address: ffff830236f6d008
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)

Quoted 8 lines

and rendering the main #DF analysis broken.

The proper fix is to delete cpu_user_regs.es and later, so no interrupt/exception path can access OoB, but this needs disentangling from the PV ABI first.

Not-really-fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks")

Is it perhaps worth also saying explicitly that the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem because show_registers() makes an local copy of the passed in struct? (Doing so also for #DF would apparently be an alternative solution.)

Jan

#2 lore raw
Quoted 47 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 46 lines · Andrew Cooper

All interrupts and exceptions pass a struct cpu_user_regs up into C. This contains the legacy vm86 fields from 32bit days, which are beyond the hardware-pushed frame.

Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.

Unfortunately, the #DF handler uses these fields as part of preparing the state dump, and being IST, accesses the adjacent stack frame.

This has been broken forever, but c/s 6001660473 "x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks" repositioned the #DF stack to be adjacent to the guard page, which turns this OoB write into a fatal pagefault:

(XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT ***

  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable  x86_64  debug=y   Tainted:  C   ]----
  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable  x86_64  debug=y   Tainted:  C   ]----
  (XEN) CPU:    4
  (XEN) RIP:    e008:[<ffff82d04031fd4f>] traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1
  (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000050086   CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0)
  ...
  (XEN) Xen call trace:
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d04031fd4f>] R traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d0403207b3>] F do_double_fault+0x3d/0x7e
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d04039acd7>] F double_fault+0x107/0x110
  (XEN)
  (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830236f6d008:
  (XEN)  L4[0x106] = 80000000bfa9b063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L3[0x008] = 0000000236ffd063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L2[0x1b7] = 0000000236ffc063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L1[0x16d] = 8000000236f6d161 ffffffffffffffff

(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 4:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0003]
(XEN) Faulting linear address: ffff830236f6d008
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)

and rendering the main #DF analysis broken.

The proper fix is to delete cpu_user_regs.es and later, so no interrupt/exception path can access OoB, but this needs disentangling from the PV ABI first.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Not-really-fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks")

Is it perhaps worth also saying explicitly that the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem because show_registers() makes an local copy of the passed in struct? (Doing so also for #DF would apparently be an alternative solution.)

They're not safe.  They merely don't explode.

https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/[email protected]/
was "fixed" by CET-SS turning the guard page from not present to read-only, but the same CET-SS series swapped #DB for #DF when it comes to the single OoB write problem case.

~Andrew

#3 lore raw
Quoted 57 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 47 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 46 lines · Andrew Cooper

All interrupts and exceptions pass a struct cpu_user_regs up into C. This contains the legacy vm86 fields from 32bit days, which are beyond the hardware-pushed frame.

Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.

Unfortunately, the #DF handler uses these fields as part of preparing the state dump, and being IST, accesses the adjacent stack frame.

This has been broken forever, but c/s 6001660473 "x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks" repositioned the #DF stack to be adjacent to the guard page, which turns this OoB write into a fatal pagefault:

(XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT ***

  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable  x86_64  debug=y   Tainted:  C   ]----
  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable  x86_64  debug=y   Tainted:  C   ]----
  (XEN) CPU:    4
  (XEN) RIP:    e008:[<ffff82d04031fd4f>] traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1
  (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000050086   CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0)
  ...
  (XEN) Xen call trace:
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d04031fd4f>] R traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d0403207b3>] F do_double_fault+0x3d/0x7e
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d04039acd7>] F double_fault+0x107/0x110
  (XEN)
  (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830236f6d008:
  (XEN)  L4[0x106] = 80000000bfa9b063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L3[0x008] = 0000000236ffd063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L2[0x1b7] = 0000000236ffc063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L1[0x16d] = 8000000236f6d161 ffffffffffffffff

(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 4:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0003]
(XEN) Faulting linear address: ffff830236f6d008
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)

and rendering the main #DF analysis broken.

The proper fix is to delete cpu_user_regs.es and later, so no interrupt/exception path can access OoB, but this needs disentangling from the PV ABI first.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Not-really-fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks")

Is it perhaps worth also saying explicitly that the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem because show_registers() makes an local copy of the passed in struct? (Doing so also for #DF would apparently be an alternative solution.)

Quoted 6 lines

They're not safe.  They merely don't explode.

https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/[email protected]/
was "fixed" by CET-SS turning the guard page from not present to read-only, but the same CET-SS series swapped #DB for #DF when it comes to the single OoB write problem case.

I see. While indeed I didn't pay attention to the OoB read aspect, me saying "the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem" was still correct, wasn't it? Anyway - not a big deal.

Jan

#4 lore raw
Quoted 59 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 58 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 47 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 46 lines · Andrew Cooper

All interrupts and exceptions pass a struct cpu_user_regs up into C. This contains the legacy vm86 fields from 32bit days, which are beyond the hardware-pushed frame.

Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.

Unfortunately, the #DF handler uses these fields as part of preparing the state dump, and being IST, accesses the adjacent stack frame.

This has been broken forever, but c/s 6001660473 "x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks" repositioned the #DF stack to be adjacent to the guard page, which turns this OoB write into a fatal pagefault:

(XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT ***

  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable  x86_64  debug=y   Tainted:  C   ]----
  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable  x86_64  debug=y   Tainted:  C   ]----
  (XEN) CPU:    4
  (XEN) RIP:    e008:[<ffff82d04031fd4f>] traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1
  (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000050086   CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0)
  ...
  (XEN) Xen call trace:
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d04031fd4f>] R traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d0403207b3>] F do_double_fault+0x3d/0x7e
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d04039acd7>] F double_fault+0x107/0x110
  (XEN)
  (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830236f6d008:
  (XEN)  L4[0x106] = 80000000bfa9b063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L3[0x008] = 0000000236ffd063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L2[0x1b7] = 0000000236ffc063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L1[0x16d] = 8000000236f6d161 ffffffffffffffff

(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 4:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0003]
(XEN) Faulting linear address: ffff830236f6d008
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)

and rendering the main #DF analysis broken.

The proper fix is to delete cpu_user_regs.es and later, so no interrupt/exception path can access OoB, but this needs disentangling from the PV ABI first.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Not-really-fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks")

Is it perhaps worth also saying explicitly that the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem because show_registers() makes an local copy of the passed in struct? (Doing so also for #DF would apparently be an alternative solution.)

They're not safe.  They merely don't explode.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/[email protected]/
was "fixed" by CET-SS turning the guard page from not present to read-only, but the same CET-SS series swapped #DB for #DF when it comes to the single OoB write problem case.

I see. While indeed I didn't pay attention to the OoB read aspect, me saying "the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem" was still correct, wasn't it? Anyway - not a big deal.

I've tweaked the commit message to make this more clear.

--8<---
Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.

show_registers() unconditionally reads these fields, but the content is discarded before use.  This is benign right now, as all parts of the stack are
readable, including the guard pages.

However, read_registers() in the #DF handler writes to these fields as part of
preparing the state dump, and being IST, hits the adjacent stack frame. --8<--

~Andrew

#5 lore raw
Quoted 79 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 59 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 58 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 47 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 46 lines · Andrew Cooper

All interrupts and exceptions pass a struct cpu_user_regs up into C. This contains the legacy vm86 fields from 32bit days, which are beyond the hardware-pushed frame.

Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.

Unfortunately, the #DF handler uses these fields as part of preparing the state dump, and being IST, accesses the adjacent stack frame.

This has been broken forever, but c/s 6001660473 "x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks" repositioned the #DF stack to be adjacent to the guard page, which turns this OoB write into a fatal pagefault:

(XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT ***

  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable  x86_64  debug=y   Tainted:  C   ]----
  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable  x86_64  debug=y   Tainted:  C   ]----
  (XEN) CPU:    4
  (XEN) RIP:    e008:[<ffff82d04031fd4f>] traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1
  (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000050086   CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0)
  ...
  (XEN) Xen call trace:
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d04031fd4f>] R traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d0403207b3>] F do_double_fault+0x3d/0x7e
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d04039acd7>] F double_fault+0x107/0x110
  (XEN)
  (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830236f6d008:
  (XEN)  L4[0x106] = 80000000bfa9b063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L3[0x008] = 0000000236ffd063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L2[0x1b7] = 0000000236ffc063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L1[0x16d] = 8000000236f6d161 ffffffffffffffff

(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 4:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0003]
(XEN) Faulting linear address: ffff830236f6d008
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)

and rendering the main #DF analysis broken.

The proper fix is to delete cpu_user_regs.es and later, so no interrupt/exception path can access OoB, but this needs disentangling from the PV ABI first.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Not-really-fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks")

Is it perhaps worth also saying explicitly that the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem because show_registers() makes an local copy of the passed in struct? (Doing so also for #DF would apparently be an alternative solution.)

They're not safe.  They merely don't explode.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/[email protected]/
was "fixed" by CET-SS turning the guard page from not present to read-only, but the same CET-SS series swapped #DB for #DF when it comes to the single OoB write problem case.

I see. While indeed I didn't pay attention to the OoB read aspect, me saying "the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem" was still correct, wasn't it? Anyway - not a big deal.

I've tweaked the commit message to make this more clear.

--8<---
Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.

show_registers() unconditionally reads these fields, but the content is discarded before use.  This is benign right now, as all parts of the stack are
readable, including the guard pages.

Quoted 4 lines

However, read_registers() in the #DF handler writes to these fields as part of
preparing the state dump, and being IST, hits the adjacent stack frame. --8<--

Thanks, lgtm.

Jan

#6 lore raw
Quoted 79 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 78 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 59 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 58 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 47 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 46 lines · Andrew Cooper

All interrupts and exceptions pass a struct cpu_user_regs up into C. This contains the legacy vm86 fields from 32bit days, which are beyond the hardware-pushed frame.

Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.

Unfortunately, the #DF handler uses these fields as part of preparing the state dump, and being IST, accesses the adjacent stack frame.

This has been broken forever, but c/s 6001660473 "x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks" repositioned the #DF stack to be adjacent to the guard page, which turns this OoB write into a fatal pagefault:

(XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT ***

  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable  x86_64  debug=y   Tainted:  C   ]----
  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable  x86_64  debug=y   Tainted:  C   ]----
  (XEN) CPU:    4
  (XEN) RIP:    e008:[<ffff82d04031fd4f>] traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1
  (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000050086   CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0)
  ...
  (XEN) Xen call trace:
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d04031fd4f>] R traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d0403207b3>] F do_double_fault+0x3d/0x7e
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d04039acd7>] F double_fault+0x107/0x110
  (XEN)
  (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830236f6d008:
  (XEN)  L4[0x106] = 80000000bfa9b063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L3[0x008] = 0000000236ffd063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L2[0x1b7] = 0000000236ffc063 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN)  L1[0x16d] = 8000000236f6d161 ffffffffffffffff

(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 4:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0003]
(XEN) Faulting linear address: ffff830236f6d008
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)

and rendering the main #DF analysis broken.

The proper fix is to delete cpu_user_regs.es and later, so no interrupt/exception path can access OoB, but this needs disentangling from the PV ABI first.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Not-really-fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks")

Is it perhaps worth also saying explicitly that the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem because show_registers() makes an local copy of the passed in struct? (Doing so also for #DF would apparently be an alternative solution.)

They're not safe.  They merely don't explode.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/[email protected]/
was "fixed" by CET-SS turning the guard page from not present to read-only, but the same CET-SS series swapped #DB for #DF when it comes to the single OoB write problem case.

I see. While indeed I didn't pay attention to the OoB read aspect, me saying "the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem" was still correct, wasn't it? Anyway - not a big deal.

I've tweaked the commit message to make this more clear.

--8<---
Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.

show_registers() unconditionally reads these fields, but the content is discarded before use.  This is benign right now, as all parts of the stack are
readable, including the guard pages.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines

However, read_registers() in the #DF handler writes to these fields as part of
preparing the state dump, and being IST, hits the adjacent stack frame. --8<--

Thanks, lgtm.

On a tangent, what are your views WRT backport beyond 4.14?

Back then, it was #DB which was adjacent to the guard frame (which was not present), but it doesn't use show_registers() by default, so I think the problem is mostly hidden.

~Andrew

#7 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Andrew Cooper

On a tangent, what are your views WRT backport beyond 4.14?

Back then, it was #DB which was adjacent to the guard frame (which was not present), but it doesn't use show_registers() by default, so I think the problem is mostly hidden.

I wasn't fully decided yet, but as long as it applies reasonably cleanly I think I'm leaning towards also putting it on 4.13. 4.12 closes anyway once 4.12.4 is out, and I don't think I want to pick up not-really-urgent changes for putting there beyond the few ones that I already have (and that I mean to put in alongside the XSA fixes on Tuesday); I could be talked into it, though.

Jan

#8 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 5 lines · Andrew Cooper

On a tangent, what are your views WRT backport beyond 4.14?

Back then, it was #DB which was adjacent to the guard frame (which was not present), but it doesn't use show_registers() by default, so I think the problem is mostly hidden.

Quoted 7 lines

I wasn't fully decided yet, but as long as it applies reasonably cleanly I think I'm leaning towards also putting it on 4.13. 4.12 closes anyway once 4.12.4 is out, and I don't think I want to pick up not-really-urgent changes for putting there beyond the few ones that I already have (and that I mean to put in alongside the XSA fixes on Tuesday); I could be talked into it, though.

The question I was asking was really "should I try and make an equivalent fix for 4.13 and older".

While the base premise of the fix would be the same, the logic in load_system_tables() is different, and the commit message is completely wrong.

I only encountered this problem with added instrumentation in the #DB handler, which is why I'm questioning the utility of going to this effort.

~Andrew

#9 lore raw
Quoted 15 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 6 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 5 lines · Andrew Cooper

On a tangent, what are your views WRT backport beyond 4.14?

Back then, it was #DB which was adjacent to the guard frame (which was not present), but it doesn't use show_registers() by default, so I think the problem is mostly hidden.

Quoted 7 lines

I wasn't fully decided yet, but as long as it applies reasonably cleanly I think I'm leaning towards also putting it on 4.13. 4.12 closes anyway once 4.12.4 is out, and I don't think I want to pick up not-really-urgent changes for putting there beyond the few ones that I already have (and that I mean to put in alongside the XSA fixes on Tuesday); I could be talked into it, though.

Quoted 2 lines

The question I was asking was really "should I try and make an equivalent fix for 4.13 and older".

Oh, I see.

Quoted 6 lines

While the base premise of the fix would be the same, the logic in load_system_tables() is different, and the commit message is completely wrong.

I only encountered this problem with added instrumentation in the #DB handler, which is why I'm questioning the utility of going to this effort.

Yeah, then probably not worth it.

Jan