Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
Subsystems (3)
v3 cover Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the guest starts running.
OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not available in the guest kernel.
The patch series copies the secrets from the EFI-provided memory to kernel reserved memory, and optionally exposes them to userspace via securityfs using a new efi_secret kernel module.
The first patch in efi/libstub copies the secret area from the EFI memory to specially allocated memory; the second patch reserves that memory block; and the third patch introduces the new efi_secret module that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink interface.
As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the efi_secret filesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content.
In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest.
This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry.
Here is a simple example for usage of the efi_secret module in a guest to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch:
# modprobe efi_secret # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
# xxd /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 00000000: 7468 6573 652d 6172 652d 7468 652d 6b61 these-are-the-ka 00000010: 7461 2d73 6563 7265 7473 0001 0203 0405 ta-secrets...... 00000020: 0607 ..
# rm /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
[1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4
---
v3 changes:
- Rename the module to efi_secret
- Remove the exporting of clean_cache_range
- Use clflush_cache_range in wipe_memory
- Document function wipe_memory
- Initialize efi.coco_secret to EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR to correctly detect when there's no secret area published in the EFI configuration tables
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]
v2 changes:
- Export clean_cache_range()
- When deleteing a secret, call clean_cache_range() after explicit_memzero
- Add Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secret
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
Dov Murik (3):
efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area
efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area
virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
.../ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret | 50 +++ arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c | 41 +++ drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 4 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/coco.c | 68 ++++ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 2 + drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 10 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 324 ++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 9 + 16 files changed, 521 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/coco.c create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
base-commit: 60a9483534ed0d99090a2ee1d4bb0b8179195f51
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 1/3 efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area
Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows a guest owner to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them.
Firmware support for secret injection is available in OVMF, which reserves a memory area for secret injection and includes a pointer to it the in EFI config table entry LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID. However, OVMF doesn't force the guest OS to keep this memory area reserved.
If EFI exposes such a table entry, efi/libstub will copy this area to a reserved memory for future use inside the kernel.
A pointer to the new copy is kept in the EFI table under LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/coco.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 2 + include/linux/efi.h | 6 +++ 6 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/coco.c
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o \ file.o mem.o random.o randomalloc.o pci.o \ skip_spaces.o lib-cmdline.o lib-ctype.o \ - alignedmem.o relocate.o vsprintf.o + alignedmem.o relocate.o vsprintf.o coco.o # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64 efi-deps-y := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/coco.c new file +68 -0
68 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c +2 -0
@@ -205,6 +205,8 @@ efi_status_t __efiapi efi_pe_entry(efi_handle_t handle,efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog (); +efi_copy_coco_secret_area (); +/* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */ efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation ();
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h +2 -0
@@ -858,4 +858,6 @@ efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(void) { }void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog (void ); +void efi_copy_coco_secret_area (void ); +#endif
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +2 -0
@@ -793,6 +793,8 @@ unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle,efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog (); +efi_copy_coco_secret_area (); +setup_graphics (boot_params);setup_efi_pci (boot_params);
include/linux/efi.h +6 -0
@@ -359,6 +359,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);#define LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x888eb0c6, 0x8ede, 0x4ff5, 0xa8, 0xf0, 0x9a, 0xee, 0x5c, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xc2)#define LINUX_EFI_INITRD_MEDIA_GUID EFI_GUID(0x5568e427, 0x68fc, 0x4f3d, 0xac, 0x74, 0xca, 0x55, 0x52, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x68)#define LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xc451ed2b, 0x9694, 0x45d3, 0xba, 0xba, 0xed, 0x9f, 0x89, 0x88, 0xa3, 0x89) +#define LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID EFI_GUID(0x940ed1e9, 0xd3da, 0x408b, 0xb3, 0x07, 0xe3, 0x2d, 0x25, 0x4a, 0x65, 0x16)/* OEM GUIDs */ #define DELLEMC_EFI_RCI2_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x2d9f28a2, 0xa886, 0x456a, 0x97, 0xa8, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0xf4, 0x55)
@@ -1282,4 +1283,9 @@ static inline struct efi_mokvar_table_entry *efi_mokvar_entry_find( }#endif +struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area { +u32 size; +u8 area[]; +}; +#endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 2/3 efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area
In reply to Dov MurikWhen efi-stub copies an EFI-provided confidential computing (coco) secret area, reserve that memory block for future use within the kernel.
--- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 4 ++++ include/linux/efi.h | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +1 -0
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = {#ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS &efi.mokvar_table, #endif + &efi.coco_secret, };u64 efi_setup;/* efi setup_data physical address */
drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_runtime-wrappers.o := n obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT) += efi-bgrt.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) += efi.o vars.o reboot.o memattr.o tpm.o -obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) += memmap.o +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) += memmap.o coco.o ifneq ($(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_LOADER),) obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) += capsule.o endif
drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c new file +41 -0
41 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +4 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = {#ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS .mokvar_table = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, #endif + .coco_secret =EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR , };EXPORT_SYMBOL (efi);
@@ -526,6 +527,7 @@ static const efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] __initconst = { #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS {LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID, &efi.mokvar_table, "MOKvar" }, #endif + {LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID, &efi.coco_secret, "CocoSecret" }, {}, };
@@ -613,6 +615,8 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables,efi_tpm_eventlog_init (); +efi_coco_secret_area_reserve (); +if (mem_reserve !=EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR ) {unsigned long prsv = mem_reserve;
include/linux/efi.h +3 -0
@@ -550,6 +550,7 @@ extern struct efi {unsigned long tpm_log;/* TPM2 Event Log table */ unsigned long tpm_final_log;/* TPM2 Final Events Log table */ unsigned long mokvar_table;/* MOK variable config table */ +unsigned long coco_secret;/* Confidential computing secret table */ efi_get_time_t *get_time;efi_set_time_t *set_time;
@@ -1189,6 +1190,8 @@ extern int efi_tpm_final_log_size;extern unsigned long rci2_table_phys; +extern int efi_coco_secret_area_reserve (void ); +/* * efi_runtime_service() function identifiers. * "NONE" is used by efi_recover_from_page_fault() to check if the page
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area
Quoted 18 lines · Dov Murik
When efi-stub copies an EFI-provided confidential computing (coco) secret area, reserve that memory block for future use within the kernel.
Signed-off-by Dov Murik <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 4 ++++ include/linux/efi.h | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.carch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +0
-0
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = { · line 96
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +1
-0@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = {#ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS &efi.mokvar_table, #endif + &efi.coco_secret,
Shouldn't this depend on CONFIG_EFI_SECRET?
Why build all of this code if that option is not enabled?
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area
Quoted 26 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 18 lines · Dov Murik
When efi-stub copies an EFI-provided confidential computing (coco) secret area, reserve that memory block for future use within the kernel.
Signed-off-by Dov Murik <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 4 ++++ include/linux/efi.h | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.carch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +0
-0arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = { · line 96
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +1
-0@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = {#ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS &efi.mokvar_table, #endif + &efi.coco_secret,Shouldn't this depend on
CONFIG_EFI_SECRET?
Quoted 2 lines
Why build all of this code if that option is not enabled?
Thanks Greg for noticing this. Fixed in v4 [1] where the code is guarded with #ifdefs (so it's not built by default).
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
-Dov
PATCH v3 3/3 virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
In reply to Dov MurikThe new efi_secret module exposes the confidential computing (coco) EFI secret area via securityfs interface.
When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under /sys/kernel/security), a "coco/efi_secret" directory is created in securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data.
This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command).
Removing (unlinking) files in the "coco/efi_secret" directory will zero out the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the module is removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem.
--- .../ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret | 50 +++ drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 10 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 324 ++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 390 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret new file +50 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +What: security/coco/efi_secret +Date: October 2021 +Contact: Dov Murik <[email protected]> +Description: + Exposes confidential computing (coco) EFI secrets to + userspace via securityfs. + + EFI can declare memory area used by confidential computing + platforms (such as AMD SEV and SEV-ES) for secret injection by + the Guest Owner during VM's launch. The secrets are encrypted + by the Guest Owner and decrypted inside the trusted enclave, + and therefore are not readable by the untrusted host. + + The efi_secret module exposes the secrets to userspace. Each + secret appears as a file under <securityfs>/coco/efi_secret, + where the filename is the GUID of the entry in the secrets + table. + + Two operations are supported for the files: read and unlink. + Reading the file returns the content of secret entry. + Unlinking the file overwrites the secret data with zeroes and + removes the entry from the filesystem. A secret cannot be read + after it has been unlinked. + + For example, listing the available secrets:: + + # modprobe efi_secret + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + Reading the secret data by reading a file:: + + # cat /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + the-content-of-the-secret-data + + Wiping a secret by unlinking a file:: + + # rm /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + + Note: The binary format of the secrets table injected by the + Guest Owner is described in + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c under "Structure of + the EFI secret area".
drivers/virt/Kconfig +3 -0
@@ -36,4 +36,7 @@ source "drivers/virt/vboxguest/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/nitro_enclaves/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/acrn/Kconfig" + +source "drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig" + endif
drivers/virt/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-y += vboxguest/ obj-$(CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVES) += nitro_enclaves/ obj-$(CONFIG_ACRN_HSM) += acrn/ +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += coco/efi_secret/
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig new file +10 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +config EFI_SECRET + tristate "EFI secret area securityfs support" + depends on EFI + select SECURITYFS + help + This is a driver for accessing the EFI secret area via securityfs. + + To compile this driver as a module, choose M here. + The module will be called efi_secret.
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile new file +2 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += efi_secret.o
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c new file +324 -0
324 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
kernel test robot
build botRe: [PATCH v3 3/3] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:
Hi Dov,
Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on 60a9483534ed0d99090a2ee1d4bb0b8179195f51]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Dov-Murik/Allow-guest-access-to-EFI-confidential-computing-secret-area/20211014-211522 base: 60a9483534ed0d99090a2ee1d4bb0b8179195f51 config: riscv-allmodconfig (attached as .config) compiler: riscv64-linux-gcc (GCC) 11.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/666035eb88583c145049b34282634d7ba716dc12
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Dov-Murik/Allow-guest-access-to-EFI-confidential-computing-secret-area/20211014-211522 git checkout 666035eb88583c145049b34282634d7ba716dc12
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-11.2.0 make.cross ARCH=riscv
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c: In function 'wipe_memory':
>> drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c:117:9: error: implicit declaration of function 'clflush_cache_range'; did you mean 'flush_cache_range'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
117 | clflush_cache_range(addr, size);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| flush_cache_rangecc1: all warnings being treated as errors
vim +117 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
109
110 /*
111 * Overwrite memory content with zeroes, and ensure that dirty cache lines are
112 * actually written back to memory, to clear out the secret.
113 */
114 static void wipe_memory(void *addr, size_t size)
115 {
116 memzero_explicit(addr, size);
> 117 clflush_cache_range(addr, size);
118 }
119
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org