Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
Subsystems (4)
v9 cover Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the guest starts running.
OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not available in the guest kernel.
The patch series keeps the address of the EFI-provided memory for injected secrets, and exposes the secrets to userspace via securityfs using a new efi_secret kernel module. The module is autoloaded (by the EFI driver) if the secret area is populated.
The first patch in EFI keeps the address of the secret area as passed in the EFI configuration table. The second patch introduces the new efi_secret module that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink interface. The third patch auto-loads the efi_secret module during startup if the injected secrets area is populated. The last patch documents the data flow of confidential computing secret injection.
As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the efi_secret filesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content.
In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest.
This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry.
To enable this functionality, set CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m when building the guest kernel.
Here is a simple example for usage of the efi_secret module in a guest to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch:
...
[ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II [ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f222680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea16418 ... [ 1.127627] Run /init as init process Loading, please wait... Starting version 245.4-4ubuntu3.15 ... [ 0.763204] efi_secret efi_secret.0: Created 4 entries in securityfs secrets/coco
...
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
# hd /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 00000000 74 68 65 73 65 2d 61 72 65 2d 74 68 65 2d 6b 61 |these-are-the-ka| 00000010 74 61 2d 73 65 63 72 65 74 73 00 01 02 03 04 05 |ta-secrets......| 00000020 06 07 |..| 00000022
# rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
[1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4
---
v9 changes:
- Change the module into a platform driver (thanks Ard)
- Remove special auto-loading code in efi; instead register a platform device (udev will load the efi_secret module) (thanks Ard)
- Change logging in the efi_secret module to dev_err() etc.
- efi_secret: first check that the secret area header is valid; only then start creating securityfs dirs.
v8: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v8 changes:
- Change path of filesystem to <securityfs>/secrets/coco and fix the documentation accordingly (Thanks Gerd, Matthew)
- Remove patch 2/5 (of v7) because the latest OVMF release (edk2-stable202202) already contains the fix to mark the launch secret page as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE.
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v7 changes:
- Improve description of efi_secret module in Kconfig.
- Fix sparse warnings on pointer address space mismatch
(Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>)
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v6 changes:
- Autoload the efi_secret module if the secret area is populated
(thanks Greg KH).
- efi_secret: Depend on X86_64 because we use ioremap_encrypted() which is only defined for this arch.
- efi_secret.c: Remove unneeded tableheader_guid local variable.
- Documentation fixes.
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v5 changes:
- Simplify EFI code: instead of copying the secret area, the firmware marks the secret area as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, and then the uefi_init() code just keeps the pointer as it appears in the EFI configuration table. The use of reserved pages is similar to the AMD SEV-SNP patches for handling SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages.
- In order to handle OVMF releases out there which mark the confidential computing secrets page as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA, add efi/libstub code that detects this and fixes the E820 map to reserve this page.
- In the efi_secret module code, map the secrets page using ioremap_encrypted (again, similar to the AMD SEV-SNP guest patches for accessing SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages).
- Add documentation in Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v4 changes:
- Guard all the new EFI and efi-stub code (patches 1+2) with #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET (thanks Greg KH). Selecting CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m (patch 3) will enable the EFI parts as well.
- Guard call to clflush_cache_range() with #ifdef CONFIG_X86 (Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>)
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v3 changes:
- Rename the module to efi_secret
- Remove the exporting of clean_cache_range
- Use clflush_cache_range in wipe_memory
- Document function wipe_memory
- Initialize efi.coco_secret to EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR to correctly detect when there's no secret area published in the EFI configuration tables
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]
v2 changes:
- Export clean_cache_range()
- When deleteing a secret, call clean_cache_range() after explicit_memzero
- Add Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secret
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
Dov Murik (4):
efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is
declared
docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation
Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco | 51 +++ Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst | 103 ++++++ Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst | 9 + arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 + drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 16 + drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 9 + drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 16 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 349 ++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 10 + 13 files changed, 573 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco create mode 100644 Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
base-commit: 7e57714cd0ad2d5bb90e50b5096a0e671dec1ef3
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v9 1/4 efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows a guest owner to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them.
Firmware support for secret injection is available in OVMF, which reserves a memory area for secret injection and includes a pointer to it the in EFI config table entry LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID.
If EFI exposes such a table entry, uefi_init() will keep a pointer to the EFI config table entry in efi.coco_secret, so it can be used later by the kernel (specifically drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret). It will also appear in the kernel log as "CocoSecret=ADDRESS"; for example:
[ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II
[ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f22e680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea0c018The new functionality can be enabled with CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET=y.
--- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 +++ drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 10 ++++++++++ 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +3 -0
@@ -93,6 +93,9 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = {#ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS &efi.mokvar_table,#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + &efi.coco_secret, +#endif };u64 efi_setup;/* efi setup_data physical address */
drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig +16 -0
@@ -284,3 +284,19 @@ config EFI_CUSTOM_SSDT_OVERLAYS See Documentation/admin-guide/acpi/ssdt-overlays.rst for more information. + +config EFI_COCO_SECRET + bool "EFI Confidential Computing Secret Area Support" + depends on EFI + help + Confidential Computing platforms (such as AMD SEV) allow the + Guest Owner to securely inject secrets during guest VM launch. + The secrets are placed in a designated EFI reserved memory area. + + In order to use the secrets in the kernel, the location of the secret + area (as published in the EFI config table) must be kept. + + If you say Y here, the address of the EFI secret area will be kept + for usage inside the kernel. This will allow the + virt/coco/efi_secret module to access the secrets, which in turn + allows userspace programs to access the injected secrets.
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +6 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = {#ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS .mokvar_table = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + .coco_secret = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, +#endif };EXPORT_SYMBOL (efi);
@@ -528,6 +531,9 @@ static const efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] __initconst = {#endif #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS {LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID, &efi.mokvar_table, "MOKvar" }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + {LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID, &efi.coco_secret, "CocoSecret" }, #endif {}, };
include/linux/efi.h +10 -0
@@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);#define LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x888eb0c6, 0x8ede, 0x4ff5, 0xa8, 0xf0, 0x9a, 0xee, 0x5c, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xc2)#define LINUX_EFI_INITRD_MEDIA_GUID EFI_GUID(0x5568e427, 0x68fc, 0x4f3d, 0xac, 0x74, 0xca, 0x55, 0x52, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x68)#define LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xc451ed2b, 0x9694, 0x45d3, 0xba, 0xba, 0xed, 0x9f, 0x89, 0x88, 0xa3, 0x89) +#define LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID EFI_GUID(0xadf956ad, 0xe98c, 0x484c, 0xae, 0x11, 0xb5, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x33, 0x64, 0x47)/* OEM GUIDs */ #define DELLEMC_EFI_RCI2_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x2d9f28a2, 0xa886, 0x456a, 0x97, 0xa8, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0xf4, 0x55)
@@ -596,6 +597,7 @@ extern struct efi {unsigned long tpm_log;/* TPM2 Event Log table */ unsigned long tpm_final_log;/* TPM2 Final Events Log table */ unsigned long mokvar_table;/* MOK variable config table */ +unsigned long coco_secret;/* Confidential computing secret table */ efi_get_time_t *get_time;efi_set_time_t *set_time;
@@ -1335,4 +1337,12 @@ extern void efifb_setup_from_dmi(struct screen_info *si, const char *opt);static inline void efifb_setup_from_dmi (struct screen_info *si,const char *opt) { }#endif +struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area { +u64 base_pa; +u64 size; +}; + +/* Header of a populated EFI secret area */ +#define EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID EFI_GUID(0x1e74f542, 0x71dd, 0x4d66, 0x96, 0x3e, 0xef, 0x42, 0x87, 0xff, 0x17, 0x3b) +#endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v9 2/4 virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
In reply to Dov MurikThe new efi_secret module exposes the confidential computing (coco) EFI secret area via securityfs interface.
When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under /sys/kernel/security), a "secrets/coco" directory is created in securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data.
This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command).
Removing (unlinking) files in the "secrets/coco" directory will zero out the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the module is removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco | 51 +++ drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 16 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 349 ++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 422 insertions(+)
Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco new file +51 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +What: security/secrets/coco +Date: February 2022 +Contact: Dov Murik <[email protected]> +Description: + Exposes confidential computing (coco) EFI secrets to + userspace via securityfs. + + EFI can declare memory area used by confidential computing + platforms (such as AMD SEV and SEV-ES) for secret injection by + the Guest Owner during VM's launch. The secrets are encrypted + by the Guest Owner and decrypted inside the trusted enclave, + and therefore are not readable by the untrusted host. + + The efi_secret module exposes the secrets to userspace. Each + secret appears as a file under <securityfs>/secrets/coco, + where the filename is the GUID of the entry in the secrets + table. This module is loaded automatically by the EFI driver + if the EFI secret area is populated. + + Two operations are supported for the files: read and unlink. + Reading the file returns the content of secret entry. + Unlinking the file overwrites the secret data with zeroes and + removes the entry from the filesystem. A secret cannot be read + after it has been unlinked. + + For example, listing the available secrets:: + + # modprobe efi_secret + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + Reading the secret data by reading a file:: + + # cat /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + the-content-of-the-secret-data + + Wiping a secret by unlinking a file:: + + # rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + + Note: The binary format of the secrets table injected by the + Guest Owner is described in + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c under "Structure of + the EFI secret area".
drivers/virt/Kconfig +3 -0
@@ -36,4 +36,7 @@ source "drivers/virt/vboxguest/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/nitro_enclaves/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/acrn/Kconfig" + +source "drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig" + endif
drivers/virt/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-y += vboxguest/ obj-$(CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVES) += nitro_enclaves/ obj-$(CONFIG_ACRN_HSM) += acrn/ +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += coco/efi_secret/
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig new file +16 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +config EFI_SECRET + tristate "EFI secret area securityfs support" + depends on EFI && X86_64 + select EFI_COCO_SECRET + select SECURITYFS + help + This is a driver for accessing the EFI secret area via securityfs. + The EFI secret area is a memory area designated by the firmware for + confidential computing secret injection (for example for AMD SEV + guests). The driver exposes the secrets as files in + <securityfs>/secrets/coco. Files can be read and deleted (deleting + a file wipes the secret from memory). + + To compile this driver as a module, choose M here. + The module will be called efi_secret.
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile new file +2 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += efi_secret.o
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c new file +349 -0
349 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v9 2/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
Quoted 13 lines · Dov Murik
The new
efi_secretmodule exposes the confidential computing (coco) EFI secret area via securityfs interface.When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under
/sys/kernel/security), a "secrets/coco" directory is created in securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data.This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection mechanism (such as AMD SEV's
LAUNCH_SECRETcommand).
Quoted 5 lines
Removing (unlinking) files in the "secrets/coco" directory will zero out the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the module is removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem.
Signed-off-by Dov Murik <[email protected]>
take care,
Gerd
PATCH v9 3/4 efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared
In reply to Dov MurikDuring efi initialization, check if coco_secret is defined in the EFI configuration table; in such case, register platform device "efi_secret". This allows udev to automatically load the efi_secret module (platform driver), which in turn will populate the <securityfs>/secrets/coco directory in guests into which secrets were injected.
Note that a declared address of an EFI secret area doesn't mean that secrets where indeed injected to that area; if the secret area is not populated, the driver will not load (but the platform device will still be registered).
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +3 -0
@@ -425,6 +425,9 @@ static int __init efisubsys_init(void)if (efi_enabled (EFI_DBG ) &&efi_enabled (EFI_PRESERVE_BS_REGIONS ))efi_debugfs_init (); +if (efi.coco_secret !=EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR ) +platform_device_register_simple ("efi_secret" ,0 ,NULL ,0 ); +return 0 ; err_remove_group:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v9 3/4] efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared
Quoted 22 lines · Dov Murik
During efi initialization, check if
coco_secretis defined in the EFI configuration table; in such case, register platform device "efi_secret". This allows udev to automatically load theefi_secretmodule (platform driver), which in turn will populate the <securityfs>/secrets/coco directory in guests into which secrets were injected.Note that a declared address of an EFI secret area doesn't mean that secrets where indeed injected to that area; if the secret area is not populated, the driver will not load (but the platform device will still be registered).
Signed-off-by Dov Murik <[email protected]>--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +0
-0
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c static int __init efisubsys_init(void) · line 429
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +2
-0@@ -425,6 +425,9 @@ static int __init efisubsys_init(void)if (efi_enabled (EFI_DBG ) &&efi_enabled (EFI_PRESERVE_BS_REGIONS ))efi_debugfs_init (); +if (efi.coco_secret !=EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR ) +platform_device_register_simple ("efi_secret" ,0 ,NULL ,0 );
These two lines should be wrapped by #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET . I'll fix that for the next round.
-Dov
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +1
-0+return 0 ; err_remove_group:
Re: [PATCH v9 3/4] efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared
In reply to Dov MurikQuoted 7 lines · Dov Murik
During efi initialization, check if
coco_secretis defined in the EFI configuration table; in such case, register platform device "efi_secret". This allows udev to automatically load theefi_secretmodule (platform driver), which in turn will populate the <securityfs>/secrets/coco directory in guests into which secrets were injected.
Quoted 6 lines
Note that a declared address of an EFI secret area doesn't mean that secrets where indeed injected to that area; if the secret area is not populated, the driver will not load (but the platform device will still be registered).
Signed-off-by Dov Murik <[email protected]>
PATCH v9 4/4 docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation
In reply to Dov MurikAdd documentation for the efi_secret module which allows access to Confidential Computing injected secrets.
--- Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst | 9 ++ 3 files changed, 113 insertions(+)
Documentation/security/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -17,3 +17,4 @@ Security Documentation tpm/index digsig landlock + secrets/index
Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst new file +103 -0
103 lines not on this page · raw message
Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst new file +9 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +===================== +Secrets documentation +===================== + +.. toctree:: + + coco
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Quoted 165 lines · Dov Murik
Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the guest starts running.
OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its AmdSev package; see edk2 commit
01726b6d23d4"OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not available in the guest kernel.The patch series keeps the address of the EFI-provided memory for injected secrets, and exposes the secrets to userspace via securityfs using a new
efi_secretkernel module. The module is autoloaded (by the EFI driver) if the secret area is populated.The first patch in EFI keeps the address of the secret area as passed in the EFI configuration table. The second patch introduces the new
efi_secretmodule that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink interface. The third patch auto-loads theefi_secretmodule during startup if the injected secrets area is populated. The last patch documents the data flow of confidential computing secret injection.As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the
efi_secretfilesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content.In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest.
This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry.
To enable this functionality, set
CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=mwhen building the guest kernel.Here is a simple example for usage of the
efi_secretmodule in a guest to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch:...
[ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II [ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f222680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea16418 ... [ 1.127627] Run /init as init process Loading, please wait... Starting version 245.4-4ubuntu3.15 ... [ 0.763204] efi_secret efi_secret.0: Created 4 entries in securityfs secrets/coco...
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..(quoted diff) +0
-4-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910# hd /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 00000000 74 68 65 73 65 2d 61 72 65 2d 74 68 65 2d 6b 61 |these-are-the-ka| 00000010 74 61 2d 73 65 63 72 65 74 73 00 01 02 03 04 05 |ta-secrets......| 00000020 06 07 |..| 00000022# rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..(quoted diff) +0
-3-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2[1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4
---
v9 changes:
- Change the module into a platform driver (thanks Ard)
- Remove special auto-loading code in efi; instead register a platform device (udev will load theefi_secretmodule) (thanks Ard)
- Change logging in theefi_secretmodule todev_err()etc.
-efi_secret: first check that the secret area header is valid; only then start creating securityfs dirs.v8: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v8 changes:
- Change path of filesystem to <securityfs>/secrets/coco and fix the documentation accordingly (Thanks Gerd, Matthew)
- Remove patch 2/5 (of v7) because the latest OVMF release (edk2-stable202202) already contains the fix to mark the launch secret page asEFI_RESERVED_TYPE.v7: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v7 changes:
- Improve description ofefi_secretmodule inKconfig.
- Fix sparse warnings on pointer address space mismatch
(Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>)v6: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v6 changes:
- Autoload theefi_secretmodule if the secret area is populated
(thanks Greg KH).
-efi_secret: Depend onX86_64because we useioremap_encrypted()which is only defined for this arch.
-efi_secret.c: Remove unneededtableheader_guidlocal variable.
- Documentation fixes.v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v5 changes:
- Simplify EFI code: instead of copying the secret area, the firmware marks the secret area asEFI_RESERVED_TYPE, and then theuefi_init()code just keeps the pointer as it appears in the EFI configuration table. The use of reserved pages is similar to the AMD SEV-SNP patches for handling SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages.
- In order to handle OVMF releases out there which mark the confidential computing secrets page asEFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA, add efi/libstub code that detects this and fixes the E820 map to reserve this page.
- In theefi_secretmodule code, map the secrets page usingioremap_encrypted(again, similar to the AMD SEV-SNP guest patches for accessing SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages).
- Add documentation inDocumentation/security/coco/efi_secret.v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v4 changes:
- Guard all the new EFI and efi-stub code (patches 1+2) with #ifdefCONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET(thanks Greg KH). SelectingCONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m(patch 3) will enable the EFI parts as well.
- Guard call toclflush_cache_range()with #ifdefCONFIG_X86(Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>)v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v3 changes:
- Rename the module toefi_secret
- Remove the exporting ofclean_cache_range
- Useclflush_cache_rangeinwipe_memory
- Document functionwipe_memory
- Initialize efi.coco_secret toEFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDRto correctly detect when there's no secret area published in the EFI configuration tablesv2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]
v2 changes:
- Exportclean_cache_range()
- When deleteing a secret, callclean_cache_range()afterexplicit_memzero
- AddDocumentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secret
Quoted 7 lines
Dov Murik (4):
efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
virt: Addefi_secretmodule to expose confidential computing secrets
efi: Registerefi_secretplatform device if EFI secret area is
declared
docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation
This series has Reviewed-by tags on all patches (though, as I mentioned, there's a missing #ifdef in patch 3).
Ard, are you going to take this through the EFI tree?
Should I resend the series with the fix for patch 3?
Thanks,
-Dov
Quoted 23 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco | 51 +++ Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst | 103 ++++++ Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst | 9 + arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 + drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 16 + drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 9 + drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 16 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 349 ++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 10 + 13 files changed, 573 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco create mode 100644 Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.cbase-commit:
7e57714cd0ad2d5bb90e50b5096a0e671dec1ef3
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 181 lines · Dov Murik
Quoted 165 lines · Dov Murik
Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the guest starts running.
OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its AmdSev package; see edk2 commit
01726b6d23d4"OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not available in the guest kernel.The patch series keeps the address of the EFI-provided memory for injected secrets, and exposes the secrets to userspace via securityfs using a new
efi_secretkernel module. The module is autoloaded (by the EFI driver) if the secret area is populated.The first patch in EFI keeps the address of the secret area as passed in the EFI configuration table. The second patch introduces the new
efi_secretmodule that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink interface. The third patch auto-loads theefi_secretmodule during startup if the injected secrets area is populated. The last patch documents the data flow of confidential computing secret injection.As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the
efi_secretfilesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content.In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest.
This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry.
To enable this functionality, set
CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=mwhen building the guest kernel.Here is a simple example for usage of the
efi_secretmodule in a guest to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch:...
[ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II [ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f222680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea16418 ... [ 1.127627] Run /init as init process Loading, please wait... Starting version 245.4-4ubuntu3.15 ... [ 0.763204] efi_secret efi_secret.0: Created 4 entries in securityfs secrets/coco...
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..(quoted diff) +0
-4-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910# hd /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 00000000 74 68 65 73 65 2d 61 72 65 2d 74 68 65 2d 6b 61 |these-are-the-ka| 00000010 74 61 2d 73 65 63 72 65 74 73 00 01 02 03 04 05 |ta-secrets......| 00000020 06 07 |..| 00000022# rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..(quoted diff) +0
-3-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2[1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4
---
v9 changes:
- Change the module into a platform driver (thanks Ard)
- Remove special auto-loading code in efi; instead register a platform device (udev will load theefi_secretmodule) (thanks Ard)
- Change logging in theefi_secretmodule todev_err()etc.
-efi_secret: first check that the secret area header is valid; only then start creating securityfs dirs.v8: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v8 changes:
- Change path of filesystem to <securityfs>/secrets/coco and fix the documentation accordingly (Thanks Gerd, Matthew)
- Remove patch 2/5 (of v7) because the latest OVMF release (edk2-stable202202) already contains the fix to mark the launch secret page asEFI_RESERVED_TYPE.v7: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v7 changes:
- Improve description ofefi_secretmodule inKconfig.
- Fix sparse warnings on pointer address space mismatch
(Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>)v6: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v6 changes:
- Autoload theefi_secretmodule if the secret area is populated
(thanks Greg KH).
-efi_secret: Depend onX86_64because we useioremap_encrypted()which is only defined for this arch.
-efi_secret.c: Remove unneededtableheader_guidlocal variable.
- Documentation fixes.v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v5 changes:
- Simplify EFI code: instead of copying the secret area, the firmware marks the secret area asEFI_RESERVED_TYPE, and then theuefi_init()code just keeps the pointer as it appears in the EFI configuration table. The use of reserved pages is similar to the AMD SEV-SNP patches for handling SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages.
- In order to handle OVMF releases out there which mark the confidential computing secrets page asEFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA, add efi/libstub code that detects this and fixes the E820 map to reserve this page.
- In theefi_secretmodule code, map the secrets page usingioremap_encrypted(again, similar to the AMD SEV-SNP guest patches for accessing SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages).
- Add documentation inDocumentation/security/coco/efi_secret.v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v4 changes:
- Guard all the new EFI and efi-stub code (patches 1+2) with #ifdefCONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET(thanks Greg KH). SelectingCONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m(patch 3) will enable the EFI parts as well.
- Guard call toclflush_cache_range()with #ifdefCONFIG_X86(Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>)v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v3 changes:
- Rename the module toefi_secret
- Remove the exporting ofclean_cache_range
- Useclflush_cache_rangeinwipe_memory
- Document functionwipe_memory
- Initialize efi.coco_secret toEFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDRto correctly detect when there's no secret area published in the EFI configuration tablesv2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]
v2 changes:
- Exportclean_cache_range()
- When deleteing a secret, callclean_cache_range()afterexplicit_memzero
- AddDocumentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secretQuoted 7 lines
Dov Murik (4):
efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
virt: Addefi_secretmodule to expose confidential computing secrets
efi: Registerefi_secretplatform device if EFI secret area is
declared
docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentationThis series has Reviewed-by tags on all patches (though, as I mentioned, there's a missing #ifdef in patch 3).
Quoted 4 lines
Ard, are you going to take this through the EFI tree?
Should I resend the series with the fix for patch 3?
Yes, please send a final version with all tags in place etc, and I will queue it up.
Thanks,
Ard.
Quoted 182 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 181 lines · Dov Murik
Quoted 165 lines · Dov Murik
Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the guest starts running.
OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its AmdSev package; see edk2 commit
01726b6d23d4"OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not available in the guest kernel.The patch series keeps the address of the EFI-provided memory for injected secrets, and exposes the secrets to userspace via securityfs using a new
efi_secretkernel module. The module is autoloaded (by the EFI driver) if the secret area is populated.The first patch in EFI keeps the address of the secret area as passed in the EFI configuration table. The second patch introduces the new
efi_secretmodule that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink interface. The third patch auto-loads theefi_secretmodule during startup if the injected secrets area is populated. The last patch documents the data flow of confidential computing secret injection.As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the
efi_secretfilesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content.In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest.
This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry.
To enable this functionality, set
CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=mwhen building the guest kernel.Here is a simple example for usage of the
efi_secretmodule in a guest to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch:...
[ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II [ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f222680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea16418 ... [ 1.127627] Run /init as init process Loading, please wait... Starting version 245.4-4ubuntu3.15 ... [ 0.763204] efi_secret efi_secret.0: Created 4 entries in securityfs secrets/coco...
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..(quoted diff) +0
-4-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910# hd /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 00000000 74 68 65 73 65 2d 61 72 65 2d 74 68 65 2d 6b 61 |these-are-the-ka| 00000010 74 61 2d 73 65 63 72 65 74 73 00 01 02 03 04 05 |ta-secrets......| 00000020 06 07 |..| 00000022# rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..(quoted diff) +0
-3-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2[1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4
---
v9 changes:
- Change the module into a platform driver (thanks Ard)
- Remove special auto-loading code in efi; instead register a platform device (udev will load theefi_secretmodule) (thanks Ard)
- Change logging in theefi_secretmodule todev_err()etc.
-efi_secret: first check that the secret area header is valid; only then start creating securityfs dirs.v8: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v8 changes:
- Change path of filesystem to <securityfs>/secrets/coco and fix the documentation accordingly (Thanks Gerd, Matthew)
- Remove patch 2/5 (of v7) because the latest OVMF release (edk2-stable202202) already contains the fix to mark the launch secret page asEFI_RESERVED_TYPE.v7: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v7 changes:
- Improve description ofefi_secretmodule inKconfig.
- Fix sparse warnings on pointer address space mismatch
(Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>)v6: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v6 changes:
- Autoload theefi_secretmodule if the secret area is populated
(thanks Greg KH).
-efi_secret: Depend onX86_64because we useioremap_encrypted()which is only defined for this arch.
-efi_secret.c: Remove unneededtableheader_guidlocal variable.
- Documentation fixes.v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v5 changes:
- Simplify EFI code: instead of copying the secret area, the firmware marks the secret area asEFI_RESERVED_TYPE, and then theuefi_init()code just keeps the pointer as it appears in the EFI configuration table. The use of reserved pages is similar to the AMD SEV-SNP patches for handling SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages.
- In order to handle OVMF releases out there which mark the confidential computing secrets page asEFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA, add efi/libstub code that detects this and fixes the E820 map to reserve this page.
- In theefi_secretmodule code, map the secrets page usingioremap_encrypted(again, similar to the AMD SEV-SNP guest patches for accessing SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages).
- Add documentation inDocumentation/security/coco/efi_secret.v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v4 changes:
- Guard all the new EFI and efi-stub code (patches 1+2) with #ifdefCONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET(thanks Greg KH). SelectingCONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m(patch 3) will enable the EFI parts as well.
- Guard call toclflush_cache_range()with #ifdefCONFIG_X86(Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>)v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v3 changes:
- Rename the module toefi_secret
- Remove the exporting ofclean_cache_range
- Useclflush_cache_rangeinwipe_memory
- Document functionwipe_memory
- Initialize efi.coco_secret toEFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDRto correctly detect when there's no secret area published in the EFI configuration tablesv2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]
v2 changes:
- Exportclean_cache_range()
- When deleteing a secret, callclean_cache_range()afterexplicit_memzero
- AddDocumentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secretQuoted 7 lines
Dov Murik (4):
efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
virt: Addefi_secretmodule to expose confidential computing secrets
efi: Registerefi_secretplatform device if EFI secret area is
declared
docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentationThis series has Reviewed-by tags on all patches (though, as I mentioned, there's a missing #ifdef in patch 3).
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Ard, are you going to take this through the EFI tree?
Should I resend the series with the fix for patch 3?
Yes, please send a final version with all tags in place etc, and I will queue it up.
Great! Thank you, I'll do that shortly.
-Dov