Skip to contentSkip to conversation

Control Flow Enforcement: Branch Tracking, PTRACE

RFC PATCH Superseded Yu-cheng Yu 2 participants 10 messages Aug 30, 2018

Subsystems (11)

v3 of 30 Superseded Latest is v30 →

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

v3 cover Control Flow Enforcement: Branch Tracking, PTRACE

This set includes CET Indirect Branch Tracking patches and a PTRACE patch.

Summary of changes from v2:

Allocate IBT bitmap at the start of a task.

H.J. Lu (1):
x86: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO

Yu-cheng Yu (7):
x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking x86/cet/ibt: User-mode indirect branch tracking support x86/cet/ibt: ELF header parsing for IBT
x86/cet/ibt: Add arch_prctl functions for IBT
x86/cet/ibt: Add ENDBR to op-code-map
mm/mmap: Add IBT bitmap size to address space limit check x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET

 arch/x86/Kconfig                              | 12 +++
 arch/x86/Makefile                             |  7 ++
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/.gitignore                |  4 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile                  | 12 ++-
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S         |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h                    |  8 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h      |  8 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/regset.h             |  7 +-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/elf_property.h      |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h             |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/resource.h          |  5 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c                         | 74 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c                   | 38 +++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  | 20 ++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/elf.c                         |  8 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c                  | 41 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c                     |  2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c                      | 16 ++++
 arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt               | 13 +++-
 include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h           |  3 +
 include/uapi/linux/elf.h                      |  1 +
 mm/mmap.c                                     | 12 ++-
 tools/objtool/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt | 13 +++-
 23 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#1 lore raw

RFC PATCH v3 1/8 x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking

The user-mode indirect branch tracking support is done mostly by GCC to insert ENDBR64/ENDBR32 instructions at branch targets. The kernel provides CPUID enumeration, feature MSR setup and the allocation of legacy bitmap.

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig  | 12 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Makefile |  7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
arch/x86/Kconfig +12 -0
index 2cfe11e1cf7f..0d97b03f35f6 100644
@@ -1941,6 +1941,18 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
 
 	  If unsure, say y.
 
+config X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
+	prompt "Intel Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode"
+	def_bool n
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
+	select X86_INTEL_CET
+	select ARCH_HAS_PROGRAM_PROPERTIES
+	---help---
+	  Indirect Branch Tracking provides hardware protection against return-/jmp-
+	  oriented programing attacks.
+
+	  If unsure, say y
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
arch/x86/Makefile +7 -0
index 00927853e409..0da5121c30db 100644
@@ -159,6 +159,13 @@ ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
   endif
 endif
 
+# Check compiler ibt support
+ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
+  ifeq ($(call cc-option-yn, -fcf-protection=branch), n)
+      $(error CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER not supported by compiler)
+  endif
+endif
+
 #
 # If the function graph tracer is used with mcount instead of fentry,
 # '-maccumulate-outgoing-args' is needed to prevent a GCC bug
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
reviewer
#2 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking

Quoted 7 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
arch/x86/Kconfig +0 -0
index 2cfe11e1cf7f..0d97b03f35f6 100644
@@ -1941,6 +1941,18 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
 
 	  If unsure, say y.

arch/x86/Kconfig config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER · line 1952

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/Kconfig +9 -0
 
+config X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
+	prompt "Intel Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode"
+	def_bool n
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
+	select X86_INTEL_CET
+	select ARCH_HAS_PROGRAM_PROPERTIES
+	---help---
+	  Indirect Branch Tracking provides hardware protection against return-/jmp-
+	  oriented programing attacks.

programming

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/Kconfig +3 -0
+
+	  If unsure, say y
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
Signature · 1 line
~Randy
#3 lore raw

RFC PATCH v3 2/8 x86/cet/ibt: User-mode indirect branch tracking support

In reply to Yu-cheng Yu

Add user-mode indirect branch tracking enabling/disabling and supporting routines.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h               |  8 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |  8 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c                    | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c             | 20 ++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c                |  1 +
 5 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +8 -0
index 212bd68e31d3..1fea93fd436a 100644
@@ -12,8 +12,11 @@ struct task_struct;
 struct cet_status {
 	unsigned long	shstk_base;
 	unsigned long	shstk_size;
+	unsigned long	ibt_bitmap_addr;
+	unsigned long	ibt_bitmap_size;
 	unsigned int	locked:1;
 	unsigned int	shstk_enabled:1;
+	unsigned int	ibt_enabled:1;
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
@@ -25,6 +28,9 @@ void cet_disable_shstk(void);
 void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
 int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp);
 int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor, unsigned long *new_ssp);
+int cet_setup_ibt(void);
+int cet_setup_ibt_bitmap(void);
+void cet_disable_ibt(void);
 #else
 static inline int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2) { return 0; }
 static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return 0; }
@@ -35,6 +41,8 @@ static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
 static inline int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp) { return 0; }
 static inline int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor,
 				   unsigned long *new_ssp) { return 0; }
+static inline int cet_setup_ibt(void) { return 0; }
+static inline void cet_disable_ibt(void) {}
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +7 -1
index 3624a11e5ba6..ce5bdaf0f1ff 100644
@@ -62,6 +62,12 @@
 #define DISABLE_SHSTK	(1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
+#define DISABLE_IBT	0
+#else
+#define DISABLE_IBT	(1<<(X86_FEATURE_IBT & 31))
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Make sure to add features to the correct mask
  */
@@ -72,7 +78,7 @@
 #define DISABLED_MASK4	(DISABLE_PCID)
 #define DISABLED_MASK5	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK6	0
-#define DISABLED_MASK7	(DISABLE_PTI)
+#define DISABLED_MASK7	(DISABLE_PTI|DISABLE_IBT)
 #define DISABLED_MASK8	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK9	(DISABLE_MPX)
 #define DISABLED_MASK10	0
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +68 -0

77 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +19 -1
index e7eb41830add..cd03c4db2270 100644
@@ -413,7 +413,8 @@ __setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
 
 static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
-	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+	    cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
 		cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET);
 }
 
@@ -434,6 +435,23 @@ static __init int setup_disable_shstk(char *s)
 __setup("no_cet_shstk", setup_disable_shstk);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
+static __init int setup_disable_ibt(char *s)
+{
+	/* require an exact match without trailing characters */
+	if (strlen(s))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+		return 1;
+
+	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
+	pr_info("x86: 'no_cet_ibt' specified, disabling Branch Tracking\n");
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("no_cet_ibt", setup_disable_ibt);
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
  * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +1 -0
index 251b8714f9a3..ac0ea9c7e89f 100644
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ void flush_thread(void)
 	memset(tsk->thread.tls_array, 0, sizeof(tsk->thread.tls_array));
 
 	cet_disable_shstk();
+	cet_disable_ibt();
 	fpu__clear(&tsk->thread.fpu);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#4 lore raw

RFC PATCH v3 3/8 x86/cet/ibt: ELF header parsing for IBT

In reply to Yu-cheng Yu

Look in .note.gnu.property of an ELF file and check if Indirect Branch Tracking needs to be enabled for the task.

---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/elf_property.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/elf.c                    | 8 +++++++-
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/elf_property.h +1 -0
index af361207718c..343a871b8fc1 100644
@@ -11,5 +11,6 @@
  * Bits for GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND
  */
 #define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK	(0x00000002)
+#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT		(0x00000001)
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_ELF_PROPERTY_H */
arch/x86/kernel/elf.c +7 -1
index a2c41bf39c58..41957f1bd9d0 100644
@@ -298,7 +298,8 @@ int arch_setup_features(void *ehdr_p, void *phdr_p,
 
 	struct elf64_hdr *ehdr64 = ehdr_p;
 
-	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
+	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (ehdr64->e_ident[EI_CLASS] == ELFCLASS64) {
@@ -333,6 +334,11 @@ int arch_setup_features(void *ehdr_p, void *phdr_p,
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
+		if (feature & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT)
+			err = cet_setup_ibt();
+	}
+
 out:
 	return err;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#5 lore raw

RFC PATCH v3 4/8 x86/cet/ibt: Add arch_prctl functions for IBT

In reply to Yu-cheng Yu

Update ARCH_CET_STATUS and ARCH_CET_DISABLE to include Indirect Branch Tracking features.

Introduce:

arch_prctl(ARCH_CET_LEGACY_BITMAP, unsigned long *addr)
Enable the Indirect Branch Tracking legacy code bitmap.

The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer. On returning to the caller, the kernel fills the following:

*addr = IBT bitmap base address
*(addr + 1) = IBT bitmap size

---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c       | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c         |  1 +
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +1 -0
index 3aec1088e01d..31d2465f9caf 100644
@@ -18,5 +18,6 @@
 #define ARCH_CET_DISABLE	0x3002
 #define ARCH_CET_LOCK		0x3003
 #define ARCH_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK	0x3004
+#define ARCH_CET_LEGACY_BITMAP	0x3005
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c +37 -1
index c4b7c19f5040..df47b5ebc3f4 100644
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ static int handle_get_status(unsigned long arg2)
 
 	if (current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
 		features |= GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK;
+	if (current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled)
+		features |= GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT;
 
 	shstk_base = current->thread.cet.shstk_base;
 	shstk_size = current->thread.cet.shstk_size;
@@ -49,9 +51,35 @@ static int handle_alloc_shstk(unsigned long arg2)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int handle_bitmap(unsigned long arg2)
+{
+	unsigned long addr, size;
+
+	if (current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled) {
+		int err;
+
+		err  = cet_setup_ibt_bitmap();
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		addr = current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_addr;
+		size = current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_size;
+	} else {
+		addr = 0;
+		size = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (put_user(addr, (unsigned long __user *)arg2) ||
+	    put_user(size, (unsigned long __user *)arg2 + 1))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2)
 {
-	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
+	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	switch (option) {
@@ -63,6 +91,8 @@ int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2)
 			return -EPERM;
 		if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
 			cet_disable_free_shstk(current);
+		if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT)
+			cet_disable_ibt();
 
 		return 0;
 
@@ -73,6 +103,12 @@ int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2)
 	case ARCH_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK:
 		return handle_alloc_shstk(arg2);
 
+	/*
+	 * Allocate legacy bitmap and return address & size to user.
+	 */
+	case ARCH_CET_LEGACY_BITMAP:
+		return handle_bitmap(arg2);
+
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +1 -0
index ac0ea9c7e89f..aea15a9b6a3e 100644
@@ -797,6 +797,7 @@ long do_arch_prctl_common(struct task_struct *task, int option,
 	case ARCH_CET_DISABLE:
 	case ARCH_CET_LOCK:
 	case ARCH_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK:
+	case ARCH_CET_LEGACY_BITMAP:
 		return prctl_cet(option, cpuid_enabled);
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#6 lore raw

RFC PATCH v3 5/8 x86/cet/ibt: Add ENDBR to op-code-map

In reply to Yu-cheng Yu

Add control transfer terminating instructions:

ENDBR64/ENDBR32:
Mark a valid 64/32-bit control transfer endpoint.

---
 arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt               | 13 +++++++++++--
 tools/objtool/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt | 13 +++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt +11 -2
index c5e825d44766..fbc53481bc59 100644
@@ -620,7 +620,16 @@ ea: SAVEPREVSSP (f3)
 # Skip 0xeb-0xff
 EndTable
 
-Table: 3-byte opcode 2 (0x0f 0x38)
+Table: 3-byte opcode 2 (0x0f 0x1e)
+Referrer:
+AVXcode:
+# Skip 0x00-0xf9
+fa: ENDBR64 (f3)
+fb: ENDBR32 (f3)
+#skip 0xfc-0xff
+EndTable
+
+Table: 3-byte opcode 3 (0x0f 0x38)
 Referrer: 3-byte escape 1
 AVXcode: 2
 # 0x0f 0x38 0x00-0x0f
@@ -804,7 +813,7 @@ f6: ADCX Gy,Ey (66) | ADOX Gy,Ey (F3) | MULX By,Gy,rDX,Ey (F2),(v) | WRSS Pq,Qq
 f7: BEXTR Gy,Ey,By (v) | SHLX Gy,Ey,By (66),(v) | SARX Gy,Ey,By (F3),(v) | SHRX Gy,Ey,By (F2),(v)
 EndTable
 
-Table: 3-byte opcode 3 (0x0f 0x3a)
+Table: 3-byte opcode 4 (0x0f 0x3a)
 Referrer: 3-byte escape 2
 AVXcode: 3
 # 0x0f 0x3a 0x00-0xff
tools/objtool/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt +11 -2
index c5e825d44766..fbc53481bc59 100644
@@ -620,7 +620,16 @@ ea: SAVEPREVSSP (f3)
 # Skip 0xeb-0xff
 EndTable
 
-Table: 3-byte opcode 2 (0x0f 0x38)
+Table: 3-byte opcode 2 (0x0f 0x1e)
+Referrer:
+AVXcode:
+# Skip 0x00-0xf9
+fa: ENDBR64 (f3)
+fb: ENDBR32 (f3)
+#skip 0xfc-0xff
+EndTable
+
+Table: 3-byte opcode 3 (0x0f 0x38)
 Referrer: 3-byte escape 1
 AVXcode: 2
 # 0x0f 0x38 0x00-0x0f
@@ -804,7 +813,7 @@ f6: ADCX Gy,Ey (66) | ADOX Gy,Ey (F3) | MULX By,Gy,rDX,Ey (F2),(v) | WRSS Pq,Qq
 f7: BEXTR Gy,Ey,By (v) | SHLX Gy,Ey,By (66),(v) | SARX Gy,Ey,By (F3),(v) | SHRX Gy,Ey,By (F2),(v)
 EndTable
 
-Table: 3-byte opcode 3 (0x0f 0x3a)
+Table: 3-byte opcode 4 (0x0f 0x3a)
 Referrer: 3-byte escape 2
 AVXcode: 3
 # 0x0f 0x3a 0x00-0xff
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#7 lore raw

RFC PATCH v3 6/8 mm/mmap: Add IBT bitmap size to address space limit check

In reply to Yu-cheng Yu

The indirect branch tracking legacy bitmap takes a large address space. This causes may_expand_vm() failure on the address limit check. For a IBT-enabled task, add the bitmap size to the address limit.

---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/resource.h |  5 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c                | 10 ++++++++--
 include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h  |  3 +++
 mm/mmap.c                            | 12 +++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/resource.h +5 -0
index 04bc4db8921b..0741b2a6101a 100644
@@ -1 +1,6 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
+#define rlimit_as_extra() current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_size
+#endif
+
 #include <asm-generic/resource.h>
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +8 -2
index 071b9dd5bc5c..f700743f6f48 100644
@@ -295,20 +295,26 @@ int cet_setup_ibt(void)
 	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
+	/*
+	 * Calculate size and put in thread header.
+	 * may_expand_vm() needs this information.
+	 */
 	size = TASK_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE / BITS_PER_BYTE;
+	current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_size = size;
 	bitmap = do_mmap_locked(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
 				MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE,
 				VM_DONTDUMP);
 
-	if (bitmap >= TASK_SIZE)
+	if (bitmap >= TASK_SIZE) {
+		current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_size = 0;
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
 	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
 	r |= (MSR_IA32_CET_ENDBR_EN | MSR_IA32_CET_NO_TRACK_EN);
 	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
 
 	current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_addr = bitmap;
-	current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_size = size;
 	current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled = 1;
 	return 0;
 }
include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h +3 -0
index f12db7a0da64..8a7608a09700 100644
@@ -58,5 +58,8 @@
 # define RLIM_INFINITY		(~0UL)
 #endif
 
+#ifndef rlimit_as_extra
+#define rlimit_as_extra() 0
+#endif
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_GENERIC_RESOURCE_H */
mm/mmap.c +11 -1
index 5f2b2b184c60..6f6c722c1484 100644
@@ -3228,7 +3228,17 @@ struct vm_area_struct *copy_vma(struct vm_area_struct **vmap,
  */
 bool may_expand_vm(struct mm_struct *mm, vm_flags_t flags, unsigned long npages)
 {
-	if (mm->total_vm + npages > rlimit(RLIMIT_AS) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
+	unsigned long as_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_AS);
+	unsigned long as_limit_plus = as_limit + rlimit_as_extra();
+
+	/* as_limit_plus overflowed */
+	if (as_limit_plus < as_limit)
+		as_limit_plus = RLIM_INFINITY;
+
+	if (as_limit_plus > as_limit)
+		as_limit = as_limit_plus;
+
+	if (mm->total_vm + npages > as_limit >> PAGE_SHIFT)
 		return false;
 
 	if (is_data_mapping(flags) &&
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#8 lore raw

RFC PATCH v3 7/8 x86: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO

In reply to Yu-cheng Yu

From: "H.J. Lu" <[email protected]>

When Intel indirect branch tracking is enabled, functions in vDSO which may be called indirectly must have endbr32 or endbr64 as the first instruction. Compiler must support -fcf-protection=branch so that it can be used to compile vDSO.

---
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/.gitignore        |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile          | 12 +++++++++++-
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S |  1 +
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/entry/vdso/.gitignore +4 -0
index aae8ffdd5880..552941fdfae0 100644
@@ -5,3 +5,7 @@ vdso32-sysenter-syms.lds
 vdso32-int80-syms.lds
 vdso-image-*.c
 vdso2c
+vclock_gettime.S
+vgetcpu.S
+vclock_gettime.asm
+vgetcpu.asm
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +11 -1
index fa3f439f0a92..8694f70c08e6 100644
@@ -102,13 +102,17 @@ vobjx32s := $(foreach F,$(vobjx32s-y),$(obj)/$F)
 
 # Convert 64bit object file to x32 for x32 vDSO.
 quiet_cmd_x32 = X32     $@
-      cmd_x32 = $(OBJCOPY) -O elf32-x86-64 $< $@
+      cmd_x32 = $(OBJCOPY) -R .note.gnu.property -O elf32-x86-64 $< $@
 
 $(obj)/%-x32.o: $(obj)/%.o FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,x32)
 
 targets += vdsox32.lds $(vobjx32s-y)
 
+ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
+    $(obj)/vclock_gettime.o $(obj)/vgetcpu.o $(obj)/vdso32/vclock_gettime.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fcf-protection=branch
+endif
+
 $(obj)/%.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S
 $(obj)/%.so: $(obj)/%.so.dbg
 	$(call if_changed,objcopy)
@@ -160,6 +164,12 @@ quiet_cmd_vdso = VDSO    $@
 
 VDSO_LDFLAGS = -shared $(call ld-option, --hash-style=both) \
 	$(call ld-option, --build-id) -Bsymbolic
+ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
+  VDSO_LDFLAGS += $(call ldoption, -z$(comma)ibt)
+endif
+ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+  VDSO_LDFLAGS += $(call ldoption, -z$(comma)shstk)
+endif
 GCOV_PROFILE := n
 
 #
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S +1 -0
index acfd5ba7d943..cabaeedfed78 100644
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ SECTIONS
 	.fake_shstrtab	: { *(.fake_shstrtab) }		:text
 
 
+	.note.gnu.property : { *(.note.gnu.property) }	:text	:note
 	.note		: { *(.note.*) }		:text	:note
 
 	.eh_frame_hdr	: { *(.eh_frame_hdr) }		:text	:eh_frame_hdr
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#9 lore raw

RFC PATCH v3 8/8 x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET

In reply to Yu-cheng Yu

Add REGSET_CET64/REGSET_CET32 to get/set CET MSRs:

IA32_U_CET (user-mode CET settings),
IA32_PL3_SSP (user-mode shadow stack),
IA32_PL0_SSP (kernel-mode shadow stack),
IA32_PL1_SSP (ring-1 shadow stack),
IA32_PL2_SSP (ring-2 shadow stack).

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/regset.h |  7 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c      | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c          | 16 ++++++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/elf.h          |  1 +
 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/regset.h +4 -3
index d5bdffb9d27f..edad0d889084 100644
@@ -7,11 +7,12 @@
 
 #include <linux/regset.h>
 
-extern user_regset_active_fn regset_fpregs_active, regset_xregset_fpregs_active;
+extern user_regset_active_fn regset_fpregs_active, regset_xregset_fpregs_active,
+				cetregs_active;
 extern user_regset_get_fn fpregs_get, xfpregs_get, fpregs_soft_get,
-				xstateregs_get;
+				xstateregs_get, cetregs_get;
 extern user_regset_set_fn fpregs_set, xfpregs_set, fpregs_soft_set,
-				 xstateregs_set;
+				 xstateregs_set, cetregs_set;
 
 /*
  * xstateregs_active == regset_fpregs_active. Please refer to the comment
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c +41 -0

47 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c +16 -0
index e2ee403865eb..ac2bc3a18427 100644
@@ -49,7 +49,9 @@ enum x86_regset {
 	REGSET_IOPERM64 = REGSET_XFP,
 	REGSET_XSTATE,
 	REGSET_TLS,
+	REGSET_CET64 = REGSET_TLS,
 	REGSET_IOPERM32,
+	REGSET_CET32,
 };
 
 struct pt_regs_offset {
@@ -1276,6 +1278,13 @@ static struct user_regset x86_64_regsets[] __ro_after_init = {
 		.size = sizeof(long), .align = sizeof(long),
 		.active = ioperm_active, .get = ioperm_get
 	},
+	[REGSET_CET64] = {
+		.core_note_type = NT_X86_CET,
+		.n = sizeof(struct cet_user_state) / sizeof(u64),
+		.size = sizeof(u64), .align = sizeof(u64),
+		.active = cetregs_active, .get = cetregs_get,
+		.set = cetregs_set
+	},
 };
 
 static const struct user_regset_view user_x86_64_view = {
@@ -1331,6 +1340,13 @@ static struct user_regset x86_32_regsets[] __ro_after_init = {
 		.size = sizeof(u32), .align = sizeof(u32),
 		.active = ioperm_active, .get = ioperm_get
 	},
+	[REGSET_CET32] = {
+		.core_note_type = NT_X86_CET,
+		.n = sizeof(struct cet_user_state) / sizeof(u64),
+		.size = sizeof(u64), .align = sizeof(u64),
+		.active = cetregs_active, .get = cetregs_get,
+		.set = cetregs_set
+	},
 };
 
 static const struct user_regset_view user_x86_32_view = {
include/uapi/linux/elf.h +1 -0
index 5ef25a565e88..f4cdfdc59c0a 100644
@@ -401,6 +401,7 @@ typedef struct elf64_shdr {
 #define NT_386_TLS	0x200		/* i386 TLS slots (struct user_desc) */
 #define NT_386_IOPERM	0x201		/* x86 io permission bitmap (1=deny) */
 #define NT_X86_XSTATE	0x202		/* x86 extended state using xsave */
+#define NT_X86_CET	0x203		/* x86 cet state */
 #define NT_S390_HIGH_GPRS	0x300	/* s390 upper register halves */
 #define NT_S390_TIMER	0x301		/* s390 timer register */
 #define NT_S390_TODCMP	0x302		/* s390 TOD clock comparator register */
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1