let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image
Subsystems (10)
v3 cover let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image
This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could use this keyring as well.
This patch series also let kexec_file_load use platform keyring as fall back if it failed to verify the image against secondary keyring, make it possible to load kernel signed by third part key if third party key is imported in the firmware.
After this patch kexec_file_load will be able to verify a signed PE bzImage using keys in platform keyring.
Tested in a VM with locally signed kernel with pesign and imported the cert to EFI's MokList variable.
Kairui Song (2):
integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
Update from V2:
- Use IS_ENABLED in kexec_file_load to judge if platform_trusted_keys should be used for verifying image as suggested by Mimi Zohar
Update from V1:
- Make platform_trusted_keys static, and update commit message as suggested by Mimi Zohar
- Always check if platform keyring is initialized before use it
Kairui Song (2):
integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 ++++++++++--- certs/system_keyring.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- include/keys/system_keyring.h | 5 +++++ include/linux/verification.h | 1 + security/integrity/digsig.c | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v3 1/2 integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
Currently when loading new kernel via kexec_file_load syscall, it is able to verify the signed PE bzimage against .builtin_trusted_keys or .secondary_trusted_keys. But the image could be signed with third part keys which will be provided by platform or firmware as EFI variable (eg. stored in MokListRT EFI variable), and the keys won't be available in keyrings mentioned above.
After commit 9dc92c45177a ('integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring') a .platform keyring is introduced to store the keys provided by platform or firmware, this keyring is intended to be used for verifying kernel images being loaded by kexec_file_load syscall. And with a few following up commits, keys provided by firmware is being loaded into this keyring, and IMA-appraisal is able to use the keyring to verify kernel images. IMA is the currently the only user of that keyring.
This patch exposes the .platform, and makes it useable for other components. For example, kexec_file_load could use this .platform keyring to verify the kernel image's image.
--- certs/system_keyring.c | 9 +++++++++ include/keys/system_keyring.h | 5 +++++ security/integrity/digsig.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
certs/system_keyring.c +9 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys;#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING static struct key *secondary_trusted_keys;#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING +static struct key *platform_trusted_keys; +#endif extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
@@ -265,4 +268,10 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (verify_pkcs7_signature); +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING +void __init set_platform_trusted_keys (struct key *keyring) { + platform_trusted_keys = keyring; +} +#endif +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
include/keys/system_keyring.h +5 -0
@@ -61,5 +61,10 @@ static inline struct key *get_ima_blacklist_keyring(void) }#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING */ +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + +extern void __init set_platform_trusted_keys (struct key * keyring); + +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING */ #endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
security/integrity/digsig.c +6 -0
@@ -89,6 +89,12 @@ static int __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, key_perm_t perm, keyring[id] =NULL ; } +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING +if (id =INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM ) { +set_platform_trusted_keys (keyring[id]); + } +#endif +return err; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 1/2] integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
Quoted 7 lines · Kairui Song
Currently when loading new kernel via
kexec_file_loadsyscall, it is able to verify the signed PE bzimage against .builtin_trusted_keys or .secondary_trusted_keys. But the image could be signed with third part keys which will be provided by platform or firmware as EFI variable (eg. stored in MokListRT EFI variable), and the keys won't be available in keyrings mentioned above.
Quoted 7 lines
After commit
9dc92c45177a('integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring') a .platform keyring is introduced to store the keys provided by platform or firmware, this keyring is intended to be used for verifying kernel images being loaded bykexec_file_loadsyscall. And with a few following up commits, keys provided by firmware is being loaded into this keyring, and IMA-appraisal is able to use the keyring to verify kernel images. IMA is the currently the only user of that keyring.
How about simply saying, Commit "...." introduced a platform keyring for storing preboot keys, used for verifying the kexec kernel image's signature.
Quoted 3 lines
This patch exposes the .platform, and makes it useable for other components. For example,
kexec_file_loadcould use this .platform keyring to verify the kernel image's image.
The above statement is too generic. Please replace "and makes it useable for other components" with " keyring, making it accessible for verifying a PE signed kernel image".
Quoted 3 lines
Suggested-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kairui Song <[email protected]>
Reviewed/Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Quoted 63 lines
--- certs/system_keyring.c | 9 +++++++++ include/keys/system_keyring.h | 5 +++++ security/integrity/digsig.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)certs/system_keyring.c +9
-0@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys;#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING static struct key *secondary_trusted_keys;#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING +static struct key *platform_trusted_keys; +#endif extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;@@ -265,4 +268,10 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (verify_pkcs7_signature); +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING +void __init set_platform_trusted_keys (struct key *keyring) { + platform_trusted_keys = keyring; +} +#endif +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ include/keys/system_keyring.h +5
-0@@ -61,5 +61,10 @@ static inline struct key *get_ima_blacklist_keyring(void) }#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING */ +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + +extern void __init set_platform_trusted_keys (struct key * keyring); + +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING */ #endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */ security/integrity/digsig.c +6
-0@@ -89,6 +89,12 @@ static int __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, key_perm_t perm, keyring[id] =NULL ; } +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING +if (id =INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM ) { +set_platform_trusted_keys (keyring[id]); + } +#endif +return err; }
PATCH v3 2/2 kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
In reply to Kairui SongWith KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG enabled, kexec_file_load will need to verify the kernel image. The image might be signed with third part keys, and the keys could be stored in firmware, then got loaded into the .platform keyring. Now we have a symbol .platform_trusted_keyring as the reference to .platform keyring, this patch makes use if it and allow kexec_file_load to verify the image against keys in .platform keyring.
This commit adds a VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING similar to previous VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING indicating that verify_pkcs7_signature should verify the signature using platform keyring. Also, decrease the error message log level when verification failed with -ENOKEY, so that if called tried multiple time with different keyring it won't generate extra noises.
--- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 ++++++++++--- certs/system_keyring.c | 13 ++++++++++++- include/linux/verification.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +10 -3
@@ -534,9 +534,16 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data)#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG static int bzImage64_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) { -return verify_pefile_signature (kernel, kernel_len, -VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING , -VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE ); +int ret; + ret =verify_pefile_signature (kernel, kernel_len, +VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING , +VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE ); +if (ret = -ENOKEY &&IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING )) { + ret =verify_pefile_signature (kernel, kernel_len, +VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , +VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE ); + } +return ret; }#endif
certs/system_keyring.c +12 -1
@@ -240,11 +240,22 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,#else trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;#endif + }else if (trusted_keys =VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING ) { +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + trusted_keys = platform_trusted_keys; +#else + trusted_keys =NULL ; +#endif +if (!trusted_keys) { + ret = -ENOKEY ; +pr_devel ("PKCS#7 platform keyring is not available\n" ); + goto error; + } } ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, trusted_keys);if (ret <0 ) {if (ret = -ENOKEY ) -pr_err ("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n" ); +pr_devel ("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n" ); goto error; }
include/linux/verification.h +1 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@* should be used. */ #define VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING ((struct key *)1UL) +#define VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING ((struct key *)2UL)/* * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put.
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 2/2] kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
Quoted 2 lines · Kairui Song
With
KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIGenabled,kexec_file_loadwill need to verify the kernel image.
The kexec_file_load syscall can verify the PE signed kernel image signature, the kernel image signature stored as an xattr, or both.
Anyone booting the system with the "appraise_tcb" policy or with a similar appraise policy rule, wanting to only verifying the PE signed kernel image, will need to include a "dont_appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK" rule in their custom policy.
Quoted 5 lines
The image might be signed with third part keys,
and the keys could be stored in firmware, then got loaded into the .platform keyring. Now we have a symbol .platform_trusted_keyring as the reference to .platform keyring, this patch makes use if it and allowkexec_file_loadto verify the image against keys in .platform keyring.
There's no need to introduce the concept of "third party" or "firmware keys" here. Referring to them as the "preboot" keys, can simplify the above paragraph.
Quoted 9 lines
This commit adds a
VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRINGsimilar to previousVERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRINGindicating thatverify_pkcs7_signatureshould verify the signature using platform keyring. Also, decrease the error message log level when verification failed with-ENOKEY, so that if called tried multiple time with different keyring it won't generate extra noises.Signed-off-by Kairui Song <[email protected]>
Reviewed/Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Quoted 70 lines
--- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 ++++++++++--- certs/system_keyring.c | 13 ++++++++++++- include/linux/verification.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +10
-3@@ -534,9 +534,16 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data)#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG static int bzImage64_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) { -return verify_pefile_signature (kernel, kernel_len, -VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING , -VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE ); +int ret; + ret =verify_pefile_signature (kernel, kernel_len, +VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING , +VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE ); +if (ret = -ENOKEY &&IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING )) { + ret =verify_pefile_signature (kernel, kernel_len, +VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , +VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE ); + } +return ret; }#endif certs/system_keyring.c +12
-1@@ -240,11 +240,22 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,#else trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;#endif + }else if (trusted_keys =VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING ) { +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + trusted_keys = platform_trusted_keys; +#else + trusted_keys =NULL ; +#endif +if (!trusted_keys) { + ret = -ENOKEY ; +pr_devel ("PKCS#7 platform keyring is not available\n" ); + goto error; + } } ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, trusted_keys);if (ret <0 ) {if (ret = -ENOKEY ) -pr_err ("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n" ); +pr_devel ("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n" ); goto error; }include/linux/verification.h +1
-0@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@* should be used. */ #define VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING ((struct key *)1UL) +#define VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING ((struct key *)2UL)/* * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put.
Mimi Zohar
maintainerQuoted 4 lines · Kairui Song
This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in
system_keyringas the reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could use this keyring as well.
Remove "other component could use ...".
Quoted 5 lines
This patch series also let
kexec_file_loaduse platform keyring as fall back if it failed to verify the image against secondary keyring, make it possible to load kernel signed by third part key if third party key is imported in the firmware.
This is the only reason for these patches. Please remove "also".
Quoted 6 lines
After this patch
kexec_file_loadwill be able to verify a signed PE bzImage using keys in platform keyring.Tested in a VM with locally signed kernel with pesign and imported the cert to EFI's MokList variable.
It's taken so long for me to review/test this patch set due to a regression in sanity_check_segment_list(), introduced somewhere between 4.20 and 5.0.0-rc1. The sgement overlap test - "if ((mend > pstart) && (mstart < pend))" - fails, returning a -EINVAL.
Is anyone else seeing this?
Mimi
Quoted 25 lines
Kairui Song (2):
integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verifyUpdate from V2:
- UseIS_ENABLEDinkexec_file_loadto judge ifplatform_trusted_keysshould be used for verifying image as suggested by Mimi ZoharUpdate from V1:
- Makeplatform_trusted_keysstatic, and update commit message as suggested by Mimi Zohar
- Always check if platform keyring is initialized before use itKairui Song (2):
integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verifyarch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 ++++++++++--- certs/system_keyring.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- include/keys/system_keyring.h | 5 +++++ include/linux/verification.h | 1 + security/integrity/digsig.c | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Quoted 22 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 4 lines · Kairui Song
This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in
system_keyringas the reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could use this keyring as well.Remove "other component could use ...".
Quoted 5 lines
This patch series also let
kexec_file_loaduse platform keyring as fall back if it failed to verify the image against secondary keyring, make it possible to load kernel signed by third part key if third party key is imported in the firmware.This is the only reason for these patches. Please remove "also".
Quoted 6 lines
After this patch
kexec_file_loadwill be able to verify a signed PE bzImage using keys in platform keyring.Tested in a VM with locally signed kernel with pesign and imported the cert to EFI's MokList variable.
Quoted 6 lines
It's taken so long for me to review/test this patch set due to a regression in
sanity_check_segment_list(), introduced somewhere between 4.20 and 5.0.0-rc1. The sgement overlap test - "if ((mend > pstart) && (mstart < pend))" - fails, returning a-EINVAL.Is anyone else seeing this?
Mimi, should be this issue? I have sent a fix for that.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Thanks
Dave
Mimi Zohar
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · Dave Young
Quoted 6 lines · Mimi Zohar
It's taken so long for me to review/test this patch set due to a regression in
sanity_check_segment_list(), introduced somewhere between 4.20 and 5.0.0-rc1. The sgement overlap test - "if ((mend > pstart) && (mstart < pend))" - fails, returning a-EINVAL.Is anyone else seeing this?
Mimi, should be this issue? I have sent a fix for that.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Thanks, that resolved the regression.
Mimi
Quoted 28 lines · Dave Young
Quoted 27 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 4 lines · Kairui Song
This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in
system_keyringas the reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could use this keyring as well.Remove "other component could use ...".
Quoted 5 lines
This patch series also let
kexec_file_loaduse platform keyring as fall back if it failed to verify the image against secondary keyring, make it possible to load kernel signed by third part key if third party key is imported in the firmware.This is the only reason for these patches. �Please remove "also".
Quoted 6 lines
After this patch
kexec_file_loadwill be able to verify a signed PE bzImage using keys in platform keyring.Tested in a VM with locally signed kernel with pesign and imported the cert to EFI's MokList variable.
It's taken so long for me to review/test this patch set due to a regression in
sanity_check_segment_list(), introduced somewhere between 4.20 and 5.0.0-rc1. �The sgement overlap test - "if ((mend > pstart) && (mstart < pend))" - fails, returning a-EINVAL.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Is anyone else seeing this?
Mimi, should be this issue? I have sent a fix for that.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Hi, Kairui, I think you should know this while working on this series, It is good to mention the test dependency in cover letter so that reviewers can save time.
BTW, Boris took it in tip already:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/commit/?id�3a110319a4a60aadbd02f6defdebe048f7773b
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks
Dave
Quoted 35 lines · Dave Young
Quoted 28 lines · Dave Young
Quoted 27 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 4 lines · Kairui Song
This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in
system_keyringas the reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could use this keyring as well.Remove "other component could use ...".
Quoted 5 lines
This patch series also let
kexec_file_loaduse platform keyring as fall back if it failed to verify the image against secondary keyring, make it possible to load kernel signed by third part key if third party key is imported in the firmware.This is the only reason for these patches. Please remove "also".
Quoted 6 lines
After this patch
kexec_file_loadwill be able to verify a signed PE bzImage using keys in platform keyring.Tested in a VM with locally signed kernel with pesign and imported the cert to EFI's MokList variable.
It's taken so long for me to review/test this patch set due to a regression in
sanity_check_segment_list(), introduced somewhere between 4.20 and 5.0.0-rc1. The sgement overlap test - "if ((mend > pstart) && (mstart < pend))" - fails, returning a-EINVAL.Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Is anyone else seeing this?
Mimi, should be this issue? I have sent a fix for that.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Quoted 7 lines
Hi, Kairui, I think you should know this while working on this series, It is good to mention the test dependency in cover letter so that reviewers can save time.
BTW, Boris took it in tip already:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/commit/?id�3a110319a4a60aadbd02f6defdebe048f7773b
Hi, thanks for the suggestion, I did apply your patch to avoid the failure. Will add such info next time.
Will send out V4 and update commit message as suggested by Mimi
--
Best Regards,
Kairui Song