bpf: File verification with LSM and fsverity
Subsystems (9)
Song Liu
maintainerv5 cover bpf: File verification with LSM and fsverity
Changes v4 => v5:
1. Revise commit logs. (Alexei)
Changes v3 => v4:
1. Fix error reported by CI.
2. Update comments of bpf_dynptr_slice* that they may return error pointer.
Changes v2 => v3:
1. Rebase and resolve conflicts.
Changes v1 => v2:
1. Let bpf_get_file_xattr() use const string for arg "name". (Alexei)
2. Add recursion prevention with allowlist. (Alexei)
3. Let bpf_get_file_xattr() use __vfs_getxattr() to avoid recursion, as vfs_getxattr() calls into other LSM hooks.
4. Do not use dynptr->data directly, use helper insteadd. (Andrii)
5. Fixes with bpf_get_fsverity_digest. (Eric Biggers)
6. Add documentation. (Eric Biggers)
7. Fix some compile warnings. (kernel test robot)
This set enables file verification with BPF LSM and fsverity.
In this solution, fsverity is used to provide reliable and efficient hash of files; and BPF LSM is used to implement signature verification (against asymmetric keys), and to enforce access control.
This solution can be used to implement access control in complicated cases. For example: only signed python binary and signed python script and access special files/devices/ports.
Thanks,
Song
Song Liu (9):
bpf: Expose bpf_dynptr_slice* kfuncs for in kernel use
bpf: Factor out helper check_reg_const_str()
bpf: Introduce KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR
bpf: Add kfunc bpf_get_file_xattr
bpf, fsverity: Add kfunc bpf_get_fsverity_digest Documentation/bpf: Add documentation for filesystem kfuncs selftests/bpf: Sort config in alphabetic order selftests/bpf: Add tests for filesystem kfuncs selftests/bpf: Add test that uses fsverity and xattr to sign a file
Documentation/bpf/fs_kfuncs.rst | 21 +++ Documentation/bpf/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst | 24 +++ fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 10 ++ fs/verity/init.c | 1 + fs/verity/measure.c | 85 +++++++++ include/linux/bpf.h | 4 + kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 16 +- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 104 +++++++---- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 74 +++++++- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h | 10 ++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config | 3 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c | 132 ++++++++++++++ .../bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c | 163 +++++++++++++++++- .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_fsverity.c | 46 +++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_xattr.c | 37 ++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c | 82 +++++++++ .../bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c | 8 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh | 25 +++ 19 files changed, 789 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/bpf/fs_kfuncs.rst create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_fsverity.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_xattr.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c
--
2.34.1
Song Liu
maintainerPATCH v5 1/9 bpf: Expose bpf_dynptr_slice* kfuncs for in kernel use
kfuncs bpf_dynptr_slice and bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr are used by BPF programs to access the dynptr data. They are also useful for in kernel functions that access dynptr data, for example, bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature.
Add bpf_dynptr_slice and bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr to bpf.h so that kernel functions can use them instead of accessing dynptr->data directly.
Update bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature to use bpf_dynptr_slice instead of dynptr->data.
Also, update the comments for bpf_dynptr_slice and bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr that they may return error pointers for BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP.
--- include/linux/bpf.h | 4 ++++ kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 16 ++++++++-------- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 15 +++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf.h +4 -0
@@ -1222,6 +1222,10 @@ enum bpf_dynptr_type {int bpf_dynptr_check_size (u32 size);u32 __bpf_dynptr_size (const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr); +void *bpf_dynptr_slice (const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr,u32 offset, +void *buffer__opt,u32 buffer__szk); +void *bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr (const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr,u32 offset, +void *buffer__opt,u32 buffer__szk);#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT int bpf_trampoline_link_prog (struct bpf_tramp_link *link,struct bpf_trampoline *tr);
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +8 -8
@@ -2270,10 +2270,10 @@ __bpf_kfunc struct task_struct *bpf_task_from_pid(s32 pid)* bpf_dynptr_slice will not invalidate any ctx->data/data_end pointers in * the bpf program. * -* Return: NULL if the call failed (eg invalid dynptr), pointer to a read-only -* data slice (can be either direct pointer to the data or a pointer to the user -* provided buffer, with its contents containing the data, if unable to obtain -* direct pointer) +* Return: NULL or error pointer if the call failed (eg invalid dynptr), pointer +* to a read-only data slice (can be either direct pointer to the data or a +* pointer to the user provided buffer, with its contents containing the data, +* if unable to obtain direct pointer) */ __bpf_kfunc void *bpf_dynptr_slice(const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, u32 offset,void *buffer__opt,u32 buffer__szk)
@@ -2354,10 +2354,10 @@ __bpf_kfunc void *bpf_dynptr_slice(const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, u32 offset* bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr will not invalidate any ctx->data/data_end pointers in * the bpf program. * -* Return: NULL if the call failed (eg invalid dynptr), pointer to a -* data slice (can be either direct pointer to the data or a pointer to the user -* provided buffer, with its contents containing the data, if unable to obtain -* direct pointer) +* Return: NULL or error pointer if the call failed (eg invalid dynptr), pointer +* to a data slice (can be either direct pointer to the data or a pointer to the +* user provided buffer, with its contents containing the data, if unable to +* obtain direct pointer) */ __bpf_kfunc void *bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr(const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, u32 offset,void *buffer__opt,u32 buffer__szk)
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +11 -4
@@ -1378,6 +1378,7 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *data_ptr,struct bpf_dynptr_kern *sig_ptr, struct bpf_key *trusted_keyring) { + void *data, *sig;int ret;if (trusted_keyring->has_ref) {
@@ -1394,10 +1395,16 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *data_ptr,return ret; } -return verify_pkcs7_signature (data_ptr->data, -__bpf_dynptr_size (data_ptr), - sig_ptr->data, -__bpf_dynptr_size (sig_ptr), + data =bpf_dynptr_slice (data_ptr,0 ,NULL ,0 ); +if (IS_ERR (data)) +return PTR_ERR (data); + + sig =bpf_dynptr_slice (sig_ptr,0 ,NULL ,0 ); +if (IS_ERR (sig)) +return PTR_ERR (sig); + +return verify_pkcs7_signature (data,__bpf_dynptr_size (data_ptr), + sig,__bpf_dynptr_size (sig_ptr), trusted_keyring->key,VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE ,NULL ,NULL );
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Song Liu
maintainerPATCH v5 2/9 bpf: Factor out helper check_reg_const_str()
In reply to Song LiuARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR is used to specify constant string args for BPF helpers. The logic that verifies a reg is ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR is implemented in check_func_arg().
As we introduce kfuncs with constant string args, it is necessary to do the same check for kfuncs (in check_kfunc_args). Factor out the logic for ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR to a new check_reg_const_str() so that it can be reused.
check_func_arg() ensures check_reg_const_str() is only called with reg of type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. Add a redundent type check in check_reg_const_str() to avoid misuse in the future. Other than this redundent check, there is no change in behavior.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +49 -36
@@ -8265,6 +8265,54 @@ static enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_get_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type; } +static int check_reg_const_str (struct bpf_verifier_env *env, +struct bpf_reg_state *reg,u32 regno) +{ +struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; +int err; +int map_off; +u64 map_addr; +char *str_ptr; + +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (reg->type !=PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE )) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly (map)) { +verbose (env,"R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n" , regno); +return -EACCES ; + } + +if (!tnum_is_const (reg->var_off)) { +verbose (env,"R%d is not a constant address'\n" , regno); +return -EACCES ; + } + +if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { +verbose (env,"no direct value access support for this map type\n" ); +return -EACCES ; + } + + err =check_map_access (env, regno, reg->off, + map->value_size - reg->off, false, +ACCESS_HELPER ); +if (err) +return err; + + map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; + err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr (map, &map_addr, map_off); +if (err) { +verbose (env,"direct value access on string failed\n" ); +return err; + } + + str_ptr = (char *)(long )(map_addr); +if (!strnchr (str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off,0 )) { +verbose (env,"string is not zero-terminated\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } +return 0 ; +} + static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, const struct bpf_func_proto *fn,
@@ -8509,44 +8557,9 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, }case ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR : { -struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; -int map_off; -u64 map_addr; -char *str_ptr; - -if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly (map)) { -verbose (env,"R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n" , regno); -return -EACCES ; - } - -if (!tnum_is_const (reg->var_off)) { -verbose (env,"R%d is not a constant address'\n" , regno); -return -EACCES ; - } - -if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { -verbose (env,"no direct value access support for this map type\n" ); -return -EACCES ; - } - - err =check_map_access (env, regno, reg->off, - map->value_size - reg->off, false, -ACCESS_HELPER ); + err =check_reg_const_str (env, reg, regno);if (err)return err; - - map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; - err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr (map, &map_addr, map_off); -if (err) { -verbose (env,"direct value access on string failed\n" ); -return err; - } - - str_ptr = (char *)(long )(map_addr); -if (!strnchr (str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off,0 )) { -verbose (env,"string is not zero-terminated\n" ); -return -EINVAL ; - }break ; }case ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR :
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Song Liu
maintainerPATCH v5 3/9 bpf: Introduce KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR
In reply to Song LiuSimilar to ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR for BPF helpers, KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR specifies kfunc args that point to const strings. Annotation "__const_str" is used to specify kfunc arg of type KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR. Also, add documentation for the "__const_str" annotation.
bpf_get_file_xattr() will be the first kfunc that uses this type.
--- Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst +24 -0
@@ -137,6 +137,30 @@ Either way, the returned buffer is either NULL, or of size buffer_szk. Without t annotation, the verifier will reject the program if a null pointer is passed in with a nonzero size. +2.2.5 __const_str Annotation +---------------------------- +This annotation is used to indicate that the argument is a constant string. + +An example is given below:: + + __bpf_kfunc bpf_get_file_xattr(..., const char *name__const_str, ...) + { + ... + } + +In this case, ``bpf_get_file_xattr()`` can be called as:: + + bpf_get_file_xattr(..., "xattr_name", ...); + +Or:: + + const char name[] = "xattr_name"; /* This need to be global */ + int BPF_PROG(...) + { + ... + bpf_get_file_xattr(..., name, ...); + ... + } .. _BPF_kfunc_nodef:
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +19 -0
@@ -10350,6 +10350,11 @@ static bool is_kfunc_arg_nullable(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_paramreturn __kfunc_param_match_suffix (btf, arg,"__nullable" ); } +static bool is_kfunc_arg_const_str (const struct btf *btf,const struct btf_param *arg) +{ +return __kfunc_param_match_suffix (btf, arg,"__const_str" ); +} +static bool is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name (const struct btf *btf,const struct btf_param *arg,const char *name)
@@ -10493,6 +10498,7 @@ enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type {KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT ,KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE ,KF_ARG_PTR_TO_NULL , + KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR, }; enum special_kfunc_type {
@@ -10637,6 +10643,9 @@ get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node (meta->btf, &args[argno]))return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE ; +if (is_kfunc_arg_const_str (meta->btf, &args[argno])) +return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR ; +if ((base_type (reg->type) ==PTR_TO_BTF_ID || reg2btf_ids[base_type (reg->type)])) {if (!btf_type_is_struct (ref_t)) { verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d pointer type %s %s is not supported\n",
@@ -11260,6 +11269,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE :case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK :case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR : +case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR :/* Trusted by default */ break ;default :
@@ -11531,6 +11541,15 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id;break ; +case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR : +if (reg->type !=PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ) { +verbose (env,"arg#%d doesn't point to a const string\n" , i); +return -EINVAL ; + } + ret =check_reg_const_str (env, reg, regno); +if (ret) +return ret; +break ; } }
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Song Liu
maintainerPATCH v5 4/9 bpf: Add kfunc bpf_get_file_xattr
In reply to Song LiuIt is common practice for security solutions to store tags/labels in xattrs. To implement similar functionalities in BPF LSM, add new kfunc bpf_get_file_xattr().
To avoid recursion, bpf_get_file_xattr can be only called from LSM hooks.
--- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+)
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +59 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@#include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/verification.h> #include <linux/namei.h> +#include <linux/fileattr.h> #include <net/bpf_sk_storage.h>
@@ -1436,6 +1437,64 @@ static int __init bpf_key_sig_kfuncs_init(void)late_initcall (bpf_key_sig_kfuncs_init);#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ +/* filesystem kfuncs */ +__diag_push (); +__diag_ignore_all ("-Wmissing-prototypes" , +"kfuncs which will be used in BPF programs" ); + +/** +* bpf_get_file_xattr - get xattr of a file +* @file: file to get xattr from +* @name__const_str: name of the xattr +* @value_ptr: output buffer of the xattr value +* +* Get xattr *name__const_str* of *file* and store the output in *value_ptr*. +* +* Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error. +*/ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name__const_str, +struct bpf_dynptr_kern *value_ptr) +{ +struct dentry *dentry; +void *value; + + value =bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr (value_ptr,0 ,NULL ,0 ); +if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL (value)) +return PTR_ERR (value); + + dentry =file_dentry (file); +return __vfs_getxattr (dentry, dentry->d_inode, name__const_str, + value,__bpf_dynptr_size (value_ptr)); +} + +__diag_pop (); + +BTF_SET8_START (fs_kfunc_set_ids) +BTF_ID_FLAGS (func ,bpf_get_file_xattr ,KF_SLEEPABLE ) +BTF_SET8_END (fs_kfunc_set_ids) + +static int bpf_get_file_xattr_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id) +{ +if (!btf_id_set8_contains (&fs_kfunc_set_ids, kfunc_id)) +return 0 ; + +/* Only allow to attach from LSM hooks, to avoid recursion */ +return prog->type !=BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM ? -EACCES :0 ; +} + +const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_fs_kfunc_set = { + .owner =THIS_MODULE , + .set = &fs_kfunc_set_ids, + .filter = bpf_get_file_xattr_filter, +}; + +static int __init bpf_fs_kfuncs_init (void ) +{ +return register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM , &bpf_fs_kfunc_set); +} + +late_initcall (bpf_fs_kfuncs_init); +static const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_tracing_func_proto (enum bpf_func_id func_id,const struct bpf_prog *prog) {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Song Liu
maintainerPATCH v5 5/9 bpf, fsverity: Add kfunc bpf_get_fsverity_digest
In reply to Song Liufsverity provides fast and reliable hash of files, namely fsverity_digest. The digest can be used by security solutions to verify file contents.
Add new kfunc bpf_get_fsverity_digest() so that we can access fsverity from BPF LSM programs. This kfunc is added to fs/verity/measure.c because some data structure used in the function is private to fsverity (fs/verity/fsverity_private.h).
To avoid recursion, bpf_get_fsverity_digest is only allowed in BPF LSM programs.
--- fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 10 +++++ fs/verity/init.c | 1 + fs/verity/measure.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 96 insertions(+)
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +10 -0
@@ -145,4 +145,14 @@ static inline void fsverity_init_signature(void)void __init fsverity_init_workqueue (void ); +/* measure.c */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +int __init fsverity_init_bpf (void ); +#else +static inline int fsverity_init_bpf (void ) +{ +} +#endif +#endif /* _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H */
fs/verity/init.c +1 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ static int __init fsverity_init(void)fsverity_init_workqueue ();fsverity_init_sysctl ();fsverity_init_signature (); +fsverity_init_bpf ();return 0 ; }late_initcall (fsverity_init)
fs/verity/measure.c +85 -0
94 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 bpf-next 5/9] bpf, fsverity: Add kfunc bpf_get_fsverity_digest
Quoted 25 lines · Song Liu
fsverity provides fast and reliable hash of files, namely
fsverity_digest. The digest can be used by security solutions to verify file contents.Add new kfunc
bpf_get_fsverity_digest()so that we can access fsverity from BPF LSM programs. This kfunc is added tofs/verity/measure.cbecause some data structure used in the function is private to fsverity (fs/verity/fsverity_private.h).To avoid recursion,
bpf_get_fsverity_digestis only allowed in BPF LSM programs.Signed-off-by Song Liu <[email protected]>--- fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 10 +++++ fs/verity/init.c | 1 + fs/verity/measure.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 96 insertions(+)fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +0
-0@@ -145,4 +145,14 @@ static inline void fsverity_init_signature(void)void __init fsverity_init_workqueue (void );
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h static inline void fsverity_init_signature(void) · line 156
Quoted 10 lines
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +9
-0+/* measure.c */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +int __init fsverity_init_bpf (void ); +#else +static inline int fsverity_init_bpf (void ) +{ +} +#endif
This does not compile when !CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL.
fsverity_init_bpf() probably shouldn't have a return value, given that this code cannot be compiled as a loadable module. You can either panic on error, or ignore the error. I don't think there are any other options.
Also, please keep the sections of this file in alphabetical order. The measure.c section should go between init.c and open.c sections.
fs/verity/measure.c line 12
Quoted 10 lines
fs/verity/measure.c +2
-0@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@#include "fsverity_private.h" #include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/bpf.h> +#include <linux/btf.h>
Keep includes in alphabetical order, please.
- Eric
Re: [PATCH v5 bpf-next 5/9] bpf, fsverity: Add kfunc bpf_get_fsverity_digest
Quoted 43 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 25 lines · Song Liu
fsverity provides fast and reliable hash of files, namely
fsverity_digest. The digest can be used by security solutions to verify file contents.Add new kfunc
bpf_get_fsverity_digest()so that we can access fsverity from BPF LSM programs. This kfunc is added tofs/verity/measure.cbecause some data structure used in the function is private to fsverity (fs/verity/fsverity_private.h).To avoid recursion,
bpf_get_fsverity_digestis only allowed in BPF LSM programs.Signed-off-by Song Liu <[email protected]>---
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 10 +++++ fs/verity/init.c | 1 + fs/verity/measure.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 96 insertions(+)fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +0
-0@@ -145,4 +145,14 @@ static inline void fsverity_init_signature(void)void __init fsverity_init_workqueue (void );fs/verity/fsverity_private.h static inline void fsverity_init_signature(void) · line 156
Quoted 10 lines
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +9
-0+/* measure.c */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +int __init fsverity_init_bpf (void ); +#else +static inline int fsverity_init_bpf (void ) +{ +} +#endif This does not compile when !CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL.
Quoted 3 lines
fsverity_init_bpf()probably shouldn't have a return value, given that this code cannot be compiled as a loadable module. You can either panic on error, or ignore the error. I don't think there are any other options.
Got it. Updated fsverity_init_bpf to return void.
Quoted 12 lines
Also, please keep the sections of this file in alphabetical order. The
measure.csection should go betweeninit.candopen.csections.Quoted 7 lines
fs/verity/measure.c +0
-0@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@#include "fsverity_private.h"
Quoted 5 lines
fs/verity/measure.c line 12
Quoted 3 lines
fs/verity/measure.c +2
-0#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/bpf.h> +#include <linux/btf.h> Keep includes in alphabetical order, please.
Fixed in the next version.
Thanks,
Song
Song Liu
maintainerPATCH v5 6/9 Documentation/bpf: Add documentation for filesystem kfuncs
In reply to Song LiuAdd a brief introduction for file system kfuncs:
bpf_get_file_xattr()
bpf_get_fsverity_digest()
The documentation highlights the strategy to avoid recursions of these kfuncs.
--- Documentation/bpf/fs_kfuncs.rst | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/bpf/index.rst | 1 + 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/bpf/fs_kfuncs.rst
Documentation/bpf/fs_kfuncs.rst new file +21 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +.. _fs_kfuncs-header-label: + +===================== +BPF filesystem kfuncs +===================== + +BPF LSM programs need to access filesystem data from LSM hooks. The following +BPF kfuncs can be used to get these data. + + * ``bpf_get_file_xattr()`` + + * ``bpf_get_fsverity_digest()`` + +To avoid recursions, these kfuncs follow the following rules: + +1. These kfuncs are only permitted from BPF LSM function. +2. These kfuncs should not call into other LSM hooks, i.e. security_*(). For + example, ``bpf_get_file_xattr()`` does not use ``vfs_getxattr()``, because + the latter calls LSM hook ``security_inode_getxattr``.
Documentation/bpf/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ that goes into great technical depth about the BPF Architecture. helpers kfuncs cpumasks + fs_kfuncs programs maps bpf_prog_run
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Song Liu
maintainerPATCH v5 7/9 selftests/bpf: Sort config in alphabetic order
In reply to Song LiuMove CONFIG_VSOCKETS up, so the CONFIGs are in alphabetic order.
--- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config +1 -1
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY=y CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y CONFIG_TEST_BPF=m CONFIG_USERFAULTFD=y +CONFIG_VSOCKETS=y CONFIG_VXLAN=y CONFIG_XDP_SOCKETS=y CONFIG_XFRM_INTERFACE=y -CONFIG_VSOCKETS=y
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Song Liu
maintainerPATCH v5 8/9 selftests/bpf: Add tests for filesystem kfuncs
In reply to Song LiuAdd selftests for two new filesystem kfuncs:
1. bpf_get_file_xattr
2. bpf_get_fsverity_digest
These tests simply make sure the two kfuncs work. Another selftest will be added to demonstrate how to use these kfuncs to verify file signature.
CONFIG_FS_VERITY is added to selftests config. However, this is not sufficient to guarantee bpf_get_fsverity_digest works. This is because fsverity need to be enabled at file system level (for example, with tune2fs on ext4). If local file system doesn't have this feature enabled, just skip the test.
--- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h | 3 + tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config | 1 + .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c | 132 ++++++++++++++++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_fsverity.c | 46 ++++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_xattr.c | 37 +++++ 5 files changed, 219 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_fsverity.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_xattr.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h +3 -0
@@ -55,4 +55,7 @@ void *bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx(void *) __ksym;void *bpf_rdonly_cast (void *obj,__u32 btf_id) __ksym; +extern int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name, + struct bpf_dynptr *value_ptr) __ksym; +extern int bpf_get_fsverity_digest(struct file *file, struct bpf_dynptr *digest_ptr) __ksym;#endif
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config +1 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ CONFIG_FPROBE=y CONFIG_FTRACE_SYSCALLS=y CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION=y CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER=y +CONFIG_FS_VERITY=y CONFIG_GENEVE=y CONFIG_IKCONFIG=y CONFIG_IKCONFIG_PROC=y
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c new file +132 -0
132 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_fsverity.c new file +46 -0
46 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_xattr.c new file +37 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright (c) 2023 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */ + +#include "vmlinux.h" +#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h> +#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h> +#include "bpf_kfuncs.h" + +char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; + +__u32 monitored_pid; +__u32 found_xattr; + +static const char expected_value[] ="hello" ; +char value[32 ]; + +SEC("lsm.s/file_open") +int BPF_PROG (test_file_open ,struct file *f) +{ +struct bpf_dynptr value_ptr; +__u32 pid; +int ret; + + pid =bpf_get_current_pid_tgid () >>32 ; +if (pid != monitored_pid) +return 0 ; + +bpf_dynptr_from_mem (value,sizeof (value),0 , &value_ptr); + + ret =bpf_get_file_xattr (f,"user.kfuncs" , &value_ptr); +if (ret !=sizeof (expected_value)) +return 0 ; +if (bpf_strncmp (value, ret, expected_value)) +return 0 ; + found_xattr =1 ; +return 0 ; +}
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Song Liu
maintainerPATCH v5 9/9 selftests/bpf: Add test that uses fsverity and xattr to sign a file
In reply to Song LiuThis selftests shows a proof of concept method to use BPF LSM to enforce file signature. This test is added to verify_pkcs7_sig, so that some existing logic can be reused.
This file signature method uses fsverity, which provides reliable and efficient hash (known as digest) of the file. The file digest is signed with asymmetic key, and the signature is stored in xattr. At the run time, BPF LSM reads file digest and the signature, and then checks them against the public key.
Note that this solution does NOT require FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES. fsverity is only used to provide file digest. The signature verification and access control is all implemented in BPF LSM.
--- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h | 7 + .../bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c | 163 +++++++++++++++++- .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c | 82 +++++++++ .../bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c | 8 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh | 25 +++ 5 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h +7 -0
@@ -58,4 +58,11 @@ void *bpf_rdonly_cast(void *obj, __u32 btf_id) __ksym; extern int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name, struct bpf_dynptr *value_ptr) __ksym; extern int bpf_get_fsverity_digest(struct file *file, struct bpf_dynptr *digest_ptr) __ksym; + +extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key (__u32 serial,__u64 flags) __ksym; +extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_system_key (__u64 id) __ksym; +extern void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *key) __ksym; +extern int bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr *data_ptr, + struct bpf_dynptr *sig_ptr, + struct bpf_key *trusted_keyring) __ksym;#endif
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c +162 -1
187 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c new file +82 -0
82 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c +1 -7
@@ -10,17 +10,11 @@#include <errno.h> #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h> #include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h> +#include "bpf_kfuncs.h" #define MAX_DATA_SIZE (1024 * 1024)#define MAX_SIG_SIZE 1024 -extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key (__u32 serial,__u64 flags) __ksym; -extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_system_key (__u64 id) __ksym; -extern void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *key) __ksym; -extern int bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr *data_ptr, - struct bpf_dynptr *sig_ptr, - struct bpf_key *trusted_keyring) __ksym; -__u32 monitored_pid;__u32 user_keyring_serial;__u64 system_keyring_id;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh +25 -0
@@ -60,6 +60,27 @@ cleanup() { rm -rf ${tmp_dir} } +fsverity_create_sign_file() { + local tmp_dir="$1" + + data_file=${tmp_dir}/data-file + sig_file=${tmp_dir}/sig-file + dd if=/dev/urandom of=$data_file bs=1 count=12345 2> /dev/null + fsverity sign --key ${tmp_dir}/signing_key.pem $data_file $sig_file + + # We do not want to enable fsverity on $data_file yet. Try whether + # the file system support fsverity on a different file. + touch ${tmp_dir}/tmp-file + fsverity enable ${tmp_dir}/tmp-file +} + +fsverity_enable_file() { + local tmp_dir="$1" + + data_file=${tmp_dir}/data-file + fsverity enable $data_file +} + catch() { local exit_code="$1"
@@ -86,6 +107,10 @@ main() setup "${tmp_dir}" elif [[ "${action}" == "cleanup" ]]; then cleanup "${tmp_dir}" + elif [[ "${action}" == "fsverity-create-sign" ]]; then + fsverity_create_sign_file "${tmp_dir}" + elif [[ "${action}" == "fsverity-enable" ]]; then + fsverity_enable_file "${tmp_dir}" else echo "Unknown action: ${action}" exit 1
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1