net: 6pack: fix slab-out-of-bounds in decode_data
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 net: 6pack: fix slab-out-of-bounds in decode_data
Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.
Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused decode_data() to be called a lot in sixpack_decode(). Since rx_count_cooked is only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.
Fail log:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 Write of size 1 at addr ffff888087c5544e by task kworker/u4:0/7 CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 ... Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641 __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:137 decode_data.part.0+0x23b/0x270 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 decode_data drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:965 [inline] sixpack_decode drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:968 [inline]
--- drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +6 -0
@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)return ; } +if (sp->rx_count_cooked +3 >=sizeof (sp->cooked_buf)) { +pr_err ("6pack: cooked buffer overrun, data loss\n" ); + sp->rx_count =0 ; +return ; + } + buf = sp->raw_buf; sp->cooked_buf[sp->rx_count_cooked++] = buf[0 ] | ((buf[1 ] <<2 ) &0xc0 );
Signature · 1 line
2.32.0
Quoted 40 lines · Pavel Skripkin
Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in
decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused
decode_data()to be called a lot insixpack_decode(). Sincerx_count_cookedis only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.Fail log:
==================================================================BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 Write of size 1 at addr ffff888087c5544e by task kworker/u4:0/7 CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 ... Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641 __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:137 decode_data.part.0+0x23b/0x270 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 decode_data drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:965 [inline] sixpack_decode drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:968 [inline]Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")Signed-off-by Pavel Skripkin <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +0
-0
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte) · line 830
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +1
-0@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)return ; } +if (sp->rx_count_cooked +3 >=sizeof (sp->cooked_buf)) {
It should be + 2 instead of + 3.
We write three bytes. idx, idx + 1, idx + 2. Otherwise, good fix!
regards,
dan carpenter
Quoted 44 lines · Dan Carpenter
Quoted 43 lines · Pavel Skripkin
Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in
decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused
decode_data()to be called a lot insixpack_decode(). Sincerx_count_cookedis only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.Fail log:
==================================================================BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 Write of size 1 at addr ffff888087c5544e by task kworker/u4:0/7 CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 ... Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641 __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:137 decode_data.part.0+0x23b/0x270 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 decode_data drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:965 [inline] sixpack_decode drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:968 [inline]Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")Signed-off-by Pavel Skripkin <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +0
-0@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)return ; }
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte) · line 830
Quoted 1 line
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +1
-0+if (sp->rx_count_cooked +3 >=sizeof (sp->cooked_buf)) {It should be + 2 instead of + 3.
We write three bytes. idx, idx + 1, idx + 2. Otherwise, good fix!
Indeed. Will fix in v2, thank you for pointing it out!
With regards,
Pavel Skripkin
PATCH v2 1/1 net: 6pack: fix slab-out-of-bounds in decode_data
In reply to Dan CarpenterSyzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.
Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused decode_data() to be called a lot in sixpack_decode(). Since rx_count_cooked is only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.
Fail log:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 Write of size 1 at addr ffff888087c5544e by task kworker/u4:0/7 CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 ... Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641 __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:137 decode_data.part.0+0x23b/0x270 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 decode_data drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:965 [inline] sixpack_decode drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:968 [inline]
---
Changes in v2:
+ 3 -> +2 (Reported by Dan Carpenter)
--- drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +6 -0
@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)return ; } +if (sp->rx_count_cooked +2 >=sizeof (sp->cooked_buf)) { +pr_err ("6pack: cooked buffer overrun, data loss\n" ); + sp->rx_count =0 ; +return ; + } + buf = sp->raw_buf; sp->cooked_buf[sp->rx_count_cooked++] = buf[0 ] | ((buf[1 ] <<2 ) &0xc0 );
Signature · 1 line
2.32.0
Quoted 4 lines · Dan Carpenter
Great!
Reviewed-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Thank you, Dan!
With regards,
Pavel Skripkin
Quoted 20 lines · Dan Carpenter
Quoted 19 lines · Pavel Skripkin
Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in
decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused
decode_data()to be called a lot insixpack_decode(). Sincerx_count_cookedis only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun....
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +0
-0@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)return ; }
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte) · line 830
Quoted 1 line
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +1
-0+if (sp->rx_count_cooked +3 >=sizeof (sp->cooked_buf)) {It should be + 2 instead of + 3.
We write three bytes. idx, idx + 1, idx + 2. Otherwise, good fix!
I would suggest that the statement be:
if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {or even, because it's a buffer overrun test:
if (sp->rx_count_cooked > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf) - 3) {This is because if there are three bytes being written, that is the number that should be obvious in the test.
I haven't looked at the surrounding code and there may be some other consideration why the "+ 2 >=" rather than "+ 3 >" (and from the description of "idx, idx + 1, idx + 2", I suspect it's visual consistency), so if that is important, feel free to adjust as required.
Thanks,
Kevin
Quoted 27 lines · Kevin Dawson
Quoted 20 lines · Dan Carpenter
Quoted 19 lines · Pavel Skripkin
Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in
decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused
decode_data()to be called a lot insixpack_decode(). Sincerx_count_cookedis only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun....
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +0
-0@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)return ; }Quoted 5 lines
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte) · line 830
Quoted 1 line
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +1
-0+if (sp->rx_count_cooked +3 >=sizeof (sp->cooked_buf)) {It should be + 2 instead of + 3.
We write three bytes. idx, idx + 1, idx + 2. Otherwise, good fix!
Quoted 8 lines
I would suggest that the statement be:
if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {or even, because it's a buffer overrun test:
if (sp->rx_count_cooked > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf) - 3) {
Hmm, I think, it will be more straightforward for someone not aware about driver details.
@Dan, can I add your Reviewed-by tag to v3 and what do you think about Kevin's suggestion?
Quoted 4 lines
This is because if there are three bytes being written, that is the number that should be obvious in the test.
I haven't looked at the surrounding code and there may be some other consideration why the "+ 2 >=" rather than "+ 3 >" (and from the description of "idx, idx + 1, idx + 2", I suspect it's visual consistency), so if that is important, feel free to adjust as required.
With regards,
Pavel Skripkin
Quoted 31 lines · Pavel Skripkin
Quoted 30 lines · Kevin Dawson
Quoted 21 lines · Dan Carpenter
Quoted 9 lines · Pavel Skripkin
Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in
decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.Quoted 1 line
Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused
decode_data()to be called a lot insixpack_decode(). Sincerx_count_cookedis only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.Review
Quoted 2 lines
...
(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.cdrivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte) · line 829
Quoted 7 lines
index
fcf3af76b6d7..f4ffc2a80ab7100644drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +0
-0@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)return ; } > + if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 >= sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {It should be + 2 instead of + 3.
Quoted 1 line
We write three bytes. idx, idx + 1, idx + 2. Otherwise, good fix!
I would suggest that the statement be:
if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {or even, because it's a buffer overrun test:
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines
if (sp->rx_count_cooked > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf) - 3) {Hmm, I think, it will be more straightforward for someone not aware about driver details.
@Dan, can I add your Reviewed-by tag to v3 and what do you think about Kevin's suggestion?
I don't care. Sure. I'm also fine with leaving it as is. I've been using "idx + 2 >= sizeof()" enough recently that it has become an idiom for me. But that's probably a bias on my part.
I guess "idx + 3 > sizeof()" is probably the most readable. Moving the + 3 to the other side would prevent integer overflows but we're not concerned about that here and no need to over engineer things if it hurts readability.
regards,
dan carpenter
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (refs/heads/master):
Hello:
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (refs/heads/master):
Quoted 10 lines · On Fri, 13 Aug 2021 18:14:33 +0300 you wrote:
Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in
decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused
decode_data()to be called a lot insixpack_decode(). Sincerx_count_cookedis only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [v2] net: 6pack: fix slab-out-of-bounds in decode_data
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/19d1532a1876
You are awesome, thank you!
--
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html