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Enable loading local and third party keys on PowerVM guest

PATCH In review Nayna Jain 4 participants 18 messages Aug 15, 2023 – Aug 16, 2023

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Nayna Jain

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#0 lore raw

v4 cover Enable loading local and third party keys on PowerVM guest

On a secure boot enabled PowerVM guest, local and third party code signing keys are needed to verify signed applications, configuration files, and kernel modules.

Loading these keys onto either the .secondary_trusted_keys or .ima keyrings requires the certificates be signed by keys on the .builtin_trusted_keys, .machine or .secondary_trusted_keys keyrings.

Keys on the .builtin_trusted_keys keyring are trusted because of the chain of trust from secure boot up to and including the linux kernel. Keys on the .machine keyring that derive their trust from an entity such as a security officer, administrator, system owner, or machine owner are said to have "imputed trust." The type of certificates and the mechanism for loading them onto the .machine keyring is platform dependent.

Userspace may load certificates onto the .secondary_trusted_keys or .ima keyrings. However, keys may also need to be loaded by the kernel if they are needed for verification in early boot time. On PowerVM guest, third party code signing keys are loaded from the moduledb variable in the Platform KeyStore(PKS) onto the .secondary_trusted_keys.

The purpose of this patch set is to allow loading of local and third party code signing keys on PowerVM.

Changelog:

v4:

* Fixed build error reported by Nageswara R Sastry <[email protected]>, as part of his testing of patches.
* Included Jarkko's and Mimi's feedback

v3:

* Included Jarkko's feedback for Patch 6/6.

v2:

* Patch 5/6: Update CA restriction to allow only key signing CA's.
* Rebase on Jarkko's master tree - https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
* Tested after reverting cfa7522f280aa95 because of build failure due to
this commit.

Nayna Jain (6):
integrity: PowerVM support for loading CA keys on machine keyring
integrity: ignore keys failing CA restrictions on non-UEFI platform
integrity: remove global variable from machine_keyring.c
integrity: check whether imputed trust is enabled
integrity: PowerVM machine keyring enablement
integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys

 certs/system_keyring.c                        | 30 ++++++++++++++++
 include/keys/system_keyring.h                 |  4 +++
 security/integrity/Kconfig                    |  4 ++-
 security/integrity/digsig.c                   |  2 +-
 security/integrity/integrity.h                |  5 +--
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          | 19 ++++++++++-
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h          | 10 ++++++
 .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c   | 34 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../platform_certs/machine_keyring.c          | 22 +++++++++---
 9 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
author
#1 lore raw

PATCH v4 1/6 integrity: PowerVM support for loading CA keys on machine keyring

Keys that derive their trust from an entity such as a security officer, administrator, system owner, or machine owner are said to have "imputed trust". CA keys with imputed trust can be loaded onto the machine keyring. The mechanism for loading these keys onto the machine keyring is platform dependent.

Load keys stored in the variable trustedcadb onto the .machine keyring on PowerVM platform.

---
 .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c  |  8 ++++++++
 .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h  |  5 +++++
 .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c     | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8 -0
index 8a1124e4d769..1649d047e3b8 100644
@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return add_to_machine_keyring;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /*
  * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
  * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5 -0
index 212d894a8c0c..6f15bb4cc8dc 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
  */
 efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
 
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types for CA keys.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
 /*
  * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
  */
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17 -0
index 170789dc63d2..339053d9726d 100644
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(u8 *key, unsigned long keylen, u64 *size)
 static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 {
 	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *data = NULL;
+	void *trustedca;
 	u64 dsize = 0;
 	u64 offset = 0;
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -120,6 +121,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 		kfree(data);
 	}
 
+	data = get_cert_list("trustedcadb", 12,  &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get trustedcadb list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading trustedcadb from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(trustedca, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:trustedca", trustedca, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_ca_keys);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse trustedcadb signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
 	return rc;
 }
 late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Tested-by on v4 1/6
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 1/6] integrity: PowerVM support for loading CA keys on machine keyring

Quoted 11 lines · Nayna Jain

Keys that derive their trust from an entity such as a security officer, administrator, system owner, or machine owner are said to have "imputed trust". CA keys with imputed trust can be loaded onto the machine keyring. The mechanism for loading these keys onto the machine keyring is platform dependent.

Load keys stored in the variable trustedcadb onto the .machine keyring on PowerVM platform.

Tested with trustedcadb, moduledb scenarios

Quoted 76 lines
---
  .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c  |  8 ++++++++
  .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h  |  5 +++++
  .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c     | 17 +++++++++++++++++
  3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8 -0
index 8a1124e4d769..1649d047e3b8 100644
@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
  	return NULL;
  }
 
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return add_to_machine_keyring;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
  /*
   * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
   * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5 -0
index 212d894a8c0c..6f15bb4cc8dc 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
   */
  efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
 
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types for CA keys.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
  /*
   * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
   */
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17 -0
index 170789dc63d2..339053d9726d 100644
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(u8 *key, unsigned long keylen, u64 *size)
  static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
  {
  	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *data = NULL;
+	void *trustedca;
  	u64 dsize = 0;
  	u64 offset = 0;
  	int rc = 0;
@@ -120,6 +121,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
  		kfree(data);
  	}
 
+	data = get_cert_list("trustedcadb", 12,  &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get trustedcadb list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading trustedcadb from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(trustedca, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:trustedca", trustedca, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_ca_keys);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse trustedcadb signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
  	return rc;
  }
  late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks and Regards
R.Nageswara Sastry
maintainer Reviewed-by on v4 1/6
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 1/6] integrity: PowerVM support for loading CA keys on machine keyring

In reply to Nayna Jain
Quoted 89 lines · Nayna Jain

Keys that derive their trust from an entity such as a security officer, administrator, system owner, or machine owner are said to have "imputed trust". CA keys with imputed trust can be loaded onto the machine keyring. The mechanism for loading these keys onto the machine keyring is platform dependent.

Load keys stored in the variable trustedcadb onto the .machine keyring on PowerVM platform.

---
 .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c  |  8 ++++++++
 .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h  |  5 +++++
 .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c     | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8 -0
index 8a1124e4d769..1649d047e3b8 100644
@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return add_to_machine_keyring;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /*
  * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
  * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5 -0
index 212d894a8c0c..6f15bb4cc8dc 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
  */
 efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
 
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types for CA keys.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
 /*
  * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
  */
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17 -0
index 170789dc63d2..339053d9726d 100644
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(u8 *key, unsigned long keylen, u64 *size)
 static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 {
 	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *data = NULL;
+	void *trustedca;
 	u64 dsize = 0;
 	u64 offset = 0;
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -120,6 +121,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 		kfree(data);
 	}
 
+	data = get_cert_list("trustedcadb", 12,  &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get trustedcadb list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading trustedcadb from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(trustedca, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:trustedca", trustedca, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_ca_keys);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse trustedcadb signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
 	return rc;
 }
 late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1

BR, Jarkko

author
#4 lore raw

PATCH v4 2/6 integrity: ignore keys failing CA restrictions on non-UEFI platform

In reply to Nayna Jain

On non-UEFI platforms, handle restrict_link_by_ca failures differently.

Certificates which do not satisfy CA restrictions on non-UEFI platforms are ignored.

---
 security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c +1 -1
index 7aaed7950b6e..389a6e7c9245 100644
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t
 	 * If the restriction check does not pass and the platform keyring
 	 * is configured, try to add it into that keyring instead.
 	 */
-	if (rc && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING))
+	if (rc && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING))
 		rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, source,
 					 data, len, perm);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Tested-by on v4 2/6
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 2/6] integrity: ignore keys failing CA restrictions on non-UEFI platform

Quoted 8 lines · Nayna Jain

On non-UEFI platforms, handle restrict_link_by_ca failures differently.

Certificates which do not satisfy CA restrictions on non-UEFI platforms are ignored.

Tested with trustedcadb, moduledb scenarios

Quoted 17 lines
---
  security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c +1 -1
index 7aaed7950b6e..389a6e7c9245 100644
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t
  	 * If the restriction check does not pass and the platform keyring
  	 * is configured, try to add it into that keyring instead.
  	 */
-	if (rc && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING))
+	if (rc && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING))
  		rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, source,
  					 data, len, perm);
 
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks and Regards
R.Nageswara Sastry
author
#6 lore raw

PATCH v4 3/6 integrity: remove global variable from machine_keyring.c

In reply to Nayna Jain

trust_mok variable is accessed within a single function locally.

Change trust_mok from global to local static variable.

---
 security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c +2 -2
index 389a6e7c9245..9482e16cb2ca 100644
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@
 #include <linux/efi.h>
 #include "../integrity.h"
 
-static bool trust_mok;
-
 static __init int machine_keyring_init(void)
 {
 	int rc;
@@ -65,9 +63,11 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void)
 bool __init trust_moklist(void)
 {
 	static bool initialized;
+	static bool trust_mok;
 
 	if (!initialized) {
 		initialized = true;
+		trust_mok = false;
 
 		if (uefi_check_trust_mok_keys())
 			trust_mok = true;
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Tested-by on v4 3/6
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 3/6] integrity: remove global variable from machine_keyring.c

Quoted 7 lines · Nayna Jain

trust_mok variable is accessed within a single function locally.

Change trust_mok from global to local static variable.

Tested with trustedcadb, moduledb scenarios

Quoted 29 lines
---
  security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c | 4 ++--
  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c +2 -2
index 389a6e7c9245..9482e16cb2ca 100644
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@
  #include <linux/efi.h>
  #include "../integrity.h"
 
-static bool trust_mok;
-
  static __init int machine_keyring_init(void)
  {
  	int rc;
@@ -65,9 +63,11 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void)
  bool __init trust_moklist(void)
  {
  	static bool initialized;
+	static bool trust_mok;
 
  	if (!initialized) {
  		initialized = true;
+		trust_mok = false;
 
  		if (uefi_check_trust_mok_keys())
  			trust_mok = true;
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks and Regards
R.Nageswara Sastry
author
#8 lore raw

PATCH v4 4/6 integrity: check whether imputed trust is enabled

In reply to Nayna Jain

trust_moklist() is specific to UEFI enabled systems. Other platforms rely only on the Kconfig.

Define a generic wrapper named imputed_trust_enabled().

---
 security/integrity/digsig.c                    |  2 +-
 security/integrity/integrity.h                 |  5 +++--
 .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c |  3 ++-
 .../integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
security/integrity/digsig.c +1 -1
index d0704b1597d4..df387de29bfa 100644
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id,
 	} else {
 		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM)
 			set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
-		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE && trust_moklist())
+		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE && imputed_trust_enabled())
 			set_machine_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
 		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA)
 			load_module_cert(keyring[id]);
security/integrity/integrity.h +3 -2
index 7167a6e99bdc..d7553c93f5c0 100644
@@ -320,13 +320,14 @@ static inline void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
 void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
-bool __init trust_moklist(void);
+bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void);
 #else
 static inline void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source,
 						  const void *data, size_t len)
 {
 }
-static inline bool __init trust_moklist(void)
+
+static inline bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void)
 {
 	return false;
 }
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +2 -1
index 1649d047e3b8..586027b9a3f5 100644
@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 {
 	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) {
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) && trust_moklist())
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) &&
+		    imputed_trust_enabled())
 			return add_to_machine_keyring;
 		else
 			return add_to_platform_keyring;
security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c +16 -2
index 9482e16cb2ca..a401640a63cd 100644
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t
 	 * If the restriction check does not pass and the platform keyring
 	 * is configured, try to add it into that keyring instead.
 	 */
-	if (rc && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING))
+	if (rc && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) &&
+	    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING))
 		rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, source,
 					 data, len, perm);
 
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void)
 	return false;
 }
 
-bool __init trust_moklist(void)
+static bool __init trust_moklist(void)
 {
 	static bool initialized;
 	static bool trust_mok;
@@ -75,3 +76,16 @@ bool __init trust_moklist(void)
 
 	return trust_mok;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Provides platform specific check for trusting imputed keys before loading
+ * on .machine keyring. UEFI systems enable this trust based on a variable,
+ * and for other platforms, it is always enabled.
+ */
+bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void)
+{
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
+		return trust_moklist();
+
+	return true;
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Tested-by on v4 4/6
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 4/6] integrity: check whether imputed trust is enabled

Quoted 7 lines · Nayna Jain

trust_moklist() is specific to UEFI enabled systems. Other platforms rely only on the Kconfig.

Define a generic wrapper named imputed_trust_enabled().

Tested with trustedcadb, moduledb scenarios

Quoted 95 lines
---
  security/integrity/digsig.c                    |  2 +-
  security/integrity/integrity.h                 |  5 +++--
  .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c |  3 ++-
  .../integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
  4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
security/integrity/digsig.c +1 -1
index d0704b1597d4..df387de29bfa 100644
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id,
  	} else {
  		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM)
  			set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
-		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE && trust_moklist())
+		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE && imputed_trust_enabled())
  			set_machine_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
  		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA)
  			load_module_cert(keyring[id]);
security/integrity/integrity.h +3 -2
index 7167a6e99bdc..d7553c93f5c0 100644
@@ -320,13 +320,14 @@ static inline void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source,
 
  #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
  void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
-bool __init trust_moklist(void);
+bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void);
  #else
  static inline void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source,
  						  const void *data, size_t len)
  {
  }
-static inline bool __init trust_moklist(void)
+
+static inline bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void)
  {
  	return false;
  }
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +2 -1
index 1649d047e3b8..586027b9a3f5 100644
@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
  __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
  {
  	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) {
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) && trust_moklist())
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) &&
+		    imputed_trust_enabled())
  			return add_to_machine_keyring;
  		else
  			return add_to_platform_keyring;
security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c +16 -2
index 9482e16cb2ca..a401640a63cd 100644
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t
  	 * If the restriction check does not pass and the platform keyring
  	 * is configured, try to add it into that keyring instead.
  	 */
-	if (rc && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING))
+	if (rc && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) &&
+	    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING))
  		rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, source,
  					 data, len, perm);
 
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void)
  	return false;
  }
 
-bool __init trust_moklist(void)
+static bool __init trust_moklist(void)
  {
  	static bool initialized;
  	static bool trust_mok;
@@ -75,3 +76,16 @@ bool __init trust_moklist(void)
 
  	return trust_mok;
  }
+
+/*
+ * Provides platform specific check for trusting imputed keys before loading
+ * on .machine keyring. UEFI systems enable this trust based on a variable,
+ * and for other platforms, it is always enabled.
+ */
+bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void)
+{
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
+		return trust_moklist();
+
+	return true;
+}
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks and Regards
R.Nageswara Sastry
author
#10 lore raw

PATCH v4 5/6 integrity: PowerVM machine keyring enablement

In reply to Nayna Jain

Update Kconfig to enable machine keyring and limit to CA certificates on PowerVM. Only key signing CA keys are allowed.

---
 security/integrity/Kconfig | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/Kconfig +3 -1
index ec6e0d789da1..232191ee09e3 100644
@@ -67,7 +67,9 @@ config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
 	depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
 	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
-	depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
+	depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS || LOAD_PPC_KEYS
+	select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING if LOAD_PPC_KEYS
+	select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX if LOAD_PPC_KEYS
 	help
 	 If set, provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may
 	 be added. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys.  Unlike keys
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Tested-by on v4 5/6
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 5/6] integrity: PowerVM machine keyring enablement

Quoted 6 lines · Nayna Jain

Update Kconfig to enable machine keyring and limit to CA certificates on PowerVM. Only key signing CA keys are allowed.

Tested with trustedcadb, moduledb scenarios

Quoted 19 lines
---
  security/integrity/Kconfig | 4 +++-
  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/Kconfig +3 -1
index ec6e0d789da1..232191ee09e3 100644
@@ -67,7 +67,9 @@ config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
  	depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
  	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
  	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
-	depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
+	depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS || LOAD_PPC_KEYS
+	select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING if LOAD_PPC_KEYS
+	select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX if LOAD_PPC_KEYS
  	help
  	 If set, provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may
  	 be added. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys.  Unlike keys
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks and Regards
R.Nageswara Sastry
author
#12 lore raw

PATCH v4 6/6 integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys

In reply to Nayna Jain

On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform KeyStore (PKS).

Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.

---
 certs/system_keyring.c                        | 30 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/keys/system_keyring.h                 |  4 +++
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          |  8 +++++
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h          |  5 ++++
 .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c   | 17 +++++++++++
 5 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
certs/system_keyring.c +30 -0
index b348e0898d34..33841c91f12c 100644
@@ -152,6 +152,36 @@ static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void
 
 	return restriction;
 }
+
+/**
+ * add_to_secondary_keyring - Add to secondary keyring.
+ * @source: Source of key
+ * @data: The blob holding the key
+ * @len: The length of the data blob
+ *
+ * Add a key to the secondary keyring. The key must be vouched for by a key in the builtin,
+ * machine or secondary keyring itself.
+ */
+void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	key_perm_t perm;
+
+	perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW;
+
+	key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(secondary_trusted_keys, 1),
+				   "asymmetric",
+				   NULL, data, len, perm,
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate from %s to secondary keyring %ld\n",
+		       source, PTR_ERR(key));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n", key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+	key_ref_put(key);
+}
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
 void __init set_machine_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
include/keys/system_keyring.h +4 -0
index 7e2583208820..8365adf842ef 100644
@@ -50,9 +50,13 @@ int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary(struct key *keyring,
 						  const struct key_type *type,
 						  const union key_payload *payload,
 						  struct key *restriction_key);
+void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
 #else
 #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
 #define restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin
+static inline void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8 -0
index 586027b9a3f5..13ea17207902 100644
@@ -78,6 +78,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return add_to_secondary_keyring;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /*
  * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
  * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5 -0
index 6f15bb4cc8dc..f92895cc50f6 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
  */
 efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
 
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types for code signing keys.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
 /*
  * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
  */
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17 -0
index 339053d9726d..c85febca3343 100644
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 {
 	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *data = NULL;
 	void *trustedca;
+	void *moduledb;
 	u64 dsize = 0;
 	u64 offset = 0;
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -137,6 +138,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 		kfree(data);
 	}
 
+	data = get_cert_list("moduledb", 9,  &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get moduledb list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading moduledb from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(moduledb, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:moduledb", moduledb, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_code_signing_keys);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse moduledb signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
 	return rc;
 }
 late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
maintainer
#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys

Quoted 8 lines · Nayna Jain

On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform KeyStore (PKS).

Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.

Reviewed-and-tested-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Tested-by on v4 6/6
#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys

In reply to Nayna Jain
Quoted 8 lines · Nayna Jain

On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform KeyStore (PKS).

Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.

Tested with trustedcadb, moduledb scenarios

Quoted 137 lines
---
  certs/system_keyring.c                        | 30 +++++++++++++++++++
  include/keys/system_keyring.h                 |  4 +++
  .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          |  8 +++++
  .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h          |  5 ++++
  .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c   | 17 +++++++++++
  5 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
certs/system_keyring.c +30 -0
index b348e0898d34..33841c91f12c 100644
@@ -152,6 +152,36 @@ static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void
 
  	return restriction;
  }
+
+/**
+ * add_to_secondary_keyring - Add to secondary keyring.
+ * @source: Source of key
+ * @data: The blob holding the key
+ * @len: The length of the data blob
+ *
+ * Add a key to the secondary keyring. The key must be vouched for by a key in the builtin,
+ * machine or secondary keyring itself.
+ */
+void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	key_perm_t perm;
+
+	perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW;
+
+	key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(secondary_trusted_keys, 1),
+				   "asymmetric",
+				   NULL, data, len, perm,
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate from %s to secondary keyring %ld\n",
+		       source, PTR_ERR(key));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n", key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+	key_ref_put(key);
+}
  #endif
  #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
  void __init set_machine_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
include/keys/system_keyring.h +4 -0
index 7e2583208820..8365adf842ef 100644
@@ -50,9 +50,13 @@ int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary(struct key *keyring,
  						  const struct key_type *type,
  						  const union key_payload *payload,
  						  struct key *restriction_key);
+void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
  #else
  #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
  #define restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin
+static inline void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+}
  #endif
 
  #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8 -0
index 586027b9a3f5..13ea17207902 100644
@@ -78,6 +78,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
  	return NULL;
  }
 
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return add_to_secondary_keyring;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
  /*
   * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
   * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5 -0
index 6f15bb4cc8dc..f92895cc50f6 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
   */
  efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
 
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types for code signing keys.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
  /*
   * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
   */
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17 -0
index 339053d9726d..c85febca3343 100644
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
  {
  	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *data = NULL;
  	void *trustedca;
+	void *moduledb;
  	u64 dsize = 0;
  	u64 offset = 0;
  	int rc = 0;
@@ -137,6 +138,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
  		kfree(data);
  	}
 
+	data = get_cert_list("moduledb", 9,  &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get moduledb list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading moduledb from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(moduledb, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:moduledb", moduledb, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_code_signing_keys);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse moduledb signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
  	return rc;
  }
  late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks and Regards
R.Nageswara Sastry
maintainer Reviewed-by on v4 6/6
#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys

In reply to Nayna Jain
Quoted 147 lines · Nayna Jain

On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform KeyStore (PKS).

Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.

---
 certs/system_keyring.c                        | 30 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/keys/system_keyring.h                 |  4 +++
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          |  8 +++++
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h          |  5 ++++
 .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c   | 17 +++++++++++
 5 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
certs/system_keyring.c +30 -0
index b348e0898d34..33841c91f12c 100644
@@ -152,6 +152,36 @@ static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void
 
 	return restriction;
 }
+
+/**
+ * add_to_secondary_keyring - Add to secondary keyring.
+ * @source: Source of key
+ * @data: The blob holding the key
+ * @len: The length of the data blob
+ *
+ * Add a key to the secondary keyring. The key must be vouched for by a key in the builtin,
+ * machine or secondary keyring itself.
+ */
+void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	key_perm_t perm;
+
+	perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW;
+
+	key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(secondary_trusted_keys, 1),
+				   "asymmetric",
+				   NULL, data, len, perm,
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate from %s to secondary keyring %ld\n",
+		       source, PTR_ERR(key));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n", key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+	key_ref_put(key);
+}
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
 void __init set_machine_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
include/keys/system_keyring.h +4 -0
index 7e2583208820..8365adf842ef 100644
@@ -50,9 +50,13 @@ int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary(struct key *keyring,
 						  const struct key_type *type,
 						  const union key_payload *payload,
 						  struct key *restriction_key);
+void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
 #else
 #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
 #define restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin
+static inline void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8 -0
index 586027b9a3f5..13ea17207902 100644
@@ -78,6 +78,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return add_to_secondary_keyring;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /*
  * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
  * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5 -0
index 6f15bb4cc8dc..f92895cc50f6 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
  */
 efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
 
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types for code signing keys.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
 /*
  * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
  */
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17 -0
index 339053d9726d..c85febca3343 100644
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 {
 	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *data = NULL;
 	void *trustedca;
+	void *moduledb;
 	u64 dsize = 0;
 	u64 offset = 0;
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -137,6 +138,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 		kfree(data);
 	}
 
+	data = get_cert_list("moduledb", 9,  &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get moduledb list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading moduledb from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(moduledb, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:moduledb", moduledb, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_code_signing_keys);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse moduledb signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
 	return rc;
 }
 late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1

I can pick this. My last PR did not went too great partly because of mess with tpm_tis but now things are calmer.

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys

Quoted 151 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 147 lines · Nayna Jain

On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform KeyStore (PKS).

Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.

---
 certs/system_keyring.c                        | 30 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/keys/system_keyring.h                 |  4 +++
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          |  8 +++++
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h          |  5 ++++
 .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c   | 17 +++++++++++
 5 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
certs/system_keyring.c +30 -0
index b348e0898d34..33841c91f12c 100644
@@ -152,6 +152,36 @@ static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void
 
 	return restriction;
 }
+
+/**
+ * add_to_secondary_keyring - Add to secondary keyring.
+ * @source: Source of key
+ * @data: The blob holding the key
+ * @len: The length of the data blob
+ *
+ * Add a key to the secondary keyring. The key must be vouched for by a key in the builtin,
+ * machine or secondary keyring itself.
+ */
+void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	key_perm_t perm;
+
+	perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW;
+
+	key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(secondary_trusted_keys, 1),
+				   "asymmetric",
+				   NULL, data, len, perm,
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate from %s to secondary keyring %ld\n",
+		       source, PTR_ERR(key));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n", key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+	key_ref_put(key);
+}
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
 void __init set_machine_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
include/keys/system_keyring.h +4 -0
index 7e2583208820..8365adf842ef 100644
@@ -50,9 +50,13 @@ int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary(struct key *keyring,
 						  const struct key_type *type,
 						  const union key_payload *payload,
 						  struct key *restriction_key);
+void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
 #else
 #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
 #define restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin
+static inline void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8 -0
index 586027b9a3f5..13ea17207902 100644
@@ -78,6 +78,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return add_to_secondary_keyring;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /*
  * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
  * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5 -0
index 6f15bb4cc8dc..f92895cc50f6 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
  */
 efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
 
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types for code signing keys.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
 /*
  * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
  */
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17 -0
index 339053d9726d..c85febca3343 100644
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 {
 	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *data = NULL;
 	void *trustedca;
+	void *moduledb;
 	u64 dsize = 0;
 	u64 offset = 0;
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -137,6 +138,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 		kfree(data);
 	}
 
+	data = get_cert_list("moduledb", 9,  &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get moduledb list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading moduledb from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(moduledb, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:moduledb", moduledb, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_code_signing_keys);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse moduledb signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
 	return rc;
 }
 late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Quoted 2 lines

I can pick this. My last PR did not went too great partly because of mess with tpm_tis but now things are calmer.

Glad things have settled down. Whatever you prefer is fine. This
patch set needs to make it into linux-next as soon as possible. Please don't forget to add Nageswara's "Tested-by" and fix mine on 4/6.

Signature · 3 lines
thanks,

Mimi
maintainer
#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys

Quoted 152 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 151 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 147 lines · Nayna Jain

On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform KeyStore (PKS).

Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.

---
 certs/system_keyring.c                        | 30 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/keys/system_keyring.h                 |  4 +++
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          |  8 +++++
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h          |  5 ++++
 .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c   | 17 +++++++++++
 5 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
certs/system_keyring.c +30 -0
index b348e0898d34..33841c91f12c 100644
@@ -152,6 +152,36 @@ static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void
 
 	return restriction;
 }
+
+/**
+ * add_to_secondary_keyring - Add to secondary keyring.
+ * @source: Source of key
+ * @data: The blob holding the key
+ * @len: The length of the data blob
+ *
+ * Add a key to the secondary keyring. The key must be vouched for by a key in the builtin,
+ * machine or secondary keyring itself.
+ */
+void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	key_perm_t perm;
+
+	perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW;
+
+	key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(secondary_trusted_keys, 1),
+				   "asymmetric",
+				   NULL, data, len, perm,
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate from %s to secondary keyring %ld\n",
+		       source, PTR_ERR(key));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n", key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+	key_ref_put(key);
+}
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
 void __init set_machine_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
include/keys/system_keyring.h +4 -0
index 7e2583208820..8365adf842ef 100644
@@ -50,9 +50,13 @@ int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary(struct key *keyring,
 						  const struct key_type *type,
 						  const union key_payload *payload,
 						  struct key *restriction_key);
+void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
 #else
 #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
 #define restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin
+static inline void __init add_to_secondary_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +8 -0
index 586027b9a3f5..13ea17207902 100644
@@ -78,6 +78,14 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return add_to_secondary_keyring;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /*
  * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
  * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +5 -0
index 6f15bb4cc8dc..f92895cc50f6 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
  */
 efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
 
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types for code signing keys.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
 /*
  * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
  */
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +17 -0
index 339053d9726d..c85febca3343 100644
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 {
 	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *data = NULL;
 	void *trustedca;
+	void *moduledb;
 	u64 dsize = 0;
 	u64 offset = 0;
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -137,6 +138,22 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 		kfree(data);
 	}
 
+	data = get_cert_list("moduledb", 9,  &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get moduledb list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading moduledb from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(moduledb, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:moduledb", moduledb, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_code_signing_keys);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse moduledb signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
 	return rc;
 }
 late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 2 lines

I can pick this. My last PR did not went too great partly because of mess with tpm_tis but now things are calmer.

Glad things have settled down. Whatever you prefer is fine. This
patch set needs to make it into linux-next as soon as possible. Please don't forget to add Nageswara's "Tested-by" and fix mine on 4/6.

Signature · 3 lines
thanks,

Mimi

I'll apply the full (v4) patch set tomorrow after I wake up.

BR, Jarkko