random,x86,kvm: Rework arch RNG seeds and get some from kvm
Subsystems (6)
v5 cover random,x86,kvm: Rework arch RNG seeds and get some from kvm
This introduces and uses a very simple synchronous mechanism to get /dev/urandom-style bits appropriate for initial KVM PV guest RNG seeding.
It also re-works the way that architectural random data is fed into random.c's pools. I added a new arch hook called arch_get_rng_seed. The default implementation is more or less the same as the current code, except that random_get_entropy is now called unconditionally.
x86 gets a custom arch_get_rng_seed. It will use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED if available, and, if it does anything, it will log the number of bits collected from each available architectural source. If more paravirt seed sources show up, it will be a natural place to add them.
I sent the corresponding kvm-unit-tests and qemu changes separately.
Changes from v4:
- Got rid of the RDRAND behavior change. If this series is accepted, I may resend it separately, but I think it's an unrelated issue.
- Fix up the changelog entries -- I misunderstood how the old code worked.
- Avoid lots of failed attempts to use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED if it's not available.
Changes from v3:
- Other than KASLR, the guest pieces are completely rewritten. Patches 2-4 have essentially nothing in common with v2.
Changes from v2:
- Bisection fix (patch 2 had a misplaced brace). The final states is identical to that of v2.
- Improve the 0/5 description a little bit.
Changes from v1:
- Split patches 2 and 3
- Log all arch sources in init_std_data
- Fix the 32-bit kaslr build
Andy Lutomirski (5):
x86,kvm: Add MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED and a matching feature bit
random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
x86,random: Add an x86 implementation of arch_get_rng_seed x86,random,kvm: Use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED in arch_get_rng_seed x86,kaslr: Use MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED for KASLR if available
Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt | 3 ++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 ++ arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c | 27 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_guest.h | 9 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 21 ++++++++-- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 10 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 3 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++ drivers/char/random.c | 14 +++++-- include/linux/random.h | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ 14 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
PATCH v5 1/5 x86,kvm: Add MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED and a matching feature bit
This adds a simple interface to allow a guest to request 64 bits of host nonblocking entropy. This is independent of virtio-rng for a couple of reasons:
- It's intended to be usable during early boot, when a trivial synchronous interface is needed.
- virtio-rng gives blocking entropy, and making guest boot wait for the host's /dev/random will cause problems.
MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED is intended to provide 64 bits of best-effort cryptographically secure data for use as a seed. It provides no guarantee that the result contains any actual entropy.
--- Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt | 3 +++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt +3 -0
@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT || 7 || guest checks this feature bit || || before enabling paravirtualized || || spinlock support. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ +KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED || 8 || host provides rng seed data via + || || MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED. +------------------------------------------------------------------------------ KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT || 24 || host will warn if no guest-side || || per-cpu warps are expected in || || kvmclock.
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +2 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@#define KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME 5#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI 6#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT 7 +#define KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED 8/* The last 8 bits are used to indicate how to interpret the flags field * in pvclock structure. If no bits are set, all flags are ignored.
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@#define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN 0x4b564d02#define MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME 0x4b564d03#define MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN 0x4b564d04 +#define MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED 0x4b564d05struct kvm_steal_time {__u64 steal;
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -1
@@ -479,7 +479,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT ) | - (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT ); + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT ) | + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED );if (sched_info_on ()) entry->eax |= (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME );
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +4 -0
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@#include <linux/pci.h> #include <linux/timekeeper_internal.h> #include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h> +#include <linux/random.h> #include <trace/events/kvm.h> #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -2480,6 +2481,9 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata)case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN : data = vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val;break ; +case MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED : +get_random_bytes (&data,sizeof (data)); +break ;case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR :case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE :case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP :
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
Re: [PATCH v5 1/5] x86,kvm: Add MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED and a matching feature bit
Il 24/07/2014 06:57, Andy Lutomirski ha scritto:
Quoted 84 lines
This adds a simple interface to allow a guest to request 64 bits of host nonblocking entropy. This is independent of virtio-rng for a couple of reasons:
- It's intended to be usable during early boot, when a trivial synchronous interface is needed.
- virtio-rng gives blocking entropy, and making guest boot wait for the host's
/dev/randomwill cause problems.
MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEEDis intended to provide 64 bits of best-effort cryptographically secure data for use as a seed. It provides no guarantee that the result contains any actual entropy.Signed-off-by Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>--- Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt | 3 +++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt +3
-0@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT || 7 || guest checks this feature bit || || before enabling paravirtualized || || spinlock support. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ +KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED || 8 || host provides rng seed data via + || || MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED. +------------------------------------------------------------------------------ KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT || 24 || host will warn if no guest-side || || per-cpu warps are expected in || || kvmclock.arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +2
-0@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@#define KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME 5#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI 6#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT 7 +#define KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED 8/* The last 8 bits are used to indicate how to interpret the flags field * in pvclock structure. If no bits are set, all flags are ignored. @@ -40,6 +41,7 @@#define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN 0x4b564d02#define MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME 0x4b564d03#define MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN 0x4b564d04 +#define MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED 0x4b564d05struct kvm_steal_time {__u64 steal;arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2
-1@@ -479,7 +479,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT ) | - (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT ); + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT ) | + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED );if (sched_info_on ()) entry->eax |= (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME );arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1
-0@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@#include <linux/pci.h> #include <linux/timekeeper_internal.h> #include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h> +#include <linux/random.h> #include <trace/events/kvm.h> #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata) · line 2489
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +3
-0@@ -2480,6 +2481,9 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata)case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN : data = vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val;break ; +case MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED : +get_random_bytes (&data,sizeof (data)); +break ;case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR :case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE :case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP :
PATCH v5 2/5 random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
In reply to Andy LutomirskiCurrently, init_std_data contains its own logic for using arch random sources. This replaces that logic with a generic function arch_get_rng_seed that allows arch code to supply its own logic. The default implementation tries arch_get_random_seed_long and arch_get_random_long individually.
The only functional change here is that random_get_entropy() is used unconditionally instead of being used only when the arch sources fail. This may add a tiny amount of security.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 14 +++++++++++--- include/linux/random.h | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +11 -3
@@ -1236,6 +1236,10 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_bytes_arch); +static void seed_entropy_store (void *ctx,u32 data) +{ +mix_pool_bytes ((struct entropy_store *)ctx, &data,sizeof (data),NULL ); +}/* * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
@@ -1251,15 +1255,19 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)int i;ktime_t now =ktime_get_real ();unsigned long rv; +char log_prefix[128 ]; r->last_pulled = jiffies;mix_pool_bytes (r, &now,sizeof (now),NULL );for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i >0 ; i -=sizeof (rv)) { -if (!arch_get_random_seed_long (&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long (&rv)) - rv =random_get_entropy (); + rv =random_get_entropy ();mix_pool_bytes (r, &rv,sizeof (rv),NULL ); } + +sprintf (log_prefix,"random: seeded %s pool" , r->name); +arch_get_rng_seed (r, seed_entropy_store,8 * r->poolinfo->poolbytes, + log_prefix); +mix_pool_bytes (r,utsname (),sizeof (*(utsname ())),NULL ); }
include/linux/random.h +40 -0
@@ -106,6 +106,46 @@ static inline int arch_has_random_seed(void) }#endif +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED + +/** +* arch_get_rng_seed() - get architectural rng seed data +* @ctx: context for the seed function +* @seed: function to call for each u32 obtained +* @bits_per_source: number of bits from each source to try to use +* @log_prefix: beginning of log output (may be NULL) +* +* Synchronously load some architectural entropy or other best-effort +* random seed data. An arch-specific implementation should be no worse +* than this generic implementation. If the arch code does something +* interesting, it may log something of the form "log_prefix with +* 8 bits of stuff". +* +* No arch-specific implementation should be any worse than the generic +* implementation. +*/ +static inline void arch_get_rng_seed (void *ctx, +void (*seed)(void *ctx,u32 data), +int bits_per_source, +const char *log_prefix) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i < bits_per_source; i +=8 *sizeof (long )) { +unsigned long rv; + +if (arch_get_random_seed_long (&rv) || +arch_get_random_long (&rv)) { +seed (ctx, (u32 )rv); +#if BITS_PER_LONG >32 +seed (ctx, (u32)(rv >>32 )); +#endif + } + } +} + +#endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED */ +/* Pseudo random number generator from numerical recipes. */ static inline u32 next_pseudo_random32 (u32 seed) {
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
Re: [PATCH v5 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
Quoted 9 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Currently,
init_std_datacontains its own logic for using arch random sources. This replaces that logic with a generic functionarch_get_rng_seedthat allows arch code to supply its own logic. The default implementation triesarch_get_random_seed_longandarch_get_random_longindividually.The only functional change here is that
random_get_entropy()is used unconditionally instead of being used only when the arch sources fail. This may add a tiny amount of security.
tytso, are you okay with this approach? I'd be happy to rework this if you prefer some other way of doing it.
--Andy
Quoted 99 lines
Signed-off-by Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>--- drivers/char/random.c | 14 +++++++++++--- include/linux/random.h | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)drivers/char/random.c +11
-3@@ -1236,6 +1236,10 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_bytes_arch); +static void seed_entropy_store (void *ctx,u32 data) +{ +mix_pool_bytes ((struct entropy_store *)ctx, &data,sizeof (data),NULL ); +}/* * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data @@ -1251,15 +1255,19 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)int i;ktime_t now =ktime_get_real ();unsigned long rv; +char log_prefix[128 ]; r->last_pulled = jiffies;mix_pool_bytes (r, &now,sizeof (now),NULL );for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i >0 ; i -=sizeof (rv)) { -if (!arch_get_random_seed_long (&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long (&rv)) - rv =random_get_entropy (); + rv =random_get_entropy ();mix_pool_bytes (r, &rv,sizeof (rv),NULL ); } + +sprintf (log_prefix,"random: seeded %s pool" , r->name); +arch_get_rng_seed (r, seed_entropy_store,8 * r->poolinfo->poolbytes, + log_prefix); +mix_pool_bytes (r,utsname (),sizeof (*(utsname ())),NULL ); }include/linux/random.h +40
-1@@ -106,6 +106,46 @@ static inline int arch_has_random_seed(void) }#endif +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED + +/** +* arch_get_rng_seed() - get architectural rng seed data +* @ctx: context for the seed function +* @seed: function to call for each u32 obtained +* @bits_per_source: number of bits from each source to try to use +* @log_prefix: beginning of log output (may be NULL) +* +* Synchronously load some architectural entropy or other best-effort +* random seed data. An arch-specific implementation should be no worse +* than this generic implementation. If the arch code does something +* interesting, it may log something of the form "log_prefix with +* 8 bits of stuff". +* +* No arch-specific implementation should be any worse than the generic +* implementation. +*/ +static inline void arch_get_rng_seed (void *ctx, +void (*seed)(void *ctx,u32 data), +int bits_per_source, +const char *log_prefix) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i < bits_per_source; i +=8 *sizeof (long )) { +unsigned long rv; + +if (arch_get_random_seed_long (&rv) || +arch_get_random_long (&rv)) { +seed (ctx, (u32 )rv); +#if BITS_PER_LONG >32 +seed (ctx, (u32)(rv >>32 )); +#endif + } + } +} + +#endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED */ +/* Pseudo random number generator from numerical recipes. */ static inline u32 next_pseudo_random32 (u32 seed) { --1.9.3
Signature · 2 lines
Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC
Re: [PATCH v5 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
In reply to Andy LutomirskiQuoted 11 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Currently,
init_std_datacontains its own logic for using arch random sources. This replaces that logic with a generic functionarch_get_rng_seedthat allows arch code to supply its own logic. The default implementation triesarch_get_random_seed_longandarch_get_random_longindividually.The only functional change here is that
random_get_entropy()is used unconditionally instead of being used only when the arch sources fail. This may add a tiny amount of security.Signed-off-by Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
- Ted
PATCH v5 3/5 x86,random: Add an x86 implementation of arch_get_rng_seed
In reply to Andy LutomirskiThis does the same thing as the generic implementation, except that it logs how many bits of each type it collected. I want to know whether the initial seeding is working and, if so, whether the RNG is fast enough.
(I know that hpa assures me that the hardware RNG is more than
fast enough, but I'd still like a direct way to verify this.)
Arguably, arch_get_random_seed could be removed now: I'm having some trouble imagining a sensible non-architecture-specific use of it that wouldn't be better served by arch_get_rng_seed.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 6 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c
arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h +6 -0
@@ -117,6 +117,12 @@ GET_SEED(arch_get_random_seed_int, unsigned int, RDSEED_INT, ASM_NOP4);#define arch_has_random () static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)#define arch_has_random_seed () static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) +#define __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED +extern void arch_get_rng_seed (void *ctx, +void (*seed)(void *ctx,u32 data), +int bits_per_source, +const char *log_prefix); +#else static inline int rdrand_long (unsigned long *v)
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PARAVIRT) += paravirt.o paravirt_patch_$(BITS).o obj-$(CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS)+= paravirt-spinlocks.o obj-$(CONFIG_PARAVIRT_CLOCK) += pvclock.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM) += archrandom.o + obj-$(CONFIG_PCSPKR_PLATFORM) += pcspeaker.o obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CHECK_BIOS_CORRUPTION) += check.o
arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c new file +51 -0
51 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
PATCH v5 4/5 x86,random,kvm: Use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED in arch_get_rng_seed
In reply to Andy LutomirskiThis is a straightforward implementation: for each bit of internal RNG state, request one bit from KVM_GET_RNG_SEED. This is done even if RDSEED/RDRAND worked, since KVM_GET_RNG_SEED is likely to provide cryptographically secure output even if the CPU's RNG is weak or compromised.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_guest.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 10 ++++++++++ 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +4 -0
@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ config KVM_GUEST bool "KVM Guest support (including kvmclock)" depends on PARAVIRT select PARAVIRT_CLOCK + select ARCH_RANDOM default y ---help--- This option enables various optimizations for running under the KVM
@@ -1507,6 +1508,9 @@ config ARCH_RANDOM If supported, this is a high bandwidth, cryptographically secure hardware random number generator. + This also enables paravirt RNGs such as KVM's if the relevant + PV guest support is enabled. + config X86_SMAP def_bool y prompt "Supervisor Mode Access Prevention" if EXPERT
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_guest.h +9 -0
@@ -3,4 +3,13 @@int kvm_setup_vsyscall_timeinfo (void ); +#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST ) && defined(CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM ) +extern bool kvm_get_rng_seed (u64 *rv); +#else +static inline bool kvm_get_rng_seed (u64 *rv) +{ +return false; +} +#endif +#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_GUEST_H */
arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c +24 -1
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@*/ #include <asm/archrandom.h> +#include <asm/kvm_guest.h> void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx, void (*seed)(void *ctx, u32 data),
@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx, const char *log_prefix) {int i; -int rdseed_bits =0 , rdrand_bits =0 ; +int rdseed_bits =0 , rdrand_bits =0 , kvm_bits =0 ;char buf[128 ] ="" ;char *msgptr = buf;
@@ -42,10 +43,32 @@ void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,#endif } +/* +* Use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED regardless of whether the CPU RNG +* worked, since it incorporates entropy unavailable to the CPU, +* and we shouldn't trust the hardware RNG more than we need to. +* We request enough bits for the entire internal RNG state, +* because there's no good reason not to. +*/ +for (i =0 ; i < bits_per_source; i +=64 ) { +u64 rv; + +if (kvm_get_rng_seed (&rv)) { +seed (ctx, (u32 )rv); +seed (ctx, (u32)(rv >>32 )); + kvm_bits +=8 *sizeof (rv); + }else { +break ;/* If it fails once, it will keep failing. */ + } + } +if (rdseed_bits) msgptr +=sprintf (msgptr,", %d bits from RDSEED" , rdseed_bits);if (rdrand_bits) msgptr +=sprintf (msgptr,", %d bits from RDRAND" , rdrand_bits); +if (kvm_bits) + msgptr +=sprintf (msgptr,", %d bits from KVM_GET_RNG_BITS" , + kvm_bits);if (buf[0 ])pr_info ("%s with %s\n" , log_prefix, buf +2 ); }
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +10 -0
@@ -416,6 +416,16 @@ void kvm_disable_steal_time(void)wrmsr (MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME ,0 ,0 ); } +bool kvm_get_rng_seed (u64 *v) +{ +/* +* Allow migration from a hypervisor with the GET_RNG_SEED +* feature to a hypervisor without it. +*/ +return (kvm_para_has_feature (KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED ) && +rdmsrl_safe (MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED , v) ==0 ); +} +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP static void __init kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu (void ) {
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
Re: [PATCH v5 4/5] x86,random,kvm: Use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED in arch_get_rng_seed
Il 24/07/2014 06:57, Andy Lutomirski ha scritto:
Quoted 120 lines
This is a straightforward implementation: for each bit of internal RNG state, request one bit from
KVM_GET_RNG_SEED. This is done even if RDSEED/RDRAND worked, sinceKVM_GET_RNG_SEEDis likely to provide cryptographically secure output even if the CPU's RNG is weak or compromised.Signed-off-by Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_guest.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 10 ++++++++++ 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/Kconfig +4
-0@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ config KVM_GUEST bool "KVM Guest support (including kvmclock)" depends on PARAVIRT select PARAVIRT_CLOCK + select ARCH_RANDOM default y ---help--- This option enables various optimizations for running under the KVM@@ -1507,6 +1508,9 @@ config ARCH_RANDOM If supported, this is a high bandwidth, cryptographically secure hardware random number generator. + This also enables paravirt RNGs such as KVM's if the relevant + PV guest support is enabled. + config X86_SMAP def_bool y prompt "Supervisor Mode Access Prevention" if EXPERTarch/x86/include/asm/kvm_guest.h +9
-0@@ -3,4 +3,13 @@int kvm_setup_vsyscall_timeinfo (void ); +#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST ) && defined(CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM ) +extern bool kvm_get_rng_seed (u64 *rv); +#else +static inline bool kvm_get_rng_seed (u64 *rv) +{ +return false; +} +#endif +#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_GUEST_H */ arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c +24
-1@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@*/ #include <asm/archrandom.h> +#include <asm/kvm_guest.h> void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx, void (*seed)(void *ctx, u32 data),@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx, const char *log_prefix) {int i; -int rdseed_bits =0 , rdrand_bits =0 ; +int rdseed_bits =0 , rdrand_bits =0 , kvm_bits =0 ;char buf[128 ] ="" ;char *msgptr = buf;@@ -42,10 +43,32 @@ void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,#endif } +/* +* Use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED regardless of whether the CPU RNG +* worked, since it incorporates entropy unavailable to the CPU, +* and we shouldn't trust the hardware RNG more than we need to. +* We request enough bits for the entire internal RNG state, +* because there's no good reason not to. +*/ +for (i =0 ; i < bits_per_source; i +=64 ) { +u64 rv; + +if (kvm_get_rng_seed (&rv)) { +seed (ctx, (u32 )rv); +seed (ctx, (u32)(rv >>32 )); + kvm_bits +=8 *sizeof (rv); + }else { +break ;/* If it fails once, it will keep failing. */ + } + } +if (rdseed_bits) msgptr +=sprintf (msgptr,", %d bits from RDSEED" , rdseed_bits);if (rdrand_bits) msgptr +=sprintf (msgptr,", %d bits from RDRAND" , rdrand_bits); +if (kvm_bits) + msgptr +=sprintf (msgptr,", %d bits from KVM_GET_RNG_BITS" , + kvm_bits);if (buf[0 ])pr_info ("%s with %s\n" , log_prefix, buf +2 ); }arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +3
-0@@ -416,6 +416,16 @@ void kvm_disable_steal_time(void)wrmsr (MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME ,0 ,0 ); } +bool kvm_get_rng_seed (u64 *v) +{ +/*
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c void kvm_disable_steal_time(void) · line 431
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +7
-0+* Allow migration from a hypervisor with the GET_RNG_SEED +* feature to a hypervisor without it. +*/ +return (kvm_para_has_feature (KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED ) && +rdmsrl_safe (MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED , v) ==0 ); +} +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP static void __init kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu (void ) {
PATCH v5 5/5 x86,kaslr: Use MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED for KASLR if available
In reply to Andy LutomirskiIt's considerably better than any of the alternatives on KVM.
Rather than reinventing all of the cpu feature query code, this fixes native_cpuid to work in PIC objects.
I haven't combined it with boot/cpuflags.c's cpuid implementation:
including asm/processor.h from boot/cpuflags.c results in a flood of unrelated errors, and fixing it might be messy.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c +27 -0
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@#include <asm/archrandom.h> #include <asm/e820.h> +#include <uapi/asm/kvm_para.h> +#include <generated/compile.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/uts.h>
@@ -15,6 +17,22 @@static const char build_str[] =UTS_RELEASE " (" LINUX_COMPILE_BY "@" LINUX_COMPILE_HOST ") (" LINUX_COMPILER ") " UTS_VERSION ; +static bool kvm_para_has_feature (unsigned int feature) +{ +u32 kvm_base; +u32 features; + +if (!has_cpuflag (X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR )) +return false; + + kvm_base =hypervisor_cpuid_base ("KVMKVMKVM\0\0\0" ,KVM_CPUID_FEATURES ); +if (!kvm_base) +return false; + + features =cpuid_eax (kvm_base |KVM_CPUID_FEATURES ); +return features & (1UL << feature); +} +#define I8254_PORT_CONTROL 0x43#define I8254_PORT_COUNTER0 0x40#define I8254_CMD_READBACK 0xC0
@@ -81,6 +99,15 @@ static unsigned long get_random_long(void) } } +if (kvm_para_has_feature (KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED )) { +u64 seed; + +debug_putstr (" MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED" ); +rdmsrl (MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED , seed); + random ^= (unsigned long )seed; + use_i8254 = false; + } +if (has_cpuflag (X86_FEATURE_TSC )) {debug_putstr (" RDTSC" );rdtscll (raw);
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +18 -3
@@ -189,10 +189,25 @@ static inline int have_cpuid_p(void)static inline void native_cpuid (unsigned int *eax,unsigned int *ebx,unsigned int *ecx,unsigned int *edx) { -/* ecx is often an input as well as an output. */ - asmvolatile ("cpuid" +/* +* This function can be used from the boot code, so it needs +* to avoid using EBX in constraints in PIC mode. +* +* ecx is often an input as well as an output. +*/ + asmvolatile (".ifnc %%ebx,%1 ; .ifnc %%rbx,%1 \n\t" +"movl %%ebx,%1 \n\t" +".endif ; .endif \n\t" +"cpuid \n\t" +".ifnc %%ebx,%1 ; .ifnc %%rbx,%1 \n\t" +"xchgl %%ebx,%1 \n\t" +".endif ; .endif" : "=a" (*eax), -"=b" (*ebx), +#if defined(__i386__) && defined(__PIC__) + "=r" (*ebx), /* gcc won't let us use ebx */ +#else + "=b" (*ebx), /* ebx is okay */ +#endif "=c" (*ecx), "=d" (*edx) : "0" (*eax), "2" (*ecx)
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] x86,kaslr: Use MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED for KASLR if available
Il 24/07/2014 06:57, Andy Lutomirski ha scritto:
Quoted 92 lines
It's considerably better than any of the alternatives on KVM.
Rather than reinventing all of the cpu feature query code, this fixes
native_cpuidto work in PIC objects.I haven't combined it with boot/cpuflags.c's cpuid implementation:
includingasm/processor.hfromboot/cpuflags.cresults in a flood of unrelated errors, and fixing it might be messy.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c +27
-0@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@#include <asm/archrandom.h> #include <asm/e820.h> +#include <uapi/asm/kvm_para.h> +#include <generated/compile.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/uts.h> @@ -15,6 +17,22 @@static const char build_str[] =UTS_RELEASE " (" LINUX_COMPILE_BY "@" LINUX_COMPILE_HOST ") (" LINUX_COMPILER ") " UTS_VERSION ; +static bool kvm_para_has_feature (unsigned int feature) +{ +u32 kvm_base; +u32 features; + +if (!has_cpuflag (X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR )) +return false; + + kvm_base =hypervisor_cpuid_base ("KVMKVMKVM\0\0\0" ,KVM_CPUID_FEATURES ); +if (!kvm_base) +return false; + + features =cpuid_eax (kvm_base |KVM_CPUID_FEATURES ); +return features & (1UL << feature); +} +#define I8254_PORT_CONTROL 0x43#define I8254_PORT_COUNTER0 0x40#define I8254_CMD_READBACK 0xC0@@ -81,6 +99,15 @@ static unsigned long get_random_long(void) } } +if (kvm_para_has_feature (KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED )) { +u64 seed; + +debug_putstr (" MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED" ); +rdmsrl (MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED , seed); + random ^= (unsigned long )seed; + use_i8254 = false; + } +if (has_cpuflag (X86_FEATURE_TSC )) {debug_putstr (" RDTSC" );rdtscll (raw);arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +13
-2@@ -189,10 +189,25 @@ static inline int have_cpuid_p(void)static inline void native_cpuid (unsigned int *eax,unsigned int *ebx,unsigned int *ecx,unsigned int *edx) { -/* ecx is often an input as well as an output. */ - asm volatile("cpuid" +/* +* This function can be used from the boot code, so it needs +* to avoid using EBX in constraints in PIC mode. +* +* ecx is often an input as well as an output. +*/ + asmvolatile (".ifnc %%ebx,%1 ; .ifnc %%rbx,%1 \n\t" +"movl %%ebx,%1 \n\t" +".endif ; .endif \n\t" +"cpuid \n\t" +".ifnc %%ebx,%1 ; .ifnc %%rbx,%1 \n\t" +"xchgl %%ebx,%1 \n\t" + ".endif ; .endif"
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h static inline int have_cpuid_p(void) · line 213
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +5
-1: "=a" (*eax), - "=b" (*ebx), +#if defined(__i386__) && defined(__PIC__) + "=r" (*ebx), /* gcc won't let us use ebx */ +#else + "=b" (*ebx), /* ebx is okay */ +#endif "=c" (*ecx), "=d" (*edx) : "0" (*eax), "2" (*ecx)
Quoted 9 lines · Andy Lutomirski
This introduces and uses a very simple synchronous mechanism to get
/dev/urandom-stylebits appropriate for initial KVM PV guest RNG seeding.It also re-works the way that architectural random data is fed into random.c's pools. I added a new arch hook called
arch_get_rng_seed. The default implementation is more or less the same as the current code, except thatrandom_get_entropyis now called unconditionally.
Quoted 7 lines
x86 gets a custom
arch_get_rng_seed. It will useKVM_GET_RNG_SEEDif available, and, if it does anything, it will log the number of bits collected from each available architectural source. If more paravirt seed sources show up, it will be a natural place to add them.I sent the corresponding kvm-unit-tests and qemu changes separately.
What's the status of this series? I assume that it's too late for at least patches 2-5 to make it into 3.17.
--Andy
Quoted 50 lines
Changes from v4:
- Got rid of the RDRAND behavior change. If this series is accepted, I may resend it separately, but I think it's an unrelated issue.
- Fix up the changelog entries -- I misunderstood how the old code worked.
- Avoid lots of failed attempts to useKVM_GET_RNG_SEEDif it's not available.Changes from v3:
- Other than KASLR, the guest pieces are completely rewritten. Patches 2-4 have essentially nothing in common with v2.Changes from v2:
- Bisection fix (patch 2 had a misplaced brace). The final states is identical to that of v2.
- Improve the 0/5 description a little bit.Changes from v1:
- Split patches 2 and 3
- Log all arch sources ininit_std_data
- Fix the 32-bit kaslr buildAndy Lutomirski (5):
x86,kvm: AddMSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEEDand a matching feature bit
random: Add and usearch_get_rng_seed
x86,random: Add an x86 implementation ofarch_get_rng_seedx86,random,kvm: UseKVM_GET_RNG_SEEDinarch_get_rng_seedx86,kaslr: UseMSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEEDfor KASLR if availableDocumentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt | 3 ++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 ++ arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c | 27 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_guest.h | 9 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 21 ++++++++-- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 10 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 3 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++ drivers/char/random.c | 14 +++++-- include/linux/random.h | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ 14 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c--
1.9.3
Signature · 2 lines
Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerQuoted 3 lines · Andy Lutomirski
What's the status of this series? I assume that it's too late for at least patches 2-5 to make it into 3.17.
Which tree were you hoping this patch series to go through? I was assuming it would go through the x86 tree since the bulk of the changes in the x86 subsystem (hence my Acked-by).
IIRC, Peter had some concerns, and I don't remember if they were all addressed. Peter?
- Ted
Quoted 8 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 3 lines · Andy Lutomirski
What's the status of this series? I assume that it's too late for at least patches 2-5 to make it into 3.17.
Which tree were you hoping this patch series to go through? I was assuming it would go through the x86 tree since the bulk of the changes in the x86 subsystem (hence my Acked-by).
There's some argument that patch 1 should go through the kvm tree. There's no real need for patch 1 and 2-5 to end up in the same kernel release, either.
Quoted 4 lines
IIRC, Peter had some concerns, and I don't remember if they were all addressed. Peter?
I don't know. I rewrite one thing he didn't like and undid the other, but there's plenty of opportunity for this version to be problematic, too.
--Andy
H. Peter Anvin
reviewerQuoted 15 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 8 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 3 lines · Andy Lutomirski
What's the status of this series? I assume that it's too late for at least patches 2-5 to make it into 3.17.
Which tree were you hoping this patch series to go through? I was assuming it would go through the x86 tree since the bulk of the changes in the x86 subsystem (hence my Acked-by).
There's some argument that patch 1 should go through the kvm tree. There's no real need for patch 1 and 2-5 to end up in the same kernel release, either.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
IIRC, Peter had some concerns, and I don't remember if they were all addressed. Peter?
I don't know. I rewrite one thing he didn't like and undid the other, but there's plenty of opportunity for this version to be problematic, too.
Sorry, I have been heads down on the current merge window. I will look at this for 3.18, presumably after Kernel Summit.
The proposed arch_get_rng_seed() is not really what it claims to be; it most definitely does not produce seed-grade randomness, instead it seems to be an arch function for best-effort initialization of the entropy pools -- which is fine, it is just something quite different.
I want to look over it more carefully before acking it, though.
Andy, are you going to be in Chicago?
-hpa
Quoted 25 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 15 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 8 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 3 lines · Andy Lutomirski
What's the status of this series? I assume that it's too late for at least patches 2-5 to make it into 3.17.
Which tree were you hoping this patch series to go through? I was assuming it would go through the x86 tree since the bulk of the changes in the x86 subsystem (hence my Acked-by).
There's some argument that patch 1 should go through the kvm tree. There's no real need for patch 1 and 2-5 to end up in the same kernel release, either.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
IIRC, Peter had some concerns, and I don't remember if they were all addressed. Peter?
I don't know. I rewrite one thing he didn't like and undid the other, but there's plenty of opportunity for this version to be problematic, too.
Quoted 7 lines
Sorry, I have been heads down on the current merge window. I will look at this for 3.18, presumably after Kernel Summit.
The proposed
arch_get_rng_seed()is not really what it claims to be; it most definitely does not produce seed-grade randomness, instead it seems to be an arch function for best-effort initialization of the entropy pools -- which is fine, it is just something quite different.
Fair enough. I meant "seed" as in something that initialized a PRNG (think srand), not "seed" as in a promised-to-be-cryptographically-secure seed for a DRBG.
I can rename it, update the comment, or otherwise tweak it to make the intent clearer.
Quoted 2 lines
I want to look over it more carefully before acking it, though.
It would also be nice for someone with a Haswell box (and an RDSEED box) to test it. I have neither.
Quoted 2 lines
Andy, are you going to be in Chicago?
Yes.
Quoted 3 lines
-hpa
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerQuoted 4 lines · H. Peter Anvin
The proposed
arch_get_rng_seed()is not really what it claims to be; it most definitely does not produce seed-grade randomness, instead it seems to be an arch function for best-effort initialization of the entropy pools -- which is fine, it is just something quite different.
Without getting into an argument about which definition of "seed" is correct --- it's certainly confusing and different form the RDSEED usage of the word "seed".
Do we expect that anyone else besides arch_get_rnd_seed() would actually want to use it? I'd argue no; we want the rest of the kernel to either use get_random_bytes() or prandom_u32(). Given that, maybe we should just call it arch_random_init(), and expect that the only user of this interface would be drivers/char/random.c?
- Ted
Quoted 6 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 4 lines · H. Peter Anvin
The proposed
arch_get_rng_seed()is not really what it claims to be; it most definitely does not produce seed-grade randomness, instead it seems to be an arch function for best-effort initialization of the entropy pools -- which is fine, it is just something quite different.
Quoted 6 lines
Without getting into an argument about which definition of "seed" is correct --- it's certainly confusing and different form the RDSEED usage of the word "seed".
Do we expect that anyone else besides
arch_get_rnd_seed()would actually want to use it?
If you mean random.c instead of arch_get_rnd_seed, then I don't expect there to be other users. Aside from the "best-effort" bit causing this to be basically useless on old bare metal, the interface is really awkward for anything other than the use in random.c.
Quoted 4 lines
I'd argue no; we want the rest of the kernel
to either useget_random_bytes()orprandom_u32(). Given that, maybe we should just call itarch_random_init(), and expect that the only user of this interface would bedrivers/char/random.c?
Sounds good to me.
FWIW, I'd like to see a second use added in random.c: I think that we should do this, or even all of init_std_data, on resume from suspend and especially on resume from hibernate / kexec.
--Andy
H. Peter Anvin
reviewerQuoted 7 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Sounds good to me.
FWIW, I'd like to see a second use added in
random.c: I think that we should do this, or even all ofinit_std_data, on resume from suspend and especially on resume from hibernate / kexec.
Yes, we should. We also need to make it possible to do this after cloning a VM.
-hpa
Theodore Ts'o
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 7 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Sounds good to me.
FWIW, I'd like to see a second use added in
random.c: I think that we should do this, or even all ofinit_std_data, on resume from suspend and especially on resume from hibernate / kexec.Yes, we should. We also need to make it possible to do this after cloning a VM.
Agreed. Can you send a patch?
I can carry the commits to add arch_random_init() the generic version, and the patch to call it after suspend/resume. I'll do this at the very head of the random tree, and make sure it gets pushed to Linus early during the next merge window.
Does that sound like a plan? Or does someone want to suggest something different? I'm flexible...
- Ted
Quoted 15 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 11 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 7 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Sounds good to me.
FWIW, I'd like to see a second use added in
random.c: I think that we should do this, or even all ofinit_std_data, on resume from suspend and especially on resume from hibernate / kexec.Yes, we should. We also need to make it possible to do this after cloning a VM.
Agreed. Can you send a patch?
Quoted 7 lines
I can carry the commits to add
arch_random_init()the generic version, and the patch to call it after suspend/resume. I'll do this at the very head of the random tree, and make sure it gets pushed to Linus early during the next merge window.Does that sound like a plan? Or does someone want to suggest something different? I'm flexible...
OK. Here's a proposal. I'll split the series into two parts. The first part will be the arch_random_init generic change and code to call it after suspend/resume (once I figure out the right callback). I'll send that to you.
The second part will be the KVM and x86 code, which will look just like this version (v5) except for the rename. If needed, hpa and I can hash the details we need at KS.
As for doing arch_random_init after clone/migration, I think we'll need another KVM extension for that, since, AFAIK, we don't actually get notified that we were cloned or migrated. That will be nontrivial. Maybe we can figure that out at KS, too.
--Andy
Quoted 2 lines
- Ted
Signature · 2 lines
Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC
H. Peter Anvin
reviewerQuoted 6 lines · Andy Lutomirski
As for doing
arch_random_initafter clone/migration, I think we'll need another KVM extension for that, since, AFAIK, we don't actually get notified that we were cloned or migrated. That will be nontrivial. Maybe we can figure that out at KS, too.
We don't need a reset when migrated (although it might be a good idea under some circumstances, i.e. if the pools might somehow have gotten exposed) but definitely when cloned.
-hpa
H. Peter Anvin
reviewerQuoted 8 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 6 lines · Andy Lutomirski
As for doing
arch_random_initafter clone/migration, I think we'll need another KVM extension for that, since, AFAIK, we don't actually get notified that we were cloned or migrated. That will be nontrivial. Maybe we can figure that out at KS, too.
Quoted 4 lines
We don't need a reset when migrated (although it might be a good idea under some circumstances, i.e. if the pools might somehow have gotten exposed) but definitely when cloned.
But yes, we need a notification. For obvious reasons there is no suspend event (one can snapshot a running VM) but we need to be notified upon wakeup, *or* we need to give KVM a way to update the necessary state.
-hpa
Quoted 9 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 8 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 6 lines · Andy Lutomirski
As for doing
arch_random_initafter clone/migration, I think we'll need another KVM extension for that, since, AFAIK, we don't actually get notified that we were cloned or migrated. That will be nontrivial. Maybe we can figure that out at KS, too.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
We don't need a reset when migrated (although it might be a good idea under some circumstances, i.e. if the pools might somehow have gotten exposed) but definitely when cloned.
But yes, we need a notification. For obvious reasons there is no suspend event (one can snapshot a running VM) but we need to be notified upon wakeup, *or* we need to give KVM a way to update the necessary state.
This could presumably use the interrupt mechanism on virtio-rng if we're willing to depend on having host support for virtio-rng.
v6 (coming in a few minutes) will at least get it right when the kernel goes through the resume path (i.e. not KVM/QEMU suspend, and maybe not S0ix either).
--Andy
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerIl 13/08/2014 20:33, Andy Lutomirski ha scritto:
Quoted 4 lines
As for doing
arch_random_initafter clone/migration, I think we'll need another KVM extension for that, since, AFAIK, we don't actually get notified that we were cloned or migrated. That will be nontrivial. Maybe we can figure that out at KS, too.
Migration doesn't need an arch_random_init, only cloning does.
MS has an ACPI-based specification for this they call the "VM Generation ID", which QEMU should be implementing it sooner rather than later. In Linux we could add a generic notifier, and an x86 platform driver that implements the VM Generation ID specification and invokes the notifier.
http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkID=260709 (warning, .docx ahead)
KY, would you be interested in looking at this?
Paolo