x86/traps: 'Fix' safety of read_registers() in #DF path
PATCH 1/1 x86/traps: 'Fix' safety of read_registers() in #DF path
All interrupts and exceptions pass a struct cpu_user_regs up into C. This contains the legacy vm86 fields from 32bit days, which are beyond the hardware-pushed frame.
Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.
Unfortunately, the #DF handler uses these fields as part of preparing the state dump, and being IST, accesses the adjacent stack frame.
This has been broken forever, but c/s 6001660473 "x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks" repositioned the #DF stack to be adjacent to the guard page, which turns this OoB write into a fatal pagefault:
(XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT ***
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) CPU: 4 (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d04031fd4f>] traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000050086 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0) ... (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<ffff82d04031fd4f>] R traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 (XEN) [<ffff82d0403207b3>] F do_double_fault+0x3d/0x7e (XEN) [<ffff82d04039acd7>] F double_fault+0x107/0x110 (XEN) (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830236f6d008: (XEN) L4[0x106] = 80000000bfa9b063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L3[0x008] = 0000000236ffd063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L2[0x1b7] = 0000000236ffc063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L1[0x16d] = 8000000236f6d161 ffffffffffffffff
(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 4:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0003]
(XEN) Faulting linear address: ffff830236f6d008
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)
and rendering the main #DF analysis broken.
The proper fix is to delete cpu_user_regs.es and later, so no interrupt/exception path can access OoB, but this needs disentangling from the PV ABI first.
Not-really-fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks")
---
CC: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
CC: Wei Liu <[email protected]>
CC: Julien Grall <[email protected]>
--- xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c +7 -1
@@ -770,7 +770,13 @@ void load_system_tables(void) tss->ist[IST_MCE -1 ] = stack_top + (1 +IST_MCE ) *PAGE_SIZE ; tss->ist[IST_NMI -1 ] = stack_top + (1 +IST_NMI ) *PAGE_SIZE ; tss->ist[IST_DB -1 ] = stack_top + (1 +IST_DB ) *PAGE_SIZE ; - tss->ist[IST_DF -1 ] = stack_top + (1 +IST_DF ) *PAGE_SIZE ; +/* +* Gross bodge. The #DF handler uses the vm86 fields of cpu_user_regs +* beyond the hardware frame. Adjust the stack entrypoint so this +* doesn't manifest as an OoB write which hits the guard page. +*/ + tss->ist[IST_DF -1 ] = stack_top + (1 +IST_DF ) *PAGE_SIZE - + (sizeof (struct cpu_user_regs ) - offsetof(struct cpu_user_regs , es)); tss->bitmap =IOBMP_INVALID_OFFSET ;/* All other stack pointers poisioned. */
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
Quoted 40 lines · Andrew Cooper
All interrupts and exceptions pass a struct
cpu_user_regsup into C. This contains the legacy vm86 fields from 32bit days, which are beyond the hardware-pushed frame.Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.
Unfortunately, the #DF handler uses these fields as part of preparing the state dump, and being IST, accesses the adjacent stack frame.
This has been broken forever, but c/s 6001660473 "x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks" repositioned the #DF stack to be adjacent to the guard page, which turns this OoB write into a fatal pagefault:
(XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT ***
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) CPU: 4 (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d04031fd4f>] traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000050086 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0) ... (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<ffff82d04031fd4f>] R traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 (XEN) [<ffff82d0403207b3>] F do_double_fault+0x3d/0x7e (XEN) [<ffff82d04039acd7>] F double_fault+0x107/0x110 (XEN) (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830236f6d008: (XEN) L4[0x106] = 80000000bfa9b063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L3[0x008] = 0000000236ffd063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L2[0x1b7] = 0000000236ffc063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L1[0x16d] = 8000000236f6d161 ffffffffffffffff(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 4:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0003]
(XEN) Faulting linear address:ffff830236f6d008
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)
Quoted 8 lines
and rendering the main #DF analysis broken.
The proper fix is to delete cpu_user_regs.es and later, so no interrupt/exception path can access OoB, but this needs disentangling from the PV ABI first.
Not-really-fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks")
Signed-off-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
Is it perhaps worth also saying explicitly that the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem because show_registers() makes an local copy of the passed in struct? (Doing so also for #DF would apparently be an alternative solution.)
Jan
Quoted 47 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 46 lines · Andrew Cooper
All interrupts and exceptions pass a struct
cpu_user_regsup into C. This contains the legacy vm86 fields from 32bit days, which are beyond the hardware-pushed frame.Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.
Unfortunately, the #DF handler uses these fields as part of preparing the state dump, and being IST, accesses the adjacent stack frame.
This has been broken forever, but c/s 6001660473 "x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks" repositioned the #DF stack to be adjacent to the guard page, which turns this OoB write into a fatal pagefault:
(XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT ***
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) CPU: 4 (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d04031fd4f>] traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000050086 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0) ... (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<ffff82d04031fd4f>] R traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 (XEN) [<ffff82d0403207b3>] F do_double_fault+0x3d/0x7e (XEN) [<ffff82d04039acd7>] F double_fault+0x107/0x110 (XEN) (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830236f6d008: (XEN) L4[0x106] = 80000000bfa9b063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L3[0x008] = 0000000236ffd063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L2[0x1b7] = 0000000236ffc063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L1[0x16d] = 8000000236f6d161 ffffffffffffffff(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 4:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0003]
(XEN) Faulting linear address:ffff830236f6d008
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)and rendering the main #DF analysis broken.
The proper fix is to delete cpu_user_regs.es and later, so no interrupt/exception path can access OoB, but this needs disentangling from the PV ABI first.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Not-really-fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks")
Signed-off-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>Is it perhaps worth also saying explicitly that the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem because
show_registers()makes an local copy of the passed in struct? (Doing so also for #DF would apparently be an alternative solution.)
They're not safe. They merely don't explode.
https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/[email protected]/
was "fixed" by CET-SS turning the guard page from not present to read-only, but the same CET-SS series swapped #DB for #DF when it comes to the single OoB write problem case.
~Andrew
Quoted 57 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 47 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 46 lines · Andrew Cooper
All interrupts and exceptions pass a struct
cpu_user_regsup into C. This contains the legacy vm86 fields from 32bit days, which are beyond the hardware-pushed frame.Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.
Unfortunately, the #DF handler uses these fields as part of preparing the state dump, and being IST, accesses the adjacent stack frame.
This has been broken forever, but c/s 6001660473 "x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks" repositioned the #DF stack to be adjacent to the guard page, which turns this OoB write into a fatal pagefault:
(XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT ***
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) CPU: 4 (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d04031fd4f>] traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000050086 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0) ... (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<ffff82d04031fd4f>] R traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 (XEN) [<ffff82d0403207b3>] F do_double_fault+0x3d/0x7e (XEN) [<ffff82d04039acd7>] F double_fault+0x107/0x110 (XEN) (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830236f6d008: (XEN) L4[0x106] = 80000000bfa9b063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L3[0x008] = 0000000236ffd063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L2[0x1b7] = 0000000236ffc063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L1[0x16d] = 8000000236f6d161 ffffffffffffffff(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 4:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0003]
(XEN) Faulting linear address:ffff830236f6d008
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)and rendering the main #DF analysis broken.
The proper fix is to delete cpu_user_regs.es and later, so no interrupt/exception path can access OoB, but this needs disentangling from the PV ABI first.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Not-really-fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks")
Signed-off-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>Is it perhaps worth also saying explicitly that the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem because
show_registers()makes an local copy of the passed in struct? (Doing so also for #DF would apparently be an alternative solution.)
Quoted 6 lines
They're not safe. They merely don't explode.
https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/[email protected]/
was "fixed" by CET-SS turning the guard page from not present to read-only, but the same CET-SS series swapped #DB for #DF when it comes to the single OoB write problem case.
I see. While indeed I didn't pay attention to the OoB read aspect, me saying "the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem" was still correct, wasn't it? Anyway - not a big deal.
Jan
Quoted 59 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 58 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 47 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 46 lines · Andrew Cooper
All interrupts and exceptions pass a struct
cpu_user_regsup into C. This contains the legacy vm86 fields from 32bit days, which are beyond the hardware-pushed frame.Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.
Unfortunately, the #DF handler uses these fields as part of preparing the state dump, and being IST, accesses the adjacent stack frame.
This has been broken forever, but c/s 6001660473 "x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks" repositioned the #DF stack to be adjacent to the guard page, which turns this OoB write into a fatal pagefault:
(XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT ***
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) CPU: 4 (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d04031fd4f>] traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000050086 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0) ... (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<ffff82d04031fd4f>] R traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 (XEN) [<ffff82d0403207b3>] F do_double_fault+0x3d/0x7e (XEN) [<ffff82d04039acd7>] F double_fault+0x107/0x110 (XEN) (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830236f6d008: (XEN) L4[0x106] = 80000000bfa9b063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L3[0x008] = 0000000236ffd063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L2[0x1b7] = 0000000236ffc063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L1[0x16d] = 8000000236f6d161 ffffffffffffffff(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 4:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0003]
(XEN) Faulting linear address:ffff830236f6d008
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)and rendering the main #DF analysis broken.
The proper fix is to delete cpu_user_regs.es and later, so no interrupt/exception path can access OoB, but this needs disentangling from the PV ABI first.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Not-really-fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks")
Signed-off-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>Is it perhaps worth also saying explicitly that the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem because
show_registers()makes an local copy of the passed in struct? (Doing so also for #DF would apparently be an alternative solution.)They're not safe. They merely don't explode.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/[email protected]/
was "fixed" by CET-SS turning the guard page from not present to read-only, but the same CET-SS series swapped #DB for #DF when it comes to the single OoB write problem case.I see. While indeed I didn't pay attention to the OoB read aspect, me saying "the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem" was still correct, wasn't it? Anyway - not a big deal.
I've tweaked the commit message to make this more clear.
--8<---
Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.
show_registers() unconditionally reads these fields, but the content is discarded before use. This is benign right now, as all parts of the stack are
readable, including the guard pages.
However, read_registers() in the #DF handler writes to these fields as part of
preparing the state dump, and being IST, hits the adjacent stack frame. --8<--
~Andrew
Quoted 79 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 59 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 58 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 47 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 46 lines · Andrew Cooper
All interrupts and exceptions pass a struct
cpu_user_regsup into C. This contains the legacy vm86 fields from 32bit days, which are beyond the hardware-pushed frame.Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.
Unfortunately, the #DF handler uses these fields as part of preparing the state dump, and being IST, accesses the adjacent stack frame.
This has been broken forever, but c/s 6001660473 "x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks" repositioned the #DF stack to be adjacent to the guard page, which turns this OoB write into a fatal pagefault:
(XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT ***
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) CPU: 4 (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d04031fd4f>] traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000050086 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0) ... (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<ffff82d04031fd4f>] R traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 (XEN) [<ffff82d0403207b3>] F do_double_fault+0x3d/0x7e (XEN) [<ffff82d04039acd7>] F double_fault+0x107/0x110 (XEN) (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830236f6d008: (XEN) L4[0x106] = 80000000bfa9b063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L3[0x008] = 0000000236ffd063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L2[0x1b7] = 0000000236ffc063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L1[0x16d] = 8000000236f6d161 ffffffffffffffff(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 4:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0003]
(XEN) Faulting linear address:ffff830236f6d008
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)and rendering the main #DF analysis broken.
The proper fix is to delete cpu_user_regs.es and later, so no interrupt/exception path can access OoB, but this needs disentangling from the PV ABI first.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Not-really-fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks")
Signed-off-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>Is it perhaps worth also saying explicitly that the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem because
show_registers()makes an local copy of the passed in struct? (Doing so also for #DF would apparently be an alternative solution.)They're not safe. They merely don't explode.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/[email protected]/
was "fixed" by CET-SS turning the guard page from not present to read-only, but the same CET-SS series swapped #DB for #DF when it comes to the single OoB write problem case.I see. While indeed I didn't pay attention to the OoB read aspect, me saying "the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem" was still correct, wasn't it? Anyway - not a big deal.
I've tweaked the commit message to make this more clear.
--8<---
Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.
show_registers()unconditionally reads these fields, but the content is discarded before use. This is benign right now, as all parts of the stack are
readable, including the guard pages.
Quoted 4 lines
However,
read_registers()in the #DF handler writes to these fields as part of
preparing the state dump, and being IST, hits the adjacent stack frame. --8<--
Thanks, lgtm.
Jan
Quoted 79 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 78 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 59 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 58 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 47 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 46 lines · Andrew Cooper
All interrupts and exceptions pass a struct
cpu_user_regsup into C. This contains the legacy vm86 fields from 32bit days, which are beyond the hardware-pushed frame.Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.
Unfortunately, the #DF handler uses these fields as part of preparing the state dump, and being IST, accesses the adjacent stack frame.
This has been broken forever, but c/s 6001660473 "x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks" repositioned the #DF stack to be adjacent to the guard page, which turns this OoB write into a fatal pagefault:
(XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT ***
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) CPU: 4 (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d04031fd4f>] traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000050086 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0) ... (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<ffff82d04031fd4f>] R traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 (XEN) [<ffff82d0403207b3>] F do_double_fault+0x3d/0x7e (XEN) [<ffff82d04039acd7>] F double_fault+0x107/0x110 (XEN) (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830236f6d008: (XEN) L4[0x106] = 80000000bfa9b063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L3[0x008] = 0000000236ffd063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L2[0x1b7] = 0000000236ffc063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L1[0x16d] = 8000000236f6d161 ffffffffffffffff(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 4:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0003]
(XEN) Faulting linear address:ffff830236f6d008
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)and rendering the main #DF analysis broken.
The proper fix is to delete cpu_user_regs.es and later, so no interrupt/exception path can access OoB, but this needs disentangling from the PV ABI first.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Not-really-fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks")
Signed-off-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>Is it perhaps worth also saying explicitly that the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem because
show_registers()makes an local copy of the passed in struct? (Doing so also for #DF would apparently be an alternative solution.)They're not safe. They merely don't explode.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/[email protected]/
was "fixed" by CET-SS turning the guard page from not present to read-only, but the same CET-SS series swapped #DB for #DF when it comes to the single OoB write problem case.I see. While indeed I didn't pay attention to the OoB read aspect, me saying "the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem" was still correct, wasn't it? Anyway - not a big deal.
I've tweaked the commit message to make this more clear.
--8<---
Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code.
show_registers()unconditionally reads these fields, but the content is discarded before use. This is benign right now, as all parts of the stack are
readable, including the guard pages.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
However,
read_registers()in the #DF handler writes to these fields as part of
preparing the state dump, and being IST, hits the adjacent stack frame. --8<--Thanks, lgtm.
On a tangent, what are your views WRT backport beyond 4.14?
Back then, it was #DB which was adjacent to the guard frame (which was not present), but it doesn't use show_registers() by default, so I think the problem is mostly hidden.
~Andrew
Quoted 5 lines · Andrew Cooper
On a tangent, what are your views WRT backport beyond 4.14?
Back then, it was #DB which was adjacent to the guard frame (which was not present), but it doesn't use
show_registers()by default, so I think the problem is mostly hidden.
I wasn't fully decided yet, but as long as it applies reasonably cleanly I think I'm leaning towards also putting it on 4.13. 4.12 closes anyway once 4.12.4 is out, and I don't think I want to pick up not-really-urgent changes for putting there beyond the few ones that I already have (and that I mean to put in alongside the XSA fixes on Tuesday); I could be talked into it, though.
Jan
Quoted 6 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 5 lines · Andrew Cooper
On a tangent, what are your views WRT backport beyond 4.14?
Back then, it was #DB which was adjacent to the guard frame (which was not present), but it doesn't use
show_registers()by default, so I think the problem is mostly hidden.
Quoted 7 lines
I wasn't fully decided yet, but as long as it applies reasonably cleanly I think I'm leaning towards also putting it on 4.13. 4.12 closes anyway once 4.12.4 is out, and I don't think I want to pick up not-really-urgent changes for putting there beyond the few ones that I already have (and that I mean to put in alongside the XSA fixes on Tuesday); I could be talked into it, though.
The question I was asking was really "should I try and make an equivalent fix for 4.13 and older".
While the base premise of the fix would be the same, the logic in load_system_tables() is different, and the commit message is completely wrong.
I only encountered this problem with added instrumentation in the #DB handler, which is why I'm questioning the utility of going to this effort.
~Andrew
Quoted 15 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 6 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 5 lines · Andrew Cooper
On a tangent, what are your views WRT backport beyond 4.14?
Back then, it was #DB which was adjacent to the guard frame (which was not present), but it doesn't use
show_registers()by default, so I think the problem is mostly hidden.Quoted 7 lines
I wasn't fully decided yet, but as long as it applies reasonably cleanly I think I'm leaning towards also putting it on 4.13. 4.12 closes anyway once 4.12.4 is out, and I don't think I want to pick up not-really-urgent changes for putting there beyond the few ones that I already have (and that I mean to put in alongside the XSA fixes on Tuesday); I could be talked into it, though.
Quoted 2 lines
The question I was asking was really "should I try and make an equivalent fix for 4.13 and older".
Oh, I see.
Quoted 6 lines
While the base premise of the fix would be the same, the logic in
load_system_tables()is different, and the commit message is completely wrong.I only encountered this problem with added instrumentation in the #DB handler, which is why I'm questioning the utility of going to this effort.
Yeah, then probably not worth it.
Jan