Skip to contentSkip to conversation

Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC

PATCH Superseded Sudhakar Kuppusamy 2 participants 36 messages Jul 14, 2025 – Jul 21, 2025

v5 of 18 Superseded Latest is v18 →

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

v5 cover Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC

This patch set contains v5 the consolidated version of the patch sets for secure boot using appended signatures on powerpc, rebased on top of git HEAD.

The v3 series is at
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2025-06/msg00049.html

Changes since v3:
- Daniel Kiper review comments addressed:
- v5 patch 1: corrected the unreliable check conditions.
- v5 patch 3: added the GRUB signing process for single and multi signature.
- v5 patch 5: expanded the commit message .
- v5 patch 9 and 10: dropping some more N_() from various cryptic error
messages.
- v5 patch 11: corrected the coding style, used grub_crypto_pk_rsa and added the explicit module dependencies using depends.
- v5 patch 13: rename appended signature GRUB commands with short names.
- v5 patch 15: merged from v3 patch 17 and 18
- v5 patch 16: corrected the coding style and GRUB_PKS_* constant are moved to "include/grub/efi/pks.h"
Also, fixed the warrnings and errors

Changes since v4:
- v5 patch 1: fixed the build error for Windows builds.
- v5 rsa_pad was removed from libgcrypt-1.11. So, removed patch-4 (factor out rsa_pad).
- rebased with libgcrypt-1.11

Linux on Power LPAR secure boot ensures the integrity of the Linux boot stack. The hypervisor and partition firmware are part of the core root of trust. The partition firmware verifies the signature on the GRUB image before handing control to GRUB. Similarly, GRUB verifies the signature on the kernel image before booting the OS. This ensures that every image running at the boot time is verified and trusted. UEFI platforms relies on PECOFF based signature scheme. Since Power is not a UEFI platform, an alternative mechanism is needed. Power already uses appended signatures on the Linux Kernel, and is now extended to sign the grub as well.

Linux on Power also allows multiple signers, and if any one of the signature passes, then the image passes the validation. Appended signature scheme uses CMS structure to contain signatures. On Power, the multiple signature support relies on the multiple signers features already supported by CMS standards. It does require that all the signers should sign at the same time and are not allowed to add or remove the signatures randomly.

By default, Linux LPAR secure boot uses static key management[1]. This means that each image embeds the keys it needs to verify the image it loads. For example, the keys used to verify the GRUB image are built into the firmware image. Similarly, the keys used for verifying the kernel image are built into the GRUB image. These are pre-defined keys and they cannot be modified at runtime. The drawback of this approach is that key rotations results in both firmware and OS updates. This is where dynamic key management is useful.

An admin can switch from static keys to dynamic keys by coordinating with Hardware Management Console(HMC) admin and enabling the required flags for the given LPAR.

The dynamic key management relies on the Platform KeyStore(PKS)[2] storage allocation for each LPAR with individually managed access controls to store sensitive information securely. Once switched to dynamic keys, HMC advertises this flag to the PowerVM, which then initializes the PKS with the default secvars. It also creates a variable SB_VERSION that represents the secure boot key management mode. The default secvars are used by Partition firmware, grub and the linux kernel to reads keys for verification. These secvars can be managed by user interface exposed via linux kernel. The linux kernel already supports this interface and it is available in the upstream kernel.

This patchset adds the appended signature support both for signing and verification and the key management to the grub component. The whole patchset can be split into following four main parts:

The series has following four main parts:

1.) Sign grub.elf with an appended signature. (Patches 1 - 3)

These patches provide some infrastructure and documentation for signing grub's core.elf with a Linux-kernel-module style appended signature.

An appended signature is a 'dumb' signature over the contents of a file. (It is distinct from schemes like Authenticode that are aware of the structure of the file and only sign certain parts.) The signature is wrapped in a PKCS#7 message, and is appended to the signed file along with some metadata and a magic string. The signatures are validated against a public key which is usually provided as an x509 certificate.

Because some platforms, such as powerpc-ieee1275, may load grub from a raw disk partition rather than a filesystem, we extend grub-install to add an ELF note that allows us to specify the size and location of the signature.

2.) Enable appended signature verification using builtin keys (Patches 4 - 13).

Part of a secure boot chain is allowing grub to verify the boot kernel. For UEFI platforms, this is usually delegated to the shim. However, for platforms that do not implement UEFI, an alternative scheme is required.

This part teaches grub how to verify Linux kernel-style appended signatures. Kernels on powerpc are already signed with this scheme and can be verified by IMA for kexec.

As PKCS#7 messages and x509 certificates are both based on ASN.1, we import libtasn1 to parse them. Because ASN.1 isn't self-documenting, we import from GNUTLS the information we need to navigate their structure.

This section is composed of the following patches:

- patches 4 and 5 are small refactorings.

- patch 6 allows x509 certificates to be built in to the grub core in much the same way as PGP keys.

- patch 7 brings in the code from GNUTLS that allows us to parse PKCS#7 and x509 with libtasn1.

- patch 8, 9 and 10 is our ASN1 node, PKCS#7 and x509 parser. They're minimal and fairly strict parsers that extract only the bits we need to verify the signatures.

- patch 11 is the guts of the appended signature verifier. It uses the verifier infrastructure like pgp, and adds a number of user-friendly commands that mirror the pgp module.

- patch 12 adds tests, and patch 13 adds documentation.

3.) Enable lockdown if secure boot is enabled (Patch 14)

If the 'ibm,secure-boot' property of the root node is 2 or greater, enter lockdown.The main appended signature module now tests for lockdown to enter 'forced' mode.

4.) Enable accessing keys dynamically from Platform KeyStore (Patch 15 - 21)

This part teaches grub how to read db and dbx variables from platform keystore using client interface call then load keys from those two variable, and use it to verify Linux kernel.

This section is composed of the following patches:

- patch 15 is an exposes an interface in ieee1275 for reading secure boot variable db and dbx from Platform Keystore. Read secure boot variables such as db and dbx from PKS and extract certificates from ESL.

- patch 16 is create the db and dbx lists from PKS.

- patch 17 is verify the kernel using db and dbx lists

- patch 18 sets the use_static_keys flag if DB not available in PKS, and patch 19 is reads the DB default keys from ELF Note and store it in trusted lists if use_static_keys flag is set.

- patch 20 adds db and dbx commands, and patch 21 adds documentation.

Thanks to Daniel Kiper for providing review comments on v3.

I've pushed this all to
https://github.com/SudhakarKuppusamy1/grub/tree/appendedsig-2.13

[1]https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/linux-on-systems?topic=servers-guest-secure-boot-static-keys [2]https://community.ibm.com/community/user/power/blogs/chris-engel1/2020/11/20/powervm-introduces-the-platform-keystore

Daniel Axtens (5):
docs/grub: Document signing GRUB under UEFI
crypto: Move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c appended signatures: Verification tests appended signatures: Documentation
ieee1275: Enter lockdown based on /ibm,secure-boot

Sudhakar Kuppusamy (16):
powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended
signature
docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature
pgp: Rename OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY to OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY
grub-install: Support embedding x509 certificates appended signatures: Import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files appended signatures: Parse ASN1 node
appended signatures: Parse PKCS#7 signedData
appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures
ieee1275: Read the DB and DBX secure boot variables
appendedsig: Create db and dbx lists
appendedsig: Verify the kernel using db and dbx lists
powerpc_ieee1275: Introduce use_static_keys flag
appendedsig: Read default DB keys from the ELF Note
appendedsig: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx
appendedsig: Documentation

 docs/grub.texi                                |  334 +++-
 grub-core/Makefile.am                         |    2 +
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def                   |   24 +
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c  | 1412 +++++++++++++++++
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h  |  108 ++
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c     |   96 ++
 .../commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c    |  148 ++
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c        |  454 ++++++
 .../commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c      |  485 ++++++
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c         |  953 +++++++++++
 grub-core/commands/pgp.c                      |    6 +-
 grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c            |    1 -
 grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c                |   54 +
 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c    |  139 ++
 .../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c |  353 +++++
 grub-core/lib/crypto.c                        |    4 +
 grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c     |  250 +++
 grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h         |  975 ++++++++++++
 grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c         |    5 +
 include/grub/crypto.h                         |    1 +
 include/grub/efi/pks.h                        |  112 ++
 include/grub/file.h                           |    2 +
 include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h              |    3 +
 include/grub/kernel.h                         |    3 +-
 include/grub/lockdown.h                       |    3 +-
 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h      |   21 +
 .../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h |  127 ++
 include/grub/util/install.h                   |   13 +-
 include/grub/util/mkimage.h                   |    4 +-
 util/grub-install-common.c                    |   43 +-
 util/grub-mkimage.c                           |   33 +-
 util/grub-mkimagexx.c                         |   40 +-
 util/mkimage.c                                |   50 +-
 33 files changed, 6212 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h
 create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/pks.h
 create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#1 lore raw

PATCH v5 1/21 powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended signature

Add infrastructure to allow firmware to verify the integrity of GRUB by use of a Linux-kernel-module-style appended signature. We initially target powerpc-ieee1275, but the code should be extensible to other platforms.

Usually these signatures are appended to a file without modifying the ELF file itself. (This is what the 'sign-file' tool does, for example.) The verifier loads the signed file from the file system and looks at the end of the file for the appended signature. However, on powerpc-ieee1275 platforms, the bootloader is often stored directly in the PReP partition as raw bytes without a file-system. This makes determining the location of an appended signature more difficult.

To address this, we add a new ELF note.

The name field of shall be the string "Appended-Signature", zero-padded to 4 byte alignment. The type field shall be 0x41536967 (the ASCII values for the string "ASig"). It must be the final section in the ELF binary.

The description shall contain the appended signature structure as defined by the Linux kernel. The description will also be padded to be a multiple of 4 bytes. The padding shall be added before the appended signature structure (not at the end) so that the final bytes of a signed ELF file are the appended signature magic.

A subsequent patch documents how to create a GRUB core.img validly signed under this scheme.

---
 include/grub/util/install.h | 10 ++++++++--
 include/grub/util/mkimage.h |  4 ++--
 util/grub-install-common.c  | 24 +++++++++++++++++++---
 util/grub-mkimage.c         | 19 ++++++++++++++++++
 util/grub-mkimagexx.c       | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 util/mkimage.c              |  9 ++++++---
 6 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
include/grub/util/install.h +8 -2
index 5c0a52ca2..a75a4f8c0 100644
@@ -69,9 +69,14 @@
       N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0 },				\
   { "disable-cli", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI, 0, 0,		\
     N_("disabled command line interface access"), 0 },			\
+  { "appended-signature-size", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE,  \
+    "SIZE", 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 1}, \
   { "verbose", 'v', 0, 0,						\
     N_("print verbose messages."), 1 }
 
+/* The max_appended_signature_size = 4096 bit key signature size x number of signature. */
+#define GRUB_APPSIG_SIZE_MAX ((unsigned int) (824 * 200))
+
 int
 grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg);
 
@@ -132,7 +137,8 @@ enum grub_install_options {
   GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DTB,
   GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_SBAT,
   GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK,
-  GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI
+  GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI,
+  GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE
 };
 
 extern char *grub_install_source_directory;
@@ -192,7 +198,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
 			     size_t npubkeys,
 			     char *config_path,
 			     const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
-			     int note,
+			     int note, size_t appsig_size,
 			     grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_file,
 			     const char *sbat_path, const int disable_shim_lock,
 			     const int disable_cli);
include/grub/util/mkimage.h +2 -2
index 9d74f82c5..0d40383eb 100644
@@ -51,12 +51,12 @@ grub_mkimage_load_image64 (const char *kernel_path,
 			   const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target);
 void
 grub_mkimage_generate_elf32 (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
-			     int note, char *sbat, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
+			     int note, char *sbat, size_t appsig_size, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
 			     Elf32_Addr target_addr,
 			     struct grub_mkimage_layout *layout);
 void
 grub_mkimage_generate_elf64 (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
-			     int note, char *sbat, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
+			     int note, char *sbat, size_t appsig_size, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
 			     Elf64_Addr target_addr,
 			     struct grub_mkimage_layout *layout);
 
util/grub-install-common.c +21 -3
index 22bccb6a3..5c1a038db 100644
@@ -467,10 +467,13 @@ static char *sbat;
 static int disable_shim_lock;
 static grub_compression_t compression;
 static int disable_cli;
+static size_t appsig_size;
 
 int
 grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)
 {
+  const char *end;
+
   switch (key)
     {
     case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_INSTALL_CORE_COMPRESS:
@@ -571,6 +574,20 @@ grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)
       grub_util_error (_("Unrecognized compression `%s'"), arg);
     case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_GRUB_MKIMAGE:
       return 1;
+    case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE:
+      appsig_size = grub_strtoul (arg, &end, 10);
+      if (*arg == '\0' || *end != '\0')
+        {
+          grub_util_error (_("non-numeric or invalid appended signature size `%s'"), arg);
+          return 0;
+        }
+      else if (appsig_size == 0 || appsig_size > GRUB_APPSIG_SIZE_MAX)
+        {
+          grub_util_error (_("appended signature size `%s' not in the range of 1 byte to %u byte"),
+                           arg, GRUB_APPSIG_SIZE_MAX);
+          return 0;
+        }
+      return 1;
     default:
       return 0;
     }
@@ -683,9 +700,10 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
   *p = '\0';
 
   grub_util_info ("grub-mkimage --directory '%s' --prefix '%s' --output '%s'"
-		  " --format '%s' --compression '%s'%s%s%s%s\n",
+		  " --format '%s' --compression '%s'"
+		  " --appended-signature-size %zu %s %s %s %s\n",
 		  dir, prefix, outname,
-		  mkimage_target, compnames[compression],
+		  mkimage_target, compnames[compression], appsig_size,
 		  note ? " --note" : "",
 		  disable_shim_lock ? " --disable-shim-lock" : "",
 		  disable_cli ? " --disable-cli" : "", s);
@@ -698,7 +716,7 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
   grub_install_generate_image (dir, prefix, fp, outname,
 			       modules.entries, memdisk_path,
 			       pubkeys, npubkeys, config_path, tgt,
-			       note, compression, dtb, sbat,
+			       note, appsig_size, compression, dtb, sbat,
 			       disable_shim_lock, disable_cli);
   while (dc--)
     grub_install_pop_module ();
util/grub-mkimage.c +19 -0
index 547f7310f..275ad49bb 100644
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = {
   {"sbat", 's', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("SBAT metadata"), 0},
   {"disable-shim-lock", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK, 0, 0, N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0},
   {"disable-cli", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI, 0, 0, N_("disable command line interface access"), 0},
+  {"appended-signature-size", 'S', N_("SIZE"), 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 0},
   {"verbose",     'v', 0,      0, N_("print verbose messages."), 0},
   { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
 };
@@ -130,6 +131,7 @@ struct arguments
   int note;
   int disable_shim_lock;
   int disable_cli;
+  size_t appsig_size;
   const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target;
   grub_compression_t comp;
 };
@@ -140,6 +142,7 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)
   /* Get the input argument from argp_parse, which we
      know is a pointer to our arguments structure. */
   struct arguments *arguments = state->input;
+  const char *end;
 
   switch (key)
     {
@@ -172,6 +175,21 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)
       arguments->note = 1;
       break;
 
+    case 'S':
+      arguments->appsig_size = grub_strtoul (arg, &end, 10);
+      if (*arg == '\0' || *end != '\0')
+        {
+          grub_util_error (_("non-numeric or invalid appended signature size `%s'"), arg);
+          return 1;
+        }
+      else if (arguments->appsig_size == 0 || arguments->appsig_size > GRUB_APPSIG_SIZE_MAX)
+        {
+          grub_util_error (_("appended signature size `%s' not in the range of 1 byte to %u byte"),
+                           arg, GRUB_APPSIG_SIZE_MAX);
+          return 1;
+        }
+      break;
+
     case 'm':
       if (arguments->memdisk)
 	free (arguments->memdisk);
@@ -330,6 +348,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
 			       arguments.memdisk, arguments.pubkeys,
 			       arguments.npubkeys, arguments.config,
 			       arguments.image_target, arguments.note,
+			       arguments.appsig_size,
 			       arguments.comp, arguments.dtb,
 			       arguments.sbat, arguments.disable_shim_lock,
 			       arguments.disable_cli);
util/grub-mkimagexx.c +39 -1
index 448862b2e..7dddd987a 100644
@@ -115,6 +115,14 @@ struct grub_sbat_note {
   char name[ALIGN_UP(sizeof(GRUB_SBAT_NOTE_NAME), 4)];
 };
 
+#define GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME "Appended-Signature"
+#define GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_TYPE 0x41536967 /* "ASig" */
+struct grub_appended_signature_note
+{
+  Elf32_Nhdr header;
+  char name[ALIGN_UP (sizeof (GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME), 4)];
+};
+
 static int
 is_relocatable (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target)
 {
@@ -216,7 +224,7 @@ grub_arm_reloc_jump24 (grub_uint32_t *target, Elf32_Addr sym_addr)
 
 void
 SUFFIX (grub_mkimage_generate_elf) (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
-				    int note, char *sbat, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
+				    int note, char *sbat, size_t appsig_size, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
 				    Elf_Addr target_addr,
 				    struct grub_mkimage_layout *layout)
 {
@@ -237,6 +245,12 @@ SUFFIX (grub_mkimage_generate_elf) (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc
       footer_size += ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct grub_sbat_note) + layout->sbat_size, 4);
     }
 
+  if (appsig_size)
+    {
+      phnum++;
+      footer_size += ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct grub_appended_signature_note), 4);
+    }
+
   if (image_target->id != IMAGE_LOONGSON_ELF)
     phnum += 2;
 
@@ -518,6 +532,30 @@ SUFFIX (grub_mkimage_generate_elf) (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc
       memcpy (note_ptr->name, GRUB_SBAT_NOTE_NAME, sizeof (GRUB_SBAT_NOTE_NAME));
       memcpy ((char *)(note_ptr + 1), sbat, layout->sbat_size);
 
+      phdr++;
+      phdr->p_type = grub_host_to_target32 (PT_NOTE);
+      phdr->p_flags = grub_host_to_target32 (PF_R);
+      phdr->p_align = grub_host_to_target32 (image_target->voidp_sizeof);
+      phdr->p_vaddr = 0;
+      phdr->p_paddr = 0;
+      phdr->p_filesz = grub_host_to_target32 (note_size);
+      phdr->p_memsz = 0;
+      phdr->p_offset = grub_host_to_target32 (header_size + program_size + footer_offset);
+      footer += note_size;
+      footer_offset += note_size;
+    }
+
+  if (appsig_size)
+    {
+      int note_size = ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct grub_appended_signature_note) + appsig_size, 4);
+      struct grub_appended_signature_note *note_ptr = (struct grub_appended_signature_note *) footer;
+
+      note_ptr->header.n_namesz = grub_host_to_target32 (sizeof (GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME));
+      /* Needs to sit at the end, so we round this up and sign some zero padding. */
+      note_ptr->header.n_descsz = grub_host_to_target32 (ALIGN_UP (appsig_size, 4));
+      note_ptr->header.n_type = grub_host_to_target32 (GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_TYPE);
+      strcpy (note_ptr->name, GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME);
+
       phdr++;
       phdr->p_type = grub_host_to_target32 (PT_NOTE);
       phdr->p_flags = grub_host_to_target32 (PF_R);
util/mkimage.c +6 -3
index b46df2909..9618b37cf 100644
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
 			     char *memdisk_path, char **pubkey_paths,
 			     size_t npubkeys, char *config_path,
 			     const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
-			     int note, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path,
+			     int note, size_t appsig_size, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path,
 			     const char *sbat_path, int disable_shim_lock,
 			     int disable_cli)
 {
@@ -946,6 +946,9 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
   if (sbat_path != NULL && (image_target->id != IMAGE_EFI && image_target->id != IMAGE_PPC))
     grub_util_error (_("SBAT data can be added only to EFI or powerpc-ieee1275 images"));
 
+  if (appsig_size != 0 && image_target->id != IMAGE_PPC)
+    grub_util_error (_("appended signature can be support only to powerpc-ieee1275 images"));
+
   if (disable_shim_lock)
     total_module_size += sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
 
@@ -1833,10 +1836,10 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
 	else
 	  target_addr = image_target->link_addr;
 	if (image_target->voidp_sizeof == 4)
-	  grub_mkimage_generate_elf32 (image_target, note, sbat, &core_img, &core_size,
+	  grub_mkimage_generate_elf32 (image_target, note, sbat, appsig_size, &core_img, &core_size,
 				       target_addr, &layout);
 	else
-	  grub_mkimage_generate_elf64 (image_target, note, sbat, &core_img, &core_size,
+	  grub_mkimage_generate_elf64 (image_target, note, sbat, appsig_size, &core_img, &core_size,
 				       target_addr, &layout);
       }
       break;
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Reviewed-by on v5 1/21
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 01/21] powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended signature

Quoted 25 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Add infrastructure to allow firmware to verify the integrity of GRUB by use of a Linux-kernel-module-style appended signature. We initially target powerpc-ieee1275, but the code should be extensible to other platforms.

Usually these signatures are appended to a file without modifying the ELF file itself. (This is what the 'sign-file' tool does, for example.) The verifier loads the signed file from the file system and looks at the end of the file for the appended signature. However, on powerpc-ieee1275 platforms, the bootloader is often stored directly in the PReP partition as raw bytes without a file-system. This makes determining the location of an appended signature more difficult.

To address this, we add a new ELF note.

The name field of shall be the string "Appended-Signature", zero-padded to 4 byte alignment. The type field shall be 0x41536967 (the ASCII values for the string "ASig"). It must be the final section in the ELF binary.

The description shall contain the appended signature structure as defined by the Linux kernel. The description will also be padded to be a multiple of 4 bytes. The padding shall be added before the appended signature structure (not at the end) so that the final bytes of a signed ELF file are the appended signature magic.

Quoted 8 lines

A subsequent patch documents how to create a GRUB core.img validly signed under this scheme.

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#3 lore raw

PATCH v5 2/21 docs/grub: Document signing GRUB under UEFI

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>

Before adding information about how grub is signed with an appended signature scheme, it's worth adding some information about how it can currently be signed for UEFI.

---
 docs/grub.texi | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
docs/grub.texi +17 -1
index 34b3484dc..320fa2124 100644
@@ -8675,6 +8675,7 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order.
 * Measured Boot::                    Measuring boot components
 * Lockdown::                         Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
 * TPM2 key protector::               Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
+* Signing GRUB itself::              Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image
 @end menu
 
 @node Authentication and authorisation
@@ -8755,7 +8756,7 @@ commands.
 
 GRUB's @file{core.img} can optionally provide enforcement that all files
 subsequently read from disk are covered by a valid digital signature.
-This document does @strong{not} cover how to ensure that your
+This section does @strong{not} cover how to ensure that your
 platform's firmware (e.g., Coreboot) validates @file{core.img}.
 
 If environment variable @code{check_signatures}
@@ -9363,6 +9364,21 @@ which increases the risk of password leakage during the process. Moreover, the
 superuser list must be well maintained, and the password used cannot be
 synchronized with LUKS key rotation.
 
+@node Signing GRUB itself
+@section Signing GRUB itself
+To ensure a complete secure-boot chain, there must be a way for the code that
+loads GRUB to verify the integrity of the core image.
+This is ultimately platform-specific and individual platforms can define their
+own mechanisms. However, there are general-purpose mechanisms that can be used
+with GRUB.
+@section Signing GRUB for UEFI secure boot
+On UEFI platforms, @file{core.img} is a PE binary. Therefore, it can be signed
+with a tool such as @command{pesign} or @command{sbsign}. Refer to the
+suggestions in @pxref{UEFI secure boot and shim} to ensure that the final
+image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It
+will also be necessary to enroll the public key used into a relevant firmware
+key database.
+
 @node Platform limitations
 @chapter Platform limitations
 
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#4 lore raw

PATCH v5 3/21 docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Signing GRUB for firmware that verifies an appended signature is a bit fiddly. I don't want people to have to figure it out from scratch so document it here.

---
 docs/grub.texi | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 86 insertions(+)
docs/grub.texi +86 -0
index 320fa2124..d594e29bd 100644
@@ -9379,6 +9379,92 @@ image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It
 will also be necessary to enroll the public key used into a relevant firmware
 key database.
 
+@section Signing GRUB with an appended signature
+The @file{core.img} itself can be signed with a Linux kernel module-style
+appended signature.
+To support IEEE1275 platforms where the boot image is often loaded directly
+from a disk partition rather than from a file system, the @file{core.img}
+can specify the size and location of the appended signature with an ELF
+note added by @command{grub-install}.
+An image can be signed this way using the @command{sign-file} command from
+the Linux kernel:
+@example
+@group
+# Signing a GRUB image with only one signer key in the appended signature:
+# The grub.key is your private key and certificate.der is your GRUB signing public key
+# kernel.der is your kernel signing public key.
+#
+# Determine the size of the appended signature. It depends on the signing certificate
+# and the hash algorithm.
+#
+# Signing the /dev/null with an appended signature.
+
+sign-file SHA256 grub.key certificate.der /dev/null /dev/empty.sig
+
+# Get the size of the signature.
+
+EMPTY_SIG_SIZE=`stat -c '%s' /dev/empty.sig`
+
+# Remove the empty files.
+
+rm -rf /dev/empty.sig
+
+# Build a GRUB image with $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE reserved for the signature.
+
+grub-install --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
+                      or
+grub-mkimage -O powerpc-ieee1275 -o core.elf.unsigned -x kernel.der -p /grub2 \
+--appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
+
+# Signing a GRUB image with an appended signature.
+
+sign-file SHA256 grub.key certificate.der core.elf.unsigned core.elf.signed
+
+#
+# Signing a GRUB image with more than one signer key in the appended signature:
+# The grub1.key and grub2.key are your private keys, certificate1.der and certificate2.der
+# are your GRUB signing public keys. kernel.der and Kernel2.der are your kernel signing public key.
+
+# Generate a raw signature for /dev/null signing using OpenSSL.
+
+openssl cms -sign -binary -nocerts -in /dev/null -signer certificate1.pem -inkey grub1.key \
+-signer certificate2.pem -inkey grub2.key -out /dev/empty.p7s -outform DER -noattr -md sha256
+
+# Signing the /dev/null with an appended signature.
+
+sign-file -s /dev/empty.p7s sha256 /dev/null /dev/null /dev/empty.signed
+
+# Get the size of the signature.
+
+EMPTY_SIG_SIZE=`stat -c '%s' /dev/empty.signed`
+
+# Remove the empty files.
+
+rm -rf /dev/empty.signed /dev/empty.p7s
+
+# Build a GRUB image with $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE reserved for the signature.
+
+grub-install --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
+                         or
+grub-mkimage -O powerpc-ieee1275 -o core.elf.unsigned -x kernel.der -p /grub2 \
+--appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
+
+# Generate a raw signature for GRUB image signing using OpenSSL.
+
+openssl cms -sign -binary -nocerts -in core.elf.unsigned -signer certificate.pem \
+-inkey grub.key -signer certificate1.pem -inkey grub1.key -out core.p7s -outform DER -noattr -md sha256
+
+# Signing a GRUB image with an appended signature.
+
+sign-file -s core.p7s sha256 /dev/null core.elf.unsigned core.elf.signed
+
+# Don't forget to install the signed image as required (e.g. on powerpc-ieee1275, to the PReP partition)
+
+@end group
+@end example
+As with UEFI secure boot, it is necessary to build-in the required modules,
+or sign them separately.
+
 @node Platform limitations
 @chapter Platform limitations
 
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 03/21] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature

Quoted 31 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Signing GRUB for firmware that verifies an appended signature is a bit fiddly. I don't want people to have to figure it out from scratch so document it here.

---
 docs/grub.texi | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 86 insertions(+)
docs/grub.texi +11 -0
index 320fa2124..d594e29bd 100644
@@ -9379,6 +9379,92 @@ image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It
 will also be necessary to enroll the public key used into a relevant firmware
 key database.
 
+@section Signing GRUB with an appended signature
+The @file{core.img} itself can be signed with a Linux kernel module-style
+appended signature.
+To support IEEE1275 platforms where the boot image is often loaded directly
+from a disk partition rather than from a file system, the @file{core.img}
+can specify the size and location of the appended signature with an ELF
+note added by @command{grub-install}.
+An image can be signed this way using the @command{sign-file} command from
+the Linux kernel:
+@example
+@group

docs/grub.texi image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It · line 9402

Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10 -0
+# Signing a GRUB image with only one signer key in the appended signature:
+# The grub.key is your private key and certificate.der is your GRUB signing public key
+# kernel.der is your kernel signing public key.
+#
+# Determine the size of the appended signature. It depends on the signing certificate
+# and the hash algorithm.
+#
+# Signing the /dev/null with an appended signature.
+
+sign-file SHA256 grub.key certificate.der /dev/null /dev/empty.sig

Please do not pollute /dev directory with randomly generated files. This applies to all command examples below too...

docs/grub.texi image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It · line 9408

Quoted 5 lines
docs/grub.texi +5 -0
+# Get the size of the signature.
+
+EMPTY_SIG_SIZE=`stat -c '%s' /dev/empty.sig`
+
+# Remove the empty files.

s/empty files/empty file signature/

docs/grub.texi image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It · line 9410

Quoted 1 line
docs/grub.texi +1 -0
+rm -rf /dev/empty.sig

The rm without "-rf" should be enough here. Same comment for rm below...

docs/grub.texi image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It · line 9417

Quoted 6 lines
docs/grub.texi +6 -0
+# Build a GRUB image with $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE reserved for the signature.
+
+grub-install --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
+                      or
+grub-mkimage -O powerpc-ieee1275 -o core.elf.unsigned -x kernel.der -p /grub2 \
+--appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE --modules="appendedsig ..." ...

I suggest to add at least two spaces before "--appended-signature-size" to make it more visible that it is line continuation.

docs/grub.texi image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It · line 9431

Quoted 13 lines
docs/grub.texi +13 -0
+# Signing a GRUB image with an appended signature.
+
+sign-file SHA256 grub.key certificate.der core.elf.unsigned core.elf.signed
+
+#
+# Signing a GRUB image with more than one signer key in the appended signature:
+# The grub1.key and grub2.key are your private keys, certificate1.der and certificate2.der
+# are your GRUB signing public keys. kernel.der and Kernel2.der are your kernel signing public key.
+
+# Generate a raw signature for /dev/null signing using OpenSSL.
+
+openssl cms -sign -binary -nocerts -in /dev/null -signer certificate1.pem -inkey grub1.key \
+-signer certificate2.pem -inkey grub2.key -out /dev/empty.p7s -outform DER -noattr -md sha256

Ditto.

docs/grub.texi image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It · line 9443

Quoted 11 lines
docs/grub.texi +11 -0
+# Signing the /dev/null with an appended signature.
+
+sign-file -s /dev/empty.p7s sha256 /dev/null /dev/null /dev/empty.signed
+
+# Get the size of the signature.
+
+EMPTY_SIG_SIZE=`stat -c '%s' /dev/empty.signed`
+
+# Remove the empty files.
+
+rm -rf /dev/empty.signed /dev/empty.p7s

s/empty files/empty files signatures/

docs/grub.texi image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It · line 9417

Quoted 6 lines
docs/grub.texi +6 -0
+# Build a GRUB image with $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE reserved for the signature.
+
+grub-install --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
+                         or
+grub-mkimage -O powerpc-ieee1275 -o core.elf.unsigned -x kernel.der -p /grub2 \
+--appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE --modules="appendedsig ..." ...

Please add at least two spaces at the beginning here...

docs/grub.texi image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It · line 9455

Quoted 4 lines
docs/grub.texi +4 -0
+# Generate a raw signature for GRUB image signing using OpenSSL.
+
+openssl cms -sign -binary -nocerts -in core.elf.unsigned -signer certificate.pem \
+-inkey grub.key -signer certificate1.pem -inkey grub1.key -out core.p7s -outform DER -noattr -md sha256

Ditto.

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#6 lore raw

PATCH v5 4/21 crypto: Move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>

The way gcry_rsa and friends (the asymmetric ciphers) are loaded for the pgp module is a bit quirky.

include/grub/crypto.h contains:
extern struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;

commands/pgp.c contains the actual storage:
struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;

And the module itself saves to the storage in pgp.c:
GRUB_MOD_INIT(gcry_rsa)

  {
    grub_crypto_pk_rsa = &_gcry_pubkey_spec_rsa;

}

This is annoying: gcry_rsa now has a dependency on pgp!

We want to be able to bring in gcry_rsa without bringing in PGP, so move the storage to crypto.c.

Previously, gcry_rsa depended on pgp and mpi. Now it depends on crypto and mpi. As pgp depends on crypto, this doesn't add any new module dependencies using the PGP verfier.

[FWIW, the story is different for the symmetric ciphers. cryptodisk and friends (zfs encryption etc) use grub_crypto_lookup_cipher_by_name() to get a cipher handle. That depends on grub_ciphers being populated by people calling grub_cipher_register. import_gcry.py ensures that the symmetric ciphers call it.]

---
 grub-core/commands/pgp.c | 4 ----
 grub-core/lib/crypto.c   | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/pgp.c +0 -4
index e61887862..251ed1b06 100644
@@ -136,10 +136,6 @@ struct signature_v4_header
   grub_uint16_t hashed_sub;
 } GRUB_PACKED;
 
-struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_dsa;
-struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_ecdsa;
-struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
-
 struct
 {
   const char *name;
grub-core/lib/crypto.c +4 -0
index dd60dd4ac..292b747b2 100644
@@ -170,6 +170,10 @@ grub_md_unregister (gcry_md_spec_t *cipher)
       }
 }
 
+struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_dsa;
+struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_ecdsa;
+struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
+
 void
 grub_crypto_hash (const gcry_md_spec_t *hash, void *out, const void *in,
 		  grub_size_t inlen)
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#7 lore raw

PATCH v5 5/21 pgp: Rename OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY to OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Prior to the addition of the X.509 public key support for appended signature, current PGP signature relied on the GPG public key. Changing the enum name from "OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY" to "OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY" to differentiate between x509 certificate based appended signature and GPG certificate based PGP signature.

---
 grub-core/commands/pgp.c | 2 +-
 include/grub/kernel.h    | 2 +-
 util/grub-mkimage.c      | 2 +-
 util/mkimage.c           | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/pgp.c +1 -1
index 251ed1b06..a2549f9fd 100644
@@ -920,7 +920,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(pgp)
     grub_memset (&pseudo_file, 0, sizeof (pseudo_file));
 
     /* Not an ELF module, skip.  */
-    if (header->type != OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY)
+    if (header->type != OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY)
       continue;
 
     pseudo_file.fs = &pseudo_fs;
include/grub/kernel.h +1 -1
index 6121c1e66..885289f5d 100644
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ enum
   OBJ_TYPE_MEMDISK,
   OBJ_TYPE_CONFIG,
   OBJ_TYPE_PREFIX,
-  OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY,
+  OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY,
   OBJ_TYPE_DTB,
   OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK,
   OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_CLI
util/grub-mkimage.c +1 -1
index 275ad49bb..027c316a5 100644
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = {
    /* TRANSLATORS: "embed" is a verb (command description).  "*/
   {"config",   'c', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as an early config"), 0},
    /* TRANSLATORS: "embed" is a verb (command description).  "*/
-  {"pubkey",   'k', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as public key for signature checking"), 0},
+  {"pubkey",   'k', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as public key for PGP signature checking"), 0},
   /* TRANSLATORS: NOTE is a name of segment.  */
   {"note",   'n', 0, 0, N_("add NOTE segment for CHRP IEEE1275"), 0},
   {"output",  'o', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("output a generated image to FILE [default=stdout]"), 0},
util/mkimage.c +1 -1
index 9618b37cf..61c4e78e2 100644
@@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
 	curs = grub_util_get_image_size (pubkey_paths[i]);
 
 	header = (struct grub_module_header *) (kernel_img + offset);
-	header->type = grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY);
+	header->type = grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY);
 	header->size = grub_host_to_target32 (curs + sizeof (*header));
 	offset += sizeof (*header);
 
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#8 lore raw

PATCH v5 6/21 grub-install: Support embedding x509 certificates

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

To support verification of appended signatures, we need a way to embed the necessary public keys. Existing appended signature schemes in the Linux kernel use X.509 certificates, so allow certificates to be embedded in the GRUB core image in the same way as PGP keys.

---
 include/grub/kernel.h       |  1 +
 include/grub/util/install.h |  3 +++
 util/grub-install-common.c  | 19 +++++++++++++++++-
 util/grub-mkimage.c         | 12 +++++++++++-
 util/mkimage.c              | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 5 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/grub/kernel.h +1 -0
index 885289f5d..9f3e2031f 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ enum
   OBJ_TYPE_CONFIG,
   OBJ_TYPE_PREFIX,
   OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY,
+  OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY,
   OBJ_TYPE_DTB,
   OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK,
   OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_CLI
include/grub/util/install.h +3 -0
index a75a4f8c0..edb666bfc 100644
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@
       N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0 },				\
   { "disable-cli", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI, 0, 0,		\
     N_("disabled command line interface access"), 0 },			\
+  { "x509key",   'x', N_("FILE"), 0,					\
+      N_("embed FILE as an x509 certificate for appended signature checking"), 0}, \
   { "appended-signature-size", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE,  \
     "SIZE", 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 1}, \
   { "verbose", 'v', 0, 0,						\
@@ -196,6 +198,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
 			     const char *outname, char *mods[],
 			     char *memdisk_path, char **pubkey_paths,
 			     size_t npubkeys,
+			     char **x509key_paths, size_t nx509keys,
 			     char *config_path,
 			     const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
 			     int note, size_t appsig_size,
util/grub-install-common.c +18 -1
index 5c1a038db..5906fe570 100644
@@ -463,6 +463,8 @@ handle_install_list (struct install_list *il, const char *val,
 
 static char **pubkeys;
 static size_t npubkeys;
+static char **x509keys;
+static size_t nx509keys;
 static char *sbat;
 static int disable_shim_lock;
 static grub_compression_t compression;
@@ -511,6 +513,10 @@ grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)
     case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI:
       disable_cli = 1;
       return 1;
+    case 'x':
+      x509keys = xrealloc (x509keys, sizeof (x509keys[0]) * (nx509keys + 1));
+      x509keys[nx509keys++] = xstrdup (arg);
+      return 1;
 
     case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_VERBOSITY:
       verbosity++;
@@ -649,6 +655,9 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
   for (pk = pubkeys; pk < pubkeys + npubkeys; pk++)
     slen += sizeof (" --pubkey ''") + grub_strlen (*pk);
 
+  for (pk = x509keys; pk < x509keys + nx509keys; pk++)
+    slen += sizeof (" --x509key ''") + grub_strlen (*pk);
+
   for (md = modules.entries; *md; md++)
     slen += sizeof (" ''") + grub_strlen (*md);
 
@@ -689,6 +698,14 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
       *p++ = '\'';
     }
 
+  for (pk = x509keys; pk < x509keys + nx509keys; pk++)
+    {
+      p = grub_stpcpy (p, "--x509key '");
+      p = grub_stpcpy (p, *pk);
+      *p++ = '\'';
+      *p++ = ' ';
+    }
+
   for (md = modules.entries; *md; md++)
     {
       *p++ = ' ';
@@ -715,7 +732,7 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
 
   grub_install_generate_image (dir, prefix, fp, outname,
 			       modules.entries, memdisk_path,
-			       pubkeys, npubkeys, config_path, tgt,
+			       pubkeys, npubkeys,  x509keys, nx509keys, config_path, tgt,
 			       note, appsig_size, compression, dtb, sbat,
 			       disable_shim_lock, disable_cli);
   while (dc--)
util/grub-mkimage.c +11 -1
index 027c316a5..af75f4527 100644
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = {
   {"config",   'c', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as an early config"), 0},
    /* TRANSLATORS: "embed" is a verb (command description).  "*/
   {"pubkey",   'k', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as public key for PGP signature checking"), 0},
+  {"x509key",     'x', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as an x509 certificate for appended signature checking"), 0},
   /* TRANSLATORS: NOTE is a name of segment.  */
   {"note",   'n', 0, 0, N_("add NOTE segment for CHRP IEEE1275"), 0},
   {"output",  'o', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("output a generated image to FILE [default=stdout]"), 0},
@@ -125,6 +126,8 @@ struct arguments
   char *dtb;
   char **pubkeys;
   size_t npubkeys;
+  char **x509keys;
+  size_t nx509keys;
   char *font;
   char *config;
   char *sbat;
@@ -216,6 +219,12 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)
       arguments->pubkeys[arguments->npubkeys++] = xstrdup (arg);
       break;
 
+    case 'x':
+      arguments->x509keys = xrealloc (arguments->x509keys,
+                                      sizeof (arguments->x509keys[0]) * (arguments->nx509keys + 1));
+      arguments->x509keys[arguments->nx509keys++] = xstrdup (arg);
+      break;
+
     case 'c':
       if (arguments->config)
 	free (arguments->config);
@@ -346,7 +355,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
   grub_install_generate_image (arguments.dir, arguments.prefix, fp,
 			       arguments.output, arguments.modules,
 			       arguments.memdisk, arguments.pubkeys,
-			       arguments.npubkeys, arguments.config,
+			       arguments.npubkeys, arguments.x509keys,
+			       arguments.nx509keys, arguments.config,
 			       arguments.image_target, arguments.note,
 			       arguments.appsig_size,
 			       arguments.comp, arguments.dtb,
util/mkimage.c +38 -1
index 61c4e78e2..f364a5718 100644
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ void
 grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
 			     FILE *out, const char *outname, char *mods[],
 			     char *memdisk_path, char **pubkey_paths,
-			     size_t npubkeys, char *config_path,
+			     size_t npubkeys, char **x509key_paths, size_t nx509keys, char *config_path,
 			     const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
 			     int note, size_t appsig_size, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path,
 			     const char *sbat_path, int disable_shim_lock,
@@ -929,6 +929,24 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
       }
   }
 
+  if (nx509keys != 0 && image_target->id != IMAGE_PPC)
+    grub_util_error (_("x509 public key can be support only to appended signature"
+                       " with powerpc-ieee1275 images"));
+
+  {
+    size_t i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < nx509keys; i++)
+      {
+        size_t curs;
+
+        curs = ALIGN_ADDR (grub_util_get_image_size (x509key_paths[i]));
+        grub_util_info ("the size of x509 public key %u is 0x%" GRUB_HOST_PRIxLONG_LONG,
+                        (unsigned) i, (unsigned long long) curs);
+        total_module_size += curs + sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
+      }
+  }
+
   if (memdisk_path)
     {
       memdisk_size = ALIGN_UP(grub_util_get_image_size (memdisk_path), 512);
@@ -1065,6 +1083,25 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
       }
   }
 
+  {
+    size_t i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < nx509keys; i++)
+      {
+        size_t curs;
+        struct grub_module_header *header;
+
+        curs = grub_util_get_image_size (x509key_paths[i]);
+        header = (struct grub_module_header *) (kernel_img + offset);
+        header->type = grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY);
+        header->size = grub_host_to_target32 (curs + sizeof (*header));
+
+        offset += sizeof (*header);
+        grub_util_load_image (x509key_paths[i], kernel_img + offset);
+        offset += ALIGN_ADDR (curs);
+      }
+  }
+
   if (memdisk_path)
     {
       struct grub_module_header *header;
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#9 lore raw

PATCH v5 7/21 appended signatures: Import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

In order to parse PKCS#7 messages and X.509 certificates with libtasn1, we need some information about how they are encoded.

We get these from GNUTLS, which has the benefit that they support the features we need and are well tested.

The GNUTLS files are from:

- https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/gnutls.asn
- https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/pkix.asn

The GNUTLS license is LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3 compatible, allowing us to import it without issue.

---
 .../commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c    | 148 ++++++
 .../commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c      | 485 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 633 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c new file +148 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..efc0c145a
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <libtasn1.h>
+
+/*
+ * Imported from gnutls.asn.
+ * https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/gnutls.asn
+ */
+const asn1_static_node grub_gnutls_asn1_tab[] = {
+  { "GNUTLS", 536872976, NULL },
+  { NULL, 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "RSAPublicKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "modulus", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "publicExponent", 3, NULL },
+  { "RSAPrivateKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "version", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "modulus", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "publicExponent", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "privateExponent", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "prime1", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "prime2", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "exponent1", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "exponent2", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "coefficient", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "otherPrimeInfos", 16386, "OtherPrimeInfos"},
+  { "ProvableSeed", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "algorithm", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "seed", 7, NULL },
+  { "OtherPrimeInfos", 1612709899, NULL },
+  { "MAX", 1074266122, "1"},
+  { NULL, 2, "OtherPrimeInfo"},
+  { "OtherPrimeInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "prime", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "exponent", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "coefficient", 3, NULL },
+  { "AlgorithmIdentifier", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "algorithm", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "parameters", 541081613, NULL },
+  { "algorithm", 1, NULL },
+  { "DigestInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "digestAlgorithm", 1073741826, "DigestAlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { "digest", 7, NULL },
+  { "DigestAlgorithmIdentifier", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { "DSAPublicKey", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "DSAParameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "p", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "q", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "g", 3, NULL },
+  { "DSASignatureValue", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "r", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "s", 3, NULL },
+  { "DSAPrivateKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "version", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "p", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "q", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "g", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "Y", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "priv", 3, NULL },
+  { "DHParameter", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "prime", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "base", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "privateValueLength", 16387, NULL },
+  { "pkcs-11-ec-Parameters", 1610612754, NULL },
+  { "oId", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "curveName", 31, NULL },
+  { "ECParameters", 1610612754, NULL },
+  { "namedCurve", 12, NULL },
+  { "ECPrivateKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "Version", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "privateKey", 1073741831, NULL },
+  { "parameters", 1610637314, "ECParameters"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+  { "publicKey", 536895494, NULL },
+  { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+  { "PrincipalName", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "name-type", 1610620931, NULL },
+  { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+  { "name-string", 536879115, NULL },
+  { NULL, 1073743880, "1"},
+  { NULL, 27, NULL },
+  { "KRB5PrincipalName", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "realm", 1610620955, NULL },
+  { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+  { "principalName", 536879106, "PrincipalName"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+  { "RSAPSSParameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "hashAlgorithm", 1610637314, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+  { "maskGenAlgorithm", 1610637314, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+  { "saltLength", 1610653699, NULL },
+  { NULL, 1073741833, "20"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "2"},
+  { "trailerField", 536911875, NULL },
+  { NULL, 1073741833, "1"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "3"},
+  { "RSAOAEPParameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "hashAlgorithm", 1610637314, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+  { "maskGenAlgorithm", 1610637314, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+  { "pSourceFunc", 536895490, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "2"},
+  { "GOSTParameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "publicKeyParamSet", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "digestParamSet", 16396, NULL },
+  { "GOSTParametersOld", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "publicKeyParamSet", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "digestParamSet", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "encryptionParamSet", 16396, NULL },
+  { "GOSTPrivateKey", 1073741831, NULL },
+  { "GOSTPrivateKeyOld", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "IssuerSignTool", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "signTool", 1073741858, NULL },
+  { "cATool", 1073741858, NULL },
+  { "signToolCert", 1073741858, NULL },
+  { "cAToolCert", 34, NULL },
+  { "Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "encryptedKey", 1073741831, NULL },
+  { "maskKey", 1610637319, NULL },
+  { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+  { "macKey", 7, NULL },
+  { "SubjectPublicKeyInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "algorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { "subjectPublicKey", 6, NULL },
+  { "GostR3410-TransportParameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "encryptionParamSet", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "ephemeralPublicKey", 1610637314, "SubjectPublicKeyInfo"},
+  { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+  { "ukm", 7, NULL },
+  { "GostR3410-KeyTransport", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "sessionEncryptedKey", 1073741826, "Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey"},
+  { "transportParameters", 536895490, "GostR3410-TransportParameters"},
+  { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+  { "TPMKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "type", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "emptyAuth", 1610637316, NULL },
+  { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+  { "parent", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "pubkey", 1073741831, NULL },
+  { "privkey", 7, NULL },
+  { "MLDSAPrivateKey", 536870917, NULL },
+  { "version", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "privateKeyAlgorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { "privateKey", 1073741831, NULL },
+  { "publicKey", 536895495, NULL },
+  { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+  { NULL, 0, NULL }
+};
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c new file +485 -0

485 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#10 lore raw

PATCH v5 8/21 appended signatures: Parse ASN1 node

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

This code allows us to parse ASN1 node and allocating memory to store it. It will work for anything where the size libtasn1 returns is right:
- Integers
- Octet strings
- DER encoding of other structures
It will _not_ work for things where libtasn1 size requires adjustment:
- Strings that require an extra NULL byte at the end
- Bit strings because libtasn1 returns the length in bits, not bytes.
If the function returns a non-NULL value, the caller must free it.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 42 +++++++++
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c    | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 138 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h new file +42 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..91cc040bb
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2020, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2020, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <libtasn1.h>
+
+extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_gnutls_asn;
+extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn;
+
+/* Do libtasn1 init. */
+extern int
+asn1_init (void);
+
+/*
+ * Read a value from an ASN1 node, allocating memory to store it.
+ * It will work for anything where the size libtasn1 returns is right:
+ *  - Integers
+ *  - Octet strings
+ *  - DER encoding of other structures
+ * It will _not_ work for things where libtasn1 size requires adjustment:
+ *  - Strings that require an extra null byte at the end
+ *  - Bit strings because libtasn1 returns the length in bits, not bytes.
+ *
+ * If the function returns a non-NULL value, the caller must free it.
+ */
+extern void *
+grub_asn1_allocate_and_read (asn1_node node, const char *name, const char *friendly_name, int *content_size);
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c new file +96 -0

96 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#11 lore raw

PATCH v5 9/21 appended signatures: Parse PKCS#7 signedData

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

This code allows us to parse:

- PKCS#7 signedData messages. Only a single signerInfo is supported, which is all that the Linux sign-file utility supports creating out-of-the-box. Only RSA, SHA-256 and SHA-512 are supported. Any certificate embedded in the PKCS#7 message will be ignored.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h |  36 ++
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c       | 454 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 490 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h +36 -0
index 91cc040bb..cac7fb02c 100644
@@ -17,11 +17,47 @@
  *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  */
 
+#include <grub/crypto.h>
 #include <libtasn1.h>
 
 extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_gnutls_asn;
 extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn;
 
+#define MAX_OID_LEN 32
+
+/* A PKCS#7 signedData signerInfo. */
+struct pkcs7_signerInfo
+{
+  const gcry_md_spec_t *hash;
+  gcry_mpi_t sig_mpi;
+};
+
+/*
+ * A PKCS#7 signedData message.
+ * We make no attempt to match intelligently, so we don't save any info about
+ * the signer.
+ */
+struct pkcs7_signedData
+{
+  int signerInfo_count;
+  struct pkcs7_signerInfo *signerInfos;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Parse a PKCS#7 message, which must be a signedData message.
+ * The message must be in 'sigbuf' and of size 'data_size'. The result is
+ * placed in 'msg', which must already be allocated.
+ */
+extern grub_err_t
+parse_pkcs7_signedData (const void *sigbuf, grub_size_t data_size, struct pkcs7_signedData *msg);
+
+/*
+ * Release all the storage associated with the PKCS#7 message.
+ * If the caller dynamically allocated the message, it must free it.
+ */
+extern void
+pkcs7_signedData_release (struct pkcs7_signedData *msg);
+
 /* Do libtasn1 init. */
 extern int
 asn1_init (void);
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c new file +454 -0

454 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#12 lore raw

PATCH v5 10/21 appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

This code allows us to parse:

- X.509 certificates: at least enough to verify the signatures on the PKCS#7 messages. We expect that the certificates embedded in GRUB will be leaf certificates, not CA certificates. The parser enforces this.

- X.509 certificates support the Extended Key Usage extension and handle it by verifying that the certificate has a Code Signing usage.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h |  30 +
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c        | 953 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 983 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h +30 -0
index cac7fb02c..289121a4d 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,21 @@ extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn;
 
 #define MAX_OID_LEN 32
 
+/*
+ * One or more x509 certificates.
+ * We do limited parsing: extracting only the serial, CN and RSA public key.
+ */
+struct x509_certificate
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *next;
+  grub_uint8_t *serial;
+  grub_size_t serial_len;
+  char *subject;
+  grub_size_t subject_len;
+  /* We only support RSA public keys. This encodes [modulus, publicExponent]. */
+  gcry_mpi_t mpis[2];
+};
+
 /* A PKCS#7 signedData signerInfo. */
 struct pkcs7_signerInfo
 {
@@ -43,6 +58,21 @@ struct pkcs7_signedData
   struct pkcs7_signerInfo *signerInfos;
 };
 
+/*
+ * Import a DER-encoded certificate at 'data', of size 'size'.
+ * Place the results into 'results', which must be already allocated.
+ */
+extern grub_err_t
+parse_x509_certificate (const void *data, grub_size_t size, struct x509_certificate *results);
+
+/*
+ * Release all the storage associated with the x509 certificate.
+ * If the caller dynamically allocated the certificate, it must free it.
+ * The caller is also responsible for maintenance of the linked list.
+ */
+extern void
+certificate_release (struct x509_certificate *cert);
+
 /*
  * Parse a PKCS#7 message, which must be a signedData message.
  * The message must be in 'sigbuf' and of size 'data_size'. The result is
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c new file +953 -0

953 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 10/21] appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates

Quoted 16 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

This code allows us to parse:

- X.509 certificates: at least enough to verify the signatures on the PKCS#7 messages. We expect that the certificates embedded in GRUB will be leaf certificates, not CA certificates. The parser enforces this.

- X.509 certificates support the Extended Key Usage extension and handle it by verifying that the certificate has a Code Signing usage.

[...]

Quoted 30 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c new file +30 -0
+static grub_err_t
+grub_x509_read_subject_public_key (asn1_node asn, struct x509_certificate *results)
+{
+  int result;
+  grub_err_t err;
+  const char *algo_name = "tbsCertificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm.algorithm";
+  const char *params_name = "tbsCertificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm.parameters";
+  const char *pk_name = "tbsCertificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo.subjectPublicKey";
+  char algo_oid[MAX_OID_LEN];
+  int algo_size = sizeof (algo_oid);
+  char params_value[2];
+  int params_size = sizeof (params_value);
+  grub_uint8_t *key_data = NULL;
+  int key_size = 0;
+  unsigned int key_type;
+
+  /* Algorithm: see notes for rsaEncryption_oid. */
+  result = asn1_read_value (asn, algo_name, algo_oid, &algo_size);
+  if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading x509 public key algorithm: %s",
+                       asn1_strerror (result));
+
+  if (grub_strncmp (algo_oid, rsaEncryption_oid, sizeof (rsaEncryption_oid)) != 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET,
+                       "unsupported x509 public key algorithm: %s", algo_oid);
+
+  /*
+   * RFC 3279 2.3.1
+   * The rsaEncryption OID is intended to be used in the algorithm field
+   * of a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier.  The parameters field MUST

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c line 188

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c new file +10 -0
+   * have ASN.1 type NULL for this algorithm identifier.
+   */
+  result = asn1_read_value (asn, params_name, params_value, &params_size);
+  if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "error reading x509 public key parameters: %s",
+                       asn1_strerror (result));
+
+  if (params_value[0] != ASN1_TAG_NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
+                       "invalid x509 public key parameters: expected NULL.");

Error messages does not end with full stop. I saw it in a few places here. Please fix it in all patches if needed. If you do that you can retain my RB...

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#14 lore raw

PATCH v5 11/21 appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Building on the parsers and the ability to embed x509 certificates, as well as the existing gcrypt functionality, add a module for verifying appended signatures.

This includes a verifier that requires that Linux kernels and grub modules have appended signatures, and commands to manage the list of trusted certificates for verification.

Verification must be enabled by setting check_appended_signatures. If GRUB is locked down when the module is loaded, verification will be enabled and locked automatically.

As with the PGP verifier, it is not a complete secure-boot solution:
other mechanisms, such as a password or lockdown, must be used to ensure that a user cannot drop to the GRUB shell and disable verification.

---
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def                  |  14 +
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 608 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/grub/file.h                          |   2 +
 3 files changed, 624 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +14 -0
index b3f71196a..7520296a6 100644
@@ -979,6 +979,20 @@ module = {
   cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY)';
 };
 
+module = {
+  name = appendedsig;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/x509.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c;
+  enable = powerpc_ieee1275;
+  cflags = '$(CFLAGS_GCRY) -Wno-redundant-decls';
+  cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY) -I$(srcdir)/lib/libtasn1-grub';
+  depends = crypto, gcry_rsa, gcry_sha256, gcry_sha512, mpi, asn1;
+};
+
 module = {
   name = hdparm;
   common = commands/hdparm.c;
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +608 -0

608 lines not on this page · raw message

include/grub/file.h +2 -0
index a5bf3a792..d678de063 100644
@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ enum grub_file_type
     GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY,
     /* File holding public key to add to trused keys.  */
     GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_TRUST,
+    /* File holding x509 certificiate to add to trusted keys.  */
+    GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_TRUST,
     /* File of which we intend to print a blocklist to the user.  */
     GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PRINT_BLOCKLIST,
     /* File we intend to use for test loading or testing speed.  */
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 11/21] appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures

Quoted 5 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Building on the parsers and the ability to embed x509 certificates, as well as the existing gcrypt functionality, add a module for verifying appended signatures.

This includes a verifier that requires that Linux kernels and grub modules

s/grub/GRUB/ this is not fixed in many places in many patches. Please fix that everywhere...

Quoted 120 lines

have appended signatures, and commands to manage the list of trusted certificates for verification.

Verification must be enabled by setting check_appended_signatures. If GRUB is locked down when the module is loaded, verification will be enabled and locked automatically.

As with the PGP verifier, it is not a complete secure-boot solution:
other mechanisms, such as a password or lockdown, must be used to ensure that a user cannot drop to the GRUB shell and disable verification.

---
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def                  |  14 +
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 608 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/grub/file.h                          |   2 +
 3 files changed, 624 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +14 -0
index b3f71196a..7520296a6 100644
@@ -979,6 +979,20 @@ module = {
   cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY)';
 };
 
+module = {
+  name = appendedsig;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/x509.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c;
+  enable = powerpc_ieee1275;
+  cflags = '$(CFLAGS_GCRY) -Wno-redundant-decls';
+  cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY) -I$(srcdir)/lib/libtasn1-grub';
+  depends = crypto, gcry_rsa, gcry_sha256, gcry_sha512, mpi, asn1;
+};
+
 module = {
   name = hdparm;
   common = commands/hdparm.c;
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +67 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d1149695b
@@ -0,0 +1,608 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/err.h>
+#include <grub/dl.h>
+#include <grub/file.h>
+#include <grub/command.h>
+#include <grub/crypto.h>
+#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/gcrypt/gcrypt.h>
+#include <grub/kernel.h>
+#include <grub/extcmd.h>
+#include <grub/verify.h>
+#include <libtasn1.h>
+#include <grub/env.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
+
+#include "appendedsig.h"
+
+GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+
+/* Public key type. */
+#define GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
+
+/* Appended signature magic string. */
+static const char magic[] = "~Module signature appended~\n";
+
+/*
+ * This structure is extracted from scripts/sign-file.c in the linux kernel
+ * source. It was licensed as LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3+ compatible.
+ */
+struct module_signature
+{
+  grub_uint8_t algo;       /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0]. */
+  grub_uint8_t hash;       /* Digest algorithm [0]. */
+  grub_uint8_t id_type;    /* Key identifier type [GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7]. */
+  grub_uint8_t signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0]. */
+  grub_uint8_t key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0]. */
+  grub_uint8_t __pad[3];
+  grub_uint32_t sig_len;   /* Length of signature data. */
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+
+/* This represents an entire, parsed, appended signature. */
+struct grub_appended_signature
+{
+  grub_size_t signature_len;            /* Length of PKCS#7 data + metadata + magic. */
+  struct module_signature sig_metadata; /* Module signature metadata. */
+  struct pkcs7_signedData pkcs7;        /* Parsed PKCS#7 data. */

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 77

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +10 -0
+};
+
+/* Trusted certificates for verifying appended signatures. */
+struct x509_certificate *db;
+
+static enum
+{
+  CHECK_SIGS_NO = 0,
+  CHECK_SIGS_ENFORCE = 1,
+  CHECK_SIGS_FORCED = 2

Is there any particular reason to have values assigned to constants? If not please drop all of them.

And I think difference between CHECK_SIGS_ENFORCE and CHECK_SIGS_FORCED should be explained. If they are really different...

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 86

Quoted 9 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +9 -0
+} check_sigs = CHECK_SIGS_NO;
+
+static const char *
+grub_env_read_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),
+                   const char *val __attribute__ ((unused)))
+{
+  if (check_sigs == CHECK_SIGS_FORCED)
+    return "forced";
+  else if (check_sigs == CHECK_SIGS_ENFORCE)

You can drop "else" here...

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 89

Quoted 3 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +3 -0
+    return "enforce";
+
+  return "no";

I have an impression that these values are not fully documented. And they should be...

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 102

Quoted 13 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +13 -0
+}
+
+static char *
+grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const char *val)
+{
+  char *ret;
+
+  /* Do not allow the value to be changed if set to forced. */
+  if (check_sigs == CHECK_SIGS_FORCED)
+    {
+      ret = grub_strdup ("forced");
+      if (ret == NULL)
+        grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "could not duplicate a string forced.");

s/."/"/ here and everywhere...

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +10 -0
+      return ret;
+    }
+
+  if ((*val == '2') || (*val == 'f'))
+    check_sigs = CHECK_SIGS_FORCED;
+  else if ((*val == '1') || (*val == 'e'))
+    check_sigs = CHECK_SIGS_ENFORCE;
+  else if ((*val == '0') || (*val == 'n'))
+    check_sigs = CHECK_SIGS_NO;
+

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 123

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +10 -0
+  ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_sec (NULL, NULL));
+  if (ret == NULL)
+    grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "could not duplicate a string %s",
+                grub_env_read_sec (NULL, NULL));
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+file_read_all (grub_file_t file, grub_uint8_t **buf, grub_size_t *len)

s/file_read_all/file_read_whole/

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#16 lore raw

PATCH v5 12/21 appended signatures: Verification tests

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>

These tests are run through all_functional_test and test a range of commands and behaviours.

---
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def               |   7 +
 grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c | 250 ++++++
 grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h     | 975 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c     |   5 +
 4 files changed, 1237 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +7 -0
index 7520296a6..effaa303c 100644
@@ -2210,6 +2210,13 @@ module = {
   cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY)';
 };
 
+module = {
+  name = appended_signature_test;
+  common = tests/appended_signature_test.c;
+  common = tests/appended_signatures.h;
+  enable = powerpc_ieee1275;
+};
+
 module = {
   name = signature_test;
   common = tests/signature_test.c;
grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c new file +250 -0

250 lines not on this page · raw message

grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h new file +975 -0

975 lines not on this page · raw message

grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c +5 -0
index 38e981f2c..e71f53758 100644
@@ -73,6 +73,11 @@ grub_functional_all_tests (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt __attribute__ ((unused)),
   grub_dl_load ("xnu_uuid_test");
   grub_dl_load ("pbkdf2_test");
   grub_dl_load ("signature_test");
+
+#if defined(__powerpc__)
+  grub_dl_load ("appended_signature_test");
+#endif
+
   grub_dl_load ("sleep_test");
   grub_dl_load ("bswap_test");
   grub_dl_load ("ctz_test");
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#17 lore raw

PATCH v5 13/21 appended signatures: Documentation

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>

This explains how appended signatures can be used to form part of a secure boot chain, and documents the commands and variables introduced.

---
 docs/grub.texi | 189 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 168 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
docs/grub.texi +168 -21
index d594e29bd..494e2eada 100644
@@ -3281,6 +3281,7 @@ These variables have special meaning to GRUB.
 
 @menu
 * biosnum::
+* check_appended_signatures::
 * check_signatures::
 * chosen::
 * cmdpath::
@@ -3343,12 +3344,16 @@ this.
 For an alternative approach which also changes BIOS drive mappings for the
 chain-loaded system, @pxref{drivemap}.
 
+@node check_appended_signatures
+@subsection check_appended_signatures
+This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation on
+loaded vmlinux file. @xref{Using appended signatures}.
 
 @node check_signatures
 @subsection check_signatures
 
-This variable controls whether GRUB enforces digital signature
-validation on loaded files. @xref{Using digital signatures}.
+This variable controls whether GRUB enforces GPG-style digital signature
+validation on loaded files. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}.
 
 @node chosen
 @subsection chosen
@@ -6414,6 +6419,10 @@ you forget a command, you can run the command @command{help}
 @menu
 * [::                           Check file types and compare values
 * acpi::                        Load ACPI tables
+* append_add_db_cert::          Add an X.509 certificate to the db list
+* append_list_db::              List trusted certificates from the db list
+* append_rm_dbx_cert::          Remove a certificate from the db list
+* append_verify::               Verify appended digital signature using db list
 * authenticate::                Check whether user is in user list
 * background_color::            Set background color for active terminal
 * background_image::            Load background image for active terminal
@@ -6535,6 +6544,68 @@ Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}).
       unsigned code.
 @end deffn
 
+@node append_add_db_cert
+@subsection append_add_db_cert
+
+@deffn Command append_add_db_cert X509_certificate
+Read a DER-formatted X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate}
+and add it to GRUB's internal db list of trusted X.509 certificates. These
+certificates are used to validate appended signatures when the environment
+variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}.
+
+Note that if @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
+when @command{append_add_db_cert} is executed, then @var{X509_certificate}
+must itself bear an appended signature. (It is not sufficient that
+@var{X509_certificate} be signed by a trusted certificate according to the
+X.509 rules: GRUB does not include support for validating signatures within X.509
+certificates themselves.)
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_list_db
+@subsection append_list_db
+
+@deffn Command append_list_db
+List all X.509 certificates trusted by GRUB for validating appended signatures.
+The output is a numbered list of certificates, showing the certificate's serial
+number and Common Name.
+
+The certificate number can be used as an argument to
+@command{append_rm_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_rm_dbx_cert
+@subsection append_rm_dbx_cert
+
+@deffn Command append_rm_dbx_cert cert_number
+Remove the X.509 certificate numbered @var{cert_number} from GRUB's keyring of
+db for verifying appended signatures.
+
+@var{cert_number} is the certificate number as listed by
+@command{append_list_db} (@pxref{append_list_db}).
+
+These certificates are used to validate appended signatures when environment
+variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
+(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}), and by @command{append_verify}
+(@pxref{append_verify}). See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more
+information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_verify
+@subsection append_verify
+
+@deffn Command append_verify file
+Verifies an appended signature on @var{file} against the trusted X.509 certificates
+known to GRUB (See @pxref{append_list_db}, @pxref{append_add_db_cert}, and
+@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
+Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates
+successfully.  If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures}, for more information.
+@end deffn
 
 @node authenticate
 @subsection authenticate
@@ -6854,7 +6925,7 @@ These keys are used to validate signatures when environment variable
 @code{check_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
 (@pxref{check_signatures}), and by some invocations of
 @command{verify_detached} (@pxref{verify_detached}).  @xref{Using
-digital signatures}, for more information.
+GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.
 @end deffn
 
 @node drivemap
@@ -7250,7 +7321,6 @@ without any options, the @command{keystatus} command returns true if and
 only if checking key modifier status is supported.
 @end deffn
 
-
 @node list_env
 @subsection list_env
 
@@ -7270,7 +7340,7 @@ The output is in GPG's v4 key fingerprint format (i.e., the output of
 @code{gpg --fingerprint}).  The least significant four bytes (last
 eight hexadecimal digits) can be used as an argument to
 @command{distrust} (@pxref{distrust}).
-@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information about uses for
+@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information about uses for
 these keys.
 @end deffn
 
@@ -7305,8 +7375,11 @@ When used with care, @option{--skip-sig} and the whitelist enable an
 administrator to configure a system to boot only signed
 configurations, but to allow the user to select from among multiple
 configurations, and to enable ``one-shot'' boot attempts and
-``savedefault'' behavior.  @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more
+``savedefault'' behavior.  @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more
 information.
+Extra care should be taken when combining this command with appended signatures
+(@pxref{Using appended signatures}), as this file is not validated by an
+appended signature and could set @code{check_appended_signatures=no}.
 @end deffn
 
 
@@ -7677,7 +7750,7 @@ read.  It is possible to modify a digitally signed environment block
 file from within GRUB using this command, such that its signature will
 no longer be valid on subsequent boots.  Care should be taken in such
 advanced configurations to avoid rendering the system
-unbootable. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information.
+unbootable. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.
 @end deffn
 
 
@@ -8167,11 +8240,10 @@ signatures when environment variable @code{check_signatures} is set to
 must itself be properly signed.  The @option{--skip-sig} option can be
 used to disable signature-checking when reading @var{pubkey_file}
 itself. It is expected that @option{--skip-sig} is useful for testing
-and manual booting. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more
+and manual booting. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more
 information.
 @end deffn
 
-
 @node unset
 @subsection unset
 
@@ -8190,7 +8262,6 @@ only on PC BIOS platforms.
 @end deffn
 @end ignore
 
-
 @node verify_detached
 @subsection verify_detached
 
@@ -8208,7 +8279,7 @@ tried.
 
 Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates
 successfully.  If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
-@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information.
+@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.
 @end deffn
 
 @node videoinfo
@@ -8668,14 +8739,15 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order.
 @chapter Security
 
 @menu
-* Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control
-* Using digital signatures::         Booting digitally signed code
-* UEFI secure boot and shim::        Booting digitally signed PE files
-* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting::   Embedded information for generation number based revocation
-* Measured Boot::                    Measuring boot components
-* Lockdown::                         Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
-* TPM2 key protector::               Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
-* Signing GRUB itself::              Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image
+* Authentication and authorisation::   Users and access control
+* Using GPG-style digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code
+* Using appended signatures::          An alternative approach to booting digitally signed code
+* UEFI secure boot and shim::          Booting digitally signed PE files
+* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting::     Embedded information for generation number based revocation
+* Measured Boot::                      Measuring boot components
+* Lockdown::                           Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
+* TPM2 key protector::                 Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
+* Signing GRUB itself::                Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image
 @end menu
 
 @node Authentication and authorisation
@@ -8751,8 +8823,8 @@ generating configuration files with authentication.  You can use
 adding @kbd{set superusers=} and @kbd{password} or @kbd{password_pbkdf2}
 commands.
 
-@node Using digital signatures
-@section Using digital signatures in GRUB
+@node Using GPG-style digital signatures
+@section Using GPG-style digital signatures in GRUB
 
 GRUB's @file{core.img} can optionally provide enforcement that all files
 subsequently read from disk are covered by a valid digital signature.
@@ -8835,6 +8907,81 @@ or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different
 (attacker-controlled) device.  GRUB is at best only one link in a
 secure boot chain.
 
+@node Using appended signatures
+@section Using appended signatures in GRUB
+
+GRUB supports verifying Linux-style 'appended signatures' for secure boot.
+Appended signatures are PKCS#7 messages containing a signature over the
+contents of a file, plus some metadata, appended to the end of a file. A file
+with an appended signature ends with the magic string:
+
+@example
+~Module signature appended~\n
+@end example
+
+where @code{\n} represents the line feed character, @code{0x0a}.
+
+To enable appended signature verification, load the appendedsig module and an
+x509 certificate for verification. Building the appendedsig module into the
+core grub image is recommended.
+
+Certificates can be managed at boot time using the @pxref{append_add_db_cert},
+@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert} and @pxref{append_list_db} commands.
+Certificates can also be built in to the core image using the @code{--x509}
+parameter to @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}.
+A file can be explicitly verified using the @pxref{append_verify} command.
+
+Only signatures made with the SHA-256 or SHA-512 hash algorithm are supported,
+and only RSA signatures are supported.
+
+A file can be signed with the @command{sign-file} utility supplied with the
+Linux kernel source. For example, if you have @code{signing.key} as the private
+key and @code{certificate.der} as the x509 certificate containing the public key:
+
+@example
+sign-file SHA256 signing.key certificate.der vmlinux vmlinux.signed
+@end example
+
+Enforcement of signature verification is controlled by the
+@code{check_appended_signatures} variable. Verification will only take place
+when files are loaded if the variable is set to @code{enforce}. If a
+certificate is built into the grub core image with the @code{--x509} parameter,
+the variable will be automatically set to @code{enforce} when the appendedsig
+module is loaded.
+
+Unlike GPG-style signatures, not all files loaded by GRUB are required to be
+signed. Once verification is turned on, the following file types must carry
+appended signatures:
+
+@enumerate
+@item Linux, Multiboot, BSD, XNU and Plan9 kernels
+@item Grub modules, except those built in to the core image
+@item Any new certificate files to be trusted
+@end enumerate
+
+ACPI tables and Device Tree images will not be checked for appended signatures
+but must be verified by another mechanism such as GPG-style signatures before
+they will be loaded.
+
+No attempt is made to validate any other file type. In particular,
+chain-loaded binaries are not verified - if your platform supports
+chain-loading and this cannot be disabled, consider an alternative secure
+boot mechanism.
+
+As with GPG-style appended signatures, signature checking does @strong{not}
+stop an attacker with console access from dropping manually to the GRUB
+console and executing:
+
+@example
+set check_appended_signatures=no
+@end example
+
+Refer to the section on password-protecting GRUB (@pxref{Authentication
+and authorisation}) for more information on preventing this.
+
+Additionally, special care must be taken around the @command{loadenv} command,
+which can be used to turn off @code{check_appended_signature}.
+
 @node UEFI secure boot and shim
 @section UEFI secure boot and shim support
 
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 13/21] appended signatures: Documentation

Quoted 104 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>

This explains how appended signatures can be used to form part of a secure boot chain, and documents the commands and variables introduced.

---
 docs/grub.texi | 189 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 168 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
docs/grub.texi +55 -2
index d594e29bd..494e2eada 100644
@@ -3281,6 +3281,7 @@ These variables have special meaning to GRUB.
 
 @menu
 * biosnum::
+* check_appended_signatures::
 * check_signatures::
 * chosen::
 * cmdpath::
@@ -3343,12 +3344,16 @@ this.
 For an alternative approach which also changes BIOS drive mappings for the
 chain-loaded system, @pxref{drivemap}.
 
+@node check_appended_signatures
+@subsection check_appended_signatures
+This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation on
+loaded vmlinux file. @xref{Using appended signatures}.
 
 @node check_signatures
 @subsection check_signatures
 
-This variable controls whether GRUB enforces digital signature
-validation on loaded files. @xref{Using digital signatures}.
+This variable controls whether GRUB enforces GPG-style digital signature
+validation on loaded files. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}.
 
 @node chosen
 @subsection chosen
@@ -6414,6 +6419,10 @@ you forget a command, you can run the command @command{help}
 @menu
 * [::                           Check file types and compare values
 * acpi::                        Load ACPI tables
+* append_add_db_cert::          Add an X.509 certificate to the db list
+* append_list_db::              List trusted certificates from the db list
+* append_rm_dbx_cert::          Remove a certificate from the db list
+* append_verify::               Verify appended digital signature using db list
 * authenticate::                Check whether user is in user list
 * background_color::            Set background color for active terminal
 * background_image::            Load background image for active terminal
@@ -6535,6 +6544,68 @@ Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}).
       unsigned code.
 @end deffn
 
+@node append_add_db_cert
+@subsection append_add_db_cert
+
+@deffn Command append_add_db_cert X509_certificate
+Read a DER-formatted X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate}
+and add it to GRUB's internal db list of trusted X.509 certificates. These
+certificates are used to validate appended signatures when the environment
+variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}.
+
+Note that if @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
+when @command{append_add_db_cert} is executed, then @var{X509_certificate}
+must itself bear an appended signature. (It is not sufficient that
+@var{X509_certificate} be signed by a trusted certificate according to the
+X.509 rules: GRUB does not include support for validating signatures within X.509
+certificates themselves.)
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_list_db
+@subsection append_list_db
+
+@deffn Command append_list_db
+List all X.509 certificates trusted by GRUB for validating appended signatures.
+The output is a numbered list of certificates, showing the certificate's serial
+number and Common Name.
+
+The certificate number can be used as an argument to
+@command{append_rm_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_rm_dbx_cert
+@subsection append_rm_dbx_cert
+
+@deffn Command append_rm_dbx_cert cert_number
+Remove the X.509 certificate numbered @var{cert_number} from GRUB's keyring of
+db for verifying appended signatures.
+
+@var{cert_number} is the certificate number as listed by
+@command{append_list_db} (@pxref{append_list_db}).
+
+These certificates are used to validate appended signatures when environment

docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6600

Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10 -0
+variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
+(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}), and by @command{append_verify}
+(@pxref{append_verify}). See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more
+information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_verify
+@subsection append_verify
+
+@deffn Command append_verify file

I suggest to use "<>" to mark arguments which gets a value, e.g.: append_verify <file> Please fix this in whole documentation...

docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6601

Quoted 1 line
docs/grub.texi +1 -0
+Verifies an appended signature on @var{file} against the trusted X.509 certificates

s/file/<file>

Quoted 50 lines
docs/grub.texi +13 -4
+known to GRUB (See @pxref{append_list_db}, @pxref{append_add_db_cert}, and
+@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
+Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates
+successfully.  If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures}, for more information.
+@end deffn
 
 @node authenticate
 @subsection authenticate
@@ -6854,7 +6925,7 @@ These keys are used to validate signatures when environment variable
 @code{check_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
 (@pxref{check_signatures}), and by some invocations of
 @command{verify_detached} (@pxref{verify_detached}).  @xref{Using
-digital signatures}, for more information.
+GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.
 @end deffn
 
 @node drivemap
@@ -7250,7 +7321,6 @@ without any options, the @command{keystatus} command returns true if and
 only if checking key modifier status is supported.
 @end deffn
 
-
 @node list_env
 @subsection list_env
 
@@ -7270,7 +7340,7 @@ The output is in GPG's v4 key fingerprint format (i.e., the output of
 @code{gpg --fingerprint}).  The least significant four bytes (last
 eight hexadecimal digits) can be used as an argument to
 @command{distrust} (@pxref{distrust}).
-@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information about uses for
+@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information about uses for
 these keys.
 @end deffn
 
@@ -7305,8 +7375,11 @@ When used with care, @option{--skip-sig} and the whitelist enable an
 administrator to configure a system to boot only signed
 configurations, but to allow the user to select from among multiple
 configurations, and to enable ``one-shot'' boot attempts and
-``savedefault'' behavior.  @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more
+``savedefault'' behavior.  @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more
 information.
+Extra care should be taken when combining this command with appended signatures
+(@pxref{Using appended signatures}), as this file is not validated by an
+appended signature and could set @code{check_appended_signatures=no}.
 @end deffn
 
 

docs/grub.texi read. It is possible to modify a digitally signed environment block · line 7753

Quoted 5 lines
docs/grub.texi +1 -1
@@ -7677,7 +7750,7 @@ read.  It is possible to modify a digitally signed environment block
 file from within GRUB using this command, such that its signature will
 no longer be valid on subsequent boots.  Care should be taken in such
 advanced configurations to avoid rendering the system
-unbootable. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information.
+unbootable. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.

I suggest to move all GPG documentation changes to separate patch.

docs/grub.texi signatures when environment variable @code{check_signatures} is set to · line 8243

Quoted 9 lines
docs/grub.texi +1 -1
 @end deffn
 
 
@@ -8167,11 +8240,10 @@ signatures when environment variable @code{check_signatures} is set to
 must itself be properly signed.  The @option{--skip-sig} option can be
 used to disable signature-checking when reading @var{pubkey_file}
 itself. It is expected that @option{--skip-sig} is useful for testing
-and manual booting. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more
+and manual booting. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more

Ditto and below...

docs/grub.texi signatures when environment variable @code{check_signatures} is set to · line 8174

Quoted 4 lines
docs/grub.texi +0 -1
 information.
 @end deffn
 
-

This and similar cleanups can be a part of GPG change set but they have to be mentioned in the commit message.

docs/grub.texi only on PC BIOS platforms. · line 8193

Quoted 8 lines
docs/grub.texi +0 -1
 @node unset
 @subsection unset
 
@@ -8190,7 +8262,6 @@ only on PC BIOS platforms.
 @end deffn
 @end ignore
 
-

Ditto...

Quoted 58 lines
docs/grub.texi +19 -11
 @node verify_detached
 @subsection verify_detached
 
@@ -8208,7 +8279,7 @@ tried.
 
 Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates
 successfully.  If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
-@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information.
+@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.
 @end deffn
 
 @node videoinfo
@@ -8668,14 +8739,15 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order.
 @chapter Security
 
 @menu
-* Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control
-* Using digital signatures::         Booting digitally signed code
-* UEFI secure boot and shim::        Booting digitally signed PE files
-* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting::   Embedded information for generation number based revocation
-* Measured Boot::                    Measuring boot components
-* Lockdown::                         Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
-* TPM2 key protector::               Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
-* Signing GRUB itself::              Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image
+* Authentication and authorisation::   Users and access control
+* Using GPG-style digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code
+* Using appended signatures::          An alternative approach to booting digitally signed code
+* UEFI secure boot and shim::          Booting digitally signed PE files
+* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting::     Embedded information for generation number based revocation
+* Measured Boot::                      Measuring boot components
+* Lockdown::                           Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
+* TPM2 key protector::                 Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
+* Signing GRUB itself::                Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image
 @end menu
 
 @node Authentication and authorisation
@@ -8751,8 +8823,8 @@ generating configuration files with authentication.  You can use
 adding @kbd{set superusers=} and @kbd{password} or @kbd{password_pbkdf2}
 commands.
 
-@node Using digital signatures
-@section Using digital signatures in GRUB
+@node Using GPG-style digital signatures
+@section Using GPG-style digital signatures in GRUB
 
 GRUB's @file{core.img} can optionally provide enforcement that all files
 subsequently read from disk are covered by a valid digital signature.
@@ -8835,6 +8907,81 @@ or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different
 (attacker-controlled) device.  GRUB is at best only one link in a
 secure boot chain.
 
+@node Using appended signatures
+@section Using appended signatures in GRUB
+
+GRUB supports verifying Linux-style 'appended signatures' for secure boot.
+Appended signatures are PKCS#7 messages containing a signature over the
+contents of a file, plus some metadata, appended to the end of a file. A file
+with an appended signature ends with the magic string:

docs/grub.texi or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different · line 8926

Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10 -0
+
+@example
+~Module signature appended~\n
+@end example
+
+where @code{\n} represents the line feed character, @code{0x0a}.
+
+To enable appended signature verification, load the appendedsig module and an
+x509 certificate for verification. Building the appendedsig module into the
+core grub image is recommended.

s/grub/GRUB/...

Quoted 21 lines
docs/grub.texi +21 -0
+Certificates can be managed at boot time using the @pxref{append_add_db_cert},
+@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert} and @pxref{append_list_db} commands.
+Certificates can also be built in to the core image using the @code{--x509}
+parameter to @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}.
+A file can be explicitly verified using the @pxref{append_verify} command.
+
+Only signatures made with the SHA-256 or SHA-512 hash algorithm are supported,
+and only RSA signatures are supported.
+
+A file can be signed with the @command{sign-file} utility supplied with the
+Linux kernel source. For example, if you have @code{signing.key} as the private
+key and @code{certificate.der} as the x509 certificate containing the public key:
+
+@example
+sign-file SHA256 signing.key certificate.der vmlinux vmlinux.signed
+@end example
+
+Enforcement of signature verification is controlled by the
+@code{check_appended_signatures} variable. Verification will only take place
+when files are loaded if the variable is set to @code{enforce}. If a
+certificate is built into the grub core image with the @code{--x509} parameter,

docs/grub.texi or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different · line 8958

Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10 -0
+the variable will be automatically set to @code{enforce} when the appendedsig
+module is loaded.
+
+Unlike GPG-style signatures, not all files loaded by GRUB are required to be
+signed. Once verification is turned on, the following file types must carry
+appended signatures:
+
+@enumerate
+@item Linux, Multiboot, BSD, XNU and Plan9 kernels
+@item Grub modules, except those built in to the core image

s/Grub/GRUB/...

Quoted 18 lines
docs/grub.texi +18 -0
+@item Any new certificate files to be trusted
+@end enumerate
+
+ACPI tables and Device Tree images will not be checked for appended signatures
+but must be verified by another mechanism such as GPG-style signatures before
+they will be loaded.
+
+No attempt is made to validate any other file type. In particular,
+chain-loaded binaries are not verified - if your platform supports
+chain-loading and this cannot be disabled, consider an alternative secure
+boot mechanism.
+
+As with GPG-style appended signatures, signature checking does @strong{not}
+stop an attacker with console access from dropping manually to the GRUB
+console and executing:
+
+@example
+set check_appended_signatures=no

docs/grub.texi or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different · line 8986

Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +8 -0
+@end example
+
+Refer to the section on password-protecting GRUB (@pxref{Authentication
+and authorisation}) for more information on preventing this.
+
+Additionally, special care must be taken around the @command{loadenv} command,
+which can be used to turn off @code{check_appended_signature}.
+
 @node UEFI secure boot and shim
 @section UEFI secure boot and shim support

May I ask you to put all documentation patches in one group at the end of the patch set? Same applies to tests patches. I think they should land before documentation patches...

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#19 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 13/21] appended signatures: Documentation

Quoted 114 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 109 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>

This explains how appended signatures can be used to form part of a secure boot chain, and documents the commands and variables introduced.

---
docs/grub.texi | 189 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------

1 file changed, 168 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
docs/grub.texi +0 -0
index d594e29bd..494e2eada 100644
@@ -3281,6 +3281,7 @@ These variables have special meaning to GRUB.
 

@menu
* biosnum::
+* check_appended_signatures::
* check_signatures::
* chosen::
* cmdpath::

docs/grub.texi +0 -0
@@ -3343,12 +3344,16 @@ this.

For an alternative approach which also changes BIOS drive mappings for the chain-loaded system, @pxref{drivemap}.

+@node check_appended_signatures
+@subsection check_appended_signatures

docs/grub.texi +2 -0
+This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation on
+loaded vmlinux file. @xref{Using appended signatures}.

@node check_signatures
@subsection check_signatures

docs/grub.texi +2 -2
-This variable controls whether GRUB enforces digital signature
-validation on loaded files. @xref{Using digital signatures}.
+This variable controls whether GRUB enforces GPG-style digital signature
+validation on loaded files. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}.

@node chosen
@subsection chosen

docs/grub.texi +0 -0
@@ -6414,6 +6419,10 @@ you forget a command, you can run the command @command{help}

@menu
* [:: Check file types and compare values
* acpi:: Load ACPI tables

docs/grub.texi +4 -0
+* append_add_db_cert::          Add an X.509 certificate to the db list
+* append_list_db::              List trusted certificates from the db list
+* append_rm_dbx_cert::          Remove a certificate from the db list
+* append_verify::               Verify appended digital signature using db list
* authenticate::                Check whether user is in user list
* background_color::            Set background color for active terminal
* background_image::            Load background image for active terminal
docs/grub.texi +0 -0
@@ -6535,6 +6544,68 @@ Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}).
      unsigned code.

@end deffn

+@node append_add_db_cert
+@subsection append_add_db_cert

docs/grub.texi +47 -0
+
+@deffn Command append_add_db_cert X509_certificate
+Read a DER-formatted X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate}
+and add it to GRUB's internal db list of trusted X.509 certificates. These
+certificates are used to validate appended signatures when the environment
+variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}.
+
+Note that if @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
+when @command{append_add_db_cert} is executed, then @var{X509_certificate}
+must itself bear an appended signature. (It is not sufficient that
+@var{X509_certificate} be signed by a trusted certificate according to the
+X.509 rules: GRUB does not include support for validating signatures within X.509
+certificates themselves.)
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_list_db
+@subsection append_list_db
+
+@deffn Command append_list_db
+List all X.509 certificates trusted by GRUB for validating appended signatures.
+The output is a numbered list of certificates, showing the certificate's serial
+number and Common Name.
+
+The certificate number can be used as an argument to
+@command{append_rm_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_rm_dbx_cert
+@subsection append_rm_dbx_cert
+
+@deffn Command append_rm_dbx_cert cert_number
+Remove the X.509 certificate numbered @var{cert_number} from GRUB's keyring of
+db for verifying appended signatures.
+
+@var{cert_number} is the certificate number as listed by
+@command{append_list_db} (@pxref{append_list_db}).
+
+These certificates are used to validate appended signatures when environment
+variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
+(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}), and by @command{append_verify}
+(@pxref{append_verify}). See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more
+information.
+@end deffn
Quoted 8 lines

docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6600

Quoted 5 lines
docs/grub.texi +5 -0
+
+@node append_verify
+@subsection append_verify
+
+@deffn Command append_verify file

I suggest to use "<>" to mark arguments which gets a value, e.g.: append_verify <file> Please fix this in whole documentation…

Will do it.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

+Verifies an appended signature on @var{file} against the trusted X.509 certificates

s/file/<file>

Will do it.

Quoted 50 lines
Quoted 50 lines
docs/grub.texi +7 -0
+known to GRUB (See @pxref{append_list_db}, @pxref{append_add_db_cert}, and
+@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
+Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates
+successfully.  If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures}, for more information.
+@end deffn

@node authenticate
@subsection authenticate

docs/grub.texi +0 -0
@@ -6854,7 +6925,7 @@ These keys are used to validate signatures when environment variable
 @code{check_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}

(@pxref{check_signatures}), and by some invocations of @command{verify_detached} (@pxref{verify_detached}). @xref{Using

docs/grub.texi +1 -1
-digital signatures}, for more information.
+GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.

@end deffn

@node drivemap

docs/grub.texi +0 -0
@@ -7250,7 +7321,6 @@ without any options, the @command{keystatus} command returns true if and

only if checking key modifier status is supported. @end deffn

-
@node list_env
@subsection list_env

docs/grub.texi +0 -0
@@ -7270,7 +7340,7 @@ The output is in GPG's v4 key fingerprint format (i.e., the output of

@code{gpg --fingerprint}). The least significant four bytes (last eight hexadecimal digits) can be used as an argument to @command{distrust} (@pxref{distrust}).
-@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information about uses for +@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information about uses for these keys.
@end deffn

docs/grub.texi +0 -0
@@ -7305,8 +7375,11 @@ When used with care, @option{--skip-sig} and the whitelist enable an

administrator to configure a system to boot only signed configurations, but to allow the user to select from among multiple configurations, and to enable ``one-shot'' boot attempts and -``savedefault'' behavior. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more +``savedefault'' behavior. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.

docs/grub.texi +3 -0
+Extra care should be taken when combining this command with appended signatures
+(@pxref{Using appended signatures}), as this file is not validated by an
+appended signature and could set @code{check_appended_signatures=no}.

@end deffn

Quoted 8 lines

docs/grub.texi read. It is possible to modify a digitally signed environment block · line 7753

Quoted 6 lines
docs/grub.texi +0 -0
@@ -7677,7 +7750,7 @@ read.  It is possible to modify a digitally signed environment block

file from within GRUB using this command, such that its signature will no longer be valid on subsequent boots. Care should be taken in such advanced configurations to avoid rendering the system

docs/grub.texi +1 -1
-unbootable. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information.
+unbootable. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.

I suggest to move all GPG documentation changes to separate patch.

Will do it.

Quoted 13 lines

docs/grub.texi signatures when environment variable @code{check_signatures} is set to · line 8243

Quoted 10 lines

@end deffn

docs/grub.texi +0 -0
@@ -8167,11 +8240,10 @@ signatures when environment variable @code{check_signatures} is set to

must itself be properly signed. The @option{--skip-sig} option can be used to disable signature-checking when reading @var{pubkey_file} itself. It is expected that @option{--skip-sig} is useful for testing

docs/grub.texi +1 -1
-and manual booting. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more
+and manual booting. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more

Ditto and below...

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

information.
@end deffn

-

This and similar cleanups can be a part of GPG change set but they have to be mentioned in the commit message.

Will do it.

Quoted 74 lines
Quoted 9 lines

@node unset
@subsection unset

docs/grub.texi +0 -0
@@ -8190,7 +8262,6 @@ only on PC BIOS platforms.

@end deffn
@end ignore

-

Ditto...

Quoted 62 lines

@node verify_detached
@subsection verify_detached

docs/grub.texi +0 -0
@@ -8208,7 +8279,7 @@ tried.
 

Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates successfully. If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value. -@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information. +@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information. @end deffn

@node videoinfo

docs/grub.texi +0 -0
@@ -8668,14 +8739,15 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order.

@chapter Security

@menu

docs/grub.texi +9 -8
-* Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control
-* Using digital signatures::         Booting digitally signed code
-* UEFI secure boot and shim::        Booting digitally signed PE files
-* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting::   Embedded information for generation number based revocation
-* Measured Boot::                    Measuring boot components
-* Lockdown::                         Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
-* TPM2 key protector::               Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
-* Signing GRUB itself::              Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image
+* Authentication and authorisation::   Users and access control
+* Using GPG-style digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code
+* Using appended signatures::          An alternative approach to booting digitally signed code
+* UEFI secure boot and shim::          Booting digitally signed PE files
+* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting::     Embedded information for generation number based revocation
+* Measured Boot::                      Measuring boot components
+* Lockdown::                           Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
+* TPM2 key protector::                 Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
+* Signing GRUB itself::                Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image

@end menu

@node Authentication and authorisation

docs/grub.texi +0 -0
@@ -8751,8 +8823,8 @@ generating configuration files with authentication.  You can use
 adding @kbd{set superusers=} and @kbd{password} or @kbd{password_pbkdf2}

commands.

-@node Using digital signatures
-@section Using digital signatures in GRUB +@node Using GPG-style digital signatures +@section Using GPG-style digital signatures in GRUB

GRUB's @file{core.img} can optionally provide enforcement that all files subsequently read from disk are covered by a valid digital signature.

docs/grub.texi +0 -0
@@ -8835,6 +8907,81 @@ or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different

(attacker-controlled) device. GRUB is at best only one link in a secure boot chain.

+@node Using appended signatures
+@section Using appended signatures in GRUB

docs/grub.texi +9 -0
+
+GRUB supports verifying Linux-style 'appended signatures' for secure boot.
+Appended signatures are PKCS#7 messages containing a signature over the
+contents of a file, plus some metadata, appended to the end of a file. A file
+with an appended signature ends with the magic string:
+
+@example
+~Module signature appended~\n
+@end example
Quoted 8 lines

docs/grub.texi or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different · line 8926

Quoted 6 lines
docs/grub.texi +6 -0
+
+where @code{\n} represents the line feed character, @code{0x0a}.
+
+To enable appended signature verification, load the appendedsig module and an
+x509 certificate for verification. Building the appendedsig module into the
+core grub image is recommended.

s/grub/GRUB/…

Will do it.

Quoted 26 lines
Quoted 26 lines
docs/grub.texi +25 -0
+Certificates can be managed at boot time using the @pxref{append_add_db_cert},
+@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert} and @pxref{append_list_db} commands.
+Certificates can also be built in to the core image using the @code{--x509}
+parameter to @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}.
+A file can be explicitly verified using the @pxref{append_verify} command.
+
+Only signatures made with the SHA-256 or SHA-512 hash algorithm are supported,
+and only RSA signatures are supported.
+
+A file can be signed with the @command{sign-file} utility supplied with the
+Linux kernel source. For example, if you have @code{signing.key} as the private
+key and @code{certificate.der} as the x509 certificate containing the public key:
+
+@example
+sign-file SHA256 signing.key certificate.der vmlinux vmlinux.signed
+@end example
+
+Enforcement of signature verification is controlled by the
+@code{check_appended_signatures} variable. Verification will only take place
+when files are loaded if the variable is set to @code{enforce}. If a
+certificate is built into the grub core image with the @code{--x509} parameter,
+the variable will be automatically set to @code{enforce} when the appendedsig
+module is loaded.
+
+Unlike GPG-style signatures, not all files loaded by GRUB are required to be
Quoted 8 lines

docs/grub.texi or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different · line 8958

Quoted 6 lines
docs/grub.texi +6 -0
+signed. Once verification is turned on, the following file types must carry
+appended signatures:
+
+@enumerate
+@item Linux, Multiboot, BSD, XNU and Plan9 kernels
+@item Grub modules, except those built in to the core image

s/Grub/GRUB/…

Will do it.

Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 25 lines

+@item Any new certificate files to be trusted
+@end enumerate

docs/grub.texi +22 -0
+
+ACPI tables and Device Tree images will not be checked for appended signatures
+but must be verified by another mechanism such as GPG-style signatures before
+they will be loaded.
+
+No attempt is made to validate any other file type. In particular,
+chain-loaded binaries are not verified - if your platform supports
+chain-loading and this cannot be disabled, consider an alternative secure
+boot mechanism.
+
+As with GPG-style appended signatures, signature checking does @strong{not}
+stop an attacker with console access from dropping manually to the GRUB
+console and executing:
+
+@example
+set check_appended_signatures=no
+@end example
+
+Refer to the section on password-protecting GRUB (@pxref{Authentication
+and authorisation}) for more information on preventing this.
+
+Additionally, special care must be taken around the @command{loadenv} command,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
docs/grub.texi +2 -0
+which can be used to turn off @code{check_appended_signature}.
+

@node UEFI secure boot and shim
@section UEFI secure boot and shim support

May I ask you to put all documentation patches in one group at the end of the patch set? Same applies to tests patches. I think they should land before documentation patches…

Will do it.

Thank you Daniel.

Thanks,
Sudhakar

Quoted 2 lines

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#20 lore raw

PATCH v5 14/21 ieee1275: Enter lockdown based on /ibm,secure-boot

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>

If the 'ibm,secure-boot' property of the root node is 2 or greater, enter lockdown.

---
 docs/grub.texi                 |  2 +-
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def    |  1 +
 grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/grub/lockdown.h        |  3 ++-
 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
docs/grub.texi +1 -1
index 494e2eada..561f301cf 100644
@@ -9060,7 +9060,7 @@ platforms.
 @section Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
 
 The GRUB can be locked down when booted on a secure boot environment, for example
-if the UEFI secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will
+if the UEFI or Power secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will
 be restricted and some operations/commands cannot be executed. This also includes
 limiting which filesystems are supported to those thought to be more robust and
 widely used within GRUB.
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +1 -0
index effaa303c..9fbadccce 100644
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ kernel = {
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/cache.S;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S;
+  powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c;
 
   sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S;
   sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +42 -0

60 lines not on this page · raw message

include/grub/lockdown.h +2 -1
index 40531fa82..ebfee4bf0 100644
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@
 #define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_DISABLED       0
 #define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED        1
 
-#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
+#if defined(GRUB_MACHINE_EFI) || \
+    (defined(__powerpc__) && defined(GRUB_MACHINE_IEEE1275))
 extern void
 EXPORT_FUNC (grub_lockdown) (void);
 extern int
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#21 lore raw

PATCH v5 15/21 ieee1275: Read the DB and DBX secure boot variables

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Enhancing the infrastructure to enable the Platform Keystore (PKS) feature, which provides access to the SB VERSION, DB, and DBX secure boot variables from PKS.

If secure boot is enabled with PKS, it will read secure boot variables such as db and dbx from PKS and extract ESL's from it.
The ESL's would be saved in the platform keystore buffer, and the appendedsig (module) would read it later to extract
the certificate's details from ESL.

In the following scenarios, static key mode will be activated:
1. When Secure Boot is enabled with static keys
2. When SB Version is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
3. When PKS support is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled

Note:-

SB Version - Secure Boot mode
1 - PKS
0 - static key (embeded key)

---
 grub-core/Makefile.am                         |   2 +
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def                   |   2 +
 grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c            |   1 -
 grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c                |  18 +-
 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c    | 139 +++++++
 .../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 343 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h              |   3 +
 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h      |  21 ++
 .../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 126 +++++++
 9 files changed, 651 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
 create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
grub-core/Makefile.am +2 -0
index e50db8106..cd6bb7c32 100644
@@ -241,11 +241,13 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_builddir)/include/grub/machine/kernel.h
 endif
 
 if COND_powerpc_ieee1275
+KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/ieee1275/alloc.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/terminfo.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/extcmd.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/lib/arg.h
+KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
 endif
 
 if COND_sparc64_ieee1275
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +2 -0
index 9fbadccce..3e8ccea38 100644
@@ -328,10 +328,12 @@ kernel = {
   extra_dist = video/sis315_init.c;
   mips_loongson = commands/keylayouts.c;
 
+  powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/cache.S;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c;
+  powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c;
 
   sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S;
   sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c +0 -1
index 36ca2dbfc..afa37a9f0 100644
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
 
 #define IEEE1275_PHANDLE_INVALID  ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
 #define IEEE1275_IHANDLE_INVALID  ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0)
-#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID     ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
 
 
 
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +15 -3
index f19d5cda9..f7a7c96f8 100644
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
 #endif
 #if defined(__powerpc__)
 #include <grub/lockdown.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
 #endif
 
 /* The maximum heap size we're going to claim at boot. Not used by sparc. */
@@ -1004,7 +1006,8 @@ grub_get_ieee1275_secure_boot (void)
 {
   grub_ieee1275_phandle_t root;
   int rc;
-  grub_uint32_t is_sb;
+  grub_err_t err;
+  grub_uint32_t is_sb = SB_DISABLED;
 
   rc = grub_ieee1275_finddevice ("/", &root);
   if (rc != 0)
@@ -1028,8 +1031,17 @@ grub_get_ieee1275_secure_boot (void)
    *
    * We only support enforce.
    */
-  if (is_sb >= 2)
-    grub_lockdown ();
+  if (is_sb == SB_ENFORCED)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "Secure Boot Enabled\n");
+      err = grub_pks_keystore_init ();
+      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        grub_error (err, "initialization of the Platform Keystore failed.\n");
+
+      grub_lockdown ();
+    }
+  else
+    grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "Secure Boot Disabled\n");
 }
 #endif
 
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c new file +139 -0

139 lines not on this page · raw message

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +343 -0

343 lines not on this page · raw message

include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +3 -0
index c445d0499..3965c5fc6 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@
 #include <grub/types.h>
 #include <grub/machine/ieee1275.h>
 
+#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID          ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
+#define IEEE1275_CELL_NOT_FOUND        ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -7)
+
 #define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_FALSE       ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0)
 #define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_TRUE        ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
 
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +21 -0
index 4eb207018..1772d1f6d 100644
@@ -28,4 +28,25 @@ typedef grub_uint32_t grub_ieee1275_cell_t;
 #define PRIxGRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_T	PRIxGRUB_UINT32_T
 #define PRIuGRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_T	PRIuGRUB_UINT32_T
 
+#ifdef __powerpc__
+
+extern int
+EXPORT_FUNC (grub_ieee1275_test) (const char *name,
+                                  grub_ieee1275_cell_t *missing);
+
+extern int
+grub_ieee1275_pks_max_object_size (grub_size_t *result);
+
+extern int
+grub_ieee1275_pks_read_object (grub_uint8_t consumer, grub_uint8_t *label,
+                               grub_size_t label_len, grub_uint8_t *buffer,
+                               grub_size_t buffer_len, grub_size_t *data_len,
+                               grub_uint32_t *policies);
+
+extern int
+grub_ieee1275_pks_read_sbvar (grub_uint8_t sbvarflags, grub_uint8_t sbvartype,
+                              grub_uint8_t *buffer, grub_size_t buffer_len,
+                              grub_size_t *data_len);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* ! GRUB_IEEE1275_MACHINE_HEADER */
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +126 -0

126 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#22 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 15/21] ieee1275: Read the DB and DBX secure boot variables

Quoted 15 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Enhancing the infrastructure to enable the Platform Keystore (PKS) feature, which provides access to the SB VERSION, DB, and DBX secure boot variables from PKS.

If secure boot is enabled with PKS, it will read secure boot variables such as db and dbx from PKS and extract ESL's from it.
The ESL's would be saved in the platform keystore buffer, and the appendedsig (module) would read it later to extract
the certificate's details from ESL.

In the following scenarios, static key mode will be activated:
1. When Secure Boot is enabled with static keys
2. When SB Version is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
3. When PKS support is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled

Quoted 5 lines

Note:-

SB Version - Secure Boot mode
1 - PKS
0 - static key (embeded key)

I think "static key" mode should be explained in the commit message too. Additionally, I think it is worth explaining key differences between two modes. I do not mention these should be put into GRUB documentation...

Quoted 15 lines
---
 grub-core/Makefile.am                         |   2 +
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def                   |   2 +
 grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c            |   1 -
 grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c                |  18 +-
 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c    | 139 +++++++
 .../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 343 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h              |   3 +
 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h      |  21 ++
 .../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 126 +++++++
 9 files changed, 651 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
 create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h

[...]

Quoted 43 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +37 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3af1ea28a
@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2024  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
+#include <grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
+
+/* PKS consumer type for firmware. */
+#define PKS_CONSUMER_FW      ((grub_uint8_t) 1)
+
+/* PKS read object lable for secure boot version. */
+#define SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME  ((grub_uint8_t *) "SB_VERSION")
+#define SB_VERSION_KEY_LEN   ((grub_size_t) 10)
+
+/* PKS read secure boot variable request type for db and dbx. */
+#define DB                   ((grub_uint8_t) 1)
+#define DBX                  ((grub_uint8_t) 2)

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 47

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+
+static grub_size_t pks_max_object_size;
+grub_uint8_t grub_pks_use_keystore = 0;
+
+/* Platform Keystore. */
+grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore = { .db = NULL, .dbx = NULL, .db_entries = 0, .dbx_entries = 0 };
+
+/* Convert the esl data into the ESL. */
+static grub_esl_t *
+convert_to_esl (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, const grub_size_t esl_data_size)

This does not convert anything. Just validate sizes and change data types. And this function is called once. So, please put its code where it belongs....

Quoted 84 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +84 -0
+{
+  grub_esl_t *esl = NULL;
+
+  if (esl_data_size < sizeof (grub_esl_t) || esl_data == NULL)
+    return esl;
+
+  esl = (grub_esl_t *) esl_data;
+
+  return esl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Import the GUID, esd, and its size into the pks sd buffer and
+ * pks sd entries from the EFI signature list.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+esd_from_esl (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t esl_size,
+              const grub_size_t signature_size, const grub_packed_guid_t *guid,
+              grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_size_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+  grub_esd_t *esd;
+  grub_pks_sd_t *signature = *pks_sd;
+  grub_size_t entries = *pks_sd_entries;
+  grub_size_t data_size, offset = 0;
+
+  /* Reads the esd from esl. */
+  while (esl_size > 0)
+    {
+      esd = (grub_esd_t *) (esl_data + offset);
+      data_size = signature_size - sizeof (grub_esd_t);
+
+      signature = grub_realloc (signature, (entries + 1) * sizeof (grub_pks_sd_t));
+      if (signature == NULL)
+        return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory.");
+
+      signature[entries].data = grub_malloc (data_size * sizeof (grub_uint8_t));
+      if (signature[entries].data == NULL)
+        {
+          /*
+           * Allocated memory will be freed by
+           * grub_free_platform_keystore.
+           */
+          *pks_sd = signature;
+          *pks_sd_entries = entries + 1;
+          return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory.");
+        }
+
+      grub_memcpy (signature[entries].data, esd->signature_data, data_size);
+      signature[entries].data_size = data_size;
+      signature[entries].guid = *guid;
+      entries++;
+      esl_size -= signature_size;
+      offset += signature_size;
+    }
+
+  *pks_sd = signature;
+  *pks_sd_entries = entries;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Extract the esd after removing the esl header from esl. */
+static grub_err_t
+esl_to_esd (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t *next_esl,
+            grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_size_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+  grub_packed_guid_t guid;
+  grub_esl_t *esl;
+  grub_size_t offset, esl_size,
+              signature_size, signature_header_size;
+
+  esl = convert_to_esl (esl_data, *next_esl);
+  if (esl == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG, "invalid ESL.");
+
+  esl_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (esl->signature_list_size);
+  signature_header_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (esl->signature_header_size);
+  signature_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (esl->signature_size);
+  grub_memcpy (&guid, &esl->signature_type, sizeof (grub_packed_guid_t));
+
+  if (esl_size < sizeof (grub_esl_t) || esl_size > *next_esl)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG, "invalid ESL size (%u)\n", esl_size);
+
+  *next_esl = esl_size;

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 141

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+  offset = sizeof (grub_esl_t) + signature_header_size;
+  esl_size = esl_size - offset;
+
+  return esd_from_esl (esl_data + offset, esl_size, signature_size, &guid,
+                       pks_sd, pks_sd_entries);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Import the EFI signature data and the number of esd from the esl
+ * into the pks sd buffer and pks sd entries.

Could you be more consistent with using abbreviations, i.e. their case? Most of them should be all upper case. And what are esd/ESD" and "sd"?

Quoted 38 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +38 -0
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+pks_sd_from_esl (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t esl_size,
+                 grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_size_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_size_t next_esl = esl_size;
+
+  do
+    {
+      rc = esl_to_esd (esl_data, &next_esl, pks_sd, pks_sd_entries);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        break;
+
+      esl_data += next_esl;
+      esl_size -= next_esl;
+      next_esl = esl_size;
+    }
+  while (esl_size > 0);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the secure boot version from PKS as an object.
+ * caller must free result.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+read_sbversion_from_pks (grub_uint8_t **out, grub_size_t *outlen, grub_size_t *policy)
+{
+  int rc;
+
+  *out = grub_malloc (pks_max_object_size);
+  if (*out == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory.");
+
+  rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_read_object (PKS_CONSUMER_FW, SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME,
+                                      SB_VERSION_KEY_LEN, *out, pks_max_object_size,

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 189

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+                                      outlen, policy);
+  if (rc != 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, "SB version read failed (%d)\n", rc);
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads the secure boot variable from PKS.
+ * caller must free result.

s/caller/Caller/

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 202

Quoted 13 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +13 -0
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+read_sbvar_from_pks (const grub_uint8_t sbvarflags, const grub_uint8_t sbvartype,
+                     grub_uint8_t **out, grub_size_t *outlen)
+{
+  int rc;
+
+  *out = grub_malloc (pks_max_object_size);
+  if (*out == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory.");
+
+  rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_read_sbvar (sbvarflags, sbvartype, *out, pks_max_object_size, outlen);
+  if (rc == (int) IEEE1275_CELL_NOT_FOUND)

This cast suggests the rc should be defined as different type...

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 205

Quoted 3 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +3 -0
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND, "secure boot variable %s not found (%d)",
+                       (sbvartype == DB ? "db" : "dbx"), rc);
+  else if (rc != 0)

If you look at the code of the grub_ieee1275_pks_read_sbvar() then you will see you return "-1" in case of an error. So, I think you should do "rc < 0" check here...

Quoted 5 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +5 -0
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, "secure boot variable %s reading (%d)",
+                       (sbvartype == DB ? "db" : "dbx"), rc);
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 220

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+
+/* Test the availability of PKS support. */
+static grub_err_t
+is_support_pks (void)
+{
+  int rc;
+  grub_ieee1275_cell_t missing = 0;
+
+  rc = grub_ieee1275_test ("pks-max-object-size", &missing);
+  if (rc != 0 || missing == IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID)

Ditto...

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 225

Quoted 5 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +5 -0
+    grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FIRMWARE, "firmware doesn't have PKS support.\n");
+  else
+    {
+      rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_max_object_size (&pks_max_object_size);
+      if (rc != 0)

Ditto... Please fix this problem everywhere...

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 234

Quoted 9 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +9 -0
+        grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER, "PKS support is there but it has zero objects.\n");
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve the secure boot variable from PKS, unpacks it, read the esd
+ * from ESL, and store the information in the pks sd buffer.

Please be consistent with case...

Quoted 13 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +13 -0
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+read_secure_boot_variables (const grub_uint8_t sbvarflags, const grub_uint8_t sbvartype,
+                            grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_size_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_uint8_t *esl_data = NULL;
+  grub_size_t esl_data_size = 0;
+
+  rc = read_sbvar_from_pks (sbvarflags, sbvartype, &esl_data, &esl_data_size);
+  if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE && esl_data_size != 0)
+    rc = pks_sd_from_esl ((const grub_uint8_t *) esl_data, esl_data_size,
+                          pks_sd, pks_sd_entries);

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 257

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+  grub_free (esl_data);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads secure boot version (SB_VERSION) and it supports following.
+ * SB_VERSION
+ * 1 - PKS
+ * 0 - static key (embeded key)

Same comment as for commit message. We need more info here...

Quoted 7 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +7 -0
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+get_secure_boot_version (void)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_uint8_t *data = NULL;
+  grub_size_t len = 0, policy = 0;

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 274

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+
+  rc = read_sbversion_from_pks (&data, &len, &policy);
+  if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE && (len != 1 || (*data >= 2)))
+    rc = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER, "found unexpected SB version (%d)\n", *data);
+
+  if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    {
+      grub_printf ("switch to static key.\n");
+      if (grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+        grub_fatal ("secure boot locked down.");

s/secure boot locked down./Secure boot locked down/

However, first of all I think it should be explained here why the lockdown cannot be enabled here...

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 277

Quoted 3 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +3 -0
+    }
+  else
+    grub_pks_use_keystore = *data;

Why do you assign version number to grub_pks_use_keystore which looks like a flag? Probably the name of variable is wrong or its type.

Quoted 24 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +24 -0
+  grub_free (data);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Free allocated memory. */
+void
+grub_pks_free_keystore (void)
+{
+  grub_size_t i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.db_entries; i++)
+    grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data);
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
+    grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data);
+
+  grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.db);
+  grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.dbx);
+  grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore, 0, sizeof (grub_pks_t));
+}
+
+/* Initialization of the Platform Keystore. */
+grub_err_t

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 312

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+grub_pks_keystore_init (void)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+
+  grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "trying to load Platform Keystore.\n");
+
+  rc = is_support_pks ();
+  if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    {
+      grub_printf ("switch to static key.\n");

s/grub_printf/grub_dprintf/?

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 321

Quoted 9 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +9 -0
+      return rc;
+    }
+
+  /* Read SB_VERSION from PKS. */
+  rc = get_secure_boot_version ();
+  if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    return rc;
+
+  if (grub_pks_use_keystore)

This looks like a flag. Should not it be defined as bool?

Quoted 53 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +22 -0
+    {
+      grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore, 0, sizeof (grub_pks_t));
+      /* Read DB from PKS. */
+      rc = read_secure_boot_variables (0, DB, &grub_pks_keystore.db, &grub_pks_keystore.db_entries);
+      if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        {
+          /* Read DBX from PKS. */
+          rc = read_secure_boot_variables (0, DBX, &grub_pks_keystore.dbx, &grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries);
+          if (rc == GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND)
+            {
+              grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "dbx is not found in PKS.\n");
+              rc = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+            }
+        }
+
+    }
+
+  if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    grub_pks_free_keystore ();
+
+  return rc;
+}
include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +3 -0
index c445d0499..3965c5fc6 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@
 #include <grub/types.h>
 #include <grub/machine/ieee1275.h>
 
+#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID          ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
+#define IEEE1275_CELL_NOT_FOUND        ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -7)
+
 #define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_FALSE       ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0)
 #define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_TRUE        ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
 
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +9 -0
index 4eb207018..1772d1f6d 100644
@@ -28,4 +28,25 @@ typedef grub_uint32_t grub_ieee1275_cell_t;
 #define PRIxGRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_T	PRIxGRUB_UINT32_T
 #define PRIuGRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_T	PRIuGRUB_UINT32_T
 
+#ifdef __powerpc__
+
+extern int
+EXPORT_FUNC (grub_ieee1275_test) (const char *name,
+                                  grub_ieee1275_cell_t *missing);
+
+extern int
+grub_ieee1275_pks_max_object_size (grub_size_t *result);
+

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h typedef grub_uint32_t grub_ieee1275_cell_t; · line 49

Quoted 10 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +10 -0
+extern int
+grub_ieee1275_pks_read_object (grub_uint8_t consumer, grub_uint8_t *label,
+                               grub_size_t label_len, grub_uint8_t *buffer,
+                               grub_size_t buffer_len, grub_size_t *data_len,
+                               grub_uint32_t *policies);
+
+extern int
+grub_ieee1275_pks_read_sbvar (grub_uint8_t sbvarflags, grub_uint8_t sbvartype,
+                              grub_uint8_t *buffer, grub_size_t buffer_len,
+                              grub_size_t *data_len);

It seems to me at least some of these functions should not be exported. If they are used in following patches then they should be exported when a given patch adds calls to these functions.

Quoted 45 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +2 -0
+#endif
+
 #endif /* ! GRUB_IEEE1275_MACHINE_HEADER */
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +36 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d48c60200
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. This
+ * program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available
+ * under the terms and conditions of the 2-Clause BSD License which
+ * accompanies this distribution.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging (edk2-staging repo of tianocore),
+ * the ImageAuthentication.h file under it, and here's the copyright and license.
+ *
+ * MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ *
+ * Copyright 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 IBM Corp.
+ */
+

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 46

Quoted 10 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +10 -0
+#ifndef __PLATFORM_KEYSTORE_H__
+#define __PLATFORM_KEYSTORE_H__
+
+#include <grub/symbol.h>
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/types.h>
+
+#if __GNUC__ >= 9
+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Waddress-of-packed-member"
+#endif

This probably should not be in the header file...

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 58

Quoted 11 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +11 -0
+#define GRUB_MAX_HASH_SIZE 64
+
+/* Secure Boot Mode. */
+#define SB_DISABLED        0
+#define SB_ENFORCED        2
+
+/*
+ * It is derived from EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ *
+ * The structure of an EFI signature database (ESD).*/

Aha... Here it is... So, you should use correct ESD abbreviation everywhere...

And missing space after "." here and below...

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 69

Quoted 11 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +11 -0
+struct grub_esd
+{
+  /*
+   * An identifier which identifies the agent which added
+   * the signature to the list.
+   */
+  grub_packed_guid_t signature_owner;
+  /* The format of the signature is defined by the SignatureType.*/
+  grub_uint8_t signature_data[];
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+

Please drop this empty line...

Quoted 12 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +12 -0
+typedef struct grub_esd grub_esd_t;
+
+/*
+ * It is derived from EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ *
+ * The structure of an EFI signature list (ESL).*/
+struct grub_esl
+{
+  /* Type of the signature. GUID signature types are defined in below.*/
+  grub_packed_guid_t signature_type;
+  /* Total size of the signature list, including this header.*/

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 91

Quoted 10 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +10 -0
+  grub_uint32_t signature_list_size;
+  /*
+   * Size of the signature header which precedes
+   * the array of signatures.
+   */
+  grub_uint32_t signature_header_size;
+  /* Size of each signature.*/
+  grub_uint32_t signature_size;
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+

Ditto...

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 94

Quoted 3 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +3 -0
+typedef struct grub_esl grub_esl_t;
+
+/* The structure of a PKS signature data.*/

Ha! sd == signature data. So, if you really use sd abbreviation in the comments please define it here, e.g. Signature Data (SD), and use it consistently.

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 101

Quoted 7 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +7 -0
+struct grub_pks_sd
+{
+  grub_packed_guid_t guid; /* Signature type. */
+  grub_uint8_t *data;      /* Signature data. */
+  grub_size_t data_size;   /* Size of signature data. */
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+

Redundant empty line...

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 112

Quoted 11 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +11 -0
+typedef struct grub_pks_sd grub_pks_sd_t;
+
+/* The structure of a PKS.*/
+struct grub_pks
+{
+  grub_pks_sd_t *db;        /* Signature database. */
+  grub_pks_sd_t *dbx;       /* Forbidden signature database. */
+  grub_size_t db_entries;   /* Size of signature database. */
+  grub_size_t dbx_entries;  /* Size of forbidden signature database. */
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+

Ditto...

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 124

Quoted 12 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +12 -0
+typedef struct grub_pks grub_pks_t;
+
+/* Initialization of the Platform Keystore. */
+extern grub_err_t
+grub_pks_keystore_init (void);
+
+/* Free allocated memory. */
+extern void
+EXPORT_FUNC (grub_pks_free_keystore) (void);
+
+extern grub_uint8_t EXPORT_VAR (grub_pks_use_keystore);
+extern grub_pks_t EXPORT_VAR (grub_pks_keystore);

Really, do these stuff need to be exported?

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#23 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 15/21] ieee1275: Read the DB and DBX secure boot variables

Quoted 22 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 17 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Enhancing the infrastructure to enable the Platform Keystore (PKS) feature, which provides access to the SB VERSION, DB, and DBX secure boot variables from PKS.

If secure boot is enabled with PKS, it will read secure boot variables such as db and dbx from PKS and extract ESL's from it.
The ESL's would be saved in the platform keystore buffer, and the appendedsig (module) would read it later to extract
the certificate's details from ESL.

In the following scenarios, static key mode will be activated:
1. When Secure Boot is enabled with static keys
2. When SB Version is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
3. When PKS support is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled

Note:-

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

SB Version - Secure Boot mode
1 - PKS
0 - static key (embeded key)

I think "static key" mode should be explained in the commit message too. Additionally, I think it is worth explaining key differences between two modes. I do not mention these should be put into GRUB documentation…

Will do it.

Quoted 68 lines
Quoted 16 lines

---

grub-core/Makefile.am                         |   2 +
grub-core/Makefile.core.def                   |   2 +
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c            |   1 -
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c                |  18 +-
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c    | 139 +++++++
.../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 343 ++++++++++++++++++
include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h              |   3 +
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h      |  21 ++
.../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 126 +++++++
9 files changed, 651 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h

[...]

Quoted 49 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +43 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3af1ea28a
@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2024  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
+#include <grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
+
+/* PKS consumer type for firmware. */
+#define PKS_CONSUMER_FW      ((grub_uint8_t) 1)
+
+/* PKS read object lable for secure boot version. */
+#define SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME  ((grub_uint8_t *) "SB_VERSION")
+#define SB_VERSION_KEY_LEN   ((grub_size_t) 10)
+
+/* PKS read secure boot variable request type for db and dbx. */
+#define DB                   ((grub_uint8_t) 1)
+#define DBX                  ((grub_uint8_t) 2)
+
+static grub_size_t pks_max_object_size;
+grub_uint8_t grub_pks_use_keystore = 0;
+
+/* Platform Keystore. */
+grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore = { .db = NULL, .dbx = NULL, .db_entries = 0, .dbx_entries = 0 };
Quoted 8 lines

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 47

Quoted 4 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +4 -0
+
+/* Convert the esl data into the ESL. */
+static grub_esl_t *
+convert_to_esl (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, const grub_size_t esl_data_size)

This does not convert anything. Just validate sizes and change data types. And this function is called once. So, please put its code where it belongs....

Will do it.

Quoted 90 lines
Quoted 90 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +89 -0
+{
+  grub_esl_t *esl = NULL;
+
+  if (esl_data_size < sizeof (grub_esl_t) || esl_data == NULL)
+    return esl;
+
+  esl = (grub_esl_t *) esl_data;
+
+  return esl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Import the GUID, esd, and its size into the pks sd buffer and
+ * pks sd entries from the EFI signature list.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+esd_from_esl (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t esl_size,
+              const grub_size_t signature_size, const grub_packed_guid_t *guid,
+              grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_size_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+  grub_esd_t *esd;
+  grub_pks_sd_t *signature = *pks_sd;
+  grub_size_t entries = *pks_sd_entries;
+  grub_size_t data_size, offset = 0;
+
+  /* Reads the esd from esl. */
+  while (esl_size > 0)
+    {
+      esd = (grub_esd_t *) (esl_data + offset);
+      data_size = signature_size - sizeof (grub_esd_t);
+
+      signature = grub_realloc (signature, (entries + 1) * sizeof (grub_pks_sd_t));
+      if (signature == NULL)
+        return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory.");
+
+      signature[entries].data = grub_malloc (data_size * sizeof (grub_uint8_t));
+      if (signature[entries].data == NULL)
+        {
+          /*
+           * Allocated memory will be freed by
+           * grub_free_platform_keystore.
+           */
+          *pks_sd = signature;
+          *pks_sd_entries = entries + 1;
+          return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory.");
+        }
+
+      grub_memcpy (signature[entries].data, esd->signature_data, data_size);
+      signature[entries].data_size = data_size;
+      signature[entries].guid = *guid;
+      entries++;
+      esl_size -= signature_size;
+      offset += signature_size;
+    }
+
+  *pks_sd = signature;
+  *pks_sd_entries = entries;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Extract the esd after removing the esl header from esl. */
+static grub_err_t
+esl_to_esd (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t *next_esl,
+            grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_size_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+  grub_packed_guid_t guid;
+  grub_esl_t *esl;
+  grub_size_t offset, esl_size,
+              signature_size, signature_header_size;
+
+  esl = convert_to_esl (esl_data, *next_esl);
+  if (esl == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG, "invalid ESL.");
+
+  esl_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (esl->signature_list_size);
+  signature_header_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (esl->signature_header_size);
+  signature_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (esl->signature_size);
+  grub_memcpy (&guid, &esl->signature_type, sizeof (grub_packed_guid_t));
+
+  if (esl_size < sizeof (grub_esl_t) || esl_size > *next_esl)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG, "invalid ESL size (%u)\n", esl_size);
+
+  *next_esl = esl_size;
+  offset = sizeof (grub_esl_t) + signature_header_size;
+  esl_size = esl_size - offset;
+
+  return esd_from_esl (esl_data + offset, esl_size, signature_size, &guid,
+                       pks_sd, pks_sd_entries);
Quoted 8 lines

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 141

Quoted 5 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +5 -0
+}
+
+/*
+ * Import the EFI signature data and the number of esd from the esl
+ * into the pks sd buffer and pks sd entries.

Could you be more consistent with using abbreviations, i.e. their case? Most of them should be all upper case. And what are esd/ESD" and "sd"?

Will do it.

EFI signature data (ESD) and Signature Data (SD).

Quoted 44 lines
Quoted 44 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +42 -0
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+pks_sd_from_esl (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t esl_size,
+                 grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_size_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_size_t next_esl = esl_size;
+
+  do
+    {
+      rc = esl_to_esd (esl_data, &next_esl, pks_sd, pks_sd_entries);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        break;
+
+      esl_data += next_esl;
+      esl_size -= next_esl;
+      next_esl = esl_size;
+    }
+  while (esl_size > 0);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the secure boot version from PKS as an object.
+ * caller must free result.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+read_sbversion_from_pks (grub_uint8_t **out, grub_size_t *outlen, grub_size_t *policy)
+{
+  int rc;
+
+  *out = grub_malloc (pks_max_object_size);
+  if (*out == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory.");
+
+  rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_read_object (PKS_CONSUMER_FW, SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME,
+                                      SB_VERSION_KEY_LEN, *out, pks_max_object_size,
+                                      outlen, policy);
+  if (rc != 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, "SB version read failed (%d)\n", rc);
+
Quoted 8 lines

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 189

Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +6 -0
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads the secure boot variable from PKS.
+ * caller must free result.

s/caller/Caller/

Will do it.

Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 4 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +3 -0
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+read_sbvar_from_pks (const grub_uint8_t sbvarflags, const grub_uint8_t sbvartype,

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 202

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+                     grub_uint8_t **out, grub_size_t *outlen)
+{
+  int rc;
+
+  *out = grub_malloc (pks_max_object_size);
+  if (*out == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory.");
+
+  rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_read_sbvar (sbvarflags, sbvartype, *out, pks_max_object_size, outlen);
+  if (rc == (int) IEEE1275_CELL_NOT_FOUND)

This cast suggests the rc should be defined as different type…

Will do it.

Quoted 8 lines

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 205

Quoted 4 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +3 -0
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND, "secure boot variable %s not found (%d)",
+                       (sbvartype == DB ? "db" : "dbx"), rc);
+  else if (rc != 0)

If you look at the code of the grub_ieee1275_pks_read_sbvar() then you will see you return "-1" in case of an error. So, I think you should do "rc < 0" check here…

Will do it.

Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +5 -0
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, "secure boot variable %s reading (%d)",
+                       (sbvartype == DB ? "db" : "dbx"), rc);
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 220

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+
+/* Test the availability of PKS support. */
+static grub_err_t
+is_support_pks (void)
+{
+  int rc;
+  grub_ieee1275_cell_t missing = 0;
+
+  rc = grub_ieee1275_test ("pks-max-object-size", &missing);
+  if (rc != 0 || missing == IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID)

Ditto...

Quoted 7 lines

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 225

Quoted 5 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +5 -0
+    grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FIRMWARE, "firmware doesn't have PKS support.\n");
+  else
+    {
+      rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_max_object_size (&pks_max_object_size);
+      if (rc != 0)

Ditto... Please fix this problem everywhere…

Will do it.

Quoted 30 lines

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 234

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +9 -0
+        grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER, "PKS support is there but it has zero objects.\n");
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve the secure boot variable from PKS, unpacks it, read the esd
+ * from ESL, and store the information in the pks sd buffer.

Please be consistent with case...

Quoted 17 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +17 -0
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+read_secure_boot_variables (const grub_uint8_t sbvarflags, const grub_uint8_t sbvartype,
+                            grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_size_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_uint8_t *esl_data = NULL;
+  grub_size_t esl_data_size = 0;
+
+  rc = read_sbvar_from_pks (sbvarflags, sbvartype, &esl_data, &esl_data_size);
+  if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE && esl_data_size != 0)
+    rc = pks_sd_from_esl ((const grub_uint8_t *) esl_data, esl_data_size,
+                          pks_sd, pks_sd_entries);
+  grub_free (esl_data);
+
+  return rc;
+}
Quoted 8 lines

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 257

Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +6 -0
+
+/*
+ * Reads secure boot version (SB_VERSION) and it supports following.
+ * SB_VERSION
+ * 1 - PKS
+ * 0 - static key (embeded key)

Same comment as for commit message. We need more info here…

Will do it

Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +7 -0
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+get_secure_boot_version (void)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_uint8_t *data = NULL;
+  grub_size_t len = 0, policy = 0;

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 274

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+
+  rc = read_sbversion_from_pks (&data, &len, &policy);
+  if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE && (len != 1 || (*data >= 2)))
+    rc = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER, "found unexpected SB version (%d)\n", *data);
+
+  if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    {
+      grub_printf ("switch to static key.\n");
+      if (grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+        grub_fatal ("secure boot locked down.");

s/secure boot locked down./Secure boot locked down/

Quoted 2 lines

However, first of all I think it should be explained here why the lockdown cannot be enabled here…

Will do it.

Quoted 7 lines

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 277

Quoted 4 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +3 -0
+    }
+  else
+    grub_pks_use_keystore = *data;

Why do you assign version number to grub_pks_use_keystore which looks like a flag? Probably the name of variable is wrong or its type.

Will change to boolean type.

Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 29 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +28 -0
+  grub_free (data);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Free allocated memory. */
+void
+grub_pks_free_keystore (void)
+{
+  grub_size_t i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.db_entries; i++)
+    grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data);
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
+    grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data);
+
+  grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.db);
+  grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.dbx);
+  grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore, 0, sizeof (grub_pks_t));
+}
+
+/* Initialization of the Platform Keystore. */
+grub_err_t
+grub_pks_keystore_init (void)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+
Quoted 8 lines

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 312

Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +6 -0
+  grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "trying to load Platform Keystore.\n");
+
+  rc = is_support_pks ();
+  if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    {
+      grub_printf ("switch to static key.\n");

s/grub_printf/grub_dprintf/?

Will do it.

Quoted 72 lines

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 321

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +9 -0
+      return rc;
+    }
+
+  /* Read SB_VERSION from PKS. */
+  rc = get_secure_boot_version ();
+  if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    return rc;
+
+  if (grub_pks_use_keystore)

This looks like a flag. Should not it be defined as bool?

Quoted 59 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +22 -0
+    {
+      grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore, 0, sizeof (grub_pks_t));
+      /* Read DB from PKS. */
+      rc = read_secure_boot_variables (0, DB, &grub_pks_keystore.db, &grub_pks_keystore.db_entries);
+      if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        {
+          /* Read DBX from PKS. */
+          rc = read_secure_boot_variables (0, DBX, &grub_pks_keystore.dbx, &grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries);
+          if (rc == GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND)
+            {
+              grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "dbx is not found in PKS.\n");
+              rc = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+            }
+        }
+
+    }
+
+  if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    grub_pks_free_keystore ();
+
+  return rc;
+}
include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +3 -0
index c445d0499..3965c5fc6 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@
 #include <grub/types.h>
 #include <grub/machine/ieee1275.h>
 
+#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID          ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
+#define IEEE1275_CELL_NOT_FOUND        ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -7)
+
 #define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_FALSE       ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0)
 #define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_TRUE        ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
 
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +15 -0
index 4eb207018..1772d1f6d 100644
@@ -28,4 +28,25 @@ typedef grub_uint32_t grub_ieee1275_cell_t;
 #define PRIxGRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_T	PRIxGRUB_UINT32_T
 #define PRIuGRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_T	PRIuGRUB_UINT32_T
 
+#ifdef __powerpc__
+
+extern int
+EXPORT_FUNC (grub_ieee1275_test) (const char *name,
+                                  grub_ieee1275_cell_t *missing);
+
+extern int
+grub_ieee1275_pks_max_object_size (grub_size_t *result);
+
+extern int
+grub_ieee1275_pks_read_object (grub_uint8_t consumer, grub_uint8_t *label,
+                               grub_size_t label_len, grub_uint8_t *buffer,
+                               grub_size_t buffer_len, grub_size_t *data_len,
+                               grub_uint32_t *policies);
+
Quoted 8 lines

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h typedef grub_uint32_t grub_ieee1275_cell_t; · line 49

Quoted 4 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +4 -0
+extern int
+grub_ieee1275_pks_read_sbvar (grub_uint8_t sbvarflags, grub_uint8_t sbvartype,
+                              grub_uint8_t *buffer, grub_size_t buffer_len,
+                              grub_size_t *data_len);

It seems to me at least some of these functions should not be exported. If they are used in following patches then they should be exported when a given patch adds calls to these functions.

Will do it.

Quoted 50 lines
Quoted 50 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +2 -0
+#endif
+
 #endif /* ! GRUB_IEEE1275_MACHINE_HEADER */
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +40 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d48c60200
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. This
+ * program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available
+ * under the terms and conditions of the 2-Clause BSD License which
+ * accompanies this distribution.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging (edk2-staging repo of tianocore),
+ * the ImageAuthentication.h file under it, and here's the copyright and license.
+ *
+ * MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ *
+ * Copyright 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 IBM Corp.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __PLATFORM_KEYSTORE_H__
+#define __PLATFORM_KEYSTORE_H__
+
+#include <grub/symbol.h>
Quoted 8 lines

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 46

Quoted 6 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +6 -0
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/types.h>
+
+#if __GNUC__ >= 9
+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Waddress-of-packed-member"
+#endif

This probably should not be in the header file…

Will take care.

Quoted 16 lines

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 58

Quoted 12 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +11 -0
+#define GRUB_MAX_HASH_SIZE 64
+
+/* Secure Boot Mode. */
+#define SB_DISABLED        0
+#define SB_ENFORCED        2
+
+/*
+ * It is derived from EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ *
+ * The structure of an EFI signature database (ESD).*/

Aha... Here it is... So, you should use correct ESD abbreviation everywhere...

Quoted 1 line

And missing space after "." here and below...

Will do it.

Quoted 40 lines

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 69

Quoted 12 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +11 -0
+struct grub_esd
+{
+  /*
+   * An identifier which identifies the agent which added
+   * the signature to the list.
+   */
+  grub_packed_guid_t signature_owner;
+  /* The format of the signature is defined by the SignatureType.*/
+  grub_uint8_t signature_data[];
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+

Please drop this empty line...

Quoted 12 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +12 -0
+typedef struct grub_esd grub_esd_t;
+
+/*
+ * It is derived from EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ *
+ * The structure of an EFI signature list (ESL).*/
+struct grub_esl
+{
+  /* Type of the signature. GUID signature types are defined in below.*/
+  grub_packed_guid_t signature_type;
+  /* Total size of the signature list, including this header.*/

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 91

Quoted 10 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +10 -0
+  grub_uint32_t signature_list_size;
+  /*
+   * Size of the signature header which precedes
+   * the array of signatures.
+   */
+  grub_uint32_t signature_header_size;
+  /* Size of each signature.*/
+  grub_uint32_t signature_size;
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+

Ditto...

Quoted 7 lines

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 94

Quoted 3 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +3 -0
+typedef struct grub_esl grub_esl_t;
+
+/* The structure of a PKS signature data.*/

Ha! sd == signature data. So, if you really use sd abbreviation in the comments please define it here, e.g. Signature Data (SD), and use it consistently.

Sure will do it.

Quoted 25 lines

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 101

Quoted 8 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +7 -0
+struct grub_pks_sd
+{
+  grub_packed_guid_t guid; /* Signature type. */
+  grub_uint8_t *data;      /* Signature data. */
+  grub_size_t data_size;   /* Size of signature data. */
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+

Redundant empty line...

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 112

Quoted 11 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +11 -0
+typedef struct grub_pks_sd grub_pks_sd_t;
+
+/* The structure of a PKS.*/
+struct grub_pks
+{
+  grub_pks_sd_t *db;        /* Signature database. */
+  grub_pks_sd_t *dbx;       /* Forbidden signature database. */
+  grub_size_t db_entries;   /* Size of signature database. */
+  grub_size_t dbx_entries;  /* Size of forbidden signature database. */
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+

Ditto...

Quoted 14 lines

include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 124

Quoted 12 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +12 -0
+typedef struct grub_pks grub_pks_t;
+
+/* Initialization of the Platform Keystore. */
+extern grub_err_t
+grub_pks_keystore_init (void);
+
+/* Free allocated memory. */
+extern void
+EXPORT_FUNC (grub_pks_free_keystore) (void);
+
+extern grub_uint8_t EXPORT_VAR (grub_pks_use_keystore);
+extern grub_pks_t EXPORT_VAR (grub_pks_keystore);

Really, do these stuff need to be exported?

These are used in following patches (appended signature module). So, I exported it.

Thanks,
Sudhakar

Quoted 2 lines

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#24 lore raw

PATCH v5 16/21 appendedsig: Create db and dbx lists

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

If secure boot is enabled with a static key, the trusted certificates will be extracted from the GRUB ELF NOTE and adding in the db list. The db list is used by GRUB for kernel verification.

If secure boot is enabled with a dynamic key, the trusted certificates and certificate/binary hash will be extracted from the PKS and adding in the db list. The distrusted certificates, certificate/binary hash from the PKS and adding in the dbx list. Both dbx and db list are used by GRUB for kernel verification.

Note:-

If the certificate or the certificate hash exists in the dbx list, then reject the certificate/certificate hash before adding it in the db list.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 558 +++++++++++++++++--
 include/grub/crypto.h                        |   1 +
 include/grub/efi/pks.h                       | 112 ++++
 3 files changed, 629 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/pks.h
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +516 -42
index d1149695b..a4b786d0c 100644
@@ -33,13 +33,16 @@
 #include <libtasn1.h>
 #include <grub/env.h>
 #include <grub/lockdown.h>
-
+#include <grub/efi/pks.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
 #include "appendedsig.h"
 
 GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
 
 /* Public key type. */
-#define GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
+#define GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7  2
+/* GUID size. */
+#define GRUB_GUID_SIZE      (sizeof (grub_packed_guid_t))
 
 /* Appended signature magic string. */
 static const char magic[] = "~Module signature appended~\n";
@@ -67,8 +70,30 @@ struct grub_appended_signature
   struct pkcs7_signedData pkcs7;        /* Parsed PKCS#7 data. */
 };
 
-/* Trusted certificates for verifying appended signatures. */
-struct x509_certificate *db;
+/* This represents a db/dbx list. */
+struct grub_database
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificates. */
+  grub_size_t cert_entries;       /* Number of certificates. */
+  grub_uint8_t **signatures;      /* Certificate/binary hashes. */
+  grub_size_t *signature_size;    /* Size of certificate/binary hashes. */
+  grub_size_t signature_entries;  /* Number of certificate/binary hashes. */
+};
+
+/* The db list */
+struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0, .signatures = NULL,
+                           .signature_size = NULL, .signature_entries = 0};
+
+/* The dbx list */
+struct grub_database dbx = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0, .signatures = NULL,
+                            .signature_size = NULL, .signature_entries = 0};
+
+/* Free db list memory */
+static void
+free_db_list (void);
+/* Free dbx list memory */
+static void
+free_dbx_list (void);
 
 static enum
 {
@@ -77,6 +102,201 @@ static enum
   CHECK_SIGS_FORCED = 2
 } check_sigs = CHECK_SIGS_NO;
 
+/*
+ * GUID can be used to determine the hashing function and
+ * generate the hash using determined hashing function.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+get_hash (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid, const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
+          grub_uint8_t *hash, grub_size_t *hash_size)
+{
+  gcry_md_spec_t *hash_func = NULL;
+
+  if (guid == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "GUID is empty.");
+
+  if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+      grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256;
+  else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+           grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha384;
+  else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+           grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha512;
+  else
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "unsupported GUID for hash.");
+
+  grub_memset (hash, 0, GRUB_MAX_HASH_SIZE);
+  grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, hash, data, data_size);
+  *hash_size =  hash_func->mdlen;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Add the certificate/binary hash into the db/dbx list. */
+static grub_err_t
+add_hash (const grub_uint8_t **data, const grub_size_t data_size,
+          grub_uint8_t ***signature_list, grub_size_t **signature_size_list,
+          grub_size_t *signature_list_entries)
+{
+  grub_uint8_t **signatures = *signature_list;
+  grub_size_t *signature_size = *signature_size_list;
+  grub_size_t signature_entries = *signature_list_entries;
+
+  if (*data == NULL || data_size == 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "certificate/binary-hash data or size is empty.");
+
+  signatures = grub_realloc (signatures, sizeof (grub_uint8_t *) * (signature_entries + 1));
+  signature_size = grub_realloc (signature_size,
+                                 sizeof (grub_size_t) * (signature_entries + 1));
+
+  if (signatures == NULL || signature_size == NULL)
+    {
+      /*
+       * Allocated memory will be freed by
+       * free_db_list/free_dbx_list.
+       */
+      if (signatures != NULL)
+        {
+          *signature_list = signatures;
+          *signature_list_entries = signature_entries + 1;
+        }
+
+      if (signature_size != NULL)
+        *signature_size_list = signature_size;
+
+      return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory.");
+    }
+
+  signatures[signature_entries] = (grub_uint8_t *) *data;
+  signature_size[signature_entries] = data_size;
+  signature_entries++;
+  *data = NULL;
+
+  *signature_list = signatures;
+  *signature_size_list = signature_size;
+  *signature_list_entries = signature_entries;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_x509 (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid)
+{
+  if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    return true;
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_cert_match (const struct x509_certificate *distrusted_cert,
+               const struct x509_certificate *db_cert)
+{
+  if (grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->subject, db_cert->subject, db_cert->subject_len) == 0
+      && grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->serial, db_cert->serial, db_cert->serial_len) == 0
+      && grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->mpis[0], db_cert->mpis[0], sizeof (db_cert->mpis[0])) == 0
+      && grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->mpis[1], db_cert->mpis[1], sizeof (db_cert->mpis[1])) == 0)
+    return true;
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+
+/* Check the certificate presence in the platform keystore dbx list. */
+static grub_err_t
+is_dbx_cert (const struct x509_certificate *db_cert)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_size_t i;
+  struct x509_certificate *distrusted_cert;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data == NULL)
+        continue;
+
+      if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true)
+        {
+          distrusted_cert = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate));
+          if (distrusted_cert == NULL)
+            return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory.");
+
+          rc = parse_x509_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data,
+                                       grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size, distrusted_cert);
+          if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+            {
+              grub_free (distrusted_cert);
+              continue;
+            }
+
+          if (is_cert_match (distrusted_cert, db_cert) == true)
+            {
+              grub_printf ("Warning: a trusted certificate CN='%s' is ignored "
+                           "because it is on the dbx list.\n", db_cert->subject);
+              grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data);
+              grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i], 0, sizeof (grub_pks_sd_t));
+              certificate_release (distrusted_cert);
+              grub_free (distrusted_cert);
+              return GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED;
+            }
+
+          certificate_release (distrusted_cert);
+          grub_free (distrusted_cert);
+        }
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Add the certificate into the db/dbx list */
+static grub_err_t
+add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
+                 struct grub_database *database, const bool is_db)
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *cert;
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_size_t cert_entries = database->cert_entries;
+
+  if (data == NULL || data_size == 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "certificate data or size is empty.");
+
+  cert = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate));
+  if (cert == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory.");
+
+  rc = parse_x509_certificate (data, data_size, cert);
+  if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "skipped %s certificate (%d)\n",
+                    (is_db == true ? "trusted":"distrusted"), (int) rc);
+      grub_free (cert);
+      return rc;
+    }
+
+  if (is_db == true)
+    {
+      rc = is_dbx_cert (cert);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        {
+          certificate_release (cert);
+          grub_free (cert);
+          return rc;
+        }
+    }
+
+  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "add a %s certificate CN='%s'\n",
+                (is_db == true ? "trusted":"distrusted"), cert->subject);
+
+  cert_entries++;
+  cert->next = database->certs;
+  database->certs = cert;
+  database->cert_entries = cert_entries;
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
 static const char *
 grub_env_read_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),
                    const char *val __attribute__ ((unused)))
@@ -270,7 +490,7 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)
   struct pkcs7_signerInfo *si;
   int i;
 
-  if (db == NULL)
+  if (!db.cert_entries)
     return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "no trusted keys to verify against.");
 
   err = extract_appended_signature (buf, bufsize, &sig);
@@ -300,7 +520,7 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)
       grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "data size %" PRIxGRUB_SIZE ", signer %d hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n",
                     datasize, i, hash[0], hash[1], hash[2], hash[3]);
 
-      for (pk = db; pk != NULL; pk = pk->next)
+      for (pk = db.certs; pk != NULL; pk = pk->next)
         {
           err = verify_signature (pk->mpis, si->sig_mpi, si->hash, hash);
           if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
@@ -371,11 +591,11 @@ grub_cmd_dbx (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args
   else if (cert_num == 0)
     return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "certificate numbers start at 1.");
 
-  for (cert = prev_cert = db; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next)
+  for (cert = prev_cert = db.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next)
     {
       if (cert_num == 1) /* Match with first certificate in the db. */
         {
-          db = cert->next;
+          db.certs = cert->next;
           break;
         }
       else if (cert_num == i)
@@ -390,6 +610,7 @@ grub_cmd_dbx (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args
 
   if (cert != NULL)
     {
+      db.cert_entries--;
       certificate_release (cert);
       grub_free (cert);
       return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
@@ -427,8 +648,9 @@ grub_cmd_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args)
 
   grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "loaded certificate with CN: %s\n", cert->subject);
 
-  cert->next = db;
-  db = cert;
+  cert->next = db.certs;
+  db.certs = cert;
+  db.cert_entries++;
 
   return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
 }
@@ -441,7 +663,7 @@ grub_cmd_list (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc __attribute
   int cert_num = 1;
   grub_size_t i;
 
-  for (cert = db; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next)
+  for (cert = db.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next)
     {
       grub_printf ("Certificate %d:\n", cert_num);
       grub_printf ("\tSerial: ");
@@ -532,6 +754,247 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = {
 
 static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list, cmd_dbx, cmd_db;
 
+/* Check the certificate hash presence in the dbx list. */
+static bool
+is_dbx_cert_hash (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_size_t i, cert_hash_size = 0;
+  grub_uint8_t cert_hash[GRUB_MAX_HASH_SIZE] = { 0 };
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data == NULL ||
+          grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size == 0)
+        continue;
+
+      rc = get_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid, data, data_size,
+                     cert_hash, &cert_hash_size);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        continue;
+
+      if (cert_hash_size == grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size &&
+          grub_memcmp (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data, cert_hash, cert_hash_size) == 0)
+        {
+          grub_printf ("Warning: a trusted certificate (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is ignored "
+                       "because this certificate hash is on the dbx list.\n",
+                       cert_hash[0], cert_hash[1], cert_hash[2], cert_hash[3]);
+          grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data);
+          grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i], 0, sizeof (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i]));
+          return true;
+        }
+    }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+/* Check the binary hash presence in the dbx list. */
+static bool
+is_dbx_binary_hash (const grub_uint8_t *binary_hash, const grub_size_t binary_hash_size)
+{
+  grub_size_t i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data == NULL ||
+          grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size == 0)
+        continue;
+
+      if (binary_hash_size == grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size &&
+          grub_memcmp (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data, binary_hash, binary_hash_size) == 0)
+        {
+          grub_printf ("Warning: a trusted binary hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is ignored"
+                       " because it is on the dbx list.\n", binary_hash[0], binary_hash[1],
+                       binary_hash[2], binary_hash[3]);
+          grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data);
+          grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i], 0, sizeof(grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i]));
+          return true;
+        }
+    }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+/* Add the binary hash to the db list if it does not exist in the dbx list. */
+static grub_err_t
+add_db_binary_hash (const grub_uint8_t **data, const grub_size_t data_size)
+{
+  if (*data == NULL || data_size == 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "trusted binary hash data or size is empty.");
+
+  if (is_dbx_binary_hash (*data, data_size) == false)
+    return add_hash (data, data_size, &db.signatures, &db.signature_size,
+                     &db.signature_entries);
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_hash (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid)
+{
+  /* GUID type of the binary hash. */
+  if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+      grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+      grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    return true;
+
+  /* GUID type of the certificate hash. */
+  if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+      grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+      grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    return true;
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+/* Add the X.509 certificates/binary hash to the db list. */
+static grub_err_t
+create_db_list (void)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_size_t i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.db_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (is_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.db[i].guid) == true)
+        {
+          rc = add_db_binary_hash ((const grub_uint8_t **) &grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data,
+                                   grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size);
+          if (rc == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
+            return rc;
+        }
+      else if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.db[i].guid) == true)
+        {
+          if (is_dbx_cert_hash (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data,
+                                grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size) == true)
+            continue;
+
+          rc = add_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data,
+                                grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size, &db, true);
+          if (rc == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
+            return rc;
+        }
+      else
+        grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "unsupported signature data type and "
+                      "skipped (%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE ")\n", i + 1);
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Add the certificates and certificate/binary hash to the dbx list. */
+static grub_err_t
+create_dbx_list (void)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_size_t i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data != NULL ||
+          grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size > 0)
+        {
+          if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true)
+            {
+              rc = add_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data,
+                                    grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size, &dbx, false);
+              if (rc == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
+                return rc;
+            }
+          else if (is_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true)
+            {
+              rc = add_hash ((const grub_uint8_t **) &grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data,
+                             grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size,
+                             &dbx.signatures, &dbx.signature_size,
+                             &dbx.signature_entries);
+              if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+                return rc;
+            }
+          else
+            grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "unsupported signature data type and "
+                          "skipped (%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE ")\n", i + 1);
+        }
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract the x509 certificates from the ELF note header,
+ * parse it, and add it to the db list.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+build_static_db_list (const struct grub_module_header *header)
+{
+  grub_err_t err;
+  struct grub_file pseudo_file;
+  grub_uint8_t *cert_data = NULL;
+  grub_size_t cert_data_size = 0;
+
+  grub_memset (&pseudo_file, 0, sizeof (pseudo_file));
+  pseudo_file.fs = &pseudo_fs;
+  pseudo_file.size = header->size - sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
+  pseudo_file.data = (char *) header + sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
+
+  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "found an x509 key, size=%" PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T "\n",
+                pseudo_file.size);
+
+  err = file_read_all (&pseudo_file, &cert_data, &cert_data_size);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    return err;
+
+  err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db, true);
+  grub_free (cert_data);
+
+  return err;
+}
+
+/* Free db list memory */
+static void
+free_db_list (void)
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *cert;
+  grub_size_t i = 0;
+
+  while (db.certs != NULL)
+    {
+      cert = db.certs;
+      db.certs = db.certs->next;
+      certificate_release (cert);
+      grub_free (cert);
+    }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < db.signature_entries; i++)
+    grub_free (db.signatures[i]);
+
+  grub_free (db.signatures);
+  grub_free (db.signature_size);
+  grub_memset (&db, 0, sizeof (db));
+}
+
+/* Free dbx list memory */
+static void
+free_dbx_list (void)
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *cert;
+  grub_size_t i = 0;
+
+  while (dbx.certs != NULL)
+    {
+      cert = dbx.certs;
+      dbx.certs = dbx.certs->next;
+      certificate_release (cert);
+      grub_free (cert);
+    }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < dbx.signature_entries; i++)
+    grub_free (dbx.signatures[i]);
+
+  grub_free (dbx.signatures);
+  grub_free (dbx.signature_size);
+  grub_memset (&dbx, 0, sizeof (dbx));
+}
+
 GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
 {
   int rc;
@@ -541,7 +1004,6 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
   if (grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
     check_sigs = CHECK_SIGS_FORCED;
 
-  db = NULL;
   grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures", grub_env_read_sec, grub_env_write_sec);
   grub_env_export ("check_appended_signatures");
 
@@ -549,37 +1011,49 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
   if (rc)
     grub_fatal ("error initing ASN.1 data structures: %d: %s\n", rc, asn1_strerror (rc));
 
-  FOR_MODULES (header)
-  {
-    struct grub_file pseudo_file;
-    struct x509_certificate *pk = NULL;
-    grub_err_t err;
-
-    /* Not an X.509 certificate, skip. */
-    if (header->type != OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY)
-      continue;
-
-    grub_memset (&pseudo_file, 0, sizeof (pseudo_file));
-    pseudo_file.fs = &pseudo_fs;
-    pseudo_file.size = header->size - sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
-    pseudo_file.data = (char *) header + sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
-
-    grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "found an x509 key, size=%" PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T "\n",
-                  pseudo_file.size);
-
-    pk = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate));
-    if (pk == NULL)
-      grub_fatal ("out of memory loading initial certificates.");
-
-    err = read_cert_from_file (&pseudo_file, pk);
-    if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
-      grub_fatal ("error loading initial key: %s", grub_errmsg);
-
-    grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "loaded certificate CN='%s'\n", pk->subject);
+  if (!grub_pks_use_keystore && check_sigs == CHECK_SIGS_FORCED)
+    {
+      FOR_MODULES (header)
+        {
+          /* Not an ELF module, skip.  */
+          if (header->type != OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY)
+            continue;
 
-    pk->next = db;
-    db = pk;
-  }
+          rc = build_static_db_list (header);
+          if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+            {
+              free_db_list ();
+              grub_error (rc, "static db list creation failed.");
+            }
+          else
+            grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " static keys.\n",
+                          db.cert_entries);
+        }
+    }
+  else if (grub_pks_use_keystore && check_sigs == CHECK_SIGS_FORCED)
+    {
+      rc = create_db_list ();
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        {
+          free_db_list ();
+          grub_error (rc, "db list creation failed.");
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          rc = create_dbx_list ();
+          if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+            {
+              free_db_list ();
+              free_dbx_list ();
+              grub_error (rc, "dbx list creation failed.");
+            }
+          else
+            grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " keys.\n"
+                          "the dbx list now has %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " keys.\n",
+                          db.signature_entries + db.cert_entries, dbx.signature_entries);
+        }
+      grub_pks_free_keystore ();
+    }
 
   cmd_db = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert", grub_cmd_db, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
                                   N_("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db"));
include/grub/crypto.h +1 -0
index b0d7add1d..00d074df8 100644
@@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ grub_crypto_hmac_buffer (const struct gcry_md_spec *md,
 extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_md5;
 extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha1;
 extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha256;
+extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha384;
 extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha512;
 extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_crc32;
 extern gcry_cipher_spec_t _gcry_cipher_spec_aes;
include/grub/efi/pks.h new file +112 -0

112 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#25 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 16/21] appendedsig: Create db and dbx lists

Quoted 2 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

If secure boot is enabled with a static key, the trusted certificates will be extracted from the GRUB ELF NOTE and adding in the db list. The db list is used by GRUB

s/and adding in the/and added to db/

Quoted 1 line

for kernel verification.

AIUI this is introduced by subsequent patch. So, it should be mentioned here...

Quoted 2 lines

If secure boot is enabled with a dynamic key, the trusted certificates and certificate/binary hash will be extracted from the PKS and adding in the db list.

s/and adding in the/and added to db/

Quoted 2 lines

The distrusted certificates, certificate/binary hash from the PKS and adding in the dbx list. Both dbx and db list are used by GRUB for kernel verification.

s/and adding in the/and added to dbx/

Quoted 5 lines

Note:-

If the certificate or the certificate hash exists in the dbx list, then reject the certificate/certificate hash before adding it in the db list.

... then do not add certificate to the db list.

Quoted 20 lines
---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 558 +++++++++++++++++--
 include/grub/crypto.h                        |   1 +
 include/grub/efi/pks.h                       | 112 ++++
 3 files changed, 629 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/pks.h
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +1 -1
index d1149695b..a4b786d0c 100644
@@ -33,13 +33,16 @@
 #include <libtasn1.h>
 #include <grub/env.h>
 #include <grub/lockdown.h>
-
+#include <grub/efi/pks.h>

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 45

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +4 -1
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
 #include "appendedsig.h"
 
 GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
 
 /* Public key type. */
-#define GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
+#define GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7  2
+/* GUID size. */
+#define GRUB_GUID_SIZE      (sizeof (grub_packed_guid_t))

If you really need that then add it to include/grub/types.h after grub_packed_guid_t definition. And it should be renamed to GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE. And for completeness GRUB_GUID_SIZE should be defined after grub_guid_t definition.

Quoted 41 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +26 -2
 /* Appended signature magic string. */
 static const char magic[] = "~Module signature appended~\n";
@@ -67,8 +70,30 @@ struct grub_appended_signature
   struct pkcs7_signedData pkcs7;        /* Parsed PKCS#7 data. */
 };
 
-/* Trusted certificates for verifying appended signatures. */
-struct x509_certificate *db;
+/* This represents a db/dbx list. */
+struct grub_database
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificates. */
+  grub_size_t cert_entries;       /* Number of certificates. */
+  grub_uint8_t **signatures;      /* Certificate/binary hashes. */
+  grub_size_t *signature_size;    /* Size of certificate/binary hashes. */
+  grub_size_t signature_entries;  /* Number of certificate/binary hashes. */
+};
+
+/* The db list */
+struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0, .signatures = NULL,
+                           .signature_size = NULL, .signature_entries = 0};
+
+/* The dbx list */
+struct grub_database dbx = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0, .signatures = NULL,
+                            .signature_size = NULL, .signature_entries = 0};
+
+/* Free db list memory */
+static void
+free_db_list (void);
+/* Free dbx list memory */
+static void
+free_dbx_list (void);
 
 static enum
 {
@@ -77,6 +102,201 @@ static enum
   CHECK_SIGS_FORCED = 2
 } check_sigs = CHECK_SIGS_NO;
 
+/*
+ * GUID can be used to determine the hashing function and

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c static enum · line 116

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +10 -0
+ * generate the hash using determined hashing function.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+get_hash (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid, const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
+          grub_uint8_t *hash, grub_size_t *hash_size)
+{
+  gcry_md_spec_t *hash_func = NULL;
+
+  if (guid == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "GUID is empty.");

s/GUID is empty./GUID is not available/

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c static enum · line 128

Quoted 11 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +11 -0
+  if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+      grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256;
+  else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+           grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha384;
+  else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+           grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha512;
+  else
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "unsupported GUID for hash.");

s/ for//

Quoted 151 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +151 -0
+  grub_memset (hash, 0, GRUB_MAX_HASH_SIZE);
+  grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, hash, data, data_size);
+  *hash_size =  hash_func->mdlen;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Add the certificate/binary hash into the db/dbx list. */
+static grub_err_t
+add_hash (const grub_uint8_t **data, const grub_size_t data_size,
+          grub_uint8_t ***signature_list, grub_size_t **signature_size_list,
+          grub_size_t *signature_list_entries)
+{
+  grub_uint8_t **signatures = *signature_list;
+  grub_size_t *signature_size = *signature_size_list;
+  grub_size_t signature_entries = *signature_list_entries;
+
+  if (*data == NULL || data_size == 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "certificate/binary-hash data or size is empty.");
+
+  signatures = grub_realloc (signatures, sizeof (grub_uint8_t *) * (signature_entries + 1));
+  signature_size = grub_realloc (signature_size,
+                                 sizeof (grub_size_t) * (signature_entries + 1));
+
+  if (signatures == NULL || signature_size == NULL)
+    {
+      /*
+       * Allocated memory will be freed by
+       * free_db_list/free_dbx_list.
+       */
+      if (signatures != NULL)
+        {
+          *signature_list = signatures;
+          *signature_list_entries = signature_entries + 1;
+        }
+
+      if (signature_size != NULL)
+        *signature_size_list = signature_size;
+
+      return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory.");
+    }
+
+  signatures[signature_entries] = (grub_uint8_t *) *data;
+  signature_size[signature_entries] = data_size;
+  signature_entries++;
+  *data = NULL;
+
+  *signature_list = signatures;
+  *signature_size_list = signature_size;
+  *signature_list_entries = signature_entries;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_x509 (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid)
+{
+  if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    return true;
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_cert_match (const struct x509_certificate *distrusted_cert,
+               const struct x509_certificate *db_cert)
+{
+  if (grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->subject, db_cert->subject, db_cert->subject_len) == 0
+      && grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->serial, db_cert->serial, db_cert->serial_len) == 0
+      && grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->mpis[0], db_cert->mpis[0], sizeof (db_cert->mpis[0])) == 0
+      && grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->mpis[1], db_cert->mpis[1], sizeof (db_cert->mpis[1])) == 0)
+    return true;
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+
+/* Check the certificate presence in the platform keystore dbx list. */
+static grub_err_t
+is_dbx_cert (const struct x509_certificate *db_cert)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_size_t i;
+  struct x509_certificate *distrusted_cert;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data == NULL)
+        continue;
+
+      if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true)
+        {
+          distrusted_cert = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate));
+          if (distrusted_cert == NULL)
+            return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory.");
+
+          rc = parse_x509_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data,
+                                       grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size, distrusted_cert);
+          if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+            {
+              grub_free (distrusted_cert);
+              continue;
+            }
+
+          if (is_cert_match (distrusted_cert, db_cert) == true)
+            {
+              grub_printf ("Warning: a trusted certificate CN='%s' is ignored "
+                           "because it is on the dbx list.\n", db_cert->subject);
+              grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data);
+              grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i], 0, sizeof (grub_pks_sd_t));
+              certificate_release (distrusted_cert);
+              grub_free (distrusted_cert);
+              return GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED;
+            }
+
+          certificate_release (distrusted_cert);
+          grub_free (distrusted_cert);
+        }
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Add the certificate into the db/dbx list */
+static grub_err_t
+add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
+                 struct grub_database *database, const bool is_db)
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *cert;
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_size_t cert_entries = database->cert_entries;
+
+  if (data == NULL || data_size == 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "certificate data or size is empty.");
+
+  cert = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate));
+  if (cert == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory.");
+
+  rc = parse_x509_certificate (data, data_size, cert);
+  if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "skipped %s certificate (%d)\n",
+                    (is_db == true ? "trusted":"distrusted"), (int) rc);
+      grub_free (cert);
+      return rc;
+    }
+
+  if (is_db == true)
+    {
+      rc = is_dbx_cert (cert);

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c static enum · line 290

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +10 -0
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        {
+          certificate_release (cert);
+          grub_free (cert);
+          return rc;
+        }
+    }
+
+  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "add a %s certificate CN='%s'\n",
+                (is_db == true ? "trusted":"distrusted"), cert->subject);

Missing spaces around ":"... Or better
(is_db == true) ? "trusted" : "distrusted"

Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +8 -0
+
+  cert_entries++;
+  cert->next = database->certs;
+  database->certs = cert;
+  database->cert_entries = cert_entries;
+
+  return rc;
+}

[...]

Quoted 1 line

+/* Add the X.509 certificates/binary hash to the db list. */

From where? PKS? Please be precise?

Quoted 25 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +25 -0
+static grub_err_t
+create_db_list (void)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_size_t i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.db_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (is_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.db[i].guid) == true)
+        {
+          rc = add_db_binary_hash ((const grub_uint8_t **) &grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data,
+                                   grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size);
+          if (rc == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
+            return rc;
+        }
+      else if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.db[i].guid) == true)
+        {
+          if (is_dbx_cert_hash (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data,
+                                grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size) == true)
+            continue;
+
+          rc = add_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data,
+                                grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size, &db, true);
+          if (rc == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
+            return rc;

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = { · line 885

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +10 -0
+        }
+      else
+        grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "unsupported signature data type and "
+                      "skipped (%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE ")\n", i + 1);
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Add the certificates and certificate/binary hash to the dbx list. */

Ditto...

Quoted 25 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +25 -0
+static grub_err_t
+create_dbx_list (void)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_size_t i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data != NULL ||
+          grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size > 0)
+        {
+          if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true)
+            {
+              rc = add_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data,
+                                    grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size, &dbx, false);
+              if (rc == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
+                return rc;
+            }
+          else if (is_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true)
+            {
+              rc = add_hash ((const grub_uint8_t **) &grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data,
+                             grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size,
+                             &dbx.signatures, &dbx.signature_size,
+                             &dbx.signature_entries);
+              if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = { · line 920

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +10 -0
+                return rc;
+            }
+          else
+            grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "unsupported signature data type and "
+                          "skipped (%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE ")\n", i + 1);
+        }
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#26 lore raw

PATCH v5 17/21 appendedsig: Verify the kernel using db and dbx lists

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

To verify the kernel's signature: verify the kernel binary against lists of binary hashes that are either in dbx or db list. If it is not list in either db or dbx list then the trusted keys from the db list are used to verify the signature.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 148 ++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 115 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +115 -33
index a4b786d0c..fb2119844 100644
@@ -478,6 +478,77 @@ verify_signature (const gcry_mpi_t *pkmpi, const gcry_mpi_t hmpi,
   return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
 }
 
+static grub_err_t
+get_binary_hash (const grub_size_t binary_hash_size, const grub_uint8_t *data,
+                 const grub_size_t data_size, grub_uint8_t *hash, grub_size_t *hash_size)
+{
+  grub_packed_guid_t guid = { 0 };
+
+  /* support SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 for binary hash */
+  if (binary_hash_size == 32)
+    grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE);
+  else if (binary_hash_size == 48)
+    grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE);
+  else if (binary_hash_size == 64)
+    grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_GUID_SIZE);
+  else
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "unsupported hash type (%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE ") and "
+                    "skipped the binary hash\n", binary_hash_size);
+      return GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND;
+    }
+
+  return get_hash (&guid, data, data_size, hash, hash_size);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify binary hash against the db and dbx list.
+ * The following errors can occur:
+ *  - GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: indicates that the hash is in dbx list.
+ *  - GRUB_ERR_EOF: the hash could not be found in the db and dbx list.
+ *  - GRUB_ERR_NONE: the hash is found in db list.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+verify_binary_hash (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+  grub_size_t i = 0, hash_size = 0;
+  grub_uint8_t hash[GRUB_MAX_HASH_SIZE] = { 0 };
+
+  for (i = 0; i < dbx.signature_entries; i++)
+    {
+      rc = get_binary_hash (dbx.signature_size[i], data, data_size, hash, &hash_size);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        continue;
+
+      if (hash_size == dbx.signature_size[i] &&
+          grub_memcmp (dbx.signatures[i], hash, hash_size) == 0)
+        {
+          grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the binary hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is present in the dbx list\n",
+                        hash[0], hash[1], hash[2], hash[3]);
+          return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+        }
+    }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < db.signature_entries; i++)
+    {
+      rc = get_binary_hash (db.signature_size[i], data, data_size, hash, &hash_size);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        continue;
+
+      if (hash_size == db.signature_size[i] &&
+          grub_memcmp (db.signatures[i], hash, hash_size) == 0)
+        {
+          grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "verified with a trusted binary hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x)\n",
+                        hash[0], hash[1], hash[2], hash[3]);
+          return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+        }
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_EOF;
+}
+
+/* Verify the kernel's integrity using db and dbx list */
 static grub_err_t
 grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)
 {
@@ -490,7 +561,7 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)
   struct pkcs7_signerInfo *si;
   int i;
 
-  if (!db.cert_entries)
+  if (!db.cert_entries && !db.signature_entries)
     return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "no trusted keys to verify against.");
 
   err = extract_appended_signature (buf, bufsize, &sig);
@@ -498,45 +569,56 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)
     return err;
 
   datasize = bufsize - sig.signature_len;
-
-  for (i = 0; i < sig.pkcs7.signerInfo_count; i++)
+  /* Verify binary hash against the db and dbx list. */
+  err = verify_binary_hash (buf, datasize);
+  if (err == GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
     {
-      /*
-       * This could be optimised in a couple of ways:
-       * - we could only compute hashes once per hash type.
-       * - we could track signer information and only verify where IDs match.
-       * For now we do the naive O(trusted keys * pkcs7 signers) approach.
-       */
-      si = &sig.pkcs7.signerInfos[i];
-      context = grub_zalloc (si->hash->contextsize);
-      if (context == NULL)
-        return grub_errno;
-
-      si->hash->init (context, 0);
-      si->hash->write (context, buf, datasize);
-      si->hash->final (context);
-      hash = si->hash->read (context);
-
-      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "data size %" PRIxGRUB_SIZE ", signer %d hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n",
-                    datasize, i, hash[0], hash[1], hash[2], hash[3]);
-
-      for (pk = db.certs; pk != NULL; pk = pk->next)
+      pkcs7_signedData_release (&sig.pkcs7);
+      return grub_error (err, "failed to verify the signature because this binary is in the dbx list.\n");
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      /* Verify kernel binary signature using trusted keys from db list */
+      for (i = 0; i < sig.pkcs7.signerInfo_count; i++)
         {
-          err = verify_signature (pk->mpis, si->sig_mpi, si->hash, hash);
-          if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+          /*
+           * This could be optimised in a couple of ways:
+           * - we could only compute hashes once per hash type.
+           * - we could track signer information and only verify where IDs match.
+           * For now we do the naive O(trusted keys * pkcs7 signers) approach.
+           */
+          si = &sig.pkcs7.signerInfos[i];
+          context = grub_zalloc (si->hash->contextsize);
+          if (context == NULL)
+            return grub_errno;
+
+          si->hash->init (context, 0);
+          si->hash->write (context, buf, datasize);
+          si->hash->final (context);
+          hash = si->hash->read (context);
+
+          grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+                        "data size %" PRIxGRUB_SIZE ", signer %d hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n",
+                        datasize, i, hash[0], hash[1], hash[2], hash[3]);
+
+          for (pk = db.certs; pk != NULL; pk = pk->next)
             {
-              grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "verify signer %d with key '%s' succeeded.\n",
+              err = verify_signature (pk->mpis, si->sig_mpi, si->hash, hash);
+              if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+                {
+                  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "verify signer %d with key '%s' succeeded.\n",
+                                i, pk->subject);
+                  break;
+                }
+
+              grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "verify signer %d with key '%s' failed\n",
                             i, pk->subject);
-              break;
             }
 
-          grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "verify signer %d with key '%s' failed\n",
-                        i, pk->subject);
+          grub_free (context);
+          if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+            break;
         }
-
-      grub_free (context);
-      if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
-        break;
     }
 
   pkcs7_signedData_release (&sig.pkcs7);
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#27 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 17/21] appendedsig: Verify the kernel using db and dbx lists

Quoted 2 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

To verify the kernel's signature: verify the kernel binary against lists of binary hashes that are either in dbx or db list. If it is not list in either db or dbx list

s/not list/not in the list/

Quoted 5 lines

then the trusted keys from the db list are used to verify the signature.

Otherwise Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>...

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#28 lore raw

PATCH v5 18/21 powerpc_ieee1275: Introduce use_static_keys flag

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Introduce the use_static_keys flag to indicate that static keys are to be used rather than keys from the PKS storage's DB variable. This flag is set when Secure Boot is enabled with PKS but the DB variable is not present in the PKS storage. The appendedsig module would use this flag to extract the static keys from the GRUB ELF Note and stored in the db list.

---
 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 12 +++++++++++-
 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h   |  1 +
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c +11 -1
index 3af1ea28a..cf08e39bb 100644
@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ static grub_size_t pks_max_object_size;
 grub_uint8_t grub_pks_use_keystore = 0;
 
 /* Platform Keystore. */
-grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore = { .db = NULL, .dbx = NULL, .db_entries = 0, .dbx_entries = 0 };
+grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore = { .db = NULL, .dbx = NULL, .db_entries = 0, .dbx_entries = 0,
+                                 .use_static_keys = false };
 
 /* Convert the esl data into the ESL. */
 static grub_esl_t *
@@ -323,6 +324,15 @@ grub_pks_keystore_init (void)
       grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore, 0, sizeof (grub_pks_t));
       /* Read DB from PKS. */
       rc = read_secure_boot_variables (0, DB, &grub_pks_keystore.db, &grub_pks_keystore.db_entries);
+      if (rc == GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND)
+        {
+          rc = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+          /*
+           * DB variable won't be available by default in PKS.
+           * So, it will use the static key as a default key from the GRUB ELF Note.
+           */
+          grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys = true;
+        }
       if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
         {
           /* Read DBX from PKS. */
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h +1 -0
index d48c60200..fc3996937 100644
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ struct grub_pks
   grub_pks_sd_t *dbx;       /* Forbidden signature database. */
   grub_size_t db_entries;   /* Size of signature database. */
   grub_size_t dbx_entries;  /* Size of forbidden signature database. */
+  bool use_static_keys;     /* Flag to indicate use of static keys. */
 } GRUB_PACKED;
 
 typedef struct grub_pks grub_pks_t;
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Reviewed-by on v5 18/21
#29 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 18/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Introduce use_static_keys flag

Quoted 9 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Introduce the use_static_keys flag to indicate that static keys are to be used rather than keys from the PKS storage's DB variable. This flag is set when Secure Boot is enabled with PKS but the DB variable is not present in the PKS storage. The appendedsig module would use this flag to extract the static keys from the GRUB ELF Note and stored in the db list.

By the way, I hope this behavior is described in the GRUB documentation somewhere...

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#30 lore raw

PATCH v5 19/21 appendedsig: Read default DB keys from the ELF Note

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

If Secure Boot is enabled with PKS and the use_static_keys flag is set, then read the static keys as a DB default keys from the ELF note and add stored in the db list.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 59 ++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +43 -16
index fb2119844..1356babaf 100644
@@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ create_dbx_list (void)
  * parse it, and add it to the db list.
  */
 static grub_err_t
-build_static_db_list (const struct grub_module_header *header)
+build_static_db_list (const struct grub_module_header *header, const bool is_pks)
 {
   grub_err_t err;
   struct grub_file pseudo_file;
@@ -1025,6 +1025,12 @@ build_static_db_list (const struct grub_module_header *header)
   if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
     return err;
 
+  if (is_pks == true)
+    {
+      if (is_dbx_cert_hash (cert_data, cert_data_size) == true)
+        return GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED;
+    }
+
   err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db, true);
   grub_free (cert_data);
 
@@ -1077,6 +1083,25 @@ free_dbx_list (void)
   grub_memset (&dbx, 0, sizeof (dbx));
 }
 
+static grub_err_t
+load_static_keys (const struct grub_module_header *header, const bool is_pks)
+{
+  int rc = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+  FOR_MODULES (header)
+    {
+      /* Not an ELF module, skip.  */
+      if (header->type != OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY)
+        continue;
+
+      rc = build_static_db_list (header, is_pks);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        return rc;
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
 GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
 {
   int rc;
@@ -1095,26 +1120,28 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
 
   if (!grub_pks_use_keystore && check_sigs == CHECK_SIGS_FORCED)
     {
-      FOR_MODULES (header)
+      rc = load_static_keys (header, false);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
         {
-          /* Not an ELF module, skip.  */
-          if (header->type != OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY)
-            continue;
-
-          rc = build_static_db_list (header);
-          if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
-            {
-              free_db_list ();
-              grub_error (rc, "static db list creation failed.");
-            }
-          else
-            grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " static keys.\n",
-                          db.cert_entries);
+          free_db_list ();
+          grub_error (rc, "static db list creation failed.");
         }
+      else
+        grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " static keys.\n",
+                      db.cert_entries);
     }
   else if (grub_pks_use_keystore && check_sigs == CHECK_SIGS_FORCED)
     {
-      rc = create_db_list ();
+
+      if (grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys == true)
+        {
+          grub_printf ("Warning: db variable is not available at PKS and using a static keys "
+                       "as a default key in db list\n");
+          rc = load_static_keys (header, grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys);
+        }
+      else
+        rc = create_db_list ();
+
       if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
         {
           free_db_list ();
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#31 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 19/21] appendedsig: Read default DB keys from the ELF Note

Quoted 2 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

If Secure Boot is enabled with PKS and the use_static_keys flag is set, then read the static keys as a DB default keys from the ELF note and

By convention UEFI uses lowercase "db". However, as I can see you mix cases or even prefer DB. I suggest to stick to UEFI convention and use db, dbx, ... Please fix this in all patches.

Quoted 62 lines

add stored in the db list.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 59 ++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +26 -1
index fb2119844..1356babaf 100644
@@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ create_dbx_list (void)
  * parse it, and add it to the db list.
  */
 static grub_err_t
-build_static_db_list (const struct grub_module_header *header)
+build_static_db_list (const struct grub_module_header *header, const bool is_pks)
 {
   grub_err_t err;
   struct grub_file pseudo_file;
@@ -1025,6 +1025,12 @@ build_static_db_list (const struct grub_module_header *header)
   if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
     return err;
 
+  if (is_pks == true)
+    {
+      if (is_dbx_cert_hash (cert_data, cert_data_size) == true)
+        return GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED;
+    }
+
   err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db, true);
   grub_free (cert_data);
 
@@ -1077,6 +1083,25 @@ free_dbx_list (void)
   grub_memset (&dbx, 0, sizeof (dbx));
 }
 
+static grub_err_t
+load_static_keys (const struct grub_module_header *header, const bool is_pks)
+{
+  int rc = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+  FOR_MODULES (header)
+    {
+      /* Not an ELF module, skip.  */
+      if (header->type != OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY)
+        continue;
+
+      rc = build_static_db_list (header, is_pks);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        return rc;
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
 GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
 {
   int rc;

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig) · line 1121

Quoted 2 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +0 -0
@@ -1095,26 +1120,28 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
 
   if (!grub_pks_use_keystore && check_sigs == CHECK_SIGS_FORCED)

Again, this shows that almost certainly grub_pks_use_keystore is a flag. So, it should be defined as bool...

Additionally, after closer looking at the code it seems to me check_sigs could be defined as bool too. Only CHECK_SIGS_NO and CHECK_SIGS_FORCED seems to have meaningful usage and CHECK_SIGS_ENFORCE is used only in definition and one barely meaningful place.

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#32 lore raw

PATCH v5 20/21 appendedsig: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Introducing the following db and dbx commands

1. append_list_db:
It will show the list of trusted certificates and binary hashes
2. append_list_dbx:
It will show the list of distrusted certificates and binary/certificate hashes
3. append_add_db_cert:
It will add the trusted certificate to the db list
4. append_add_db_sig:
It will add the certificate/binary hash to the db list
5. append_rm_dbx_cert:
It will remove the trusted certificate from the db list
6. append_add_dbx_sig:
It will add the certificate/binary hash to the dbx list

Note:-
The addition/deletion of trusted certificates and binary hashes
are not allowed in GRUB command prompt while secure boot is enabled.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 351 +++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 286 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +286 -65
index 1356babaf..f25e4734b 100644
@@ -102,6 +102,38 @@ static enum
   CHECK_SIGS_FORCED = 2
 } check_sigs = CHECK_SIGS_NO;
 
+enum
+{
+  OPTION_BINARY_HASH = 0,
+  OPTION_CERT_HASH = 1
+};
+
+static const struct grub_arg_option options[] =
+{
+  {"binary-hash", 'b', 0, N_("hash file of the binary."), 0, ARG_TYPE_NONE},
+  {"cert-hash", 'c', 1, N_("hash file of the certificate."), 0, ARG_TYPE_NONE},
+  {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
+};
+
+static void
+print_hex (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t length)
+{
+  grub_size_t i, count = 0;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < length-1; i++)
+    {
+      grub_printf ("%02x:", data[i]);
+      count++;
+      if (count == 16)
+        {
+          grub_printf ("\n\t      ");
+          count = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+  grub_printf ("%02x\n", data[i]);
+}
+
 /*
  * GUID can be used to determine the hashing function and
  * generate the hash using determined hashing function.
@@ -634,37 +666,203 @@ grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc
 {
   grub_file_t signed_file;
   grub_err_t err;
-  grub_uint8_t *data;
-  grub_size_t file_size;
+  grub_uint8_t *signed_data;
+  grub_size_t signed_size;
 
   if (argc != 1)
-    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "one argument expected.");
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+                       "a signed file is expected.\nExample:\n\tappend_verify <SIGNED FILE>\n");
 
   grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "verifying %s\n", args[0]);
 
   signed_file = grub_file_open (args[0], GRUB_FILE_TYPE_VERIFY_SIGNATURE);
   if (signed_file == NULL)
-    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "could not open %s file.", args[0]);
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "could not open %s file.", args[0]);
 
-  err = file_read_all (signed_file, &data, &file_size);
+  err = file_read_all (signed_file, &signed_data, &signed_size);
   if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
-    err = grub_verify_appended_signature (data, file_size);
+    err = grub_verify_appended_signature (signed_data, signed_size);
 
   grub_file_close (signed_file);
-  grub_free (data);
+  grub_free (signed_data);
+
+  return err;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)),
+                  int argc __attribute__((unused)), char **args __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *cert;
+  grub_size_t i, cert_num = 1;
+
+  for (cert = db.certs; cert; cert = cert->next)
+    {
+      grub_printf ("trusted X.509 certificate %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE ":\n", cert_num);
+      grub_printf ("\tserial: ");
+
+      for (i = 0; i < cert->serial_len - 1; i++)
+        grub_printf ("%02x:", cert->serial[i]);
+
+      grub_printf ("%02x\n", cert->serial[cert->serial_len - 1]);
+      grub_printf ("\tCN: %s\n\n", cert->subject);
+      cert_num++;
+    }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < db.signature_entries; i++)
+    {
+      grub_printf ("trusted binary hash %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE ":\n", i + 1);
+      grub_printf ("\thash: ");
+      print_hex (db.signatures[i], db.signature_size[i]);
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_list_dbx (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)),
+                   int argc __attribute__((unused)), char **args __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *cert;
+  grub_size_t i, cert_num = 1;
+
+  for (cert = dbx.certs; cert; cert = cert->next)
+    {
+      grub_printf ("distrusted X.509 certificate %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE ":\n", cert_num);
+      grub_printf ("\tserial: ");
+
+      for (i = 0; i < cert->serial_len - 1; i++)
+        grub_printf ("%02x:", cert->serial[i]);
+
+      grub_printf ("%02x\n", cert->serial[cert->serial_len - 1]);
+      grub_printf ("\tCN: %s\n\n", cert->subject);
+      cert_num++;
+    }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < dbx.signature_entries; i++)
+    {
+      grub_printf ("distrusted certificate/binary hash %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE ":\n", i + 1);
+      grub_printf ("\thash: ");
+      print_hex (dbx.signatures[i], dbx.signature_size[i]);
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)), int argc, char **args)
+{
+  grub_err_t err;
+  grub_file_t cert_file;
+  struct x509_certificate *cert;
+
+  if (argc != 1)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+                       "a trusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format.\n"
+                       "Example:\n\tappend_add_db_cert <CERT FILE>\n");
+
+  if (check_sigs == CHECK_SIGS_FORCED)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
+                       "since secure boot is enabled, "
+                       "adding of trusted X.509 certificate is not permitted!\n");
+
+  if (grub_strlen (args[0]) == 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing trusted X.509 certificate file.");
+
+  cert_file = grub_file_open (args[0], GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_TRUST |
+                                       GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS);
+  if (cert_file == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND,
+                       "unable to open the trusted X.509 certificate file.");
+
+  cert = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate));
+  if (cert == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "could not allocate memory for certificate.");
+
+  err = read_cert_from_file (cert_file, cert);
+  grub_file_close (cert_file);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    {
+      grub_free (cert);
+      return err;
+    }
+
+  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "added the certificate with CN: %s\n", cert->subject);
+
+  cert->next = db.certs;
+  db.certs = cert;
+  db.cert_entries++;
 
   return err;
 }
 
 static grub_err_t
-grub_cmd_dbx (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args)
+grub_cmd_db_sig (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)), int argc, char**args)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_file_t hash_file;
+  grub_uint8_t *hash_data = NULL;
+  grub_size_t hash_data_size = 0;
+
+  if (argc != 1)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+                       "a trusted binary hash file is expected.\n"
+                       "Example:\n\tappend_add_db_sig <BINARY HASH FILE>\n");
+
+  if (check_sigs == CHECK_SIGS_FORCED)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
+                       "since secure boot is enabled, "
+                       "adding of trusted binary hash is not permitted.\n");
+
+  if (grub_strlen (args[0]) == 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing trusted binary hash file.");
+
+  hash_file = grub_file_open (args[0], GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TO_HASH | GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS);
+  if (hash_file == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "unable to open the trusted binary hash file.");
+
+  rc = file_read_all (hash_file, &hash_data, &hash_data_size);
+  grub_file_close (hash_file);
+  if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+                    "adding a trusted binary hash %s\n with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n",
+                    hash_data, hash_data_size);
+
+      /* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 binary hash */
+      if (hash_data_size != 32 && hash_data_size != 48 && hash_data_size != 64)
+        return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "unacceptable trusted binary hash type.");
+
+      rc = add_hash ((const grub_uint8_t **) &hash_data, hash_data_size, &db.signatures,
+                     &db.signature_size, &db.signature_entries);
+      grub_free (hash_data);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        {
+          free_db_list ();
+          free_dbx_list ();
+          return grub_error (rc, "adding of trusted binary hash failed.");
+        }
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args)
 {
   unsigned long cert_num, i = 0;
   const char *end;
   struct x509_certificate *cert, *prev_cert;
 
   if (argc != 1)
-    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "one argument expected.");
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+                       "a distrusted certificate number is expected.\n"
+                       "Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert <CERT NUMBER>\n");
+
+  if (check_sigs == CHECK_SIGS_FORCED)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
+                       "since secure boot is enabled, "
+                       "removing of distrusted X.509 certificate is not permitted.\n");
 
   cert_num = grub_strtoul (args[0], &end, 10);
   if (*(args[0]) == '\0' || *end != '\0')
@@ -703,62 +901,69 @@ grub_cmd_dbx (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args
 }
 
 static grub_err_t
-grub_cmd_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args)
+grub_cmd_dbx_sig (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args)
 {
-  grub_file_t certf;
-  struct x509_certificate *cert = NULL;
-  grub_err_t err;
-
-  if (argc != 1)
-    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "one argument expected.");
-
-  certf = grub_file_open (args[0], GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_TRUST | GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS);
-  if (certf == NULL)
-    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "could not open %s file.", args[0]);
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_file_t hash_file = NULL;
+  grub_uint8_t *hash_data = NULL;
+  grub_size_t hash_data_size = 0;
 
-  cert = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate));
-  if (cert == NULL)
-    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "could not allocate memory for certificate.");
+  if (argc != 2)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+                       "a distrusted certificate/binary hash file is expected\n"
+                       "Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_sig [option] <FILE>\n"
+                       "option:\n[-b|--binary-hash] FILE [BINARY HASH FILE]\n"
+                       "[-c|--cert-hash] FILE [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]\n");
 
-  err = read_cert_from_file (certf, cert);
-  grub_file_close (certf);
-  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
-    {
-      grub_free (cert);
-      return err;
-    }
+  if (check_sigs == CHECK_SIGS_FORCED)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
+                       "since secure boot is enabled, "
+                       "adding of distrusted certificate/binary hash is not permitted!\n");
 
-  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "loaded certificate with CN: %s\n", cert->subject);
+  if (!ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].set && !ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].set)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "missing options and use --help to konw.");
 
-  cert->next = db.certs;
-  db.certs = cert;
-  db.cert_entries++;
+  if (grub_strlen (args[1]) == 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing distrusted certificate/binary hash file.");
 
-  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
-}
+  hash_file = grub_file_open (args[1], GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TO_HASH | GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS);
+  if (hash_file == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND,
+                       "unable to open the distrusted certificate/binary hash file.");
 
-static grub_err_t
-grub_cmd_list (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc __attribute__ ((unused)),
-               char **args __attribute__ ((unused)))
-{
-  struct x509_certificate *cert;
-  int cert_num = 1;
-  grub_size_t i;
-
-  for (cert = db.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next)
+  rc = file_read_all (hash_file, &hash_data, &hash_data_size);
+  grub_file_close (hash_file);
+  if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
     {
-      grub_printf ("Certificate %d:\n", cert_num);
-      grub_printf ("\tSerial: ");
+      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+                    "adding a distrusted certificate/binary hash %s\n"
+                    " with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n", hash_data, hash_data_size);
 
-      for (i = 0; i < cert->serial_len - 1; i++)
-        grub_printf ("%02x:", cert->serial[i]);
+      if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].set)
+        {
+          /* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 binary hash */
+          if (hash_data_size != 32 && hash_data_size != 48 && hash_data_size != 64)
+            return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "unacceptable distrusted binary hash type.");
+        }
+      else if (ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].set)
+        {
+          /* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 certificate hash */
+          if (hash_data_size != 32 && hash_data_size != 48 && hash_data_size != 64)
+            return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "unacceptable distrusted certificate hash type.");
+        }
 
-      grub_printf ("%02x\n", cert->serial[cert->serial_len - 1]);
-      grub_printf ("\tCN: %s\n\n", cert->subject);
-      cert_num++;
+      rc = add_hash ((const grub_uint8_t **) &hash_data, hash_data_size, &dbx.signatures,
+                     &dbx.signature_size, &dbx.signature_entries);
+      grub_free (hash_data);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        {
+          free_db_list ();
+          free_dbx_list ();
+          return grub_error (rc, "adding of distrusted binary/certificate hash failed.");
+        }
     }
 
-  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+  return rc;
 }
 
 static grub_err_t
@@ -834,8 +1039,6 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = {
   .fs_read = pseudo_read
 };
 
-static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list, cmd_dbx, cmd_db;
-
 /* Check the certificate hash presence in the dbx list. */
 static bool
 is_dbx_cert_hash (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size)
@@ -1102,6 +1305,10 @@ load_static_keys (const struct grub_module_header *header, const bool is_pks)
   return rc;
 }
 
+static grub_extcmd_t cmd_dbx_sig;
+static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_db_cert, cmd_db_sig,
+                      cmd_list_dbx, cmd_dbx_cert;
+
 GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
 {
   int rc;
@@ -1164,14 +1371,25 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
       grub_pks_free_keystore ();
     }
 
-  cmd_db = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert", grub_cmd_db, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
-                                  N_("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db"));
-  cmd_list = grub_register_command ("append_list_db", grub_cmd_list, 0,
-                                    N_("Show the list of trusted X.509 certificates from the db"));
+  cmd_db_cert = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert", grub_cmd_db_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
+                                       N_("Add X509_CERTIFICATE to the db list."));
+  cmd_db_sig = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_sig", grub_cmd_db_sig, N_("BINARY HASH FILE"),
+                                      N_("Add trusted BINARY HASH to the db list."));
+  cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("CERT_NUMBER"),
+                                        N_("Remove CERT_NUMBER (as listed by append_list_db) from the db"));
+  cmd_dbx_sig = grub_register_extcmd ("append_add_dbx_sig", grub_cmd_dbx_sig, 0,
+                                      N_("[-b|--binary-hash] FILE [BINARY HASH FILE]\n"
+                                         "[-c|--cert-hash] FILE [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]"),
+                                      N_("Add distrusted CERTFICATE/BINARY HASH to the db list."), options);
+  cmd_list_db = grub_register_command ("append_list_db", grub_cmd_list_db, 0,
+                                       N_("Show the list of trusted x509 certificates and"
+                                          " trusted binary hashes from the db list."));
+  cmd_list_dbx = grub_register_command ("append_list_dbx", grub_cmd_list_dbx, 0,
+                                        N_("Show the list of distrusted certificates and"
+                                           " certificate/binary hashes from the dbx list"));
   cmd_verify = grub_register_command ("append_verify", grub_cmd_verify_signature, N_("FILE"),
-                                      N_("Verify FILE against the trusted X.509 certificates in the db"));
-  cmd_dbx = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx, N_("CERT_NUMBER"),
-                                   N_("Remove CERT_NUMBER (as listed by append_list_db) from the db"));
+                                      N_("Verify FILE against the trusted x509 certificates/"
+                                         "trusted binary hashes."));
 
   grub_verifier_register (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);
   grub_dl_set_persistent (mod);
@@ -1185,7 +1403,10 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI (appendedsig)
    */
   grub_verifier_unregister (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);
   grub_unregister_command (cmd_verify);
-  grub_unregister_command (cmd_list);
-  grub_unregister_command (cmd_db);
-  grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx);
+  grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db);
+  grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_dbx);
+  grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert);
+  grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_sig);
+  grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert);
+  grub_unregister_extcmd (cmd_dbx_sig);
 }
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#33 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 20/21] appendedsig: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx

Quoted 4 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Introducing the following db and dbx commands

1. append_list_db:
It will show the list of trusted certificates and binary hashes

s/It will show/Show/

Quoted 2 lines

2. append_list_dbx:
It will show the list of distrusted certificates and binary/certificate hashes

s/It will show/Show/ and below please...

Quoted 6 lines

3. append_add_db_cert:
It will add the trusted certificate to the db list
4. append_add_db_sig:
It will add the certificate/binary hash to the db list
5. append_rm_dbx_cert:
It will remove the trusted certificate from the db list

s/db/dbx/

Quoted 18 lines

6. append_add_dbx_sig:
It will add the certificate/binary hash to the dbx list

Note:-
The addition/deletion of trusted certificates and binary hashes
are not allowed in GRUB command prompt while secure boot is enabled.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 351 +++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 286 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +0 -0
index 1356babaf..f25e4734b 100644

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c static enum · line 109

Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +5 -0
@@ -102,6 +102,38 @@ static enum
   CHECK_SIGS_FORCED = 2
 } check_sigs = CHECK_SIGS_NO;
 
+enum
+{
+  OPTION_BINARY_HASH = 0,
+  OPTION_CERT_HASH = 1
+};

Please define enum type properly/fully and use it or use plain constants.

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c static enum · line 119

Quoted 9 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +9 -0
+static const struct grub_arg_option options[] =
+{
+  {"binary-hash", 'b', 0, N_("hash file of the binary."), 0, ARG_TYPE_NONE},
+  {"cert-hash", 'c', 1, N_("hash file of the certificate."), 0, ARG_TYPE_NONE},
+  {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
+};
+
+static void
+print_hex (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t length)

Could you use hexdump function instead?

Quoted 21 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +17 -0
+{
+  grub_size_t i, count = 0;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < length-1; i++)
+    {
+      grub_printf ("%02x:", data[i]);
+      count++;
+      if (count == 16)
+        {
+          grub_printf ("\n\t      ");
+          count = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+  grub_printf ("%02x\n", data[i]);
+}
+
 /*
  * GUID can be used to determine the hashing function and
  * generate the hash using determined hashing function.

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc · line 670

Quoted 7 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +2 -2
@@ -634,37 +666,203 @@ grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc
 {
   grub_file_t signed_file;
   grub_err_t err;
-  grub_uint8_t *data;
-  grub_size_t file_size;
+  grub_uint8_t *signed_data;
+  grub_size_t signed_size;

If want better naming please change that in original patch.

Quoted 13 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +3 -3
   if (argc != 1)
-    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "one argument expected.");
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+                       "a signed file is expected.\nExample:\n\tappend_verify <SIGNED FILE>\n");
 
   grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "verifying %s\n", args[0]);
 
   signed_file = grub_file_open (args[0], GRUB_FILE_TYPE_VERIFY_SIGNATURE);
   if (signed_file == NULL)
-    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "could not open %s file.", args[0]);
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "could not open %s file.", args[0]);
 
-  err = file_read_all (signed_file, &data, &file_size);

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc · line 689

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +5 -2
+  err = file_read_all (signed_file, &signed_data, &signed_size);
   if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
-    err = grub_verify_appended_signature (data, file_size);
+    err = grub_verify_appended_signature (signed_data, signed_size);
 
   grub_file_close (signed_file);
-  grub_free (data);
+  grub_free (signed_data);
+
+  return err;

All theses changes belong to original patch...

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc · line 689

Quoted 1 line
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +1 -0
+}

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#34 lore raw

PATCH v5 21/21 appendedsig: Documentation

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

This explains how static and dynamic key appended signatures can be used to form part of a secure boot chain, and documents the commands and variables introduced.

---
 docs/grub.texi | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
docs/grub.texi +58 -17
index 561f301cf..af63fe4f7 100644
@@ -6420,9 +6420,12 @@ you forget a command, you can run the command @command{help}
 * [::                           Check file types and compare values
 * acpi::                        Load ACPI tables
 * append_add_db_cert::          Add an X.509 certificate to the db list
-* append_list_db::              List trusted certificates from the db list
+* append_add_db_sig::           Add an X.509 certificate/binary hash to the db list
+* append_add_dbx_sig::          Add an X.509 certificate/binary hash to the dbx list
+* append_list_db::              List trusted certificates/binary hashes from the db list
+* append_list_dbx::             List certificates and binary/certificate hashes from the dbx list
 * append_rm_dbx_cert::          Remove a certificate from the db list
-* append_verify::               Verify appended digital signature using db list
+* append_verify::               Verify appended digital signature using db and dbx list
 * authenticate::                Check whether user is in user list
 * background_color::            Set background color for active terminal
 * background_image::            Load background image for active terminal
@@ -6563,16 +6566,48 @@ certificates themselves.)
 See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
 @end deffn
 
+@node append_add_db_sig
+@subsection append_add_db_sig
+
+@deffn Command append_add_db_sig hash_file
+Read a binary/certificate hash from the file @var{hash_file}
+and add it to GRUB's internal db list. These hash are used to validate linux image
+integrity if appended signatures validation failed when the environment variable
+@code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}.
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_add_dbx_sig
+@subsection append_add_dbx_sig
+
+@deffn Command append_add_dbx_sig hash_file
+Read a binary/certificate hash from the file @var{hash_file}
+and add it to GRUB's internal dbx list. These hash are used to restrict validation
+of linux image integrity using db list if appended signatures validation failed
+when the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}.
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
 @node append_list_db
 @subsection append_list_db
 
 @deffn Command append_list_db
-List all X.509 certificates trusted by GRUB for validating appended signatures.
-The output is a numbered list of certificates, showing the certificate's serial
-number and Common Name.
+List all X.509 certificates and binary hashes trusted by GRUB for validating
+appended signatures. The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary hashes,
+showing the certificate's serial number and Common Name.
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_list_dbx
+@subsection append_list_dbx
 
-The certificate number can be used as an argument to
-@command{append_rm_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
+@deffn Command append_list_dbx
+List all the distrusted x509 certificates and binary/certificate hashes.
+The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary/certificate hashes,
+showing the certificate's serial number and Common Name.
 
 See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
 @end deffn
@@ -6597,12 +6632,12 @@ information.
 @node append_verify
 @subsection append_verify
 
-@deffn Command append_verify file
-Verifies an appended signature on @var{file} against the trusted X.509 certificates
-known to GRUB (See @pxref{append_list_db}, @pxref{append_add_db_cert}, and
-@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
-Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates
-successfully.  If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
+@deffn Command append_verify signed_file
+Verifies an appended signature on @var{signed_file} against the trusted X.509 certificates
+known to GRUB (See @pxref{append_list_db},@pxref{append_list_dbx}, @pxref{append_add_db_cert},
+@pxref{append_add_db_sig}, @pxref{append_add_dbx_sig}, and @pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
+Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates successfully.
+If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
 
 See @xref{Using appended signatures}, for more information.
 @end deffn
@@ -8925,10 +8960,16 @@ To enable appended signature verification, load the appendedsig module and an
 x509 certificate for verification. Building the appendedsig module into the
 core grub image is recommended.
 
-Certificates can be managed at boot time using the @pxref{append_add_db_cert},
-@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert} and @pxref{append_list_db} commands.
-Certificates can also be built in to the core image using the @code{--x509}
-parameter to @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}.
+For static key secure boot, certificates will be built in to the core image using
+the @code{--x509} parameter to @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}.
+It allows listing the trusted certificates and binary hashes at boot time using
+@pxref{append_list_db} command.
+
+For dynamic key secure boot, it loads the db and dbx from Platform KeyStore (PKS).
+It allows listing the trusted certificates and binary hashes at boot time using
+@pxref{append_list_db} and listing distrusted certificates and binary/certificate
+hashes at boot time using @pxref{append_list_dbx} commands.
+
 A file can be explicitly verified using the @pxref{append_verify} command.
 
 Only signatures made with the SHA-256 or SHA-512 hash algorithm are supported,
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#35 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 21/21] appendedsig: Documentation

Quoted 29 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

This explains how static and dynamic key appended signatures can be used to form part of a secure boot chain, and documents the commands and variables introduced.

---
 docs/grub.texi | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
docs/grub.texi +5 -2
index 561f301cf..af63fe4f7 100644
@@ -6420,9 +6420,12 @@ you forget a command, you can run the command @command{help}
 * [::                           Check file types and compare values
 * acpi::                        Load ACPI tables
 * append_add_db_cert::          Add an X.509 certificate to the db list
-* append_list_db::              List trusted certificates from the db list
+* append_add_db_sig::           Add an X.509 certificate/binary hash to the db list
+* append_add_dbx_sig::          Add an X.509 certificate/binary hash to the dbx list
+* append_list_db::              List trusted certificates/binary hashes from the db list
+* append_list_dbx::             List certificates and binary/certificate hashes from the dbx list
 * append_rm_dbx_cert::          Remove a certificate from the db list
-* append_verify::               Verify appended digital signature using db list
+* append_verify::               Verify appended digital signature using db and dbx list
 * authenticate::                Check whether user is in user list
 * background_color::            Set background color for active terminal
 * background_image::            Load background image for active terminal

docs/grub.texi certificates themselves.) · line 6572

Quoted 7 lines
docs/grub.texi +4 -0
@@ -6563,16 +6566,48 @@ certificates themselves.)
 See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
 @end deffn
 
+@node append_add_db_sig
+@subsection append_add_db_sig
+
+@deffn Command append_add_db_sig hash_file

s/hash_file/<hash_file>/

docs/grub.texi certificates themselves.) · line 6573

Quoted 1 line
docs/grub.texi +1 -0
+Read a binary/certificate hash from the file @var{hash_file}

What is <hash_file> format?

docs/grub.texi certificates themselves.) · line 6584

Quoted 11 lines
docs/grub.texi +11 -0
+and add it to GRUB's internal db list. These hash are used to validate linux image
+integrity if appended signatures validation failed when the environment variable
+@code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}.
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_add_dbx_sig
+@subsection append_add_dbx_sig
+
+@deffn Command append_add_dbx_sig hash_file

s/hash_file/<hash_file>/

docs/grub.texi certificates themselves.) · line 6585

Quoted 1 line
docs/grub.texi +1 -0
+Read a binary/certificate hash from the file @var{hash_file}

What is <hash_file> format?

Quoted 34 lines
docs/grub.texi +20 -5
+and add it to GRUB's internal dbx list. These hash are used to restrict validation
+of linux image integrity using db list if appended signatures validation failed
+when the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}.
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
 @node append_list_db
 @subsection append_list_db
 
 @deffn Command append_list_db
-List all X.509 certificates trusted by GRUB for validating appended signatures.
-The output is a numbered list of certificates, showing the certificate's serial
-number and Common Name.
+List all X.509 certificates and binary hashes trusted by GRUB for validating
+appended signatures. The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary hashes,
+showing the certificate's serial number and Common Name.
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_list_dbx
+@subsection append_list_dbx
 
-The certificate number can be used as an argument to
-@command{append_rm_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
+@deffn Command append_list_dbx
+List all the distrusted x509 certificates and binary/certificate hashes.
+The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary/certificate hashes,
+showing the certificate's serial number and Common Name.
 
 See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
 @end deffn

docs/grub.texi information. · line 6635

Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +1 -6
@@ -6597,12 +6632,12 @@ information.
 @node append_verify
 @subsection append_verify
 
-@deffn Command append_verify file
-Verifies an appended signature on @var{file} against the trusted X.509 certificates
-known to GRUB (See @pxref{append_list_db}, @pxref{append_add_db_cert}, and
-@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
-Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates
-successfully.  If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
+@deffn Command append_verify signed_file

s/hash_file/<signed_file>/

docs/grub.texi information. · line 6640

Quoted 5 lines
docs/grub.texi +5 -0
+Verifies an appended signature on @var{signed_file} against the trusted X.509 certificates
+known to GRUB (See @pxref{append_list_db},@pxref{append_list_dbx}, @pxref{append_add_db_cert},
+@pxref{append_add_db_sig}, @pxref{append_add_dbx_sig}, and @pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
+Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates successfully.
+If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel