virtiofsd: Add notion of unprivileged mode
cover virtiofsd: Add notion of unprivileged mode
Hi,
Daniel Berrange mentioned that having a unpriviliged mode in virtiofsd might be useful for certain use cases. Hence I decided to give it a try.
This is RFC patch series to allow running virtiofsd as unpriviliged user. This is still work in progress. I am posting it to get some early feedback.
These patches are dependent on Stefan's patch series for sandbox=chroot.
https://www.redhat.com/archives/virtio-fs/2020-July/msg00078.html
I can now run virtiofsd as user "test" and also export a directory into a VM running as user test.
This is ideally for the cases where user "test" inside VM will operate on this virtiofs mount point. Any filesystem operations which can't be done with the creds of "test" user on host, will fail.
Thanks
Vivek
Vivek Goyal (5):
virtiofsd: Add notion of unprivileged mode
virtiofsd: create lock/pid file in per user cache dir
virtiofsd: open /proc/self/fd/ in sandbox=NONE mode
virtiofsd: Open lo->source while setting up root in sandbox=NONE mode
virtiofsd: Skip setup_capabilities() in sandbox=NONE mode
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
PATCH 1/5 virtiofsd: Add notion of unprivileged mode
At startup if we are running as non-root user, then internall set unpriviliged mode set. Also add a notion of sandbox NONE and set that internally in unprivileged mode. setting up namespaces and chroot() fails when one does not have privileges.
--- tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +8 -0
@@ -147,11 +147,13 @@ enum {enum {SANDBOX_NAMESPACE ,SANDBOX_CHROOT , +SANDBOX_NONE , };struct lo_data {pthread_mutex_t mutex;int sandbox; +bool unprivileged;int debug;int writeback;int flock;
@@ -3288,6 +3290,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])lo_map_init (&lo.dirp_map);lo_map_init (&lo.fd_map); +if (geteuid () !=0 ) { + lo.unprivileged = true; + lo.sandbox =SANDBOX_NONE ; +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_DEBUG ,"Running in unprivileged passthrough mode.\n" ); + } +if (fuse_parse_cmdline (&args, &opts) !=0 ) { goto err_out1; }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
PATCH 2/5 virtiofsd: create lock/pid file in per user cache dir
In reply to Vivek GoyalRight now we create lock/pid file in /usr/local/var/... and unprivliged user does not have access to create files there.
So create this file in per user cache dir as queried as specified by environment variable XDG_RUNTIME_DIR.
Note: "su $USER" does not update XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and it still points to root user's director. So for now I create a directory /tmp/$UID to save lock/pid file. Dan pointed out that it can be a problem if a malicious app already has /tmp/$UID created. So we probably need to get rid of this.
--- tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +35 -5
@@ -972,13 +972,43 @@ static bool fv_socket_lock(struct fuse_session *se) g_autofree gchar *pidfile = NULL; g_autofree gchar *dir = NULL;Error *local_err =NULL ; +gboolean unprivileged = false; - dir =qemu_get_local_state_pathname ("run/virtiofsd" ); +if (geteuid () !=0 ) + unprivileged = true; -if (g_mkdir_with_parents (dir,S_IRWXU ) <0 ) { -fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"%s: Failed to create directory %s: %s" , - __func__, dir,strerror (errno)); -return false; +/* +* Unpriviliged users don't have access to /usr/local/var. Hence +* store lock/pid file in per user directory. Use environment +* variable XDG_RUNTIME_DIR. +* If one logs into the system as root and then does "su" then +* XDG_RUNTIME_DIR still points to root user directory. In that +* case create a directory for user in /tmp/$UID +*/ +if (unprivileged) { +gchar *user_dir =NULL ; +gboolean create_dir = false; + user_dir =g_strdup (g_get_user_runtime_dir ()); +if (!user_dir ||g_str_has_suffix (user_dir,"/0" )) { + user_dir =g_strdup_printf ("/tmp/%d" ,geteuid ()); + create_dir = true; + } + +if (create_dir &&g_mkdir_with_parents (user_dir,S_IRWXU ) <0 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"%s: Failed to create directory %s: %s" , + __func__, user_dir,strerror (errno)); +g_free (user_dir); +return false; + } + dir =g_strdup (user_dir); +g_free (user_dir); + }else { + dir =qemu_get_local_state_pathname ("run/virtiofsd" ); +if (g_mkdir_with_parents (dir,S_IRWXU ) <0 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"%s: Failed to create directory %s: %s" , + __func__, dir,strerror (errno)); +return false; + } } sk_name =g_strdup (se->vu_socket_path);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
Re: [PATCH 2/5] virtiofsd: create lock/pid file in per user cache dir
Quoted 10 lines · Vivek Goyal
Right now we create lock/pid file in
/usr/local/var/... and unprivliged user does not have access to create files there.So create this file in per user cache dir as queried as specified by environment variable
XDG_RUNTIME_DIR.Note: "su $USER" does not update
XDG_RUNTIME_DIRand it still points to root user's director. So for now I create a directory/tmp/$UIDto save lock/pid file. Dan pointed out that it can be a problem if a malicious app already has/tmp/$UIDcreated. So we probably need to get rid of this.
IMHO use of "su $USER" is simply user error and we don't need to care about workarounds. They will see the startup fail due to EPERM on /run/user/0 directory, and then they'll have to fix their command to use "su - $USER" to setup a clean environment.
Quoted 6 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +6
-0+/* +* Unpriviliged users don't have access to /usr/local/var. Hence +* store lock/pid file in per user directory. Use environment +* variable XDG_RUNTIME_DIR. +* If one logs into the system as root and then does "su" then +* XDG_RUNTIME_DIR still points to root user directory. In that
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c static bool fv_socket_lock(struct fuse_session *se) · line 995
Quoted 10 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +10
-0+* case create a directory for user in /tmp/$UID +*/ +if (unprivileged) { +gchar *user_dir =NULL ; +gboolean create_dir = false; + user_dir =g_strdup (g_get_user_runtime_dir ()); +if (!user_dir ||g_str_has_suffix (user_dir,"/0" )) { + user_dir =g_strdup_printf ("/tmp/%d" ,geteuid ()); + create_dir = true; + }
As above, I don't think we need to have this fallback code to deal with something that is just user error.
Also, g_get_user_runtime_dir() is guaranteed to return non-NULL.
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c static bool fv_socket_lock(struct fuse_session *se) · line 1003
Quoted 8 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +8
-0+ +if (create_dir &&g_mkdir_with_parents (user_dir,S_IRWXU ) <0 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"%s: Failed to create directory %s: %s" , + __func__, user_dir,strerror (errno)); +g_free (user_dir); +return false; + } + dir =g_strdup (user_dir);
Don't we also want to be appending "virtiofsd" to this directory path like we do in the privileged case ?
Quoted 14 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +8
-0+g_free (user_dir); + }else { + dir =qemu_get_local_state_pathname ("run/virtiofsd" ); +if (g_mkdir_with_parents (dir,S_IRWXU ) <0 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"%s: Failed to create directory %s: %s" , + __func__, dir,strerror (errno)); +return false; + } } sk_name =g_strdup (se->vu_socket_path);Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
Regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
Re: [PATCH 2/5] virtiofsd: create lock/pid file in per user cache dir
Quoted 12 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 10 lines · Vivek Goyal
Right now we create lock/pid file in
/usr/local/var/... and unprivliged user does not have access to create files there.So create this file in per user cache dir as queried as specified by environment variable
XDG_RUNTIME_DIR.Note: "su $USER" does not update
XDG_RUNTIME_DIRand it still points to root user's director. So for now I create a directory/tmp/$UIDto save lock/pid file. Dan pointed out that it can be a problem if a malicious app already has/tmp/$UIDcreated. So we probably need to get rid of this.
Quoted 4 lines
IMHO use of "su $USER" is simply user error and we don't need to care about workarounds. They will see the startup fail due to EPERM on
/run/user/0directory, and then they'll have to fix their command to use "su - $USER" to setup a clean environment.
I tried "su - $USER". That clears the old XDG_RUNTIME_DIR but does not set new one. So now we have an empty XDG_RUNTIME_DIR env variable. But good thing is that now g_get_user_runtime_dir() returns "/home/$USER/.cache" and we can store user specific temp files there.
So I agree that I will get rid of all the logic to create /tmp/$USER. "su $USER" will not be a supported path.
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 8 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +6
-0+/* +* Unpriviliged users don't have access to /usr/local/var. Hence +* store lock/pid file in per user directory. Use environment +* variable XDG_RUNTIME_DIR. +* If one logs into the system as root and then does "su" then +* XDG_RUNTIME_DIR still points to root user directory. In that tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c static bool fv_socket_lock(struct fuse_session *se) · line 995
Quoted 10 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +10
-0+* case create a directory for user in /tmp/$UID +*/ +if (unprivileged) { +gchar *user_dir =NULL ; +gboolean create_dir = false; + user_dir =g_strdup (g_get_user_runtime_dir ()); +if (!user_dir ||g_str_has_suffix (user_dir,"/0" )) { + user_dir =g_strdup_printf ("/tmp/%d" ,geteuid ()); + create_dir = true; + }
Quoted 4 lines
As above, I don't think we need to have this fallback code to deal with something that is just user error.
Also,
g_get_user_runtime_dir()is guaranteed to return non-NULL.
Thanks. I will get rid of (!user_dir) case.
Quoted 10 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c static bool fv_socket_lock(struct fuse_session *se) · line 1003
Quoted 9 lines
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +8
-0+ +if (create_dir &&g_mkdir_with_parents (user_dir,S_IRWXU ) <0 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"%s: Failed to create directory %s: %s" , + __func__, user_dir,strerror (errno)); +g_free (user_dir); +return false; + } + dir =g_strdup (user_dir);
Quoted 2 lines
Don't we also want to be appending "virtiofsd" to this directory path like we do in the privileged case ?
Yes. I forgot to append "virtiofsd" dir. Will do.
Thanks
Vivek
Re: [Virtio-fs] [PATCH 2/5] virtiofsd: create lock/pid file in per user cache dir
In reply to Vivek GoyalQuoted 2 lines · Vivek Goyal
Right now we create lock/pid file in
/usr/local/var/... and unprivliged user does not have access to create files there.
Lock files should never be created in /usr, /usr should be considered readonly. Lock files should
always be created in /run or /tmp if /run is not writable. As this PR shows for rootless users XDG_RUNTIME_DIR
should be used.
Quoted 66 lines
So create this file in per user cache dir as queried as specified by environment variable
XDG_RUNTIME_DIR.Note: "su $USER" does not update
XDG_RUNTIME_DIRand it still points to root user's director. So for now I create a directory/tmp/$UIDto save lock/pid file. Dan pointed out that it can be a problem if a malicious app already has/tmp/$UIDcreated. So we probably need to get rid of this.Signed-off-by Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>--- tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c +35
-5@@ -972,13 +972,43 @@ static bool fv_socket_lock(struct fuse_session *se) g_autofree gchar *pidfile = NULL; g_autofree gchar *dir = NULL;Error *local_err =NULL ; +gboolean unprivileged = false; - dir =qemu_get_local_state_pathname ("run/virtiofsd" ); +if (geteuid () !=0 ) + unprivileged = true; -if (g_mkdir_with_parents (dir,S_IRWXU ) <0 ) { -fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"%s: Failed to create directory %s: %s" , - __func__, dir,strerror (errno)); -return false; +/* +* Unpriviliged users don't have access to /usr/local/var. Hence +* store lock/pid file in per user directory. Use environment +* variable XDG_RUNTIME_DIR. +* If one logs into the system as root and then does "su" then +* XDG_RUNTIME_DIR still points to root user directory. In that +* case create a directory for user in /tmp/$UID +*/ +if (unprivileged) { +gchar *user_dir =NULL ; +gboolean create_dir = false; + user_dir =g_strdup (g_get_user_runtime_dir ()); +if (!user_dir ||g_str_has_suffix (user_dir,"/0" )) { + user_dir =g_strdup_printf ("/tmp/%d" ,geteuid ()); + create_dir = true; + } + +if (create_dir &&g_mkdir_with_parents (user_dir,S_IRWXU ) <0 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"%s: Failed to create directory %s: %s" , + __func__, user_dir,strerror (errno)); +g_free (user_dir); +return false; + } + dir =g_strdup (user_dir); +g_free (user_dir); + }else { + dir =qemu_get_local_state_pathname ("run/virtiofsd" ); +if (g_mkdir_with_parents (dir,S_IRWXU ) <0 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"%s: Failed to create directory %s: %s" , + __func__, dir,strerror (errno)); +return false; + } } sk_name =g_strdup (se->vu_socket_path);
PATCH 3/5 virtiofsd: open /proc/self/fd/ in sandbox=NONE mode
In reply to Vivek GoyalWe need /proc/self/fd descriptor even in sandbox=NONE mode.
--- tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +12 -1
@@ -2969,6 +2969,15 @@ static void setup_capabilities(char *modcaps_in)pthread_mutex_unlock (&cap.mutex); } +static void setup_none (struct lo_data *lo) +{ + lo->proc_self_fd =open ("/proc/self/fd" ,O_PATH ); +if (lo->proc_self_fd ==-1 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"open(\"/proc/self/fd\", O_PATH): %m\n" ); +exit (1 ); + } +} +/* * Use chroot as a weaker sandbox for environments where the process is * launched without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
@@ -3014,8 +3023,10 @@ static void setup_sandbox(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se,if (lo->sandbox ==SANDBOX_NAMESPACE ) {setup_namespaces (lo, se);setup_mounts (lo->source); - }else { + }else if (lo->sandbox ==SANDBOX_CHROOT ) {setup_chroot (lo); + }else { +setup_none (lo); }setup_seccomp (enable_syslog);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
PATCH 4/5 virtiofsd: Open lo->source while setting up root in sandbox=NONE mode
In reply to Vivek GoyalIn sandbox=NONE mode, lo->source points to the directory which is being exported. We have not done any chroot()/pivot_root(). So open lo->source.
--- tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +4 -1
@@ -3209,7 +3209,10 @@ static void setup_root(struct lo_data *lo, struct lo_inode *root)int fd, res;struct stat stat; - fd =open ("/" ,O_PATH ); +if (lo->sandbox ==SANDBOX_NONE ) + fd =open (lo->source,O_PATH ); +else + fd =open ("/" ,O_PATH );if (fd ==-1 ) {fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"open(%s, O_PATH): %m\n" , lo->source);exit (1 );
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
PATCH 5/5 virtiofsd: Skip setup_capabilities() in sandbox=NONE mode
In reply to Vivek GoyalWhile running as unpriviliged user setup_capabilities() fails for me. So we are doing some operation which requires priviliges. For now simply skip it in sandbox=NONE mode.
--- tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +2 -1
@@ -3030,7 +3030,8 @@ static void setup_sandbox(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se, }setup_seccomp (enable_syslog); -setup_capabilities (g_strdup (lo->modcaps)); +if (lo->sandbox !=SANDBOX_NONE ) +setup_capabilities (g_strdup (lo->modcaps)); }/* Set the maximum number of open file descriptors */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4