enable early printing of hashed pointers
Subsystems (3)
v5 cover enable early printing of hashed pointers
Currently if an attempt is made to print a pointer before there is enough entropy then '(____ptrval____)' is printed. This makes debugging stack traces during early boot difficult.
One partial solution to this problem is to use the hw RNG if it is available.
Patch 1 - Whitespace fixes.
Patch 2 - Fix get_random_bytes_arch()
Patch 3 - Use hw RNG for pointer hashing if available (by default).
thanks,
Tobin.
v4 -> v5
- Use 'upside-down-xmas-tree' style to declare local variables (Steve)
- Added Reviewed-by tag from Steve (patch 2 and 3).
v3 -> v4
- remove last patch of series (command line option patch)
v2 -> v3
- Add __ro_after_init (suggested by Kees).
v1 -> v2
- Use min_t() instead of min() (thanks checkpatch).
- Add __must_check to function declaration (thanks Steve).
- Use hw RNG by default if available (as originally suggested by Kees).
- Add command line option to use cryptographically insecure hashing. If debug_early_boot is enabled use hash_long() instead of siphash (as requested by Steve, and solves original problem for Anna-Maria).
- Added Acked-by tag from Ted (patch 1 and 2)
*** BLURB HERE ***
Tobin C. Harding (3):
random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work
random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key
drivers/char/random.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- include/linux/random.h | 2 +- lib/vsprintf.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
PATCH v5 1/3 random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work
There are a couple of whitespace issues around the function get_random_bytes_arch(). In preparation for patching this function let's clean them up.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -2
@@ -1737,7 +1737,7 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)if (!arch_get_random_long (&v))break ; - +memcpy (p, &v, chunk); p += chunk; nbytes -= chunk;
@@ -1748,7 +1748,6 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_bytes_arch); -/* * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data *
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
PATCH v5 2/3 random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
In reply to Tobin C. HardingCurrently the function get_random_bytes_arch() has return value 'void'. If the hw RNG fails we currently fall back to using get_random_bytes(). This defeats the purpose of requesting random material from the hw RNG in the first place.
There are currently no intree users of get_random_bytes_arch().
Only get random bytes from the hw RNG, make function return the number of bytes retrieved from the hw RNG.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 16 +++++++++------- include/linux/random.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +9 -7
@@ -1725,26 +1725,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);* key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to * have put in a back door. +* +* Return number of bytes filled in. */ -void get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes) +int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes) { +int left = nbytes;char *p = buf; -trace_get_random_bytes_arch (nbytes, _RET_IP_); -while (nbytes) { +trace_get_random_bytes_arch (left, _RET_IP_); +while (left) {unsigned long v; -int chunk =min (nbytes, (int )sizeof (unsigned long )); +int chunk =min_t (int, left, (int )sizeof (unsigned long ));if (!arch_get_random_long (&v))break ;memcpy (p, &v, chunk); p += chunk; - nbytes -= chunk; + left -= chunk; } -if (nbytes) -get_random_bytes (p, nbytes); +return nbytes - left; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_bytes_arch);
include/linux/random.h +1 -1
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);extern int wait_for_random_bytes (void );extern int add_random_ready_callback (struct random_ready_callback *rdy);extern void del_random_ready_callback (struct random_ready_callback *rdy); -extern void get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes); +extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes);#ifndef MODULE extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
PATCH v5 3/3 vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key
In reply to Tobin C. HardingCurrently we must wait for enough entropy to become available before hashed pointers can be printed. We can remove this wait by using the hw RNG if available.
Use hw RNG to get keying material.
--- lib/vsprintf.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
lib/vsprintf.c +16 -3
@@ -1657,9 +1657,8 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key__read_mostly ;static siphash_key_t ptr_key__read_mostly ; -static void fill_random_ptr_key (struct random_ready_callback *unused) +static void ptr_key_ready (void ) { -get_random_bytes (&ptr_key,sizeof (ptr_key));/* * have_filled_random_ptr_key==true is dependent on get_random_bytes(). * ptr_to_id() needs to see have_filled_random_ptr_key==true
@@ -1669,14 +1668,28 @@ static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)WRITE_ONCE (have_filled_random_ptr_key, true); } +static void fill_random_ptr_key (struct random_ready_callback *unused) +{ +get_random_bytes (&ptr_key,sizeof (ptr_key)); +ptr_key_ready (); +} +static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = { .func = fill_random_ptr_key };static int __init initialize_ptr_random (void ) { -int ret =add_random_ready_callback (&random_ready); +int key_size =sizeof (ptr_key); +int ret; + +/* Use hw RNG if available */ +if (get_random_bytes_arch (&ptr_key, key_size) == key_size) { +ptr_key_ready (); +return 0 ; + } + ret =add_random_ready_callback (&random_ready);if (!ret) {return 0 ; }else if (ret == -EALREADY ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Steven Rostedt
maintainerI think the series looks good, although if Linus takes my last patch, it may conflict badly with the third patch. I'll have to look into that.
Anyway, Andrew, you want to take this in your tree?
-- Steve
Quoted 48 lines · On Wed, 16 May 2018 09:17:36 +1000 "Tobin C. Harding" <[email protected]> wrote:
Currently if an attempt is made to print a pointer before there is enough entropy then '(
____ptrval____)' is printed. This makes debugging stack traces during early boot difficult.One partial solution to this problem is to use the hw RNG if it is available.
Patch 1 - Whitespace fixes.
Patch 2 - Fixget_random_bytes_arch()
Patch 3 - Use hw RNG for pointer hashing if available (by default).thanks,
Tobin.v4 -> v5
- Use 'upside-down-xmas-tree' style to declare local variables (Steve)
- Added Reviewed-by tag from Steve (patch 2 and 3).v3 -> v4
- remove last patch of series (command line option patch)v2 -> v3
- Add__ro_after_init(suggested by Kees).v1 -> v2
- Usemin_t()instead ofmin()(thanks checkpatch).
- Add__must_checkto function declaration (thanks Steve).
- Use hw RNG by default if available (as originally suggested by Kees).
- Add command line option to use cryptographically insecure hashing. Ifdebug_early_bootis enabled usehash_long()instead of siphash (as requested by Steve, and solves original problem for Anna-Maria).
- Added Acked-by tag from Ted (patch 1 and 2)*** BLURB HERE ***
Tobin C. Harding (3):
random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work
random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
vsprintf: Use hw RNG forptr_keydrivers/char/random.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- include/linux/random.h | 2 +- lib/vsprintf.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
Quoted 3 lines · Steven Rostedt
I think the series looks good, although if Linus takes my last patch, it may conflict badly with the third patch. I'll have to look into that.
I applied your PR patch ontop of mainline (imitating Linus pulling) any yes patch 3 of this set has a merge conflict.
Quoted 1 line
Anyway, Andrew, you want to take this in your tree?
I split this set up into it's current form because Ted offered to take it through his tree. There has been no response from him though since doing so. He has ack'ed the first 2 patches (that touch drivers/char/random.c and include/linux/random.c).
Since this is not overly urgent stuff is it easier for everyone involved if I wait until the PR to Linus goes through then rebase this, add the other vsprintf patch back onto the set and send it all to Andrew?
Usual disclaimer about being a massive noob, please correct me if I am out of line. My aim is to make the job of others more simple.
thanks,
Tobin.
Steven Rostedt
maintainer[ Steve is back from vacation ]
Quoted 8 lines · On Thu, 17 May 2018 08:41:58 +1000 "Tobin C. Harding" <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 3 lines · Steven Rostedt
I think the series looks good, although if Linus takes my last patch, it may conflict badly with the third patch. I'll have to look into that.
I applied your PR patch ontop of mainline (imitating Linus pulling) any yes patch 3 of this set has a merge conflict.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Anyway, Andrew, you want to take this in your tree?
I split this set up into it's current form because Ted offered to take it through his tree. There has been no response from him though since doing so. He has ack'ed the first 2 patches (that touch
drivers/char/random.candinclude/linux/random.c).
Hopefully Ted takes this then.
Quoted 4 lines
Since this is not overly urgent stuff is it easier for everyone involved if I wait until the PR to Linus goes through then rebase this, add the other vsprintf patch back onto the set and send it all to Andrew?
Linus already pulled my commit in his tree. You can base your latest work on top of it and post it again. I'm sure Andrew could take it after that.
Quoted 3 lines
Usual disclaimer about being a massive noob, please correct me if I am out of line. My aim is to make the job of others more simple.
No worries, you're doing a fine job ;-)
-- Steve