iommu/vt-d: Force snooping improvement
Subsystems (2)
Lu Baolu
maintainerv2 cover iommu/vt-d: Force snooping improvement
Hi folks,
Previously, the IOMMU capability of enforcing cache coherency was queried through iommu_capable(IOMMU_CAP_CACHE_COHERENCY). This is a global capability, hence the IOMMU driver reports support for this capability only when all IOMMUs in the system has this support.
Commit 6043257b1de06 ("iommu: Introduce the domain op enforce_cache_coherency()") converts this into a per-domain test-and-set option, and the previous iommu_capable(IOMMU_CAP_CACHE_COHERENCY) is deprecated.
This is a follow-up series which improves the Intel IOMMU driver to support the per-domain scheme better.
Best regards,
baolu
Change log:
v2:
- Check whether force_snooping has already been set in intel_iommu_enforce_cache_coherency().
- Set PGSNP pasid bit field during domain attaching if forcing_snooping is set.
- Remove redundant list_empty() checks.
- Add dmar_domain->set_pte_snp and set it if force snooping is enforced on a domain with 2nd-level translation.
v1:
- https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/[email protected]
- Initial post.
Lu Baolu (4):
iommu/vt-d: Block force-snoop domain attaching if no SC support iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices iommu/vt-d: Remove domain_update_iommu_snooping() iommu/vt-d: Remove hard coding PGSNP bit in PASID entries
include/linux/intel-iommu.h | 1 + drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h | 2 + drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 26 +++++++++-- 4 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
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Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH v2 1/4 iommu/vt-d: Block force-snoop domain attaching if no SC support
In the attach_dev callback of the default domain ops, if the domain has been set force_snooping, but the iommu hardware of the device does not support SC(Snoop Control) capability, the callback should block it and return a corresponding error code.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +3 -0
@@ -4354,6 +4354,9 @@ static int prepare_domain_attach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain,if (!iommu)return -ENODEV ; +if (dmar_domain->force_snooping && !ecap_sc_support (iommu->ecap)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +/* check if this iommu agaw is sufficient for max mapped address */ addr_width =agaw_to_width (iommu->agaw);if (addr_width >cap_mgaw (iommu->cap))
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2.25.1 _______________________________________________ iommu mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
RE: [PATCH v2 1/4] iommu/vt-d: Block force-snoop domain attaching if no SC support
Quoted 10 lines
From: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, May 5, 2022 9:07 AMIn the
attach_devcallback of the default domain ops, if the domain has been setforce_snooping, but the iommu hardware of the device does not support SC(Snoop Control) capability, the callback should block it and return a corresponding error code.Signed-off-by Lu Baolu <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Quoted 21 lines
--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +3
-0@@ -4354,6 +4354,9 @@ static int prepare_domain_attach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain, if (!iommu) return -ENODEV; +if (dmar_domain->force_snooping && !ecap_sc_support (iommu- >ecap)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +/* check if this iommu agaw is sufficient for max mapped address */ drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +0
-1addr_width =agaw_to_width (iommu->agaw);if (addr_width >cap_mgaw (iommu->cap)) --
Quoted 1 line
2.25.1
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Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH v2 2/4 iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices
In reply to Lu BaoluAs domain->force_snooping only impacts the devices attached with the domain, there's no need to check against all IOMMU units. At the same time, for a brand new domain (hasn't been attached to any device), the force_snooping field could be set, but the attach_dev callback will return failure if it wants to attach to a device which IOMMU has no snoop control capability.
--- include/linux/intel-iommu.h | 1 + drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h | 2 ++ drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/intel-iommu.h +1 -0
@@ -540,6 +540,7 @@ struct dmar_domain { u8 has_iotlb_device: 1; u8 iommu_coherency: 1; /* indicate coherency of iommu access */ u8 force_snooping : 1; /* Create IOPTEs with snoop control */ + u8 set_pte_snp:1;struct list_head devices;/* all devices' list */ struct iova_domain iovad;/* iova's that belong to this domain */
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h +2 -0
@@ -123,4 +123,6 @@ void intel_pasid_tear_down_entry(struct intel_iommu *iommu, bool fault_ignore);int vcmd_alloc_pasid (struct intel_iommu *iommu,u32 *pasid);void vcmd_free_pasid (struct intel_iommu *iommu,u32 pasid); +void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (struct intel_iommu *iommu, +struct device *dev,u32 pasid);#endif /* __INTEL_PASID_H */
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +48 -3
75 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +23 -0
@@ -762,3 +762,26 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu,return 0 ; } + +/* +* Set the page snoop control for a pasid entry which has been set up. +*/ +void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (struct intel_iommu *iommu, +struct device *dev,u32 pasid) +{ +struct pasid_entry *pte; +u16 did; + +spin_lock (&iommu->lock); + pte =intel_pasid_get_entry (dev, pasid); +if (WARN_ON (!pte || !pasid_pte_is_present (pte))) { +spin_unlock (&iommu->lock); +return ; + } + +pasid_set_pgsnp (pte); + did =pasid_get_domain_id (pte); +spin_unlock (&iommu->lock); + +pasid_flush_caches (iommu, pte, pasid, did); +}
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RE: [PATCH v2 2/4] iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices
Quoted 9 lines
From: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, May 5, 2022 9:07 AMAs
domain->force_snoopingonly impacts the devices attached with the domain, there's no need to check against all IOMMU units. At the same time, for a brand new domain (hasn't been attached to any device), theforce_snoopingfield could be set, but theattach_devcallback will return failure if it wants to attach to a device which IOMMU has no snoop control capability.
The description about brand new domain is not very clear. I think the point here is that force_snooping could be set on a domain no matter whether it has been attached or not and once set it is an immutable flag. If no device attached the operation always succeeds then this empty domain can be only attached to a device of which the IOMMU supports snoop control.
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, · line 4605
Quoted 12 lines
static bool intel_iommu_enforce_cache_coherency(struct
iommu_domain
*domain)
{drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +5
-1struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain =to_dmar_domain (domain); -if (!domain_update_iommu_snooping (NULL )) +if (dmar_domain->force_snooping) +return true; + +if (!domain_support_force_snooping (dmar_domain))return false; +
Who guarantees that domain->devices won't change between above condition check and following set operation?
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, · line 4610
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +2
-0+domain_set_force_snooping (dmar_domain); dmar_domain->force_snooping = true; +return true; }
Thanks
Kevin
Baolu Lu
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 2/4] iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices
Quoted 10 lines · Kevin
Quoted 9 lines
From: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, May 5, 2022 9:07 AMAs
domain->force_snoopingonly impacts the devices attached with the domain, there's no need to check against all IOMMU units. At the same time, for a brand new domain (hasn't been attached to any device), theforce_snoopingfield could be set, but theattach_devcallback will return failure if it wants to attach to a device which IOMMU has no snoop control capability.
Quoted 6 lines
The description about brand new domain is not very clear. I think the point here is that
force_snoopingcould be set on a domain no matter whether it has been attached or not and once set it is an immutable flag. If no device attached the operation always succeeds then this empty domain can be only attached to a device of which the IOMMU supports snoop control.
Exactly. Will update this description.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
static bool intel_iommu_enforce_cache_coherency(struct
iommu_domain
*domain)
{
structdmar_domain*dmar_domain=to_dmar_domain(domain);
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, · line 4605
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +5
-1-if (!domain_update_iommu_snooping (NULL )) +if (dmar_domain->force_snooping) +return true; + +if (!domain_support_force_snooping (dmar_domain))return false; +Who guarantees that
domain->deviceswon't change between above condition check and following set operation?
Good catch. Should lift the lock up here.
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, · line 4610
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +2
-0+domain_set_force_snooping (dmar_domain); dmar_domain->force_snooping = true; +return true; }Thanks
Kevin
Best regards,
baolu
Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH v2 3/4 iommu/vt-d: Remove domain_update_iommu_snooping()
In reply to Lu BaoluThe IOMMU force snooping capability is not required to be consistent among all the IOMMUs anymore. Remove force snooping capability check in the IOMMU hot-add path and domain_update_iommu_snooping() becomes a dead code now.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 34 +--------------------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 33 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +1 -33
@@ -533,33 +533,6 @@ static void domain_update_iommu_coherency(struct dmar_domain *domain)rcu_read_unlock (); } -static bool domain_update_iommu_snooping (struct intel_iommu *skip) -{ -struct dmar_drhd_unit *drhd; -struct intel_iommu *iommu; -bool ret = true; - -rcu_read_lock (); -for_each_active_iommu (iommu, drhd) { -if (iommu != skip) { -/* -* If the hardware is operating in the scalable mode, -* the snooping control is always supported since we -* always set PASID-table-entry.PGSNP bit if the domain -* is managed outside (UNMANAGED). -*/ -if (!sm_supported (iommu) && - !ecap_sc_support (iommu->ecap)) { - ret = false; -break ; - } - } - } -rcu_read_unlock (); - -return ret; -} -static int domain_update_iommu_superpage (struct dmar_domain *domain,struct intel_iommu *skip) {
@@ -3593,12 +3566,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_add(struct dmar_drhd_unit *dmaru) iommu->name);return -ENXIO ; } -if (!ecap_sc_support (iommu->ecap) && -domain_update_iommu_snooping (iommu)) { -pr_warn ("%s: Doesn't support snooping.\n" , - iommu->name); -return -ENXIO ; - } + sp =domain_update_iommu_superpage (NULL , iommu) -1 ;if (sp >=0 && !(cap_super_page_val (iommu->cap) & (1 << sp))) { pr_warn("%s: Doesn't support large page.\n",
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2.25.1 _______________________________________________ iommu mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
RE: [PATCH v2 3/4] iommu/vt-d: Remove domain_update_iommu_snooping()
Quoted 11 lines
From: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, May 5, 2022 9:07 AMThe IOMMU force snooping capability is not required to be consistent among all the IOMMUs anymore. Remove force snooping capability check in the IOMMU hot-add path and
domain_update_iommu_snooping()becomes
a dead code now.Signed-off-by Lu Baolu <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Quoted 58 lines
--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 34 +--------------------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 33 deletions(-)drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +0
-13@@ -533,33 +533,6 @@ static void domain_update_iommu_coherency(struct dmar_domain *domain)rcu_read_unlock (); } -static bool domain_update_iommu_snooping (struct intel_iommu *skip) -{ -struct dmar_drhd_unit *drhd; -struct intel_iommu *iommu; -bool ret = true; - -rcu_read_lock (); -for_each_active_iommu (iommu, drhd) { -if (iommu != skip) { -/* -* If the hardware is operating in the scalable mode, -* the snooping control is always supported since we -* always set PASID-table-entry.PGSNP bit if the domain
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +1
-20-* is managed outside (UNMANAGED). -*/ -if (!sm_supported (iommu) && - !ecap_sc_support (iommu->ecap)) { - ret = false; -break ; - } - } - } -rcu_read_unlock (); - -return ret; -} -static int domain_update_iommu_superpage (struct dmar_domain *domain,struct intel_iommu *skip) {@@ -3593,12 +3566,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_add(struct dmar_drhd_unit *dmaru) iommu->name);return -ENXIO ; } -if (!ecap_sc_support (iommu->ecap) && -domain_update_iommu_snooping (iommu)) { -pr_warn ("%s: Doesn't support snooping.\n" , - iommu->name); -return -ENXIO ; - } + sp =domain_update_iommu_superpage (NULL , iommu) -1 ;if (sp >=0 && !(cap_super_page_val (iommu->cap) & (1 << sp))) {
Quoted 3 lines
pr_warn("%s: Doesn't support large page.\n",
--
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Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH v2 4/4 iommu/vt-d: Remove hard coding PGSNP bit in PASID entries
In reply to Lu BaoluAs enforce_cache_coherency has been introduced into the iommu_domain_ops, the kernel component which owns the iommu domain is able to opt-in its requirement for force snooping support. The iommu driver has no need to hard code the page snoop control bit in the PASID table entries anymore.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +0 -3
@@ -710,9 +710,6 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_second_level(struct intel_iommu *iommu,pasid_set_fault_enable (pte);pasid_set_page_snoop (pte, !!ecap_smpwc (iommu->ecap)); -if (domain->domain.type ==IOMMU_DOMAIN_UNMANAGED ) -pasid_set_pgsnp (pte); -/* * Since it is a second level only translation setup, we should * set SRE bit as well (addresses are expected to be GPAs).
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RE: [PATCH v2 4/4] iommu/vt-d: Remove hard coding PGSNP bit in PASID entries
Quoted 10 lines
From: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, May 5, 2022 9:07 AMAs
enforce_cache_coherencyhas been introduced into theiommu_domain_ops,
the kernel component which owns the iommu domain is able to opt-in its requirement for force snooping support. The iommu driver has no need to hard code the page snoop control bit in the PASID table entries anymore.Signed-off-by Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c int intel_pasid_setup_second_level(struct · line 712
Quoted 12 lines
--- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +0
-0@@ -710,9 +710,6 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_second_level(structintel_iommu *iommu,pasid_set_fault_enable (pte );pasid_set_page_snoop (pte, !!ecap_smpwc (iommu->ecap));
Probably in a separate patch but above should really be renamed to pasid_set_page_walk_snoop().
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +0
-4-if (domain->domain.type ==IOMMU_DOMAIN_UNMANAGED ) -pasid_set_pgsnp (pte); -/* * Since it is a second level only translation setup, we should * set SRE bit as well (addresses are expected to be GPAs). -- 2.25.1
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Baolu Lu
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 4/4] iommu/vt-d: Remove hard coding PGSNP bit in PASID entries
Quoted 17 lines · Kevin
Quoted 10 lines
From: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, May 5, 2022 9:07 AMAs
enforce_cache_coherencyhas been introduced into theiommu_domain_ops,
the kernel component which owns the iommu domain is able to opt-in its requirement for force snooping support. The iommu driver has no need to hard code the page snoop control bit in the PASID table entries anymore.Signed-off-by Lu Baolu <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Kevin Tian <[email protected]>, with one nit:Quoted 4 lines
--- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
Quoted 11 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c int intel_pasid_setup_second_level(struct · line 712
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +0
-0@@ -710,9 +710,6 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_second_level(structintel_iommu *iommu,pasid_set_fault_enable (pte );pasid_set_page_snoop (pte, !!ecap_smpwc (iommu->ecap));Probably in a separate patch but above should really be renamed to
pasid_set_page_walk_snoop().
Yeah! Need a cleanup here. Above name is confusing.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +0
-4-if (domain->domain.type ==IOMMU_DOMAIN_UNMANAGED ) -pasid_set_pgsnp (pte); -/* * Since it is a second level only translation setup, we should * set SRE bit as well (addresses are expected to be GPAs). -- 2.25.1
Best regards,
baolu
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