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x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)

PATCH Superseded Brijesh Singh 2 participants 42 messages Nov 1, 2017 – Nov 6, 2017

Subsystems (7)
Documentation x86 KVM Crypto API +3 more subsystems

v7 of 12 Superseded Latest is v12 →

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v7 cover x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)

This part of Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) patch series focuses on KVM changes required to create and manage SEV guests.

SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running encrypted virtual machine (VMs) under the control of a hypervisor. Encrypted VMs have their pages (code and data) secured such that only the guest itself has access to unencrypted version. Each encrypted VM is associated with a unique encryption key; if its data is accessed to a different entity using a different key the encrypted guest's data will be incorrectly decrypted, leading to unintelligible data. This security model ensures that hypervisor will no longer able to inspect or alter any guest code or data.

The key management of this feature is handled by a separate processor known as the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP) which is present on AMD SOCs. The SEV Key Management Specification (see below) provides a set of commands which can be used by hypervisor to load virtual machine keys through the AMD-SP driver.

The patch series adds a new ioctl in KVM driver (KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPTION_OP). The ioctl will be used by qemu to issue SEV guest-specific commands defined in Key Management Specification.

The following links provide additional details:

AMD Memory Encryption white paper:
http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf

AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual:
http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf
SME is section 7.10
SEV is section 15.34

SEV Key Management:
http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf

KVM Forum Presentation:
http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf

SEV Guest BIOS support:
SEV support has been add to EDKII/OVMF BIOS
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2

SEV Part 1 patch series: https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=150851036113575&w=2

--
The series is based on kvm/master commit : cc9085b68753 (Merge branch \
'kvm-ppc-fixes')

Complete tree is available at:
repo: https://github.com/codomania/kvm.git
branch: sev-v7-p2

TODO:
* Add SEV guest migration command support

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Cc Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc Gary Hook <[email protected]>

Changes since v6:
* (ccp): Extend psp_device structure to track the FW INIT and SHUTDOWN states.
* (ccp): Init and Uninit SEV FW during module load/unload
* (ccp): Avoid repeated k*alloc() for init and status command buffer
* (kvm): Rework DBG command to fix the compilation warning seen with gcc7.x
* (kvm): Convert the SEV doc in rst format

Changes since v5:
* split the PSP driver support into multiple patches
* multiple improvements from Boris
* remove mem_enc_enabled() ops

Changes since v4:
* Fixes to address kbuild robot errors
* Add 'sev' module params to allow enable/disable SEV feature
* Update documentation
* Multiple fixes to address v4 feedbacks
* Some coding style changes to address checkpatch reports

Changes since v3:
* Re-design the PSP interface support patch
* Rename the ioctls based on the feedbacks
* Improve documentation
* Fix i386 build issues
* Add LAUNCH_SECRET command
* Add new Kconfig option to enable SEV support
* Changes to address v3 feedbacks.

Changes since v2:
* Add KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REGISTER/UNREGISTER_RAM ioct to register encrypted memory ranges (recommend by Paolo)
* Extend kvm_x86_ops to provide new memory_encryption_enabled ops
* Enhance DEBUG DECRYPT/ENCRYPT commands to work with more than one page \
(recommended by Paolo)
* Optimize LAUNCH_UPDATE command to reduce the number of calls to AMD-SP driver
* Changes to address v2 feedbacks

Borislav Petkov (1):
crypto: ccp: Build the AMD secure processor driver only with AMD CPU
support

Brijesh Singh (34):
Documentation/virtual/kvm: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization

    (SEV)

KVM: SVM: Prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest
KVM: X86: Extend CPUID range to include new leaf
KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl
KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_{UN,}REG_REGION ioctl
crypto: ccp: Define SEV userspace ioctl and command id
crypto: ccp: Define SEV key management command id
crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) device support
crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support
crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_FACTORY_RESET ioctl command
crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS ioctl command
crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_GEN ioctl command
crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_GEN ioctl command
crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CSR ioctl command
crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT ioctl command
crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT ioctl command
KVM: X86: Add CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
KVM: SVM: Add sev module_param
KVM: SVM: Reserve ASID range for SEV guest
KVM: Define SEV key management command id
KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_INIT command
KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled
KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command
KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command
KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE command
KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command
KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command
KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command
KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command
KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_SECRET command
KVM: SVM: Pin guest memory when SEV is active
KVM: SVM: Clear C-bit from the page fault address
KVM: SVM: Do not install #UD intercept when SEV is enabled
KVM: X86: Restart the guest when insn_len is zero and SEV is enabled

Tom Lendacky (3):
x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
kvm: svm: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl
kvm: svm: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM

 Documentation/virtual/kvm/00-INDEX                 |    3 +
 .../virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst          |  247 +++++
 Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt                  |   50 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h                 |    1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h                    |   15 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h                   |    2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h                         |    3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c                          |   66 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c                    |    1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig                               |   10 +
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c                               |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c                                 |   10 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                                 | 1135 +++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                                 |   30 +
 drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig                         |   12 +
 drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile                        |    1 +
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c                       |  807 ++++++++++++++
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h                       |   83 ++
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c                        |   35 +
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h                        |   28 +-
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c                        |   52 +
 include/linux/psp-sev.h                            |  641 +++++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                           |   90 ++
 include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h                       |  113 ++
 24 files changed, 3407 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
 create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
 create mode 100644 include/linux/psp-sev.h
 create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#1 lore raw

PATCH v7 1/38 Documentation/virtual/kvm: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)

Create a Documentation entry to describe the AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 Documentation/virtual/kvm/00-INDEX                 |  3 ++
 .../virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst          | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
Documentation/virtual/kvm/00-INDEX +3 -0
index 69fe1a8b7ad1..3da73aabff5a 100644
@@ -26,3 +26,6 @@ s390-diag.txt
 	- Diagnose hypercall description (for IBM S/390)
 timekeeping.txt
 	- timekeeping virtualization for x86-based architectures.
+amd-memory-encryption.txt
+	- notes on AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization feature and SEV firmware
+	  command description
Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst new file +45 -0

45 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#2 lore raw

PATCH v7 2/38 x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature

In reply to Brijesh Singh

From: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>

Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature. SEV is identified by CPUID 0x8000001f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of MSR_K8_SYSCFG and set bit 0 of MSR_K7_HWCR). Only show the SEV feature as available if reported by CPUID and enabled by BIOS.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c          | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c    |  1 +
 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
index 2519c6c801c9..759d29c37686 100644
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE	( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SME		( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SEV		( 7*32+11) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN	( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT	( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +2 -0
index 17f5c12e1afd..e399d68029a9 100644
@@ -378,6 +378,8 @@
 #define MSR_K7_PERFCTR3			0xc0010007
 #define MSR_K7_CLK_CTL			0xc001001b
 #define MSR_K7_HWCR			0xc0010015
+#define MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK_BIT		0
+#define MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK		BIT_ULL(MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK_BIT)
 #define MSR_K7_FID_VID_CTL		0xc0010041
 #define MSR_K7_FID_VID_STATUS		0xc0010042
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +46 -20

78 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +1 -0
index 05459ad3db46..63a78d5fe505 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CPB,		CPUID_EDX,  9, 0x80000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK,    CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_SME,		CPUID_EAX,  0, 0x8000001f, 0 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_SEV,		CPUID_EAX,  1, 0x8000001f, 0 },
 	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#3 lore raw

PATCH v7 3/38 kvm: svm: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl

In reply to Brijesh Singh

From: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>

Currently the nested_ctl variable in the vmcb_control_area structure is used to indicate nested paging support. The nested paging support field is actually defined as bit 0 of the field. In order to support a new feature flag the usage of the nested_ctl and nested paging support must be converted to operate on a single bit.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c         | 7 ++++---
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +2 -0
index 14835dd205a5..5e3244724c9d 100644
@@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {
 #define SVM_VM_CR_SVM_LOCK_MASK 0x0008ULL
 #define SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DIS_MASK  0x0010ULL
 
+#define SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE	BIT(0)
+
 struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_seg {
 	u16 selector;
 	u16 attrib;
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +4 -3
index 0e68f0b3cbf7..8186b8d7c469 100644
@@ -1296,7 +1296,7 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 
 	if (npt_enabled) {
 		/* Setup VMCB for Nested Paging */
-		control->nested_ctl = 1;
+		control->nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE;
 		clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
 		clr_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
 		clr_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
@@ -2910,7 +2910,8 @@ static bool nested_vmcb_checks(struct vmcb *vmcb)
 	if (vmcb->control.asid == 0)
 		return false;
 
-	if (vmcb->control.nested_ctl && !npt_enabled)
+	if ((vmcb->control.nested_ctl & SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE) &&
+	    !npt_enabled)
 		return false;
 
 	return true;
@@ -2985,7 +2986,7 @@ static bool nested_svm_vmrun(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	else
 		svm->vcpu.arch.hflags &= ~HF_HIF_MASK;
 
-	if (nested_vmcb->control.nested_ctl) {
+	if (nested_vmcb->control.nested_ctl & SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE) {
 		kvm_mmu_unload(&svm->vcpu);
 		svm->nested.nested_cr3 = nested_vmcb->control.nested_cr3;
 		nested_svm_init_mmu_context(&svm->vcpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#4 lore raw

PATCH v7 4/38 kvm: svm: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM

In reply to Brijesh Singh

From: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>

Define the SEV enable bit for the VMCB control structure. The hypervisor will use this bit to enable SEV in the guest.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +1 -0
index 5e3244724c9d..e9899ed67c70 100644
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {
 #define SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DIS_MASK  0x0010ULL
 
 #define SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE	BIT(0)
+#define SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE	BIT(1)
 
 struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_seg {
 	u16 selector;
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#5 lore raw

PATCH v7 5/38 KVM: SVM: Prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest

In reply to Brijesh Singh

Currently, ASID allocation start at 1. Add a svm_vcpu_data.min_asid which allows supplying a dynamic start ASID.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +3 -1
index 8186b8d7c469..2c3a3c88596c 100644
@@ -525,6 +525,7 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
 	u64 asid_generation;
 	u32 max_asid;
 	u32 next_asid;
+	u32 min_asid;
 	struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
 
 	struct page *save_area;
@@ -782,6 +783,7 @@ static int svm_hardware_enable(void)
 	sd->asid_generation = 1;
 	sd->max_asid = cpuid_ebx(SVM_CPUID_FUNC) - 1;
 	sd->next_asid = sd->max_asid + 1;
+	sd->min_asid = 1;
 
 	gdt = get_current_gdt_rw();
 	sd->tss_desc = (struct kvm_ldttss_desc *)(gdt + GDT_ENTRY_TSS);
@@ -2091,7 +2093,7 @@ static void new_asid(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
 {
 	if (sd->next_asid > sd->max_asid) {
 		++sd->asid_generation;
-		sd->next_asid = 1;
+		sd->next_asid = sd->min_asid;
 		svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#6 lore raw

PATCH v7 6/38 KVM: X86: Extend CPUID range to include new leaf

In reply to Brijesh Singh

This CPUID leaf provides the memory encryption support information on AMD Platform. Its complete description is available in APM volume 2, Section 15.34

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c   | 6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -1
index 0099e10eb045..c6473ca825cd 100644
@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
 		entry->edx = 0;
 		break;
 	case 0x80000000:
-		entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 0x8000001a);
+		entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 0x8000001f);
 		break;
 	case 0x80000001:
 		entry->edx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0001_edx_x86_features;
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +6 -0
index 2c3a3c88596c..fab5b1b7fc63 100644
@@ -5149,6 +5149,12 @@ static void svm_set_supported_cpuid(u32 func, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry)
 			entry->edx |= SVM_FEATURE_NPT;
 
 		break;
+	case 0x8000001F:
+		/* Support memory encryption cpuid if host supports it */
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
+			cpuid(0x8000001f, &entry->eax, &entry->ebx,
+				&entry->ecx, &entry->edx);
+
 	}
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#7 lore raw

PATCH v7 7/38 KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl

In reply to Brijesh Singh

If the hardware supports memory encryption then the KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl can be used by qemu to issue a platform specific memory encryption commands.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h   |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                |  6 ++++++
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h          |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt +16 -0
index e63a35fafef0..fcafdae1739e 100644
@@ -3390,6 +3390,22 @@ invalid, if invalid pages are written to (e.g. after the end of memory)
 or if no page table is present for the addresses (e.g. when using
 hugepages).
 
+4.109 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
+
+Capability: basic
+Architectures: x86
+Type: system
+Parameters: an opaque platform specific structure (in/out)
+Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+If the platform supports creating encrypted VMs then this ioctl can be used
+for issuing platform-specific memory encryption commands to manage those
+encrypted VMs.
+
+Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Secure Encrypted Virtualization
+(SEV) commands on AMD Processors. The SEV commands are defined in
+Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.txt.
+
 5. The kvm_run structure
 ------------------------
 
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
index c73e493adf07..48001ca48c14 100644
@@ -1061,6 +1061,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	void (*cancel_hv_timer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 	void (*setup_mce)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+	int (*mem_enc_op)(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
 };
 
 struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +6 -0
index 03869eb7fcd6..4c365eb23080 100644
@@ -4270,6 +4270,12 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(kvm, &cap);
 		break;
 	}
+	case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP: {
+		r = -ENOTTY;
+		if (kvm_x86_ops->mem_enc_op)
+			r = kvm_x86_ops->mem_enc_op(kvm, argp);
+		break;
+	}
 	default:
 		r = -ENOTTY;
 	}
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +2 -0
index 838887587411..4a39d99c5f99 100644
@@ -1356,6 +1356,8 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
 /* Available with KVM_CAP_S390_CMMA_MIGRATION */
 #define KVM_S390_GET_CMMA_BITS      _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xb8, struct kvm_s390_cmma_log)
 #define KVM_S390_SET_CMMA_BITS      _IOW(KVMIO, 0xb9, struct kvm_s390_cmma_log)
+/* Memory Encryption Commands */
+#define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP      _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xba, unsigned long)
 
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU	(1 << 0)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3		(1 << 1)
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#8 lore raw

PATCH v7 8/38 KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_{UN,}REG_REGION ioctl

In reply to Brijesh Singh

If hardware supports memory encryption then KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION and KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION ioctl's can be used by userspace to register/unregister the guest memory regions which may contain the encrypted data (e.g guest RAM, PCI BAR, SMRAM etc).

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h   |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h          |  8 ++++++++
 4 files changed, 68 insertions(+)
Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt +34 -0
index fcafdae1739e..365b6e2c8be5 100644
@@ -3406,6 +3406,40 @@ Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Secure Encrypted Virtualization
 (SEV) commands on AMD Processors. The SEV commands are defined in
 Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.txt.
 
+4.110 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION
+
+Capability: basic
+Architectures: x86
+Type: system
+Parameters: struct kvm_enc_region (in)
+Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This ioctl can be used to register a guest memory region which may
+contain encrypted data (e.g. guest RAM, SMRAM etc).
+
+It is used in the SEV-enabled guest. When encryption is enabled, a guest
+memory region may contain encrypted data. The SEV memory encryption
+engine uses a tweak such that two identical plaintext pages, each at
+different locations will have differing ciphertexts. So swapping or
+moving ciphertext of those pages will not result in plaintext being
+swapped. So relocating (or migrating) physical backing pages for the SEV
+guest will require some additional steps.
+
+Note: The current SEV key management spec does not provide commands to
+swap or migrate (move) ciphertext pages. Hence, for now we pin the guest
+memory region registered with the ioctl.
+
+4.111 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION
+
+Capability: basic
+Architectures: x86
+Type: system
+Parameters: struct kvm_enc_region (in)
+Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This ioctl can be used to unregister the guest memory region registered
+with KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION ioctl above.
+
 5. The kvm_run structure
 ------------------------
 
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
index 48001ca48c14..3af074452b2b 100644
@@ -1063,6 +1063,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	void (*setup_mce)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 	int (*mem_enc_op)(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
+	int (*mem_enc_reg_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
+	int (*mem_enc_unreg_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
 };
 
 struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +24 -0
index 4c365eb23080..d4e2c61cb6b7 100644
@@ -4276,6 +4276,30 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 			r = kvm_x86_ops->mem_enc_op(kvm, argp);
 		break;
 	}
+	case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION: {
+		struct kvm_enc_region region;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&region, argp, sizeof(region)))
+			goto out;
+
+		r = -ENOTTY;
+		if (kvm_x86_ops->mem_enc_reg_region)
+			r = kvm_x86_ops->mem_enc_reg_region(kvm, &region);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION: {
+		struct kvm_enc_region region;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&region, argp, sizeof(region)))
+			goto out;
+
+		r = -ENOTTY;
+		if (kvm_x86_ops->mem_enc_unreg_region)
+			r = kvm_x86_ops->mem_enc_unreg_region(kvm, &region);
+		break;
+	}
 	default:
 		r = -ENOTTY;
 	}
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +8 -0
index 4a39d99c5f99..1f9f26a8e111 100644
@@ -1359,6 +1359,14 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
 /* Memory Encryption Commands */
 #define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP      _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xba, unsigned long)
 
+struct kvm_enc_region {
+	__u64 addr;
+	__u64 size;
+};
+
+#define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION    _IOR(KVMIO, 0xbb, struct kvm_enc_region)
+#define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION  _IOR(KVMIO, 0xbc, struct kvm_enc_region)
+
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU	(1 << 0)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3		(1 << 1)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX	(1 << 2)
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#9 lore raw

PATCH v7 9/38 crypto: ccp: Build the AMD secure processor driver only with AMD CPU support

In reply to Brijesh Singh

From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>

This is AMD-specific hardware so present it in Kconfig only when AMD CPU support is enabled or on ARM64 where it is also used.

---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig +1 -0
index 6d626606b9c5..9c84f9838931 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 config CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD
 	tristate "Secure Processor device driver"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD || ARM64
 	default m
 	help
 	  Provides AMD Secure Processor device driver.
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#10 lore raw

PATCH v7 10/38 crypto: ccp: Define SEV userspace ioctl and command id

In reply to Brijesh Singh

Add a include file which defines the ioctl and command id used for issuing SEV platform management specific commands.

---
 include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 113 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h new file +113 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1dd98ba4ff22
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+/*
+ * Userspace interface for AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
+ * platform management commands.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * SEV spec 0.14 is available at:
+ * http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __PSP_SEV_USER_H__
+#define __PSP_SEV_USER_H__
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/**
+ * SEV platform commands
+ */
+enum {
+	SEV_FACTORY_RESET = 0,
+	SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS,
+	SEV_PEK_GEN,
+	SEV_PEK_CSR,
+	SEV_PDH_GEN,
+	SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT,
+	SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT,
+
+	SEV_MAX,
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_status - PLATFORM_STATUS command parameters
+ *
+ * @major: major API version
+ * @minor: minor API version
+ * @state: platform state
+ * @flags: platform config flags
+ * @build: firmware build id for API version
+ * @guest_count: number of active guests
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_status {
+	__u8 api_major;				/* Out */
+	__u8 api_minor;				/* Out */
+	__u8 state;				/* Out */
+	__u32 flags;				/* Out */
+	__u8 build;				/* Out */
+	__u32 guest_count;			/* Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_pek_csr - PEK_CSR command parameters
+ *
+ * @address: PEK certificate chain
+ * @length: length of certificate
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_pek_csr {
+	__u64 address;				/* In */
+	__u32 length;				/* In/Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_cert_import - PEK_CERT_IMPORT command parameters
+ *
+ * @pek_address: PEK certificate chain
+ * @pek_len: length of PEK certificate
+ * @oca_address: OCA certificate chain
+ * @oca_len: length of OCA certificate
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_pek_cert_import {
+	__u64 pek_cert_address;			/* In */
+	__u32 pek_cert_len;			/* In */
+	__u64 oca_cert_address;			/* In */
+	__u32 oca_cert_len;			/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_pdh_cert_export - PDH_CERT_EXPORT command parameters
+ *
+ * @pdh_address: PDH certificate address
+ * @pdh_len: length of PDH certificate
+ * @cert_chain_address: PDH certificate chain
+ * @cert_chain_len: length of PDH certificate chain
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_pdh_cert_export {
+	__u64 pdh_cert_address;			/* In */
+	__u32 pdh_cert_len;			/* In/Out */
+	__u64 cert_chain_address;		/* In */
+	__u32 cert_chain_len;			/* In/Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_issue_cmd - SEV ioctl parameters
+ *
+ * @cmd: SEV commands to execute
+ * @opaque: pointer to the command structure
+ * @error: SEV FW return code on failure
+ */
+struct sev_issue_cmd {
+	__u32 cmd;				/* In */
+	__u64 data;				/* In */
+	__u32 error;				/* Out */
+} __packed;
+
+#define SEV_IOC_TYPE		'S'
+#define SEV_ISSUE_CMD	_IOWR(SEV_IOC_TYPE, 0x0, struct sev_issue_cmd)
+
+#endif /* __PSP_USER_SEV_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#11 lore raw

PATCH v7 11/38 crypto: ccp: Define SEV key management command id

In reply to Brijesh Singh

Define Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) key management command id and structure. The command definition is available in SEV KM spec 0.14 (http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf)

---
 include/linux/psp-sev.h | 494 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 494 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/psp-sev.h
include/linux/psp-sev.h new file +494 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..15bda519538e
@@ -0,0 +1,494 @@
+/*
+ * AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) driver interface
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * SEV spec 0.14 is available at:
+ * http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __PSP_SEV_H__
+#define __PSP_SEV_H__
+
+#include <uapi/linux/psp-sev.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+
+#define __psp_pa(x)	__sme_pa(x)
+#else
+#define __psp_pa(x)	__pa(x)
+#endif
+
+#define SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE	0x4000	/* 16KB */
+
+/**
+ * SEV platform state
+ */
+enum sev_state {
+	SEV_STATE_UNINIT		= 0x0,
+	SEV_STATE_INIT			= 0x1,
+	SEV_STATE_WORKING		= 0x2,
+
+	SEV_STATE_MAX
+};
+
+/**
+ * SEV platform and guest management commands
+ */
+enum sev_cmd {
+	/* platform commands */
+	SEV_CMD_INIT			= 0x001,
+	SEV_CMD_SHUTDOWN		= 0x002,
+	SEV_CMD_FACTORY_RESET		= 0x003,
+	SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS		= 0x004,
+	SEV_CMD_PEK_GEN			= 0x005,
+	SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR			= 0x006,
+	SEV_CMD_PEK_CERT_IMPORT		= 0x007,
+	SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT		= 0x008,
+	SEV_CMD_PDH_GEN			= 0x009,
+	SEV_CMD_DF_FLUSH		= 0x00A,
+
+	/* Guest commands */
+	SEV_CMD_DECOMMISSION		= 0x020,
+	SEV_CMD_ACTIVATE		= 0x021,
+	SEV_CMD_DEACTIVATE		= 0x022,
+	SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS		= 0x023,
+
+	/* Guest launch commands */
+	SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START		= 0x030,
+	SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA	= 0x031,
+	SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA	= 0x032,
+	SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE		= 0x033,
+	SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET	= 0x034,
+	SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH		= 0x035,
+
+	/* Guest migration commands (outgoing) */
+	SEV_CMD_SEND_START		= 0x040,
+	SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA	= 0x041,
+	SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA	= 0x042,
+	SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH		= 0x043,
+
+	/* Guest migration commands (incoming) */
+	SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START		= 0x050,
+	SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA	= 0x051,
+	SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA	= 0x052,
+	SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH		= 0x053,
+
+	/* Guest debug commands */
+	SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT		= 0x060,
+	SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT		= 0x061,
+
+	SEV_CMD_MAX,
+};
+
+/**
+ * status code returned by the commands
+ */
+enum psp_ret_code {
+	SEV_RET_SUCCESS = 0,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_PLATFORM_STATE,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST_STATE,
+	SEV_RET_INAVLID_CONFIG,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_len,
+	SEV_RET_ALREADY_OWNED,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_CERTIFICATE,
+	SEV_RET_POLICY_FAILURE,
+	SEV_RET_INACTIVE,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS,
+	SEV_RET_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+	SEV_RET_BAD_MEASUREMENT,
+	SEV_RET_ASID_OWNED,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_ASID,
+	SEV_RET_WBINVD_REQUIRED,
+	SEV_RET_DFFLUSH_REQUIRED,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_COMMAND,
+	SEV_RET_ACTIVE,
+	SEV_RET_HWSEV_RET_PLATFORM,
+	SEV_RET_HWSEV_RET_UNSAFE,
+	SEV_RET_UNSUPPORTED,
+	SEV_RET_MAX,
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_init - INIT command parameters
+ *
+ * @flags: processing flags
+ * @tmr_address: system physical address used for SEV-ES
+ * @tmr_len: len of tmr_address
+ */
+struct sev_data_init {
+	u32 flags;			/* In */
+	u32 reserved;			/* In */
+	u64 tmr_address;		/* In */
+	u32 tmr_len;			/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_pek_csr - PEK_CSR command parameters
+ *
+ * @address: PEK certificate chain
+ * @len: len of certificate
+ */
+struct sev_data_pek_csr {
+	u64 address;				/* In */
+	u32 len;				/* In/Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_cert_import - PEK_CERT_IMPORT command parameters
+ *
+ * @pek_address: PEK certificate chain
+ * @pek_len: len of PEK certificate
+ * @oca_address: OCA certificate chain
+ * @oca_len: len of OCA certificate
+ */
+struct sev_data_pek_cert_import {
+	u64 pek_cert_address;			/* In */
+	u32 pek_cert_len;			/* In */
+	u32 reserved;				/* In */
+	u64 oca_cert_address;			/* In */
+	u32 oca_cert_len;			/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export - PDH_CERT_EXPORT command parameters
+ *
+ * @pdh_address: PDH certificate address
+ * @pdh_len: len of PDH certificate
+ * @cert_chain_address: PDH certificate chain
+ * @cert_chain_len: len of PDH certificate chain
+ */
+struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export {
+	u64 pdh_cert_address;			/* In */
+	u32 pdh_cert_len;			/* In/Out */
+	u32 reserved;				/* In */
+	u64 cert_chain_address;			/* In */
+	u32 cert_chain_len;			/* In/Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_decommission - DECOMMISSION command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to decommission
+ */
+struct sev_data_decommission {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_activate - ACTIVATE command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to activate
+ * @asid: asid assigned to the VM
+ */
+struct sev_data_activate {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+	u32 asid;				/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_deactivate - DEACTIVATE command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to deactivate
+ */
+struct sev_data_deactivate {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_guest_status - SEV GUEST_STATUS command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to retrieve status
+ * @policy: policy information for the VM
+ * @asid: current ASID of the VM
+ * @state: current state of the VM
+ */
+struct sev_data_guest_status {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+	u32 policy;				/* Out */
+	u32 asid;				/* Out */
+	u8 state;				/* Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_launch_start - LAUNCH_START command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle assigned to the VM
+ * @policy: guest launch policy
+ * @dh_cert_address: physical address of DH certificate blob
+ * @dh_cert_len: len of DH certificate blob
+ * @session_address: physical address of session parameters
+ * @session_len: len of session parameters
+ */
+struct sev_data_launch_start {
+	u32 handle;				/* In/Out */
+	u32 policy;				/* In */
+	u64 dh_cert_address;			/* In */
+	u32 dh_cert_len;			/* In */
+	u32 reserved;				/* In */
+	u64 session_address;			/* In */
+	u32 session_len;			/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_launch_update_data - LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command parameter
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to update
+ * @len: len of memory to be encrypted
+ * @address: physical address of memory region to encrypt
+ */
+struct sev_data_launch_update_data {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved;
+	u64 address;				/* In */
+	u32 len;				/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa - LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM
+ * @address: physical address of memory region to encrypt
+ * @len: len of memory region to encrypt
+ */
+struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved;
+	u64 address;				/* In */
+	u32 len;				/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_launch_measure - LAUNCH_MEASURE command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to process
+ * @address: physical address containing the measurement blob
+ * @len: len of measurement blob
+ */
+struct sev_data_launch_measure {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved;
+	u64 address;				/* In */
+	u32 len;				/* In/Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_launch_secret - LAUNCH_SECRET command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to process
+ * @hdr_address: physical address containing the packet header
+ * @hdr_len: len of packet header
+ * @guest_address: system physical address of guest memory region
+ * @guest_len: len of guest_paddr
+ * @trans_address: physical address of transport memory buffer
+ * @trans_len: len of transport memory buffer
+ */
+struct sev_data_launch_secret {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved1;
+	u64 hdr_address;			/* In */
+	u32 hdr_len;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved2;
+	u64 guest_address;			/* In */
+	u32 guest_len;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved3;
+	u64 trans_address;			/* In */
+	u32 trans_len;				/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_launch_finish - LAUNCH_FINISH command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to process
+ */
+struct sev_data_launch_finish {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_send_start - SEND_START command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to process
+ * @policy: policy information for the VM
+ * @pdh_cert_address: physical address containing PDH certificate
+ * @pdh_cert_len: len of PDH certificate
+ * @plat_certs_address: physical address containing platform certificate
+ * @plat_certs_len: len of platform certificate
+ * @amd_certs_address: physical address containing AMD certificate
+ * @amd_certs_len: len of AMD certificate
+ * @session_address: physical address containing Session data
+ * @session_len: len of session data
+ */
+struct sev_data_send_start {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+	u32 policy;				/* Out */
+	u64 pdh_cert_address;			/* In */
+	u32 pdh_cert_len;			/* In */
+	u32 reserved1;
+	u64 plat_cert_address;			/* In */
+	u32 plat_cert_len;			/* In */
+	u32 reserved2;
+	u64 amd_cert_address;			/* In */
+	u32 amd_cert_len;			/* In */
+	u32 reserved3;
+	u64 session_address;			/* In */
+	u32 session_len;			/* In/Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_send_update - SEND_UPDATE_DATA command
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to process
+ * @hdr_address: physical address containing packet header
+ * @hdr_len: len of packet header
+ * @guest_address: physical address of guest memory region to send
+ * @guest_len: len of guest memory region to send
+ * @trans_address: physical address of host memory region
+ * @trans_len: len of host memory region
+ */
+struct sev_data_send_update_data {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved1;
+	u64 hdr_address;			/* In */
+	u32 hdr_len;				/* In/Out */
+	u32 reserved2;
+	u64 guest_address;			/* In */
+	u32 guest_len;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved3;
+	u64 trans_address;			/* In */
+	u32 trans_len;				/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_send_update - SEND_UPDATE_VMSA command
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to process
+ * @hdr_address: physical address containing packet header
+ * @hdr_len: len of packet header
+ * @guest_address: physical address of guest memory region to send
+ * @guest_len: len of guest memory region to send
+ * @trans_address: physical address of host memory region
+ * @trans_len: len of host memory region
+ */
+struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+	u64 hdr_address;			/* In */
+	u32 hdr_len;				/* In/Out */
+	u32 reserved2;
+	u64 guest_address;			/* In */
+	u32 guest_len;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved3;
+	u64 trans_address;			/* In */
+	u32 trans_len;				/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_send_finish - SEND_FINISH command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to process
+ */
+struct sev_data_send_finish {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_receive_start - RECEIVE_START command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to perform receive operation
+ * @pdh_cert_address: system physical address containing PDH certificate blob
+ * @pdh_cert_len: len of PDH certificate blob
+ * @session_address: system physical address containing session blob
+ * @session_len: len of session blob
+ */
+struct sev_data_receive_start {
+	u32 handle;				/* In/Out */
+	u32 policy;				/* In */
+	u64 pdh_cert_address;			/* In */
+	u32 pdh_cert_len;			/* In */
+	u32 reserved1;
+	u64 session_address;			/* In */
+	u32 session_len;			/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_receive_update_data - RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to update
+ * @hdr_address: physical address containing packet header blob
+ * @hdr_len: len of packet header
+ * @guest_address: system physical address of guest memory region
+ * @guest_len: len of guest memory region
+ * @trans_address: system physical address of transport buffer
+ * @trans_len: len of transport buffer
+ */
+struct sev_data_receive_update_data {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved1;
+	u64 hdr_address;			/* In */
+	u32 hdr_len;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved2;
+	u64 guest_address;			/* In */
+	u32 guest_len;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved3;
+	u64 trans_address;			/* In */
+	u32 trans_len;				/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa - RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to update
+ * @hdr_address: physical address containing packet header blob
+ * @hdr_len: len of packet header
+ * @guest_address: system physical address of guest memory region
+ * @guest_len: len of guest memory region
+ * @trans_address: system physical address of transport buffer
+ * @trans_len: len of transport buffer
+ */
+struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved1;
+	u64 hdr_address;			/* In */
+	u32 hdr_len;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved2;
+	u64 guest_address;			/* In */
+	u32 guest_len;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved3;
+	u64 trans_address;			/* In */
+	u32 trans_len;				/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_receive_finish - RECEIVE_FINISH command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to finish
+ */
+struct sev_data_receive_finish {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_dbg - DBG_ENCRYPT/DBG_DECRYPT command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to perform debug operation
+ * @src_addr: source address of data to operate on
+ * @dst_addr: destination address of data to operate on
+ * @len: len of data to operate on
+ */
+struct sev_data_dbg {
+	u32 handle;				/* In */
+	u32 reserved;
+	u64 src_addr;				/* In */
+	u64 dst_addr;				/* In */
+	u32 len;				/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+#endif	/* __PSP_SEV_H__ */
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#12 lore raw

PATCH v7 12/38 crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) device support

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The Platform Security Processor (PSP) is part of the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP) functionality. The PSP is a dedicated processor that provides support for key management commands in Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) mode, along with software-based Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to enable third-party trusted applications.

Note that the key management functionality provided by the SEV firmware can be used outside of the kvm-amd driver hence it doesn't need to depend on CONFIG_KVM_AMD.

---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig   |  11 +++++
 drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile  |   1 +
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h |  59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c  |  26 +++++++++++
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h  |  24 +++++++++-
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c  |  52 +++++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig +11 -0
index 9c84f9838931..b9dfae47aefd 100644
@@ -33,3 +33,14 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_CRYPTO
 	  Support for using the cryptographic API with the AMD Cryptographic
 	  Coprocessor. This module supports offload of SHA and AES algorithms.
 	  If you choose 'M' here, this module will be called ccp_crypto.
+
+config CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
+	bool "Platform Security Processor (PSP) device"
+	default y
+	depends on CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD && X86_64
+	help
+	 Provide support for the AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP).
+	 The PSP is a dedicated processor that provides support for key
+	 management commands in Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) mode,
+	 along with software-based Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to
+	 enable third-party trusted applications.
drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile +1 -0
index 57f8debfcfb3..008bae7e26ec 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ ccp-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP) += ccp-dev.o \
 	    ccp-dmaengine.o \
 	    ccp-debugfs.o
 ccp-$(CONFIG_PCI) += sp-pci.o
+ccp-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP) += psp-dev.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_CRYPTO) += ccp-crypto.o
 ccp-crypto-objs := ccp-crypto-main.o \
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c new file +105 -0

105 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h new file +59 -0

59 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c +26 -0
index bef387c8abfd..cf101c039c8f 100644
@@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ int sp_init(struct sp_device *sp)
 	if (sp->dev_vdata->ccp_vdata)
 		ccp_dev_init(sp);
 
+	if (sp->dev_vdata->psp_vdata)
+		psp_dev_init(sp);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -206,6 +208,9 @@ void sp_destroy(struct sp_device *sp)
 	if (sp->dev_vdata->ccp_vdata)
 		ccp_dev_destroy(sp);
 
+	if (sp->dev_vdata->psp_vdata)
+		psp_dev_destroy(sp);
+
 	sp_del_device(sp);
 }
 
@@ -237,6 +242,27 @@ int sp_resume(struct sp_device *sp)
 }
 #endif
 
+struct sp_device *sp_get_psp_master_device(void)
+{
+	struct sp_device *i, *ret = NULL;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	write_lock_irqsave(&sp_unit_lock, flags);
+	if (list_empty(&sp_units))
+		goto unlock;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(i, &sp_units, entry) {
+		if (i->psp_data)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (i->get_psp_master_device)
+		ret = i->get_psp_master_device();
+unlock:
+	write_unlock_irqrestore(&sp_unit_lock, flags);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int __init sp_mod_init(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86
drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h +23 -1
index 5ab486ade1ad..909cf3e436b4 100644
@@ -42,12 +42,17 @@ struct ccp_vdata {
 	const unsigned int offset;
 	const unsigned int rsamax;
 };
+
+struct psp_vdata {
+	const unsigned int offset;
+};
+
 /* Structure to hold SP device data */
 struct sp_dev_vdata {
 	const unsigned int bar;
 
 	const struct ccp_vdata *ccp_vdata;
-	void *psp_vdata;
+	const struct psp_vdata *psp_vdata;
 };
 
 struct sp_device {
@@ -68,6 +73,10 @@ struct sp_device {
 	/* DMA caching attribute support */
 	unsigned int axcache;
 
+	/* get and set master device */
+	struct sp_device*(*get_psp_master_device)(void);
+	void (*set_psp_master_device)(struct sp_device *);
+
 	bool irq_registered;
 	bool use_tasklet;
 
@@ -103,6 +112,7 @@ void sp_free_ccp_irq(struct sp_device *sp, void *data);
 int sp_request_psp_irq(struct sp_device *sp, irq_handler_t handler,
 		       const char *name, void *data);
 void sp_free_psp_irq(struct sp_device *sp, void *data);
+struct sp_device *sp_get_psp_master_device(void);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP
 
@@ -130,4 +140,16 @@ static inline int ccp_dev_resume(struct sp_device *sp)
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
+
+int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp);
+void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp);
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
+
+static inline int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp) { return 0; }
+static inline void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp) { }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
+
 #endif
drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c +52 -0

88 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#13 lore raw

PATCH v7 13/38 crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support

In reply to Brijesh Singh

AMD's new Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature allows the memory contents of virtual machines to be transparently encrypted with a key unique to the VM. The programming and management of the encryption keys are handled by the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP) which exposes the commands for these tasks. The complete spec is available at:

http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf

Extend the AMD-SP driver to provide the following support:

- an in-kernel API to communicate with the SEV firmware. The API can be used by the hypervisor to create encryption context for a SEV guest.

- a userspace IOCTL to manage the platform certificates.

---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 350 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h |  24 +++
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c  |   9 ++
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h  |   4 +
 include/linux/psp-sev.h      | 143 ++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 530 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +350 -0
index b5789f878560..c61ca16096ca 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@
 #include "sp-dev.h"
 #include "psp-dev.h"
 
+#define DEVICE_NAME	"sev"
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_cmd_mutex);
+static struct sev_misc_dev *misc_dev;
+static struct psp_device *psp_master;
+
 static struct psp_device *psp_alloc_struct(struct sp_device *sp)
 {
 	struct device *dev = sp->dev;
@@ -45,9 +51,296 @@ static struct psp_device *psp_alloc_struct(struct sp_device *sp)
 
 static irqreturn_t psp_irq_handler(int irq, void *data)
 {
+	struct psp_device *psp = data;
+	unsigned int status;
+	int reg;
+
+	/* Read the interrupt status: */
+	status = ioread32(psp->io_regs + PSP_P2CMSG_INTSTS);
+
+	/* Check if it is command completion: */
+	if (!(status & BIT(PSP_CMD_COMPLETE_REG)))
+		goto done;
+
+	/* Check if it is SEV command completion: */
+	reg = ioread32(psp->io_regs + PSP_CMDRESP);
+	if (reg & PSP_CMDRESP_RESP) {
+		psp->sev_int_rcvd = 1;
+		wake_up(&psp->sev_int_queue);
+	}
+
+done:
+	/* Clear the interrupt status by writing the same value we read. */
+	iowrite32(status, psp->io_regs + PSP_P2CMSG_INTSTS);
+
 	return IRQ_HANDLED;
 }
 
+static void sev_wait_cmd_ioc(struct psp_device *psp, unsigned int *reg)
+{
+	psp->sev_int_rcvd = 0;
+
+	wait_event(psp->sev_int_queue, psp->sev_int_rcvd);
+	*reg = ioread32(psp->io_regs + PSP_CMDRESP);
+}
+
+static int sev_cmd_buffer_len(int cmd)
+{
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case SEV_CMD_INIT:			return sizeof(struct sev_data_init);
+	case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS:		return sizeof(struct sev_user_data_status);
+	case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR:			return sizeof(struct sev_data_pek_csr);
+	case SEV_CMD_PEK_CERT_IMPORT:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_pek_cert_import);
+	case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export);
+	case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_start);
+	case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:	return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_update_data);
+	case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA:	return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa);
+	case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_finish);
+	case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_measure);
+	case SEV_CMD_ACTIVATE:			return sizeof(struct sev_data_activate);
+	case SEV_CMD_DEACTIVATE:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_deactivate);
+	case SEV_CMD_DECOMMISSION:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_decommission);
+	case SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_guest_status);
+	case SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_dbg);
+	case SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_dbg);
+	case SEV_CMD_SEND_START:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_send_start);
+	case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_send_update_data);
+	case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa);
+	case SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_send_finish);
+	case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_receive_start);
+	case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH:		return sizeof(struct sev_data_receive_finish);
+	case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA:	return sizeof(struct sev_data_receive_update_data);
+	case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA:	return sizeof(struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa);
+	case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET:	return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_secret);
+	default:				return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
+{
+	struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
+	unsigned int phys_lsb, phys_msb;
+	unsigned int reg, ret = 0;
+
+	if (!psp)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	/* Get the physical address of the command buffer */
+	phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(data)) : 0;
+	phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(data)) : 0;
+
+	dev_dbg(psp->dev, "sev command id %#x buffer 0x%08x%08x\n",
+		cmd, phys_msb, phys_lsb);
+
+	print_hex_dump_debug("(in):  ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data,
+			     sev_cmd_buffer_len(cmd), false);
+
+	iowrite32(phys_lsb, psp->io_regs + PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_LO);
+	iowrite32(phys_msb, psp->io_regs + PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_HI);
+
+	reg = cmd;
+	reg <<= PSP_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT;
+	reg |= PSP_CMDRESP_IOC;
+	iowrite32(reg, psp->io_regs + PSP_CMDRESP);
+
+	/* wait for command completion */
+	sev_wait_cmd_ioc(psp, &reg);
+
+	if (psp_ret)
+		*psp_ret = reg & PSP_CMDRESP_ERR_MASK;
+
+	if (reg & PSP_CMDRESP_ERR_MASK) {
+		dev_dbg(psp->dev, "sev command %#x failed (%#010x)\n",
+			cmd, reg & PSP_CMDRESP_ERR_MASK);
+		ret = -EIO;
+	}
+
+	print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data,
+			     sev_cmd_buffer_len(cmd), false);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_do_cmd(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+	rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(cmd, data, psp_ret);
+	mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int __sev_platform_init_locked(struct sev_data_init *data, int *error)
+{
+	struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!psp)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	if (psp->sev_state == SEV_STATE_INIT)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!data)
+		data = psp->sev_init;
+
+	rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_INIT, data, error);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	psp->sev_state = SEV_STATE_INIT;
+	dev_dbg(psp->dev, "SEV firmware initialized\n");
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int sev_platform_init(struct sev_data_init *data, int *error)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+	rc = __sev_platform_init_locked(data, error);
+	mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_platform_init);
+
+static int __sev_platform_shutdown_locked(int *error)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SHUTDOWN, 0, error);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	psp_master->sev_state = SEV_STATE_UNINIT;
+	dev_dbg(psp_master->dev, "SEV firmware shutdown\n");
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_platform_shutdown(int *error)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+	rc = __sev_platform_shutdown_locked(NULL);
+	mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	return -ENOTTY;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sev_fops = {
+	.owner	= THIS_MODULE,
+	.unlocked_ioctl = sev_ioctl,
+};
+
+int sev_platform_status(struct sev_user_data_status *data, int *error)
+{
+	return sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS, data, error);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_platform_status);
+
+int sev_guest_deactivate(struct sev_data_deactivate *data, int *error)
+{
+	return sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_DEACTIVATE, data, error);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_guest_deactivate);
+
+int sev_guest_activate(struct sev_data_activate *data, int *error)
+{
+	return sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_ACTIVATE, data, error);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_guest_activate);
+
+int sev_guest_decommission(struct sev_data_decommission *data, int *error)
+{
+	return sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_DECOMMISSION, data, error);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_guest_decommission);
+
+int sev_guest_df_flush(int *error)
+{
+	return sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_DF_FLUSH, 0, error);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_guest_df_flush);
+
+static void sev_exit(struct kref *ref)
+{
+	struct sev_misc_dev *misc_dev = container_of(ref, struct sev_misc_dev, refcount);
+
+	misc_deregister(&misc_dev->misc);
+}
+
+static int sev_ops_init(struct psp_device *psp)
+{
+	struct device *dev = psp->dev;
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * SEV feature support can be detected on multiple devices but the SEV
+	 * FW commands must be issued on the master. During probe, we do not
+	 * know the master hence we create /dev/sev on the first device probe.
+	 * sev_do_cmd() finds the right master device to which to issue the
+	 * command to the firmware.
+	 */
+	if (!misc_dev) {
+		struct miscdevice *misc;
+
+		misc_dev = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*misc_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!misc_dev)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		misc = &misc_dev->misc;
+		misc->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR;
+		misc->name = DEVICE_NAME;
+		misc->fops = &sev_fops;
+
+		ret = misc_register(misc);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
+		kref_init(&misc_dev->refcount);
+	} else {
+		kref_get(&misc_dev->refcount);
+	}
+
+	psp->sev_status = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*psp->sev_status), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!psp->sev_status)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	psp->sev_init = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*psp->sev_init), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!psp->sev_init)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	init_waitqueue_head(&psp->sev_int_queue);
+	psp->sev_misc = misc_dev;
+	dev_dbg(dev, "registered SEV device\n");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sev_init(struct psp_device *psp)
+{
+	/* Check if device supports SEV feature */
+	if (!(ioread32(psp->io_regs + PSP_FEATURE_REG) & 1)) {
+		dev_dbg(psp->dev, "device does not support SEV\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return sev_ops_init(psp);
+}
+
 int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp)
 {
 	struct device *dev = sp->dev;
@@ -81,6 +374,10 @@ int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp)
 		goto e_err;
 	}
 
+	ret = sev_init(psp);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_irq;
+
 	if (sp->set_psp_master_device)
 		sp->set_psp_master_device(sp);
 
@@ -89,6 +386,8 @@ int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp)
 
 	return 0;
 
+e_irq:
+	sp_free_psp_irq(psp->sp, psp);
 e_err:
 	sp->psp_data = NULL;
 
@@ -101,5 +400,56 @@ void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp)
 {
 	struct psp_device *psp = sp->psp_data;
 
+	if (psp->sev_misc)
+		kref_put(&misc_dev->refcount, sev_exit);
+
 	sp_free_psp_irq(sp, psp);
 }
+
+int sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
+				void *data, int *error)
+{
+	if (!filep || filep->f_op != &sev_fops)
+		return -EBADF;
+
+	return  sev_do_cmd(cmd, data, error);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_issue_cmd_external_user);
+
+void psp_pci_init(void)
+{
+	struct sp_device *sp;
+	int error, rc;
+
+	sp = sp_get_psp_master_device();
+	if (!sp)
+		return;
+
+	psp_master = sp->psp_data;
+
+	/* Initialize the platform */
+	rc = sev_platform_init(NULL, &error);
+	if (rc) {
+		dev_err(sp->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Display SEV firmware version */
+	rc = sev_platform_status(psp_master->sev_status, &error);
+	if (rc) {
+		dev_err(sp->dev, "SEV: failed to get status error %#x\n", error);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	dev_info(sp->dev, "SEV API:%d.%d build:%d\n",
+		 psp_master->sev_status->api_major, psp_master->sev_status->api_minor,
+		 psp_master->sev_status->build);
+}
+
+void psp_pci_exit(void)
+{
+	if (!psp_master)
+		return;
+
+	sev_platform_shutdown(NULL);
+}
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h +24 -0
index 55b7808367c3..2236d6749d2e 100644
@@ -25,9 +25,21 @@
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <linux/irqreturn.h>
 #include <linux/dmaengine.h>
+#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
 
 #include "sp-dev.h"
 
+#define PSP_C2PMSG(_num)		((_num) << 2)
+#define PSP_CMDRESP			PSP_C2PMSG(32)
+#define PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_LO		PSP_C2PMSG(56)
+#define PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_HI             PSP_C2PMSG(57)
+#define PSP_FEATURE_REG			PSP_C2PMSG(63)
+
+#define PSP_P2CMSG(_num)		((_num) << 2)
+#define PSP_CMD_COMPLETE_REG		1
+#define PSP_CMD_COMPLETE		PSP_P2CMSG(PSP_CMD_COMPLETE_REG)
+
 #define PSP_P2CMSG_INTEN		0x0110
 #define PSP_P2CMSG_INTSTS		0x0114
 
@@ -44,6 +56,11 @@
 
 #define MAX_PSP_NAME_LEN		16
 
+struct sev_misc_dev {
+	struct kref refcount;
+	struct miscdevice misc;
+};
+
 struct psp_device {
 	struct list_head entry;
 
@@ -54,6 +71,13 @@ struct psp_device {
 	struct sp_device *sp;
 
 	void __iomem *io_regs;
+
+	int sev_state;
+	unsigned int sev_int_rcvd;
+	wait_queue_head_t sev_int_queue;
+	struct sev_misc_dev *sev_misc;
+	struct sev_user_data_status *sev_status;
+	struct sev_data_init *sev_init;
 };
 
 #endif /* __PSP_DEV_H */
drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c +9 -0
index cf101c039c8f..eb0da6572720 100644
@@ -272,6 +272,10 @@ static int __init sp_mod_init(void)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
+	psp_pci_init();
+#endif
+
 	return 0;
 #endif
 
@@ -291,6 +295,11 @@ static int __init sp_mod_init(void)
 static void __exit sp_mod_exit(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
+	psp_pci_exit();
+#endif
+
 	sp_pci_exit();
 #endif
 
drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h +4 -0
index 909cf3e436b4..acb197b66ced 100644
@@ -143,12 +143,16 @@ static inline int ccp_dev_resume(struct sp_device *sp)
 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
 
 int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp);
+void psp_pci_init(void);
 void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp);
+void psp_pci_exit(void);
 
 #else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
 
 static inline int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp) { return 0; }
+static inline void psp_pci_init(void) { }
 static inline void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp) { }
+static inline void psp_pci_exit(void) { }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
 
include/linux/psp-sev.h +143 -0

147 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
maintainer
#14 lore raw

Re: [Part2 PATCH v7 13/38] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support

Quoted 26 lines · Brijesh Singh

AMD's new Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature allows the memory contents of virtual machines to be transparently encrypted with a key unique to the VM. The programming and management of the encryption keys are handled by the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP) which exposes the commands for these tasks. The complete spec is available at:

http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf

Extend the AMD-SP driver to provide the following support:

- an in-kernel API to communicate with the SEV firmware. The API can be used by the hypervisor to create encryption context for a SEV guest.

- a userspace IOCTL to manage the platform certificates.

Quoted 7 lines
---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 350 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h |  24 +++
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c  |   9 ++
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h  |   4 +
 include/linux/psp-sev.h      | 143 ++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 530 insertions(+)

Some more cleanups:

* If sev_data_init is per psp_device, you can simply embed it in the struct psp_device and save yourself the complete allocation.

* s/sev_ops_init/sev_misc_init/ because it doesn't do anything ops-like

* save some header lines.

---

drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +3 -7
index c61ca16096ca..81c70f9ce23c 100644
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static int __sev_platform_init_locked(struct sev_data_init *data, int *error)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (!data)
-		data = psp->sev_init;
+		data = &psp->cmd_buf;
 
 	rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_INIT, data, error);
 	if (rc)
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static void sev_exit(struct kref *ref)
 	misc_deregister(&misc_dev->misc);
 }
 
-static int sev_ops_init(struct psp_device *psp)
+static int sev_misc_init(struct psp_device *psp)
 {
 	struct device *dev = psp->dev;
 	int ret;
@@ -319,10 +319,6 @@ static int sev_ops_init(struct psp_device *psp)
 	if (!psp->sev_status)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	psp->sev_init = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*psp->sev_init), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!psp->sev_init)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
 	init_waitqueue_head(&psp->sev_int_queue);
 	psp->sev_misc = misc_dev;
 	dev_dbg(dev, "registered SEV device\n");
@@ -338,7 +334,7 @@ static int sev_init(struct psp_device *psp)
 		return 1;
 	}
 
-	return sev_ops_init(psp);
+	return sev_misc_init(psp);
 }
 
 int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp)
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h +1 -1
index 2236d6749d2e..fa62ff50912b 100644
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ struct psp_device {
 	wait_queue_head_t sev_int_queue;
 	struct sev_misc_dev *sev_misc;
 	struct sev_user_data_status *sev_status;
-	struct sev_data_init *sev_init;
+	struct sev_data_init cmd_buf;
 };
 
 #endif /* __PSP_DEV_H */
include/linux/psp-sev.h +1 -5
index fb563248d9a9..d57cd7625a9f 100644
@@ -626,11 +626,7 @@ sev_guest_activate(struct sev_data_activate *data, int *error) { return -ENODEV;
 static inline int sev_guest_df_flush(int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
 
 static inline int
-sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep,
-			    unsigned int id, void *data, int *error)
-{
-	return -ENODEV;
-}
+sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int id, void *data, int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
 
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
#15 lore raw

Re: [Part2 PATCH v7 13/38] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support

On 11/02/2017 12:10 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
...

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
  drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 350 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h |  24 +++
  drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c  |   9 ++
  drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h  |   4 +
  include/linux/psp-sev.h      | 143 ++++++++++++++++++
  5 files changed, 530 insertions(+)
Quoted 9 lines

Some more cleanups:

* If sev_data_init is per psp_device, you can simply embed it in the struct psp_device and save yourself the complete allocation.

* s/sev_ops_init/sev_misc_init/ because it doesn't do anything ops-like

* save some header lines.

Thanks for the cleanup patch, I will apply these changes. Additionally, I will also embed the sev_user_data_platform_status in per psp_device struct instead of dvmem_kzalloc().

-Brijesh

#16 lore raw

PATCH v7 14/38 crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_FACTORY_RESET ioctl command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The SEV_FACTORY_RESET command can be used by the platform owner to reset the non-volatile SEV related data. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.4

---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +69 -1
index c61ca16096ca..a757bd1c34e8 100644
@@ -235,9 +235,77 @@ static int sev_platform_shutdown(int *error)
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static int sev_platform_state(int *state, int *error)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS,
+				 psp_master->sev_status, error);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	*state = psp_master->sev_status->state;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int sev_ioctl_do_reset(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
+{
+	int state, rc;
+
+	rc = sev_platform_state(&state, &argp->error);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (state == SEV_STATE_WORKING) {
+		argp->error = SEV_RET_INVALID_PLATFORM_STATE;
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
+	if (state == SEV_STATE_INIT) {
+		rc = __sev_platform_shutdown_locked(&argp->error);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_FACTORY_RESET, 0, &argp->error);
+}
+
 static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 {
-	return -ENOTTY;
+	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
+	struct sev_issue_cmd input;
+	int ret = -EFAULT;
+
+	if (!psp_master)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	if (ioctl != SEV_ISSUE_CMD)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&input, argp, sizeof(struct sev_issue_cmd)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (input.cmd > SEV_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+
+	switch (input.cmd) {
+
+	case SEV_FACTORY_RESET:
+		ret = sev_ioctl_do_reset(&input);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_to_user(argp, &input, sizeof(struct sev_issue_cmd)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations sev_fops = {
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
maintainer
#17 lore raw

Re: [Part2 PATCH v7 14/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_FACTORY_RESET ioctl command

Quoted 4 lines · Brijesh Singh

The SEV_FACTORY_RESET command can be used by the platform owner to reset the non-volatile SEV related data. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.4

Quoted 12 lines

Acked-by: needs to go away too if you send a new revision with non-trivial changes. Same as with Reviewed-by: tags.

drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c static int sev_platform_shutdown(int *error) · line 238

Quoted 13 lines
---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +1 -0
index c61ca16096ca..a757bd1c34e8 100644
@@ -235,9 +235,77 @@ static int sev_platform_shutdown(int *error)
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static int sev_platform_state(int *state, int *error)

It needs a verb in the name: sev_get_platform_state()

Quoted 11 lines
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +11 -0
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS,
+				 psp_master->sev_status, error);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	*state = psp_master->sev_status->state;
+	return rc;
+}

drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c static int sev_platform_shutdown(int *error) · line 259

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +10 -0
+
+static int sev_ioctl_do_reset(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
+{
+	int state, rc;
+
+	rc = sev_platform_state(&state, &argp->error);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (state == SEV_STATE_WORKING) {

You could write a short blurb somewhere in a comment around here, what the logic now is going to be for the SEV device: If in working state, reset is denied. All other states accept it, because... <reasons>.

drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c static int sev_platform_shutdown(int *error) · line 260

Quoted 1 line
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +1 -0
+		argp->error = SEV_RET_INVALID_PLATFORM_STATE;

If you're going to write enum psp_ret_code types into argp->error, then it needs to be of enum psp_ret_code type and not an int.

Quoted 11 lines
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +11 -0
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
+	if (state == SEV_STATE_INIT) {
+		rc = __sev_platform_shutdown_locked(&argp->error);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_FACTORY_RESET, 0, &argp->error);
+}
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
#18 lore raw

PATCH v7 15/38 crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS ioctl command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS command can be used by the platform owner to get the current status of the platform. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.5.

---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +18 -0
index a757bd1c34e8..ef473ec4a413 100644
@@ -270,6 +270,21 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_reset(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
 	return __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_FACTORY_RESET, 0, &argp->error);
 }
 
+static int sev_ioctl_do_platform_status(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct sev_user_data_status *data = psp_master->sev_status;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS, data, &argp->error);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)argp->data, data, sizeof(*data)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 {
 	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
@@ -295,6 +310,9 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 	case SEV_FACTORY_RESET:
 		ret = sev_ioctl_do_reset(&input);
 		break;
+	case SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS:
+		ret = sev_ioctl_do_platform_status(&input);
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#19 lore raw

PATCH v7 16/38 crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_GEN ioctl command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The SEV_PEK_GEN command is used to generate a new Platform Endorsement Key (PEK). The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.6.

---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +16 -0
index ef473ec4a413..2c28c36d7ae8 100644
@@ -285,6 +285,19 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_platform_status(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(int cmd, struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (psp_master->sev_state == SEV_STATE_UNINIT) {
+		rc = __sev_platform_init_locked(psp_master->sev_init, &argp->error);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return __sev_do_cmd_locked(cmd, 0, &argp->error);
+}
+
 static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 {
 	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
@@ -313,6 +326,9 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 	case SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS:
 		ret = sev_ioctl_do_platform_status(&input);
 		break;
+	case SEV_PEK_GEN:
+		ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(SEV_CMD_PEK_GEN, &input);
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#20 lore raw

PATCH v7 17/38 crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_GEN ioctl command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The SEV_PDH_GEN command is used to re-generate the Platform Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.6.

---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +3 -0
index 2c28c36d7ae8..42991c2e9085 100644
@@ -329,6 +329,9 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 	case SEV_PEK_GEN:
 		ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(SEV_CMD_PEK_GEN, &input);
 		break;
+	case SEV_PDH_GEN:
+		ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(SEV_CMD_PDH_GEN, &input);
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#21 lore raw

PATCH v7 18/38 crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CSR ioctl command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The SEV_PEK_CSR command can be used to generate a PEK certificate signing request. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.7.

---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +68 -0
index 42991c2e9085..4e2f9d037f0a 100644
@@ -298,6 +298,71 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(int cmd, struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
 	return __sev_do_cmd_locked(cmd, 0, &argp->error);
 }
 
+static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct sev_user_data_pek_csr input;
+	struct sev_data_pek_csr *data;
+	void *blob = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&input, (void __user *)argp->data, sizeof(input)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* userspace wants to query CSR length */
+	if (!input.address || !input.length)
+		goto cmd;
+
+	/* allocate a physically contiguous buffer to store the CSR blob */
+	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, input.address, input.length) ||
+	    input.length > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	blob = kmalloc(input.length, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!blob) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	data->address = __psp_pa(blob);
+	data->len = input.length;
+
+cmd:
+	if (psp_master->sev_state == SEV_STATE_UNINIT) {
+		ret = __sev_platform_init_locked(psp_master->sev_init, &argp->error);
+		if (ret)
+			goto e_free_blob;
+	}
+
+	ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR, data, &argp->error);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we query the CSR length, FW responded with expected data
+	 */
+	input.length = data->len;
+
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)argp->data, &input, sizeof(input))) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free_blob;
+	}
+
+	if (blob) {
+		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)input.address, blob, input.length))
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+e_free_blob:
+	kfree(blob);
+e_free:
+	kfree(data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 {
 	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
@@ -332,6 +397,9 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 	case SEV_PDH_GEN:
 		ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(SEV_CMD_PDH_GEN, &input);
 		break;
+	case SEV_PEK_CSR:
+		ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr(&input);
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
maintainer
#22 lore raw

Re: [Part2 PATCH v7 18/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CSR ioctl command

Quoted 54 lines · Brijesh Singh

The SEV_PEK_CSR command can be used to generate a PEK certificate signing request. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.7.

---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +27 -0
index 42991c2e9085..4e2f9d037f0a 100644
@@ -298,6 +298,71 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(int cmd, struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
 	return __sev_do_cmd_locked(cmd, 0, &argp->error);
 }
 
+static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct sev_user_data_pek_csr input;
+	struct sev_data_pek_csr *data;
+	void *blob = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&input, (void __user *)argp->data, sizeof(input)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* userspace wants to query CSR length */
+	if (!input.address || !input.length)
+		goto cmd;
+
+	/* allocate a physically contiguous buffer to store the CSR blob */
+	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, input.address, input.length) ||
+	    input.length > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	blob = kmalloc(input.length, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!blob) {

drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(int cmd, struct sev_issue_cmd *argp) · line 337

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +10 -0
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	data->address = __psp_pa(blob);
+	data->len = input.length;
+
+cmd:
+	if (psp_master->sev_state == SEV_STATE_UNINIT) {
+		ret = __sev_platform_init_locked(psp_master->sev_init, &argp->error);

Right, you're passing psp_master->sev_init (or whatever you're going to end up calling it) down but then in __sev_platform_init_locked() you end up doing

        if (!data)
                data = &psp->cmd_buf;

which looks silly.

IOW, if not really required, __sev_platform_init_locked() could have only one argument instead:

static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error)

unless some later patch needs to pass in a different command buffer. I guess I need to keep on reviewing...

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
#23 lore raw

Re: [Part2 PATCH v7 18/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CSR ioctl command

On 11/3/17 2:42 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:

...

Quoted 9 lines

drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(int cmd, struct sev_issue_cmd *argp) · line 337

Quoted 2 lines
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +2 -0
+	if (psp_master->sev_state == SEV_STATE_UNINIT) {
+		ret = __sev_platform_init_locked(psp_master->sev_init, &argp->error);

Right, you're passing psp_master->sev_init (or whatever you're going to end up calling it) down but then in __sev_platform_init_locked() you end up doing

        if (!data)
                data = &psp->cmd_buf;
Quoted 6 lines

which looks silly.

IOW, if not really required, __sev_platform_init_locked() could have only one argument instead:

static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error)

The cmd_buf argument can be remove. I am have not looked at SEV-ES but it may be possible that during SEV-ES patches kvm driver may need to call the sev_platform_init() with different cmd_buf to initialize SEV-ES states. I can removed it in next version.

-Brijesh

#24 lore raw

PATCH v7 19/38 crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT ioctl command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT command can be used to import the signed PEK certificate. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.8.

---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/psp-sev.h      |  4 +++
 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +81 -0
index 4e2f9d037f0a..2648faf33a19 100644
@@ -363,6 +363,84 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+void *psp_copy_user_blob(u64 __user uaddr, u32 len)
+{
+	void *data;
+
+	if (!uaddr || !len)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	/* verify that blob length does not exceed our limit */
+	if (len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	if (copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)uaddr, len))
+		goto e_free;
+
+	return data;
+
+e_free:
+	kfree(data);
+	return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(psp_copy_user_blob);
+
+static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_import(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct sev_user_data_pek_cert_import input;
+	struct sev_data_pek_cert_import *data;
+	void *pek_blob, *oca_blob;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&input, (void __user *)argp->data, sizeof(input)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* copy PEK certificate blobs from userspace */
+	pek_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(input.pek_cert_address, input.pek_cert_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(pek_blob)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(pek_blob);
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	data->pek_cert_address = __psp_pa(pek_blob);
+	data->pek_cert_len = input.pek_cert_len;
+
+	/* copy PEK certificate blobs from userspace */
+	oca_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(input.oca_cert_address, input.oca_cert_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(oca_blob)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(oca_blob);
+		goto e_free_pek;
+	}
+
+	data->oca_cert_address = __psp_pa(oca_blob);
+	data->oca_cert_len = input.oca_cert_len;
+
+	/* If platform is not in INIT state then transition it to INIT */
+	if (psp_master->sev_state != SEV_STATE_INIT) {
+		ret = __sev_platform_init_locked(psp_master->sev_init, &argp->error);
+		if (ret)
+			goto e_free_oca;
+	}
+
+	ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PEK_CERT_IMPORT, data, &argp->error);
+
+e_free_oca:
+	kfree(oca_blob);
+e_free_pek:
+	kfree(pek_blob);
+e_free:
+	kfree(data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 {
 	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
@@ -400,6 +478,9 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 	case SEV_PEK_CSR:
 		ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr(&input);
 		break;
+	case SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT:
+		ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_import(&input);
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
include/linux/psp-sev.h +4 -0
index fb563248d9a9..a65d96dea77b 100644
@@ -606,6 +606,8 @@ int sev_guest_df_flush(int *error);
  */
 int sev_guest_decommission(struct sev_data_decommission *data, int *error);
 
+void *psp_copy_user_blob(u64 __user uaddr, u32 len);
+
 #else	/* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
 
 static inline int
@@ -632,6 +634,8 @@ sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep,
 	return -ENODEV;
 }
 
+static inline void *psp_copy_user_blob(u64 __user uaddr, u32 len) { return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); }
+
 #endif	/* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
 
 #endif	/* __PSP_SEV_H__ */
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
maintainer Reviewed-by on v7 19/38
#25 lore raw

Re: [Part2 PATCH v7 19/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT ioctl command

Quoted 15 lines · Brijesh Singh

The SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT command can be used to import the signed PEK certificate. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.8.

Quoted 4 lines
---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/psp-sev.h      |  4 +++
 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
#26 lore raw

PATCH v7 20/38 crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT ioctl command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT command can be used to export the PDH and its certificate chain. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.10.

---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 98 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +98 -0
index 2648faf33a19..96739ff105e6 100644
@@ -441,6 +441,101 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_import(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct sev_user_data_pdh_cert_export input;
+	void *pdh_blob = NULL, *cert_blob = NULL;
+	struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export *data;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&input, (void __user *)argp->data, sizeof(input)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* Userspace wants to query the certificate length */
+	if (!input.pdh_cert_address || !input.pdh_cert_len ||
+	    !input.cert_chain_address || !input.cert_chain_address)
+		goto cmd;
+
+	/* allocate a physically contiguous buffer to store the PDH blob */
+	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, input.pdh_cert_address, input.pdh_cert_len) ||
+	    (input.pdh_cert_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	pdh_blob = kmalloc(input.pdh_cert_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!pdh_blob) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	data->pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_blob);
+	data->pdh_cert_len = input.pdh_cert_len;
+
+	/* allocate a physically contiguous buffer to store the cert chain blob */
+	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, input.cert_chain_address, input.cert_chain_len) ||
+	    (input.cert_chain_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free_pdh;
+	}
+
+	cert_blob = kmalloc(input.cert_chain_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cert_blob) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto e_free_pdh;
+	}
+
+	data->cert_chain_address = __psp_pa(cert_blob);
+	data->cert_chain_len = input.cert_chain_len;
+
+cmd:
+	/* If platform is not in INIT state then transition it to INIT */
+	if (psp_master->sev_state != SEV_STATE_INIT) {
+		ret = __sev_platform_init_locked(psp_master->sev_init, &argp->error);
+		if (ret)
+			goto e_free_cert;
+	}
+
+	ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT, data, &argp->error);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we query the length, FW responded with expected data
+	 */
+	input.cert_chain_len = data->cert_chain_len;
+	input.pdh_cert_len = data->pdh_cert_len;
+
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)argp->data, &input, sizeof(input))) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free_cert;
+	}
+
+	if (pdh_blob) {
+		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)input.pdh_cert_address,
+				 pdh_blob, input.pdh_cert_len)) {
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			goto e_free_cert;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (cert_blob) {
+		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)input.cert_chain_address,
+				 cert_blob, input.cert_chain_len))
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+e_free_cert:
+	kfree(cert_blob);
+e_free_pdh:
+	kfree(pdh_blob);
+e_free:
+	kfree(data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 {
 	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
@@ -481,6 +576,9 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 	case SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT:
 		ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_import(&input);
 		break;
+	case SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT:
+		ret = sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export(&input);
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
maintainer
#27 lore raw

Re: [Part2 PATCH v7 20/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT ioctl command

Quoted 2 lines · Brijesh Singh

The SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT command can be used to export the PDH and its certificate chain. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.10.

...

Quoted 3 lines
---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 98 insertions(+)

Fixes ontop:

* !input.cert_chain_address test was repeated. I saw that by aligning them vertically, i.e., after making it more readable, the repetition became obvious.

* Do the lengths checks first and the access_ok after, in each PDH and cert chain test.

* Do the checks first and the allocations after, not interleaved.

* Comments are sentences which should end with a '.'

(hunk below contains also that &psp_master->cmd_buf change but you're going to
remove that arg anyway).

---

drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c +17 -18
index 09f69e573d00..d3fdcce61e6d 100644
@@ -455,14 +455,22 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
 	if (!data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	/* Userspace wants to query the certificate length */
-	if (!input.pdh_cert_address || !input.pdh_cert_len ||
-	    !input.cert_chain_address || !input.cert_chain_address)
+	/* Userspace wants to query the certificate length. */
+	if (!input.pdh_cert_address ||
+	    !input.pdh_cert_len ||
+	    !input.cert_chain_address)
 		goto cmd;
 
-	/* allocate a physically contiguous buffer to store the PDH blob */
-	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, input.pdh_cert_address, input.pdh_cert_len) ||
-	    (input.pdh_cert_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)) {
+	/* allocate a physically contiguous buffer to store the PDH blob. */
+	if ((input.pdh_cert_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) ||
+	    !access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, input.pdh_cert_address, input.pdh_cert_len)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	/* allocate a physically contiguous buffer to store the cert chain blob. */
+	if ((input.cert_chain_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) ||
+	    !access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, input.cert_chain_address, input.cert_chain_len)) {
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 		goto e_free;
 	}
@@ -476,13 +484,6 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
 	data->pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_blob);
 	data->pdh_cert_len = input.pdh_cert_len;
 
-	/* allocate a physically contiguous buffer to store the cert chain blob */
-	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, input.cert_chain_address, input.cert_chain_len) ||
-	    (input.cert_chain_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)) {
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		goto e_free_pdh;
-	}
-
 	cert_blob = kmalloc(input.cert_chain_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!cert_blob) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -493,18 +494,16 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
 	data->cert_chain_len = input.cert_chain_len;
 
 cmd:
-	/* If platform is not in INIT state then transition it to INIT */
+	/* If platform is not in INIT state then transition it to INIT. */
 	if (psp_master->sev_state != SEV_STATE_INIT) {
-		ret = __sev_platform_init_locked(psp_master->sev_init, &argp->error);
+		ret = __sev_platform_init_locked(&psp_master->cmd_buf, &argp->error);
 		if (ret)
 			goto e_free_cert;
 	}
 
 	ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT, data, &argp->error);
 
-	/*
-	 * If we query the length, FW responded with expected data
-	 */
+	/* If we query the length, FW responded with expected data. */
 	input.cert_chain_len = data->cert_chain_len;
 	input.pdh_cert_len = data->pdh_cert_len;
 
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
#28 lore raw

Re: [Part2 PATCH v7 20/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT ioctl command

On 11/05/2017 05:34 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
...

Quoted 10 lines

Fixes ontop:

* !input.cert_chain_address test was repeated. I saw that by aligning them vertically, i.e., after making it more readable, the repetition became obvious.

* Do the lengths checks first and the access_ok after, in each PDH and cert chain test.

Quoted 7 lines

* Do the checks first and the allocations after, not interleaved.

* Comments are sentences which should end with a '.'

(hunk below contains also that &psp_master->cmd_buf change but you're going to
remove that arg anyway).

I am good with all your fixup, I will apply them in v8.

-Brijesh

#29 lore raw

PATCH v7 21/38 KVM: X86: Add CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The config option can be used to enable SEV support on AMD Processors.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +10 -0
index 3c48bc8bf08c..86273a0f981a 100644
@@ -80,6 +80,16 @@ config KVM_AMD
 	  To compile this as a module, choose M here: the module
 	  will be called kvm-amd.
 
+config KVM_AMD_SEV
+	def_bool y
+	bool "AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support"
+	depends on KVM_AMD && X86_64
+	select CRYPTO_DEV_CCP
+	select CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD
+	select CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
+	---help---
+	Provides support for launching Encrypted VMs on AMD processors.
+
 config KVM_MMU_AUDIT
 	bool "Audit KVM MMU"
 	depends on KVM && TRACEPOINTS
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#30 lore raw

PATCH v7 22/38 KVM: SVM: Add sev module_param

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The module parameter can be used to control the SEV feature support.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +4 -0
index fab5b1b7fc63..be2e98c01b22 100644
@@ -284,6 +284,10 @@ module_param(vls, int, 0444);
 static int vgif = true;
 module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
 
+/* enable/disable SEV support */
+static int sev = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
+module_param(sev, int, 0444);
+
 static void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
 static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#31 lore raw

PATCH v7 23/38 KVM: SVM: Reserve ASID range for SEV guest

In reply to Brijesh Singh

A SEV-enabled guest must use ASIDs from the defined subset, while non-SEV guests can use the remaining ASID range. The range of allowed SEV guest ASIDs is [1 - CPUID_8000_001F[ECX][31:0]].

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +22 -1
index be2e98c01b22..d4b62536e305 100644
@@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ enum {
 
 #define VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK		0xFFFFFFFFFF000ULL
 
+static unsigned int max_sev_asid;
+
 static inline void mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
 {
 	vmcb->control.clean = 0;
@@ -787,7 +789,7 @@ static int svm_hardware_enable(void)
 	sd->asid_generation = 1;
 	sd->max_asid = cpuid_ebx(SVM_CPUID_FUNC) - 1;
 	sd->next_asid = sd->max_asid + 1;
-	sd->min_asid = 1;
+	sd->min_asid = max_sev_asid + 1;
 
 	gdt = get_current_gdt_rw();
 	sd->tss_desc = (struct kvm_ldttss_desc *)(gdt + GDT_ENTRY_TSS);
@@ -1054,6 +1056,15 @@ static int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_tag)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Get the maximum number of encrypted guests:
+ *  Fn8001_001F[ECX][31:0]: Number of supported guests.
+ */
+static __init void sev_hardware_setup(void)
+{
+	max_sev_asid = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F);
+}
+
 static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 {
 	int cpu;
@@ -1084,6 +1095,16 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 		kvm_tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 32;
 	}
 
+	if (sev) {
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV) &&
+		    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV)) {
+			sev_hardware_setup();
+			pr_info("SEV supported\n");
+		} else {
+			sev = false;
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (nested) {
 		printk(KERN_INFO "kvm: Nested Virtualization enabled\n");
 		kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_SVME | EFER_LMSLE);
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
maintainer
#32 lore raw

Re: [Part2 PATCH v7 23/38] KVM: SVM: Reserve ASID range for SEV guest

Quoted 63 lines · Brijesh Singh

A SEV-enabled guest must use ASIDs from the defined subset, while non-SEV guests can use the remaining ASID range. The range of allowed SEV guest ASIDs is [1 - CPUID_8000_001F[ECX][31:0]].

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +12 -1
index be2e98c01b22..d4b62536e305 100644
@@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ enum {
 
 #define VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK		0xFFFFFFFFFF000ULL
 
+static unsigned int max_sev_asid;
+
 static inline void mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
 {
 	vmcb->control.clean = 0;
@@ -787,7 +789,7 @@ static int svm_hardware_enable(void)
 	sd->asid_generation = 1;
 	sd->max_asid = cpuid_ebx(SVM_CPUID_FUNC) - 1;
 	sd->next_asid = sd->max_asid + 1;
-	sd->min_asid = 1;
+	sd->min_asid = max_sev_asid + 1;
 
 	gdt = get_current_gdt_rw();
 	sd->tss_desc = (struct kvm_ldttss_desc *)(gdt + GDT_ENTRY_TSS);
@@ -1054,6 +1056,15 @@ static int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_tag)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Get the maximum number of encrypted guests:
+ *  Fn8001_001F[ECX][31:0]: Number of supported guests.
+ */
+static __init void sev_hardware_setup(void)
+{
+	max_sev_asid = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F);
+}
+
 static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 {
 	int cpu;
@@ -1084,6 +1095,16 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 		kvm_tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 32;
 	}

arch/x86/kvm/svm.c static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void) · line 1106

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +9 -0
 
+	if (sev) {
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV) &&
+		    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV)) {
+			sev_hardware_setup();
+			pr_info("SEV supported\n");
+		} else {
+			sev = false;
+		}
+	}

Btw, upon a second look, this hunk should go with the previous patch. This patch deals with ASID ranges, as the commit message states.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
#33 lore raw

Re: [Part2 PATCH v7 23/38] KVM: SVM: Reserve ASID range for SEV guest

On 11/06/2017 04:34 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
...

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

int cpu;

arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +0 -0
@@ -1084,6 +1095,16 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
  		kvm_tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 32;
  	}
 
Quoted 13 lines

arch/x86/kvm/svm.c static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void) · line 1106

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +9 -0
+	if (sev) {
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV) &&
+		    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV)) {
+			sev_hardware_setup();
+			pr_info("SEV supported\n");
+		} else {
+			sev = false;
+		}
+	}

Btw, upon a second look, this hunk should go with the previous patch. This patch deals with ASID ranges, as the commit message states.

I will see if I can move the hunk in previous patch. thanks

#34 lore raw

PATCH v7 24/38 KVM: Define SEV key management command id

In reply to Brijesh Singh

Define Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) key management command id and structure. The command definition is available in SEV KM spec 0.14 (http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf) and Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.txt.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Cc Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
---
 .../virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst          | 202 +++++++++++++++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                           |  80 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 282 insertions(+)
Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +202 -0
index a8ef21e737db..71d6d257074f 100644
@@ -43,3 +43,205 @@ setting the SEV bit before executing VMRUN.::
 SEV hardware uses ASIDs to associate a memory encryption key with a VM.
 Hence, the ASID for the SEV-enabled guests must be from 1 to a maximum value
 defined in the CPUID 0x8000001f[ecx] field.
+
+SEV Key Management
+==================
+
+The SEV guest key management is handled by a separate processor called the AMD
+Secure Processor (AMD-SP). Firmware running inside the AMD-SP provides a secure
+key management interface to perform common hypervisor activities such as
+encrypting bootstrap code, snapshot, migrating and debugging the guest. For more
+information, see the SEV Key Management spec [api-spec]_
+
+KVM implements the following commands to support common lifecycle events of SEV
+guests, such as launching, running, snapshotting, migrating and decommissioning.
+
+1. KVM_SEV_INIT
+---------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_INIT command is used by the hypervisor to initialize the SEV platform
+context. In a typical workflow, this command should be the first command issued.
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+2. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START
+-----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command is used for creating the memory encryption
+context. To create the encryption context, user must provide a guest policy,
+the owner's public Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key and session information.
+
+Parameters: struct  kvm_sev_launch_start (in/out)
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_launch_start {
+                __u32 handle;           /* if zero then firmware creates a new handle */
+                __u32 policy;           /* guest's policy */
+
+                __u64 dh_uaddr;         /* userspace address pointing to the guest owner's PDH key */
+                __u32 dh_len;
+
+                __u64 session_addr;     /* userspace address which points to the guest session information */
+                __u32 session_len;
+        };
+
+On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative value.
+
+For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.2.
+
+3. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA
+-----------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA is used for encrypting a memory region. It also
+calculates a measurement of the memory contents. The measurement is a signature
+of the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an attestation
+that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware.
+
+Parameters (in): struct  kvm_sev_launch_update_data
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_launch_update {
+                __u64 uaddr;    /* userspace address to be encrypted (must be 16-byte aligned) */
+                __u32 len;      /* length of the data to be encrypted (must be 16-byte aligned) */
+        };
+
+For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.3.
+
+4. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE
+-------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE command is used to retrieve the measurement of the
+data encrypted by the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command. The guest owner may
+wait to provide the guest with confidential information until it can verify the
+measurement. Since the guest owner knows the initial contents of the guest at
+boot, the measurement can be verified by comparing it to what the guest owner
+expects.
+
+Parameters (in): struct  kvm_sev_launch_measure
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_launch_measure {
+                __u64 uaddr;    /* where to copy the measurement */
+                __u32 len;      /* length of measurement blob */
+        };
+
+For more details on the measurement verification flow, see SEV spec Section 6.4.
+
+5. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH
+------------------------
+
+After completion of the launch flow, the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command can be
+issued to make the guest ready for the execution.
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+6. KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS
+-----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS command is used to retrieve status information about a
+SEV-enabled guest.
+
+Parameters (out): struct kvm_sev_guest_status
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_guest_status {
+                __u32 handle;   /* guest handle */
+                __u32 policy;   /* guest policy */
+                __u8 state;     /* guest state (see enum below) */
+        };
+
+SEV guest state:
+
+::
+
+        enum {
+        SEV_STATE_INVALID = 0;
+        SEV_STATE_LAUNCHING,    /* guest is currently being launched */
+        SEV_STATE_SECRET,       /* guest is being launched and ready to accept the ciphertext data */
+        SEV_STATE_RUNNING,      /* guest is fully launched and running */
+        SEV_STATE_RECEIVING,    /* guest is being migrated in from another SEV machine */
+        SEV_STATE_SENDING       /* guest is getting migrated out to another SEV machine */
+        };
+
+7. KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT
+----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_DEBUG_DECRYPT command can be used by the hypervisor to request the
+firmware to decrypt the data at the given memory region.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_dbg
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_dbg {
+                __u64 src_uaddr;        /* userspace address of data to decrypt */
+                __u64 dst_uaddr;        /* userspace address of destination */
+                __u32 len;              /* length of memory region to decrypt */
+        };
+
+The command returns an error if the guest policy does not allow debugging.
+
+8. KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT
+----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_DEBUG_ENCRYPT command can be used by the hypervisor to request the
+firmware to encrypt the data at the given memory region.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_dbg
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_dbg {
+                __u64 src_uaddr;        /* userspace address of data to encrypt */
+                __u64 dst_uaddr;        /* userspace address of destination */
+                __u32 len;              /* length of memory region to encrypt */
+        };
+
+The command returns an error if the guest policy does not allow debugging.
+
+9. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET
+------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET command can be used by the hypervisor to inject secret
+data after the measurement has been validated by the guest owner.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_launch_secret
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_launch_secret {
+                __u64 hdr_uaddr;        /* userspace address containing the packet header */
+                __u32 hdr_len;
+
+                __u64 guest_uaddr;      /* the guest memory region where the secret should be injected */
+                __u32 guest_len;
+
+                __u64 trans_uaddr;      /* the hypervisor memory region which contains the secret */
+                __u32 trans_len;
+        };
+
+References
+==========
+
+.. [white-paper] http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf
+.. [api-spec] http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf
+.. [amd-apm] http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.34)
+.. [kvm-forum]  http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +80 -0

86 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#35 lore raw

PATCH v7 25/38 KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_INIT command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The command initializes the SEV platform context and allocates a new ASID for this guest from the SEV ASID pool. The firmware must be initialized before we issue any guest launch commands to create a new memory encryption context.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   7 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c              | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +7 -0
index 3af074452b2b..b8837cff22ec 100644
@@ -747,6 +747,11 @@ enum kvm_irqchip_mode {
 	KVM_IRQCHIP_SPLIT,        /* created with KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP */
 };
 
+struct kvm_sev_info {
+	bool active;		/* SEV enabled guest */
+	unsigned int asid;	/* ASID used for this guest */
+};
+
 struct kvm_arch {
 	unsigned int n_used_mmu_pages;
 	unsigned int n_requested_mmu_pages;
@@ -834,6 +839,8 @@ struct kvm_arch {
 
 	bool x2apic_format;
 	bool x2apic_broadcast_quirk_disabled;
+
+	struct kvm_sev_info sev_info;
 };
 
 struct kvm_vm_stat {
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +129 -1

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Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
maintainer Reviewed-by on v7 25/38
#36 lore raw

Re: [Part2 PATCH v7 25/38] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_INIT command

Quoted 21 lines · Brijesh Singh

The command initializes the SEV platform context and allocates a new ASID for this guest from the SEV ASID pool. The firmware must be initialized before we issue any guest launch commands to create a new memory encryption context.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   7 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c              | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

...

Review static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void) · line 1194

Quoted 9 lines
(quoted diff) +5 -0
@@ -1167,10 +1187,18 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 	return r;
 }
 
+static __exit void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
+{
+	if (svm_sev_enabled())
+		kfree(sev_asid_bitmap);
+}

Just get rid of that silly function:

arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +2 -7
index 1410e6b7e8d8..5f5c3ddad139 100644
@@ -1187,17 +1187,12 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 	return r;
 }
 
-static __exit void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
-{
-	if (svm_sev_enabled())
-		kfree(sev_asid_bitmap);
-}
-
 static __exit void svm_hardware_unsetup(void)
 {
 	int cpu;
 
-	sev_hardware_unsetup();
+	if (svm_sev_enabled())
+		kfree(sev_asid_bitmap);
 
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
 		svm_cpu_uninit(cpu);

with that:

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
#37 lore raw

Re: [Part2 PATCH v7 25/38] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_INIT command

On 11/06/2017 04:57 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
...

Quoted 3 lines

Just get rid of that silly function:

Sure, will do.

#38 lore raw

PATCH v7 26/38 KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled

In reply to Brijesh Singh

SEV hardware uses ASIDs to associate a memory encryption key with a guest VM. During guest creation, a SEV VM uses the SEV_CMD_ACTIVATE command to bind a particular ASID to the guest. Lets make sure that the VMCB is programmed with the bound ASID before a VMRUN.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +56 -2
index 1410e6b7e8d8..18af702f783a 100644
@@ -213,6 +213,9 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
 	 */
 	struct list_head ir_list;
 	spinlock_t ir_list_lock;
+
+	/* which host CPU was used for running this vcpu */
+	unsigned int last_cpu;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -340,6 +343,13 @@ static inline bool sev_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
 	return sev->active;
 }
 
+static inline int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+
+	return sev->asid;
+}
+
 static inline void mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
 {
 	vmcb->control.clean = 0;
@@ -550,6 +560,9 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
 	struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
 
 	struct page *save_area;
+
+	/* index = sev_asid, value = vmcb pointer */
+	struct vmcb **sev_vmcbs;
 };
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data);
@@ -863,6 +876,7 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)
 		return;
 
 	per_cpu(svm_data, raw_smp_processor_id()) = NULL;
+	kfree(sd->sev_vmcbs);
 	__free_page(sd->save_area);
 	kfree(sd);
 }
@@ -876,11 +890,18 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
 	if (!sd)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	sd->cpu = cpu;
-	sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 	r = -ENOMEM;
+	sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!sd->save_area)
 		goto err_1;
 
+	if (svm_sev_enabled()) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc((max_sev_asid + 1) * sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
+			goto err_1;
+	}
+
 	per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = sd;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -1476,10 +1497,16 @@ static int avic_init_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static void __sev_asid_free(int asid)
 {
-	int pos;
+	struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
+	int cpu, pos;
 
 	pos = asid - 1;
 	clear_bit(pos, sev_asid_bitmap);
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
+		sd->sev_vmcbs[pos] = NULL;
+	}
 }
 
 static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm *kvm)
@@ -4420,12 +4447,39 @@ static void reload_tss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	load_TR_desc();
 }
 
+static void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu)
+{
+	struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
+	int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm);
+
+	/* Assign the asid allocated with this SEV guest */
+	svm->vmcb->control.asid = asid;
+
+	/*
+	 * Flush guest TLB:
+	 *
+	 * 1) when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU.
+	 * 2) or this VMCB was executed on different host CPU in previous VMRUNs.
+	 */
+	if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] == svm->vmcb &&
+	    svm->last_cpu == cpu)
+		return;
+
+	svm->last_cpu = cpu;
+	sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = svm->vmcb;
+	svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID;
+	mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
+}
+
 static void pre_svm_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
 	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
 
 	struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
 
+	if (sev_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
+		return pre_sev_run(svm, cpu);
+
 	/* FIXME: handle wraparound of asid_generation */
 	if (svm->asid_generation != sd->asid_generation)
 		new_asid(svm, sd);
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#39 lore raw

PATCH v7 27/38 KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command is used to create a memory encryption context within the SEV firmware. In order to do so, the guest owner should provide the guest's policy, its public Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key and session information. The command implements the LAUNCH_START flow defined in SEV spec Section 6.2.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c              | 153 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 155 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
index b8837cff22ec..f2654486b9a6 100644
@@ -750,6 +750,8 @@ enum kvm_irqchip_mode {
 struct kvm_sev_info {
 	bool active;		/* SEV enabled guest */
 	unsigned int asid;	/* ASID used for this guest */
+	unsigned int handle;	/* SEV firmware handle */
+	int fd;			/* SEV device fd */
 };
 
 struct kvm_arch {
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +153 -0

176 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#40 lore raw

PATCH v7 28/38 KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the VM encryption key (VEK) created during KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c              | 191 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
index f2654486b9a6..924ce807c76c 100644
@@ -752,6 +752,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
 	unsigned int asid;	/* ASID used for this guest */
 	unsigned int handle;	/* SEV firmware handle */
 	int fd;			/* SEV device fd */
+	unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */
 };
 
 struct kvm_arch {
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +189 -2

239 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.9.5
#41 lore raw

PATCH v7 29/38 KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The command is used to retrieve the measurement of contents encrypted through the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +74 -0
index f400753a37a8..c9be9dde7b85 100644
@@ -5911,6 +5911,77 @@ static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_launch_measure *data;
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params;
+	void *blob = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* User wants to query the blob length */
+	if (!params.len)
+		goto cmd;
+
+	if (params.uaddr) {
+		if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto e_free;
+		}
+
+		if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, params.uaddr, params.len)) {
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			goto e_free;
+		}
+
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!blob)
+			goto e_free;
+
+		data->address = __psp_pa(blob);
+		data->len = params.len;
+	}
+
+cmd:
+	data->handle = sev->handle;
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, data, &argp->error);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
+	 */
+	if (!params.len)
+		goto done;
+
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free_blob;
+
+	if (blob) {
+		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr, blob, params.len))
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+done:
+	params.len = data->len;
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params, sizeof(params)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+e_free_blob:
+	kfree(blob);
+e_free:
+	kfree(data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -5934,6 +6005,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
 		r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
 		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
+		r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
 	default:
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.9.5