usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()
PATCH v2 1/1 usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()
From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>
The check_command_size_in_blocks() function calculates the data size in bytes by left shifting common->data_size_from_cmnd by the block size (common->curlun->blkbits). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.
Initially, the block size is set up in fsg_lun_open() , and the common->data_size_from_cmnd is set up in do_scsi_command(). During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.
So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (common->data_size_from_cmnd), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.
Fix this by using the check_shl_overflow() macro to safely perform the shift and catch any overflows.
---
v1 -> v2: Removed the cmnd_size check and applied the check_shl_overflow() macro
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +12 -2
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@#include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/limits.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/rwsem.h> #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -1853,8 +1854,17 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir, unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name) { - if (common->curlun) - common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits; + unsigned int blkbits; + +if (common->curlun) { + blkbits = common->curlun->blkbits; +if (check_shl_overflow (common->data_size_from_cmnd, blkbits, + &common->data_size_from_cmnd)) { + common->phase_error =1 ; +return -EINVAL ; + } + } +return check_command (common, cmnd_size, data_dir, mask, needs_medium, name); }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 43 lines · pip-izony
From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>
The
check_command_size_in_blocks()function calculates the data size in bytes by left shiftingcommon->data_size_from_cmndby the block size (common->curlun->blkbits). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.Initially, the block size is set up in
fsg_lun_open(), and thecommon->data_size_from_cmndis set up indo_scsi_command(). During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (
common->data_size_from_cmnd), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.Fix this by using the
check_shl_overflow()macro to safely perform the shift and catch any overflows.Fixes 144974e7f9e3 ("usb: gadget: mass_storage: support multi-luns with different logic block size")Signed-off-by Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>---
v1 -> v2: Removed thecmnd_sizecheck and applied thecheck_shl_overflow()macrodrivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +1
-0@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@#include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/limits.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/rwsem.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -1853,8 +1854,17 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir,
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, · line 1862
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +6
-2unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name) { - if (common->curlun) - common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits; + unsigned int blkbits; + +if (common->curlun) { + blkbits = common->curlun->blkbits; +if (check_shl_overflow (common->data_size_from_cmnd, blkbits, + &common->data_size_from_cmnd)) {
It's a little odd to create a local variable for something that's used only once -- you could just as easily have put common->curlun->blkbits directly as the macro's argument. But never mind.
The indentation of the continuation line is strange. This source file uses a couple of different conventions for continuation lines, but none of them involve adding 5-1/2 extra tab stops.
These are just formal problems. There's nothing semantically wrong with the patch.
Alan Stern
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +5
-0+ common->phase_error =1 ; +return -EINVAL ; + } + } +return check_command (common, cmnd_size, data_dir, mask, needs_medium, name); }Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 47 lines · pip-izony
From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>
The
check_command_size_in_blocks()function calculates the data size in bytes by left shiftingcommon->data_size_from_cmndby the block size (common->curlun->blkbits). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.Initially, the block size is set up in
fsg_lun_open(), and thecommon->data_size_from_cmndis set up indo_scsi_command(). During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (
common->data_size_from_cmnd), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.Fix this by using the
check_shl_overflow()macro to safely perform the shift and catch any overflows.Fixes 144974e7f9e3 ("usb: gadget: mass_storage: support multi-luns with different logic block size")Signed-off-by Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>---
v1 -> v2: Removed thecmnd_sizecheck and applied thecheck_shl_overflow()macrodrivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +1
-2@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@#include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/limits.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/rwsem.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -1853,8 +1854,17 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir, unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name) { - if (common->curlun) - common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits;
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common, · line 1866
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c +10
-0+unsigned int blkbits; + +if (common->curlun) { + blkbits = common->curlun->blkbits; +if (check_shl_overflow (common->data_size_from_cmnd, blkbits, + &common->data_size_from_cmnd)) { + common->phase_error =1 ; +return -EINVAL ; + } + }
Right, as Alan suggested, I would expect the code style to be:
if (common->curlen) {
if (check_shl_overflow(common->data_size_from_cmnd,
common->curlun->blkbits,
&common->data_size_from_cmnd)) {
common->phase_error = 1;
return -EINVAL;
}
}I would have expected scripts/checkpatch.pl to complain about the indentation. Did you check your patch with that?
-Kees
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook