net: 6pack: fix slab-out-of-bounds in decode_data
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 net: 6pack: fix slab-out-of-bounds in decode_data
Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.
Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused decode_data() to be called a lot in sixpack_decode(). Since rx_count_cooked is only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.
Fail log:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 Write of size 1 at addr ffff888087c5544e by task kworker/u4:0/7 CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 ... Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641 __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:137 decode_data.part.0+0x23b/0x270 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 decode_data drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:965 [inline] sixpack_decode drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:968 [inline]
--- drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +6 -0
@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)return ; } +if (sp->rx_count_cooked +3 >=sizeof (sp->cooked_buf)) { +pr_err ("6pack: cooked buffer overrun, data loss\n" ); + sp->rx_count =0 ; +return ; + } + buf = sp->raw_buf; sp->cooked_buf[sp->rx_count_cooked++] = buf[0 ] | ((buf[1 ] <<2 ) &0xc0 );
Signature · 1 line
2.32.0
Quoted 40 lines · Pavel Skripkin
Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in
decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused
decode_data()to be called a lot insixpack_decode(). Sincerx_count_cookedis only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.Fail log:
==================================================================BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 Write of size 1 at addr ffff888087c5544e by task kworker/u4:0/7 CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 ... Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641 __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:137 decode_data.part.0+0x23b/0x270 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 decode_data drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:965 [inline] sixpack_decode drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:968 [inline]Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")Signed-off-by Pavel Skripkin <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +0
-0
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte) · line 830
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +1
-0@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)return ; } +if (sp->rx_count_cooked +3 >=sizeof (sp->cooked_buf)) {
It should be + 2 instead of + 3.
We write three bytes. idx, idx + 1, idx + 2. Otherwise, good fix!
regards,
dan carpenter
Quoted 44 lines · Dan Carpenter
Quoted 43 lines · Pavel Skripkin
Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in
decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused
decode_data()to be called a lot insixpack_decode(). Sincerx_count_cookedis only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.Fail log:
==================================================================BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 Write of size 1 at addr ffff888087c5544e by task kworker/u4:0/7 CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 ... Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641 __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:137 decode_data.part.0+0x23b/0x270 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 decode_data drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:965 [inline] sixpack_decode drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:968 [inline]Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")Signed-off-by Pavel Skripkin <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +0
-0@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)return ; }
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte) · line 830
Quoted 1 line
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +1
-0+if (sp->rx_count_cooked +3 >=sizeof (sp->cooked_buf)) {It should be + 2 instead of + 3.
We write three bytes. idx, idx + 1, idx + 2. Otherwise, good fix!
Indeed. Will fix in v2, thank you for pointing it out!
With regards,
Pavel Skripkin
PATCH v2 1/1 net: 6pack: fix slab-out-of-bounds in decode_data
In reply to Dan CarpenterSyzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.
Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused decode_data() to be called a lot in sixpack_decode(). Since rx_count_cooked is only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.
Fail log:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 Write of size 1 at addr ffff888087c5544e by task kworker/u4:0/7 CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 ... Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641 __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:137 decode_data.part.0+0x23b/0x270 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:843 decode_data drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:965 [inline] sixpack_decode drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:968 [inline]
---
Changes in v2:
+ 3 -> +2 (Reported by Dan Carpenter)
--- drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +6 -0
@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)return ; } +if (sp->rx_count_cooked +2 >=sizeof (sp->cooked_buf)) { +pr_err ("6pack: cooked buffer overrun, data loss\n" ); + sp->rx_count =0 ; +return ; + } + buf = sp->raw_buf; sp->cooked_buf[sp->rx_count_cooked++] = buf[0 ] | ((buf[1 ] <<2 ) &0xc0 );
Signature · 1 line
2.32.0
Quoted 4 lines · Dan Carpenter
Great!
Reviewed-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Thank you, Dan!
With regards,
Pavel Skripkin
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (refs/heads/master):
Hello:
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (refs/heads/master):
Quoted 10 lines · On Fri, 13 Aug 2021 18:14:33 +0300 you wrote:
Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in
decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused
decode_data()to be called a lot insixpack_decode(). Sincerx_count_cookedis only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [v2] net: 6pack: fix slab-out-of-bounds in decode_data
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/19d1532a1876
You are awesome, thank you!
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Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
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Quoted 20 lines · Dan Carpenter
Quoted 19 lines · Pavel Skripkin
Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in
decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused
decode_data()to be called a lot insixpack_decode(). Sincerx_count_cookedis only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun....
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +0
-0@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)return ; }
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte) · line 830
Quoted 1 line
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +1
-0+if (sp->rx_count_cooked +3 >=sizeof (sp->cooked_buf)) {It should be + 2 instead of + 3.
We write three bytes. idx, idx + 1, idx + 2. Otherwise, good fix!
I would suggest that the statement be:
if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {or even, because it's a buffer overrun test:
if (sp->rx_count_cooked > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf) - 3) {This is because if there are three bytes being written, that is the number that should be obvious in the test.
I haven't looked at the surrounding code and there may be some other consideration why the "+ 2 >=" rather than "+ 3 >" (and from the description of "idx, idx + 1, idx + 2", I suspect it's visual consistency), so if that is important, feel free to adjust as required.
Thanks,
Kevin
Quoted 27 lines · Kevin Dawson
Quoted 20 lines · Dan Carpenter
Quoted 19 lines · Pavel Skripkin
Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in
decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused
decode_data()to be called a lot insixpack_decode(). Sincerx_count_cookedis only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun....
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +0
-0@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)return ; }Quoted 5 lines
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte) · line 830
Quoted 1 line
drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +1
-0+if (sp->rx_count_cooked +3 >=sizeof (sp->cooked_buf)) {It should be + 2 instead of + 3.
We write three bytes. idx, idx + 1, idx + 2. Otherwise, good fix!
Quoted 8 lines
I would suggest that the statement be:
if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {or even, because it's a buffer overrun test:
if (sp->rx_count_cooked > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf) - 3) {
Hmm, I think, it will be more straightforward for someone not aware about driver details.
@Dan, can I add your Reviewed-by tag to v3 and what do you think about Kevin's suggestion?
Quoted 4 lines
This is because if there are three bytes being written, that is the number that should be obvious in the test.
I haven't looked at the surrounding code and there may be some other consideration why the "+ 2 >=" rather than "+ 3 >" (and from the description of "idx, idx + 1, idx + 2", I suspect it's visual consistency), so if that is important, feel free to adjust as required.
With regards,
Pavel Skripkin
Quoted 31 lines · Pavel Skripkin
Quoted 30 lines · Kevin Dawson
Quoted 21 lines · Dan Carpenter
Quoted 9 lines · Pavel Skripkin
Syzbot reported slab-out-of bounds write in
decode_data(). The problem was in missing validation checks.Quoted 1 line
Syzbot's reproducer generated malicious input, which caused
decode_data()to be called a lot insixpack_decode(). Sincerx_count_cookedis only 400 bytes and noone reported before, that 400 bytes is not enough, let's just check if input is malicious and complain about buffer overrun.Review
Quoted 2 lines
...
(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.cdrivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte) · line 829
Quoted 7 lines
index
fcf3af76b6d7..f4ffc2a80ab7100644drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c +0
-0@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static void decode_data(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char inbyte)return ; } > + if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 >= sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {It should be + 2 instead of + 3.
Quoted 1 line
We write three bytes. idx, idx + 1, idx + 2. Otherwise, good fix!
I would suggest that the statement be:
if (sp->rx_count_cooked + 3 > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf)) {or even, because it's a buffer overrun test:
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines
if (sp->rx_count_cooked > sizeof(sp->cooked_buf) - 3) {Hmm, I think, it will be more straightforward for someone not aware about driver details.
@Dan, can I add your Reviewed-by tag to v3 and what do you think about Kevin's suggestion?
I don't care. Sure. I'm also fine with leaving it as is. I've been using "idx + 2 >= sizeof()" enough recently that it has become an idiom for me. But that's probably a bias on my part.
I guess "idx + 3 > sizeof()" is probably the most readable. Moving the + 3 to the other side would prevent integer overflows but we're not concerned about that here and no need to over engineer things if it hurts readability.
regards,
dan carpenter