Skip to contentSkip to conversation

random,x86,kvm: Rework arch RNG seeds and get some from kvm

PATCH Superseded Andy Lutomirski 4 participants 25 messages Jul 24, 2014 – Aug 17, 2014

Subsystems (6)
Documentation x86 KVM KVM x86 +2 more subsystems

v5 of 6 Superseded Latest is v6 →

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

v5 cover random,x86,kvm: Rework arch RNG seeds and get some from kvm

This introduces and uses a very simple synchronous mechanism to get /dev/urandom-style bits appropriate for initial KVM PV guest RNG seeding.

It also re-works the way that architectural random data is fed into random.c's pools. I added a new arch hook called arch_get_rng_seed. The default implementation is more or less the same as the current code, except that random_get_entropy is now called unconditionally.

x86 gets a custom arch_get_rng_seed. It will use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED if available, and, if it does anything, it will log the number of bits collected from each available architectural source. If more paravirt seed sources show up, it will be a natural place to add them.

I sent the corresponding kvm-unit-tests and qemu changes separately.

Changes from v4:
- Got rid of the RDRAND behavior change. If this series is accepted, I may resend it separately, but I think it's an unrelated issue.
- Fix up the changelog entries -- I misunderstood how the old code worked.
- Avoid lots of failed attempts to use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED if it's not available.

Changes from v3:
- Other than KASLR, the guest pieces are completely rewritten. Patches 2-4 have essentially nothing in common with v2.

Changes from v2:
- Bisection fix (patch 2 had a misplaced brace). The final states is identical to that of v2.
- Improve the 0/5 description a little bit.

Changes from v1:
- Split patches 2 and 3
- Log all arch sources in init_std_data
- Fix the 32-bit kaslr build

Andy Lutomirski (5):
x86,kvm: Add MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED and a matching feature bit
random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
x86,random: Add an x86 implementation of arch_get_rng_seed x86,random,kvm: Use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED in arch_get_rng_seed x86,kaslr: Use MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED for KASLR if available

 Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt  |  3 ++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                     |  4 ++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c      | 27 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h    |  6 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_guest.h     |  9 +++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h     | 21 ++++++++--
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h |  2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile             |  2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c         | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c                | 10 +++++
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c                 |  3 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                   |  4 ++
 drivers/char/random.c                | 14 +++++--
 include/linux/random.h               | 40 +++++++++++++++++++
 14 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
#1 lore raw

PATCH v5 1/5 x86,kvm: Add MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED and a matching feature bit

This adds a simple interface to allow a guest to request 64 bits of host nonblocking entropy. This is independent of virtio-rng for a couple of reasons:

- It's intended to be usable during early boot, when a trivial synchronous interface is needed.

- virtio-rng gives blocking entropy, and making guest boot wait for the host's /dev/random will cause problems.

MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED is intended to provide 64 bits of best-effort cryptographically secure data for use as a seed. It provides no guarantee that the result contains any actual entropy.

---
 Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt  | 3 +++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c                 | 3 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                   | 4 ++++
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt +3 -0
index 3c65feb..0ab043b 100644
@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT              ||     7 || guest checks this feature bit
                                    ||       || before enabling paravirtualized
                                    ||       || spinlock support.
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED           ||     8 || host provides rng seed data via
+                                   ||       || MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED.
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT ||    24 || host will warn if no guest-side
                                    ||       || per-cpu warps are expected in
                                    ||       || kvmclock.
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +2 -0
index 94dc8ca..e2eaf93 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #define KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME		5
 #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI		6
 #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT		7
+#define KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED	8
 
 /* The last 8 bits are used to indicate how to interpret the flags field
  * in pvclock structure. If no bits are set, all flags are ignored.
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@
 #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN 0x4b564d02
 #define MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME  0x4b564d03
 #define MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN      0x4b564d04
+#define MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED 0x4b564d05
 
 struct kvm_steal_time {
 	__u64 steal;
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -1
index 38a0afe..40d6763 100644
@@ -479,7 +479,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
 			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF) |
 			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI) |
 			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT) |
-			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT);
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT) |
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED);
 
 		if (sched_info_on())
 			entry->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME);
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +4 -0
index f644933..4e81853 100644
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
 #include <linux/pci.h>
 #include <linux/timekeeper_internal.h>
 #include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 #include <trace/events/kvm.h>
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -2480,6 +2481,9 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata)
 	case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN:
 		data = vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val;
 		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED:
+		get_random_bytes(&data, sizeof(data));
+		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR:
 	case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE:
 	case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP:
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
maintainer Acked-by on v5 1/5
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 1/5] x86,kvm: Add MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED and a matching feature bit

Il 24/07/2014 06:57, Andy Lutomirski ha scritto:

Quoted 84 lines

This adds a simple interface to allow a guest to request 64 bits of host nonblocking entropy. This is independent of virtio-rng for a couple of reasons:

- It's intended to be usable during early boot, when a trivial synchronous interface is needed.

- virtio-rng gives blocking entropy, and making guest boot wait for the host's /dev/random will cause problems.

MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED is intended to provide 64 bits of best-effort cryptographically secure data for use as a seed. It provides no guarantee that the result contains any actual entropy.

---
 Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt  | 3 +++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c                 | 3 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                   | 4 ++++
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt +3 -0
index 3c65feb..0ab043b 100644
@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT              ||     7 || guest checks this feature bit
                                    ||       || before enabling paravirtualized
                                    ||       || spinlock support.
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED           ||     8 || host provides rng seed data via
+                                   ||       || MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED.
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT ||    24 || host will warn if no guest-side
                                    ||       || per-cpu warps are expected in
                                    ||       || kvmclock.
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +2 -0
index 94dc8ca..e2eaf93 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #define KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME		5
 #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI		6
 #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT		7
+#define KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED	8
 
 /* The last 8 bits are used to indicate how to interpret the flags field
  * in pvclock structure. If no bits are set, all flags are ignored.
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@
 #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN 0x4b564d02
 #define MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME  0x4b564d03
 #define MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN      0x4b564d04
+#define MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED 0x4b564d05
 
 struct kvm_steal_time {
 	__u64 steal;
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -1
index 38a0afe..40d6763 100644
@@ -479,7 +479,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
 			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF) |
 			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI) |
 			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT) |
-			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT);
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT) |
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED);
 
 		if (sched_info_on())
 			entry->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME);
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -0
index f644933..4e81853 100644
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
 #include <linux/pci.h>
 #include <linux/timekeeper_internal.h>
 #include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 #include <trace/events/kvm.h>
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS

arch/x86/kvm/x86.c int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata) · line 2489

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +3 -0
@@ -2480,6 +2481,9 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata)
 	case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN:
 		data = vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val;
 		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED:
+		get_random_bytes(&data, sizeof(data));
+		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR:
 	case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE:
 	case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP:
#3 lore raw

PATCH v5 2/5 random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed

In reply to Andy Lutomirski

Currently, init_std_data contains its own logic for using arch random sources. This replaces that logic with a generic function arch_get_rng_seed that allows arch code to supply its own logic. The default implementation tries arch_get_random_seed_long and arch_get_random_long individually.

The only functional change here is that random_get_entropy() is used unconditionally instead of being used only when the arch sources fail. This may add a tiny amount of security.

---
 drivers/char/random.c  | 14 +++++++++++---
 include/linux/random.h | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +11 -3
index 0a7ac0a..be7a94e 100644
@@ -1236,6 +1236,10 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
 
+static void seed_entropy_store(void *ctx, u32 data)
+{
+	mix_pool_bytes((struct entropy_store *)ctx, &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
+}
 
 /*
  * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
@@ -1251,15 +1255,19 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
 	int i;
 	ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
 	unsigned long rv;
+	char log_prefix[128];
 
 	r->last_pulled = jiffies;
 	mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now), NULL);
 	for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
-		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
-		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
-			rv = random_get_entropy();
+		rv = random_get_entropy();
 		mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv), NULL);
 	}
+
+	sprintf(log_prefix, "random: seeded %s pool", r->name);
+	arch_get_rng_seed(r, seed_entropy_store, 8 * r->poolinfo->poolbytes,
+			  log_prefix);
+
 	mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())), NULL);
 }
 
include/linux/random.h +40 -0
index 57fbbff..81a6145 100644
@@ -106,6 +106,46 @@ static inline int arch_has_random_seed(void)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED
+
+/**
+ * arch_get_rng_seed() - get architectural rng seed data
+ * @ctx: context for the seed function
+ * @seed: function to call for each u32 obtained
+ * @bits_per_source: number of bits from each source to try to use
+ * @log_prefix: beginning of log output (may be NULL)
+ *
+ * Synchronously load some architectural entropy or other best-effort
+ * random seed data.  An arch-specific implementation should be no worse
+ * than this generic implementation.  If the arch code does something
+ * interesting, it may log something of the form "log_prefix with
+ * 8 bits of stuff".
+ *
+ * No arch-specific implementation should be any worse than the generic
+ * implementation.
+ */
+static inline void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,
+				     void (*seed)(void *ctx, u32 data),
+				     int bits_per_source,
+				     const char *log_prefix)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < bits_per_source; i += 8 * sizeof(long)) {
+		unsigned long rv;
+
+		if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) ||
+		    arch_get_random_long(&rv)) {
+			seed(ctx, (u32)rv);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG > 32
+			seed(ctx, (u32)(rv >> 32));
+#endif
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+#endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED */
+
 /* Pseudo random number generator from numerical recipes. */
 static inline u32 next_pseudo_random32(u32 seed)
 {
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed

Quoted 9 lines · Andy Lutomirski

Currently, init_std_data contains its own logic for using arch random sources. This replaces that logic with a generic function arch_get_rng_seed that allows arch code to supply its own logic. The default implementation tries arch_get_random_seed_long and arch_get_random_long individually.

The only functional change here is that random_get_entropy() is used unconditionally instead of being used only when the arch sources fail. This may add a tiny amount of security.

tytso, are you okay with this approach? I'd be happy to rework this if you prefer some other way of doing it.

--Andy

Quoted 99 lines
---
 drivers/char/random.c  | 14 +++++++++++---
 include/linux/random.h | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +11 -3
index 0a7ac0a..be7a94e 100644
@@ -1236,6 +1236,10 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
 
+static void seed_entropy_store(void *ctx, u32 data)
+{
+       mix_pool_bytes((struct entropy_store *)ctx, &data, sizeof(data), NULL);
+}
 
 /*
  * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
@@ -1251,15 +1255,19 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
        int i;
        ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
        unsigned long rv;
+       char log_prefix[128];
 
        r->last_pulled = jiffies;
        mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now), NULL);
        for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
-               if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
-                   !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
-                       rv = random_get_entropy();
+               rv = random_get_entropy();
                mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv), NULL);
        }
+
+       sprintf(log_prefix, "random: seeded %s pool", r->name);
+       arch_get_rng_seed(r, seed_entropy_store, 8 * r->poolinfo->poolbytes,
+                         log_prefix);
+
        mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())), NULL);
 }
 
include/linux/random.h +40 -1
index 57fbbff..81a6145 100644
@@ -106,6 +106,46 @@ static inline int arch_has_random_seed(void)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED
+
+/**
+ * arch_get_rng_seed() - get architectural rng seed data
+ * @ctx: context for the seed function
+ * @seed: function to call for each u32 obtained
+ * @bits_per_source: number of bits from each source to try to use
+ * @log_prefix: beginning of log output (may be NULL)
+ *
+ * Synchronously load some architectural entropy or other best-effort
+ * random seed data.  An arch-specific implementation should be no worse
+ * than this generic implementation.  If the arch code does something
+ * interesting, it may log something of the form "log_prefix with
+ * 8 bits of stuff".
+ *
+ * No arch-specific implementation should be any worse than the generic
+ * implementation.
+ */
+static inline void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,
+                                    void (*seed)(void *ctx, u32 data),
+                                    int bits_per_source,
+                                    const char *log_prefix)
+{
+       int i;
+
+       for (i = 0; i < bits_per_source; i += 8 * sizeof(long)) {
+               unsigned long rv;
+
+               if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) ||
+                   arch_get_random_long(&rv)) {
+                       seed(ctx, (u32)rv);
+#if BITS_PER_LONG > 32
+                       seed(ctx, (u32)(rv >> 32));
+#endif
+               }
+       }
+}
+
+#endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED */
+
 /* Pseudo random number generator from numerical recipes. */
 static inline u32 next_pseudo_random32(u32 seed)
 {
--

1.9.3

Signature · 2 lines
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
maintainer Acked-by on v5 2/5
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 2/5] random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed

In reply to Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 11 lines · Andy Lutomirski

Currently, init_std_data contains its own logic for using arch random sources. This replaces that logic with a generic function arch_get_rng_seed that allows arch code to supply its own logic. The default implementation tries arch_get_random_seed_long and arch_get_random_long individually.

The only functional change here is that random_get_entropy() is used unconditionally instead of being used only when the arch sources fail. This may add a tiny amount of security.

- Ted

#6 lore raw

PATCH v5 3/5 x86,random: Add an x86 implementation of arch_get_rng_seed

In reply to Andy Lutomirski

This does the same thing as the generic implementation, except that it logs how many bits of each type it collected. I want to know whether the initial seeding is working and, if so, whether the RNG is fast enough.

(I know that hpa assures me that the hardware RNG is more than
fast enough, but I'd still like a direct way to verify this.)

Arguably, arch_get_random_seed could be removed now: I'm having some trouble imagining a sensible non-architecture-specific use of it that wouldn't be better served by arch_get_rng_seed.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h |  6 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile          |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c      | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c
arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h +6 -0
index 69f1366..88f9c5a 100644
@@ -117,6 +117,12 @@ GET_SEED(arch_get_random_seed_int, unsigned int, RDSEED_INT, ASM_NOP4);
 #define arch_has_random()	static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)
 #define arch_has_random_seed()	static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)
 
+#define __HAVE_ARCH_GET_RNG_SEED
+extern void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,
+			      void (*seed)(void *ctx, u32 data),
+			      int bits_per_source,
+			      const char *log_prefix);
+
 #else
 
 static inline int rdrand_long(unsigned long *v)
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +2 -0
index 047f9ff..0718bae 100644
@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PARAVIRT)		+= paravirt.o paravirt_patch_$(BITS).o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS)+= paravirt-spinlocks.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PARAVIRT_CLOCK)	+= pvclock.o
 
+obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM)	+= archrandom.o
+
 obj-$(CONFIG_PCSPKR_PLATFORM)	+= pcspeaker.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CHECK_BIOS_CORRUPTION) += check.o
arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c new file +51 -0

51 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
#7 lore raw

PATCH v5 4/5 x86,random,kvm: Use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED in arch_get_rng_seed

In reply to Andy Lutomirski

This is a straightforward implementation: for each bit of internal RNG state, request one bit from KVM_GET_RNG_SEED. This is done even if RDSEED/RDRAND worked, since KVM_GET_RNG_SEED is likely to provide cryptographically secure output even if the CPU's RNG is weak or compromised.

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                 |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_guest.h |  9 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c     | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c            | 10 ++++++++++
 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +4 -0
index a8f749e..adfa09c 100644
@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ config KVM_GUEST
 	bool "KVM Guest support (including kvmclock)"
 	depends on PARAVIRT
 	select PARAVIRT_CLOCK
+	select ARCH_RANDOM
 	default y
 	---help---
 	  This option enables various optimizations for running under the KVM
@@ -1507,6 +1508,9 @@ config ARCH_RANDOM
 	  If supported, this is a high bandwidth, cryptographically
 	  secure hardware random number generator.
 
+	  This also enables paravirt RNGs such as KVM's if the relevant
+	  PV guest support is enabled.
+
 config X86_SMAP
 	def_bool y
 	prompt "Supervisor Mode Access Prevention" if EXPERT
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_guest.h +9 -0
index a92b176..8c4dbd5 100644
@@ -3,4 +3,13 @@
 
 int kvm_setup_vsyscall_timeinfo(void);
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST) && defined(CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM)
+extern bool kvm_get_rng_seed(u64 *rv);
+#else
+static inline bool kvm_get_rng_seed(u64 *rv)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_GUEST_H */
arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c +24 -1
index 47d13b0..8c8d021 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <asm/archrandom.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_guest.h>
 
 void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,
 		       void (*seed)(void *ctx, u32 data),
@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,
 		       const char *log_prefix)
 {
 	int i;
-	int rdseed_bits = 0, rdrand_bits = 0;
+	int rdseed_bits = 0, rdrand_bits = 0, kvm_bits = 0;
 	char buf[128] = "";
 	char *msgptr = buf;
 
@@ -42,10 +43,32 @@ void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,
 #endif
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED regardless of whether the CPU RNG
+	 * worked, since it incorporates entropy unavailable to the CPU,
+	 * and we shouldn't trust the hardware RNG more than we need to.
+	 * We request enough bits for the entire internal RNG state,
+	 * because there's no good reason not to.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < bits_per_source; i += 64) {
+		u64 rv;
+
+		if (kvm_get_rng_seed(&rv)) {
+			seed(ctx, (u32)rv);
+			seed(ctx, (u32)(rv >> 32));
+			kvm_bits += 8 * sizeof(rv);
+		} else {
+			break;	/* If it fails once, it will keep failing. */
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (rdseed_bits)
 		msgptr += sprintf(msgptr, ", %d bits from RDSEED", rdseed_bits);
 	if (rdrand_bits)
 		msgptr += sprintf(msgptr, ", %d bits from RDRAND", rdrand_bits);
+	if (kvm_bits)
+		msgptr += sprintf(msgptr, ", %d bits from KVM_GET_RNG_BITS",
+				  kvm_bits);
 	if (buf[0])
 		pr_info("%s with %s\n", log_prefix, buf + 2);
 }
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +10 -0
index 3dd8e2c..bd8783a 100644
@@ -416,6 +416,16 @@ void kvm_disable_steal_time(void)
 	wrmsr(MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME, 0, 0);
 }
 
+bool kvm_get_rng_seed(u64 *v)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Allow migration from a hypervisor with the GET_RNG_SEED
+	 * feature to a hypervisor without it.
+	 */
+	return (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED) &&
+		rdmsrl_safe(MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED, v) == 0);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 static void __init kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
 {
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
maintainer Acked-by on v5 4/5
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 4/5] x86,random,kvm: Use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED in arch_get_rng_seed

Il 24/07/2014 06:57, Andy Lutomirski ha scritto:

Quoted 120 lines

This is a straightforward implementation: for each bit of internal RNG state, request one bit from KVM_GET_RNG_SEED. This is done even if RDSEED/RDRAND worked, since KVM_GET_RNG_SEED is likely to provide cryptographically secure output even if the CPU's RNG is weak or compromised.

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                 |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_guest.h |  9 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c     | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c            | 10 ++++++++++
 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +4 -0
index a8f749e..adfa09c 100644
@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ config KVM_GUEST
 	bool "KVM Guest support (including kvmclock)"
 	depends on PARAVIRT
 	select PARAVIRT_CLOCK
+	select ARCH_RANDOM
 	default y
 	---help---
 	  This option enables various optimizations for running under the KVM
@@ -1507,6 +1508,9 @@ config ARCH_RANDOM
 	  If supported, this is a high bandwidth, cryptographically
 	  secure hardware random number generator.
 
+	  This also enables paravirt RNGs such as KVM's if the relevant
+	  PV guest support is enabled.
+
 config X86_SMAP
 	def_bool y
 	prompt "Supervisor Mode Access Prevention" if EXPERT
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_guest.h +9 -0
index a92b176..8c4dbd5 100644
@@ -3,4 +3,13 @@
 
 int kvm_setup_vsyscall_timeinfo(void);
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST) && defined(CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM)
+extern bool kvm_get_rng_seed(u64 *rv);
+#else
+static inline bool kvm_get_rng_seed(u64 *rv)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_GUEST_H */
arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c +24 -1
index 47d13b0..8c8d021 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <asm/archrandom.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_guest.h>
 
 void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,
 		       void (*seed)(void *ctx, u32 data),
@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,
 		       const char *log_prefix)
 {
 	int i;
-	int rdseed_bits = 0, rdrand_bits = 0;
+	int rdseed_bits = 0, rdrand_bits = 0, kvm_bits = 0;
 	char buf[128] = "";
 	char *msgptr = buf;
 
@@ -42,10 +43,32 @@ void arch_get_rng_seed(void *ctx,
 #endif
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED regardless of whether the CPU RNG
+	 * worked, since it incorporates entropy unavailable to the CPU,
+	 * and we shouldn't trust the hardware RNG more than we need to.
+	 * We request enough bits for the entire internal RNG state,
+	 * because there's no good reason not to.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < bits_per_source; i += 64) {
+		u64 rv;
+
+		if (kvm_get_rng_seed(&rv)) {
+			seed(ctx, (u32)rv);
+			seed(ctx, (u32)(rv >> 32));
+			kvm_bits += 8 * sizeof(rv);
+		} else {
+			break;	/* If it fails once, it will keep failing. */
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (rdseed_bits)
 		msgptr += sprintf(msgptr, ", %d bits from RDSEED", rdseed_bits);
 	if (rdrand_bits)
 		msgptr += sprintf(msgptr, ", %d bits from RDRAND", rdrand_bits);
+	if (kvm_bits)
+		msgptr += sprintf(msgptr, ", %d bits from KVM_GET_RNG_BITS",
+				  kvm_bits);
 	if (buf[0])
 		pr_info("%s with %s\n", log_prefix, buf + 2);
 }
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +3 -0
index 3dd8e2c..bd8783a 100644
@@ -416,6 +416,16 @@ void kvm_disable_steal_time(void)
 	wrmsr(MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME, 0, 0);
 }
 
+bool kvm_get_rng_seed(u64 *v)
+{
+	/*

arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c void kvm_disable_steal_time(void) · line 431

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +7 -0
+	 * Allow migration from a hypervisor with the GET_RNG_SEED
+	 * feature to a hypervisor without it.
+	 */
+	return (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED) &&
+		rdmsrl_safe(MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED, v) == 0);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 static void __init kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
 {
#9 lore raw

PATCH v5 5/5 x86,kaslr: Use MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED for KASLR if available

In reply to Andy Lutomirski

It's considerably better than any of the alternatives on KVM.

Rather than reinventing all of the cpu feature query code, this fixes native_cpuid to work in PIC objects.

I haven't combined it with boot/cpuflags.c's cpuid implementation:
including asm/processor.h from boot/cpuflags.c results in a flood of unrelated errors, and fixing it might be messy.

---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c  | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c +27 -0
index fc6091a..8583f0e 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
 #include <asm/archrandom.h>
 #include <asm/e820.h>
 
+#include <uapi/asm/kvm_para.h>
+
 #include <generated/compile.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/uts.h>
@@ -15,6 +17,22 @@
 static const char build_str[] = UTS_RELEASE " (" LINUX_COMPILE_BY "@"
 		LINUX_COMPILE_HOST ") (" LINUX_COMPILER ") " UTS_VERSION;
 
+static bool kvm_para_has_feature(unsigned int feature)
+{
+	u32 kvm_base;
+	u32 features;
+
+	if (!has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		return false;
+
+	kvm_base = hypervisor_cpuid_base("KVMKVMKVM\0\0\0", KVM_CPUID_FEATURES);
+	if (!kvm_base)
+		return false;
+
+	features = cpuid_eax(kvm_base | KVM_CPUID_FEATURES);
+	return features & (1UL << feature);
+}
+
 #define I8254_PORT_CONTROL	0x43
 #define I8254_PORT_COUNTER0	0x40
 #define I8254_CMD_READBACK	0xC0
@@ -81,6 +99,15 @@ static unsigned long get_random_long(void)
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED)) {
+		u64 seed;
+
+		debug_putstr(" MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED");
+		rdmsrl(MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED, seed);
+		random ^= (unsigned long)seed;
+		use_i8254 = false;
+	}
+
 	if (has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_TSC)) {
 		debug_putstr(" RDTSC");
 		rdtscll(raw);
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +18 -3
index a4ea023..6096f3c 100644
@@ -189,10 +189,25 @@ static inline int have_cpuid_p(void)
 static inline void native_cpuid(unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
 				unsigned int *ecx, unsigned int *edx)
 {
-	/* ecx is often an input as well as an output. */
-	asm volatile("cpuid"
+	/*
+	 * This function can be used from the boot code, so it needs
+	 * to avoid using EBX in constraints in PIC mode.
+	 *
+	 * ecx is often an input as well as an output.
+	 */
+	asm volatile(".ifnc %%ebx,%1 ; .ifnc %%rbx,%1           \n\t"
+		     "movl  %%ebx,%1                            \n\t"
+		     ".endif ; .endif                           \n\t"
+		     "cpuid					\n\t"
+		     ".ifnc %%ebx,%1 ; .ifnc %%rbx,%1           \n\t"
+		     "xchgl %%ebx,%1                            \n\t"
+		     ".endif ; .endif"
 	    : "=a" (*eax),
-	      "=b" (*ebx),
+#if defined(__i386__) && defined(__PIC__)
+	      "=r" (*ebx),	/* gcc won't let us use ebx */
+#else
+	      "=b" (*ebx),	/* ebx is okay */
+#endif
 	      "=c" (*ecx),
 	      "=d" (*edx)
 	    : "0" (*eax), "2" (*ecx)
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
maintainer Acked-by on v5 5/5
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] x86,kaslr: Use MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED for KASLR if available

Il 24/07/2014 06:57, Andy Lutomirski ha scritto:

Quoted 92 lines

It's considerably better than any of the alternatives on KVM.

Rather than reinventing all of the cpu feature query code, this fixes native_cpuid to work in PIC objects.

I haven't combined it with boot/cpuflags.c's cpuid implementation:
including asm/processor.h from boot/cpuflags.c results in a flood of unrelated errors, and fixing it might be messy.

---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c  | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c +27 -0
index fc6091a..8583f0e 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
 #include <asm/archrandom.h>
 #include <asm/e820.h>
 
+#include <uapi/asm/kvm_para.h>
+
 #include <generated/compile.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/uts.h>
@@ -15,6 +17,22 @@
 static const char build_str[] = UTS_RELEASE " (" LINUX_COMPILE_BY "@"
 		LINUX_COMPILE_HOST ") (" LINUX_COMPILER ") " UTS_VERSION;
 
+static bool kvm_para_has_feature(unsigned int feature)
+{
+	u32 kvm_base;
+	u32 features;
+
+	if (!has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		return false;
+
+	kvm_base = hypervisor_cpuid_base("KVMKVMKVM\0\0\0", KVM_CPUID_FEATURES);
+	if (!kvm_base)
+		return false;
+
+	features = cpuid_eax(kvm_base | KVM_CPUID_FEATURES);
+	return features & (1UL << feature);
+}
+
 #define I8254_PORT_CONTROL	0x43
 #define I8254_PORT_COUNTER0	0x40
 #define I8254_CMD_READBACK	0xC0
@@ -81,6 +99,15 @@ static unsigned long get_random_long(void)
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_GET_RNG_SEED)) {
+		u64 seed;
+
+		debug_putstr(" MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED");
+		rdmsrl(MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED, seed);
+		random ^= (unsigned long)seed;
+		use_i8254 = false;
+	}
+
 	if (has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_TSC)) {
 		debug_putstr(" RDTSC");
 		rdtscll(raw);
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +13 -2
index a4ea023..6096f3c 100644
@@ -189,10 +189,25 @@ static inline int have_cpuid_p(void)
 static inline void native_cpuid(unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
 				unsigned int *ecx, unsigned int *edx)
 {
-	/* ecx is often an input as well as an output. */
-	asm volatile("cpuid"
+	/*
+	 * This function can be used from the boot code, so it needs
+	 * to avoid using EBX in constraints in PIC mode.
+	 *
+	 * ecx is often an input as well as an output.
+	 */
+	asm volatile(".ifnc %%ebx,%1 ; .ifnc %%rbx,%1           \n\t"
+		     "movl  %%ebx,%1                            \n\t"
+		     ".endif ; .endif                           \n\t"
+		     "cpuid					\n\t"
+		     ".ifnc %%ebx,%1 ; .ifnc %%rbx,%1           \n\t"
+		     "xchgl %%ebx,%1                            \n\t"
+		     ".endif ; .endif"

arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h static inline int have_cpuid_p(void) · line 213

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +5 -1
 	    : "=a" (*eax),
-	      "=b" (*ebx),
+#if defined(__i386__) && defined(__PIC__)
+	      "=r" (*ebx),	/* gcc won't let us use ebx */
+#else
+	      "=b" (*ebx),	/* ebx is okay */
+#endif
 	      "=c" (*ecx),
 	      "=d" (*edx)
 	    : "0" (*eax), "2" (*ecx)
#11 lore raw
In reply to Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 9 lines · Andy Lutomirski

This introduces and uses a very simple synchronous mechanism to get /dev/urandom-style bits appropriate for initial KVM PV guest RNG seeding.

It also re-works the way that architectural random data is fed into random.c's pools. I added a new arch hook called arch_get_rng_seed. The default implementation is more or less the same as the current code, except that random_get_entropy is now called unconditionally.

Quoted 7 lines

x86 gets a custom arch_get_rng_seed. It will use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED if available, and, if it does anything, it will log the number of bits collected from each available architectural source. If more paravirt seed sources show up, it will be a natural place to add them.

I sent the corresponding kvm-unit-tests and qemu changes separately.

What's the status of this series? I assume that it's too late for at least patches 2-5 to make it into 3.17.

--Andy

Quoted 50 lines

Changes from v4:
- Got rid of the RDRAND behavior change. If this series is accepted, I may resend it separately, but I think it's an unrelated issue.
- Fix up the changelog entries -- I misunderstood how the old code worked.
- Avoid lots of failed attempts to use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED if it's not available.

Changes from v3:
- Other than KASLR, the guest pieces are completely rewritten. Patches 2-4 have essentially nothing in common with v2.

Changes from v2:
- Bisection fix (patch 2 had a misplaced brace). The final states is identical to that of v2.
- Improve the 0/5 description a little bit.

Changes from v1:
- Split patches 2 and 3
- Log all arch sources in init_std_data
- Fix the 32-bit kaslr build

Andy Lutomirski (5):
x86,kvm: Add MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED and a matching feature bit
random: Add and use arch_get_rng_seed
x86,random: Add an x86 implementation of arch_get_rng_seed x86,random,kvm: Use KVM_GET_RNG_SEED in arch_get_rng_seed x86,kaslr: Use MSR_KVM_GET_RNG_SEED for KASLR if available

 Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt  |  3 ++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                     |  4 ++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c      | 27 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h    |  6 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_guest.h     |  9 +++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h     | 21 ++++++++--
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h |  2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile             |  2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c         | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c                | 10 +++++
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c                 |  3 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                   |  4 ++
 drivers/char/random.c                | 14 +++++--
 include/linux/random.h               | 40 +++++++++++++++++++
 14 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/archrandom.c

--
1.9.3

Signature · 2 lines
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
maintainer
#12 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Andy Lutomirski

What's the status of this series? I assume that it's too late for at least patches 2-5 to make it into 3.17.

Which tree were you hoping this patch series to go through? I was assuming it would go through the x86 tree since the bulk of the changes in the x86 subsystem (hence my Acked-by).

IIRC, Peter had some concerns, and I don't remember if they were all addressed. Peter?

- Ted

#13 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 3 lines · Andy Lutomirski

What's the status of this series? I assume that it's too late for at least patches 2-5 to make it into 3.17.

Which tree were you hoping this patch series to go through? I was assuming it would go through the x86 tree since the bulk of the changes in the x86 subsystem (hence my Acked-by).

There's some argument that patch 1 should go through the kvm tree. There's no real need for patch 1 and 2-5 to end up in the same kernel release, either.

Quoted 4 lines

IIRC, Peter had some concerns, and I don't remember if they were all addressed. Peter?

I don't know. I rewrite one thing he didn't like and undid the other, but there's plenty of opportunity for this version to be problematic, too.

--Andy

#14 lore raw
Quoted 15 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 8 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 3 lines · Andy Lutomirski

What's the status of this series? I assume that it's too late for at least patches 2-5 to make it into 3.17.

Which tree were you hoping this patch series to go through? I was assuming it would go through the x86 tree since the bulk of the changes in the x86 subsystem (hence my Acked-by).

There's some argument that patch 1 should go through the kvm tree. There's no real need for patch 1 and 2-5 to end up in the same kernel release, either.

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

IIRC, Peter had some concerns, and I don't remember if they were all addressed. Peter?

I don't know. I rewrite one thing he didn't like and undid the other, but there's plenty of opportunity for this version to be problematic, too.

Sorry, I have been heads down on the current merge window. I will look at this for 3.18, presumably after Kernel Summit.

The proposed arch_get_rng_seed() is not really what it claims to be; it most definitely does not produce seed-grade randomness, instead it seems to be an arch function for best-effort initialization of the entropy pools -- which is fine, it is just something quite different.

I want to look over it more carefully before acking it, though.

Andy, are you going to be in Chicago?

-hpa

#15 lore raw
Quoted 25 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 15 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 8 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 3 lines · Andy Lutomirski

What's the status of this series? I assume that it's too late for at least patches 2-5 to make it into 3.17.

Which tree were you hoping this patch series to go through? I was assuming it would go through the x86 tree since the bulk of the changes in the x86 subsystem (hence my Acked-by).

There's some argument that patch 1 should go through the kvm tree. There's no real need for patch 1 and 2-5 to end up in the same kernel release, either.

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

IIRC, Peter had some concerns, and I don't remember if they were all addressed. Peter?

I don't know. I rewrite one thing he didn't like and undid the other, but there's plenty of opportunity for this version to be problematic, too.

Quoted 7 lines

Sorry, I have been heads down on the current merge window. I will look at this for 3.18, presumably after Kernel Summit.

The proposed arch_get_rng_seed() is not really what it claims to be; it most definitely does not produce seed-grade randomness, instead it seems to be an arch function for best-effort initialization of the entropy pools -- which is fine, it is just something quite different.

Fair enough. I meant "seed" as in something that initialized a PRNG (think srand), not "seed" as in a promised-to-be-cryptographically-secure seed for a DRBG.

I can rename it, update the comment, or otherwise tweak it to make the intent clearer.

Quoted 2 lines

I want to look over it more carefully before acking it, though.

It would also be nice for someone with a Haswell box (and an RDSEED box) to test it. I have neither.

Quoted 2 lines

Andy, are you going to be in Chicago?

Yes.

Quoted 3 lines

-hpa

maintainer
#16 lore raw
In reply to H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 4 lines · H. Peter Anvin

The proposed arch_get_rng_seed() is not really what it claims to be; it most definitely does not produce seed-grade randomness, instead it seems to be an arch function for best-effort initialization of the entropy pools -- which is fine, it is just something quite different.

Without getting into an argument about which definition of "seed" is correct --- it's certainly confusing and different form the RDSEED usage of the word "seed".

Do we expect that anyone else besides arch_get_rnd_seed() would actually want to use it? I'd argue no; we want the rest of the kernel to either use get_random_bytes() or prandom_u32(). Given that, maybe we should just call it arch_random_init(), and expect that the only user of this interface would be drivers/char/random.c?

- Ted

#17 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 4 lines · H. Peter Anvin

The proposed arch_get_rng_seed() is not really what it claims to be; it most definitely does not produce seed-grade randomness, instead it seems to be an arch function for best-effort initialization of the entropy pools -- which is fine, it is just something quite different.

Quoted 6 lines

Without getting into an argument about which definition of "seed" is correct --- it's certainly confusing and different form the RDSEED usage of the word "seed".

Do we expect that anyone else besides arch_get_rnd_seed() would actually want to use it?

If you mean random.c instead of arch_get_rnd_seed, then I don't expect there to be other users. Aside from the "best-effort" bit causing this to be basically useless on old bare metal, the interface is really awkward for anything other than the use in random.c.

Quoted 4 lines

I'd argue no; we want the rest of the kernel
to either use get_random_bytes() or prandom_u32(). Given that, maybe we should just call it arch_random_init(), and expect that the only user of this interface would be drivers/char/random.c?

Sounds good to me.

FWIW, I'd like to see a second use added in random.c: I think that we should do this, or even all of init_std_data, on resume from suspend and especially on resume from hibernate / kexec.

--Andy

#18 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Andy Lutomirski

Sounds good to me.

FWIW, I'd like to see a second use added in random.c: I think that we should do this, or even all of init_std_data, on resume from suspend and especially on resume from hibernate / kexec.

Yes, we should. We also need to make it possible to do this after cloning a VM.

-hpa

maintainer
#19 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 7 lines · Andy Lutomirski

Sounds good to me.

FWIW, I'd like to see a second use added in random.c: I think that we should do this, or even all of init_std_data, on resume from suspend and especially on resume from hibernate / kexec.

Yes, we should. We also need to make it possible to do this after cloning a VM.

Agreed. Can you send a patch?

I can carry the commits to add arch_random_init() the generic version, and the patch to call it after suspend/resume. I'll do this at the very head of the random tree, and make sure it gets pushed to Linus early during the next merge window.

Does that sound like a plan? Or does someone want to suggest something different? I'm flexible...

- Ted

#20 lore raw
Quoted 15 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 11 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 7 lines · Andy Lutomirski

Sounds good to me.

FWIW, I'd like to see a second use added in random.c: I think that we should do this, or even all of init_std_data, on resume from suspend and especially on resume from hibernate / kexec.

Yes, we should. We also need to make it possible to do this after cloning a VM.

Agreed. Can you send a patch?

Quoted 7 lines

I can carry the commits to add arch_random_init() the generic version, and the patch to call it after suspend/resume. I'll do this at the very head of the random tree, and make sure it gets pushed to Linus early during the next merge window.

Does that sound like a plan? Or does someone want to suggest something different? I'm flexible...

OK. Here's a proposal. I'll split the series into two parts. The first part will be the arch_random_init generic change and code to call it after suspend/resume (once I figure out the right callback). I'll send that to you.

The second part will be the KVM and x86 code, which will look just like this version (v5) except for the rename. If needed, hpa and I can hash the details we need at KS.

As for doing arch_random_init after clone/migration, I think we'll need another KVM extension for that, since, AFAIK, we don't actually get notified that we were cloned or migrated. That will be nontrivial. Maybe we can figure that out at KS, too.

--Andy

Quoted 2 lines

- Ted

Signature · 2 lines
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
#21 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Andy Lutomirski

As for doing arch_random_init after clone/migration, I think we'll need another KVM extension for that, since, AFAIK, we don't actually get notified that we were cloned or migrated. That will be nontrivial. Maybe we can figure that out at KS, too.

We don't need a reset when migrated (although it might be a good idea under some circumstances, i.e. if the pools might somehow have gotten exposed) but definitely when cloned.

-hpa

#22 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 6 lines · Andy Lutomirski

As for doing arch_random_init after clone/migration, I think we'll need another KVM extension for that, since, AFAIK, we don't actually get notified that we were cloned or migrated. That will be nontrivial. Maybe we can figure that out at KS, too.

Quoted 4 lines

We don't need a reset when migrated (although it might be a good idea under some circumstances, i.e. if the pools might somehow have gotten exposed) but definitely when cloned.

But yes, we need a notification. For obvious reasons there is no suspend event (one can snapshot a running VM) but we need to be notified upon wakeup, *or* we need to give KVM a way to update the necessary state.

-hpa

#23 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 8 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 6 lines · Andy Lutomirski

As for doing arch_random_init after clone/migration, I think we'll need another KVM extension for that, since, AFAIK, we don't actually get notified that we were cloned or migrated. That will be nontrivial. Maybe we can figure that out at KS, too.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

We don't need a reset when migrated (although it might be a good idea under some circumstances, i.e. if the pools might somehow have gotten exposed) but definitely when cloned.

But yes, we need a notification. For obvious reasons there is no suspend event (one can snapshot a running VM) but we need to be notified upon wakeup, *or* we need to give KVM a way to update the necessary state.

This could presumably use the interrupt mechanism on virtio-rng if we're willing to depend on having host support for virtio-rng.

v6 (coming in a few minutes) will at least get it right when the kernel goes through the resume path (i.e. not KVM/QEMU suspend, and maybe not S0ix either).

--Andy

maintainer
#24 lore raw
In reply to Andy Lutomirski

Il 13/08/2014 20:33, Andy Lutomirski ha scritto:

Quoted 4 lines

As for doing arch_random_init after clone/migration, I think we'll need another KVM extension for that, since, AFAIK, we don't actually get notified that we were cloned or migrated. That will be nontrivial. Maybe we can figure that out at KS, too.

Migration doesn't need an arch_random_init, only cloning does.

MS has an ACPI-based specification for this they call the "VM Generation ID", which QEMU should be implementing it sooner rather than later. In Linux we could add a generic notifier, and an x86 platform driver that implements the VM Generation ID specification and invokes the notifier.

http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkID=260709 (warning, .docx ahead)

KY, would you be interested in looking at this?

Paolo