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net: 6pack: fix slab-out-of-bounds in decode_data

PATCH Superseded Pavel Skripkin 4 participants 10 messages Aug 13, 2021 – Aug 16, 2021

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 net: 6pack: fix slab-out-of-bounds in decode_data

Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.

Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused decode_data() to be called a lot in sixpack_decode(). Since rx_count_cooked is only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.

Fail log:
==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843
Write of size 1 at addr ffff888087c5544e by task kworker/u4:0/7

CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
...
Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506
 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641
 __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:137
 decode_data.part.0+0x23b/0x270 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843
 decode_data drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:965 [inline]
 sixpack_decode drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:968 [inline]
Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]
Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
---
 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +6 -0
index fcf3af76b6d7..f4ffc2a80ab7 100644
@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 >= sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {
+		pr_err("6pack: cooked buffer overrun, data loss\n");
+		sp->rx_count = 0;
+		return;
+	}
+
 	buf = sp->raw_buf;
 	sp->cooked_buf[sp->rx_count_cooked++] =
 		buf[0] | ((buf[1] << 2) & 0xc0);
Signature · 1 line
2.32.0
#1 lore raw
Quoted 40 lines · Pavel Skripkin

Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.

Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused decode_data() to be called a lot in sixpack_decode(). Since rx_count_cooked is only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.

Fail log:
==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843
Write of size 1 at addr ffff888087c5544e by task kworker/u4:0/7

CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
...
Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506
 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641
 __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:137
 decode_data.part.0+0x23b/0x270 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843
 decode_data drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:965 [inline]
 sixpack_decode drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:968 [inline]
Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]
Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
---
 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +0 -0
index fcf3af76b6d7..f4ffc2a80ab7 100644

drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte) · line 830

Quoted 4 lines
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +1 -0
@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 >= sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {

It should be + 2 instead of + 3.

We write three bytes. idx, idx + 1, idx + 2. Otherwise, good fix!

regards,
dan carpenter

#2 lore raw
Quoted 44 lines · Dan Carpenter
Quoted 43 lines · Pavel Skripkin

Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.

Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused decode_data() to be called a lot in sixpack_decode(). Since rx_count_cooked is only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.

Fail log:
==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843
Write of size 1 at addr ffff888087c5544e by task kworker/u4:0/7

CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
...
Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506
 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641
 __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:137
 decode_data.part.0+0x23b/0x270 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843
 decode_data drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:965 [inline]
 sixpack_decode drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:968 [inline]
Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]
Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
---
 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +0 -0
index fcf3af76b6d7..f4ffc2a80ab7 100644
@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)
 		return;
 	}
 
Quoted 6 lines

drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte) · line 830

Quoted 1 line
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +1 -0
+	if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 >= sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {

It should be + 2 instead of + 3.

We write three bytes. idx, idx + 1, idx + 2. Otherwise, good fix!

Indeed. Will fix in v2, thank you for pointing it out!

With regards,
Pavel Skripkin

#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 net: 6pack: fix slab-out-of-bounds in decode_data

In reply to Dan Carpenter

Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.

Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused decode_data() to be called a lot in sixpack_decode(). Since rx_count_cooked is only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.

Fail log:
==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843
Write of size 1 at addr ffff888087c5544e by task kworker/u4:0/7

CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
...
Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506
 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641
 __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:137
 decode_data.part.0+0x23b/0x270 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843
 decode_data drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:965 [inline]
 sixpack_decode drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:968 [inline]
Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]
Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")

---

Changes in v2:
+ 3 -> +2 (Reported by Dan Carpenter)

---
 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +6 -0
index fcf3af76b6d7..8fe8887d506a 100644
@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 2 >= sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {
+		pr_err("6pack: cooked buffer overrun, data loss\n");
+		sp->rx_count = 0;
+		return;
+	}
+
 	buf = sp->raw_buf;
 	sp->cooked_buf[sp->rx_count_cooked++] =
 		buf[0] | ((buf[1] << 2) & 0xc0);
Signature · 1 line
2.32.0
#6 lore raw
In reply to Pavel Skripkin
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (refs/heads/master):

Hello:

This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (refs/heads/master):

Quoted 10 lines · On Fri, 13 Aug 2021 18:14:33 +0300 you wrote:

Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.

Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused decode_data() to be called a lot in sixpack_decode(). Since rx_count_cooked is only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
- [v2] net: 6pack: fix slab-out-of-bounds in decode_data

    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/19d1532a1876

You are awesome, thank you!
--
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html

#7 lore raw
In reply to Dan Carpenter
Quoted 20 lines · Dan Carpenter
Quoted 19 lines · Pavel Skripkin

Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.

Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused decode_data() to be called a lot in sixpack_decode(). Since rx_count_cooked is only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.

...

drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +0 -0
index fcf3af76b6d7..f4ffc2a80ab7 100644
@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)
 		return;
 	}
 
Quoted 5 lines

drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte) · line 830

Quoted 1 line
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +1 -0
+	if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 >= sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {

It should be + 2 instead of + 3.

We write three bytes. idx, idx + 1, idx + 2. Otherwise, good fix!

I would suggest that the statement be:

	if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {

or even, because it's a buffer overrun test:

	if (sp->rx_count_cooked > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf) - 3) {

This is because if there are three bytes being written, that is the number that should be obvious in the test.

I haven't looked at the surrounding code and there may be some other consideration why the "+ 2 >=" rather than "+ 3 >" (and from the description of "idx, idx + 1, idx + 2", I suspect it's visual consistency), so if that is important, feel free to adjust as required.

Thanks,
Kevin

#8 lore raw
Quoted 27 lines · Kevin Dawson
Quoted 20 lines · Dan Carpenter
Quoted 19 lines · Pavel Skripkin

Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.

Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused decode_data() to be called a lot in sixpack_decode(). Since rx_count_cooked is only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.

...

drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +0 -0
index fcf3af76b6d7..f4ffc2a80ab7 100644
@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)
 		return;
 	}
 
Quoted 5 lines

drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte) · line 830

Quoted 1 line
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +1 -0
+	if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 >= sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {

It should be + 2 instead of + 3.

We write three bytes. idx, idx + 1, idx + 2. Otherwise, good fix!

Quoted 8 lines

I would suggest that the statement be:

	if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {

or even, because it's a buffer overrun test:

	if (sp->rx_count_cooked > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf) - 3) {

Hmm, I think, it will be more straightforward for someone not aware about driver details.

@Dan, can I add your Reviewed-by tag to v3 and what do you think about Kevin's suggestion?

Quoted 4 lines

This is because if there are three bytes being written, that is the number that should be obvious in the test.

I haven't looked at the surrounding code and there may be some other consideration why the "+ 2 >=" rather than "+ 3 >" (and from the description of "idx, idx + 1, idx + 2", I suspect it's visual consistency), so if that is important, feel free to adjust as required.

With regards,
Pavel Skripkin

#9 lore raw
Quoted 31 lines · Pavel Skripkin
Quoted 30 lines · Kevin Dawson
Quoted 21 lines · Dan Carpenter
Quoted 9 lines · Pavel Skripkin

Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.

Quoted 1 line

Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused

decode_data() to be called a lot in sixpack_decode(). Since rx_count_cooked is only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.

Review

Quoted 2 lines

...

(quoted diff) +0 -0

b/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c

drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte) · line 829

Quoted 7 lines

index fcf3af76b6d7..f4ffc2a80ab7 100644

drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +0 -0
@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)
 		return;
 	}
 > +	if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 >= sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {

It should be + 2 instead of + 3.

Quoted 1 line

We write three bytes. idx, idx + 1, idx + 2. Otherwise, good fix!

I would suggest that the statement be:

	if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {

or even, because it's a buffer overrun test:

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines
	if (sp->rx_count_cooked > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf) - 3) {

Hmm, I think, it will be more straightforward for someone not aware about driver details.

@Dan, can I add your Reviewed-by tag to v3 and what do you think about Kevin's suggestion?

I don't care. Sure. I'm also fine with leaving it as is. I've been using "idx + 2 >= sizeof()" enough recently that it has become an idiom for me. But that's probably a bias on my part.

I guess "idx + 3 > sizeof()" is probably the most readable. Moving the + 3 to the other side would prevent integer overflows but we're not concerned about that here and no need to over engineer things if it hurts readability.

regards,
dan carpenter