Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC
v9 cover Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC
This patch set contains v9 the consolidated version of the patch sets for secure boot using appended signatures on powerpc, rebased on top of git HEAD.
The v8 series is at
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2025-08/msg00120.html
Changes since v8:
- Daniel Kiper review comments addressed:
- v9 patch 10, 11: splited into two patch 10 and 11 from patch 10 in v8, defined SIG_MAGIC and SIG_MAGIC_SIZE constants then used accross the functions, corrected code sytle.
- v9 patch 12: changed the function name from esd_from_esl to _esd_from_esl and from is_support_pks to is_pks_present. Also merged the get_secure_boot_version function with this.
Strict with one variable grub_pks_keystore instead of grub_pks_use_keystore and grub_pks_is_support_pks.
Linux on Power LPAR secure boot ensures the integrity of the Linux boot stack. The hypervisor and partition firmware are part of the core root of trust. The partition firmware verifies the signature on the GRUB image before handing control to GRUB. Similarly, GRUB verifies the signature on the kernel image before booting the OS. This ensures that every image running at the boot time is verified and trusted. UEFI platforms relies on PECOFF based signature scheme. Since Power is not a UEFI platform, an alternative mechanism is needed. Power already uses appended signatures on the Linux Kernel, and is now extended to sign the grub as well.
Linux on Power also allows multiple signers, and if any one of the signature passes, then the image passes the validation. Appended signature scheme uses CMS structure to contain signatures. On Power, the multiple signature support relies on the multiple signers features already supported by CMS standards. It does require that all the signers should sign at the same time and are not allowed to add or remove the signatures randomly.
By default, Linux LPAR secure boot uses static key management[1]. This means that each image embeds the keys it needs to verify the image it loads. For example, the keys used to verify the GRUB image are built into the firmware image. Similarly, the keys used for verifying the kernel image are built into the GRUB image. These are pre-defined keys and they cannot be modified at runtime. The drawback of this approach is that key rotations results in both firmware and OS updates. This is where dynamic key management is useful.
An admin can switch from static keys to dynamic keys by coordinating with Hardware Management Console(HMC) admin and enabling the required flags for the given LPAR.
The dynamic key management relies on the Platform KeyStore(PKS)[2] storage allocation for each LPAR with individually managed access controls to store sensitive information securely. Once switched to dynamic keys, HMC advertises this flag to the PowerVM, which then initializes the PKS with the default secvars. It also creates a variable SB_VERSION that represents the secure boot key management mode. The default secvars are used by Partition firmware, grub and the linux kernel to reads keys for verification. These secvars can be managed by user interface exposed via linux kernel. The linux kernel already supports this interface and it is available in the upstream kernel.
This patchset adds the appended signature support both for signing and verification and the key management to the grub component. The whole patchset can be split into following four main parts:
The series has following four main parts:
1.) Sign grub.elf with an appended signature. (Patches 1, 19, 20)
These patches provide some infrastructure and documentation for signing grub's core.elf with a Linux-kernel-module style appended signature.
An appended signature is a 'dumb' signature over the contents of a file. (It is distinct from schemes like Authenticode that are aware of the structure of the file and only sign certain parts.) The signature is wrapped in a PKCS#7 message, and is appended to the signed file along with some metadata and a magic string. The signatures are validated against a public key which is usually provided as an x509 certificate.
Because some platforms, such as powerpc-ieee1275, may load grub from a raw disk partition rather than a filesystem, we extend grub-install to add an ELF note that allows us to specify the size and location of the signature.
2.) Enable lockdown if secure boot is enabled (Patch 9)
Read secure boot mode from 'ibm,secure-boot' property and
If the 'ibm,secure-boot' property of the root node is 2, enter lockdown. Else it is considered as disabled.
There are three secure boot modes. They are
0 - disabled
No signature verification is performed. This is the default.
1 - audit
Signature verification is performed and if signature verification fails, post the errors and allow the boot to continue.
2 - enforced
Lockdown the GRUB. Signature verification is performed and If signature verification fails, post the errors and stop the boot.
Now, only support disabled and enforced.
3.) Enable appended signature verification using builtin keys (Patches 2 - 8 and 10 - 11).
Part of a secure boot chain is allowing grub to verify the boot kernel. For UEFI platforms, this is usually delegated to the shim. However, for platforms that do not implement UEFI, an alternative scheme is required.
This part teaches grub how to verify Linux kernel-style appended signatures. Kernels on powerpc are already signed with this scheme and can be verified by IMA for kexec.
As PKCS#7 messages and x509 certificates are both based on ASN.1, we import libtasn1 to parse them. Because ASN.1 isn't self-documenting, we import from GNUTLS the information we need to navigate their structure.
This section is composed of the following patches:
- patches 2 and 3 are small refactorings.
- patch 4 allows x509 certificates to be built in to the grub core in much the same way as PGP keys.
- patch 5 brings in the code from GNUTLS that allows us to parse PKCS#7 and x509 with libtasn1.
- patch 6, 7 and 8 is our ASN1 node, PKCS#7 and x509 parser. They're minimal and fairly strict parsers that extract only the bits we need to verify the signatures.
- patch 10 and patch 11 is the guts of the appended signature verifier. It uses the verifier infrastructure like pgp, and adds a number of user-friendly commands that mirror the pgp module.
4.) Enable accessing keys dynamically from Platform KeyStore (Patch 12 - 17)
This part teaches grub how to read db and dbx variables from platform keystore using client interface call then load keys from those two variable, and use it to verify Linux kernel.
This section is composed of the following patches:
- patch 12 is an exposes an interface in ieee1275 for reading secure boot variable db and dbx from Platform Keystore. Read secure boot variables such as db and dbx from PKS and extract certificates from ESL.
- patch 13 is create the db and dbx lists from PKS.
- patch 14 is verify the kernel using db and dbx lists
- patch 15 sets the use_static_keys flag if DB not available in PKS, and patch 16 is reads the DB default keys from ELF Note and store it in trusted lists if use_static_keys flag is set.
- patch 17 adds GRUB commands to access db and dbx.
5.) patch 18 adds unit test and 21 adds GRUB commands and an appended signatures
documentation.
Thanks to Daniel Kiper for providing review comments.
I've pushed this all to
https://github.com/SudhakarKuppusamy1/grub/tree/appendedsig-2.13
[1]https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/linux-on-systems?topic=servers-guest-secure-boot-static-keys [2]https://community.ibm.com/community/user/power/blogs/chris-engel1/2020/11/20/powervm-introduces-the-platform-keystore
Daniel Axtens (2):
crypto: Move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c docs/grub: Document signing GRUB under UEFI
Sudhakar Kuppusamy (19):
powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended
signature
pgp: Rename OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY to OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY
grub-install: Support embedding x509 certificates
appended signatures: Import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files appended signatures: Parse ASN1 node
appended signatures: Parse PKCS#7 signedData
appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates
powerpc_ieee1275: Enter lockdown based on /ibm,secure-boot appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures appended signatures: Introducting GRUB commands to manage the db list
powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables appended signatures: Create db and dbx lists
appended signatures: Using db and dbx lists for signature verification
powerpc_ieee1275: Introduce use_static_keys flag
appended signatures: Read default db keys from the ELF Note appended signatures: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx appended signatures: Verification tests
docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature docs/grub: Document appended signature
docs/grub.texi | 559 +++++- grub-core/Makefile.am | 2 + grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 26 + grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 1783 +++++++++++++++++ grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 116 ++ grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c | 96 + .../commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c | 148 ++ grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c | 454 +++++ .../commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c | 485 +++++ grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c | 962 +++++++++ grub-core/commands/pgp.c | 6 +- grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 1 - grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 63 + grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 139 ++ .../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 347 ++++ grub-core/lib/crypto.c | 4 + grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c | 344 ++++ grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h | 975 +++++++++ grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c | 1 + include/grub/crypto.h | 1 + include/grub/efi/pks.h | 112 ++ include/grub/err.h | 3 +- include/grub/file.h | 4 + include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 3 + include/grub/kernel.h | 3 +- include/grub/lockdown.h | 3 +- include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 20 + .../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 140 ++ include/grub/types.h | 4 + include/grub/util/install.h | 10 +- include/grub/util/mkimage.h | 4 +- util/grub-install-common.c | 42 +- util/grub-mkimage.c | 32 +- util/grub-mkimagexx.c | 40 +- util/mkimage.c | 50 +- 35 files changed, 6938 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/pks.h create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v9 1/21 powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended signature
Add infrastructure to allow firmware to verify the integrity of GRUB by use of a Linux-kernel-module-style appended signature. We initially target powerpc-ieee1275, but the code should be extensible to other platforms.
Usually these signatures are appended to a file without modifying the ELF file itself. (This is what the 'sign-file' tool does, for example.) The verifier loads the signed file from the file system and looks at the end of the file for the appended signature. However, on powerpc-ieee1275 platforms, the bootloader is often stored directly in the PReP partition as raw bytes without a file-system. This makes determining the location of an appended signature more difficult.
To address this, we add a new ELF Note.
The name field of shall be the string "Appended-Signature", zero-padded to 4 byte alignment. The type field shall be 0x41536967 (the ASCII values for the string "ASig"). It must be the final section in the ELF binary.
The description shall contain the appended signature structure as defined by the Linux kernel. The description will also be padded to be a multiple of 4 bytes. The padding shall be added before the appended signature structure (not at the end) so that the final bytes of a signed ELF file are the appended signature magic.
A subsequent patch documents how to create a GRUB core.img validly signed under this scheme.
--- include/grub/util/install.h | 7 +++++-- include/grub/util/mkimage.h | 4 ++-- util/grub-install-common.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++--- util/grub-mkimage.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++ util/grub-mkimagexx.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- util/mkimage.c | 9 ++++++--- 6 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
include/grub/util/install.h +5 -2
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0 }, \ {"disable-cli" ,GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI ,0 ,0 , \ N_("disabled command line interface access"), 0 }, \ + { "appended-signature-size", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE, \ + "SIZE", 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 1}, \ { "verbose", 'v', 0, 0, \ N_("print verbose messages."), 1 }
@@ -132,7 +134,8 @@ enum grub_install_options {GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DTB ,GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_SBAT ,GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK , - GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI +GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI , + GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE };extern char *grub_install_source_directory;
@@ -192,7 +195,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,size_t npubkeys, char *config_path, const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target, - int note, + int note, size_t appsig_size, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_file, const char *sbat_path, const int disable_shim_lock, const int disable_cli);
include/grub/util/mkimage.h +2 -2
@@ -51,12 +51,12 @@ grub_mkimage_load_image64 (const char *kernel_path, const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target);void grub_mkimage_generate_elf32 (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target, -int note,char *sbat,char **core_img,size_t *core_size, +int note,char *sbat,size_t appsig_size,char **core_img,size_t *core_size,Elf32_Addr target_addr,struct grub_mkimage_layout *layout);void grub_mkimage_generate_elf64 (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target, -int note,char *sbat,char **core_img,size_t *core_size, +int note,char *sbat,size_t appsig_size,char **core_img,size_t *core_size,Elf64_Addr target_addr,struct grub_mkimage_layout *layout);
util/grub-install-common.c +20 -3
@@ -467,10 +467,13 @@ static char *sbat;static int disable_shim_lock;static grub_compression_t compression;static int disable_cli; +static size_t appsig_size;int grub_install_parse (int key,char *arg) { +const char *end; +switch (key) {case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_INSTALL_CORE_COMPRESS :
@@ -571,6 +574,19 @@ grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)grub_util_error (_ ("Unrecognized compression `%s'" ), arg);case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_GRUB_MKIMAGE :return 1 ; +case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE : + appsig_size =grub_strtoul (arg, &end,10 ); +if (*arg =='\0' || *end !='\0' ) + { +grub_util_error (_ ("non-numeric or invalid appended signature size `%s'" ), arg); +return 0 ; + } +else if (appsig_size ==0 ) + { +grub_util_error (_ ("appended signature size `%s', and it should not be zero" ), arg); +return 0 ; + } +return 1 ;default :return 0 ; }
@@ -683,9 +699,10 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix, *p ='\0' ;grub_util_info ("grub-mkimage --directory '%s' --prefix '%s' --output '%s'" -" --format '%s' --compression '%s'%s%s%s%s\n" , +" --format '%s' --compression '%s'" +" --appended-signature-size %zu %s %s %s %s\n" , dir, prefix, outname, - mkimage_target, compnames[compression], + mkimage_target, compnames[compression], appsig_size, note ?" --note" :"" , disable_shim_lock ?" --disable-shim-lock" :"" , disable_cli ?" --disable-cli" :"" , s);
@@ -698,7 +715,7 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,grub_install_generate_image (dir, prefix, fp, outname, modules.entries, memdisk_path, pubkeys, npubkeys, config_path, tgt, - note, compression, dtb, sbat, + note, appsig_size, compression, dtb, sbat, disable_shim_lock, disable_cli);while (dc--)grub_install_pop_module ();
util/grub-mkimage.c +18 -0
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = { {"sbat", 's', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("SBAT metadata"), 0}, {"disable-shim-lock", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK, 0, 0, N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0}, {"disable-cli", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI, 0, 0, N_("disable command line interface access"), 0}, + {"appended-signature-size", 'S', N_("SIZE"), 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 0}, {"verbose", 'v', 0, 0, N_("print verbose messages."), 0}, { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } };
@@ -130,6 +131,7 @@ struct argumentsint note;int disable_shim_lock;int disable_cli; +size_t appsig_size;const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target;grub_compression_t comp; };
@@ -140,6 +142,7 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)/* Get the input argument from argp_parse, which we know is a pointer to our arguments structure. */ struct arguments *arguments = state->input; +const char *end;switch (key) {
@@ -172,6 +175,20 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state) arguments->note =1 ;break ; +case 'S' : + arguments->appsig_size =grub_strtoul (arg, &end,10 ); +if (*arg =='\0' || *end !='\0' ) + { +grub_util_error (_ ("non-numeric or invalid appended signature size `%s'" ), arg); +return 1 ; + } +else if (arguments->appsig_size ==0 ) + { +grub_util_error (_ ("appended signature size `%s', and it should not be zero" ), arg); +return 1 ; + } +break ; +case 'm' :if (arguments->memdisk)free (arguments->memdisk);
@@ -330,6 +347,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[]) arguments.memdisk, arguments.pubkeys, arguments.npubkeys, arguments.config, arguments.image_target, arguments.note, + arguments.appsig_size, arguments.comp, arguments.dtb, arguments.sbat, arguments.disable_shim_lock, arguments.disable_cli);
util/grub-mkimagexx.c +39 -1
@@ -115,6 +115,14 @@ struct grub_sbat_note {char name[ALIGN_UP (sizeof (GRUB_SBAT_NOTE_NAME ),4 )]; }; +#define GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME "Appended-Signature" +#define GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_TYPE 0x41536967/* "ASig" */ +struct grub_appended_signature_note +{ +Elf32_Nhdr header; +char name[ALIGN_UP (sizeof (GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME ),4 )]; +}; +static int is_relocatable (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target) {
@@ -216,7 +224,7 @@ grub_arm_reloc_jump24 (grub_uint32_t *target, Elf32_Addr sym_addr)void SUFFIX (grub_mkimage_generate_elf ) (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target, -int note,char *sbat,char **core_img,size_t *core_size, +int note,char *sbat,size_t appsig_size,char **core_img,size_t *core_size,Elf_Addr target_addr,struct grub_mkimage_layout *layout) {
@@ -237,6 +245,12 @@ SUFFIX (grub_mkimage_generate_elf) (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc footer_size +=ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct grub_sbat_note ) + layout->sbat_size,4 ); } +if (appsig_size) + { + phnum++; + footer_size +=ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct grub_appended_signature_note ),4 ); + } +if (image_target->id !=IMAGE_LOONGSON_ELF ) phnum +=2 ;
@@ -518,6 +532,30 @@ SUFFIX (grub_mkimage_generate_elf) (const struct grub_install_image_target_descmemcpy (note_ptr->name,GRUB_SBAT_NOTE_NAME ,sizeof (GRUB_SBAT_NOTE_NAME ));memcpy ((char *)(note_ptr +1 ), sbat, layout->sbat_size); + phdr++; + phdr->p_type =grub_host_to_target32 (PT_NOTE ); + phdr->p_flags =grub_host_to_target32 (PF_R ); + phdr->p_align =grub_host_to_target32 (image_target->voidp_sizeof); + phdr->p_vaddr =0 ; + phdr->p_paddr =0 ; + phdr->p_filesz =grub_host_to_target32 (note_size); + phdr->p_memsz =0 ; + phdr->p_offset =grub_host_to_target32 (header_size + program_size + footer_offset); + footer += note_size; + footer_offset += note_size; + } + +if (appsig_size) + { +int note_size =ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct grub_appended_signature_note ) + appsig_size,4 ); +struct grub_appended_signature_note *note_ptr = (struct grub_appended_signature_note *) footer; + + note_ptr->header.n_namesz =grub_host_to_target32 (sizeof (GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME )); +/* Needs to sit at the end, so we round this up and sign some zero padding. */ + note_ptr->header.n_descsz =grub_host_to_target32 (ALIGN_UP (appsig_size,4 )); + note_ptr->header.n_type =grub_host_to_target32 (GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_TYPE ); +strcpy (note_ptr->name,GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME ); + phdr++; phdr->p_type =grub_host_to_target32 (PT_NOTE ); phdr->p_flags =grub_host_to_target32 (PF_R );
util/mkimage.c +6 -3
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix, char *memdisk_path, char **pubkey_paths, size_t npubkeys, char *config_path, const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target, - int note, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path, + int note, size_t appsig_size, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path, const char *sbat_path, int disable_shim_lock, int disable_cli) {
@@ -946,6 +946,9 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,if (sbat_path !=NULL && (image_target->id !=IMAGE_EFI && image_target->id !=IMAGE_PPC ))grub_util_error (_ ("SBAT data can be added only to EFI or powerpc-ieee1275 images" )); +if (appsig_size !=0 && image_target->id !=IMAGE_PPC ) +grub_util_error (_ ("appended signature can be support only to powerpc-ieee1275 images" )); +if (disable_shim_lock) total_module_size +=sizeof (struct grub_module_header );
@@ -1833,10 +1836,10 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,else target_addr = image_target->link_addr;if (image_target->voidp_sizeof ==4 ) -grub_mkimage_generate_elf32 (image_target, note, sbat, &core_img, &core_size, +grub_mkimage_generate_elf32 (image_target, note, sbat, appsig_size, &core_img, &core_size, target_addr, &layout);else -grub_mkimage_generate_elf64 (image_target, note, sbat, &core_img, &core_size, +grub_mkimage_generate_elf64 (image_target, note, sbat, appsig_size, &core_img, &core_size, target_addr, &layout); }break ;
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v9 2/21 crypto: Move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyFrom: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
The way gcry_rsa and friends (the asymmetric ciphers) are loaded for the pgp module is a bit quirky.
include/grub/crypto.h contains:
extern struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
commands/pgp.c contains the actual storage:
struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
And the module itself saves to the storage in pgp.c:
GRUB_MOD_INIT(gcry_rsa)
{
grub_crypto_pk_rsa = &_gcry_pubkey_spec_rsa;}
This is annoying: gcry_rsa now has a dependency on pgp!
We want to be able to bring in gcry_rsa without bringing in PGP, so move the storage to crypto.c.
Previously, gcry_rsa depended on pgp and mpi. Now it depends on crypto and mpi. As pgp depends on crypto, this doesn't add any new module dependencies using the PGP verfier.
[FWIW, the story is different for the symmetric ciphers. cryptodisk and friends (zfs encryption etc) use grub_crypto_lookup_cipher_by_name() to get a cipher handle. That depends on grub_ciphers being populated by people calling grub_cipher_register. import_gcry.py ensures that the symmetric ciphers call it.]
--- grub-core/commands/pgp.c | 4 ---- grub-core/lib/crypto.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/pgp.c +0 -4
@@ -136,10 +136,6 @@ struct signature_v4_headergrub_uint16_t hashed_sub; }GRUB_PACKED ; -struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_dsa; -struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_ecdsa; -struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa; -struct {const char *name;
grub-core/lib/crypto.c +4 -0
@@ -170,6 +170,10 @@ grub_md_unregister (gcry_md_spec_t *cipher) } } +struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_dsa; +struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_ecdsa; +struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa; +void grub_crypto_hash (const gcry_md_spec_t *hash,void *out,const void *in,grub_size_t inlen)
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v9 3/21 pgp: Rename OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY to OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyPrior to the addition of the X.509 public key support for appended signature, current PGP signature relied on the GPG public key. Changing the enum name from "OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY" to "OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY" to differentiate between x509 certificate based appended signature and GPG certificate based PGP signature.
--- docs/grub.texi | 34 +++++++++++++++++----------------- grub-core/commands/pgp.c | 2 +- include/grub/kernel.h | 2 +- util/grub-mkimage.c | 2 +- util/mkimage.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
docs/grub.texi +17 -17
@@ -3347,8 +3347,8 @@ chain-loaded system, @pxref{drivemap}. @node check_signatures @subsection check_signatures -This variable controls whether GRUB enforces digital signature -validation on loaded files. @xref{Using digital signatures}. +This variable controls whether GRUB enforces GPG-style digital signature +validation on loaded files. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}. @node chosen @subsection chosen
@@ -6854,7 +6854,7 @@ These keys are used to validate signatures when environment variable @code{check_signatures} is set to @code{enforce} (@pxref{check_signatures}), and by some invocations of @command{verify_detached} (@pxref{verify_detached}). @xref{Using -digital signatures}, for more information. +GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information. @end deffn @node drivemap
@@ -7270,7 +7270,7 @@ The output is in GPG's v4 key fingerprint format (i.e., the output of @code{gpg --fingerprint}). The least significant four bytes (last eight hexadecimal digits) can be used as an argument to @command{distrust} (@pxref{distrust}). -@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information about uses for +@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information about uses for these keys. @end deffn
@@ -7305,7 +7305,7 @@ When used with care, @option{--skip-sig} and the whitelist enable an administrator to configure a system to boot only signed configurations, but to allow the user to select from among multiple configurations, and to enable ``one-shot'' boot attempts and -``savedefault'' behavior. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more +``savedefault'' behavior. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information. @end deffn
@@ -7677,7 +7677,7 @@ read. It is possible to modify a digitally signed environment block file from within GRUB using this command, such that its signature will no longer be valid on subsequent boots. Care should be taken in such advanced configurations to avoid rendering the system -unbootable. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information. +unbootable. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information. @end deffn
@@ -8167,7 +8167,7 @@ signatures when environment variable @code{check_signatures} is set to must itself be properly signed. The @option{--skip-sig} option can be used to disable signature-checking when reading @var{pubkey_file} itself. It is expected that @option{--skip-sig} is useful for testing -and manual booting. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more +and manual booting. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information. @end deffn
@@ -8208,7 +8208,7 @@ tried. Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates successfully. If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value. -@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information. +@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information. @end deffn @node videoinfo
@@ -8668,13 +8668,13 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order. @chapter Security @menu -* Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control -* Using digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code -* UEFI secure boot and shim:: Booting digitally signed PE files -* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting:: Embedded information for generation number based revocation -* Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components -* Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup -* TPM2 key protector:: Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector +* Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control +* Using GPG-style digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code +* UEFI secure boot and shim:: Booting digitally signed PE files +* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting:: Embedded information for generation number based revocation +* Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components +* Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup +* TPM2 key protector:: Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector @end menu @node Authentication and authorisation
@@ -8750,8 +8750,8 @@ generating configuration files with authentication. You can use adding @kbd{set superusers=} and @kbd{password} or @kbd{password_pbkdf2} commands. -@node Using digital signatures -@section Using digital signatures in GRUB +@node Using GPG-style digital signatures +@section Using GPG-style digital signatures in GRUB GRUB's @file{core.img} can optionally provide enforcement that all files subsequently read from disk are covered by a valid digital signature.
grub-core/commands/pgp.c +1 -1
@@ -920,7 +920,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(pgp)grub_memset (&pseudo_file,0 ,sizeof (pseudo_file));/* Not an ELF module, skip. */ -if (header->type !=OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY ) +if (header->type !=OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY )continue ; pseudo_file.fs = &pseudo_fs;
include/grub/kernel.h +1 -1
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ enumOBJ_TYPE_MEMDISK ,OBJ_TYPE_CONFIG ,OBJ_TYPE_PREFIX , -OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY , +OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY ,OBJ_TYPE_DTB ,OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK ,OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_CLI
util/grub-mkimage.c +1 -1
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = {/* TRANSLATORS: "embed" is a verb (command description). "*/ {"config", 'c', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as an early config"), 0},/* TRANSLATORS: "embed" is a verb (command description). "*/ - {"pubkey", 'k', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as public key for signature checking"), 0}, + {"pubkey", 'k', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as public key for PGP signature checking"), 0},/* TRANSLATORS: NOTE is a name of segment. */ {"note", 'n', 0, 0, N_("add NOTE segment for CHRP IEEE1275"), 0}, {"output", 'o', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("output a generated image to FILE [default=stdout]"), 0},
util/mkimage.c +1 -1
@@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix, curs =grub_util_get_image_size (pubkey_paths[i]); header = (struct grub_module_header *) (kernel_img + offset); - header->type =grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY ); + header->type =grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY ); header->size =grub_host_to_target32 (curs +sizeof (*header)); offset +=sizeof (*header);
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v9 4/21 grub-install: Support embedding x509 certificates
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyTo support verification of appended signatures, we need a way to embed the necessary public keys. Existing appended signature schemes in the Linux kernel use X.509 certificates, so allow certificates to be embedded in the GRUB core image in the same way as PGP keys.
--- include/grub/kernel.h | 1 + include/grub/util/install.h | 3 +++ util/grub-install-common.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++- util/grub-mkimage.c | 12 +++++++++++- util/mkimage.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/grub/kernel.h +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ enumOBJ_TYPE_CONFIG ,OBJ_TYPE_PREFIX ,OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY , +OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY ,OBJ_TYPE_DTB ,OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK ,OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_CLI
include/grub/util/install.h +3 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0 }, \ {"disable-cli" ,GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI ,0 ,0 , \ N_("disabled command line interface access"), 0 }, \ + { "x509key", 'x', N_("FILE"), 0, \ + N_("embed FILE as an x509 certificate for appended signature checking"), 0}, \ { "appended-signature-size", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE, \ "SIZE", 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 1}, \ { "verbose", 'v', 0, 0, \
@@ -193,6 +195,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix, const char *outname, char *mods[], char *memdisk_path, char **pubkey_paths, size_t npubkeys, + char **x509key_paths, size_t nx509keys, char *config_path, const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target, int note, size_t appsig_size,
util/grub-install-common.c +18 -1
@@ -463,6 +463,8 @@ handle_install_list (struct install_list *il, const char *val,static char **pubkeys;static size_t npubkeys; +static char **x509keys; +static size_t nx509keys;static char *sbat;static int disable_shim_lock;static grub_compression_t compression;
@@ -511,6 +513,10 @@ grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI : disable_cli =1 ;return 1 ; +case 'x' : + x509keys =xrealloc (x509keys,sizeof (x509keys[0 ]) * (nx509keys +1 )); + x509keys[nx509keys++] =xstrdup (arg); +return 1 ;case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_VERBOSITY : verbosity++;
@@ -648,6 +654,9 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,for (pk = pubkeys; pk < pubkeys + npubkeys; pk++) slen +=sizeof (" --pubkey ''" ) +grub_strlen (*pk); +for (pk = x509keys; pk < x509keys + nx509keys; pk++) + slen +=sizeof (" --x509key ''" ) +grub_strlen (*pk); +for (md = modules.entries; *md; md++) slen +=sizeof (" ''" ) +grub_strlen (*md);
@@ -688,6 +697,14 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix, *p++ ='\'' ; } +for (pk = x509keys; pk < x509keys + nx509keys; pk++) + { + p =grub_stpcpy (p,"--x509key '" ); + p =grub_stpcpy (p, *pk); + *p++ ='\'' ; + *p++ =' ' ; + } +for (md = modules.entries; *md; md++) { *p++ =' ' ;
@@ -714,7 +731,7 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,grub_install_generate_image (dir, prefix, fp, outname, modules.entries, memdisk_path, - pubkeys, npubkeys, config_path, tgt, + pubkeys, npubkeys, x509keys, nx509keys, config_path, tgt, note, appsig_size, compression, dtb, sbat, disable_shim_lock, disable_cli);while (dc--)
util/grub-mkimage.c +11 -1
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = { {"config", 'c', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as an early config"), 0},/* TRANSLATORS: "embed" is a verb (command description). "*/ {"pubkey", 'k', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as public key for PGP signature checking"), 0}, + {"x509key", 'x', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as an x509 certificate for appended signature checking"), 0},/* TRANSLATORS: NOTE is a name of segment. */ {"note", 'n', 0, 0, N_("add NOTE segment for CHRP IEEE1275"), 0}, {"output", 'o', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("output a generated image to FILE [default=stdout]"), 0},
@@ -125,6 +126,8 @@ struct argumentschar *dtb;char **pubkeys;size_t npubkeys; +char **x509keys; +size_t nx509keys;char *font;char *config;char *sbat;
@@ -215,6 +218,12 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state) arguments->pubkeys[arguments->npubkeys++] =xstrdup (arg);break ; +case 'x' : + arguments->x509keys =xrealloc (arguments->x509keys, +sizeof (arguments->x509keys[0 ]) * (arguments->nx509keys +1 )); + arguments->x509keys[arguments->nx509keys++] =xstrdup (arg); +break ; +case 'c' :if (arguments->config)free (arguments->config);
@@ -345,7 +354,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[]) grub_install_generate_image (arguments.dir, arguments.prefix, fp, arguments.output, arguments.modules, arguments.memdisk, arguments.pubkeys, - arguments.npubkeys, arguments.config, + arguments.npubkeys, arguments.x509keys, + arguments.nx509keys, arguments.config, arguments.image_target, arguments.note, arguments.appsig_size, arguments.comp, arguments.dtb,
util/mkimage.c +38 -1
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ void grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix, FILE *out, const char *outname, char *mods[], char *memdisk_path, char **pubkey_paths, - size_t npubkeys, char *config_path, + size_t npubkeys, char **x509key_paths, size_t nx509keys, char *config_path, const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target, int note, size_t appsig_size, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path, const char *sbat_path, int disable_shim_lock,
@@ -929,6 +929,24 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix, } } +if (nx509keys !=0 && image_target->id !=IMAGE_PPC ) +grub_util_error (_ ("x509 public key can be support only to appended signature" +" with powerpc-ieee1275 images" )); + + { +size_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < nx509keys; i++) + { +size_t curs; + + curs =ALIGN_ADDR (grub_util_get_image_size (x509key_paths[i])); +grub_util_info ("the size of x509 public key %u is 0x%" GRUB_HOST_PRIxLONG_LONG, + (unsigned ) i, (unsigned long long ) curs); + total_module_size += curs +sizeof (struct grub_module_header ); + } + } +if (memdisk_path) { memdisk_size =ALIGN_UP (grub_util_get_image_size (memdisk_path),512 );
@@ -1065,6 +1083,25 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix, } } + { +size_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < nx509keys; i++) + { +size_t curs; +struct grub_module_header *header; + + curs =grub_util_get_image_size (x509key_paths[i]); + header = (struct grub_module_header *) (kernel_img + offset); + header->type =grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY ); + header->size =grub_host_to_target32 (curs +sizeof (*header)); + + offset +=sizeof (*header); +grub_util_load_image (x509key_paths[i], kernel_img + offset); + offset +=ALIGN_ADDR (curs); + } + } +if (memdisk_path) {struct grub_module_header *header;
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v9 5/21 appended signatures: Import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyIn order to parse PKCS#7 messages and X.509 certificates with libtasn1, we need some information about how they are encoded.
We get these from GNUTLS, which has the benefit that they support the features we need and are well tested.
The GNUTLS files are from:
- https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/gnutls.asn
- https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/pkix.asn
The GNUTLS license is LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3 compatible, allowing us to import it without issue.
--- .../commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c | 148 ++++++ .../commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c | 485 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 633 insertions(+) create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c new file +148 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +#include <grub/mm.h> +#include <libtasn1.h> + +/* +* Imported from gnutls.asn. +* https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/gnutls.asn +*/ +const asn1_static_node grub_gnutls_asn1_tab[] = { + {"GNUTLS" ,536872976 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"RSAPublicKey" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"modulus" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"publicExponent" ,3 ,NULL }, + {"RSAPrivateKey" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"version" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"modulus" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"publicExponent" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"privateExponent" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"prime1" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"prime2" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"exponent1" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"exponent2" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"coefficient" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"otherPrimeInfos" ,16386 ,"OtherPrimeInfos" }, + {"ProvableSeed" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"algorithm" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"seed" ,7 ,NULL }, + {"OtherPrimeInfos" ,1612709899 ,NULL }, + {"MAX" ,1074266122 ,"1" }, + {NULL ,2 ,"OtherPrimeInfo" }, + {"OtherPrimeInfo" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"prime" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"exponent" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"coefficient" ,3 ,NULL }, + {"AlgorithmIdentifier" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"algorithm" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"parameters" ,541081613 ,NULL }, + {"algorithm" ,1 ,NULL }, + {"DigestInfo" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"digestAlgorithm" ,1073741826 ,"DigestAlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {"digest" ,7 ,NULL }, + {"DigestAlgorithmIdentifier" ,1073741826 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {"DSAPublicKey" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"DSAParameters" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"p" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"q" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"g" ,3 ,NULL }, + {"DSASignatureValue" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"r" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"s" ,3 ,NULL }, + {"DSAPrivateKey" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"version" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"p" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"q" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"g" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"Y" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"priv" ,3 ,NULL }, + {"DHParameter" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"prime" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"base" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"privateValueLength" ,16387 ,NULL }, + {"pkcs-11-ec-Parameters" ,1610612754 ,NULL }, + {"oId" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"curveName" ,31 ,NULL }, + {"ECParameters" ,1610612754 ,NULL }, + {"namedCurve" ,12 ,NULL }, + {"ECPrivateKey" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"Version" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"privateKey" ,1073741831 ,NULL }, + {"parameters" ,1610637314 ,"ECParameters" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"0" }, + {"publicKey" ,536895494 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"1" }, + {"PrincipalName" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"name-type" ,1610620931 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"0" }, + {"name-string" ,536879115 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,1073743880 ,"1" }, + {NULL ,27 ,NULL }, + {"KRB5PrincipalName" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"realm" ,1610620955 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"0" }, + {"principalName" ,536879106 ,"PrincipalName" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"1" }, + {"RSAPSSParameters" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"hashAlgorithm" ,1610637314 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"0" }, + {"maskGenAlgorithm" ,1610637314 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"1" }, + {"saltLength" ,1610653699 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,1073741833 ,"20" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"2" }, + {"trailerField" ,536911875 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,1073741833 ,"1" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"3" }, + {"RSAOAEPParameters" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"hashAlgorithm" ,1610637314 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"0" }, + {"maskGenAlgorithm" ,1610637314 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"1" }, + {"pSourceFunc" ,536895490 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"2" }, + {"GOSTParameters" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"publicKeyParamSet" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"digestParamSet" ,16396 ,NULL }, + {"GOSTParametersOld" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"publicKeyParamSet" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"digestParamSet" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"encryptionParamSet" ,16396 ,NULL }, + {"GOSTPrivateKey" ,1073741831 ,NULL }, + {"GOSTPrivateKeyOld" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"IssuerSignTool" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"signTool" ,1073741858 ,NULL }, + {"cATool" ,1073741858 ,NULL }, + {"signToolCert" ,1073741858 ,NULL }, + {"cAToolCert" ,34 ,NULL }, + {"Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"encryptedKey" ,1073741831 ,NULL }, + {"maskKey" ,1610637319 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,4104 ,"0" }, + {"macKey" ,7 ,NULL }, + {"SubjectPublicKeyInfo" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"algorithm" ,1073741826 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {"subjectPublicKey" ,6 ,NULL }, + {"GostR3410-TransportParameters" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"encryptionParamSet" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"ephemeralPublicKey" ,1610637314 ,"SubjectPublicKeyInfo" }, + {NULL ,4104 ,"0" }, + {"ukm" ,7 ,NULL }, + {"GostR3410-KeyTransport" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"sessionEncryptedKey" ,1073741826 ,"Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey" }, + {"transportParameters" ,536895490 ,"GostR3410-TransportParameters" }, + {NULL ,4104 ,"0" }, + {"TPMKey" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"type" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"emptyAuth" ,1610637316 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"0" }, + {"parent" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"pubkey" ,1073741831 ,NULL }, + {"privkey" ,7 ,NULL }, + {"MLDSAPrivateKey" ,536870917 ,NULL }, + {"version" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"privateKeyAlgorithm" ,1073741826 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {"privateKey" ,1073741831 ,NULL }, + {"publicKey" ,536895495 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"1" }, + {NULL ,0 ,NULL } +};
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c new file +485 -0
485 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v9 6/21 appended signatures: Parse ASN1 node
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyThis code allows us to parse ASN1 node and allocating memory to store it. It will work for anything where the size libtasn1 returns is right:
- Integers
- Octet strings
- DER encoding of other structures
It will _not_ work for things where libtasn1 size requires adjustment:
- Strings that require an extra NULL byte at the end
- Bit strings because libtasn1 returns the length in bits, not bytes.
If the function returns a non-NULL value, the caller must free it.
--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 42 +++++++++ grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 138 insertions(+) create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h new file +42 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +/* +* GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader +* Copyright (C) 2020, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +* Copyright (C) 2020, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation +* +* GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +* (at your option) any later version. +* +* GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +* GNU General Public License for more details. +* +* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +* along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include <libtasn1.h> + +extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_gnutls_asn; +extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn; + +/* Do libtasn1 init. */ +extern int +asn1_init (void ); + +/* +* Read a value from an ASN1 node, allocating memory to store it. +* It will work for anything where the size libtasn1 returns is right: +* - Integers +* - Octet strings +* - DER encoding of other structures +* It will _not_ work for things where libtasn1 size requires adjustment: +* - Strings that require an extra null byte at the end +* - Bit strings because libtasn1 returns the length in bits, not bytes. +* +* If the function returns a non-NULL value, the caller must free it. +*/ +extern void * +grub_asn1_allocate_and_read (asn1_node node,const char *name,const char *friendly_name,int *content_size);
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c new file +96 -0
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Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v9 7/21 appended signatures: Parse PKCS#7 signedData
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyThis code allows us to parse:
- PKCS#7 signedData messages. Only a single signerInfo is supported, which is all that the Linux sign-file utility supports creating out-of-the-box. Only RSA, SHA-256 and SHA-512 are supported. Any certificate embedded in the PKCS#7 message will be ignored.
--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 36 ++ grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c | 454 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 490 insertions(+) create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h +36 -0
@@ -17,11 +17,47 @@* along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */ +#include <grub/crypto.h> #include <libtasn1.h> extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_gnutls_asn;extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn; +#define MAX_OID_LEN 32 + +/* A PKCS#7 signedData signerInfo. */ +struct pkcs7_signerInfo +{ +const gcry_md_spec_t *hash; +gcry_mpi_t sig_mpi; +}; + +/* +* A PKCS#7 signedData message. +* We make no attempt to match intelligently, so we don't save any info about +* the signer. +*/ +struct pkcs7_signedData +{ +int signerInfo_count; +struct pkcs7_signerInfo *signerInfos; +}; + +/* +* Parse a PKCS#7 message, which must be a signedData message. +* The message must be in 'sigbuf' and of size 'data_size'. The result is +* placed in 'msg', which must already be allocated. +*/ +extern grub_err_t +parse_pkcs7_signedData (const void *sigbuf,grub_size_t data_size,struct pkcs7_signedData *msg); + +/* +* Release all the storage associated with the PKCS#7 message. +* If the caller dynamically allocated the message, it must free it. +*/ +extern void +pkcs7_signedData_release (struct pkcs7_signedData *msg); +/* Do libtasn1 init. */ extern int asn1_init (void );
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c new file +454 -0
454 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v9 8/21 appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyThis code allows us to parse:
- X.509 certificates: at least enough to verify the signatures on the PKCS#7 messages. We expect that the certificates embedded in GRUB will be leaf certificates, not CA certificates. The parser enforces this.
- X.509 certificates support the Extended Key Usage extension and handle it by verifying that the certificate has a Code Signing usage.
--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 38 + grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c | 962 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 1000 insertions(+) create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h +38 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,29 @@ extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn;#define MAX_OID_LEN 32 +/* +* One or more x509 certificates. +* We do limited parsing: +* extracting only the version, serial, issuer, subject, RSA public key +* and key size. +* Also, hold the sha256, sha384, and sha512 fingerprint of the certificate. +*/ +struct x509_certificate +{ +struct x509_certificate *next; +grub_uint8_t version; +grub_uint8_t *serial; +grub_size_t serial_len; +char *issuer; +grub_size_t issuer_len; +char *subject; +grub_size_t subject_len; +/* We only support RSA public keys. This encodes [modulus, publicExponent]. */ +gcry_mpi_t mpis[2 ]; +int modulus_size; +char fingerprint[3 ][64 ]; +}; +/* A PKCS#7 signedData signerInfo. */ struct pkcs7_signerInfo {
@@ -43,6 +66,21 @@ struct pkcs7_signedDatastruct pkcs7_signerInfo *signerInfos; }; +/* +* Import a DER-encoded certificate at 'data', of size 'size'. +* Place the results into 'results', which must be already allocated. +*/ +extern grub_err_t +parse_x509_certificate (const void *data,grub_size_t size,struct x509_certificate *results); + +/* +* Release all the storage associated with the x509 certificate. +* If the caller dynamically allocated the certificate, it must free it. +* The caller is also responsible for maintenance of the linked list. +*/ +extern void +certificate_release (struct x509_certificate *cert); +/* * Parse a PKCS#7 message, which must be a signedData message. * The message must be in 'sigbuf' and of size 'data_size'. The result is
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c new file +962 -0
962 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v9 08/21] appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates
Quoted 41 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy
This code allows us to parse:
- X.509 certificates: at least enough to verify the signatures on the PKCS#7 messages. We expect that the certificates embedded in GRUB will be leaf certificates, not CA certificates. The parser enforces this.
- X.509 certificates support the Extended Key Usage extension and handle it by verifying that the certificate has a Code Signing usage.
Signed-off-by Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sudhakar Kuppusamy <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Stefan Berger <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Avnish Chouhan <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 38 + grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c | 962 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 1000 insertions(+) create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.cgrub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h +11
-0@@ -25,6 +25,29 @@ extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn;#define MAX_OID_LEN 32 +/* +* One or more x509 certificates. +* We do limited parsing: +* extracting only the version, serial, issuer, subject, RSA public key +* and key size. +* Also, hold the sha256, sha384, and sha512 fingerprint of the certificate. +*/ +struct x509_certificate +{ +struct x509_certificate *next; +grub_uint8_t version;
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn; · line 48
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h +10
-0+grub_uint8_t *serial; +grub_size_t serial_len; +char *issuer; +grub_size_t issuer_len; +char *subject; +grub_size_t subject_len; +/* We only support RSA public keys. This encodes [modulus, publicExponent]. */ +gcry_mpi_t mpis[2 ]; +int modulus_size; +char fingerprint[3 ][64 ];
This should be grub_uint8_t and here you should define all constants mentioned earlier in the comments to another patch.
... and if you use plain numbers for mpis[] indexing you should define relevant constants as well...
Daniel
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PATCH v9 9/21 powerpc_ieee1275: Enter lockdown based on /ibm, secure-boot
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyRead secure boot mode from 'ibm,secure-boot' property and if the secure boot mode is enforced, enter lockdown. Else it is considered as disabled. There are three secure boot modes. They are
0 - disabled
No signature verification is performed. This is the default.
1 - audit
Signature verification is performed and if signature verification fails, post the errors and allow the boot to continue.
2 - enforced
Lockdown the GRUB. Signature verification is performed and If signature verification fails, post the errors and stop the boot.
Now, only support disabled and enforced.
--- docs/grub.texi | 2 +- grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 1 + grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/grub/lockdown.h | 3 +- 4 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
docs/grub.texi +1 -1
@@ -8912,7 +8912,7 @@ platforms. @section Lockdown when booting on a secure setup The GRUB can be locked down when booted on a secure boot environment, for example -if the UEFI secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will +if the UEFI or Power secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will be restricted and some operations/commands cannot be executed. This also includes limiting which filesystems are supported to those thought to be more robust and widely used within GRUB.
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +1 -0
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ kernel = { powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/cache.S; powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c; powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S; + powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c; sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S; sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +56 -0
74 lines not on this page · raw message
include/grub/lockdown.h +2 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@#define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_DISABLED 0#define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED 1 -#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI +#if defined(GRUB_MACHINE_EFI ) || \ + (defined(__powerpc__) && defined(GRUB_MACHINE_IEEE1275 ))extern void EXPORT_FUNC (grub_lockdown ) (void ); extern int
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v9 10/21 appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyBuilding on the parsers and the ability to embed X.509 certificates, as well as the existing gcrypt functionality, add a module for verifying appended signatures.
This includes a signature verifier that requires that the Linux kernel and GRUB modules have appended signatures for verification.
Signature verification must be enabled by setting check_appended_signatures. If secure boot is enabled with enforced mode when the appendedsig module is loaded, signature verification will be enabled, and trusted keys will be extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and stored in the db and locked automatically.
--- grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 15 + grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 597 +++++++++++++++++++ include/grub/err.h | 3 +- include/grub/file.h | 2 + 4 files changed, 616 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +15 -0
@@ -980,6 +980,21 @@ module = { cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY)'; }; +module = { + name = appendedsig; + common = commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c; + common = commands/appendedsig/x509.c; + common = commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c; + common = commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c; + common = commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c; + common = commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c; + enable = emu; + enable = powerpc_ieee1275; + cflags = '$(CFLAGS_GCRY) -Wno-redundant-decls'; + cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY) -I$(srcdir)/lib/libtasn1-grub'; + depends = crypto, gcry_rsa, gcry_sha256, gcry_sha512, mpi, asn1; +}; + module = { name = hdparm; common = commands/hdparm.c;
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +597 -0
597 lines not on this page · raw message
include/grub/err.h +2 -1
@@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ typedef enumGRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE ,GRUB_ERR_BAD_FIRMWARE ,GRUB_ERR_STILL_REFERENCED , - GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH +GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH , + GRUB_ERR_EXISTS } grub_err_t;
include/grub/file.h +2 -0
@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ enum grub_file_typeGRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY ,/* File holding public key to add to trused keys. */ GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_TRUST , +/* File holding x509 certificiate to add to trusted keys. */ +GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_TRUST ,/* File of which we intend to print a blocklist to the user. */ GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PRINT_BLOCKLIST,/* File we intend to use for test loading or testing speed. */
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v9 10/21] appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures
Quoted 7 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Building on the parsers and the ability to embed X.509 certificates, as well as the existing gcrypt functionality, add a module for verifying appended signatures.
This includes a signature verifier that requires that the Linux kernel and GRUB modules have appended signatures for verification.
Quoted 8 lines
Signature verification must be enabled by setting
check_appended_signatures. If secure boot is enabled with enforced mode when the appendedsig module is loaded, signature verification will be enabled, and trusted keys will be extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and stored in the db and locked automatically.Signed-off-by Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sudhakar Kuppusamy <[email protected]>
Except two nits below Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>...
[...]
Quoted 116 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +110
-0@@ -0,0 +1,597 @@ +/* +* GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader +* Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +* Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation +* +* GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +* (at your option) any later version. +* +* GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +* GNU General Public License for more details. +* +* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +* along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include <grub/types.h> +#include <grub/misc.h> +#include <grub/mm.h> +#include <grub/err.h> +#include <grub/dl.h> +#include <grub/file.h> +#include <grub/command.h> +#include <grub/crypto.h> +#include <grub/i18n.h> +#include <grub/gcrypt/gcrypt.h> +#include <grub/kernel.h> +#include <grub/extcmd.h> +#include <grub/verify.h> +#include <libtasn1.h> +#include <grub/env.h> +#include <grub/lockdown.h> + +#include "appendedsig.h" + +GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+" ); + +/* Max size of hash data. */ +#define MAX_HASH_SIZE 64 + +/* Public key type. */ +#define PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2 + +/* Appended signature magic string and size. */ +#define SIG_MAGIC "~Module signature appended~\n" +#define SIG_MAGIC_SIZE ((sizeof(SIG_MAGIC) - 1)) + +/* +* This structure is extracted from scripts/sign-file.c in the linux kernel +* source. It was licensed as LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3+ compatible. +*/ +struct module_signature +{ +grub_uint8_t algo;/* Public-key crypto algorithm [0]. */ +grub_uint8_t hash;/* Digest algorithm [0]. */ +grub_uint8_t id_type;/* Key identifier type [GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7]. */ +grub_uint8_t signer_len;/* Length of signer's name [0]. */ +grub_uint8_t key_id_len;/* Length of key identifier [0]. */ +grub_uint8_t __pad[3 ]; +grub_uint32_t sig_len;/* Length of signature data. */ +}GRUB_PACKED ; + +#define SIG_METADATA_SIZE (sizeof (struct module_signature)) +#define APPENDED_SIG_SIZE (pkcs7_data_size) \ + (pkcs7_data_size + SIG_MAGIC_SIZE + SIG_METADATA_SIZE) + +/* This represents an entire, parsed, appended signature. */ +struct grub_appended_signature +{ +grub_size_t signature_len;/* Length of PKCS#7 data + metadata + magic. */ +struct module_signature sig_metadata;/* Module signature metadata. */ +struct pkcs7_signedData pkcs7;/* Parsed PKCS#7 data. */ +}; + +/* This represents a trusted certificates. */ +struct grub_database +{ +struct x509_certificate *certs;/* Certificates. */ +grub_uint32_t cert_entries;/* Number of certificates. */ +}; + +/* The db list is used to validate appended signatures. */ +struct grub_database db = {.certs =NULL , .cert_entries =0 }; + +/* +* Signature verification flag (check_sigs). +* check_sigs: false +* - No signature verification. This is the default. +* check_sigs: true +* - Enforce signature verification, and if signature verification fails, +* post the errors and stop the boot. +*/ +static bool check_sigs = false; + +static grub_ssize_t +pseudo_read (struct grub_file *file,char *buf,grub_size_t len) +{ +grub_memcpy (buf, (grub_uint8_t *) file->data + file->offset, len); +return len; +} + +/* Filesystem descriptor. */ +static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = { + .name ="pseudo" , + .fs_read = pseudo_read +}; +
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 120
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +10
-0+static void +add_cert_fingerprint (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size, +struct x509_certificate *const cert) +{ +gcry_md_spec_t *hash_func =NULL ; + +/* Add SHA256 hash of certificate. */ + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256; +grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[0 ],0 ,MAX_HASH_SIZE ); +grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[0 ], data, data_size);
grub_crypto_hash ((gcry_md_spec_t *) &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256, ...
And you can drop hash_func vaiable then...
Quoted 1 line
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +1
-0+}
[...]
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 463
Quoted 7 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +7
-0+static char * +grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),const char *val) +{ +char *ret; + +/* +* Do not allow the value to be changed If signature verification is
s/If/if/
Quoted 13 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +13
-0+* (check_sigs is set to enforce) enabled and GRUB is locked down. +*/ +if (check_sigs == true &&grub_is_lockdown () ==GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED ) + { + ret =grub_strdup ("enforce" ); +if (ret ==NULL ) +grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"could not duplicate a string enforce" ); + +return ret; + } + +if ((*val =='1' ) || (*val =='e' )) + check_sigs = true;
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 486
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +10
-0+else if ((*val =='0' ) || (*val =='n' )) + check_sigs = false; + + ret =grub_strdup (grub_env_read_sec (NULL ,NULL )); +if (ret ==NULL ) +grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"could not duplicate a string %s" , +grub_env_read_sec (NULL ,NULL )); + +return ret; +}
Daniel
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Re: [PATCH v9 10/21] appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures
Thank you Daniel for the review.
Quoted 152 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 7 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Building on the parsers and the ability to embed X.509 certificates, as well as the existing gcrypt functionality, add a module for verifying appended signatures.
This includes a signature verifier that requires that the Linux kernel and GRUB modules have appended signatures for verification.
Quoted 8 lines
Signature verification must be enabled by setting
check_appended_signatures. If secure boot is enabled with enforced mode when the appendedsig module is loaded, signature verification will be enabled, and trusted keys will be extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and stored in the db and locked automatically.Signed-off-by Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sudhakar Kuppusamy <[email protected]>Except two nits below Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>...
[...]
Quoted 116 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +110
-0@@ -0,0 +1,597 @@ +/* +* GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader +* Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +* Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation +* +* GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +* (at your option) any later version. +* +* GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +* GNU General Public License for more details. +* +* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +* along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include <grub/types.h> +#include <grub/misc.h> +#include <grub/mm.h> +#include <grub/err.h> +#include <grub/dl.h> +#include <grub/file.h> +#include <grub/command.h> +#include <grub/crypto.h> +#include <grub/i18n.h> +#include <grub/gcrypt/gcrypt.h> +#include <grub/kernel.h> +#include <grub/extcmd.h> +#include <grub/verify.h> +#include <libtasn1.h> +#include <grub/env.h> +#include <grub/lockdown.h> + +#include "appendedsig.h" + +GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+" ); + +/* Max size of hash data. */ +#define MAX_HASH_SIZE 64 + +/* Public key type. */ +#define PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2 + +/* Appended signature magic string and size. */ +#define SIG_MAGIC "~Module signature appended~\n" +#define SIG_MAGIC_SIZE ((sizeof(SIG_MAGIC) - 1)) + +/* +* This structure is extracted from scripts/sign-file.c in the linux kernel +* source. It was licensed as LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3+ compatible. +*/ +struct module_signature +{ +grub_uint8_t algo;/* Public-key crypto algorithm [0]. */ +grub_uint8_t hash;/* Digest algorithm [0]. */ +grub_uint8_t id_type;/* Key identifier type [GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7]. */ +grub_uint8_t signer_len;/* Length of signer's name [0]. */ +grub_uint8_t key_id_len;/* Length of key identifier [0]. */ +grub_uint8_t __pad[3 ]; +grub_uint32_t sig_len;/* Length of signature data. */ +}GRUB_PACKED ; + +#define SIG_METADATA_SIZE (sizeof (struct module_signature)) +#define APPENDED_SIG_SIZE (pkcs7_data_size) \ + (pkcs7_data_size + SIG_MAGIC_SIZE + SIG_METADATA_SIZE) + +/* This represents an entire, parsed, appended signature. */ +struct grub_appended_signature +{ +grub_size_t signature_len;/* Length of PKCS#7 data + metadata + magic. */ +struct module_signature sig_metadata;/* Module signature metadata. */ +struct pkcs7_signedData pkcs7;/* Parsed PKCS#7 data. */ +}; + +/* This represents a trusted certificates. */ +struct grub_database +{ +struct x509_certificate *certs;/* Certificates. */ +grub_uint32_t cert_entries;/* Number of certificates. */ +}; + +/* The db list is used to validate appended signatures. */ +struct grub_database db = {.certs =NULL , .cert_entries =0 }; + +/* +* Signature verification flag (check_sigs). +* check_sigs: false +* - No signature verification. This is the default. +* check_sigs: true +* - Enforce signature verification, and if signature verification fails, +* post the errors and stop the boot. +*/ +static bool check_sigs = false; + +static grub_ssize_t +pseudo_read (struct grub_file *file,char *buf,grub_size_t len) +{ +grub_memcpy (buf, (grub_uint8_t *) file->data + file->offset, len); +return len; +} + +/* Filesystem descriptor. */ +static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = { + .name ="pseudo" , + .fs_read = pseudo_read +}; +grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 120
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +10
-0+static void +add_cert_fingerprint (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size, +struct x509_certificate *const cert) +{ +gcry_md_spec_t *hash_func =NULL ; + +/* Add SHA256 hash of certificate. */ + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256; +grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[0 ],0 ,MAX_HASH_SIZE ); +grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[0 ], data, data_size);
grub_crypto_hash((gcry_md_spec_t*)&_gcry_digest_spec_sha256, ...
Quoted 1 line
And you can drop
hash_funcvaiable then…
Sure, will do it.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +1
-0+}[...]
Quoted 9 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 463
Quoted 7 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +7
-0+static char * +grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),const char *val) +{ +char *ret; + +/* +* Do not allow the value to be changed If signature verification is s/If/if/
Sure, will change it.
Thanks,
Sudhakar
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 18 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +17
-0+* (check_sigs is set to enforce) enabled and GRUB is locked down. +*/ +if (check_sigs == true &&grub_is_lockdown () ==GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED ) + { + ret =grub_strdup ("enforce" ); +if (ret ==NULL ) +grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"could not duplicate a string enforce" ); + +return ret; + } + +if ((*val =='1' ) || (*val =='e' )) + check_sigs = true; +else if ((*val =='0' ) || (*val =='n' )) + check_sigs = false; + + ret =grub_strdup (grub_env_read_sec (NULL ,NULL ));
Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 486
Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +6
-0+if (ret ==NULL ) +grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"could not duplicate a string %s" , +grub_env_read_sec (NULL ,NULL )); + +return ret; +}Daniel
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PATCH v9 11/21 appended signatures: Introducting GRUB commands to manage the db list
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyIntroducing the following GRUB commands to manage the db list.
1. append_list_db:
Show the list of trusted certificates from the db list
2. append_add_db_cert:
Add the trusted certificate to the db list
3. append_rm_dbx_cert:
Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list
4. append_verify:
Verify the signed file using db list
--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 310 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 310 insertions(+)
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +310 -0
@@ -95,6 +95,14 @@ struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0};*/ static bool check_sigs = false; +/* Appended signature size. */ +static grub_size_t append_sig_len =0 ; + +static void +register_appended_signatures_cmd (void ); +static void +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void ); +static grub_ssize_t pseudo_read (struct grub_file *file,char *buf,grub_size_t len) {
@@ -108,6 +116,63 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = { .fs_read = pseudo_read }; +/* +* We cannot use hexdump() to display hash data because it is typically +* displayed in hexadecimal format, along with an ASCII representation of +* the same data. +* Example: sha256 hash data +* 00000000 52 b5 90 49 64 de 22 d7 4e 5f 4f b4 1b 51 9c 34 |R..Id.".N_O..Q.4| +* 00000010 b1 96 21 7c 91 78 a5 0d 20 8c e9 5c 22 54 53 f7 |..!|.x.. ..\"TS.| +* +* An appended signature only required to display the hexadecimal of the hash data +* by separating each byte with ":". So, we introduced a new method dump_data_to_hex +* to display it. +* Example: Sha256 hash data +* 52:b5:90:49:64:de:22:d7:4e:5f:4f:b4:1b:51:9c:34: +* b1:96:21:7c:91:78:a5:0d:20:8c:e9:5c:22:54:53:f7 +*/ +static void +dump_data_to_hex (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t length) +{ +grub_size_t i, count =0 ; + +for (i =0 ; i < length -1 ; i++) + { +grub_printf ("%02x:" , data[i]); + count++; +if (count ==16 ) + { +grub_printf ("\n " ); + count =0 ; + } + } + +grub_printf ("%02x\n" , data[i]); +} + +static void +print_certificate (const struct x509_certificate *cert,const grub_uint32_t cert_num) +{ +grub_uint32_t i; + +grub_printf ("\nCertificate: %u\n" , cert_num); +grub_printf (" Data:\n" ); +grub_printf (" Version: %u (0x%u)\n" , cert->version +1 , cert->version); +grub_printf (" Serial Number:\n " ); + +for (i =0 ; i < cert->serial_len -1 ; i++) +grub_printf ("%02x:" , cert->serial[i]); + +grub_printf ("%02x\n" , cert->serial[cert->serial_len -1 ]); +grub_printf (" Issuer: %s\n" , cert->issuer); +grub_printf (" Subject: %s\n" , cert->subject); +grub_printf (" Subject Public Key Info:\n" ); +grub_printf (" Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption\n" ); +grub_printf (" RSA Public-Key: (%d bit)\n" , cert->modulus_size); +grub_printf (" Fingerprint: sha256\n " ); +dump_data_to_hex ((grub_uint8_t *) &cert->fingerprint[0 ],grub_strlen (cert->fingerprint[0 ])); +} +static void add_cert_fingerprint (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size,struct x509_certificate *const cert)
@@ -193,6 +258,63 @@ add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,return rc; } +static void +_remove_cert_from_db (const struct x509_certificate *cert) +{ +grub_uint32_t i =1 ; +struct x509_certificate *curr_cert, *prev_cert; + +for (curr_cert = prev_cert = db.certs; curr_cert !=NULL ; curr_cert = curr_cert->next, i++) + { +if (is_cert_match (curr_cert, cert) == true) + { +if (i ==1 )/* Match with first certificate in the db list. */ + db.certs = curr_cert->next; +else + prev_cert->next = curr_cert->next; + +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"removed distrusted certificate with CN: %s from the db list\n" , + curr_cert->subject); + curr_cert->next =NULL ; +certificate_release (curr_cert); +grub_free (curr_cert); +break ; + } +else + prev_cert = curr_cert; + } +} + +static grub_err_t +remove_cert_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +struct x509_certificate *cert; + +if (data ==NULL || data_size ==0 ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE ,"certificate data or size is not available" ); + + cert =grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate )); +if (cert ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + + rc =parse_x509_certificate (data, data_size, cert); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"cannot remove a certificate from the db list\n" ); +grub_free (cert); +return rc; + } + +add_cert_fingerprint (data, data_size, cert); + +/* Remove certificate from the db list. */ +_remove_cert_from_db (cert); + +return rc; +} +static grub_err_t file_read_whole (grub_file_t file,grub_uint8_t **buf,grub_size_t *len) {
@@ -336,6 +458,7 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE )return err; + append_sig_len = sig.signature_len; datasize = bufsize - sig.signature_len;/* Verify signature using trusted keys from db list. */
@@ -387,6 +510,165 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)return err; } +static grub_err_t +grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),int argc,char **args) +{ +grub_file_t signed_file; +grub_err_t err; +grub_uint8_t *signed_data =NULL ; +grub_size_t signed_data_size =0 ; + +if (argc !=1 ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT , +"a signed file is expected\nExample:\n\tappend_verify <SIGNED FILE>\n" ); + +if (!grub_strlen (args[0 ])) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME ,"missing signed file" ); + +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"verifying %s\n" , args[0 ]); + + signed_file =grub_file_open (args[0 ],GRUB_FILE_TYPE_VERIFY_SIGNATURE ); +if (signed_file ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND ,"could not open %s file" , args[0 ]); + + err =file_read_whole (signed_file, &signed_data, &signed_data_size); +if (err ==GRUB_ERR_NONE ) + err =grub_verify_appended_signature (signed_data, signed_data_size); + +grub_file_close (signed_file); +grub_free (signed_data); + +return err; +} + +/* +* Add the trusted certificate to the db list if it is not already present. +* Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the +* trusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature. +* The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, +* the certificate is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and +* the certificate is not added. +* When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the trusted certificate without +* an appended signature and add it to the db list. +* +* Also, note that the adding of the trusted certificate using this command does +* not persist across reboots. +*/ +static grub_err_t +grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),int argc,char **args) +{ +grub_err_t err; +grub_file_t cert_file; +grub_uint8_t *cert_data =NULL ; +grub_size_t cert_data_size =0 ; + +if (argc !=1 ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT , +"a trusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n" +"Example:\n\tappend_add_db_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n" ); + +if (!grub_strlen (args[0 ])) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME ,"missing trusted X.509 certificate file" ); + + cert_file =grub_file_open (args[0 ], +GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_TRUST |GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS ); +if (cert_file ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE ,"could not open %s file" , args[0 ]); + + err =file_read_whole (cert_file, &cert_data, &cert_data_size); +grub_file_close (cert_file); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +return err; + +/* +* If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down, +* obtain the actual certificate size by subtracting the appended +* signature size from the certificate size because +* the certificate has an appended signature, and this actual certificate size is +* used to get the X.509 certificate. +*/ +if (check_sigs == true &&grub_is_lockdown () ==GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED ) + cert_data_size -= append_sig_len; + + err =add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db); +grub_free (cert_data); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +return err; + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +/* +* Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list if it is already present. +* Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the +* distrusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature. +* The signature is verified by the appended sig module. If verification succeeds, +* the certificate is removed from the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and +* the certificate is not removed. +* When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the distrusted certificate +* without an appended signature and removes it from the db list. +* +* Also, note that the removal of the distrusted certificate using this command +* does not persist across reboots. +*/ +static grub_err_t +grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),int argc,char **args) +{ +grub_err_t err; +grub_file_t cert_file; +grub_uint8_t *cert_data =NULL ; +grub_size_t cert_data_size =0 ; + +if (argc !=1 ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT , +"a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n" +"Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n" ); + +if (!grub_strlen (args[0 ])) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME ,"missing distrusted X.509 certificate file" ); + + cert_file =grub_file_open (args[0 ], +GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_TRUST |GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS ); +if (cert_file ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE ,"could not open %s file" , args[0 ]); + + err =file_read_whole (cert_file, &cert_data, &cert_data_size); +grub_file_close (cert_file); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +return err; + +/* +* If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down, +* obtain the actual certificate size by subtracting the appended +* signature size from the certificate size because +* the certificate has an appended signature, and this actual certificate size is +* used to get the X.509 certificate. +*/ +if (check_sigs == true &&grub_is_lockdown () ==GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED ) + cert_data_size -= append_sig_len; + +/* Remove distrusted certificate from the db list if present. */ + err =remove_cert_from_db (cert_data, cert_data_size); +grub_free (cert_data); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +return err; + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),int argc __attribute__ ((unused)), +char **args __attribute__ ((unused))) +{ +struct x509_certificate *cert; +grub_uint32_t i, cert_num =1 ; + +for (cert = db.certs; cert !=NULL ; cert = cert->next, cert_num++) +print_certificate (cert, cert_num); + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} +/* * Extract the X.509 certificates from the ELF Note header, * parse it, and add it to the db list.
@@ -545,6 +827,32 @@ struct grub_file_verifier grub_appendedsig_verifier = { .write = appendedsig_write, }; +static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert; + +/* It registers the appended signatures GRUB commands. */ +static void +register_appended_signatures_cmd (void ) +{ + cmd_verify =grub_register_command ("append_verify" , grub_cmd_verify_signature,N_ ("SIGNED_FILE" ), +N_ ("Verify SIGNED_FILE against the trusted X.509 certificates in the db list" )); + cmd_list_db =grub_register_command ("append_list_db" , grub_cmd_list_db,0 , +N_ ("Show the list of trusted X.509 certificates from the db list" )); + cmd_db_cert =grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert" , grub_cmd_db_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ), +N_ ("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db list" )); + cmd_dbx_cert =grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert" , grub_cmd_dbx_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ), +N_ ("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list" )); +} + +/* It unregisters the appended signatures GRUB commands. */ +static void +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void ) +{ +grub_unregister_command (cmd_verify); +grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db); +grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert); +grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert); +} +GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig) {grub_int32_t rc;
@@ -579,6 +887,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"the db list now has %u static keys\n" , db.cert_entries); +register_appended_signatures_cmd ();grub_verifier_register (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);grub_dl_set_persistent (mod); }
@@ -594,4 +903,5 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI (appendedsig)grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures" ,NULL ,NULL );grub_env_unset ("check_appended_signatures" );grub_verifier_unregister (&grub_appendedsig_verifier); +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (); }
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v9 11/21] appended signatures: Introducting GRUB commands to manage the db list
Quoted 11 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Introducing the following GRUB commands to manage the db list.
1.
append_list_db:
Show the list of trusted certificates from the db list
2.append_add_db_cert:
Add the trusted certificate to the db list
3.append_rm_dbx_cert:
Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list
4.append_verify:
Verify the signed file using db list
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sudhakar Kuppusamy <[email protected]>
Just three nits below...
Quoted 34 lines
--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 310 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 310 insertions(+)grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +15
-0@@ -95,6 +95,14 @@ struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0};*/ static bool check_sigs = false; +/* Appended signature size. */ +static grub_size_t append_sig_len =0 ; + +static void +register_appended_signatures_cmd (void ); +static void +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void ); +static grub_ssize_t pseudo_read (struct grub_file *file,char *buf,grub_size_t len) {@@ -108,6 +116,63 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = { .fs_read = pseudo_read }; +/* +* We cannot use hexdump() to display hash data because it is typically +* displayed in hexadecimal format, along with an ASCII representation of +* the same data. +* Example: sha256 hash data +* 00000000 52 b5 90 49 64 de 22 d7 4e 5f 4f b4 1b 51 9c 34 |R..Id.".N_O..Q.4| +* 00000010 b1 96 21 7c 91 78 a5 0d 20 8c e9 5c 22 54 53 f7 |..!|.x.. ..\"TS.|
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = { · line 135
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +10
-0+* +* An appended signature only required to display the hexadecimal of the hash data +* by separating each byte with ":". So, we introduced a new method dump_data_to_hex +* to display it. +* Example: Sha256 hash data +* 52:b5:90:49:64:de:22:d7:4e:5f:4f:b4:1b:51:9c:34: +* b1:96:21:7c:91:78:a5:0d:20:8c:e9:5c:22:54:53:f7 +*/ +static void +dump_data_to_hex (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t length)
s/dump_data_to_hex/hexdump_colon/
Quoted 16 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +16
-0+{ +grub_size_t i, count =0 ; + +for (i =0 ; i < length -1 ; i++) + { +grub_printf ("%02x:" , data[i]); + count++; +if (count ==16 ) + { +grub_printf ("\n " ); + count =0 ; + } + } + +grub_printf ("%02x\n" , data[i]); +}
[...]
Quoted 7 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +7
-0+static grub_err_t +remove_cert_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +struct x509_certificate *cert; + +if (data ==NULL || data_size ==0 )
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size, · line 305
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +10
-0+return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE ,"certificate data or size is not available" ); + + cert =grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate )); +if (cert ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + + rc =parse_x509_certificate (data, data_size, cert); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"cannot remove a certificate from the db list\n" );
s/a certificate/an invalid certificate/
Quoted 11 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +11
-0+grub_free (cert); +return rc; + } + +add_cert_fingerprint (data, data_size, cert); + +/* Remove certificate from the db list. */ +_remove_cert_from_db (cert); + +return rc; +}
[...]
Quoted 15 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +15
-0+static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert; + +/* It registers the appended signatures GRUB commands. */ +static void +register_appended_signatures_cmd (void ) +{ + cmd_verify =grub_register_command ("append_verify" , grub_cmd_verify_signature,N_ ("SIGNED_FILE" ), +N_ ("Verify SIGNED_FILE against the trusted X.509 certificates in the db list" )); + cmd_list_db =grub_register_command ("append_list_db" , grub_cmd_list_db,0 , +N_ ("Show the list of trusted X.509 certificates from the db list" )); + cmd_db_cert =grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert" , grub_cmd_db_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ), +N_ ("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db list" )); + cmd_dbx_cert =grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert" , grub_cmd_dbx_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ), +N_ ("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list" )); +}
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c struct grub_file_verifier grub_appendedsig_verifier = { · line 854
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +10
-0+ +/* It unregisters the appended signatures GRUB commands. */ +static void +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void ) +{ +grub_unregister_command (cmd_verify); +grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db); +grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert); +grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert); +}
I cannot seen any reason to have register_appended_signatures_cmd() and unregister_appended_signatures_cmd() functions. Please put their code directly into GRUB_MOD_INIT() and GRUB_MOD_FINI().
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v9 11/21] appended signatures: Introducting GRUB commands to manage the db list
Thank you Daniel for the review.
Quoted 59 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 11 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Introducing the following GRUB commands to manage the db list.
1.
append_list_db:
Show the list of trusted certificates from the db list
2.append_add_db_cert:
Add the trusted certificate to the db list
3.append_rm_dbx_cert:
Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list
4.append_verify:
Verify the signed file using db listQuoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sudhakar Kuppusamy <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>Just three nits below...
Quoted 38 lines
---
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c| 310 +++++++++++++++++++1 file changed, 310 insertions(+)grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +8
-0@@ -95,6 +95,14 @@ struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0};*/ static bool check_sigs = false; +/* Appended signature size. */ +static grub_size_t append_sig_len =0 ; + +static void +register_appended_signatures_cmd (void ); +static void +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void ); +static
grub_ssize_tpseudo_read(structgrub_file*file, char *buf,grub_size_tlen) {grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +11
-0@@ -108,6 +116,63 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = { .fs_read = pseudo_read }; +/* +* We cannot use hexdump() to display hash data because it is typically +* displayed in hexadecimal format, along with an ASCII representation of +* the same data. +* Example: sha256 hash data +* 00000000 52 b5 90 49 64 de 22 d7 4e 5f 4f b4 1b 51 9c 34 |R..Id.".N_O..Q.4| +* 00000010 b1 96 21 7c 91 78 a5 0d 20 8c e9 5c 22 54 53 f7 |..!|.x.. ..\"TS.| +* +* An appended signature only required to display the hexadecimal of the hash data +* by separating each byte with ":". So, we introduced a new method dump_data_to_hex +* to display it.
Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = { · line 135
Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +6
-0+* Example: Sha256 hash data +* 52:b5:90:49:64:de:22:d7:4e:5f:4f:b4:1b:51:9c:34: +* b1:96:21:7c:91:78:a5:0d:20:8c:e9:5c:22:54:53:f7 +*/ +static void +dump_data_to_hex (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t length)s/dump_data_to_hex/hexdump_colon/
Sure, will change it.
Quoted 31 lines
Quoted 17 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +16
-0+{ +grub_size_t i, count =0 ; + +for (i =0 ; i < length -1 ; i++) + { +grub_printf ("%02x:" , data[i]); + count++; +if (count ==16 ) + { +grub_printf ("\n " ); + count =0 ; + } + } + +grub_printf ("%02x\n" , data[i]); +}[...]
Quoted 11 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +11
-0+static grub_err_t +remove_cert_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +struct x509_certificate *cert; + +if (data ==NULL || data_size ==0 ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE ,"certificate data or size is not available" ); + + cert =grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate )); +if (cert ==NULL )
Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size, · line 305
Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +6
-0+return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + + rc =parse_x509_certificate (data, data_size, cert); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"cannot remove a certificate from the db list\n" );s/a certificate/an invalid certificate/
Sure, will do it.
Quoted 36 lines
Quoted 12 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +11
-0+grub_free (cert); +return rc; + } + +add_cert_fingerprint (data, data_size, cert); + +/* Remove certificate from the db list. */ +_remove_cert_from_db (cert); + +return rc; +}[...]
Quoted 21 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +21
-0+static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert; + +/* It registers the appended signatures GRUB commands. */ +static void +register_appended_signatures_cmd (void ) +{ + cmd_verify =grub_register_command ("append_verify" , grub_cmd_verify_signature,N_ ("SIGNED_FILE" ), +N_ ("Verify SIGNED_FILE against the trusted X.509 certificates in the db list" )); + cmd_list_db =grub_register_command ("append_list_db" , grub_cmd_list_db,0 , +N_ ("Show the list of trusted X.509 certificates from the db list" )); + cmd_db_cert =grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert" , grub_cmd_db_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ), +N_ ("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db list" )); + cmd_dbx_cert =grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert" , grub_cmd_dbx_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ), +N_ ("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list" )); +} + +/* It unregisters the appended signatures GRUB commands. */ +static void +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void ) +{ +grub_unregister_command (cmd_verify);
Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c struct grub_file_verifier grub_appendedsig_verifier = { · line 854
Quoted 4 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +4
-0+grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db); +grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert); +grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert); +}I cannot seen any reason to have
register_appended_signatures_cmd()andunregister_appended_signatures_cmd()functions. Please put their code directly intoGRUB_MOD_INIT()andGRUB_MOD_FINI().
Subsequent patches (patch 17) use these functions to register/unregister the static and dynamic key support GRUB commands based on key management. That's why I kept it as a separate functions.
Thanks,
Sudhakar
Quoted 2 lines
Daniel
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Re: [PATCH v9 11/21] appended signatures: Introducting GRUB commands to manage the db list
Quoted 4 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Thank you Daniel for the review.
Quoted 2 lines · Daniel Kiper
On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 04:38:33PM +0530, Sudhakar Kuppusamy wrote:
[...]
Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 21 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +21
-0+static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert; + +/* It registers the appended signatures GRUB commands. */ +static void +register_appended_signatures_cmd (void ) +{ + cmd_verify =grub_register_command ("append_verify" , grub_cmd_verify_signature,N_ ("SIGNED_FILE" ), +N_ ("Verify SIGNED_FILE against the trusted X.509 certificates in the db list" )); + cmd_list_db =grub_register_command ("append_list_db" , grub_cmd_list_db,0 , +N_ ("Show the list of trusted X.509 certificates from the db list" )); + cmd_db_cert =grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert" , grub_cmd_db_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ), +N_ ("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db list" )); + cmd_dbx_cert =grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert" , grub_cmd_dbx_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ), +N_ ("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list" )); +} + +/* It unregisters the appended signatures GRUB commands. */ +static void +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void ) +{ +grub_unregister_command (cmd_verify);Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c struct grub_file_verifier grub_appendedsig_verifier = { · line 854
Quoted 4 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +4
-0+grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db); +grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert); +grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert); +}I cannot seen any reason to have
register_appended_signatures_cmd()andunregister_appended_signatures_cmd()functions. Please put their code directly intoGRUB_MOD_INIT()andGRUB_MOD_FINI().
Quoted 2 lines
Subsequent patches (patch 17) use these functions to register/unregister the static and dynamic key support GRUB commands based on key management. That's why I kept it as a separate functions.
I have checked the code. I think this is not needed. It should be enough to change use_keystore flag. If it is not then probably something is wrong in the code...
Daniel
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PATCH v9 12/21 powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyEnhancing the infrastructure to enable the Platform Keystore (PKS) feature, which provides access to the SB_VERSION, db, and dbx secure boot variables from PKS.
If PKS is enabled, it will read secure boot variables such as db and dbx from PKS and extract EFI Signature List (ESL) from it. The ESLs would be saved in the Platform Keystore buffer, and the appendedsig module would read it later to extract the certificate's details from ESL.
In the following scenarios, static key management mode will be activated:
1. When Secure Boot is enabled with static key management mode
2. When SB_VERSION is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
3. When PKS support is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
Note:-
SB_VERSION: Key Management Mode
1 - Enable dynamic key management mode. Read the db and dbx variables from PKS,
and use them for signature verification.
0 - Enable static key management mode. Read keys from the GRUB ELF Note and
use it for signature verification.
--- grub-core/Makefile.am | 2 + grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 2 + grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 1 - grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 7 + grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 139 ++++++++ .../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 328 ++++++++++++++++++ include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 3 + include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 20 ++ .../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 139 ++++++++ 9 files changed, 640 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
grub-core/Makefile.am +2 -0
@@ -246,6 +246,8 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/ieee1275/alloc.h KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/terminfo.h KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/extcmd.h KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/lib/arg.h +KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h endif if COND_sparc64_ieee1275
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +2 -0
@@ -332,6 +332,8 @@ kernel = { powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c; powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S; powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c; + powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c; + powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c; sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S; sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c +0 -1
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@#define IEEE1275_PHANDLE_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)#define IEEE1275_IHANDLE_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0) -#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +7 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@#endif #if defined(__powerpc__)#include <grub/lockdown.h> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h> #endif #ifdef __powerpc__
@@ -1007,6 +1009,7 @@ grub_parse_cmdline (void)static void grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void ) { +grub_err_t err;grub_ieee1275_phandle_t root;grub_uint32_t sb_mode =GRUB_SB_DISABLED ;int rc;
@@ -1044,6 +1047,10 @@ grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void) }else grub_dprintf ("ieee1275" ,"Secure Boot Disabled\n" ); + + err =grub_pks_keystore_init (); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +grub_error (err,"initialization of the Platform KeyStore failed\n" ); }#endif /* __powerpc__ */
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c new file +139 -0
139 lines not on this page · raw message
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +328 -0
328 lines not on this page · raw message
include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +3 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@#include <grub/types.h> #include <grub/machine/ieee1275.h> +#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1) +#define IEEE1275_CELL_NOT_FOUND ((grub_int32_t) -7) +#define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_FALSE ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0)#define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_TRUE ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +20 -0
@@ -28,4 +28,24 @@ typedef grub_uint32_t grub_ieee1275_cell_t;#define PRIxGRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_T PRIxGRUB_UINT32_T#define PRIuGRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_T PRIuGRUB_UINT32_T +#ifdef __powerpc__ + +extern grub_int32_t +grub_ieee1275_test (const grub_uint8_t *name,grub_ieee1275_cell_t *missing); + +extern grub_int32_t +grub_ieee1275_pks_max_object_size (grub_ieee1275_cell_t *result); + +extern grub_int32_t +grub_ieee1275_pks_read_object (const grub_uint8_t consumer,const grub_uint8_t *label, +const grub_size_t label_len,const grub_size_t buffer_len, +grub_uint8_t *buffer,grub_uint32_t *data_len, +grub_uint32_t *policies); + +extern grub_int32_t +grub_ieee1275_pks_read_sbvar (const grub_uint8_t sbvar_flags,const grub_uint8_t sbvar_type, +const grub_uint32_t buffer_len,grub_uint8_t *buffer, +grub_size_t *data_len); +#endif +#endif /* ! GRUB_IEEE1275_MACHINE_HEADER */
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +139 -0
139 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v9 12/21] powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables
Quoted 98 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Enhancing the infrastructure to enable the Platform Keystore (PKS) feature, which provides access to the
SB_VERSION, db, and dbx secure boot variables from PKS.If PKS is enabled, it will read secure boot variables such as db and dbx from PKS and extract EFI Signature List (ESL) from it. The ESLs would be saved in the Platform Keystore buffer, and the appendedsig module would read it later to extract the certificate's details from ESL.
In the following scenarios, static key management mode will be activated:
1. When Secure Boot is enabled with static key management mode
2. WhenSB_VERSIONis unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
3. When PKS support is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabledNote:-
SB_VERSION: Key Management Mode
1 - Enable dynamic key management mode. Read the db and dbx variables from PKS,
and use them for signature verification.
0 - Enable static key management mode. Read keys from the GRUB ELF Note and
use it for signature verification.Signed-off-by Sudhakar Kuppusamy <[email protected]>--- grub-core/Makefile.am | 2 + grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 2 + grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 1 - grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 7 + grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 139 ++++++++ .../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 328 ++++++++++++++++++ include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 3 + include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 20 ++ .../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 139 ++++++++ 9 files changed, 640 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.hgrub-core/Makefile.am +2
-0@@ -246,6 +246,8 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/ieee1275/alloc.h KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/terminfo.h KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/extcmd.h KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/lib/arg.h +KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h endif if COND_sparc64_ieee1275grub-core/Makefile.core.def +2
-0@@ -332,6 +332,8 @@ kernel = { powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c; powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S; powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c; + powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c; + powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c; sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S; sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c +0
-1@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@#define IEEE1275_PHANDLE_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)#define IEEE1275_IHANDLE_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0) -#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +3
-0@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@#endif #if defined(__powerpc__)#include <grub/lockdown.h> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h> #endif #ifdef __powerpc__@@ -1007,6 +1009,7 @@ grub_parse_cmdline (void)static void grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void ) { +grub_err_t err;grub_ieee1275_phandle_t root;grub_uint32_t sb_mode =GRUB_SB_DISABLED ;int rc;
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void) · line 1053
Quoted 7 lines
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +4
-0@@ -1044,6 +1047,10 @@ grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void) }else grub_dprintf ("ieee1275" ,"Secure Boot Disabled\n" ); + + err =grub_pks_keystore_init (); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +grub_error (err,"initialization of the Platform KeyStore failed\n" );
This should be a part of grub_pks_keystore_init().
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void) · line 1056
Quoted 3 lines
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +0
-0}#endif /* __powerpc__ */
Please drop this empty line.
[...]
Quoted 26 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +20
-0@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@ +/* +* GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader +* Copyright (C) 2024 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +* Copyright (C) 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 IBM Corporation +* +* GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +* (at your option) any later version. +* +* GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +* GNU General Public License for more details. +* +* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +* along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include <grub/mm.h>
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 30
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10
-0+#include <grub/types.h> +#include <grub/misc.h> +#include <grub/lockdown.h> +#include <grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h> + +#if __GNUC__ >=9 +#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Waddress-of-packed-member" +#endif
Is it really needed? If yes it begs for a comment.
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 40
Quoted 9 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +9
-0+/* PKS consumer type for firmware. */ +#define PKS_CONSUMER_FW ((grub_uint8_t) 1) + +/* The maximum object size interface name for a PKS object. */ +#define PKS_MAX_OBJ_SIZE ((grub_uint8_t *) "pks-max-object-size") + +/* PKS read object lable for secure boot version. */ +#define SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME ((grub_uint8_t *) "SB_VERSION") +#define SB_VERSION_KEY_LEN ((grub_size_t) 10)
#define SB_VERSION_KEY_LEN (sizeof (SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME) - 1)
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 50
Quoted 9 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +9
-0+/* PKS read secure boot variable request type for db and dbx. */ +#define DB ((grub_uint8_t) 1) +#define DBX ((grub_uint8_t) 2) + +static grub_size_t pks_max_object_size; + +/* +* Platform KeyStore db and dbx, pks_supported flag to indicate the availability +* of PSK support and use_keystore flag to indicate the key management.
s/key management/key management mode in the GRUB/
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 54
Quoted 3 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +3
-0+* pks_supported: +* False: No PKS support. This is default. +* True: PKS support available.
The pks_supported member does not make a lot of sense for me. It makes code more complicated for nothing. In real we care about use_keystore only.
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 66
Quoted 11 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +11
-0+* use_keystore: +* False: Static key management (use built-in Keys). This is default. +* True: Dynamic key management (use Platform KeySotre). +*/ +grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore = { .db =NULL , .dbx =NULL , .db_entries =0 , .dbx_entries =0 , + .use_keystore = false, .pks_supported = false}; + +/* +* Import the Globally Unique Identifier (GUID), EFI Signature Database (ESD), +* and its size into the PKS Signature Database (SD) (i.e pks_sd buffer) and pks_sd entries +* from the EFI Signature List (ESL).
It should be made clear it is copied from the platform PKS into the pks_sd in the GRUB. Otherwise the comment and whole code in this patch is confusing.
Quoted 46 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +46
-0+*/ +static grub_err_t +_esl_to_esd (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data,grub_size_t esl_size, +const grub_size_t signature_size,const grub_packed_guid_t *guid, +grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd,grub_uint32_t *pks_sd_entries) +{ +grub_esd_t *esd; +grub_pks_sd_t *signature = *pks_sd; +grub_uint32_t entries = *pks_sd_entries; +grub_size_t data_size, offset =0 ; + +/* Reads the ESD from ESL. */ +while (esl_size >0 ) + { + esd = (grub_esd_t *) (esl_data + offset); + data_size = signature_size -sizeof (grub_esd_t); + + signature =grub_realloc (signature, (entries +1 ) *sizeof (grub_pks_sd_t)); +if (signature ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + + signature[entries].data =grub_malloc (data_size *sizeof (grub_uint8_t)); +if (signature[entries].data ==NULL ) + { +/* +* Allocated memory will be freed by +* grub_free_platform_keystore. +*/ + *pks_sd = signature; + *pks_sd_entries = entries +1 ; +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + } + +grub_memcpy (signature[entries].data, esd->signature_data, data_size); + signature[entries].data_size = data_size; + signature[entries].guid = *guid; + entries++; + esl_size -= signature_size; + offset += signature_size; + } + + *pks_sd = signature; + *pks_sd_entries = entries; + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +}
[...]
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 244
Quoted 12 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +12
-0+/* +* Test the availability of PKS support. If PKS support is avaialble and +* objects present, it reads the secure boot version (SB_VERSION) from PKS. +* +* SB_VERSION: Key Management Mode +* 1 - Enable dynamic key management mode. Read the db and dbx variables from PKS, +and use them for signature verification. +* 0 - Enable static key management mode. Read keys from the GRUB ELF Note and +* use it for signature verification. +*/ +static grub_err_t +is_pks_present (void )
This function should return bool.
Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +8
-0+{ +grub_err_t err; +grub_int32_t rc; +grub_ieee1275_cell_t missing =0 ; +grub_uint8_t *data =NULL ; +grub_uint32_t len =0 , policy =0 ; + + rc =grub_ieee1275_test (PKS_MAX_OBJ_SIZE , &missing);
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 262
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10
-0+if (rc <0 || missing ==IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FIRMWARE ,"firmware doesn't have PKS support\n" ); +else + { + rc =grub_ieee1275_pks_max_object_size (&pks_max_object_size); +if (rc <0 ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER ,"PKS support is there but it has zero objects\n" ); + } + + grub_pks_keystore.pks_supported = true;
We do not care...
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 271
Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +8
-0+ err =read_sbversion_from_pks (&data, &len, &policy); +if (err ==GRUB_ERR_NONE && (len !=1 || (*data >=2 ))) + { +grub_free (data); +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER ,"found unexpected SB version (%d)\n" , *data); + } +else if (*data) + grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = true;
This should happen in the grub_pks_keystore_init().
Quoted 14 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +14
-0+grub_free (data); + +return err; +} + +/* Free allocated memory. */ +void +grub_pks_free_keystore (void ) +{ +grub_size_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < grub_pks_keystore.db_entries; i++) +grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data); +
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 296
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10
-0+for (i =0 ; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++) +grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data); + +grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.db); +grub_free (grub_pks_keystore.dbx); +grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore,0 ,sizeof (grub_pks_t)); +} + +/* Initialization of the Platform KeyStore. */ +grub_err_t
return void...
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 303
Quoted 7 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +7
-0+grub_pks_keystore_init (void) +{ +grub_err_t rc; + +grub_dprintf ("ieee1275" ,"trying to load Platform KeyStore\n" ); + + rc =is_pks_present ();
if (is_pks_present () == false)
{
grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "Platform PKS is not available\n");
return;}
Quoted 12 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +12
-0+if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) + { +grub_dprintf ("ieee1275" ,"switch to static key\n" ); +return rc; + } + +if (grub_pks_keystore.pks_supported == true) + { +grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore,0 ,sizeof (grub_pks_t)); +/* Read db from PKS. */ + rc =read_sbvar_from_pks (0 ,DB , &grub_pks_keystore.db, &grub_pks_keystore.db_entries); +if (rc ==GRUB_ERR_NONE )
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 325
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10
-0+ { +/* Read dbx from PKS. */ + rc =read_sbvar_from_pks (0 ,DBX , &grub_pks_keystore.dbx, &grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries); +if (rc ==GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND ) + rc =GRUB_ERR_NONE ; + } + +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +grub_pks_free_keystore (); + }
grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = true;
Quoted 2 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +2
-0+return rc; +}
[...]
Quoted 22 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +17
-0+#if defined(__powerpc__) + +/* +* Platform KeyStore db and dbx, pks_supported flag to indicate the availability +* of PSK support and use_keystore flag to indicate the key management. +* +* pks_supported: +* False: No PKS support. This is default. +* True: PKS support available. +* +* use_keystore: +* False: Static key management (use built-in Keys). This is default. +* True: Dynamic key management (use Platform KeySotre). +*/ +extern grub_pks_t EXPORT_VAR (grub_pks_keystore ); + +/* Initialization of the Platform Keystore. */
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 129
Quoted 10 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +10
-0+extern grub_err_t +grub_pks_keystore_init (void ); + +/* Free allocated memory. */ +extern void +EXPORT_FUNC (grub_pks_free_keystore ) (void ); + +#else + +grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore;
This clearly shows it should not be a global variable. You should have a function which returns pointer to PKS or NULL. And even this makes use_keystore usage questionable...
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h line 132
Quoted 2 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +2
-0+static inline void +grub_pks_free_keystore (void )
I am not convinced this function should be called of outside platform_keystore.c above.
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
Quoted 2 lines
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +2
-0+{ +
Please drop this empty line if this function is really needed.
Quoted 1 line
+}
Daniel
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PATCH v9 13/21 appended signatures: Create db and dbx lists
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyIf secure boot is enabled with static key management mode, the trusted certificates will be extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and added to db list.
If secure boot is enabled with dynamic key management mode, the trusted certificates and certificate/binary hash will be extracted from the PKS and added to db list. The distrusted certificates, certificate/binary hash are read from the PKS and added to dbx list. Both dbx and db lists are introduced by a subsequent patch.
Note:-
If the certificate or the certificate hash exists in the dbx list, then do not add that certificate/certificate hash to the db list.
--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 517 ++++++++++++++++++- include/grub/crypto.h | 1 + include/grub/efi/pks.h | 112 ++++ include/grub/types.h | 4 + 4 files changed, 613 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/pks.h
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +496 -21
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@#include <libtasn1.h> #include <grub/env.h> #include <grub/lockdown.h> - +#include <grub/efi/pks.h> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h> #include "appendedsig.h" GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+" );
@@ -80,10 +81,21 @@ struct grub_database {struct x509_certificate *certs;/* Certificates. */ grub_uint32_t cert_entries;/* Number of certificates. */ +grub_uint8_t **hashes;/* Certificate/binary hashes. */ +grub_size_t *hash_size;/* Size of certificate/binary hashes. */ +grub_uint32_t hash_entries;/* Number of certificate/binary hashes. */ };/* The db list is used to validate appended signatures. */ -struct grub_database db = {.certs =NULL , .cert_entries =0 }; +struct grub_database db = {.certs =NULL , .cert_entries =0 , .hashes =NULL , + .hash_size =NULL , .hash_entries =0 }; + +/* +* The dbx list is used to ensure that the distrusted certificates/kernel binaries are +* rejected during appended signatures/hashes validation. +*/ +struct grub_database dbx = {.certs =NULL , .cert_entries =0 , .hashes =NULL , + .hash_size =NULL , .hash_entries =0 };/* * Signature verification flag (check_sigs).
@@ -116,6 +128,187 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = { .fs_read = pseudo_read }; + +/* +* GUID can be used to determine the hashing function and +* generate the hash using determined hashing function. +*/ +static grub_err_t +get_hash (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid,const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size, +grub_uint8_t *hash,grub_size_t *hash_size) +{ +gcry_md_spec_t *hash_func =NULL ; + +if (guid ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE ,"GUID is not available" ); + +if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256; +else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha384; +else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha512; +else +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE ,"unsupported GUID hash" ); + +grub_memset (hash,0 ,MAX_HASH_SIZE ); +grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, hash, data, data_size); + *hash_size = hash_func->mdlen; + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +static grub_err_t +generate_cert_hash (const grub_size_t cert_hash_size,const grub_uint8_t *data, +const grub_size_t data_size,grub_uint8_t *hash,grub_size_t *hash_size) +{ +grub_packed_guid_t guid = {0 }; + +/* support SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 for certificate hash */ +if (cert_hash_size ==32 ) +grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ); +else if (cert_hash_size ==48 ) +grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ); +else if (cert_hash_size ==64 ) +grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ); +else + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"unsupported hash type (%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE") and " +"skipped\n" , cert_hash_size); +return GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND ; + } + +return get_hash (&guid, data, data_size, hash, hash_size); +} + +/* Check the hash presence in the dbx list. */ +static bool +is_hash_present_in_dbx (grub_uint8_t *const hash,const grub_size_t hash_size) +{ +grub_uint32_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++) + { +if (hash_size == dbx.hash_size[i] && +grub_memcmp (dbx.hashes[i], hash, hash_size) ==0 ) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"the hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is ignored" +" because it is on the dbx list\n" , hash[0 ], hash[1 ], + hash[2 ], hash[3 ]); +return true; + } + } + +return false; +} + +/* Check the hash presence in the db list. */ +static bool +is_hash_present_in_db (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data,const grub_size_t hash_data_size) +{ +grub_uint32_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < db.hash_entries; i++) +if (grub_memcmp (db.hashes[i], hash_data, hash_data_size) ==0 ) +return true; + +return false; +} + +/* Add the certificate/binary hash into the db/dbx list. */ +static grub_err_t +add_hash (grub_uint8_t *const data,const grub_size_t data_size, +struct grub_database *database,const bool is_db) +{ +grub_uint8_t **hashes; +grub_size_t *hash_size; + +if (data ==NULL || data_size ==0 ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE ,"certificate/binary-hash data or size is not available" ); + +if (is_hash_present_in_dbx (data, data_size) == true) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"cannot add a hash, as it is present in the %s list" , + ((is_db == true) ?"db" :"dbx" )); + +return ((is_db == true) ?GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED :GRUB_ERR_EXISTS ); + } + +if (is_db == true) + { +if (is_hash_present_in_db (data, data_size) == true) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_EXISTS , +"cannot a add hash, as it is present in the db list" ); + } + + hashes =grub_realloc (database->hashes,sizeof (grub_uint8_t *) * (database->hash_entries +1 )); +if (hashes ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + + hash_size =grub_realloc (database->hash_size,sizeof (grub_size_t) * (database->hash_entries +1 )); +if (hash_size ==NULL ) + { +/* +* Allocated memory will be freed by +* free_db_list/free_dbx_list. +*/ + hashes[database->hash_entries] =NULL ; + database->hashes = hashes; + database->hash_entries++; + +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + } + + hashes[database->hash_entries] =grub_malloc (data_size); +if (hashes[database->hash_entries] !=NULL ) +grub_memcpy (hashes[database->hash_entries], data, data_size); + + hash_size[database->hash_entries] = data_size; + database->hash_size = hash_size; + +if (hashes[database->hash_entries] ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"added the hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE" to the %s list\n" , + data[0 ], data[1 ], data[2 ], data[3 ], data_size, ((is_db == true) ?"db" :"dbx" )); + + database->hashes = hashes; + database->hash_entries++; + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +static bool +is_hash (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid) +{ +/* GUID type of the binary hash. */ +if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) +return true; + +/* GUID type of the certificate hash. */ +if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) +return true; + +return false; +} + +static bool +is_x509 (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid) +{ +if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) +return true; + +return false; +} +/* * We cannot use hexdump() to display hash data because it is typically * displayed in hexadecimal format, along with an ASCII representation of
@@ -183,6 +376,16 @@ add_cert_fingerprint (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size, hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256;grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[0 ],0 ,MAX_HASH_SIZE );grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[0 ], data, data_size); + +/* Add SHA384 hash of certificate. */ + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha384; +grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[1 ],0 ,MAX_HASH_SIZE ); +grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[1 ], data, data_size); + +/* Add SHA512 hash of certificate. */ + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha512; +grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[2 ],0 ,MAX_HASH_SIZE ); +grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[2 ], data, data_size); } static bool
@@ -199,6 +402,46 @@ is_cert_match (const struct x509_certificate *cert1, const struct x509_certificareturn false; } +static bool +is_cert_present_in_dbx (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in) +{ +struct x509_certificate *cert; + +for (cert = dbx.certs; cert; cert = cert->next) +if (is_cert_match (cert, cert_in) == true) +return true; + +return false; +} + +/* Check the certificate hash presence in the dbx list. */ +static bool +is_cert_hash_present_in_dbx (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +grub_uint32_t i; +grub_size_t cert_hash_size =0 ; +grub_uint8_t cert_hash[MAX_HASH_SIZE ] = {0 }; + +for (i =0 ; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++) + { + rc =generate_cert_hash (dbx.hash_size[i], data, data_size, cert_hash, &cert_hash_size); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +continue ; + +if (cert_hash_size == dbx.hash_size[i] && +grub_memcmp (dbx.hashes[i], cert_hash, cert_hash_size) ==0 ) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"a certificate (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is ignored " +"because this certificate hash is on the dbx list\n" , + cert_hash[0 ], cert_hash[1 ], cert_hash[2 ], cert_hash[3 ]); +return true; + } + } + +return false; +} +static bool is_cert_present_in_db (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in) {
@@ -211,10 +454,13 @@ is_cert_present_in_db (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in)return false; } -/* Add the certificate into the db list */ +/* +* Add the certificate into the db list if it is not present in the dbx and db list +* when is_db is true. Add the certificate into the dbx list when is_db is false. +*/ static grub_err_t add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size, -struct grub_database *database) +struct grub_database *database,const bool is_db) {grub_err_t rc;struct x509_certificate *cert;
@@ -229,32 +475,64 @@ add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size, rc =parse_x509_certificate (data, data_size, cert);if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) { -grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"cannot add a certificate CN='%s' to the db list\n" , - cert->subject); +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"cannot add a certificate CN='%s' to the %s list\n" , + cert->subject, ((is_db == true) ?"db" :"dbx" ));grub_free (cert);return rc; }add_cert_fingerprint (data, data_size, cert); -if (is_cert_present_in_db (cert) == true) +if (is_db == false && grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) { -grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , -"cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the db list" , - cert->subject); -certificate_release (cert); -grub_free (cert); +if (is_cert_present_in_dbx (cert) == true) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the dbx list" , + cert->subject); + rc =GRUB_ERR_EXISTS ; + goto clean_exit; + } + } +else + { +/* Only checks the certificate against dbx if dynamic key management is enabled. */ +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) + { +if (is_cert_hash_present_in_dbx (data, data_size) == true || +is_cert_present_in_dbx (cert) == true) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the dbx list" , + cert->subject); + rc =GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED ; + goto clean_exit; + } + } -return GRUB_ERR_EXISTS ; +if (is_cert_present_in_db (cert) == true) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the db list" , + cert->subject); + rc =GRUB_ERR_EXISTS ; + goto clean_exit; + } } -grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"added a certificate CN='%s' to the db list\n" , - cert->subject); +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"added a certificate CN='%s' to the %s list\n" , + cert->subject, ((is_db == true) ?"db" :"dbx" )); cert->next = database->certs; database->certs = cert; database->cert_entries++; +return rc; + + clean_exit: +certificate_release (cert); +grub_free (cert); +return rc; }
@@ -590,7 +868,7 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **if (check_sigs == true &&grub_is_lockdown () ==GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED ) cert_data_size -= append_sig_len; - err =add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db); + err =add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db, true);grub_free (cert_data);if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE )return err;
@@ -669,6 +947,68 @@ grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc __attribreturn GRUB_ERR_NONE ; } +/* Add the X.509 certificates/binary hash to the db list from PKS. */ +static grub_err_t +create_db_list (void ) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +grub_uint32_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < grub_pks_keystore.db_entries; i++) + { +if (is_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.db[i].guid) == true) + { + rc =add_hash (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data, + grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size, &db, true); +if (rc ==GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ) +return rc; + } +else if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.db[i].guid) == true) + { + rc =add_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data, + grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size, &db, true); +if (rc ==GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ) +return rc; + } +else +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"unsupported signature data type and " +"skipped (%u)\n" , i +1 ); + } + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +/* Add the certificates and certificate/binary hash to the dbx list from PKS. */ +static grub_err_t +create_dbx_list (void ) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +grub_uint32_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++) + { +if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true) + { + rc =add_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data, + grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size, &dbx, false); +if (rc ==GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ) +return rc; + } +else if (is_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true) + { + rc =add_hash (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data, + grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size, &dbx, false); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +return rc; + } +else +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"unsupported signature data type and " +"skipped (%u)\n" , i +1 ); + } + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} +/* * Extract the X.509 certificates from the ELF Note header, * parse it, and add it to the db list.
@@ -702,18 +1042,43 @@ build_static_db_list (void)else if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE )continue ; - err =add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db); + err =add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db, true);grub_free (cert_data);if (err ==GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY )return ; } } +/* +* Extract trusted and distrusted keys from PKS and store them in +* the db and dbx list. +*/ +static void +build_pks_keystore (void ) +{ +grub_err_t err; + + err =create_dbx_list (); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +grub_printf ("warning: dbx list might not be fully populated\n" ); + + err =create_db_list (); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +grub_printf ("warning: db list might not be fully populated\n" ); + +grub_pks_free_keystore (); +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"the db list now has %u keys\n" +"the dbx list now has %u keys\n" , + db.hash_entries + db.cert_entries, + dbx.hash_entries + dbx.cert_entries); +} +/* Free db list memory */ static void free_db_list (void ) {struct x509_certificate *cert; +grub_uint32_t i;while (db.certs !=NULL ) {
@@ -723,9 +1088,37 @@ free_db_list (void)grub_free (cert); } +for (i =0 ; i < db.hash_entries; i++) +grub_free (db.hashes[i]); + +grub_free (db.hashes); +grub_free (db.hash_size);grub_memset (&db,0 ,sizeof (struct grub_database )); } +/* Free dbx list memory */ +static void +free_dbx_list (void ) +{ +struct x509_certificate *cert; +grub_uint32_t i; + +while (dbx.certs !=NULL ) + { + cert = dbx.certs; + dbx.certs = dbx.certs->next; +certificate_release (cert); +grub_free (cert); + } + +for (i =0 ; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++) +grub_free (dbx.hashes[i]); + +grub_free (dbx.hashes); +grub_free (dbx.hash_size); +grub_memset (&dbx,0 ,sizeof (struct grub_database )); +} +static const char *grub_env_read_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),const char *val __attribute__ ((unused)))
@@ -767,6 +1160,55 @@ grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const chareturn ret; } +static const char * +grub_env_read_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), +const char *val __attribute__ ((unused))) +{ +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) +return "dynamic" ; + +return "static" ; +} + +static char * +grub_env_write_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),const char *val) +{ +char *ret; + +/* +* Do not allow the value to be changed if check_sigs is set to enforce and +* GRUB is locked down. +*/ +if (check_sigs == true &&grub_is_lockdown () ==GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED ) + { + ret =grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL ,NULL )); +if (ret ==NULL ) +grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + +return ret; + } + +if ((*val =='1' ) || (*val =='d' )) + { +/* +* If dynamic key management is disabled and PKS support is available, +* load the PKS. +*/ +if (grub_pks_keystore.pks_supported == true && grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == false) +build_pks_keystore (); + + grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = true; + } +else if ((*val =='0' ) || (*val =='s' )) + grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = false; + + ret =grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL ,NULL )); +if (ret ==NULL ) +grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + +return ret; +} +static grub_err_t appendedsig_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)),enum grub_file_type type,void **context __attribute__ ((unused)),enum grub_verify_flags *flags)
@@ -877,15 +1319,45 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)*/ grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures" , grub_env_read_sec, grub_env_write_sec);grub_env_export ("check_appended_signatures" ); +/* +* This is appended signature key management environment variable. +* It is automatically set to "static" or "dynamic" based on the +* ’ibm,secure-boot’ device tree property and Platform KeyStore +* (grub_pks_use_keystore). +* +* "static": Enforce static key management signature verification. +* This is the default. When the GRUB is locked down, +* user cannot change the value by setting the +* appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "dynamic". +* +* "dynamic": Enforce dynamic key management signature verification. +* When the GRUB is locked down, user cannot change the value +* by setting the appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "static". +*/ +grub_register_variable_hook ("appendedsig_key_mgmt" , grub_env_read_key_mgmt, + grub_env_write_key_mgmt); +grub_env_export ("appendedsig_key_mgmt" ); rc =asn1_init ();if (rc !=ASN1_SUCCESS )grub_fatal ("error initing ASN.1 data structures: %d: %s\n" , rc,asn1_strerror (rc)); -/* Extract trusted keys from ELF Note and store them in the db. */ -build_static_db_list (); -grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"the db list now has %u static keys\n" , - db.cert_entries); +/* +* If signature verification is enabled with the dynamic key management, +* load the Platform KeyStore(PKS). +*/ +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) +build_pks_keystore (); +/* +* If signature verification is enabled with the static key management, +* extract trusted keys from ELF Note and store them in the db list. +*/ +else if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == false) + { +build_static_db_list (); +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"the db list now has %u static keys\n" , + db.cert_entries); + }register_appended_signatures_cmd ();grub_verifier_register (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);
@@ -900,8 +1372,11 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI (appendedsig)*/ free_db_list (); +free_dbx_list ();grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures" ,NULL ,NULL );grub_env_unset ("check_appended_signatures" ); +grub_register_variable_hook ("appendedsig_key_mgmt" ,NULL ,NULL ); +grub_env_unset ("appendedsig_key_mgmt" );grub_verifier_unregister (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (); }
include/grub/crypto.h +1 -0
@@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ grub_crypto_hmac_buffer (const struct gcry_md_spec *md,extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_md5;extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha1;extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha256; +extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha384;extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha512;extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_crc32;extern gcry_cipher_spec_t _gcry_cipher_spec_aes;
include/grub/efi/pks.h new file +112 -0
112 lines not on this page · raw message
include/grub/types.h +4 -0
@@ -379,6 +379,8 @@ struct grub_guid } __attribute__ ((aligned(4)));typedef struct grub_guid grub_guid_t ; +#define GRUB_GUID_SIZE (sizeof (grub_guid_t)) +struct grub_packed_guid {grub_uint32_t data1;
@@ -388,4 +390,6 @@ struct grub_packed_guid } GRUB_PACKED;typedef struct grub_packed_guid grub_packed_guid_t ; +#define GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE (sizeof (grub_packed_guid_t)) +#endif /* ! GRUB_TYPES_HEADER */
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v9 13/21] appended signatures: Create db and dbx lists
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c struct grub_database
Quoted 40 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy
If secure boot is enabled with static key management mode, the trusted certificates will be extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and added to db list.
If secure boot is enabled with dynamic key management mode, the trusted certificates and certificate/binary hash will be extracted from the PKS and added to db list. The distrusted certificates, certificate/binary hash are read from the PKS and added to dbx list. Both dbx and db lists are introduced by a subsequent patch.
Note:-
If the certificate or the certificate hash exists in the dbx list, then do not add that certificate/certificate hash to the db list.
Signed-off-by Sudhakar Kuppusamy <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Stefan Berger <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Avnish Chouhan <[email protected]>--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 517 ++++++++++++++++++- include/grub/crypto.h | 1 + include/grub/efi/pks.h | 112 ++++ include/grub/types.h | 4 + 4 files changed, 613 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/pks.hgrub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +2
-1@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@#include <libtasn1.h> #include <grub/env.h> #include <grub/lockdown.h> - +#include <grub/efi/pks.h> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h> #include "appendedsig.h" GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+" );@@ -80,10 +81,21 @@ struct grub_database
The grub_database is too generic... s/database/sb_database/
You do not need "grub_" prefix if it is an internal struct...
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c struct grub_database · line 85
Quoted 5 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +2
-0{struct x509_certificate *certs;/* Certificates. */ grub_uint32_t cert_entries;/* Number of certificates. */ +grub_uint8_t **hashes;/* Certificate/binary hashes. */ +grub_size_t *hash_size;/* Size of certificate/binary hashes. */
s/hash_size/hash_sizes/
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c struct grub_database · line 87
Quoted 2 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +1
-0+grub_uint32_t hash_entries;/* Number of certificate/binary hashes. */ };
typedef struct sb_database sb_database_t;
... and then use it...
Quoted 35 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +26
-1/* The db list is used to validate appended signatures. */ -struct grub_database db = {.certs =NULL , .cert_entries =0 }; +struct grub_database db = {.certs =NULL , .cert_entries =0 , .hashes =NULL , + .hash_size =NULL , .hash_entries =0 }; + +/* +* The dbx list is used to ensure that the distrusted certificates/kernel binaries are +* rejected during appended signatures/hashes validation. +*/ +struct grub_database dbx = {.certs =NULL , .cert_entries =0 , .hashes =NULL , + .hash_size =NULL , .hash_entries =0 };/* * Signature verification flag (check_sigs). @@ -116,6 +128,187 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = { .fs_read = pseudo_read }; + +/* +* GUID can be used to determine the hashing function and +* generate the hash using determined hashing function. +*/ +static grub_err_t +get_hash (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid,const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size, +grub_uint8_t *hash,grub_size_t *hash_size) +{ +gcry_md_spec_t *hash_func =NULL ; + +if (guid ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE ,"GUID is not available" ); + +if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256;
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = { · line 157
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +10
-0+else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha384; +else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha512; +else +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE ,"unsupported GUID hash" ); + +grub_memset (hash,0 ,MAX_HASH_SIZE );
Do we really need that grub_memset() call?
Quoted 43 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +43
-0+grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, hash, data, data_size); + *hash_size = hash_func->mdlen; + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +static grub_err_t +generate_cert_hash (const grub_size_t cert_hash_size,const grub_uint8_t *data, +const grub_size_t data_size,grub_uint8_t *hash,grub_size_t *hash_size) +{ +grub_packed_guid_t guid = {0 }; + +/* support SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 for certificate hash */ +if (cert_hash_size ==32 ) +grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ); +else if (cert_hash_size ==48 ) +grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ); +else if (cert_hash_size ==64 ) +grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ); +else + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"unsupported hash type (%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE") and " +"skipped\n" , cert_hash_size); +return GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND ; + } + +return get_hash (&guid, data, data_size, hash, hash_size); +} + +/* Check the hash presence in the dbx list. */ +static bool +is_hash_present_in_dbx (grub_uint8_t *const hash,const grub_size_t hash_size) +{ +grub_uint32_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++) + { +if (hash_size == dbx.hash_size[i] && +grub_memcmp (dbx.hashes[i], hash, hash_size) ==0 ) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"the hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is ignored" +" because it is on the dbx list\n" , hash[0 ], hash[1 ], + hash[2 ], hash[3 ]);
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = { · line 210
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +10
-0+return true; + } + } + +return false; +} + +/* Check the hash presence in the db list. */ +static bool +is_hash_present_in_db (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data,const grub_size_t hash_data_size)
Why is_hash_present_in_dbx() and is_hash_present_in_db() have different logic? I think both should be the same. Even I think it could be one function getting a pointer to relevant Secure Boot database...
Quoted 53 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +53
-0+{ +grub_uint32_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < db.hash_entries; i++) +if (grub_memcmp (db.hashes[i], hash_data, hash_data_size) ==0 ) +return true; + +return false; +} + +/* Add the certificate/binary hash into the db/dbx list. */ +static grub_err_t +add_hash (grub_uint8_t *const data,const grub_size_t data_size, +struct grub_database *database,const bool is_db) +{ +grub_uint8_t **hashes; +grub_size_t *hash_size; + +if (data ==NULL || data_size ==0 ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE ,"certificate/binary-hash data or size is not available" ); + +if (is_hash_present_in_dbx (data, data_size) == true) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"cannot add a hash, as it is present in the %s list" , + ((is_db == true) ?"db" :"dbx" )); + +return ((is_db == true) ?GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED :GRUB_ERR_EXISTS ); + } + +if (is_db == true) + { +if (is_hash_present_in_db (data, data_size) == true) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_EXISTS , +"cannot a add hash, as it is present in the db list" ); + } + + hashes =grub_realloc (database->hashes,sizeof (grub_uint8_t *) * (database->hash_entries +1 )); +if (hashes ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + + hash_size =grub_realloc (database->hash_size,sizeof (grub_size_t) * (database->hash_entries +1 )); +if (hash_size ==NULL ) + { +/* +* Allocated memory will be freed by +* free_db_list/free_dbx_list. +*/ + hashes[database->hash_entries] =NULL ; + database->hashes = hashes; + database->hash_entries++; + +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + }
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = { · line 273
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +10
-0+ + hashes[database->hash_entries] =grub_malloc (data_size); +if (hashes[database->hash_entries] !=NULL ) +grub_memcpy (hashes[database->hash_entries], data, data_size); + + hash_size[database->hash_entries] = data_size; + database->hash_size = hash_size; + +if (hashes[database->hash_entries] ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" );
Why is not this check immediately after grub_malloc() call? If it is done deliberately then it begs for a comment...
Quoted 41 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +37
-0+grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"added the hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE" to the %s list\n" , + data[0 ], data[1 ], data[2 ], data[3 ], data_size, ((is_db == true) ?"db" :"dbx" )); + + database->hashes = hashes; + database->hash_entries++; + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +static bool +is_hash (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid) +{ +/* GUID type of the binary hash. */ +if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) +return true; + +/* GUID type of the certificate hash. */ +if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) +return true; + +return false; +} + +static bool +is_x509 (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid) +{ +if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) +return true; + +return false; +} +/* * We cannot use hexdump() to display hash data because it is typically * displayed in hexadecimal format, along with an ASCII representation of
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c add_cert_fingerprint (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size, · line 382
Quoted 7 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +4
-0@@ -183,6 +376,16 @@ add_cert_fingerprint (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size, hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256;grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[0 ],0 ,MAX_HASH_SIZE );grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[0 ], data, data_size); + +/* Add SHA384 hash of certificate. */ + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha384; +grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[1 ],0 ,MAX_HASH_SIZE );
You are asking yourself for problems. Using plain numbers for indexing cert->fingerprint is very problematic. Please define meaningful constants and use them...
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c add_cert_fingerprint (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size, · line 387
Quoted 5 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +5
-0+grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[1 ], data, data_size); + +/* Add SHA512 hash of certificate. */ + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha512; +grub_memset (&cert->fingerprint[2 ],0 ,MAX_HASH_SIZE );
Again... I am not convinced we really need these grub_memset() calls.
Quoted 54 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +41
-0+grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, &cert->fingerprint[2 ], data, data_size); } static bool@@ -199,6 +402,46 @@ is_cert_match (const struct x509_certificate *cert1, const struct x509_certificareturn false; } +static bool +is_cert_present_in_dbx (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in) +{ +struct x509_certificate *cert; + +for (cert = dbx.certs; cert; cert = cert->next) +if (is_cert_match (cert, cert_in) == true) +return true; + +return false; +} + +/* Check the certificate hash presence in the dbx list. */ +static bool +is_cert_hash_present_in_dbx (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +grub_uint32_t i; +grub_size_t cert_hash_size =0 ; +grub_uint8_t cert_hash[MAX_HASH_SIZE ] = {0 }; + +for (i =0 ; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++) + { + rc =generate_cert_hash (dbx.hash_size[i], data, data_size, cert_hash, &cert_hash_size); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +continue ; + +if (cert_hash_size == dbx.hash_size[i] && +grub_memcmp (dbx.hashes[i], cert_hash, cert_hash_size) ==0 ) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"a certificate (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is ignored " +"because this certificate hash is on the dbx list\n" , + cert_hash[0 ], cert_hash[1 ], cert_hash[2 ], cert_hash[3 ]); +return true; + } + } + +return false; +} +static bool is_cert_present_in_db (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in) {@@ -211,10 +454,13 @@ is_cert_present_in_db (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in)return false; }
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c is_cert_present_in_db (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in) · line 463
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +5
-2-/* Add the certificate into the db list */ +/* +* Add the certificate into the db list if it is not present in the dbx and db list +* when is_db is true. Add the certificate into the dbx list when is_db is false. +*/ static grub_err_t add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size, -struct grub_database *database) +struct grub_database *database,const bool is_db)
Define is_db as a bool in the struct grub_database and you are done.
And in general I suggest s/database/sb_database/ all over the code...
Quoted 9 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +0
-2{grub_err_t rc;struct x509_certificate *cert;@@ -229,32 +475,64 @@ add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size, rc =parse_x509_certificate (data, data_size, cert);if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) { -grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"cannot add a certificate CN='%s' to the db list\n" , - cert->subject);
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size, · line 486
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +3
-1+grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"cannot add a certificate CN='%s' to the %s list\n" , + cert->subject, ((is_db == true) ?"db" :"dbx" ));grub_free (cert);return rc; }add_cert_fingerprint (data, data_size, cert); -if (is_cert_present_in_db (cert) == true) +if (is_db == false && grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
When I look at the code below I think this condition is wrong. I think you should have first "if" checking for "grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true" and then another checking is_db...
Quoted 44 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +32
-8{ -grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , -"cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the db list" , - cert->subject); -certificate_release (cert); -grub_free (cert); +if (is_cert_present_in_dbx (cert) == true) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the dbx list" , + cert->subject); + rc =GRUB_ERR_EXISTS ; + goto clean_exit; + } + } + else + { +/* Only checks the certificate against dbx if dynamic key management is enabled. */ +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) + { +if (is_cert_hash_present_in_dbx (data, data_size) == true || +is_cert_present_in_dbx (cert) == true) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the dbx list" , + cert->subject); + rc =GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED ; + goto clean_exit; + } + } -return GRUB_ERR_EXISTS ; +if (is_cert_present_in_db (cert) == true) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the db list" , + cert->subject); + rc =GRUB_ERR_EXISTS ; + goto clean_exit; + } } -grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"added a certificate CN='%s' to the db list\n" , - cert->subject);
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size, · line 532
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +5
-0+grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"added a certificate CN='%s' to the %s list\n" , + cert->subject, ((is_db == true) ?"db" :"dbx" )); cert->next = database->certs; database->certs = cert; database->cert_entries++; +return rc; + + clean_exit:
s/clean_exit/fail/
Quoted 92 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +67
-2+certificate_release (cert); +grub_free (cert); +return rc; }@@ -590,7 +868,7 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **if (check_sigs == true &&grub_is_lockdown () ==GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED ) cert_data_size -= append_sig_len; - err =add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db); + err =add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db, true);grub_free (cert_data);if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE )return err;@@ -669,6 +947,68 @@ grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc __attribreturn GRUB_ERR_NONE ; } +/* Add the X.509 certificates/binary hash to the db list from PKS. */ +static grub_err_t +create_db_list (void ) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +grub_uint32_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < grub_pks_keystore.db_entries; i++) + { +if (is_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.db[i].guid) == true) + { + rc =add_hash (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data, + grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size, &db, true); +if (rc ==GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ) +return rc; + } +else if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.db[i].guid) == true) + { + rc =add_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data, + grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size, &db, true); +if (rc ==GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ) +return rc; + } +else +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"unsupported signature data type and " +"skipped (%u)\n" , i +1 ); + } + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +/* Add the certificates and certificate/binary hash to the dbx list from PKS. */ +static grub_err_t +create_dbx_list (void ) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +grub_uint32_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++) + { +if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true) + { + rc =add_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data, + grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size, &dbx, false); +if (rc ==GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ) +return rc; + } +else if (is_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true) + { + rc =add_hash (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data, + grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size, &dbx, false); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +return rc; + } +else +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"unsupported signature data type and " +"skipped (%u)\n" , i +1 ); + } + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} +/* * Extract the X.509 certificates from the ELF Note header, * parse it, and add it to the db list. @@ -702,18 +1042,43 @@ build_static_db_list (void)else if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE )continue ; - err =add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db); + err =add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db, true);grub_free (cert_data);if (err ==GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY )
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c build_static_db_list (void) · line 1057
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +6
-0return ; } } +/* +* Extract trusted and distrusted keys from PKS and store them in +* the db and dbx list. +*/ +static void +build_pks_keystore (void )
s/build_pks_keystore/create_dbs_from_pks/
Quoted 66 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +47
-0+{ +grub_err_t err; + + err =create_dbx_list (); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +grub_printf ("warning: dbx list might not be fully populated\n" ); + + err =create_db_list (); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +grub_printf ("warning: db list might not be fully populated\n" ); + +grub_pks_free_keystore (); +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"the db list now has %u keys\n" +"the dbx list now has %u keys\n" , + db.hash_entries + db.cert_entries, + dbx.hash_entries + dbx.cert_entries); +} +/* Free db list memory */ static void free_db_list (void ) {struct x509_certificate *cert; +grub_uint32_t i;while (db.certs !=NULL ) {@@ -723,9 +1088,37 @@ free_db_list (void)grub_free (cert); } +for (i =0 ; i < db.hash_entries; i++) +grub_free (db.hashes[i]); + +grub_free (db.hashes); +grub_free (db.hash_size);grub_memset (&db,0 ,sizeof (struct grub_database )); } +/* Free dbx list memory */ +static void +free_dbx_list (void ) +{ +struct x509_certificate *cert; +grub_uint32_t i; + +while (dbx.certs !=NULL ) + { + cert = dbx.certs; + dbx.certs = dbx.certs->next; +certificate_release (cert); +grub_free (cert); + } + +for (i =0 ; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++) +grub_free (dbx.hashes[i]); + +grub_free (dbx.hashes); +grub_free (dbx.hash_size); +grub_memset (&dbx,0 ,sizeof (struct grub_database )); +} +static const char *grub_env_read_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),const char *val __attribute__ ((unused)))
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const cha · line 1161
Quoted 2 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +0
-0@@ -767,6 +1160,55 @@ grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const chareturn ret; }
Starting from here...
Quoted 104 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +83
-4+static const char * +grub_env_read_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), +const char *val __attribute__ ((unused))) +{ +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) +return "dynamic" ; + +return "static" ; +} + +static char * +grub_env_write_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),const char *val) +{ +char *ret; + +/* +* Do not allow the value to be changed if check_sigs is set to enforce and +* GRUB is locked down. +*/ +if (check_sigs == true &&grub_is_lockdown () ==GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED ) + { + ret =grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL ,NULL )); +if (ret ==NULL ) +grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + +return ret; + } + +if ((*val =='1' ) || (*val =='d' )) + { +/* +* If dynamic key management is disabled and PKS support is available, +* load the PKS. +*/ +if (grub_pks_keystore.pks_supported == true && grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == false) +build_pks_keystore (); + + grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = true; + } +else if ((*val =='0' ) || (*val =='s' )) + grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = false; + + ret =grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL ,NULL )); +if (ret ==NULL ) +grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + +return ret; +} +static grub_err_t appendedsig_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)),enum grub_file_type type,void **context __attribute__ ((unused)),enum grub_verify_flags *flags)@@ -877,15 +1319,45 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)*/ grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures" , grub_env_read_sec, grub_env_write_sec);grub_env_export ("check_appended_signatures" ); +/* +* This is appended signature key management environment variable. +* It is automatically set to "static" or "dynamic" based on the +* ’ibm,secure-boot’ device tree property and Platform KeyStore +* (grub_pks_use_keystore). +* +* "static": Enforce static key management signature verification. +* This is the default. When the GRUB is locked down, +* user cannot change the value by setting the +* appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "dynamic". +* +* "dynamic": Enforce dynamic key management signature verification. +* When the GRUB is locked down, user cannot change the value +* by setting the appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "static". +*/ +grub_register_variable_hook ("appendedsig_key_mgmt" , grub_env_read_key_mgmt, + grub_env_write_key_mgmt); +grub_env_export ("appendedsig_key_mgmt" ); rc =asn1_init ();if (rc !=ASN1_SUCCESS )grub_fatal ("error initing ASN.1 data structures: %d: %s\n" , rc,asn1_strerror (rc)); -/* Extract trusted keys from ELF Note and store them in the db. */ -build_static_db_list (); -grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"the db list now has %u static keys\n" , - db.cert_entries); +/* +* If signature verification is enabled with the dynamic key management, +* load the Platform KeyStore(PKS). +*/ +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) +build_pks_keystore (); +/* +* If signature verification is enabled with the static key management, +* extract trusted keys from ELF Note and store them in the db list. +*/ +else if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == false) + { +build_static_db_list (); +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"the db list now has %u static keys\n" , + db.cert_entries); + }register_appended_signatures_cmd ();grub_verifier_register (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);@@ -900,8 +1372,11 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI (appendedsig)*/
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c GRUB_MOD_FINI (appendedsig) · line 1382
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +3
-0free_db_list (); +free_dbx_list ();grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures" ,NULL ,NULL );grub_env_unset ("check_appended_signatures" ); +grub_register_variable_hook ("appendedsig_key_mgmt" ,NULL ,NULL ); +grub_env_unset ("appendedsig_key_mgmt" );grub_verifier_unregister (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (); }
... until at least here it seems to me the code does not belong to this patch...
Daniel
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https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v9 14/21 appended signatures: Using db and dbx lists for signature verification
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamySignature verification: verify the kernel against lists of hashes that are either in dbx or db list. If it is not in the dbx list then the trusted keys from the db list are used to verify the signature.
--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 93 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +93 -1
@@ -685,6 +685,83 @@ extract_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize,return parse_pkcs7_signedData (signed_data, appendedsig_pkcs7_size, &sig->pkcs7); } +static grub_err_t +get_binary_hash (const grub_size_t binary_hash_size,const grub_uint8_t *data, +const grub_size_t data_size,grub_uint8_t *hash,grub_size_t *hash_size) +{ +grub_packed_guid_t guid = {0 }; + +/* support SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 for binary hash */ +if (binary_hash_size ==32 ) +grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ); +else if (binary_hash_size ==48 ) +grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ); +else if (binary_hash_size ==64 ) +grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ); +else + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"unsupported hash type (%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE") and " +"skipped\n" , binary_hash_size); +return GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND ; + } + +return get_hash (&guid, data, data_size, hash, hash_size); +} + +/* +* Verify binary hash against the db and dbx list. +* The following errors can occur: +* - GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: indicates that the hash is in dbx list. +* - GRUB_ERR_EOF: the hash could not be found in the db and dbx list. +* - GRUB_ERR_NONE: the hash is found in db list. +*/ +static grub_err_t +verify_binary_hash (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size) +{ +grub_err_t rc =GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +grub_uint32_t i; +grub_size_t hash_size =0 ; +grub_uint8_t hash[MAX_HASH_SIZE ] = {0 }; + +for (i =0 ; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++) + { +if (dbx.hashes[i] ==NULL ) +continue ; + + rc =get_binary_hash (dbx.hash_size[i], data, data_size, hash, &hash_size); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +continue ; + +if (hash_size == dbx.hash_size[i] && +grub_memcmp (dbx.hashes[i], hash, hash_size) ==0 ) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"the hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is present in the dbx list\n" , + hash[0 ], hash[1 ], hash[2 ], hash[3 ]); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE ; + } + } + +for (i =0 ; i < db.hash_entries; i++) + { +if (db.hashes[i] ==NULL ) +continue ; + + rc =get_binary_hash (db.hash_size[i], data, data_size, hash, &hash_size); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +continue ; + +if (hash_size == db.hash_size[i] && +grub_memcmp (db.hashes[i], hash, hash_size) ==0 ) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"verified with a trusted hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x)\n" , + hash[0 ], hash[1 ], hash[2 ], hash[3 ]); +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; + } + } + +return GRUB_ERR_EOF ; +} +/* * Given a hash value 'hval', of hash specification 'hash', prepare * the S-expressions (sexp) and perform the signature verification.
@@ -729,7 +806,7 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)struct pkcs7_signerInfo *si;grub_uint32_t i; -if (!db.cert_entries) +if (!db.cert_entries && !db.hash_entries)return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE ,"no trusted keys to verify against" ); err =extract_appended_signature (buf, bufsize, &sig);
@@ -739,6 +816,21 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize) append_sig_len = sig.signature_len; datasize = bufsize - sig.signature_len; +/* +* If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode, +* Verify binary hash against the db and dbx list. +*/ +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) + { + err =verify_binary_hash (buf, datasize); +if (err ==GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE ) + { +pkcs7_signedData_release (&sig.pkcs7); +return grub_error (err, +"failed to verify the binary hash against a trusted binary hash" ); + } + } +/* Verify signature using trusted keys from db list. */ for (i =0 ; i < sig.pkcs7.signerInfo_count; i++) {
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v9 15/21 powerpc_ieee1275: Introduce use_static_keys flag
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyIntroduce the use_static_keys flag to indicate that static keys are to be used rather than keys from the PKS storage's db variable. This flag is set when Secure Boot is enabled with PKS but the db variable is not present in the PKS storage. The appendedsig module would use this flag to extract the static keys from the GRUB ELF Note and stored in the db list.
--- .../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++- .../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c +20 -1
@@ -56,9 +56,18 @@ static grub_size_t pks_max_object_size;* use_keystore: * False: Static key management (use built-in Keys). This is default. * True: Dynamic key management (use Platform KeySotre). +* +* use_static_keys: +* False: Does not enforce the use of the static key as a default key from +the GRUB ELF Note. This is default. +* True: Enforce the use of the static key as a default key from the +* GRUB ELF Note if db variable is not available in PKS when use_keystore +* is set to true +* */ grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore = { .db =NULL , .dbx =NULL , .db_entries =0 , .dbx_entries =0 , - .use_keystore = false, .pks_supported = false}; + .use_keystore = false, .pks_supported = false, + .use_static_keys = false};/* * Import the Globally Unique Identifier (GUID), EFI Signature Database (ESD),
@@ -312,6 +321,16 @@ grub_pks_keystore_init (void)grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore,0 ,sizeof (grub_pks_t));/* Read db from PKS. */ rc =read_sbvar_from_pks (0 ,DB , &grub_pks_keystore.db, &grub_pks_keystore.db_entries); +if (rc ==GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND ) + { + rc =GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +/* +* The db variable won't be available by default in PKS. +* So, it will use the static key as a default key from the GRUB ELF Note. +*/ + grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys = true; + } +if (rc ==GRUB_ERR_NONE ) {/* Read dbx from PKS. */
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h +1 -0
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ struct grub_pksgrub_uint32_t dbx_entries;/* Size of forbidden signature database. */ bool pks_supported;/* Flag to indicate the availability of PKS support. */ bool use_keystore;/* Flag to indicate the key management mode. */ +bool use_static_keys;/* Flag to indicate use of static keys. */ }GRUB_PACKED ;typedef struct grub_pks grub_pks_t ;
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v9 16/21 appended signatures: Read default db keys from the ELF Note
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyIf Secure Boot is enabled with dynamic key management mode and the use_static_keys flag is not set, then read the keys from the PKS keystore as well from ELF Note, and add them into the db. Otherwise, it only reads the static keys from the ELF Note and adds them into the db.
--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +11 -3
@@ -1154,9 +1154,17 @@ build_pks_keystore (void)if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE )grub_printf ("warning: dbx list might not be fully populated\n" ); - err =create_db_list (); -if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) -grub_printf ("warning: db list might not be fully populated\n" ); +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys == true) +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"db variable is not available at PKS and " +"using a static keys as a default key in db list\n" ); + +build_static_db_list (); +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys == false) + { + err =create_db_list (); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +grub_printf ("warning: db list might not be fully populated\n" ); + }grub_pks_free_keystore (); grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %u keys\n"
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v9 16/21] appended signatures: Read default db keys from the ELF Note
Quoted 19 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy
If Secure Boot is enabled with dynamic key management mode and the
use_static_keysflag is not set, then read the keys from the PKS keystore as well from ELF Note, and add them into the db. Otherwise, it only reads the static keys from the ELF Note and adds them into the db.Signed-off-by Sudhakar Kuppusamy <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Stefan Berger <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Avnish Chouhan <[email protected]>--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +0
-0@@ -1154,9 +1154,17 @@ build_pks_keystore (void)if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE )
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c build_pks_keystore (void) · line 1161
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +5
-3grub_printf ("warning: dbx list might not be fully populated\n" ); - err =create_db_list (); -if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) -grub_printf ("warning: db list might not be fully populated\n" ); +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys == true) +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"db variable is not available at PKS and " +"using a static keys as a default key in db list\n" ); + +build_static_db_list ();
I find some function names very confusing...
s/build_static_db_list/load_elf2db/
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c build_pks_keystore (void) · line 1164
Quoted 3 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +3
-0+if (grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys == false) + { + err =create_db_list ();
s/create_db_list/load_pks2db/, etc...
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c build_pks_keystore (void) · line 1167
Quoted 3 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +3
-0+if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +grub_printf ("warning: db list might not be fully populated\n" ); + }
If you shuffle the code a bit then you need one if/else only.
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c build_pks_keystore (void) · line 1169
Quoted 1 line
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +0
-0grub_pks_free_keystore ();
s/grub_pks_free_keystore/grub_pks_tmp_free/, etc...
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c build_pks_keystore (void) · line 1170
Quoted 1 line
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +0
-0grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %u keys\n"
Daniel
_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v9 17/21 appended signatures: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyIntroducing the following db and dbx commands
1. append_list_db:
Show the list of trusted certificates and binary hashes from the db list.
2. append_list_dbx:
Show the list of distrusted certificates and binary/certificate hashes from the dbx list.
3. append_add_db_cert:
Add the trusted certificate to the db list.
4. append_add_db_hash:
Add the trusted binary hash to the db list.
5. append_add_dbx_cert:
Add the distrusted certificate to the dbx list.
6. append_add_dbx_hash:
Add the distrusted certificate/binary hash to the dbx list.
Note that if signature verification (check_appended_signature) is set to enforce,
1. When append_add_db_cert or append_add_dbx_cert executes,
then the certificate file must be signed with an appended signature.
2. When append_add_db_hash executes, then the binary hash file
must be signed with an appended signature.
3. When append_add_dbx_hash executes, then the certificate/binary hash file must be signed with an appended signature.
--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 319 ++++++++++++++++++- include/grub/file.h | 2 + 2 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +310 -9
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");#define SIG_MAGIC "~Module signature appended~\n"#define SIG_MAGIC_SIZE ((sizeof(SIG_MAGIC) - 1)) +#define OPTION_BINARY_HASH 0 +#define OPTION_CERT_HASH 1 +/* * This structure is extracted from scripts/sign-file.c in the linux kernel * source. It was licensed as LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3+ compatible.
@@ -110,6 +113,13 @@ static bool check_sigs = false;/* Appended signature size. */ static grub_size_t append_sig_len =0 ; +static const struct grub_arg_option options[] = +{ + {"binary-hash" ,'b' ,0 ,N_ ("hash file of the binary." ),0 ,ARG_TYPE_PATHNAME }, + {"cert-hash" ,'c' ,1 ,N_ ("hash file of the certificate." ),0 ,ARG_TYPE_PATHNAME }, + {0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 } +}; +static void register_appended_signatures_cmd (void ); static void
@@ -593,6 +603,53 @@ remove_cert_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size)return rc; } +static bool +is_cert_fingerprint_match (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data,const grub_size_t hash_data_size, +const struct x509_certificate *cert) +{ +if (grub_memcmp (cert->fingerprint[0 ], hash_data, hash_data_size) ==0 + ||grub_memcmp (cert->fingerprint[1 ], hash_data, hash_data_size) ==0 + ||grub_memcmp (cert->fingerprint[2 ], hash_data, hash_data_size) ==0 ) +return true; + +return false; +} + +static void +remove_hash_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data,const grub_size_t hash_data_size, +const bool is_binary_hash) +{ +grub_uint32_t i; +struct x509_certificate *cert; + +if (is_binary_hash == true) + { +for (i =0 ; i < db.hash_entries; i++) + { +if (grub_memcmp (db.hashes[i], hash_data, hash_data_size) ==0 ) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"removed distrusted hash %02x%02x%02x%02x.. from the db list\n" , + db.hashes[i][0 ], db.hashes[i][1 ], db.hashes[i][2 ], db.hashes[i][3 ]); +grub_free (db.hashes[i]); + db.hashes[i] =NULL ; + db.hash_size[i] =0 ; +break ; + } + } + } +else + { +for (cert = db.certs; cert !=NULL ; cert = cert->next) + { +if (is_cert_fingerprint_match (hash_data, hash_data_size, cert) == true) + { +_remove_cert_from_db (cert); +break ; + } + } + } +} +static grub_err_t file_read_whole (grub_file_t file,grub_uint8_t **buf,grub_size_t *len) {
@@ -913,6 +970,8 @@ grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc/* * Add the trusted certificate to the db list if it is not already present. +* Checks the trusted certificate against dbx list if dynamic key management is enabled. +* And add it to the db list if it is not already present. * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the * trusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature. * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
@@ -970,6 +1029,8 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **/* * Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list if it is already present. +* And add it to the dbx list if not present when dynamic key management is +* enabled. * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the * distrusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature. * The signature is verified by the appended sig module. If verification succeeds,
@@ -979,7 +1040,9 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char *** without an appended signature and removes it from the db list. * * Also, note that the removal of the distrusted certificate using this command -* does not persist across reboots. +* does not persist across reboots. If static key management is enabled, the +* append_rm_dbx_cert command is only available in the GRUB console. Else the +* append_add_dbx_cert command is available in the GRUB console. */ static grub_err_t grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),int argc,char **args)
@@ -991,8 +1054,10 @@ grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char *if (argc !=1 )return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT , -"a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n" -"Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n" ); +"a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n%s" , + ((grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) ? +"Example:\n\tappend_add_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n" : +"Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n" ));if (!grub_strlen (args[0 ]))return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME ,"missing distrusted X.509 certificate file" );
@@ -1019,9 +1084,21 @@ grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char */* Remove distrusted certificate from the db list if present. */ err =remove_cert_from_db (cert_data, cert_data_size); -grub_free (cert_data);if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) -return err; + { +grub_free (cert_data); +return err; + } + +/* Only add the certificate to the dbx list if dynamic key management is enabled. */ +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) + { + err =add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &dbx, false); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +return err; + } + +grub_free (cert_data);return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; }
@@ -1036,9 +1113,196 @@ grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc __attribfor (cert = db.certs; cert !=NULL ; cert = cert->next, cert_num++)print_certificate (cert, cert_num); +/* Only list the binary hash if dynamic key management is enabled. */ +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) + { +for (i =0 ; i < db.hash_entries; i++) + { +if (db.hashes[i] !=NULL ) + { +grub_printf ("\nBinary hash: %u\n" , i +1 ); +grub_printf (" Hash: sha%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE"\n " , db.hash_size[i] *8 ); +dump_data_to_hex (db.hashes[i], db.hash_size[i]); + } + } + } +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; } +static grub_err_t +grub_cmd_list_dbx (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)), +int argc __attribute__((unused)),char **args __attribute__((unused))) +{ +struct x509_certificate *cert; +grub_uint32_t i, cert_num =1 ; + +for (cert = dbx.certs; cert !=NULL ; cert = cert->next, cert_num++) +print_certificate (cert, cert_num); + +for (i =0 ; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++) + { +if (dbx.hashes[i] !=NULL ) + { +grub_printf ("\nCertificate/Binary hash: %u\n" , i +1 ); +grub_printf (" Hash: sha%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE"\n " , dbx.hash_size[i] *8 ); +dump_data_to_hex (dbx.hashes[i], dbx.hash_size[i]); + } + } + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +/* +* Remove the trusted binary hash from the dbx list if present. +* And add them to the db list if it is not already present. +* Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts +* the binary hash file that is signed with an appended signature. +* The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, +* the binary hash is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and +* the binary hash is not added. +* When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the binary hash file without +* an appended signature and adds it to the db list. +* +* Also, note that the adding of the trusted binary hash using this command does +* not persist across reboots. +*/ +static grub_err_t +grub_cmd_db_hash (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)),int argc,char **args) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +grub_file_t hash_file; +grub_uint8_t *hash_data =NULL ; +grub_size_t hash_data_size =0 ; + +if (argc !=1 ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT , +"a trusted binary hash file is expected in ASCII text format\n" +"Example:\n\tappend_add_db_hash <BINARY HASH FILE>\n" ); + +if (!grub_strlen (args[0 ])) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME ,"missing trusted binary hash file" ); + + hash_file =grub_file_open (args[0 ],GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST |GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS ); +if (hash_file ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND ,"unable to open %s file" , args[0 ]); + + rc =file_read_whole (hash_file, &hash_data, &hash_data_size); +grub_file_close (hash_file); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +return rc; + +/* +* If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down, +* obtain the actual hash data size by subtracting the appended +* signature size from the hash data size because +* the hash has an appended signature, and this actual hash data size is +* used to get the hash data. +*/ +if (check_sigs == true &&grub_is_lockdown () ==GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED ) + hash_data_size -= append_sig_len; + +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"adding a trusted binary hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE"\n" , + hash_data[0 ], hash_data[1 ], hash_data[2 ], hash_data[3 ], hash_data_size); + +/* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 binary hash */ +if (hash_data_size !=32 && hash_data_size !=48 && hash_data_size !=64 ) + { +grub_free (hash_data); +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE ,"unacceptable trusted binary hash type" ); + } + + rc =add_hash (hash_data, hash_data_size, &db, true); +grub_free (hash_data); + +return rc; +} + +/* +* Remove the distrusted binary/certificate hash from the db list if present. +* And add them to the dbx list if it is not already present. +* Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts +* the binary/certificate hash file that is signed with an appended signature. +* The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, +* the binary/certificate hash is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error is posted and +* the binary/certificate hash is not added. +* When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the binary/certificate hash file without +* an appended signature and adds it to the dbx list. +* +* Also, note that the adding of the distrusted binary/certificate hash using this command does +* not persist across reboots. +*/ +static grub_err_t +grub_cmd_dbx_hash (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt,int argc __attribute__ ((unused)), +char **args __attribute__ ((unused))) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +grub_file_t hash_file; +grub_uint8_t *hash_data =NULL ; +grub_size_t hash_data_size =0 ; +char *file_path; + +if (!ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH ].set && !ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH ].set) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT , +"a distrusted certificate/binary hash file is expected in ASCII text format\n" +"Example:\n\tappend_add_dbx_hash [option] <FILE>\n" +"option:\n[-b|--binary-hash] FILE [BINARY HASH FILE]\n" +"[-c|--cert-hash] FILE [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]\n" ); + +if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH ].arg ==NULL && ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH ].arg ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME ,"missing distrusted certificate/binary hash file" ); + +if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH ].arg !=NULL ) + file_path = ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH ].arg; +else + file_path = ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH ].arg; + + hash_file =grub_file_open (file_path,GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST |GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS ); +if (hash_file ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND ,"unable to open %s file" , file_path); + + rc =file_read_whole (hash_file, &hash_data, &hash_data_size); +grub_file_close (hash_file); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +return rc; + +/* +* If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down, +* obtain the actual hash data size by subtracting the appended +* signature size from the hash data size because +* the hash has an appended signature, and this actual hash data size is +* used to get the hash data. +*/ +if (check_sigs == true &&grub_is_lockdown () ==GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED ) + hash_data_size -= append_sig_len; + +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"adding a distrusted certificate/binary hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n" +" with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE"\n" , hash_data[0 ], hash_data[1 ], + hash_data[2 ], hash_data[3 ], hash_data_size); + +if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH ].set || ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH ].set) + { +/* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 certificate/binary hash */ +if (hash_data_size !=32 && hash_data_size !=48 && hash_data_size !=64 ) + { +grub_free (hash_data); +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE , +"unacceptable distrusted certificate/binary hash type" ); + } + } + +/* Remove distrusted binary hash/certificate from the db list if present. */ +remove_hash_from_db (hash_data, hash_data_size, + ((ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH ].set) ? true : false)); + + rc =add_hash (hash_data, hash_data_size, &dbx, false); +grub_free (hash_data); + +return rc; +} +/* Add the X.509 certificates/binary hash to the db list from PKS. */ static grub_err_t create_db_list (void )
@@ -1297,10 +1561,16 @@ grub_env_write_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), consif (grub_pks_keystore.pks_supported == true && grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == false)build_pks_keystore (); +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (); grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = true; +register_appended_signatures_cmd (); }else if ((*val =='0' ) || (*val =='s' )) - grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = false; + { +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (); + grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = false; +register_appended_signatures_cmd (); + } ret =grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL ,NULL ));if (ret ==NULL )
@@ -1369,7 +1639,9 @@ struct grub_file_verifier grub_appendedsig_verifier = { .write = appendedsig_write, }; -static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert; +static grub_extcmd_t cmd_dbx_hash; +static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_db_cert, cmd_db_hash, + cmd_list_dbx, cmd_dbx_cert;/* It registers the appended signatures GRUB commands. */ static void
@@ -1381,8 +1653,27 @@ register_appended_signatures_cmd (void) N_("Show the list of trusted X.509 certificates from the db list")); cmd_db_cert =grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert" , grub_cmd_db_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ),N_ ("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db list" )); - cmd_dbx_cert =grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert" , grub_cmd_dbx_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ), -N_ ("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list" )); +/* +* If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode, +* register dynamic secure boot GRUB commands. +*/ +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) + { + cmd_dbx_cert =grub_register_command ("append_add_dbx_cert" , grub_cmd_dbx_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ), +N_ ("Add distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the dbx list" )); + cmd_list_dbx =grub_register_command ("append_list_dbx" , grub_cmd_list_dbx,0 , +N_ ("Show the list of distrusted certificates and" +" certificate/binary hashes from the dbx list" )); + cmd_db_hash =grub_register_command ("append_add_db_hash" , grub_cmd_db_hash,N_ ("BINARY HASH FILE" ), +N_ ("Add trusted BINARY HASH to the db list." )); + cmd_dbx_hash =grub_register_extcmd ("append_add_dbx_hash" , grub_cmd_dbx_hash,0 , +N_ ("[-b|--binary-hash] FILE [BINARY HASH FILE]\n" +"[-c|--cert-hash] FILE [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]" ), +N_ ("Add distrusted CERTFICATE/BINARY HASH to the dbx list." ), options); + } +else + cmd_dbx_cert =grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert" , grub_cmd_dbx_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ), +N_ ("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list" )); }/* It unregisters the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
@@ -1393,6 +1684,16 @@ unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void)grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db);grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert);grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert); +/* +* If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode, +* unregister dynamic secure boot GRUB commands. +*/ +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) + { +grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_dbx); +grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_hash); +grub_unregister_extcmd (cmd_dbx_hash); + } }GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
include/grub/file.h +2 -0
@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ enum grub_file_typeGRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASHLIST ,/* File hashed by hashsum. */ GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TO_HASH , +/* File holding certificiate/binary hash to add to db/dbx. */ +GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST ,/* Keyboard layout. */ GRUB_FILE_TYPE_KEYBOARD_LAYOUT,/* Picture file. */
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v9 17/21] appended signatures: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx
Quoted 61 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Introducing the following db and dbx commands
1.
append_list_db:
Show the list of trusted certificates and binary hashes from the db list.
2.append_list_dbx:
Show the list of distrusted certificates and binary/certificate hashes from the dbx list.
3.append_add_db_cert:
Add the trusted certificate to the db list.
4.append_add_db_hash:
Add the trusted binary hash to the db list.
5.append_add_dbx_cert:
Add the distrusted certificate to the dbx list.
6.append_add_dbx_hash:
Add the distrusted certificate/binary hash to the dbx list.Note that if signature verification (
check_appended_signature) is set to enforce,
1. Whenappend_add_db_certorappend_add_dbx_certexecutes,
then the certificate file must be signed with an appended signature.
2. Whenappend_add_db_hashexecutes, then the binary hash file
must be signed with an appended signature.
3. Whenappend_add_dbx_hashexecutes, then the certificate/binary hash file must be signed with an appended signature.Signed-off-by Sudhakar Kuppusamy <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Avnish Chouhan <[email protected]>--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 319 ++++++++++++++++++- include/grub/file.h | 2 + 2 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +10
-0@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");#define SIG_MAGIC "~Module signature appended~\n"#define SIG_MAGIC_SIZE ((sizeof(SIG_MAGIC) - 1)) +#define OPTION_BINARY_HASH 0 +#define OPTION_CERT_HASH 1 +/* * This structure is extracted from scripts/sign-file.c in the linux kernel * source. It was licensed as LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3+ compatible. @@ -110,6 +113,13 @@ static bool check_sigs = false;/* Appended signature size. */ static grub_size_t append_sig_len =0 ; +static const struct grub_arg_option options[] = +{ + {"binary-hash" ,'b' ,0 ,N_ ("hash file of the binary." ),0 ,ARG_TYPE_PATHNAME }, + {"cert-hash" ,'c' ,1 ,N_ ("hash file of the certificate." ),0 ,ARG_TYPE_PATHNAME }, + {0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 } +}; +static void register_appended_signatures_cmd (void ); static void
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c remove_cert_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size) · line 608
Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +3
-0@@ -593,6 +603,53 @@ remove_cert_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size)return rc; } +static bool +is_cert_fingerprint_match (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data,const grub_size_t hash_data_size, +const struct x509_certificate *cert)
s/is_cert_fingerprint_match/cert_fingerprint_match/
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c remove_cert_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size) · line 612
Quoted 4 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +4
-0+{ +if (grub_memcmp (cert->fingerprint[0 ], hash_data, hash_data_size) ==0 + ||grub_memcmp (cert->fingerprint[1 ], hash_data, hash_data_size) ==0 + ||grub_memcmp (cert->fingerprint[2 ], hash_data, hash_data_size) ==0 )
Why are you comparing all hashes instead of chosen one?
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c remove_cert_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size) · line 620
Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +8
-0+return true; + +return false; +} + +static void +remove_hash_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data,const grub_size_t hash_data_size, +const bool is_binary_hash)
s/is_binary_hash/bin_hash/
Quoted 102 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +57
-5+{ +grub_uint32_t i; +struct x509_certificate *cert; + +if (is_binary_hash == true) + { +for (i =0 ; i < db.hash_entries; i++) + { +if (grub_memcmp (db.hashes[i], hash_data, hash_data_size) ==0 ) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"removed distrusted hash %02x%02x%02x%02x.. from the db list\n" , + db.hashes[i][0 ], db.hashes[i][1 ], db.hashes[i][2 ], db.hashes[i][3 ]); +grub_free (db.hashes[i]); + db.hashes[i] =NULL ; + db.hash_size[i] =0 ; +break ; + } + } + } +else + { +for (cert = db.certs; cert !=NULL ; cert = cert->next) + { +if (is_cert_fingerprint_match (hash_data, hash_data_size, cert) == true) + { +_remove_cert_from_db (cert); +break ; + } + } + } +} +static grub_err_t file_read_whole (grub_file_t file,grub_uint8_t **buf,grub_size_t *len) {@@ -913,6 +970,8 @@ grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc/* * Add the trusted certificate to the db list if it is not already present. +* Checks the trusted certificate against dbx list if dynamic key management is enabled. +* And add it to the db list if it is not already present. * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the * trusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature. * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, @@ -970,6 +1029,8 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **/* * Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list if it is already present. +* And add it to the dbx list if not present when dynamic key management is +* enabled. * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the * distrusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature. * The signature is verified by the appended sig module. If verification succeeds, @@ -979,7 +1040,9 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char *** without an appended signature and removes it from the db list. * * Also, note that the removal of the distrusted certificate using this command -* does not persist across reboots. +* does not persist across reboots. If static key management is enabled, the +* append_rm_dbx_cert command is only available in the GRUB console. Else the +* append_add_dbx_cert command is available in the GRUB console. */ static grub_err_t grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),int argc,char **args)@@ -991,8 +1054,10 @@ grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char *if (argc !=1 )return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT , -"a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n" -"Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n" ); +"a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n%s" , + ((grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) ? +"Example:\n\tappend_add_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n" : +"Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n" ));if (!grub_strlen (args[0 ]))return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME ,"missing distrusted X.509 certificate file" );@@ -1019,9 +1084,21 @@ grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char */* Remove distrusted certificate from the db list if present. */ err =remove_cert_from_db (cert_data, cert_data_size); -grub_free (cert_data);if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) -return err; + { +grub_free (cert_data); +return err; + } + +/* Only add the certificate to the dbx list if dynamic key management is enabled. */ +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) + { + err =add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &dbx, false); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +return err; + } + +grub_free (cert_data);return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; }
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc __attrib · line 1116
Quoted 4 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +1
-0@@ -1036,9 +1113,196 @@ grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc __attribfor (cert = db.certs; cert !=NULL ; cert = cert->next, cert_num++)print_certificate (cert, cert_num); +/* Only list the binary hash if dynamic key management is enabled. */
Why?
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc __attrib · line 1128
Quoted 12 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +12
-0+if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) + { +for (i =0 ; i < db.hash_entries; i++) + { +if (db.hashes[i] !=NULL ) + { +grub_printf ("\nBinary hash: %u\n" , i +1 ); +grub_printf (" Hash: sha%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE"\n " , db.hash_size[i] *8 ); +dump_data_to_hex (db.hashes[i], db.hash_size[i]); + } + } + }
This change does not seem to belong to this patch...
Quoted 240 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +205
-4+return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; } +static grub_err_t +grub_cmd_list_dbx (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)), +int argc __attribute__((unused)),char **args __attribute__((unused))) +{ +struct x509_certificate *cert; +grub_uint32_t i, cert_num =1 ; + +for (cert = dbx.certs; cert !=NULL ; cert = cert->next, cert_num++) +print_certificate (cert, cert_num); + +for (i =0 ; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++) + { +if (dbx.hashes[i] !=NULL ) + { +grub_printf ("\nCertificate/Binary hash: %u\n" , i +1 ); +grub_printf (" Hash: sha%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE"\n " , dbx.hash_size[i] *8 ); +dump_data_to_hex (dbx.hashes[i], dbx.hash_size[i]); + } + } + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +/* +* Remove the trusted binary hash from the dbx list if present. +* And add them to the db list if it is not already present. +* Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts +* the binary hash file that is signed with an appended signature. +* The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, +* the binary hash is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and +* the binary hash is not added. +* When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the binary hash file without +* an appended signature and adds it to the db list. +* +* Also, note that the adding of the trusted binary hash using this command does +* not persist across reboots. +*/ +static grub_err_t +grub_cmd_db_hash (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)),int argc,char **args) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +grub_file_t hash_file; +grub_uint8_t *hash_data =NULL ; +grub_size_t hash_data_size =0 ; + +if (argc !=1 ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT , +"a trusted binary hash file is expected in ASCII text format\n" +"Example:\n\tappend_add_db_hash <BINARY HASH FILE>\n" ); + +if (!grub_strlen (args[0 ])) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME ,"missing trusted binary hash file" ); + + hash_file =grub_file_open (args[0 ],GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST |GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS ); +if (hash_file ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND ,"unable to open %s file" , args[0 ]); + + rc =file_read_whole (hash_file, &hash_data, &hash_data_size); +grub_file_close (hash_file); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +return rc; + +/* +* If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down, +* obtain the actual hash data size by subtracting the appended +* signature size from the hash data size because +* the hash has an appended signature, and this actual hash data size is +* used to get the hash data. +*/ +if (check_sigs == true &&grub_is_lockdown () ==GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED ) + hash_data_size -= append_sig_len; + +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"adding a trusted binary hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE"\n" , + hash_data[0 ], hash_data[1 ], hash_data[2 ], hash_data[3 ], hash_data_size); + +/* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 binary hash */ +if (hash_data_size !=32 && hash_data_size !=48 && hash_data_size !=64 ) + { +grub_free (hash_data); +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE ,"unacceptable trusted binary hash type" ); + } + + rc =add_hash (hash_data, hash_data_size, &db, true); +grub_free (hash_data); + +return rc; +} + +/* +* Remove the distrusted binary/certificate hash from the db list if present. +* And add them to the dbx list if it is not already present. +* Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts +* the binary/certificate hash file that is signed with an appended signature. +* The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, +* the binary/certificate hash is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error is posted and +* the binary/certificate hash is not added. +* When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the binary/certificate hash file without +* an appended signature and adds it to the dbx list. +* +* Also, note that the adding of the distrusted binary/certificate hash using this command does +* not persist across reboots. +*/ +static grub_err_t +grub_cmd_dbx_hash (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt,int argc __attribute__ ((unused)), +char **args __attribute__ ((unused))) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +grub_file_t hash_file; +grub_uint8_t *hash_data =NULL ; +grub_size_t hash_data_size =0 ; +char *file_path; + +if (!ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH ].set && !ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH ].set) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT , +"a distrusted certificate/binary hash file is expected in ASCII text format\n" +"Example:\n\tappend_add_dbx_hash [option] <FILE>\n" +"option:\n[-b|--binary-hash] FILE [BINARY HASH FILE]\n" +"[-c|--cert-hash] FILE [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]\n" ); + +if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH ].arg ==NULL && ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH ].arg ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME ,"missing distrusted certificate/binary hash file" ); + +if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH ].arg !=NULL ) + file_path = ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH ].arg; +else + file_path = ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH ].arg; + + hash_file =grub_file_open (file_path,GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST |GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS ); +if (hash_file ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND ,"unable to open %s file" , file_path); + + rc =file_read_whole (hash_file, &hash_data, &hash_data_size); +grub_file_close (hash_file); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +return rc; + +/* +* If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down, +* obtain the actual hash data size by subtracting the appended +* signature size from the hash data size because +* the hash has an appended signature, and this actual hash data size is +* used to get the hash data. +*/ +if (check_sigs == true &&grub_is_lockdown () ==GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED ) + hash_data_size -= append_sig_len; + +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"adding a distrusted certificate/binary hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n" +" with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE"\n" , hash_data[0 ], hash_data[1 ], + hash_data[2 ], hash_data[3 ], hash_data_size); + +if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH ].set || ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH ].set) + { +/* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 certificate/binary hash */ +if (hash_data_size !=32 && hash_data_size !=48 && hash_data_size !=64 ) + { +grub_free (hash_data); +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE , +"unacceptable distrusted certificate/binary hash type" ); + } + } + +/* Remove distrusted binary hash/certificate from the db list if present. */ +remove_hash_from_db (hash_data, hash_data_size, + ((ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH ].set) ? true : false)); + + rc =add_hash (hash_data, hash_data_size, &dbx, false); +grub_free (hash_data); + +return rc; +} +/* Add the X.509 certificates/binary hash to the db list from PKS. */ static grub_err_t create_db_list (void )@@ -1297,10 +1561,16 @@ grub_env_write_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), consif (grub_pks_keystore.pks_supported == true && grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == false)build_pks_keystore (); +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (); grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = true; +register_appended_signatures_cmd (); }else if ((*val =='0' ) || (*val =='s' )) - grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = false; + { +unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (); + grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = false; +register_appended_signatures_cmd (); + } ret =grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL ,NULL ));if (ret ==NULL )@@ -1369,7 +1639,9 @@ struct grub_file_verifier grub_appendedsig_verifier = { .write = appendedsig_write, }; -static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert; +static grub_extcmd_t cmd_dbx_hash; +static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_db_cert, cmd_db_hash, + cmd_list_dbx, cmd_dbx_cert;/* It registers the appended signatures GRUB commands. */ static void@@ -1381,8 +1653,27 @@ register_appended_signatures_cmd (void) N_("Show the list of trusted X.509 certificates from the db list")); cmd_db_cert =grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert" , grub_cmd_db_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ),N_ ("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db list" )); - cmd_dbx_cert =grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert" , grub_cmd_dbx_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ), -N_ ("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list" )); +/* +* If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode, +* register dynamic secure boot GRUB commands. +*/ +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) + { + cmd_dbx_cert =grub_register_command ("append_add_dbx_cert" , grub_cmd_dbx_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ), +N_ ("Add distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the dbx list" )); + cmd_list_dbx =grub_register_command ("append_list_dbx" , grub_cmd_list_dbx,0 , +N_ ("Show the list of distrusted certificates and" +" certificate/binary hashes from the dbx list" )); + cmd_db_hash =grub_register_command ("append_add_db_hash" , grub_cmd_db_hash,N_ ("BINARY HASH FILE" ), +N_ ("Add trusted BINARY HASH to the db list." )); + cmd_dbx_hash =grub_register_extcmd ("append_add_dbx_hash" , grub_cmd_dbx_hash,0 , +N_ ("[-b|--binary-hash] FILE [BINARY HASH FILE]\n" +"[-c|--cert-hash] FILE [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]" ), +N_ ("Add distrusted CERTFICATE/BINARY HASH to the dbx list." ), options); + } +else + cmd_dbx_cert =grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert" , grub_cmd_dbx_cert,N_ ("X509_CERTIFICATE" ), +N_ ("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list" )); }/* It unregisters the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void) · line 1689
Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +3
-0@@ -1393,6 +1684,16 @@ unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void)grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db);grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert);grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert); +/* +* If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode, +* unregister dynamic secure boot GRUB commands.
Why? I think these commands should be always enabled and do not print anything if relevant databases are empty. It is also worth considering a command which would print state of PKS and static keys.
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void) · line 1697
Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +7
-0+*/ +if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) + { +grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_dbx); +grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_hash); +grub_unregister_extcmd (cmd_dbx_hash); + } }
Daniel
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PATCH v9 18/21 appended signatures: Verification tests
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyThese tests are run through all_functional_test and test a range of commands and behaviours.
--- grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 8 + grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c | 344 ++++++++ grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h | 975 ++++++++++++++++++++++ grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 1328 insertions(+) create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +8 -0
@@ -2214,6 +2214,14 @@ module = { cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY)'; }; +module = { + name = appended_signature_test; + common = tests/appended_signature_test.c; + common = tests/appended_signatures.h; + enable = emu; + enable = powerpc_ieee1275; +}; + module = { name = signature_test; common = tests/signature_test.c;
grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c new file +344 -0
344 lines not on this page · raw message
grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h new file +975 -0
975 lines not on this page · raw message
grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c +1 -0
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ grub_functional_all_tests (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt __attribute__ ((unused)),grub_dl_load ("xnu_uuid_test" );grub_dl_load ("pbkdf2_test" );grub_dl_load ("signature_test" ); +grub_dl_load ("appended_signature_test" );grub_dl_load ("sleep_test" );grub_dl_load ("bswap_test" );grub_dl_load ("ctz_test" );
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v9 19/21 docs/grub: Document signing GRUB under UEFI
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyFrom: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
Before adding information about how GRUB is signed with an appended signature scheme, it's worth adding some information about how it can currently be signed for UEFI.
--- docs/grub.texi | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
docs/grub.texi +17 -1
@@ -8675,6 +8675,7 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order. * Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components * Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup * TPM2 key protector:: Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector +* Signing GRUB itself:: Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image @end menu @node Authentication and authorisation
@@ -8755,7 +8756,7 @@ commands. GRUB's @file{core.img} can optionally provide enforcement that all files subsequently read from disk are covered by a valid digital signature. -This document does @strong{not} cover how to ensure that your +This section does @strong{not} cover how to ensure that your platform's firmware (e.g., Coreboot) validates @file{core.img}. If environment variable @code{check_signatures}
@@ -9363,6 +9364,21 @@ which increases the risk of password leakage during the process. Moreover, the superuser list must be well maintained, and the password used cannot be synchronized with LUKS key rotation. +@node Signing GRUB itself +@section Signing GRUB itself +To ensure a complete secure-boot chain, there must be a way for the code that +loads GRUB to verify the integrity of the core image. +This is ultimately platform-specific and individual platforms can define their +own mechanisms. However, there are general-purpose mechanisms that can be used +with GRUB. +@section Signing GRUB for UEFI secure boot +On UEFI platforms, @file{core.img} is a PE binary. Therefore, it can be signed +with a tool such as @command{pesign} or @command{sbsign}. Refer to the +suggestions in @pxref{UEFI secure boot and shim} to ensure that the final +image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It +will also be necessary to enroll the public key used into a relevant firmware +key database. + @node Platform limitations @chapter Platform limitations
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v9 20/21 docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamySigning GRUB for firmware that verifies an appended signature is a bit fiddly. I don't want people to have to figure it out from scratch so document it here.
--- docs/grub.texi | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 100 insertions(+)
docs/grub.texi +100 -0
@@ -9379,6 +9379,106 @@ image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It will also be necessary to enroll the public key used into a relevant firmware key database. +@section Signing GRUB with an appended signature +The @file{core.elf} itself can be signed with a Linux kernel module-style +appended signature (@pxref{Using appended signatures}). +To support IEEE1275 platforms where the boot image is often loaded directly +from a disk partition rather than from a file system, the @file{core.elf} +can specify the size and location of the appended signature with an ELF +Note added by @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}. +An image can be signed this way using the @command{sign-file} command from +the Linux kernel: + +@itemize +@item Signing a GRUB image using a single signer key. The grub.key is your +private key used for GRUB signing, grub.der is a corresponding public key +(certificate) used for GRUB signature verification, and the kernel.der is +your public key (certificate) used for kernel signature verification. +@example +@group +# Determine the size of the appended signature. It depends on the +# signing key (certificate) and the hash algorithm. +# +# Signing the /dev/null with an appended signature. + +sign-file SHA256 grub.key grub.der /dev/null ./empty.sig + +# Get the size of the signature. + +EMPTY_SIG_SIZE=`stat -c '%s' ./empty.sig` + +# Remove the empty file signature. + +rm ./empty.sig + +# Build a GRUB image with $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE reserved for the signature. + +grub-install --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE -x kernel.der \ + --modules="appendedsig ..." ... + or +grub-mkimage -O powerpc-ieee1275 -o core.elf.unsigned -x kernel.der \ + -p /grub --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE \ + --modules="appendedsig ..." ... + +# Signing a GRUB image with an appended signature. + +sign-file SHA256 grub.key grub.der core.elf.unsigned core.elf.signed + +@end group +@end example +@item Signing a GRUB image using more than one signer key. The grub1.key and +grub2.key are private keys used for GRUB signing, grub1.der and grub2.der +are corresponding public keys (certificates) used for GRUB signature verification. +The kernel1.der and kernel2.der are your public keys (certificates) used for +kernel signature verification. +@example +@group +# Generate a raw signature for /dev/null signing using OpenSSL. + +openssl cms -sign -binary -nocerts -in /dev/null -signer \ + grub1.der -inkey grub1.key -signer grub2.der -inkey grub2.key \ + -out ./empty.p7s -outform DER -noattr -md sha256 + +# Signing the /dev/null with an appended signature. + +sign-file -s ./empty.p7s sha256 /dev/null /dev/null ./empty.signed + +# Get the size of the signature. + +EMPTY_SIG_SIZE=`stat -c '%s' ./empty.signed` + +# Remove the empty file signatures. + +rm ./empty.signed ./empty.p7s + +# Build a GRUB image with $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE reserved for the signature. + +grub-install --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE -x kernel1.der \ + kernel2.der --modules="appendedsig ..." ... + or +grub-mkimage -O powerpc-ieee1275 -o core.elf.unsigned -x kernel1.der \ + kernel2.der -p /grub --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE \ + --modules="appendedsig ..." ... + +# Generate a raw signature for GRUB image signing using OpenSSL. + +openssl cms -sign -binary -nocerts -in core.elf.unsigned -signer \ + grub1.der -inkey grub1.key -signer grub2.der -inkey grub2.key \ + -out core.p7s -outform DER -noattr -md sha256 + +# Signing a GRUB image with an appended signature. + +sign-file -s core.p7s sha256 /dev/null core.elf.unsigned core.elf.signed + +@end group +@end example +@item Don't forget to install the signed image as required +(e.g. on powerpc-ieee1275, to the PReP partition). +@end itemize + +As with UEFI secure boot, it is necessary to build-in the required modules, +or sign them if they are not part of the GRUB image. + @node Platform limitations @chapter Platform limitations
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v9 20/21] docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature
Quoted 29 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy
Signing GRUB for firmware that verifies an appended signature is a bit fiddly. I don't want people to have to figure it out from scratch so document it here.
Signed-off-by Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sudhakar Kuppusamy <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Stefan Berger <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Avnish Chouhan <[email protected]>--- docs/grub.texi | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 100 insertions(+)docs/grub.texi +9
-0@@ -9379,6 +9379,106 @@ image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It will also be necessary to enroll the public key used into a relevant firmware key database. +@section Signing GRUB with an appended signature +The @file{core.elf} itself can be signed with a Linux kernel module-style +appended signature (@pxref{Using appended signatures}). +To support IEEE1275 platforms where the boot image is often loaded directly +from a disk partition rather than from a file system, the @file{core.elf} +can specify the size and location of the appended signature with an ELF +Note added by @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}. +An image can be signed this way using the @command{sign-file} command from +the Linux kernel:
docs/grub.texi image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It · line 9400
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+ +@itemize +@item Signing a GRUB image using a single signer key. The grub.key is your +private key used for GRUB signing, grub.der is a corresponding public key +(certificate) used for GRUB signature verification, and the kernel.der is +your public key (certificate) used for kernel signature verification. +@example +@group +# Determine the size of the appended signature. It depends on the +# signing key (certificate) and the hash algorithm.
s/ (certificate)//
Quoted 7 lines
docs/grub.texi +7
-0+# Signing the /dev/null with an appended signature. + +sign-file SHA256 grub.key grub.der /dev/null ./empty.sig + +# Get the size of the signature. + +EMPTY_SIG_SIZE=`stat -c '%s' ./empty.sig`
docs/grub.texi image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It · line 9418
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+ +# Remove the empty file signature. + +rm ./empty.sig + +# Build a GRUB image with $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE reserved for the signature. + +grub-install --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE -x kernel.der \ + --modules="appendedsig ..." ... + or
I think the grub-install does not make a lot of sense here because it installs unsigned version of GRUB image to the partition. So, I would simply drop it...
docs/grub.texi image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It · line 9425
Quoted 7 lines
docs/grub.texi +7
-0+grub-mkimage -O powerpc-ieee1275 -o core.elf.unsigned -x kernel.der \ + -p /grub --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE \ + --modules="appendedsig ..." ... + +# Signing a GRUB image with an appended signature. + +sign-file SHA256 grub.key grub.der core.elf.unsigned core.elf.signed
I think installation step is missing here. Please add an example how the signed image should be installed to the partition.
Quoted 21 lines
docs/grub.texi +21
-0+@end group +@end example +@item Signing a GRUB image using more than one signer key. The grub1.key and +grub2.key are private keys used for GRUB signing, grub1.der and grub2.der +are corresponding public keys (certificates) used for GRUB signature verification. +The kernel1.der and kernel2.der are your public keys (certificates) used for +kernel signature verification. +@example +@group +# Generate a raw signature for /dev/null signing using OpenSSL. + +openssl cms -sign -binary -nocerts -in /dev/null -signer \ + grub1.der -inkey grub1.key -signer grub2.der -inkey grub2.key \ + -out ./empty.p7s -outform DER -noattr -md sha256 + +# Signing the /dev/null with an appended signature. + +sign-file -s ./empty.p7s sha256 /dev/null /dev/null ./empty.signed + +# Get the size of the signature. +
docs/grub.texi image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It · line 9457
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+EMPTY_SIG_SIZE=`stat -c '%s' ./empty.signed` + +# Remove the empty file signatures. + +rm ./empty.signed ./empty.p7s + +# Build a GRUB image with $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE reserved for the signature. + +grub-install --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE -x kernel1.der \ + kernel2.der --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
Again, I would drop grub-install from here...
Quoted 4 lines
docs/grub.texi +4
-0+ or +grub-mkimage -O powerpc-ieee1275 -o core.elf.unsigned -x kernel1.der \ + kernel2.der -p /grub --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE \ + --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
docs/grub.texi image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It · line 9471
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+ +# Generate a raw signature for GRUB image signing using OpenSSL. + +openssl cms -sign -binary -nocerts -in core.elf.unsigned -signer \ + grub1.der -inkey grub1.key -signer grub2.der -inkey grub2.key \ + -out core.p7s -outform DER -noattr -md sha256 + +# Signing a GRUB image with an appended signature. + +sign-file -s core.p7s sha256 /dev/null core.elf.unsigned core.elf.signed
As above, please add an example how signed image should be installed...
docs/grub.texi image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It · line 9476
Quoted 4 lines
docs/grub.texi +4
-0+@end group +@end example +@item Don't forget to install the signed image as required +(e.g. on powerpc-ieee1275, to the PReP partition).
And here it is... Though I think you should add example install commands as I stated above.
Daniel
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PATCH v9 21/21 docs/grub: Document appended signature
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyThis explains how appended signatures can be used to form part of a secure boot chain, and documents the commands and variables introduced.
--- docs/grub.texi | 405 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 405 insertions(+)
docs/grub.texi +405 -0
@@ -3280,7 +3280,9 @@ GRUB. Others may be used freely in GRUB configuration files. These variables have special meaning to GRUB. @menu +* appendedsig_key_mgmt:: * biosnum:: +* check_appended_signatures:: * check_signatures:: * chosen:: * cmdpath::
@@ -3331,6 +3333,19 @@ These variables have special meaning to GRUB. @end menu +@node appendedsig_key_mgmt +@subsection appendedsig_key_mgmt + +This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation +using @code{static} or @code{dynamic} key management. It is automatically +set by GRUB to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} based on the +@strong{'ibm,secure-boot'} device tree property and Platform KeyStore(PKS). +Also, it can be explicitly set to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} by +executing @code{set appendedsig_key_mgmt} command from the GRUB console +when the GRUB is not locked down. + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. + @node biosnum @subsection biosnum
@@ -3343,6 +3358,17 @@ this. For an alternative approach which also changes BIOS drive mappings for the chain-loaded system, @pxref{drivemap}. +@node check_appended_signatures +@subsection check_appended_signatures + +This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation on +loaded kernel and GRUB module files. It is automatically set by GRUB +to @code{no} or @code{enforce} based on the @strong{'ibm,secure-boot'} device +tree property. Also, it can be explicitly set to @code{no} or @code{enforce} by +executing @code{set check_appended_signatures} command from the GRUB console +when the GRUB is not locked down. + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. @node check_signatures @subsection check_signatures
@@ -6414,6 +6440,14 @@ you forget a command, you can run the command @command{help} @menu * [:: Check file types and compare values * acpi:: Load ACPI tables +* append_add_db_cert:: Add trusted certificate to the db list +* append_add_db_hash:: Add trusted certificate/binary hash to the db list +* append_add_dbx_cert:: Add distrusted certificate to the dbx list +* append_add_dbx_hash:: Add distrusted certificate/binary hash to the dbx list +* append_list_db:: List all trusted certificates from the db list +* append_list_dbx:: List all distrusted certificates and binary/certificate hashes from the dbx list +* append_rm_dbx_cert:: Remove distrusted certificate from the db list +* append_verify:: Verify appended digital signature using db and dbx lists * authenticate:: Check whether user is in user list * background_color:: Set background color for active terminal * background_image:: Load background image for active terminal
@@ -6535,6 +6569,231 @@ Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). unsigned code. @end deffn +@node append_add_db_cert +@subsection append_add_db_cert + +@deffn Command append_add_db_cert <X509_certificate> +Read X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate} +and add it to GRUB's internal db list of trusted certificates. +These certificates are used to validate appended signatures when the +environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) +is set to @code{enforce} or the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}) +command is executed from the GRUB console. + +Note: The file @var{X509_certificate} should be in DER-format. When the environment + variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}, + the @command{append_add_db_cert} command only accepts the file @var{X509_certificate} + that is signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}). + The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, + the certificate is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and + the certificate is not added. + When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no}, + it accepts files @var{X509_certificate} without an appended signature and the + certificate is added to the db list. + +Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_db_cert} command +does not persist across reboots, and this command is available if either static +or dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}). + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn + +@node append_add_db_hash +@subsection append_add_db_hash + +@deffn Command append_add_db_hash <hash_file> +Read binary hash from the file @var{hash_file} +and add it to GRUB's internal db list of trusted binary hashes. These +hashes are used to validate the Linux kernel binary hashes when the +environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} +(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) is set to @code{enforce} or the +@command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed +from the GRUB console. + +Note: The file @var{hash_file} should contain data in binary format. When the + environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is + set to @code{enforce}, the @command{append_add_db_hash} command only accepts + the file @var{hash_file} that is signed with an appended signature + (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}). + The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, + the binary hash is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and + the binary hash is not added. + When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no}, + it accepts files @var{hash_file} without an appended signature and the + binary hash is added to the db list. + +Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_db_hash} +command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when +dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}). + +@example + +# Generate the hash of the binary file using OpenSSL +# in binary format. The vmlinux (kernel image) file +# should be unsigned. + +openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out binary_hash.bin vmlinux + +@end example + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn + +@node append_add_dbx_cert +@subsection append_add_dbx_cert + +@deffn Command append_add_dbx_cert <X509_certificate> +Read X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate} +and add it to GRUB's internal dbx list of distrusted certificates. +These certificates are used to ensure that the distrusted certificates +are rejected during appended signatures validation when the environment +variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce} +(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) or the @command{append_verify} +(@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed from the GRUB console. +Also, These certificates are used to block adding the distrusted +certificates to the db list in the future. + +Note: The file @var{X509_certificate} should be in DER-format. When the + environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to + @code{enforce}, the @command{append_add_dbx_cert} command only accepts + the file @var{X509_certificate} that is signed with an appended signature + (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}). + The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, + the certificate is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error is posted and + the certificate is not added. + When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no}, + it accepts file @var{X509_certificate} without an appended signature and the + certificate is added to the dbx list. + +Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_dbx_cert} +command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when +dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}). + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn + +@node append_add_dbx_hash +@subsection append_add_dbx_hash + +@deffn Command append_add_dbx_hash [@option{-b}|@option{-c}] <hash_file> +Read binary/certificate hash from the file @var{hash_file} +and add it to GRUB's internal dbx list of distrusted binary/certificate hashes. +These hashes are used to ensure that the distrusted binary hashes/certificates +are rejected during Linux kernel binary hashes and appended signatures validation +when the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) +is set to @code{enforce} or the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}) command +is executed from the GRUB console. Also,these hashes are used to block adding the distrusted +binary hashes and certificates to the db list in the future. + +The @option{-b} (@option{--binary-hash}) can be used to specify binary hash file and +@option{-c} (@option{--cert-hash}) can be used to specify certificate hash file. + +Note: The file @var{hash_file} should contain data in binary format. When the environment + variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}, the + @command{append_add_dbx_hash} command only accepts the file @var{hash_file} + that is signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}). + The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, + the binary/certificate hash is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error is posted and + the binary/certificate hash is not added. + When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no}, + it accepts the file @var{hash_file} without an appended signature and the + binary/certificate hash is added to the dbx list. + +Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_dbx_hash} +command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when +dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}). + +@example + +# Generate the hash of the binary/certificate file +# using OpenSSL in binary format. The vmlinux +# (kernel image) file should be unsigned, kernel.der +# is certificate. + +openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out cert_hash.bin kernel.der + +openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out binary_hash.bin vmlinux + +@end example + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn + +@node append_list_db +@subsection append_list_db + +@deffn Command append_list_db +List all X.509 certificates and binary hashes trusted by GRUB for validating +appended signatures. The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary hashes, +showing the certificate's version, serial number, issuer, subject, +public key algorithm, RSA public Key size, and certificate fingerprint. + +Note that the @command{append_list_db} command is available if either static +or dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}). + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn + +@node append_list_dbx +@subsection append_list_dbx + +@deffn Command append_list_dbx +List all the distrusted X.509 certificates and binary/certificate hashes. +The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary/certificate hashes, +showing the certificate's version, serial number, issuer, subject, +public key algorithm, RSA public Key size, and certificate fingerprint. + +Note that the @command{append_list_dbx} command is only available when +dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}). + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn + +@node append_rm_dbx_cert +@subsection append_rm_dbx_cert + +@deffn Command append_rm_dbx_cert <X509_certificate> +Read DER-formatted X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate} +and remove it from GRUB's internal db list of trusted certificates. +These certificates are used to ensure that the distrusted certificates +are rejected during appended signatures validation when the environment +variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce} +(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) or the @command{append_verify} +(@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed from the GRUB console. + +Note: The file @var{X509_certificate} should be in DER-format. When the environment + variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}, the + @command{append_rm_dbx_cert} command only accepts the files @var{X509_certificate} + that are signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}). + The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, + the certificate is removed from the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and + the certificate is not removed. + When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no}, + it accepts the file @var{X509_certificate} without an appended signature and + certificate is removed from the db list. + +Also, note that the removing of the certificate using @command{append_rm_dbx_cert} +command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when +static key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}). + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn + +@node append_verify +@subsection append_verify + +@deffn Command append_verify <signed_file> +Verifies an appended signature on @var{signed_file} against the trusted X.509 certificates +and hashes known to GRUB (@pxref{append_list_db},@pxref{append_list_dbx}, @pxref{append_add_db_cert}, +@pxref{append_add_db_hash}, @pxref{append_add_dbx_hash}, @pxref{append_add_dbx_cert}, and +@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}). Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates successfully. +If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value. + +Note that the @command{append_verify} command is available if either static +or dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}). + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn @node authenticate @subsection authenticate
@@ -7307,6 +7566,15 @@ configurations, but to allow the user to select from among multiple configurations, and to enable ``one-shot'' boot attempts and ``savedefault'' behavior. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information. + +On Linux on Power LPAR, the signature validation on the environment block file +is not supported with or without the @option{--skip-sig} option. +If the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} value is set to +@code{enforce} and GRUB is in locked down mode, the user is not allowed to set +@code{check_appended_signatures} to @code{no} and @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt} +to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} either directly using @command{load_env} +command or via environment block file. @xref{Using appended signatures}, for +more information. @end deffn
@@ -8670,11 +8938,13 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order. @menu * Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control * Using GPG-style digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code +* Using appended signatures:: An alternative approach to booting digitally signed code * UEFI secure boot and shim:: Booting digitally signed PE files * Secure Boot Advanced Targeting:: Embedded information for generation number based revocation * Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components * Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup * TPM2 key protector:: Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector +* Signing certificate and hash file:: Certificate and hash file signing * Signing GRUB itself:: Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image @end menu
@@ -8835,6 +9105,113 @@ or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different (attacker-controlled) device. GRUB is at best only one link in a secure boot chain. +@node Using appended signatures +@section Using appended signatures in GRUB + +GRUB supports verifying Linux-style 'appended signatures' for Linux on Power LPAR +secure boot. Appended signatures are PKCS#7 messages containing a signature over the +contents of a file, plus some metadata, appended to the end of a file. A file +with an appended signature ends with the magic string: + +@example +~Module signature appended~\n +@end example + +where @code{\n} represents the line feed character, @code{0x0a}. + +Linux on Power LPAR secure boot is controlled by @strong{'ibm,secure-boot'} +device tree property and if this property is set to @code{2} (@samp{2 - enforced}), +GRUB enters lockdown. There are three secure boot modes. They are + +@itemize +@item @samp{0 - disabled}: Secure boot is disabled. This is the default. +@item @samp{1 - audit}: Enforce signature verification by setting + @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) to + @code{enforce} and do not to lockdown the GRUB. +@item @samp{2 - enforced}: Lockdown the GRUB and enforce signature verification by setting + @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) to @code{enforce}. +@end itemize + +Note that Linux on Power LPAR only supports @samp{0 - disabled} and @samp{2 - enforced}. + +To enable appended signature verification, load the appendedsig module and an +X.509 certificate for verification. Building the appendedsig module into the +core GRUB image is recommended. + +Key management is controlled by the environment variable @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt} +(@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}). + +@itemize +@item @samp{static}: Enforce static key management signature verification. This is the default. + When the GRUB is locked down, user cannot change the value by setting the + @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt} variable back to @samp{dynamic}. +@item @samp{dynamic}: Enforce dynamic key management signature verification. When the GRUB is + locked down, user cannot change the value by setting the @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt} + variable back to @samp{static}. +@end itemize + +In static key management mode, certificates will be built into the core image using +the @code{--x509} parameter to @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}. +It is possible to list the trusted certificates available at boot time using +@command{append_list_db} (@pxref{append_list_db}). The distrusted certificates can be +explicitly removed from the db using the @command{append_rm_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}). +The trusted certificates can be explicitly added to the db using the +@command{append_add_db_cert} (@pxref{append_add_db_cert}). + + +In dynamic key management mode, db and dbx are read from the Platform KeyStore(PKS). If +db is not present in PKS, static key (built-in keys) is used as the default key. +It is possible to list the trusted certificates and binary hashes available at boot time using +@command{append_list_dbx} (@pxref{append_list_db}) and list the distrusted +certificates and binary/certificate hashes available at boot time using @command{append_list_dbx} +(@pxref{append_list_dbx}). The trusted certificates and binary hashes can be explicitly added +to the db using the @command{append_add_db_cert} (@pxref{append_add_db_cert}) and +@command{append_add_db_hash} (@pxref{append_add_db_hash}). The distrusted certificates can be +explicitly added to the dbx using the @command{append_add_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_add_dbx_cert}) +and the distrusted certificate/binary hases can be explicitly added to the dbx using the +@command{append_add_dbx_hash} (@pxref{append_add_dbx_hash}). + +Enforcement of signature verification is controlled by the environment variable +@code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}). + +@itemize +@item @samp{no}: No verification is performed. This is the default. +@item @samp{enforce}: Signature verification is performed and if signature verification fails, + post the errors and stop the boot. Signature verification cannot be disabled by setting + the @code{check_appended_signatures} variable back to @samp{no}. +@end itemize + +A file can be explicitly verified using the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}). + +Only signatures generated using SHA-256 or SHA-512 hash algorithms are supported, +and only RSA signatures generated using 2048, 3076, or 4096 bit key are supported. +Only binary/certificate hash generated using SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 algorithms +are supported. + +A file can be signed with the @command{sign-file} utility supplied with the +Linux kernel source. For example, if you have @code{signing.key} as the private +key and @code{certificate.der} as the X.509 certificate containing the public key: + +@example +sign-file SHA256 signing.key certificate.der vmlinux vmlinux.signed +@end example + +Once signature verification is turned on, the following file types must carry +appended signatures: + +@enumerate +@item Linux kernels +@item GRUB modules, except those built in to the core image +@item Any new certificate and binary hash files to be trusted +@item Any new certificate/binary hash files to be distrusted +@end enumerate + +When GRUB is locked down (when secure boot modes is @code{enforced}), +signature verification cannot be @strong{disabled} by setting the +@code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) variable +to @code{no} or using the @command{load_env} (@pxref{load_env}) command from +the GRUB console. + @node UEFI secure boot and shim @section UEFI secure boot and shim support
@@ -9364,6 +9741,34 @@ which increases the risk of password leakage during the process. Moreover, the superuser list must be well maintained, and the password used cannot be synchronized with LUKS key rotation. +@node Signing certificate and hash file +@section Signing certificate and hash file +The X.509 certificate (public key) file and hash file (binary/certificate hash file) +can be signed with a Linux kernel module-style appended signature. + +The signer.key is your private key used for signing, signer.der is corresponding +public key (certificate) used for appended signature verification. Note that the +signer.der (certificate) should exist in the db (@pxref{Using appended signatures}). + +@itemize +@item Signing the X.509 certificate file using @file{sign-file}. +The kernel.der is your X.509 certificate file. +@example + +sign-file SHA256 signer.key signer.der kernel.der \ + kernel.der.signed + +@end example +@item Signing the hash file using @file{sign-file}. +The binary_hash.bin is your binary hash file. +@example + +sign-file SHA256 signer.key signer.der binary_hash.bin \ + binary_hash.signed + +@end example +@end itemize + @node Signing GRUB itself @section Signing GRUB itself To ensure a complete secure-boot chain, there must be a way for the code that
Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
Re: [PATCH v9 21/21] docs/grub: Document appended signature
Quoted 26 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy
This explains how appended signatures can be used to form part of a secure boot chain, and documents the commands and variables introduced.
Signed-off-by Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sudhakar Kuppusamy <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Avnish Chouhan <[email protected]>--- docs/grub.texi | 405 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 405 insertions(+)docs/grub.texi +2
-0@@ -3280,7 +3280,9 @@ GRUB. Others may be used freely in GRUB configuration files. These variables have special meaning to GRUB. @menu +* appendedsig_key_mgmt:: * biosnum:: +* check_appended_signatures:: * check_signatures:: * chosen:: * cmdpath::
docs/grub.texi These variables have special meaning to GRUB. · line 3342
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +7
-0@@ -3331,6 +3333,19 @@ These variables have special meaning to GRUB. @end menu +@node appendedsig_key_mgmt +@subsection appendedsig_key_mgmt + +This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation +using @code{static} or @code{dynamic} key management. It is automatically +set by GRUB to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} based on the +@strong{'ibm,secure-boot'} device tree property and Platform KeyStore(PKS).
s/KeyStore(PKS)/KeyStore (PKS)/
Quoted 61 lines
docs/grub.texi +40
-0+Also, it can be explicitly set to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} by +executing @code{set appendedsig_key_mgmt} command from the GRUB console +when the GRUB is not locked down. + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. + @node biosnum @subsection biosnum@@ -3343,6 +3358,17 @@ this. For an alternative approach which also changes BIOS drive mappings for the chain-loaded system, @pxref{drivemap}. +@node check_appended_signatures +@subsection check_appended_signatures + +This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation on +loaded kernel and GRUB module files. It is automatically set by GRUB +to @code{no} or @code{enforce} based on the @strong{'ibm,secure-boot'} device +tree property. Also, it can be explicitly set to @code{no} or @code{enforce} by +executing @code{set check_appended_signatures} command from the GRUB console +when the GRUB is not locked down. + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. @node check_signatures @subsection check_signatures@@ -6414,6 +6440,14 @@ you forget a command, you can run the command @command{help} @menu * [:: Check file types and compare values * acpi:: Load ACPI tables +* append_add_db_cert:: Add trusted certificate to the db list +* append_add_db_hash:: Add trusted certificate/binary hash to the db list +* append_add_dbx_cert:: Add distrusted certificate to the dbx list +* append_add_dbx_hash:: Add distrusted certificate/binary hash to the dbx list +* append_list_db:: List all trusted certificates from the db list +* append_list_dbx:: List all distrusted certificates and binary/certificate hashes from the dbx list +* append_rm_dbx_cert:: Remove distrusted certificate from the db list +* append_verify:: Verify appended digital signature using db and dbx lists * authenticate:: Check whether user is in user list * background_color:: Set background color for active terminal * background_image:: Load background image for active terminal@@ -6535,6 +6569,231 @@ Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). unsigned code. @end deffn +@node append_add_db_cert +@subsection append_add_db_cert + +@deffn Command append_add_db_cert <X509_certificate> +Read X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate} +and add it to GRUB's internal db list of trusted certificates. +These certificates are used to validate appended signatures when the +environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) +is set to @code{enforce} or the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}) +command is executed from the GRUB console. + +Note: The file @var{X509_certificate} should be in DER-format. When the environment + variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}, + the @command{append_add_db_cert} command only accepts the file @var{X509_certificate} + that is signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6596
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+ The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, + the certificate is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and + the certificate is not added. + When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no}, + it accepts files @var{X509_certificate} without an appended signature and the + certificate is added to the db list. + +Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_db_cert} command +does not persist across reboots, and this command is available if either static +or dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
If you change the code as I asked for then everything after second comma can be dropped.
docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6607
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn + +@node append_add_db_hash +@subsection append_add_db_hash + +@deffn Command append_add_db_hash <hash_file> +Read binary hash from the file @var{hash_file} +and add it to GRUB's internal db list of trusted binary hashes. These +hashes are used to validate the Linux kernel binary hashes when the
What about GRUB modules?
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} +(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) is set to @code{enforce} or the +@command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed +from the GRUB console. + +Note: The file @var{hash_file} should contain data in binary format. When the + environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is + set to @code{enforce}, the @command{append_add_db_hash} command only accepts + the file @var{hash_file} that is signed with an appended signature + (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6627
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+ The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, + the binary hash is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and + the binary hash is not added. + When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no}, + it accepts files @var{hash_file} without an appended signature and the + binary hash is added to the db list. + +Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_db_hash} +command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when +dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
Again, probably everything after second comma can be dropped. Here and below...
docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6631
Quoted 3 lines
docs/grub.texi +3
-0+@example + +# Generate the hash of the binary file using OpenSSL
s/the hash/the SHA-256 hash/
docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6635
Quoted 4 lines
docs/grub.texi +4
-0+# in binary format. The vmlinux (kernel image) file +# should be unsigned. + +openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out binary_hash.bin vmlinux
This jumps out of the blue. Probably this should be moved behind the GRUB appendedsig module commands list or got proper title here...
Quoted 7 lines
docs/grub.texi +7
-0+@end example + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn + +@node append_add_dbx_cert +@subsection append_add_dbx_cert
docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6653
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docs/grub.texi +10
-0+ +@deffn Command append_add_dbx_cert <X509_certificate> +Read X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate} +and add it to GRUB's internal dbx list of distrusted certificates. +These certificates are used to ensure that the distrusted certificates +are rejected during appended signatures validation when the environment +variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce} +(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) or the @command{append_verify} +(@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed from the GRUB console. +Also, These certificates are used to block adding the distrusted
s/These/these/
Quoted 5 lines
docs/grub.texi +5
-0+certificates to the db list in the future. + +Note: The file @var{X509_certificate} should be in DER-format. When the + environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to + @code{enforce}, the @command{append_add_dbx_cert} command only accepts
docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6668
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+ the file @var{X509_certificate} that is signed with an appended signature + (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}). + The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, + the certificate is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error is posted and + the certificate is not added. + When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no}, + it accepts file @var{X509_certificate} without an appended signature and the + certificate is added to the dbx list. + +Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_dbx_cert}
s/adding of the certificate/adding the certificates/
Quoted 6 lines
docs/grub.texi +6
-0+command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when +dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}). + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn +
docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6684
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docs/grub.texi +10
-0+@node append_add_dbx_hash +@subsection append_add_dbx_hash + +@deffn Command append_add_dbx_hash [@option{-b}|@option{-c}] <hash_file> +Read binary/certificate hash from the file @var{hash_file} +and add it to GRUB's internal dbx list of distrusted binary/certificate hashes. +These hashes are used to ensure that the distrusted binary hashes/certificates +are rejected during Linux kernel binary hashes and appended signatures validation +when the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) +is set to @code{enforce} or the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}) command
I think it does not make a lot of sense repeating in every command when validation happens. It seems to me it should be stated once probably at the beginning of section.
docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6693
Quoted 9 lines
docs/grub.texi +9
-0+is executed from the GRUB console. Also,these hashes are used to block adding the distrusted +binary hashes and certificates to the db list in the future. + +The @option{-b} (@option{--binary-hash}) can be used to specify binary hash file and +@option{-c} (@option{--cert-hash}) can be used to specify certificate hash file. + +Note: The file @var{hash_file} should contain data in binary format. When the environment + variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}, the + @command{append_add_dbx_hash} command only accepts the file @var{hash_file}
Ditto and here and there...
docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6704
Quoted 11 lines
docs/grub.texi +11
-0+ that is signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}). + The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, + the binary/certificate hash is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error is posted and + the binary/certificate hash is not added. + When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no}, + it accepts the file @var{hash_file} without an appended signature and the + binary/certificate hash is added to the dbx list. + +Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_dbx_hash} +command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when +dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
Would not it be better to state that once somewhere and list all commands to which this applies?
docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6715
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+@example + +# Generate the hash of the binary/certificate file +# using OpenSSL in binary format. The vmlinux +# (kernel image) file should be unsigned, kernel.der +# is certificate. + +openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out cert_hash.bin kernel.der + +openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out binary_hash.bin vmlinux
Again, this jumps out of the blue...
Quoted 6 lines
docs/grub.texi +6
-0+@end example + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn + +@node append_list_db
docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6732
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+@subsection append_list_db + +@deffn Command append_list_db +List all X.509 certificates and binary hashes trusted by GRUB for validating +appended signatures. The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary hashes, +showing the certificate's version, serial number, issuer, subject, +public key algorithm, RSA public Key size, and certificate fingerprint. + +Note that the @command{append_list_db} command is available if either static +or dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
Again, when you change the code then probably this is not needed...
Quoted 4 lines
docs/grub.texi +4
-0+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn + +@node append_list_dbx
docs/grub.texi Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). · line 6747
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+@subsection append_list_dbx + +@deffn Command append_list_dbx +List all the distrusted X.509 certificates and binary/certificate hashes. +The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary/certificate hashes, +showing the certificate's version, serial number, issuer, subject, +public key algorithm, RSA public Key size, and certificate fingerprint. + +Note that the @command{append_list_dbx} command is only available when +dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
Ditto and below...
Quoted 52 lines
docs/grub.texi +48
-0+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn + +@node append_rm_dbx_cert +@subsection append_rm_dbx_cert + +@deffn Command append_rm_dbx_cert <X509_certificate> +Read DER-formatted X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate} +and remove it from GRUB's internal db list of trusted certificates. +These certificates are used to ensure that the distrusted certificates +are rejected during appended signatures validation when the environment +variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce} +(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) or the @command{append_verify} +(@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed from the GRUB console. + +Note: The file @var{X509_certificate} should be in DER-format. When the environment + variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}, the + @command{append_rm_dbx_cert} command only accepts the files @var{X509_certificate} + that are signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}). + The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds, + the certificate is removed from the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and + the certificate is not removed. + When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no}, + it accepts the file @var{X509_certificate} without an appended signature and + certificate is removed from the db list. + +Also, note that the removing of the certificate using @command{append_rm_dbx_cert} +command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when +static key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}). + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn + +@node append_verify +@subsection append_verify + +@deffn Command append_verify <signed_file> +Verifies an appended signature on @var{signed_file} against the trusted X.509 certificates +and hashes known to GRUB (@pxref{append_list_db},@pxref{append_list_dbx}, @pxref{append_add_db_cert}, +@pxref{append_add_db_hash}, @pxref{append_add_dbx_hash}, @pxref{append_add_dbx_cert}, and +@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}). Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates successfully. +If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value. + +Note that the @command{append_verify} command is available if either static +or dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}). + +@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information. +@end deffn @node authenticate @subsection authenticate
docs/grub.texi configurations, but to allow the user to select from among multiple · line 7571
Quoted 6 lines
docs/grub.texi +3
-0@@ -7307,6 +7566,15 @@ configurations, but to allow the user to select from among multiple configurations, and to enable ``one-shot'' boot attempts and ``savedefault'' behavior. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information. + +On Linux on Power LPAR, the signature validation on the environment block file +is not supported with or without the @option{--skip-sig} option.
I am not sure what you mean here...
Quoted 40 lines
docs/grub.texi +21
-0+If the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} value is set to +@code{enforce} and GRUB is in locked down mode, the user is not allowed to set +@code{check_appended_signatures} to @code{no} and @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt} +to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} either directly using @command{load_env} +command or via environment block file. @xref{Using appended signatures}, for +more information. @end deffn@@ -8670,11 +8938,13 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order. @menu * Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control * Using GPG-style digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code +* Using appended signatures:: An alternative approach to booting digitally signed code * UEFI secure boot and shim:: Booting digitally signed PE files * Secure Boot Advanced Targeting:: Embedded information for generation number based revocation * Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components * Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup * TPM2 key protector:: Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector +* Signing certificate and hash file:: Certificate and hash file signing * Signing GRUB itself:: Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image @end menu@@ -8835,6 +9105,113 @@ or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different (attacker-controlled) device. GRUB is at best only one link in a secure boot chain. +@node Using appended signatures +@section Using appended signatures in GRUB + +GRUB supports verifying Linux-style 'appended signatures' for Linux on Power LPAR +secure boot. Appended signatures are PKCS#7 messages containing a signature over the +contents of a file, plus some metadata, appended to the end of a file. A file +with an appended signature ends with the magic string: + +@example +~Module signature appended~\n +@end example + +where @code{\n} represents the line feed character, @code{0x0a}.
docs/grub.texi or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different · line 9130
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+ +Linux on Power LPAR secure boot is controlled by @strong{'ibm,secure-boot'} +device tree property and if this property is set to @code{2} (@samp{2 - enforced}), +GRUB enters lockdown. There are three secure boot modes. They are + +@itemize +@item @samp{0 - disabled}: Secure boot is disabled. This is the default. +@item @samp{1 - audit}: Enforce signature verification by setting + @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) to + @code{enforce} and do not to lockdown the GRUB.
Something is off or not properly explained here...
docs/grub.texi or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different · line 9135
Quoted 5 lines
docs/grub.texi +5
-0+@item @samp{2 - enforced}: Lockdown the GRUB and enforce signature verification by setting + @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) to @code{enforce}. +@end itemize + +Note that Linux on Power LPAR only supports @samp{0 - disabled} and @samp{2 - enforced}.
What does GRUB when it is set to something different than 0 or 2?
Quoted 8 lines
docs/grub.texi +8
-0+To enable appended signature verification, load the appendedsig module and an +X.509 certificate for verification. Building the appendedsig module into the +core GRUB image is recommended. + +Key management is controlled by the environment variable @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt} +(@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}). + +@itemize
docs/grub.texi or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different · line 9154
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+@item @samp{static}: Enforce static key management signature verification. This is the default. + When the GRUB is locked down, user cannot change the value by setting the + @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt} variable back to @samp{dynamic}. +@item @samp{dynamic}: Enforce dynamic key management signature verification. When the GRUB is + locked down, user cannot change the value by setting the @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt} + variable back to @samp{static}. +@end itemize + +In static key management mode, certificates will be built into the core image using +the @code{--x509} parameter to @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}.
I think grub-install should not be mentioned in the context of this documentation.
docs/grub.texi or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different · line 9157
Quoted 3 lines
docs/grub.texi +3
-0+It is possible to list the trusted certificates available at boot time using +@command{append_list_db} (@pxref{append_list_db}). The distrusted certificates can be +explicitly removed from the db using the @command{append_rm_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
Is it possible to do that when Secure Boot is enabled?
Quoted 22 lines
docs/grub.texi +22
-0+The trusted certificates can be explicitly added to the db using the +@command{append_add_db_cert} (@pxref{append_add_db_cert}). + + +In dynamic key management mode, db and dbx are read from the Platform KeyStore(PKS). If +db is not present in PKS, static key (built-in keys) is used as the default key. +It is possible to list the trusted certificates and binary hashes available at boot time using +@command{append_list_dbx} (@pxref{append_list_db}) and list the distrusted +certificates and binary/certificate hashes available at boot time using @command{append_list_dbx} +(@pxref{append_list_dbx}). The trusted certificates and binary hashes can be explicitly added +to the db using the @command{append_add_db_cert} (@pxref{append_add_db_cert}) and +@command{append_add_db_hash} (@pxref{append_add_db_hash}). The distrusted certificates can be +explicitly added to the dbx using the @command{append_add_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_add_dbx_cert}) +and the distrusted certificate/binary hases can be explicitly added to the dbx using the +@command{append_add_dbx_hash} (@pxref{append_add_dbx_hash}). + +Enforcement of signature verification is controlled by the environment variable +@code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}). + +@itemize +@item @samp{no}: No verification is performed. This is the default. +@item @samp{enforce}: Signature verification is performed and if signature verification fails,
docs/grub.texi or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different · line 9189
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+ post the errors and stop the boot. Signature verification cannot be disabled by setting + the @code{check_appended_signatures} variable back to @samp{no}. +@end itemize + +A file can be explicitly verified using the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}). + +Only signatures generated using SHA-256 or SHA-512 hash algorithms are supported, +and only RSA signatures generated using 2048, 3076, or 4096 bit key are supported. +Only binary/certificate hash generated using SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 algorithms +are supported.
Too many "only" words. Could you rephrase these two sentences to make them more readable, meaningful and consistent?
Quoted 9 lines
docs/grub.texi +9
-0+A file can be signed with the @command{sign-file} utility supplied with the +Linux kernel source. For example, if you have @code{signing.key} as the private +key and @code{certificate.der} as the X.509 certificate containing the public key: + +@example +sign-file SHA256 signing.key certificate.der vmlinux vmlinux.signed +@end example + +Once signature verification is turned on, the following file types must carry
docs/grub.texi or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different · line 9209
Quoted 10 lines
docs/grub.texi +10
-0+appended signatures: + +@enumerate +@item Linux kernels +@item GRUB modules, except those built in to the core image +@item Any new certificate and binary hash files to be trusted +@item Any new certificate/binary hash files to be distrusted +@end enumerate + +When GRUB is locked down (when secure boot modes is @code{enforced}),
s/modes/mode/
And I think you are still using "enforced" instead of "enforce" here and there...
Daniel
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