Add kernel seccomp support for m68k
Subsystems (6)
v13 cover Add kernel seccomp support for m68k
Previous version of patch 1 did overwrite a syscall return value that was changed by ptrace or seccomp (in regs->d0) by -ENOSYS when skipping a syscall. Branch directly to ret_from_syscall instead of falling through to badsys (which must set -ENOSYS). I'm sure this can be done more elegantly.
Patch 3 used the wrong struct definition for ARCH_REGS - the kernel ptrace code copies 19 registers (from syscall stack and switch_stack, pt_regs only contains the 14 from the syscall stack). Stack overflow ensues.
With these changes, 79 of 94 seccomp_bpf tests now succeed.
Cheers,
Michael
PATCH v13 1/3 m68k/kernel - check syscall_trace_enter() return code on m68k
Check return code of syscall_trace_enter(), and skip syscall if -1. Return code will be left at what had been set by ptrace or seccomp (in regs->d0).
No regression seen in testing with strace on ARAnyM.
--
Changes from v12:
- prevent overwriting the syscall return value after change by ptrace or seccomp on 68020+
Changes from v7:
Al Viro:
- split return code checks from switch to syscall_trace_enter()
Changes from v6:
Geert Uytterhoeven:
- add syscall_trace_enter() return code check for 68000 and coldfire
Changes from v5:
- add comment to explain optimization
Changes from v4:
Andreas Schwab:
- optimize return code test (addql #1,%d0 for cmpil #-1,%d0)
- spelling fix in commit message
Changes from v3:
- change syscall_trace_enter return code test from !=0 to ==-1
--- arch/m68k/68000/entry.S | 2 ++ arch/m68k/coldfire/entry.S | 2 ++ arch/m68k/kernel/entry.S | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
arch/m68k/68000/entry.S +2 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ do_trace: jbsr syscall_trace_enter RESTORE_SWITCH_STACK addql #4,%sp + addql #1,%d0 + jeq ret_from_exception movel %sp@(PT_OFF_ORIG_D0),%d1 movel #-ENOSYS,%d0 cmpl #NR_syscalls,%d1
arch/m68k/coldfire/entry.S +2 -0
@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ ENTRY(system_call) jbsr syscall_trace_enter RESTORE_SWITCH_STACK addql #4,%sp + addql #1,%d0 + jeq ret_from_exception movel %d3,%a0 jbsr %a0@ movel %d0,%sp@(PT_OFF_D0) /* save the return value */
arch/m68k/kernel/entry.S +3 -0
@@ -184,9 +184,12 @@ do_trace_entry: jbsr syscall_trace_enter RESTORE_SWITCH_STACK addql #4,%sp + addql #1,%d0 | optimization for cmpil #-1,%d0 + jeq ret_from_syscall movel %sp@(PT_OFF_ORIG_D0),%d0 cmpl #NR_syscalls,%d0 jcs syscall + jra ret_from_syscall badsys: movel #-ENOSYS,%sp@(PT_OFF_D0) jra ret_from_syscall
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v13 1/3] m68k/kernel - check syscall_trace_enter() return code on m68k
Quoted 6 lines · Michael Schmitz
Check return code of
syscall_trace_enter(), and skip syscall if -1. Return code will be left at what had been set by ptrace or seccomp (inregs->d0).No regression seen in testing with strace on ARAnyM.
Quoted 7 lines
Signed-off-by Michael Schmitz <[email protected]>--
Changes from v12:- prevent overwriting the syscall return value after change by ptrace or seccomp on 68020+
Thanks for the update!
i.e. will queue in renesas-devel for v6.3.
Gr{oetje,eeting}s,
Geert
--
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- [email protected]
In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
-- Linus Torvalds
Re: [PATCH v13 1/3] m68k/kernel - check syscall_trace_enter() return code on m68k
Quoted 12 lines · Geert Uytterhoeven
Quoted 11 lines · Michael Schmitz
Check return code of
syscall_trace_enter(), and skip syscall if -1. Return code will be left at what had been set by ptrace or seccomp (inregs->d0).No regression seen in testing with strace on ARAnyM.
Signed-off-by Michael Schmitz <[email protected]>--
Changes from v12:
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
- prevent overwriting the syscall return value after change by ptrace or seccomp on 68020+
Thanks for the update!
Reviewed-by Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>i.e. will queue in renesas-devel for v6.3.
Doh...
i.e. will queue in the m68k for-v6.3 branch.
Gr{oetje,eeting}s,
Geert
--
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- [email protected]
In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
-- Linus Torvalds
PATCH v13 2/3 m68k: add kernel seccomp support
In reply to Michael SchmitzAdd secure_computing() call to syscall_trace_enter to actually filter system calls.
Add necessary arch Kconfig options, define TIF_SECCOMP trace flag and provide basic seccomp filter support in asm/syscall.h
syscall_get_nr currently uses the syscall nr stored in orig_d0 because we change d0 to a default return code before starting a syscall trace. This may be inconsistent with syscall_rollback copying orig_d0 to d0 (which we never check upon return from trace). We use d0 for the return code from syscall_trace_enter in entry.S currently, and could perhaps expand that to store a new syscall number returned by the seccomp filter before executing the syscall. This clearly needs some discussion.
seccomp_bpf self test on ARAnyM passes 63 out of 89 tests.
--
Changes from v10:
- fix merge conflicts
Changes from v9:
- add test for TIF_SECCOMP bit to call syscall_trace_enter() if seccomp syscall filtering is active
Changes from v6:
Geert Uytterhoeven:
- add syscall_get_error(), syscall_get_return_value(), and syscall_set_arguments() (not needed to compile!)
Changes from v5:
Geert Uytterhoeven:
- correct wrong offset for d1-d5 register copy
- update Documentation/features/seccomp/seccomp-filter/arch-support.txt
add syscall_get_error(), syscall_get_return_value(), syscall_set_arguments()
--- .../seccomp/seccomp-filter/arch-support.txt | 2 +- arch/m68k/Kconfig | 2 + arch/m68k/include/asm/seccomp.h | 11 ++++ arch/m68k/include/asm/syscall.h | 56 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/m68k/include/asm/thread_info.h | 2 + arch/m68k/kernel/entry.S | 3 + arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c | 6 +- 7 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/m68k/include/asm/seccomp.h
Documentation/features/seccomp/seccomp-filter/arch-support.txt +1 -1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ | hexagon: | TODO | | ia64: | TODO | | loongarch: | ok | - | m68k: | TODO | + | m68k: | ok | | microblaze: | TODO | | mips: | ok | | nios2: | TODO |
arch/m68k/Kconfig +2 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ config M68K select GENERIC_CPU_DEVICES select GENERIC_IOMAP select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ASM_MODVERSIONS select HAVE_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE select HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS if !CPU_HAS_NO_UNALIGNED
arch/m68k/include/asm/seccomp.h new file +11 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +#ifndef _ASM_SECCOMP_H +#define _ASM_SECCOMP_H + +#include <asm-generic/seccomp.h> + +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE AUDIT_ARCH_M68K +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR NR_syscalls +#define SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME "m68k" + +#endif /* _ASM_SECCOMP_H */
arch/m68k/include/asm/syscall.h +56 -0
62 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/m68k/include/asm/thread_info.h +2 -0
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME 5/* callback before returning to user */ #define TIF_SIGPENDING 6/* signal pending */ #define TIF_NEED_RESCHED 7/* rescheduling necessary */ +#define TIF_SECCOMP 13/* seccomp syscall filtering active */ #define TIF_DELAYED_TRACE 14/* single step a syscall */ #define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE 15/* syscall trace active */ #define TIF_MEMDIE 16/* is terminating due to OOM killer */
@@ -69,6 +70,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)#define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)#define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED) +#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)#define _TIF_DELAYED_TRACE (1 << TIF_DELAYED_TRACE)#define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)#define _TIF_MEMDIE (1 << TIF_MEMDIE)
arch/m68k/kernel/entry.S +3 -0
@@ -214,6 +214,9 @@ ENTRY(system_call) | syscall trace? tstb %a1@(TINFO_FLAGS+2) jmi do_trace_entry + | seccomp filter active? + btst #5,%a1@(TINFO_FLAGS+2) + bnes do_trace_entry cmpl #NR_syscalls,%d0 jcc badsys syscall:
arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c +5 -1
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@#include <linux/signal.h> #include <linux/regset.h> #include <linux/elf.h> - +#include <linux/seccomp.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -278,6 +278,10 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(void)if (test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE )) ret =ptrace_report_syscall_entry (task_pt_regs (current)); + +if (secure_computing () ==-1 ) +return -1 ; +return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v13 2/3] m68k: add kernel seccomp support
Quoted 15 lines · Michael Schmitz
Add
secure_computing()call tosyscall_trace_enterto actually filter system calls.Add necessary arch
Kconfigoptions, defineTIF_SECCOMPtrace flag and provide basic seccomp filter support inasm/syscall.h
syscall_get_nrcurrently uses the syscall nr stored inorig_d0because we change d0 to a default return code before starting a syscall trace. This may be inconsistent withsyscall_rollbackcopyingorig_d0to d0 (which we never check upon return from trace). We use d0 for the return code fromsyscall_trace_enterinentry.Scurrently, and could perhaps expand that to store a new syscall number returned by the seccomp filter before executing the syscall. This clearly needs some discussion.
Quoted 3 lines
seccomp_bpfself test on ARAnyM passes 63 out of 89 tests.Signed-off-by Michael Schmitz <[email protected]>
Thanks for your patch!
i.e. will queue in the m68k for-v6.3 branch.
arch/m68k/include/asm/syscall.h line 40
Quoted 8 lines
arch/m68k/include/asm/syscall.h +5
-0+static inline void syscall_set_return_value (struct task_struct *task, +struct pt_regs *regs, +int error,long val) +{ + regs->d0 = (long ) error ? error : val;
I'll change this to "(long)error ?: val" while applying.
arch/m68k/include/asm/syscall.h
Quoted 2 lines
arch/m68k/include/asm/syscall.h +2
-0+} +
Gr{oetje,eeting}s,
Geert
--
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- [email protected]
In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
-- Linus Torvalds
Re: [PATCH v13 2/3] m68k: add kernel seccomp support
Quoted 16 lines · Geert Uytterhoeven
Quoted 15 lines · Michael Schmitz
Add
secure_computing()call tosyscall_trace_enterto actually filter system calls.Add necessary arch
Kconfigoptions, defineTIF_SECCOMPtrace flag and provide basic seccomp filter support inasm/syscall.h
syscall_get_nrcurrently uses the syscall nr stored inorig_d0because we change d0 to a default return code before starting a syscall trace. This may be inconsistent withsyscall_rollbackcopyingorig_d0to d0 (which we never check upon return from trace). We use d0 for the return code fromsyscall_trace_enterinentry.Scurrently, and could perhaps expand that to store a new syscall number returned by the seccomp filter before executing the syscall. This clearly needs some discussion.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
seccomp_bpfself test on ARAnyM passes 63 out of 89 tests.Signed-off-by Michael Schmitz <[email protected]>Thanks for your patch!
Reviewed-by Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>i.e. will queue in the m68k for-v6.3 branch.
Very cool to see this finally getting merged.
Adrian
Signature · 4 lines
.''`. John Paul Adrian Glaubitz : :' : Debian Developer `. `' Physicist `- GPG: 62FF 8A75 84E0 2956 9546 0006 7426 3B37 F5B5 F913
Re: [PATCH v13 2/3] m68k: add kernel seccomp support
In reply to Geert UytterhoevenThanks Geert,
Quoted 24 lines · Geert Uytterhoeven
Quoted 15 lines · Michael Schmitz
Add
secure_computing()call tosyscall_trace_enterto actually filter system calls.Add necessary arch
Kconfigoptions, defineTIF_SECCOMPtrace flag and provide basic seccomp filter support inasm/syscall.h
syscall_get_nrcurrently uses the syscall nr stored inorig_d0because we change d0 to a default return code before starting a syscall trace. This may be inconsistent withsyscall_rollbackcopyingorig_d0to d0 (which we never check upon return from trace). We use d0 for the return code fromsyscall_trace_enterinentry.Scurrently, and could perhaps expand that to store a new syscall number returned by the seccomp filter before executing the syscall. This clearly needs some discussion.Quoted 3 lines
seccomp_bpfself test on ARAnyM passes 63 out of 89 tests.Signed-off-by Michael Schmitz <[email protected]>Thanks for your patch!
Reviewed-by Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>i.e. will queue in the m68k for-v6.3 branch.
Quoted 8 lines
arch/m68k/include/asm/syscall.h line 40
Quoted 7 lines
arch/m68k/include/asm/syscall.h +5
-0+static inline void syscall_set_return_value (struct task_struct *task, +struct pt_regs *regs, +int error,long val) +{ + regs->d0 = (long ) error ? error : val;I'll change this to "(long)error ?: val" while applying.
Sure - could you also update the commit message that I forgot to change? It's 81 out of 94 tests now.
Many thanks also to Adrian for his libseccomp port work!
Cheers,
Michael
Quoted 12 lines
arch/m68k/include/asm/syscall.h
Quoted 2 lines
arch/m68k/include/asm/syscall.h +2
-0+} +Gr{oetje,eeting}s,
Geert
--
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- [email protected]In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
-- Linus Torvalds
Geert Uytterhoeven
maintainerRe: [PATCH v13 2/3] m68k: add kernel seccomp support
Hi Michael,
Quoted 34 lines · Michael Schmitz
Quoted 24 lines · Geert Uytterhoeven
Quoted 15 lines · Michael Schmitz
Add
secure_computing()call tosyscall_trace_enterto actually filter system calls.Add necessary arch
Kconfigoptions, defineTIF_SECCOMPtrace flag and provide basic seccomp filter support inasm/syscall.h
syscall_get_nrcurrently uses the syscall nr stored inorig_d0because we change d0 to a default return code before starting a syscall trace. This may be inconsistent withsyscall_rollbackcopyingorig_d0to d0 (which we never check upon return from trace). We use d0 for the return code fromsyscall_trace_enterinentry.Scurrently, and could perhaps expand that to store a new syscall number returned by the seccomp filter before executing the syscall. This clearly needs some discussion.Quoted 3 lines
seccomp_bpfself test on ARAnyM passes 63 out of 89 tests.Signed-off-by Michael Schmitz <[email protected]>Thanks for your patch!
Reviewed-by Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>i.e. will queue in the m68k for-v6.3 branch.
Quoted 8 lines
arch/m68k/include/asm/syscall.h line 40
Quoted 7 lines
arch/m68k/include/asm/syscall.h +5
-0+static inline void syscall_set_return_value (struct task_struct *task, +struct pt_regs *regs, +int error,long val) +{ + regs->d0 = (long ) error ? error : val;I'll change this to "(long)error ?: val" while applying.
Quoted 2 lines
Sure - could you also update the commit message that I forgot to change? It's 81 out of 94 tests now.
Np, will do so (tomorrow).
Gr{oetje,eeting}s,
Geert
--
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- [email protected]
In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
-- Linus Torvalds
PATCH v13 3/3 tools/testing - seccomp test fixes for m68k
In reply to Michael SchmitzAdd m68k seccomp definitions to seccomp_bpf self test code.
Tested on ARAnyM.
--
Changes from v12:
Michael Karcher:
- use correct definition of ARCH_REGS (use of struct pt_regs cause stack overflow on passing register set to user space due to size mismatch, and has some register offsets wrong)
--- tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c +7 -1
@@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ struct seccomp_data {# define __NR_seccomp 337# elif defined(__sh__)# define __NR_seccomp 372 +# elif defined(__mc68000__) +# define __NR_seccomp 380# else # warning "seccomp syscall number unknown for this architecture"# define __NR_seccomp 0xffff
@@ -1838,6 +1840,10 @@ TEST_F(TRACE_poke, getpid_runs_normally)# define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs# define SYSCALL_NUM (_regs) (_regs).regs[3]# define SYSCALL_RET (_regs) (_regs).regs[0] +#elif defined(__mc68000__) +# define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct +# define SYSCALL_NUM (_regs) (_regs).orig_d0 +# define SYSCALL_RET (_regs) (_regs).d0#else # error "Do not know how to find your architecture's registers and syscalls"#endif
@@ -1902,7 +1908,7 @@ const bool ptrace_entry_set_syscall_ret =* Use PTRACE_GETREGS and PTRACE_SETREGS when available. This is useful for * architectures without HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK (e.g. User-mode Linux). */ -#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__mips__) +#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__mips__) || defined(__mc68000__)# define ARCH_GETREGS (_regs) ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, tracee, 0, &(_regs))# define ARCH_SETREGS (_regs) ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, tracee, 0, &(_regs))#else
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v13 3/3] tools/testing - seccomp test fixes for m68k
CC linux-kselftest
Quoted 6 lines · Michael Schmitz
Add m68k seccomp definitions to
seccomp_bpfself test code.Tested on ARAnyM.
Signed-off-by Michael Schmitz <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
--
Changes from v12:Michael Karcher:
- use correct definition ofARCH_REGS(use of structpt_regscause stack overflow on passing register set to user space due to size mismatch, and has some register offsets wrong)
Thanks for the update!
i.e. will queue in the m68k for-v6.3 branch.
Quoted 23 lines
tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c +6
-0@@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ struct seccomp_data {# define __NR_seccomp 337# elif defined(__sh__)# define __NR_seccomp 372 +# elif defined(__mc68000__) +# define __NR_seccomp 380# else # warning "seccomp syscall number unknown for this architecture"# define __NR_seccomp 0xffff@@ -1838,6 +1840,10 @@ TEST_F(TRACE_poke, getpid_runs_normally)# define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs# define SYSCALL_NUM (_regs) (_regs).regs[3]# define SYSCALL_RET (_regs) (_regs).regs[0] +#elif defined(__mc68000__) +# define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct +# define SYSCALL_NUM (_regs) (_regs).orig_d0 +# define SYSCALL_RET (_regs) (_regs).d0#else # error "Do not know how to find your architecture's registers and syscalls"#endif
tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c const bool ptrace_entry_set_syscall_ret = · line 1914
Quoted 8 lines
tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c +1
-1@@ -1902,7 +1908,7 @@ const bool ptrace_entry_set_syscall_ret =* Use PTRACE_GETREGS and PTRACE_SETREGS when available. This is useful for * architectures without HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK (e.g. User-mode Linux). */ -#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__mips__) +#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__mips__) || defined(__mc68000__)# define ARCH_GETREGS (_regs) ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, tracee, 0, &(_regs))# define ARCH_SETREGS (_regs) ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, tracee, 0, &(_regs))#else
Gr{oetje,eeting}s,
Geert
--
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- [email protected]
In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
-- Linus Torvalds
Minor correction - it's 81 tests that succeed. Most of the improvement due to changes to patch 3. Correcting patch 1 only added two more.
The remainder may well be due to my use of an old m68k cross tool chain and old ARAnyM userland. Building the self test against a current system version is certainly recommended, Adrian!
Cheers,
Michael
Am 12.01.2023 um 16:55 schrieb Michael Schmitz:
Quoted 18 lines
Previous version of patch 1 did overwrite a syscall return value that was changed by ptrace or seccomp (in
regs->d0) by-ENOSYSwhen skipping a syscall. Branch directly toret_from_syscallinstead of falling through to badsys (which must set-ENOSYS). I'm sure this can be done more elegantly.Patch 3 used the wrong struct definition for
ARCH_REGS- the kernel ptrace code copies 19 registers (from syscall stack andswitch_stack,pt_regsonly contains the 14 from the syscall stack). Stack overflow ensues.With these changes, 79 of 94
seccomp_bpftests now succeed.Cheers,
Michael
Hi!
Quoted 6 lines · Michael Schmitz
Previous version of patch 1 did overwrite a syscall return value that was changed by ptrace or seccomp (in
regs->d0) by-ENOSYSwhen skipping a syscall. Branch directly toret_from_syscallinstead of falling through to badsys (which must set-ENOSYS). I'm sure this can be done more elegantly.
Quoted 6 lines
Patch 3 used the wrong struct definition for
ARCH_REGS- the kernel ptrace code copies 19 registers (from syscall stack andswitch_stack,pt_regsonly contains the 14 from the syscall stack). Stack overflow ensues.With these changes, 79 of 94
seccomp_bpftests now succeed.
I have also opened a PR now to add m68k support to libseccomp [1].
Unfortunately, libseccomp fails to build after I updated the syscalls.csv file after adding m68k support. It seems that the problem are a number of syscalls that exist on m68k only:
CC libseccomp_la-syscalls.perf.lo
syscalls.perf:152:70: error: '__PNR_getpagesize' undeclared here (not in a function)
152 | getpagesize,119,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,166,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
syscalls.perf:45:69: error: '__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32' undeclared here (not in a function)
45 | atomic_cmpxchg_32,12,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,335,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_cmpxchg_32,SCMP_KV_UNDEF
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
syscalls.perf:44:69: error: '__PNR_atomic_barrier' undeclared here (not in a function)
44 | atomic_barrier,11,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,336,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_atomic_barrier,SCMP_KV_UNDEF
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
make[3]: *** [Makefile:903: libseccomp_la-syscalls.perf.lo] Error 1
make[2]: *** [Makefile:922: all-recursive] Error 1
make[1]: *** [Makefile:524: all-recursive] Error 1
make: *** [Makefile:433: all] Error 2
Adrian
Quoted 1 line
Signature · 4 lines
.''`. John Paul Adrian Glaubitz : :' : Debian Developer `. `' Physicist `- GPG: 62FF 8A75 84E0 2956 9546 0006 7426 3B37 F5B5 F913
Hi Adrian,
Am 14.01.2023 um 06:29 schrieb John Paul Adrian Glaubitz:
Quoted 24 lines
Hi!
Quoted 6 lines · Michael Schmitz
Previous version of patch 1 did overwrite a syscall return value that was changed by ptrace or seccomp (in
regs->d0) by-ENOSYSwhen skipping a syscall. Branch directly toret_from_syscallinstead of falling through to badsys (which must set-ENOSYS). I'm sure this can be done more elegantly.Quoted 6 lines
Patch 3 used the wrong struct definition for
ARCH_REGS- the kernel ptrace code copies 19 registers (from syscall stack andswitch_stack,pt_regsonly contains the 14 from the syscall stack). Stack overflow ensues.With these changes, 79 of 94
seccomp_bpftests now succeed.I have also opened a PR now to add m68k support to libseccomp [1].
Unfortunately, libseccomp fails to build after I updated the syscalls.csv file
after adding m68k support. It seems that the problem are a number of syscalls
that exist on m68k only:
Quoted 5 lines
CC libseccomp_la-syscalls.perf.lo
syscalls.perf:152:70: error: '__PNR_getpagesize' undeclared here (not in
a function)
152 |
getpagesize,119,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,166,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF
That one also exists on alpha and sparc. The other two are indeed unique to m68k.
There must have been other cases of novel syscalls added to libseccomp before?
Cheers,
Michael
Quoted 12 lines
|
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
make[3]: *** [Makefile:903: libseccomp_la-syscalls.perf.lo] Error 1 make[2]: *** [Makefile:922: all-recursive] Error 1 make[1]: *** [Makefile:524: all-recursive] Error 1
make: *** [Makefile:433: all] Error 2Adrian
Quoted 1 line
Hi Michael!
Quoted 12 lines · Michael Schmitz
Quoted 11 lines
Unfortunately, libseccomp fails to build after I updated the syscalls.csv file
after adding m68k support. It seems that the problem are a number of syscalls
that exist on m68k only:CC libseccomp_la-syscalls.perf.lo
syscalls.perf:152:70: error: '__PNR_getpagesize' undeclared here (not in
a function)
152 |
getpagesize,119,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,166,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF
Quoted 3 lines
That one also exists on alpha and sparc. The other two are indeed unique to m68k.
There must have been other cases of novel syscalls added to libseccomp before?
Neither alpha nor sparc are supported by libseccomp, so I think that's not an argument.
Adrian
Signature · 4 lines
.''`. John Paul Adrian Glaubitz : :' : Debian Developer `. `' Physicist `- GPG: 62FF 8A75 84E0 2956 9546 0006 7426 3B37 F5B5 F913
Hi Adrian,
Am 16.01.2023 um 22:12 schrieb John Paul Adrian Glaubitz:
Quoted 16 lines
Hi Michael!
Quoted 13 lines · Michael Schmitz
Quoted 12 lines
Unfortunately, libseccomp fails to build after I updated the syscalls.csv file
after adding m68k support. It seems that the problem are a number of syscalls
that exist on m68k only:CC libseccomp_la-syscalls.perf.lo
syscalls.perf:152:70: error: '__PNR_getpagesize' undeclared here (not in
a function)
152 |
getpagesize,119,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,166,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF,__PNR_getpagesize,SCMP_KV_UNDEF
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
That one also exists on alpha and sparc. The other two are indeed unique to m68k.
There must have been other cases of novel syscalls added to libseccomp before?
Neither alpha nor sparc are supported by libseccomp, so I think that's not an argument.
Explains why getpagesize still is not handled by libseccomp, then.
Now do any of the other architectures recently added to libseccomp have non-standard syscalls? (Trying to work out what commits might hold the secret to adding support for new syscalls...)
Cheers,
Michael
Quoted 3 lines
Adrian
Hi Michael!
Quoted 6 lines · Michael Schmitz
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
That one also exists on alpha and sparc. The other two are indeed unique to m68k.
There must have been other cases of novel syscalls added to libseccomp before?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Neither alpha nor sparc are supported by libseccomp, so I think that's not an argument.
Explains why getpagesize still is not handled by libseccomp, then.
Now do any of the other architectures recently added to libseccomp have non-standard syscalls? (Trying to work out what commits might hold the secret to adding support for new syscalls...)
This interactive arch-wide chart table should be helpful for finding this out:
Adrian
Signature · 4 lines
.''`. John Paul Adrian Glaubitz : :' : Debian Developer `. `' Physicist `- GPG: 62FF 8A75 84E0 2956 9546 0006 7426 3B37 F5B5 F913
Hi Adrian,
Quoted 12 lines · John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
Hi Michael!
Quoted 9 lines · Michael Schmitz
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
That one also exists on alpha and sparc. The other two are indeed unique to m68k.
There must have been other cases of novel syscalls added to libseccomp before?
Neither alpha nor sparc are supported by libseccomp, so I think that's not an argument.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Explains why getpagesize still is not handled by libseccomp, then.
Now do any of the other architectures recently added to libseccomp have non-standard syscalls? (Trying to work out what commits might hold the secret to adding support for new syscalls...)
This interactive arch-wide chart table should be helpful for finding this out:
Look at include/seccomp-syscalls.h - I'd add the missing syscalls after this one:
#define __PNR_memfd_secret -10244
(pseudo syscall numbers for the other architectures)
plus appropriate boilerplate such as this:
#ifdef __NR_memfd_secret
#define __SNR_memfd_secret __NR_memfd_secret #else
#define __SNR_memfd_secret __PNR_memfd_secret #endif
(actual syscall numbers from our arch/m68k/include/uapi/asm/unistd-32.h used).
Just looked at the source, didn't try to build anything so I may be missing something crucial here...
Cheers,
Michael
Quoted 3 lines
Adrian
Hi Michael
Quoted 14 lines · Michael Schmitz
Look at
include/seccomp-syscalls.h- I'd add the missing syscalls after this one:#define
__PNR_memfd_secret-10244(pseudo syscall numbers for the other architectures)
plus appropriate boilerplate such as this:
#ifdef
__NR_memfd_secret
#define__SNR_memfd_secret__NR_memfd_secret
#else
#define__SNR_memfd_secret__PNR_memfd_secret
#endif
Quoted 3 lines
(actual syscall numbers from our
arch/m68k/include/uapi/asm/unistd-32.hused).Just looked at the source, didn't try to build anything so I may be missing something crucial here...
Good catch, thank you! I added the missing definitions and it builds fine now.
Will test against a kernel with your patches now.
Adrian
Signature · 4 lines
.''`. John Paul Adrian Glaubitz : :' : Debian Developer `. `' Physicist `- GPG: 62FF 8A75 84E0 2956 9546 0006 7426 3B37 F5B5 F913
Hi Michael!
Quoted 3 lines · John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
Good catch, thank you! I added the missing definitions and it builds fine now.
Will test against a kernel with your patches now.
libseccomp testsuite now fully passes on m68k, see attached.
@Geert: Any chance you can approve the seccomp patches?
Thanks,
Adrian
Signature · 4 lines
.''`. John Paul Adrian Glaubitz : :' : Debian Developer `. `' Physicist `- GPG: 62FF 8A75 84E0 2956 9546 0006 7426 3B37 F5B5 F913
Hi Adrian,
Quoted 8 lines · John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
Hi Michael!
Quoted 3 lines · John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
Good catch, thank you! I added the missing definitions and it builds fine now.
Will test against a kernel with your patches now.
libseccomp testsuite now fully passes on m68k, see attached.
Great - you haven't had a chance to compile the kernel selftest suite for seccomp though?
I wonder whether some of the 'architecture difference' skipped tests are related to the remaining seccomp_bpf self test faults??
Quoted 2 lines
@Geert: Any chance you can approve the seccomp patches?
Now that we have m68k support for libseccomp, getting this merged is no longer purely academic.
Both Al Viro and Andreas Schwab had provided feedback and improvements - could you perhaps review the latest version again (v13) if that's what is holding this up?
Cheers,
Michael
Quoted 4 lines
Thanks,
Adrian
Hi!
Quoted 3 lines · Michael Schmitz
Quoted 1 line
libseccomp testsuite now fully passes on m68k, see attached.
Great - you haven't had a chance to compile the kernel selftest suite for seccomp though?
I haven't looked into this yet.
Quoted 1 line
I wonder whether some of the 'architecture difference' skipped tests are related to the remaining
seccomp_bpfself test faults??
I actually forgot to enable some tests on m68k in libseccomp.
After my most recent changes, there is a large number of tests being run now without errors.
Quoted 8 lines
https://github.com/glaubitz/libseccomp/tree/m68k
Quoted 1 line
@Geert: Any chance you can approve the seccomp patches?
Now that we have m68k support for libseccomp, getting this merged is no longer purely academic.
Both Al Viro and Andreas Schwab had provided feedback and improvements - could you perhaps review the latest version again (v13) if that's what is holding this up?
@Andreas: Please use my Github branch if you want to test libseccomp as well.
Thanks,
Adrian
Signature · 4 lines
.''`. John Paul Adrian Glaubitz : :' : Debian Developer `. `' Physicist `- GPG: 62FF 8A75 84E0 2956 9546 0006 7426 3B37 F5B5 F913
Hi!
Quoted 6 lines · John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
Quoted 4 lines
Now that we have m68k support for libseccomp, getting this merged is no longer purely academic.
Both Al Viro and Andreas Schwab had provided feedback and improvements - could you perhaps review the latest version again (v13) if that's what is holding this up?
@Andreas: Please use my Github branch if you want to test libseccomp as well.
libseccomp upstream is now waiting for the kernel patches to be merged, see [1].
Adrian
Quoted 1 line
Signature · 4 lines
.''`. John Paul Adrian Glaubitz : :' : Debian Developer `. `' Physicist `- GPG: 62FF 8A75 84E0 2956 9546 0006 7426 3B37 F5B5 F913
Quoted 10 lines · Michael Schmitz
Previous version of patch 1 did overwrite a syscall return value that was changed by ptrace or seccomp (in
regs->d0) by-ENOSYSwhen skipping a syscall. Branch directly toret_from_syscallinstead of falling through to badsys (which must set-ENOSYS). I'm sure this can be done more elegantly.Patch 3 used the wrong struct definition for
ARCH_REGS- the kernel ptrace code copies 19 registers (from syscall stack andswitch_stack,pt_regsonly contains the 14 from the syscall stack). Stack overflow ensues.
Hi,
Thanks for expanding seccomp support to m68k! I happened to see this land in Linus's tree, but it was news to me that it was under development. Please use scripts/get_maintainers.pl in the future:
SECURE COMPUTING
M: Kees Cook <[email protected]> R: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> R: Will Drewry <[email protected]> S: Supported T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git for-next/seccomp F: Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst F: include/linux/seccomp.h F: include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h F: kernel/seccomp.c F: tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h F: tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/* K: \bsecure_computing K: \bTIF_SECCOMP\b
Quoted 1 line
With these changes, 79 of 94
seccomp_bpftests now succeed.
I'm curious which tests are not passing?
Thanks!
-Kees
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Hi Kees,
Am 28.02.2023 um 09:45 schrieb Kees Cook:
Quoted 12 lines · Michael Schmitz
Quoted 10 lines
Previous version of patch 1 did overwrite a syscall return value that was changed by ptrace or seccomp (in
regs->d0) by-ENOSYSwhen skipping a syscall. Branch directly toret_from_syscallinstead of falling through to badsys (which must set-ENOSYS). I'm sure this can be done more elegantly.Patch 3 used the wrong struct definition for
ARCH_REGS- the kernel ptrace code copies 19 registers (from syscall stack andswitch_stack,pt_regsonly contains the 14 from the syscall stack). Stack overflow ensues.
Quoted 5 lines
Hi,
Thanks for expanding seccomp support to m68k! I happened to see this land in Linus's tree, but it was news to me that it was under development. Please use
scripts/get_maintainers.plin the future:
This has been slowly progressed over the past three years, following a nudge from Adrian. Most everything was contained in arch/m68k, and I don't need get_maintainers.pl to find out Geert's address :-) The selftest patches were an afterthought, should have kept you in the loop there.
Quoted 16 lines
SECURE COMPUTING
M: Kees Cook <[email protected]> R: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> R: Will Drewry <[email protected]> S: Supported T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git for-next/seccomp F: Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst F: include/linux/seccomp.h F: include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h F: kernel/seccomp.c F: tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h F: tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/* K: \bsecure_computing K: \bTIF_SECCOMP\b
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
With these changes, 79 of 94
seccomp_bpftests now succeed.I'm curious which tests are not passing?
See attached log - it's actually 81 tests passing in the merged version. The test system isn't up to date with libraries and stuff in any real sense, and I had to disable a few of the tests. Either may well explain a few of the failing tests.
Any hints on how to address the remaining failures welcome, of course.
Adrian did report all libseccomp tests passed (see https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/pull/397), and he may have run the kernel selftests on a current system.
Cheers,
Michael
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks!
-Kees
TAP version 13
1..94
# Starting 94 tests from 8 test cases.
# RUN TRAP.dfl ...
# OK TRAP.dfl
ok 1 TRAP.dfl
# RUN TRAP.ign ...
# OK TRAP.ign
ok 2 TRAP.ign
# RUN TRAP.handler ...
# OK TRAP.handler
ok 3 TRAP.handler
# RUN precedence.allow_ok ...
# OK precedence.allow_ok
ok 4 precedence.allow_ok
# RUN precedence.kill_is_highest ...
# OK precedence.kill_is_highest
ok 5 precedence.kill_is_highest
# RUN precedence.kill_is_highest_in_any_order ...
# OK precedence.kill_is_highest_in_any_order
ok 6 precedence.kill_is_highest_in_any_order
# RUN precedence.trap_is_second ...
# OK precedence.trap_is_second
ok 7 precedence.trap_is_second
# RUN precedence.trap_is_second_in_any_order ...
# OK precedence.trap_is_second_in_any_order
ok 8 precedence.trap_is_second_in_any_order
# RUN precedence.errno_is_third ...
# OK precedence.errno_is_third
ok 9 precedence.errno_is_third
# RUN precedence.errno_is_third_in_any_order ...
# OK precedence.errno_is_third_in_any_order
ok 10 precedence.errno_is_third_in_any_order
# RUN precedence.trace_is_fourth ...
# OK precedence.trace_is_fourth
ok 11 precedence.trace_is_fourth
# RUN precedence.trace_is_fourth_in_any_order ...
# OK precedence.trace_is_fourth_in_any_order
ok 12 precedence.trace_is_fourth_in_any_order
# RUN precedence.log_is_fifth ...
# OK precedence.log_is_fifth
ok 13 precedence.log_is_fifth
# RUN precedence.log_is_fifth_in_any_order ...
# OK precedence.log_is_fifth_in_any_order
ok 14 precedence.log_is_fifth_in_any_order
# RUN TRACE_poke.read_has_side_effects ...
# OK TRACE_poke.read_has_side_effects
ok 15 TRACE_poke.read_has_side_effects
# RUN TRACE_poke.getpid_runs_normally ...
# OK TRACE_poke.getpid_runs_normally
ok 16 TRACE_poke.getpid_runs_normally
# RUN TRACE_syscall.ptrace.negative_ENOSYS ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.ptrace.negative_ENOSYS
ok 17 TRACE_syscall.ptrace.negative_ENOSYS
# RUN TRACE_syscall.ptrace.syscall_allowed ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.ptrace.syscall_allowed
ok 18 TRACE_syscall.ptrace.syscall_allowed
# RUN TRACE_syscall.ptrace.syscall_redirected ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.ptrace.syscall_redirected
ok 19 TRACE_syscall.ptrace.syscall_redirected
# RUN TRACE_syscall.ptrace.syscall_errno ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.ptrace.syscall_errno
ok 20 TRACE_syscall.ptrace.syscall_errno
# RUN TRACE_syscall.ptrace.syscall_faked ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.ptrace.syscall_faked
ok 21 TRACE_syscall.ptrace.syscall_faked
# RUN TRACE_syscall.ptrace.kill_immediate ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.ptrace.kill_immediate
ok 22 TRACE_syscall.ptrace.kill_immediate
# RUN TRACE_syscall.ptrace.skip_after ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.ptrace.skip_after
ok 23 TRACE_syscall.ptrace.skip_after
# RUN TRACE_syscall.ptrace.kill_after ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.ptrace.kill_after
ok 24 TRACE_syscall.ptrace.kill_after
# RUN TRACE_syscall.seccomp.negative_ENOSYS ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.seccomp.negative_ENOSYS
ok 25 TRACE_syscall.seccomp.negative_ENOSYS
# RUN TRACE_syscall.seccomp.syscall_allowed ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.seccomp.syscall_allowed
ok 26 TRACE_syscall.seccomp.syscall_allowed
# RUN TRACE_syscall.seccomp.syscall_redirected ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.seccomp.syscall_redirected
ok 27 TRACE_syscall.seccomp.syscall_redirected
# RUN TRACE_syscall.seccomp.syscall_errno ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.seccomp.syscall_errno
ok 28 TRACE_syscall.seccomp.syscall_errno
# RUN TRACE_syscall.seccomp.syscall_faked ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.seccomp.syscall_faked
ok 29 TRACE_syscall.seccomp.syscall_faked
# RUN TRACE_syscall.seccomp.kill_immediate ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.seccomp.kill_immediate
ok 30 TRACE_syscall.seccomp.kill_immediate
# RUN TRACE_syscall.seccomp.skip_after ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.seccomp.skip_after
ok 31 TRACE_syscall.seccomp.skip_after
# RUN TRACE_syscall.seccomp.kill_after ...
# OK TRACE_syscall.seccomp.kill_after
ok 32 TRACE_syscall.seccomp.kill_after
# RUN TSYNC.siblings_fail_prctl ...
# OK TSYNC.siblings_fail_prctl
ok 33 TSYNC.siblings_fail_prctl
# RUN TSYNC.two_siblings_with_ancestor ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:2710:two_siblings_with_ancestor:Expected 0x0 (0) == (long)status (195935983) # seccomp_bpf.c:2712:two_siblings_with_ancestor:Expected 0x0 (0) == (long)status (195935983) # two_siblings_with_ancestor: Test failed at step #8
# FAIL TSYNC.two_siblings_with_ancestor
not ok 34 TSYNC.two_siblings_with_ancestor
# RUN TSYNC.two_sibling_want_nnp ...
# OK TSYNC.two_sibling_want_nnp
ok 35 TSYNC.two_sibling_want_nnp
# RUN TSYNC.two_siblings_with_no_filter ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:2776:two_siblings_with_no_filter:Expected 0x0 (0) == (long)status (195952365) # seccomp_bpf.c:2778:two_siblings_with_no_filter:Expected 0x0 (0) == (long)status (195952365) # two_siblings_with_no_filter: Test failed at step #7
# FAIL TSYNC.two_siblings_with_no_filter
not ok 36 TSYNC.two_siblings_with_no_filter
# RUN TSYNC.two_siblings_with_one_divergence ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:2808:two_siblings_with_one_divergence:Expected self->sibling[0].system_tid (2733) == ret (0) # seccomp_bpf.c:2809:two_siblings_with_one_divergence:Did not fail on diverged sibling.
# two_siblings_with_one_divergence: Test terminated unexpectedly by signal 9
# FAIL TSYNC.two_siblings_with_one_divergence
not ok 37 TSYNC.two_siblings_with_one_divergence
# RUN TSYNC.two_siblings_with_one_divergence_no_tid_in_err ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:2854:two_siblings_with_one_divergence_no_tid_in_err:Expected ESRCH (3) == errno (0) # seccomp_bpf.c:2855:two_siblings_with_one_divergence_no_tid_in_err:Did not return ESRCH for diverged sibling. # two_siblings_with_one_divergence_no_tid_in_err: Test terminated unexpectedly by signal 9
# FAIL TSYNC.two_siblings_with_one_divergence_no_tid_in_err
not ok 38 TSYNC.two_siblings_with_one_divergence_no_tid_in_err
# RUN TSYNC.two_siblings_not_under_filter ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:2910:two_siblings_not_under_filter:Expected ret (0) == self->sibling[0].system_tid (2743) # seccomp_bpf.c:2911:two_siblings_not_under_filter:Did not fail on diverged sibling.
# two_siblings_not_under_filter: Test terminated unexpectedly by signal 9
# FAIL TSYNC.two_siblings_not_under_filter
not ok 39 TSYNC.two_siblings_not_under_filter
# RUN O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP.setoptions ... # SKIP Kernel does not support PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (missing CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE?) # OK O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP.setoptions ok 40 # SKIP Kernel does not support PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (missing CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE?) # RUN O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP.seize ... # SKIP Kernel does not support PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (missing CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE?) # OK O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP.seize
ok 41 # SKIP Kernel does not support PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (missing CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE?)
# RUN global.kcmp ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:329:kcmp:Expected ret (-1) == 0 (0)
# SKIP Kernel does not support kcmp() (missing CONFIG_KCMP?)
# OK global.kcmp
ok 42 # SKIP Kernel does not support kcmp() (missing CONFIG_KCMP?)
# RUN global.mode_strict_support ...
# OK global.mode_strict_support
ok 43 global.mode_strict_support
# RUN global.mode_strict_cannot_call_prctl ...
# OK global.mode_strict_cannot_call_prctl
ok 44 global.mode_strict_cannot_call_prctl
# RUN global.no_new_privs_support ...
# OK global.no_new_privs_support
ok 45 global.no_new_privs_support
# RUN global.mode_filter_support ...
# OK global.mode_filter_support
ok 46 global.mode_filter_support
# RUN global.filter_size_limits ...
# OK global.filter_size_limits
ok 47 global.filter_size_limits
# RUN global.filter_chain_limits ...
# OK global.filter_chain_limits
ok 48 global.filter_chain_limits
# RUN global.mode_filter_cannot_move_to_strict ...
# OK global.mode_filter_cannot_move_to_strict
ok 49 global.mode_filter_cannot_move_to_strict
# RUN global.mode_filter_get_seccomp ...
# OK global.mode_filter_get_seccomp
ok 50 global.mode_filter_get_seccomp
# RUN global.ALLOW_all ...
# OK global.ALLOW_all
ok 51 global.ALLOW_all
# RUN global.empty_prog ...
# OK global.empty_prog
ok 52 global.empty_prog
# RUN global.log_all ...
# OK global.log_all
ok 53 global.log_all
# RUN global.unknown_ret_is_kill_inside ...
# OK global.unknown_ret_is_kill_inside
ok 54 global.unknown_ret_is_kill_inside
# RUN global.unknown_ret_is_kill_above_allow ...
# OK global.unknown_ret_is_kill_above_allow
ok 55 global.unknown_ret_is_kill_above_allow
# RUN global.KILL_all ...
# OK global.KILL_all
ok 56 global.KILL_all
# RUN global.KILL_one ...
# OK global.KILL_one
ok 57 global.KILL_one
# RUN global.KILL_one_arg_one ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:693:KILL_one_arg_one:Expected 0 (0) == syscall(__NR_times, &fatal_address) (43917)
# KILL_one_arg_one: Test exited normally instead of by signal (code: 3)
# FAIL global.KILL_one_arg_one
not ok 58 global.KILL_one_arg_one
# RUN global.KILL_one_arg_six ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:738:KILL_one_arg_six:Expected MAP_FAILED (4294967295) != map1 (4294967295)
# KILL_one_arg_six: Test exited normally instead of by signal (code: 5)
# FAIL global.KILL_one_arg_six
not ok 59 global.KILL_one_arg_six
# RUN global.KILL_thread ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:848:KILL_thread:Expected 0 (0) != WIFEXITED(status) (0)
# KILL_thread: Test terminated by assertion
# FAIL global.KILL_thread
not ok 60 global.KILL_thread
# RUN global.KILL_process ...
# OK global.KILL_process
ok 61 global.KILL_process
# RUN global.KILL_unknown ...
# OK global.KILL_unknown
ok 62 global.KILL_unknown
# RUN global.arg_out_of_range ...
# OK global.arg_out_of_range
ok 63 global.arg_out_of_range
# RUN global.ERRNO_valid ...
# OK global.ERRNO_valid
ok 64 global.ERRNO_valid
# RUN global.ERRNO_zero ...
# OK global.ERRNO_zero
ok 65 global.ERRNO_zero
# RUN global.ERRNO_capped ...
# OK global.ERRNO_capped
ok 66 global.ERRNO_capped
# RUN global.ERRNO_order ...
# OK global.ERRNO_order
ok 67 global.ERRNO_order
# RUN global.negative_ENOSYS ...
# OK global.negative_ENOSYS
ok 68 global.negative_ENOSYS
# RUN global.seccomp_syscall ...
# OK global.seccomp_syscall
ok 69 global.seccomp_syscall
# RUN global.seccomp_syscall_mode_lock ...
# OK global.seccomp_syscall_mode_lock
ok 70 global.seccomp_syscall_mode_lock
# RUN global.detect_seccomp_filter_flags ...
# OK global.detect_seccomp_filter_flags
ok 71 global.detect_seccomp_filter_flags
# RUN global.TSYNC_first ...
# OK global.TSYNC_first
ok 72 global.TSYNC_first
# RUN global.syscall_restart ...
# OK global.syscall_restart
ok 73 global.syscall_restart
# RUN global.filter_flag_log ...
# OK global.filter_flag_log
ok 74 global.filter_flag_log
# RUN global.get_action_avail ...
# OK global.get_action_avail
ok 75 global.get_action_avail
# RUN global.get_metadata ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:3285:get_metadata:Expected sizeof(md) (16) == ret (-1)
# SKIP Kernel does not support PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_METADATA (missing CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE?)
# OK global.get_metadata
ok 76 # SKIP Kernel does not support PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_METADATA (missing CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE?)
# RUN global.user_notification_basic ...
# OK global.user_notification_basic
ok 77 global.user_notification_basic
# RUN global.user_notification_with_tsync ...
# OK global.user_notification_with_tsync
ok 78 global.user_notification_with_tsync
# RUN global.user_notification_kill_in_middle ...
# OK global.user_notification_kill_in_middle
ok 79 global.user_notification_kill_in_middle
# RUN global.user_notification_signal ...
# OK global.user_notification_signal
ok 80 global.user_notification_signal
# RUN global.user_notification_closed_listener ...
# OK global.user_notification_closed_listener
ok 81 global.user_notification_closed_listener
# RUN global.user_notification_child_pid_ns ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:3620:user_notification_child_pid_ns:Expected unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWPID) (-1) == 0 (0)
# SKIP kernel missing CLONE_NEWUSER support
# OK global.user_notification_child_pid_ns
ok 82 # SKIP kernel missing CLONE_NEWUSER support
# RUN global.user_notification_sibling_pid_ns ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:3688:user_notification_sibling_pid_ns:Expected unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) (-1) == 0 (0)
# user_notification_sibling_pid_ns: Test terminated by assertion
# seccomp_bpf.c:3673:user_notification_sibling_pid_ns:Expected unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) (-1) == 0 (0)
# FAIL global.user_notification_sibling_pid_ns
not ok 83 global.user_notification_sibling_pid_ns
# RUN global.user_notification_fault_recv ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:3731:user_notification_fault_recv:Expected unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) (-1) == 0 (0)
# SKIP kernel missing CLONE_NEWUSER support
# OK global.user_notification_fault_recv
ok 84 # SKIP kernel missing CLONE_NEWUSER support
# RUN global.seccomp_get_notif_sizes ...
# OK global.seccomp_get_notif_sizes
ok 85 global.seccomp_get_notif_sizes
# RUN global.user_notification_continue ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:3805:user_notification_continue:kcmp() syscall missing (test is less accurate)
# OK global.user_notification_continue
ok 86 global.user_notification_continue
# RUN global.user_notification_filter_empty ...
# OK global.user_notification_filter_empty
ok 87 global.user_notification_filter_empty
# RUN global.user_notification_filter_empty_threaded ...
# user_notification_filter_empty_threaded: Test terminated by timeout
# FAIL global.user_notification_filter_empty_threaded
not ok 88 global.user_notification_filter_empty_threaded
# RUN global.user_notification_addfd ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:4020:user_notification_addfd:Expected listener (3) == nextfd++ (1)
# user_notification_addfd: Test terminated by assertion
# FAIL global.user_notification_addfd
not ok 89 global.user_notification_addfd
# RUN global.user_notification_addfd_rlimit ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:4195:user_notification_addfd_rlimit:Expected ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD, &addfd) (4) == -1 (-1) # seccomp_bpf.c:4196:user_notification_addfd_rlimit:Expected errno (0) == EMFILE (24)
# seccomp_bpf.c:4199:user_notification_addfd_rlimit:Expected ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD, &addfd) (5) == -1 (-1) # seccomp_bpf.c:4200:user_notification_addfd_rlimit:Expected errno (0) == EMFILE (24)
# seccomp_bpf.c:4205:user_notification_addfd_rlimit:Expected errno (2) == EBADF (9)
# seccomp_bpf.c:4211:user_notification_addfd_rlimit:Expected ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp) (-1) == 0 (0) # seccomp_bpf.c:4216:user_notification_addfd_rlimit:Expected 0 (0) == WEXITSTATUS(status) (1)
# user_notification_addfd_rlimit: Test failed at step #6
# FAIL global.user_notification_addfd_rlimit
not ok 90 global.user_notification_addfd_rlimit
# RUN global.user_notification_fifo ...
# OK global.user_notification_fifo
ok 91 global.user_notification_fifo
# RUN global.user_notification_wait_killable_pre_notification ...
# seccomp_bpf.c:4290:user_notification_wait_killable_pre_notification:Expected f (0) != NULL (0)
# seccomp_bpf.c:4291:user_notification_wait_killable_pre_notification:Could not open /proc/2902/syscall: No such file or directory # user_notification_wait_killable_pre_notification: Test terminated by assertion
# FAIL global.user_notification_wait_killable_pre_notification
not ok 92 global.user_notification_wait_killable_pre_notification
# RUN global.user_notification_wait_killable ...
# OK global.user_notification_wait_killable
ok 93 global.user_notification_wait_killable
# RUN global.user_notification_wait_killable_fatal ...
# OK global.user_notification_wait_killable_fatal
ok 94 global.user_notification_wait_killable_fatal
# FAILED: 81 / 94 tests passed.
# Totals: pass:75 fail:13 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:6 error:0