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Allow access to confidential computing secret area

RFC PATCH Superseded Dov Murik 4 participants 13 messages Jun 28, 2021 – Jun 29, 2021

Subsystems (2)

v2 of 10 Superseded Latest is v10 →

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Dov Murik

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover Allow access to confidential computing secret area

Confidential computing hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the guest starts running.

Support for secret injection is already available in OVMF (in its AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not available in the guest kernel.

The patch series copies the secrets from the EFI-provided memory to kernel reserved memory, and optionally exposes them to userspace via securityfs using a new sev_secret kernel module.

The first patch in efi/libstub copies the secret area from the EFI memory to specially allocated memory; the second patch reserves that memory block; and the third patch introduces the new sev_secret module that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink interface.

This has been tested with AMD SEV guests, but the kernel side of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore should be usable for any confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry.

Here is a simple example for usage of the sev_secret module in a guest to which secrets were injected during launch:

# modprobe sev_secret
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret/
total 0
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
# xxd /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
00000000: 7468 6573 652d 6172 652d 7468 652d 6b61  these-are-the-ka
00000010: 7461 2d73 6563 7265 7473 0001 0203 0405  ta-secrets......
00000020: 0607                                     ..
# rm /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret/
total 0
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2

[1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4

v2 changes:
- Add unlink support in sev_secret securityfs.

Dov Murik (3):
efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area
efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area
virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets

 drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile                 |   2 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c |  41 +++
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c                    |   5 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile         |   3 +-
 .../efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c      |  68 ++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c       |   2 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h        |   2 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c       |   2 +
 drivers/virt/Kconfig                          |   2 +
 drivers/virt/Makefile                         |   1 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig               |  11 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile              |   2 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c          | 298 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/efi.h                           |  11 +
 14 files changed, 448 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c

base-commit: 62fb9874f5da54fdb243003b386128037319b219

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author
#1 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 1/3 efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area

Confidential computing hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows a guest owner to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them.

Firmware support for secret injection is available in OVMF, which reserves a memory area for secret injection and includes a pointer to it the in EFI config table entry LINUX_EFI_CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_TABLE_GUID. However, OVMF doesn't force the guest OS to keep this memory area reserved.

If EFI exposes such a table entry, efi/libstub will copy this area to a reserved memory for future use inside the kernel.

A pointer to the new copy is kept in the EFI table under LINUX_EFI_CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_AREA_GUID.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile         |  3 +-
 .../efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c      | 68 +++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c       |  2 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h        |  2 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c       |  2 +
 include/linux/efi.h                           |  7 ++
 6 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +2 -1
index d0537573501e..938ed23dd135 100644
@@ -55,7 +55,8 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT			:= n
 lib-y				:= efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o \
 				   file.o mem.o random.o randomalloc.o pci.o \
 				   skip_spaces.o lib-cmdline.o lib-ctype.o \
-				   alignedmem.o relocate.o vsprintf.o
+				   alignedmem.o relocate.o vsprintf.o \
+				   confidential-computing.o
 
 # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
 efi-deps-y := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c new file +68 -0

68 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c +2 -0
index 26e69788f27a..56bcd94a387e 100644
@@ -205,6 +205,8 @@ efi_status_t __efiapi efi_pe_entry(efi_handle_t handle,
 
 	efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog();
 
+	efi_copy_confidential_computing_secret_area();
+
 	/* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */
 	efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation();
 
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h +2 -0
index cde0a2ef507d..1c02658042ea 100644
@@ -858,4 +858,6 @@ efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(void) { }
 
 void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(void);
 
+void efi_copy_confidential_computing_secret_area(void);
+
 #endif
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +2 -0
index f14c4ff5839f..c663bf47370a 100644
@@ -793,6 +793,8 @@ unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle,
 
 	efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog();
 
+	efi_copy_confidential_computing_secret_area();
+
 	setup_graphics(boot_params);
 
 	setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
include/linux/efi.h +7 -0
index 6b5d36babfcc..4f647f1ee298 100644
@@ -359,6 +359,8 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
 #define LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID		EFI_GUID(0x888eb0c6, 0x8ede, 0x4ff5,  0xa8, 0xf0, 0x9a, 0xee, 0x5c, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xc2)
 #define LINUX_EFI_INITRD_MEDIA_GUID		EFI_GUID(0x5568e427, 0x68fc, 0x4f3d,  0xac, 0x74, 0xca, 0x55, 0x52, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x68)
 #define LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID	EFI_GUID(0xc451ed2b, 0x9694, 0x45d3,  0xba, 0xba, 0xed, 0x9f, 0x89, 0x88, 0xa3, 0x89)
+#define LINUX_EFI_CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_AREA_GUID \
+						EFI_GUID(0x940ed1e9, 0xd3da, 0x408b,  0xb3, 0x07, 0xe3, 0x2d, 0x25, 0x4a, 0x65, 0x16)
 
 /* OEM GUIDs */
 #define DELLEMC_EFI_RCI2_TABLE_GUID		EFI_GUID(0x2d9f28a2, 0xa886, 0x456a,  0x97, 0xa8, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0xf4, 0x55)
@@ -1282,4 +1284,9 @@ static inline struct efi_mokvar_table_entry *efi_mokvar_entry_find(
 }
 #endif
 
+struct linux_efi_confidential_computing_secret_area {
+	u32	size;
+	u8	area[];
+};
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author
#2 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 2/3 efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area

In reply to Dov Murik

When efi-stub copies an EFI-provided confidential computing secret area, reserve that memory block for future use within the kernel.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile                 |  2 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c                    |  5 +++
 include/linux/efi.h                           |  4 ++
 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c
drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile +1 -1
index 467e94259679..63f21f7351da 100644
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_runtime-wrappers.o	:= n
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT) 		+= efi-bgrt.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= efi.o vars.o reboot.o memattr.o tpm.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= memmap.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= memmap.o confidential-computing.o
 ifneq ($(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_LOADER),)
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= capsule.o
 endif
drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c new file +41 -0

41 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +5 -0
index 4b7ee3fa9224..da36333e5c9f 100644
@@ -526,6 +526,9 @@ static const efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] __initconst = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
 	{LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID,	&efi.mokvar_table,	"MOKvar"	},
 #endif
+	{LINUX_EFI_CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_AREA_GUID,
+						&efi.confidential_computing_secret,
+									"ConfCompSecret"},
 	{},
 };
 
@@ -613,6 +616,8 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables,
 
 	efi_tpm_eventlog_init();
 
+	efi_confidential_computing_secret_area_reserve();
+
 	if (mem_reserve != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
 		unsigned long prsv = mem_reserve;
 
include/linux/efi.h +4 -0
index 4f647f1ee298..e9740bd16db0 100644
@@ -551,6 +551,8 @@ extern struct efi {
 	unsigned long			tpm_log;		/* TPM2 Event Log table */
 	unsigned long			tpm_final_log;		/* TPM2 Final Events Log table */
 	unsigned long			mokvar_table;		/* MOK variable config table */
+	unsigned long			confidential_computing_secret;	/* Confidential computing */
+									/* secret table           */
 
 	efi_get_time_t			*get_time;
 	efi_set_time_t			*set_time;
@@ -1190,6 +1192,8 @@ extern int efi_tpm_final_log_size;
 
 extern unsigned long rci2_table_phys;
 
+extern int efi_confidential_computing_secret_area_reserve(void);
+
 /*
  * efi_runtime_service() function identifiers.
  * "NONE" is used by efi_recover_from_page_fault() to check if the page
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#3 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area

Quoted 17 lines · Dov Murik

When efi-stub copies an EFI-provided confidential computing secret area, reserve that memory block for future use within the kernel.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile                 |  2 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c                    |  5 +++
 include/linux/efi.h                           |  4 ++
 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c
include/linux/efi.h +0 -0
index 4f647f1ee298..e9740bd16db0 100644

include/linux/efi.h extern struct efi { · line 555

Quoted 5 lines
include/linux/efi.h +2 -0
@@ -551,6 +551,8 @@ extern struct efi {
 	unsigned long			tpm_log;		/* TPM2 Event Log table */
 	unsigned long			tpm_final_log;		/* TPM2 Final Events Log table */
 	unsigned long			mokvar_table;		/* MOK variable config table */
+	unsigned long			confidential_computing_secret;	/* Confidential computing */
+									/* secret table           */

If there is any possibility that someone could reuse a form of this confidential computing secret table in a bare metal system, then this table needs to be added to the efi_tables[] array in arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c. Otherwise, it will be mapped improperly on a system with SME active.

Thanks,
Tom

Quoted 13 lines
include/linux/efi.h +2 -0
 	efi_get_time_t			*get_time;
 	efi_set_time_t			*set_time;
@@ -1190,6 +1192,8 @@ extern int efi_tpm_final_log_size;
 
 extern unsigned long rci2_table_phys;
 
+extern int efi_confidential_computing_secret_area_reserve(void);
+
 /*
  * efi_runtime_service() function identifiers.
  * "NONE" is used by efi_recover_from_page_fault() to check if the page
author
#4 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area

Hi Tom,

Quoted 13 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 12 lines · Dov Murik

When efi-stub copies an EFI-provided confidential computing secret area, reserve that memory block for future use within the kernel.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile                 |  2 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c                    |  5 +++
 include/linux/efi.h                           |  4 ++
 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c
Quoted 16 lines

include/linux/efi.h extern struct efi { · line 555

Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/efi.h +2 -0
index 4f647f1ee298..e9740bd16db0 100644
@@ -551,6 +551,8 @@ extern struct efi {
 	unsigned long			tpm_log;		/* TPM2 Event Log table */
 	unsigned long			tpm_final_log;		/* TPM2 Final Events Log table */
 	unsigned long			mokvar_table;		/* MOK variable config table */
+	unsigned long			confidential_computing_secret;	/* Confidential computing */
+									/* secret table           */

If there is any possibility that someone could reuse a form of this confidential computing secret table in a bare metal system, then this table needs to be added to the efi_tables[] array in arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c. Otherwise, it will be mapped improperly on a system with SME active.

Good catch, thanks. I see that all existing table addresses from struct efi are added to the efi_tables[] array, so for completeness it makes sense to add efi.confidential_computing_secret as well (even though currently bare metal firmware doesn't have this table).

Thanks,
-Dov

Quoted 17 lines

Thanks,
Tom

Quoted 13 lines
include/linux/efi.h +2 -0
 	efi_get_time_t			*get_time;
 	efi_set_time_t			*set_time;
@@ -1190,6 +1192,8 @@ extern int efi_tpm_final_log_size;
 
 extern unsigned long rci2_table_phys;
 
+extern int efi_confidential_computing_secret_area_reserve(void);
+
 /*
  * efi_runtime_service() function identifiers.
  * "NONE" is used by efi_recover_from_page_fault() to check if the page
author
#5 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 3/3 virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets

In reply to Dov Murik

The new sev_secret module exposes the confidential computing secret area via securityfs interface.

When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under /sys/kernel/security), an "sev_secret" directory is created in securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data.

This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command).

Removing (unlinking) files in the "sev_secret" directory will zero out the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the module is removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem.

---
 drivers/virt/Kconfig                 |   2 +
 drivers/virt/Makefile                |   1 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig      |  11 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile     |   2 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c | 298 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 314 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c
drivers/virt/Kconfig +2 -0
index 8061e8ef449f..c222cc625891 100644
@@ -36,4 +36,6 @@ source "drivers/virt/vboxguest/Kconfig"
 source "drivers/virt/nitro_enclaves/Kconfig"
 
 source "drivers/virt/acrn/Kconfig"
+
+source "drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig"
 endif
drivers/virt/Makefile +1 -0
index 3e272ea60cd9..0765e5418d1d 100644
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-y				+= vboxguest/
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVES)	+= nitro_enclaves/
 obj-$(CONFIG_ACRN_HSM)		+= acrn/
+obj-y				+= sev_secret/
drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig new file +11 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4505526b8ef1
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config AMD_SEV_SECRET_SECURITYFS
+	tristate "AMD SEV secret area securityfs support"
+	depends on EFI
+	select SECURITYFS
+	help
+	  This is a driver for accessing the AMD SEV secret area via
+	  securityfs.
+
+	  To compile this driver as a module, choose M here.
+	  The module will be called sev_secret.
drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile new file +2 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9671f7bb3941
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_SEV_SECRET_SECURITYFS) += sev_secret.o
drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c new file +298 -0

298 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#6 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets

Quoted 19 lines · Dov Murik

The new sev_secret module exposes the confidential computing secret area via securityfs interface.

When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under /sys/kernel/security), an "sev_secret" directory is created in securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data.

This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command).

Removing (unlinking) files in the "sev_secret" directory will zero out the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the module is removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem.

Quoted 10 lines
---
 drivers/virt/Kconfig                 |   2 +
 drivers/virt/Makefile                |   1 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig      |  11 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile     |   2 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c | 298 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 314 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c

Same question here: maybe have

drivers/virt/coco/

and put all coco guest stuff in there.

Quoted 26 lines
drivers/virt/Kconfig +2 -0
index 8061e8ef449f..c222cc625891 100644
@@ -36,4 +36,6 @@ source "drivers/virt/vboxguest/Kconfig"
 source "drivers/virt/nitro_enclaves/Kconfig"
 
 source "drivers/virt/acrn/Kconfig"
+
+source "drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig"
 endif
drivers/virt/Makefile +1 -0
index 3e272ea60cd9..0765e5418d1d 100644
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-y				+= vboxguest/
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVES)	+= nitro_enclaves/
 obj-$(CONFIG_ACRN_HSM)		+= acrn/
+obj-y				+= sev_secret/
drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig new file +0 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4505526b8ef1

drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig line 4

Quoted 4 lines
drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig new file +4 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config AMD_SEV_SECRET_SECURITYFS
+	tristate "AMD SEV secret area securityfs support"
+	depends on EFI

That probably needs to depend on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT - otherwise what's the point for it.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
author
#7 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets

Quoted 31 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 19 lines · Dov Murik

The new sev_secret module exposes the confidential computing secret area via securityfs interface.

When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under /sys/kernel/security), an "sev_secret" directory is created in securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data.

This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command).

Removing (unlinking) files in the "sev_secret" directory will zero out the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the module is removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem.

Quoted 10 lines
---
 drivers/virt/Kconfig                 |   2 +
 drivers/virt/Makefile                |   1 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig      |  11 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile     |   2 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c | 298 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 314 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c
Quoted 6 lines

Same question here: maybe have

drivers/virt/coco/

and put all coco guest stuff in there.

I agree, according to what comes up of the conversation we have in replies to the cover letter.

Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 17 lines
drivers/virt/Kconfig +2 -0
index 8061e8ef449f..c222cc625891 100644
@@ -36,4 +36,6 @@ source "drivers/virt/vboxguest/Kconfig"
 source "drivers/virt/nitro_enclaves/Kconfig"
 
 source "drivers/virt/acrn/Kconfig"
+
+source "drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig"
 endif
drivers/virt/Makefile +0 -0
index 3e272ea60cd9..0765e5418d1d 100644
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-y				+= vboxguest/
 
Quoted 17 lines

drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig line 4

Quoted 13 lines
drivers/virt/Makefile +1 -0
 obj-$(CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVES)	+= nitro_enclaves/
 obj-$(CONFIG_ACRN_HSM)		+= acrn/
+obj-y				+= sev_secret/
drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig new file +4 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4505526b8ef1
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config AMD_SEV_SECRET_SECURITYFS
+	tristate "AMD SEV secret area securityfs support"
+	depends on EFI

That probably needs to depend on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT - otherwise what's the point for it.

But not if it's a generic driver that is useful for other confidential computing implementations. Consider some non-encrypting guest memory isolation mechanism where the host can't read most guest pages; this module might be useful there too.

Also, isn't it a bit weird to depend on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT but not use any of its APIs?

-Dov

#8 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets

Quoted 4 lines · Dov Murik

But not if it's a generic driver that is useful for other confidential computing implementations. Consider some non-encrypting guest memory isolation mechanism where the host can't read most guest pages; this module might be useful there too.

Anything concrete or just hypothetical?

In any case, if this thing is generic, it should not have "AMD" and "SEV" in the strings.

Quoted 2 lines

Also, isn't it a bit weird to depend on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT but not use any of its APIs?

Yeah, see above.

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
#9 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets

In reply to Dov Murik
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): # https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/767fdcb4e6ae071b1bbfb07240cf556a6fcb8449 git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux git fetch --no-tags…

Hi Dov,

[FYI, it's a private test report for your RFC patch.] [auto build test WARNING on 62fb9874f5da54fdb243003b386128037319b219]

url:    https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Dov-Murik/Allow-access-to-confidential-computing-secret-area/20210629-023700
base:   62fb9874f5da54fdb243003b386128037319b219
config: i386-allyesconfig (attached as .config)
compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-22) 9.3.0

reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/767fdcb4e6ae071b1bbfb07240cf556a6fcb8449
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Dov-Murik/Allow-access-to-confidential-computing-secret-area/20210629-023700 git checkout 767fdcb4e6ae071b1bbfb07240cf556a6fcb8449
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
make W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=i386 SHELL=/bin/bash drivers/virt/sev_secret/

If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate

All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c:28: warning: expecting prototype for sev_secret(). Prototype was for SEV_SECRET_NUM_FILES() instead

vim +28 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c

    17	
    18	/**
    19	 * sev_secret: Allow reading confidential computing secret area via securityfs
    20	 * interface.
    21	 *
    22	 * When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under
    23	 * /sys/kernel/security), an "sev_secret" directory is created in securityfs.
    24	 * In it, a file is created for each secret entry.  The name of each such file
    25	 * is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data.
    26	 */
    27	
  > 28	#define SEV_SECRET_NUM_FILES 64
    29	

---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org

#10 lore raw
In reply to Dov Murik

Just a couple of notes below:

Quoted 21 lines · Dov Murik

Confidential computing hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the guest starts running.

Support for secret injection is already available in OVMF (in its AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not available in the guest kernel.

The patch series copies the secrets from the EFI-provided memory to kernel reserved memory, and optionally exposes them to userspace via securityfs using a new sev_secret kernel module.

The first patch in efi/libstub copies the secret area from the EFI memory to specially allocated memory; the second patch reserves that memory block; and the third patch introduces the new sev_secret module that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink interface.

Quoted 7 lines

This has been tested with AMD SEV guests, but the kernel side of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore should be usable for any confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry.

Here is a simple example for usage of the sev_secret module in a guest to which secrets were injected during launch:

That's all fine and good but I miss the "why" in this explanation. I.e., a proper use case of a guest owner providing those sekrits to the guest would be good.

Quoted 3 lines
# modprobe sev_secret
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret/

So that sysfs URL becomes an ABI. Shouldn't this be:

/sys/kernel/security/coco/

instead which stands for "confidential computing" and contains all kinds of protected guest things. TDX might wanna do something similar there, for example.

Quoted 47 lines

total 0
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..

(quoted diff) +0 -4
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
# xxd /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
00000000: 7468 6573 652d 6172 652d 7468 652d 6b61  these-are-the-ka
00000010: 7461 2d73 6563 7265 7473 0001 0203 0405  ta-secrets......
00000020: 0607                                     ..
# rm /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret/
total 0
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..
(quoted diff) +0 -3
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2

[1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4

v2 changes:
- Add unlink support in sev_secret securityfs.

Dov Murik (3):
efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area
efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area
virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets

 drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile                 |   2 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c |  41 +++
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c                    |   5 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile         |   3 +-
 .../efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c      |  68 ++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c       |   2 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h        |   2 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c       |   2 +
 drivers/virt/Kconfig                          |   2 +
 drivers/virt/Makefile                         |   1 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig               |  11 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile              |   2 +
Quoted 8 lines
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c          | 298 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/efi.h                           |  11 +
 14 files changed, 448 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c

Those "confidential-computing.c" filenames are too long. I'd vote for coco.c.

Same for your naming: efi_copy_confidential_computing_secret_area() - that is a wow and doesn't look like kernel code to me. :)

Another example why it is too long:

+ {LINUX_EFI_CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_AREA_GUID,
+ &efi.confidential_computing_secret,
+ "ConfCompSecret"},

I'd do

{ LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID, &efi.coco_secret, "ConfCompSecret" },

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
author
#11 lore raw

Hi Boris,

Quoted 29 lines · Borislav Petkov

Just a couple of notes below:

Quoted 26 lines · Dov Murik

Confidential computing hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the guest starts running.

Support for secret injection is already available in OVMF (in its AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not available in the guest kernel.

The patch series copies the secrets from the EFI-provided memory to kernel reserved memory, and optionally exposes them to userspace via securityfs using a new sev_secret kernel module.

The first patch in efi/libstub copies the secret area from the EFI memory to specially allocated memory; the second patch reserves that memory block; and the third patch introduces the new sev_secret module that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink interface.

This has been tested with AMD SEV guests, but the kernel side of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore should be usable for any confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Here is a simple example for usage of the sev_secret module in a guest to which secrets were injected during launch:

That's all fine and good but I miss the "why" in this explanation. I.e., a proper use case of a guest owner providing those sekrits to the guest would be good.

OK, I'll add it in the cover letter; something along the lines of:

An example would be a guest performing computations on encrypted files.
The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret
injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the sev_secret filesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content.

Host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines
# modprobe sev_secret
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret/
Quoted 8 lines

So that sysfs URL becomes an ABI. Shouldn't this be:

/sys/kernel/security/coco/

instead which stands for "confidential computing" and contains all kinds of protected guest things. TDX might wanna do something similar there, for example.

On one hand, I agree. This entire series has no SEV-specific code (but I tested it only on SEV).

On the other hand, secret injection mechanisms in SEV-SNP and TDX are different beasts than the one used here (SEV). In SEV the secrets must be injected at VM launch time; so when OVMF runs and kernel efistub runs the secrets are already there (patches 1+2). However, in SNP there's no secret injection at launch; (/me hand-waving) the guest can securely talk with the PSP hardware, check the attestation, and if OK then securely contact some Guest Owner secret provider to get the required secrets. Not sure it makes sense for the kernel to be part of this "getting secrets from secret provider and exposing them in securityfs".

So maybe for regular SEV we'll use this sev_secret module to get one secret which will allow the guest to contact to the Guest Owner secret provider (and from here continue like SNP or TDX). Brijesh (AMD) also suggested collapsing the proposed sev_secret module into the new sev-guest module ("[PATCH Part1 RFC v3 22/22] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver", sent 2021-06-02), and the logic suggested here will be used when SNP is not active.

Or taking a step back: Maybe the kernel should not try to unify SEV/SEV-SNP/TDX/PEF/s390x-SE. Each should have its own API. A userspace process will have to understand what is available and get the required info to run the application in a confidential environment.

Or maybe we can find an API that fits all these confidential computing mechanisms and expose a unified API that hides the underlying implementation.

(I'm not really sure - that's the reason this is an RFC series.)

Quoted 50 lines
Quoted 50 lines

total 0
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..

(quoted diff) +0 -4
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
# xxd /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
00000000: 7468 6573 652d 6172 652d 7468 652d 6b61  these-are-the-ka
00000010: 7461 2d73 6563 7265 7473 0001 0203 0405  ta-secrets......
00000020: 0607                                     ..
# rm /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret/
total 0
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..
(quoted diff) +0 -3
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2

[1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4

v2 changes:
- Add unlink support in sev_secret securityfs.

Dov Murik (3):
efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area
efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area
virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets

 drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile                 |   2 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c |  41 +++
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c                    |   5 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile         |   3 +-
 .../efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c      |  68 ++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c       |   2 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h        |   2 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c       |   2 +
 drivers/virt/Kconfig                          |   2 +
 drivers/virt/Makefile                         |   1 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig               |  11 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile              |   2 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c          | 298 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/efi.h                           |  11 +
 14 files changed, 448 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c

Those "confidential-computing.c" filenames are too long. I'd vote for coco.c.

When I wrote this I didn't yet encounter "coco" as an abbreviation. Now there's a linux-coco mailing list, but I saw no other mentions of it in the kernel (as an abbreviation for confidential computing).

I agree that the full term is too long; I considered conf-comp (but in my mind "conf" is short for "configuration"). I used it in one place:
"ConfCompSecret" in patch 2/3.

If as a community we settle on coco / CoCo / COCO then I agree these should be renamed.

(in QEMU they use CGS = Confidential Guest Support [1].)

[1]
https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/[email protected]/

Quoted 9 lines

Same for your naming: efi_copy_confidential_computing_secret_area() - that is a wow and doesn't look like kernel code to me. :)

Another example why it is too long:

(quoted diff) +3 -0
+       {LINUX_EFI_CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_AREA_GUID,
+                                               &efi.confidential_computing_secret,
+                                                                       "ConfCompSecret"},
Quoted 5 lines

I'd do

{ LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID, &efi.coco_secret, "ConfCompSecret" },

I agree.

Thanks,
-Dov

#12 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Dov Murik

OK, I'll add it in the cover letter; something along the lines of:

An example would be a guest performing computations on encrypted files.
The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret
injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the sev_secret filesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content.

Quoted 5 lines

Host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest.

Yap, much better, thanks!

And that whole deal with the providing the secret this way is because you want to be starting the same guest image in the cloud over and over again but each guest owner would have their own decryption key which they would supply this way.

Yap, good.

Quoted 12 lines

On one hand, I agree. This entire series has no SEV-specific code (but I tested it only on SEV).

On the other hand, secret injection mechanisms in SEV-SNP and TDX are different beasts than the one used here (SEV). In SEV the secrets must be injected at VM launch time; so when OVMF runs and kernel efistub runs the secrets are already there (patches 1+2). However, in SNP there's no secret injection at launch; (/me hand-waving) the guest can securely talk with the PSP hardware, check the attestation, and if OK then securely contact some Guest Owner secret provider to get the required secrets. Not sure it makes sense for the kernel to be part of this "getting secrets from secret provider and exposing them in securityfs".

Which begs the question: why are you even doing this for only SEV instead of supporting SEV-SNP/TDX only?

I'm under the impression that people should run only SNP and the equivalent of that in TDX, guests but not those earlier technologies which are lacking in some situations.

Quoted 6 lines

So maybe for regular SEV we'll use this sev_secret module to get one secret which will allow the guest to contact to the Guest Owner secret provider (and from here continue like SNP or TDX). Brijesh (AMD) also suggested collapsing the proposed sev_secret module into the new sev-guest module ("[PATCH Part1 RFC v3 22/22] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver", sent 2021-06-02),

Which reminds me - I still need to take a look at that one.

Quoted 7 lines

and the logic suggested here will be used when SNP is not active.

Or taking a step back: Maybe the kernel should not try to unify SEV/SEV-SNP/TDX/PEF/s390x-SE. Each should have its own API. A userspace process will have to understand what is available and get the required info to run the application in a confidential environment.

Quoted 5 lines

Or maybe we can find an API that fits all these confidential computing mechanisms and expose a unified API that hides the underlying implementation.

(I'm not really sure - that's the reason this is an RFC series.)

I'm gravitating towards a common API so that userspace doesn't have to care. But that comes at the price of having to define that API properly so that it fits them all. And we all know how that bikeshedding works.

:-\

Quoted 3 lines

When I wrote this I didn't yet encounter "coco" as an abbreviation. Now there's a linux-coco mailing list, but I saw no other mentions of it in the kernel (as an abbreviation for confidential computing).

That's what Joerg and me came up with - "coco" :-)

Quoted 8 lines

I agree that the full term is too long; I considered conf-comp (but in my mind "conf" is short for "configuration"). I used it in one place:
"ConfCompSecret" in patch 2/3.

If as a community we settle on coco / CoCo / COCO then I agree these should be renamed.

(in QEMU they use CGS = Confidential Guest Support [1].)

That's not bad too.

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg