Enable loading local and third party keys on PowerVM guest
Subsystems (7)
v4 cover Enable loading local and third party keys on PowerVM guest
On a secure boot enabled PowerVM guest, local and third party code signing keys are needed to verify signed applications, configuration files, and kernel modules.
Loading these keys onto either the .secondary_trusted_keys or .ima keyrings requires the certificates be signed by keys on the .builtin_trusted_keys, .machine or .secondary_trusted_keys keyrings.
Keys on the .builtin_trusted_keys keyring are trusted because of the chain of trust from secure boot up to and including the linux kernel. Keys on the .machine keyring that derive their trust from an entity such as a security officer, administrator, system owner, or machine owner are said to have "imputed trust." The type of certificates and the mechanism for loading them onto the .machine keyring is platform dependent.
Userspace may load certificates onto the .secondary_trusted_keys or .ima keyrings. However, keys may also need to be loaded by the kernel if they are needed for verification in early boot time. On PowerVM guest, third party code signing keys are loaded from the moduledb variable in the Platform KeyStore(PKS) onto the .secondary_trusted_keys.
The purpose of this patch set is to allow loading of local and third party code signing keys on PowerVM.
Changelog:
v4:
* Fixed build error reported by Nageswara R Sastry <[email protected]>, as part of his testing of patches.
* Included Jarkko's and Mimi's feedback
v3:
* Included Jarkko's feedback for Patch 6/6.
v2:
* Patch 5/6: Update CA restriction to allow only key signing CA's.
* Rebase on Jarkko's master tree - https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
* Tested after reverting cfa7522f280aa95 because of build failure due to
this commit.
Nayna Jain (6):
integrity: PowerVM support for loading CA keys on machine keyring
integrity: ignore keys failing CA restrictions on non-UEFI platform
integrity: remove global variable from machine_keyring.c
integrity: check whether imputed trust is enabled
integrity: PowerVM machine keyring enablement
integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys
certs/system_keyring.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++ include/keys/system_keyring.h | 4 +++ security/integrity/Kconfig | 4 ++- security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 +- security/integrity/integrity.h | 5 +-- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 19 ++++++++++- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 10 ++++++ .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++ .../platform_certs/machine_keyring.c | 22 +++++++++--- 9 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
PATCH v4 1/6 integrity: PowerVM support for loading CA keys on machine keyring
Keys that derive their trust from an entity such as a security officer, administrator, system owner, or machine owner are said to have "imputed trust". CA keys with imputed trust can be loaded onto the machine keyring. The mechanism for loading these keys onto the machine keyring is platform dependent.
Load keys stored in the variable trustedcadb onto the .machine keyring on PowerVM platform.
--- .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 8 ++++++++ .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 5 +++++ .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)return NULL ; } +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ +if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) ==0 ) +return add_to_machine_keyring; + +return NULL ; +} +/* * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);*/ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* +* Return the handler for particular signature list types for CA keys. +*/ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx. */
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17 -0
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(u8 *key, unsigned long keylen, u64 *size)static int __init load_powerpc_certs (void ) {void *db =NULL , *dbx =NULL , *data =NULL ; +void *trustedca;u64 dsize =0 ;u64 offset =0 ;int rc =0 ;
@@ -120,6 +121,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)kfree (data); } + data =get_cert_list ("trustedcadb" ,12 , &dsize); +if (!data) { +pr_info ("Couldn't get trustedcadb list from firmware\n" ); + }else if (IS_ERR (data)) { + rc =PTR_ERR (data); +pr_err ("Error reading trustedcadb from firmware: %d\n" , rc); + }else { +extract_esl (trustedca, data, dsize, offset); + + rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("powerpc:trustedca" , trustedca, dsize, + get_handler_for_ca_keys); +if (rc) +pr_err ("Couldn't parse trustedcadb signatures: %d\n" , rc); +kfree (data); + } +return rc; }late_initcall (load_powerpc_certs);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Re: [PATCH v4 1/6] integrity: PowerVM support for loading CA keys on machine keyring
Quoted 11 lines · Nayna Jain
Keys that derive their trust from an entity such as a security officer, administrator, system owner, or machine owner are said to have "imputed trust". CA keys with imputed trust can be loaded onto the machine keyring. The mechanism for loading these keys onto the machine keyring is platform dependent.
Load keys stored in the variable trustedcadb onto the .machine keyring on PowerVM platform.
Signed-off-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Reviewed-and-tested-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Tested with trustedcadb, moduledb scenarios
Quoted 76 lines
--- .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 8 ++++++++ .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 5 +++++ .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8
-0@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)return NULL ; } +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ +if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) ==0 ) +return add_to_machine_keyring; + +return NULL ; +} +/* * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables. security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5
-0@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);*/ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* +* Return the handler for particular signature list types for CA keys. +*/ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx. */ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17
-0@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(u8 *key, unsigned long keylen, u64 *size)static int __init load_powerpc_certs (void ) {void *db =NULL , *dbx =NULL , *data =NULL ; +void *trustedca;u64 dsize =0 ;u64 offset =0 ;int rc =0 ;@@ -120,6 +121,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)kfree (data); } + data =get_cert_list ("trustedcadb" ,12 , &dsize); +if (!data) { +pr_info ("Couldn't get trustedcadb list from firmware\n" ); + }else if (IS_ERR (data)) { + rc =PTR_ERR (data); +pr_err ("Error reading trustedcadb from firmware: %d\n" , rc); + }else { +extract_esl (trustedca, data, dsize, offset); + + rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("powerpc:trustedca" , trustedca, dsize, + get_handler_for_ca_keys); +if (rc) +pr_err ("Couldn't parse trustedcadb signatures: %d\n" , rc); +kfree (data); + } +return rc; }late_initcall (load_powerpc_certs);
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks and Regards R.Nageswara Sastry
Re: [PATCH v4 1/6] integrity: PowerVM support for loading CA keys on machine keyring
In reply to Nayna JainQuoted 89 lines · Nayna Jain
Keys that derive their trust from an entity such as a security officer, administrator, system owner, or machine owner are said to have "imputed trust". CA keys with imputed trust can be loaded onto the machine keyring. The mechanism for loading these keys onto the machine keyring is platform dependent.
Load keys stored in the variable trustedcadb onto the .machine keyring on PowerVM platform.
Signed-off-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Reviewed-and-tested-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>--- .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 8 ++++++++ .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 5 +++++ .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8
-0@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)return NULL ; } +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ +if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) ==0 ) +return add_to_machine_keyring; + +return NULL ; +} +/* * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables. security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5
-0@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);*/ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* +* Return the handler for particular signature list types for CA keys. +*/ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx. */ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17
-0@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(u8 *key, unsigned long keylen, u64 *size)static int __init load_powerpc_certs (void ) {void *db =NULL , *dbx =NULL , *data =NULL ; +void *trustedca;u64 dsize =0 ;u64 offset =0 ;int rc =0 ;@@ -120,6 +121,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)kfree (data); } + data =get_cert_list ("trustedcadb" ,12 , &dsize); +if (!data) { +pr_info ("Couldn't get trustedcadb list from firmware\n" ); + }else if (IS_ERR (data)) { + rc =PTR_ERR (data); +pr_err ("Error reading trustedcadb from firmware: %d\n" , rc); + }else { +extract_esl (trustedca, data, dsize, offset); + + rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("powerpc:trustedca" , trustedca, dsize, + get_handler_for_ca_keys); +if (rc) +pr_err ("Couldn't parse trustedcadb signatures: %d\n" , rc); +kfree (data); + } +return rc; }late_initcall (load_powerpc_certs);Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
BR, Jarkko
PATCH v4 2/6 integrity: ignore keys failing CA restrictions on non-UEFI platform
In reply to Nayna JainOn non-UEFI platforms, handle restrict_link_by_ca failures differently.
Certificates which do not satisfy CA restrictions on non-UEFI platforms are ignored.
--- security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c +1 -1
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t* If the restriction check does not pass and the platform keyring * is configured, try to add it into that keyring instead. */ -if (rc &&IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING )) +if (rc &&efi_enabled (EFI_BOOT ) &&IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING )) rc =integrity_load_cert (INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM , source, data, len, perm);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Re: [PATCH v4 2/6] integrity: ignore keys failing CA restrictions on non-UEFI platform
Quoted 8 lines · Nayna Jain
On non-UEFI platforms, handle
restrict_link_by_cafailures differently.Certificates which do not satisfy CA restrictions on non-UEFI platforms are ignored.
Signed-off-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Reviewed-and-tested-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Acked-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Tested with trustedcadb, moduledb scenarios
Quoted 17 lines
--- security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c +1
-1@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t* If the restriction check does not pass and the platform keyring * is configured, try to add it into that keyring instead. */ -if (rc &&IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING )) +if (rc &&efi_enabled (EFI_BOOT ) &&IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING )) rc =integrity_load_cert (INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM , source, data, len, perm);
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks and Regards R.Nageswara Sastry
PATCH v4 3/6 integrity: remove global variable from machine_keyring.c
In reply to Nayna Jaintrust_mok variable is accessed within a single function locally.
Change trust_mok from global to local static variable.
--- security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c +2 -2
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@#include <linux/efi.h> #include "../integrity.h" -static bool trust_mok; -static __init int machine_keyring_init (void ) {int rc;
@@ -65,9 +63,11 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void)bool __init trust_moklist (void ) {static bool initialized; +static bool trust_mok;if (!initialized) { initialized = true; + trust_mok = false;if (uefi_check_trust_mok_keys ()) trust_mok = true;
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Re: [PATCH v4 3/6] integrity: remove global variable from machine_keyring.c
Quoted 7 lines · Nayna Jain
trust_mokvariable is accessed within a single function locally.Change
trust_mokfrom global to local static variable.Signed-off-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Reviewed-and-tested-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Tested with trustedcadb, moduledb scenarios
Quoted 29 lines
--- security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c +2
-2@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@#include <linux/efi.h> #include "../integrity.h" -static bool trust_mok; -static __init int machine_keyring_init (void ) {int rc;@@ -65,9 +63,11 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void)bool __init trust_moklist (void ) {static bool initialized; +static bool trust_mok;if (!initialized) { initialized = true; + trust_mok = false;if (uefi_check_trust_mok_keys ()) trust_mok = true;
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks and Regards R.Nageswara Sastry
PATCH v4 4/6 integrity: check whether imputed trust is enabled
In reply to Nayna Jaintrust_moklist() is specific to UEFI enabled systems. Other platforms rely only on the Kconfig.
Define a generic wrapper named imputed_trust_enabled().
--- security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 +- security/integrity/integrity.h | 5 +++-- .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 3 ++- .../integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
security/integrity/digsig.c +1 -1
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, }else {if (id ==INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM )set_platform_trusted_keys (keyring[id]); -if (id ==INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE &&trust_moklist ()) +if (id ==INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE &&imputed_trust_enabled ())set_machine_trusted_keys (keyring[id]);if (id ==INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA )load_module_cert (keyring[id]);
security/integrity/integrity.h +3 -2
@@ -320,13 +320,14 @@ static inline void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source,#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING void __init add_to_machine_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len); -bool __init trust_moklist (void ); +bool __init imputed_trust_enabled (void );#else static inline void __init add_to_machine_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { } -static inline bool __init trust_moklist (void ) + +static inline bool __init imputed_trust_enabled (void ) {return false; }
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +2 -1
@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok (const efi_guid_t *sig_type) {if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) ==0 ) { -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING ) &&trust_moklist ()) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING ) && +imputed_trust_enabled ())return add_to_machine_keyring;else return add_to_platform_keyring;
security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c +16 -2
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t* If the restriction check does not pass and the platform keyring * is configured, try to add it into that keyring instead. */ -if (rc &&efi_enabled (EFI_BOOT ) &&IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING )) +if (rc &&efi_enabled (EFI_BOOT ) && +IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING )) rc =integrity_load_cert (INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM , source, data, len, perm);
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void)return false; } -bool __init trust_moklist (void ) +static bool __init trust_moklist (void ) {static bool initialized;static bool trust_mok;
@@ -75,3 +76,16 @@ bool __init trust_moklist(void)return trust_mok; } + +/* +* Provides platform specific check for trusting imputed keys before loading +* on .machine keyring. UEFI systems enable this trust based on a variable, +* and for other platforms, it is always enabled. +*/ +bool __init imputed_trust_enabled (void ) +{ +if (efi_enabled (EFI_BOOT )) +return trust_moklist (); + +return true; +}
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Re: [PATCH v4 4/6] integrity: check whether imputed trust is enabled
Quoted 7 lines · Nayna Jain
trust_moklist()is specific to UEFI enabled systems. Other platforms rely only on theKconfig.Define a generic wrapper named
imputed_trust_enabled().Signed-off-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Reviewed-off-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Tested with trustedcadb, moduledb scenarios
Quoted 95 lines
--- security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 +- security/integrity/integrity.h | 5 +++-- .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 3 ++- .../integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)security/integrity/digsig.c +1
-1@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, }else {if (id ==INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM )set_platform_trusted_keys (keyring[id]); -if (id ==INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE &&trust_moklist ()) +if (id ==INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE &&imputed_trust_enabled ())set_machine_trusted_keys (keyring[id]);if (id ==INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA )load_module_cert (keyring[id]);security/integrity/integrity.h +3
-2@@ -320,13 +320,14 @@ static inline void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source,#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING void __init add_to_machine_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len); -bool __init trust_moklist (void ); +bool __init imputed_trust_enabled (void );#else static inline void __init add_to_machine_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { } -static inline bool __init trust_moklist (void ) + +static inline bool __init imputed_trust_enabled (void ) {return false; }security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +2
-1@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok (const efi_guid_t *sig_type) {if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) ==0 ) { -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING ) &&trust_moklist ()) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING ) && +imputed_trust_enabled ())return add_to_machine_keyring;else return add_to_platform_keyring;security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c +16
-2@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t* If the restriction check does not pass and the platform keyring * is configured, try to add it into that keyring instead. */ -if (rc &&efi_enabled (EFI_BOOT ) &&IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING )) +if (rc &&efi_enabled (EFI_BOOT ) && +IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING )) rc =integrity_load_cert (INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM , source, data, len, perm);@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void)return false; } -bool __init trust_moklist (void ) +static bool __init trust_moklist (void ) {static bool initialized;static bool trust_mok;@@ -75,3 +76,16 @@ bool __init trust_moklist(void)return trust_mok; } + +/* +* Provides platform specific check for trusting imputed keys before loading +* on .machine keyring. UEFI systems enable this trust based on a variable, +* and for other platforms, it is always enabled. +*/ +bool __init imputed_trust_enabled (void ) +{ +if (efi_enabled (EFI_BOOT )) +return trust_moklist (); + +return true; +}
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks and Regards R.Nageswara Sastry
PATCH v4 5/6 integrity: PowerVM machine keyring enablement
In reply to Nayna JainUpdate Kconfig to enable machine keyring and limit to CA certificates on PowerVM. Only key signing CA keys are allowed.
--- security/integrity/Kconfig | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/Kconfig +3 -1
@@ -67,7 +67,9 @@ config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING - depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS + depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS || LOAD_PPC_KEYS + select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING if LOAD_PPC_KEYS + select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX if LOAD_PPC_KEYS help If set, provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may be added. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys. Unlike keys
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Re: [PATCH v4 5/6] integrity: PowerVM machine keyring enablement
Quoted 6 lines · Nayna Jain
Update
Kconfigto enable machine keyring and limit to CA certificates on PowerVM. Only key signing CA keys are allowed.Signed-off-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>Reviewed-and-tested-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Tested with trustedcadb, moduledb scenarios
Quoted 19 lines
--- security/integrity/Kconfig | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)security/integrity/Kconfig +3
-1@@ -67,7 +67,9 @@ config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING - depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS + depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS || LOAD_PPC_KEYS + select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING if LOAD_PPC_KEYS + select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX if LOAD_PPC_KEYS help If set, provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may be added. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys. Unlike keys
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks and Regards R.Nageswara Sastry
PATCH v4 6/6 integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys
In reply to Nayna JainOn secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform KeyStore (PKS).
Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.
--- certs/system_keyring.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ include/keys/system_keyring.h | 4 +++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 8 +++++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 5 ++++ .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 17 +++++++++++ 5 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
certs/system_keyring.c +30 -0
@@ -152,6 +152,36 @@ static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void return restriction; } + +/** +* add_to_secondary_keyring - Add to secondary keyring. +* @source: Source of key +* @data: The blob holding the key +* @len: The length of the data blob +* +* Add a key to the secondary keyring. The key must be vouched for by a key in the builtin, +* machine or secondary keyring itself. +*/ +void __init add_to_secondary_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) +{ +key_ref_t key; +key_perm_t perm; + + perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR ) |KEY_USR_VIEW ; + + key =key_create_or_update (make_key_ref (secondary_trusted_keys,1 ), +"asymmetric" , +NULL , data, len, perm, +KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA ); +if (IS_ERR (key)) { +pr_err ("Problem loading X.509 certificate from %s to secondary keyring %ld\n" , + source,PTR_ERR (key)); +return ; + } + +pr_notice ("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n" ,key_ref_to_ptr (key)->description); +key_ref_put (key); +}#endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING void __init set_machine_trusted_keys (struct key *keyring)
include/keys/system_keyring.h +4 -0
@@ -50,9 +50,13 @@ int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary(struct key *keyring,const struct key_type *type, const union key_payload *payload, struct key *restriction_key); +void __init add_to_secondary_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len);#else #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted#define restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin +static inline void __init add_to_secondary_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) +{ +}#endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8 -0
@@ -78,6 +78,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)return NULL ; } +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ +if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) ==0 ) +return add_to_secondary_keyring; + +return NULL ; +} +/* * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);*/ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* +* Return the handler for particular signature list types for code signing keys. +*/ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx. */
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17 -0
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void) {void *db =NULL , *dbx =NULL , *data =NULL ;void *trustedca; +void *moduledb;u64 dsize =0 ;u64 offset =0 ;int rc =0 ;
@@ -137,6 +138,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)kfree (data); } + data =get_cert_list ("moduledb" ,9 , &dsize); +if (!data) { +pr_info ("Couldn't get moduledb list from firmware\n" ); + }else if (IS_ERR (data)) { + rc =PTR_ERR (data); +pr_err ("Error reading moduledb from firmware: %d\n" , rc); + }else { +extract_esl (moduledb, data, dsize, offset); + + rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("powerpc:moduledb" , moduledb, dsize, + get_handler_for_code_signing_keys); +if (rc) +pr_err ("Couldn't parse moduledb signatures: %d\n" , rc); +kfree (data); + } +return rc; }late_initcall (load_powerpc_certs);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 6/6] integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys
Quoted 8 lines · Nayna Jain
On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform KeyStore (PKS).
Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.
Signed-off-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys
In reply to Nayna JainQuoted 8 lines · Nayna Jain
On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform KeyStore (PKS).
Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.
Signed-off-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
Tested with trustedcadb, moduledb scenarios
Quoted 137 lines
--- certs/system_keyring.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ include/keys/system_keyring.h | 4 +++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 8 +++++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 5 ++++ .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 17 +++++++++++ 5 files changed, 64 insertions(+)certs/system_keyring.c +30
-0@@ -152,6 +152,36 @@ static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void return restriction; } + +/** +* add_to_secondary_keyring - Add to secondary keyring. +* @source: Source of key +* @data: The blob holding the key +* @len: The length of the data blob +* +* Add a key to the secondary keyring. The key must be vouched for by a key in the builtin, +* machine or secondary keyring itself. +*/ +void __init add_to_secondary_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) +{ +key_ref_t key; +key_perm_t perm; + + perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR ) |KEY_USR_VIEW ; + + key =key_create_or_update (make_key_ref (secondary_trusted_keys,1 ), +"asymmetric" , +NULL , data, len, perm, +KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA ); +if (IS_ERR (key)) { +pr_err ("Problem loading X.509 certificate from %s to secondary keyring %ld\n" , + source,PTR_ERR (key)); +return ; + } + +pr_notice ("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n" ,key_ref_to_ptr (key)->description); +key_ref_put (key); +}#endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING void __init set_machine_trusted_keys (struct key *keyring)include/keys/system_keyring.h +4
-0@@ -50,9 +50,13 @@ int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary(struct key *keyring,const struct key_type *type, const union key_payload *payload, struct key *restriction_key); +void __init add_to_secondary_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len);#else #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted#define restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin +static inline void __init add_to_secondary_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) +{ +}#endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8
-0@@ -78,6 +78,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)return NULL ; } +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ +if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) ==0 ) +return add_to_secondary_keyring; + +return NULL ; +} +/* * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables. security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5
-0@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);*/ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* +* Return the handler for particular signature list types for code signing keys. +*/ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx. */ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17
-0@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void) {void *db =NULL , *dbx =NULL , *data =NULL ;void *trustedca; +void *moduledb;u64 dsize =0 ;u64 offset =0 ;int rc =0 ;@@ -137,6 +138,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)kfree (data); } + data =get_cert_list ("moduledb" ,9 , &dsize); +if (!data) { +pr_info ("Couldn't get moduledb list from firmware\n" ); + }else if (IS_ERR (data)) { + rc =PTR_ERR (data); +pr_err ("Error reading moduledb from firmware: %d\n" , rc); + }else { +extract_esl (moduledb, data, dsize, offset); + + rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("powerpc:moduledb" , moduledb, dsize, + get_handler_for_code_signing_keys); +if (rc) +pr_err ("Couldn't parse moduledb signatures: %d\n" , rc); +kfree (data); + } +return rc; }late_initcall (load_powerpc_certs);
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks and Regards R.Nageswara Sastry
Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys
In reply to Nayna JainQuoted 147 lines · Nayna Jain
On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform KeyStore (PKS).
Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.
Signed-off-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>--- certs/system_keyring.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ include/keys/system_keyring.h | 4 +++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 8 +++++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 5 ++++ .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 17 +++++++++++ 5 files changed, 64 insertions(+)certs/system_keyring.c +30
-0@@ -152,6 +152,36 @@ static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void return restriction; } + +/** +* add_to_secondary_keyring - Add to secondary keyring. +* @source: Source of key +* @data: The blob holding the key +* @len: The length of the data blob +* +* Add a key to the secondary keyring. The key must be vouched for by a key in the builtin, +* machine or secondary keyring itself. +*/ +void __init add_to_secondary_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) +{ +key_ref_t key; +key_perm_t perm; + + perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR ) |KEY_USR_VIEW ; + + key =key_create_or_update (make_key_ref (secondary_trusted_keys,1 ), +"asymmetric" , +NULL , data, len, perm, +KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA ); +if (IS_ERR (key)) { +pr_err ("Problem loading X.509 certificate from %s to secondary keyring %ld\n" , + source,PTR_ERR (key)); +return ; + } + +pr_notice ("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n" ,key_ref_to_ptr (key)->description); +key_ref_put (key); +}#endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING void __init set_machine_trusted_keys (struct key *keyring)include/keys/system_keyring.h +4
-0@@ -50,9 +50,13 @@ int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary(struct key *keyring,const struct key_type *type, const union key_payload *payload, struct key *restriction_key); +void __init add_to_secondary_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len);#else #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted#define restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin +static inline void __init add_to_secondary_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) +{ +}#endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8
-0@@ -78,6 +78,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)return NULL ; } +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ +if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) ==0 ) +return add_to_secondary_keyring; + +return NULL ; +} +/* * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables. security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5
-0@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);*/ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* +* Return the handler for particular signature list types for code signing keys. +*/ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx. */ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17
-0@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void) {void *db =NULL , *dbx =NULL , *data =NULL ;void *trustedca; +void *moduledb;u64 dsize =0 ;u64 offset =0 ;int rc =0 ;@@ -137,6 +138,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)kfree (data); } + data =get_cert_list ("moduledb" ,9 , &dsize); +if (!data) { +pr_info ("Couldn't get moduledb list from firmware\n" ); + }else if (IS_ERR (data)) { + rc =PTR_ERR (data); +pr_err ("Error reading moduledb from firmware: %d\n" , rc); + }else { +extract_esl (moduledb, data, dsize, offset); + + rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("powerpc:moduledb" , moduledb, dsize, + get_handler_for_code_signing_keys); +if (rc) +pr_err ("Couldn't parse moduledb signatures: %d\n" , rc); +kfree (data); + } +return rc; }late_initcall (load_powerpc_certs);Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
I can pick this. My last PR did not went too great partly because of mess with tpm_tis but now things are calmer.
BR, Jarkko
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 6/6] integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys
Quoted 151 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 147 lines · Nayna Jain
On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform KeyStore (PKS).
Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.
Signed-off-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>--- certs/system_keyring.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ include/keys/system_keyring.h | 4 +++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 8 +++++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 5 ++++ .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 17 +++++++++++ 5 files changed, 64 insertions(+)certs/system_keyring.c +30
-0@@ -152,6 +152,36 @@ static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void return restriction; } + +/** +* add_to_secondary_keyring - Add to secondary keyring. +* @source: Source of key +* @data: The blob holding the key +* @len: The length of the data blob +* +* Add a key to the secondary keyring. The key must be vouched for by a key in the builtin, +* machine or secondary keyring itself. +*/ +void __init add_to_secondary_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) +{ +key_ref_t key; +key_perm_t perm; + + perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR ) |KEY_USR_VIEW ; + + key =key_create_or_update (make_key_ref (secondary_trusted_keys,1 ), +"asymmetric" , +NULL , data, len, perm, +KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA ); +if (IS_ERR (key)) { +pr_err ("Problem loading X.509 certificate from %s to secondary keyring %ld\n" , + source,PTR_ERR (key)); +return ; + } + +pr_notice ("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n" ,key_ref_to_ptr (key)->description); +key_ref_put (key); +}#endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING void __init set_machine_trusted_keys (struct key *keyring)include/keys/system_keyring.h +4
-0@@ -50,9 +50,13 @@ int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary(struct key *keyring,const struct key_type *type, const union key_payload *payload, struct key *restriction_key); +void __init add_to_secondary_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len);#else #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted#define restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin +static inline void __init add_to_secondary_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) +{ +}#endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8
-0@@ -78,6 +78,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)return NULL ; } +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ +if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) ==0 ) +return add_to_secondary_keyring; + +return NULL ; +} +/* * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables. security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5
-0@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);*/ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* +* Return the handler for particular signature list types for code signing keys. +*/ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx. */ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17
-0@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void) {void *db =NULL , *dbx =NULL , *data =NULL ;void *trustedca; +void *moduledb;u64 dsize =0 ;u64 offset =0 ;int rc =0 ;@@ -137,6 +138,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)kfree (data); } + data =get_cert_list ("moduledb" ,9 , &dsize); +if (!data) { +pr_info ("Couldn't get moduledb list from firmware\n" ); + }else if (IS_ERR (data)) { + rc =PTR_ERR (data); +pr_err ("Error reading moduledb from firmware: %d\n" , rc); + }else { +extract_esl (moduledb, data, dsize, offset); + + rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("powerpc:moduledb" , moduledb, dsize, + get_handler_for_code_signing_keys); +if (rc) +pr_err ("Couldn't parse moduledb signatures: %d\n" , rc); +kfree (data); + } +return rc; }late_initcall (load_powerpc_certs);Signature · 1 line
2.31.1Reviewed-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Quoted 2 lines
I can pick this. My last PR did not went too great partly because of mess with
tpm_tisbut now things are calmer.
Glad things have settled down. Whatever you prefer is fine. This
patch set needs to make it into linux-next as soon as possible. Please don't forget to add Nageswara's "Tested-by" and fix mine on 4/6.
Signature · 3 lines
thanks, Mimi
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 6/6] integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys
Quoted 152 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 151 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 147 lines · Nayna Jain
On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform KeyStore (PKS).
Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.
Signed-off-by Nayna Jain <[email protected]>--- certs/system_keyring.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ include/keys/system_keyring.h | 4 +++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 8 +++++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 5 ++++ .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 17 +++++++++++ 5 files changed, 64 insertions(+)certs/system_keyring.c +30
-0@@ -152,6 +152,36 @@ static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void return restriction; } + +/** +* add_to_secondary_keyring - Add to secondary keyring. +* @source: Source of key +* @data: The blob holding the key +* @len: The length of the data blob +* +* Add a key to the secondary keyring. The key must be vouched for by a key in the builtin, +* machine or secondary keyring itself. +*/ +void __init add_to_secondary_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) +{ +key_ref_t key; +key_perm_t perm; + + perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR ) |KEY_USR_VIEW ; + + key =key_create_or_update (make_key_ref (secondary_trusted_keys,1 ), +"asymmetric" , +NULL , data, len, perm, +KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA ); +if (IS_ERR (key)) { +pr_err ("Problem loading X.509 certificate from %s to secondary keyring %ld\n" , + source,PTR_ERR (key)); +return ; + } + +pr_notice ("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n" ,key_ref_to_ptr (key)->description); +key_ref_put (key); +}#endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING void __init set_machine_trusted_keys (struct key *keyring)include/keys/system_keyring.h +4
-0@@ -50,9 +50,13 @@ int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary(struct key *keyring,const struct key_type *type, const union key_payload *payload, struct key *restriction_key); +void __init add_to_secondary_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len);#else #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted#define restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin +static inline void __init add_to_secondary_keyring (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) +{ +}#endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8
-0@@ -78,6 +78,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)return NULL ; } +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ +if (efi_guidcmp (*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) ==0 ) +return add_to_secondary_keyring; + +return NULL ; +} +/* * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables. security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5
-0@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);*/ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* +* Return the handler for particular signature list types for code signing keys. +*/ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); +/* * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx. */ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17
-0@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void) {void *db =NULL , *dbx =NULL , *data =NULL ;void *trustedca; +void *moduledb;u64 dsize =0 ;u64 offset =0 ;int rc =0 ;@@ -137,6 +138,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)kfree (data); } + data =get_cert_list ("moduledb" ,9 , &dsize); +if (!data) { +pr_info ("Couldn't get moduledb list from firmware\n" ); + }else if (IS_ERR (data)) { + rc =PTR_ERR (data); +pr_err ("Error reading moduledb from firmware: %d\n" , rc); + }else { +extract_esl (moduledb, data, dsize, offset); + + rc =parse_efi_signature_list ("powerpc:moduledb" , moduledb, dsize, + get_handler_for_code_signing_keys); +if (rc) +pr_err ("Couldn't parse moduledb signatures: %d\n" , rc); +kfree (data); + } +return rc; }late_initcall (load_powerpc_certs);Signature · 1 line
2.31.1Reviewed-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I can pick this. My last PR did not went too great partly because of mess with
tpm_tisbut now things are calmer.Glad things have settled down. Whatever you prefer is fine. This
patch set needs to make it into linux-next as soon as possible. Please don't forget to add Nageswara's "Tested-by" and fix mine on 4/6.Signature · 3 lines
thanks, Mimi
I'll apply the full (v4) patch set tomorrow after I wake up.
BR, Jarkko