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6.6.130-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 14 participants 582 messages Mar 23 – Mar 25 Page 4 of 5

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author maintainer
#402 lore raw

PATCH 402/567 arm64: mm: Dont remap pgtables per-cont(pte|pmd) block

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ryan Roberts <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5c63db59c5f89925add57642be4f789d0d671ccd ]

A large part of the kernel boot time is creating the kernel linear map page tables. When rodata=full, all memory is mapped by pte. And when there is lots of physical ram, there are lots of pte tables to populate. The primary cost associated with this is mapping and unmapping the pte table memory in the fixmap; at unmap time, the TLB entry must be invalidated and this is expensive.

Previously, each pmd and pte table was fixmapped/fixunmapped for each cont(pte|pmd) block of mappings (16 entries with 4K granule). This means we ended up issuing 32 TLBIs per (pmd|pte) table during the population phase.

Let's fix that, and fixmap/fixunmap each page once per population, for a saving of 31 TLBIs per (pmd|pte) table. This gives a significant boot speedup.

Execution time of map_mem(), which creates the kernel linear map page tables, was measured on different machines with different RAM configs:

               | Apple M2 VM | Ampere Altra| Ampere Altra| Ampere Altra
               | VM, 16G     | VM, 64G     | VM, 256G    | Metal, 512G
---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------
               |   ms    (%) |   ms    (%) |   ms    (%) |    ms    (%)
---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------
before         |  168   (0%) | 2198   (0%) | 8644   (0%) | 17447   (0%)
after          |   78 (-53%) |  435 (-80%) | 1723 (-80%) |  3779 (-78%)
---
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c |   27 ++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +14 -13
@@ -169,12 +169,9 @@ bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64
 	return ((old ^ new) & ~mask) == 0;
 }
 
-static void init_pte(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
+static void init_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
 		     phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot)
 {
-	pte_t *ptep;
-
-	ptep = pte_set_fixmap_offset(pmdp, addr);
 	do {
 		pte_t old_pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
 
@@ -189,8 +186,6 @@ static void init_pte(pmd_t *pmdp, unsign
 
 		phys += PAGE_SIZE;
 	} while (ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
-
-	pte_clear_fixmap();
 }
 
 static void alloc_init_cont_pte(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,
@@ -201,6 +196,7 @@ static void alloc_init_cont_pte(pmd_t *p
 {
 	unsigned long next;
 	pmd_t pmd = READ_ONCE(*pmdp);
+	pte_t *ptep;
 
 	BUG_ON(pmd_sect(pmd));
 	if (pmd_none(pmd)) {
@@ -216,6 +212,7 @@ static void alloc_init_cont_pte(pmd_t *p
 	}
 	BUG_ON(pmd_bad(pmd));
 
+	ptep = pte_set_fixmap_offset(pmdp, addr);
 	do {
 		pgprot_t __prot = prot;
 
@@ -226,20 +223,21 @@ static void alloc_init_cont_pte(pmd_t *p
 		    (flags & NO_CONT_MAPPINGS) == 0)
 			__prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) | PTE_CONT);
 
-		init_pte(pmdp, addr, next, phys, __prot);
+		init_pte(ptep, addr, next, phys, __prot);
 
+		ptep += pte_index(next) - pte_index(addr);
 		phys += next - addr;
 	} while (addr = next, addr != end);
+
+	pte_clear_fixmap();
 }
 
-static void init_pmd(pud_t *pudp, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
+static void init_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
 		     phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot,
 		     phys_addr_t (*pgtable_alloc)(int), int flags)
 {
 	unsigned long next;
-	pmd_t *pmdp;
 
-	pmdp = pmd_set_fixmap_offset(pudp, addr);
 	do {
 		pmd_t old_pmd = READ_ONCE(*pmdp);
 
@@ -265,8 +263,6 @@ static void init_pmd(pud_t *pudp, unsign
 		}
 		phys += next - addr;
 	} while (pmdp++, addr = next, addr != end);
-
-	pmd_clear_fixmap();
 }
 
 static void alloc_init_cont_pmd(pud_t *pudp, unsigned long addr,
@@ -276,6 +272,7 @@ static void alloc_init_cont_pmd(pud_t *p
 {
 	unsigned long next;
 	pud_t pud = READ_ONCE(*pudp);
+	pmd_t *pmdp;
 
 	/*
 	 * Check for initial section mappings in the pgd/pud.
@@ -294,6 +291,7 @@ static void alloc_init_cont_pmd(pud_t *p
 	}
 	BUG_ON(pud_bad(pud));
 
+	pmdp = pmd_set_fixmap_offset(pudp, addr);
 	do {
 		pgprot_t __prot = prot;
 
@@ -304,10 +302,13 @@ static void alloc_init_cont_pmd(pud_t *p
 		    (flags & NO_CONT_MAPPINGS) == 0)
 			__prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) | PTE_CONT);
 
-		init_pmd(pudp, addr, next, phys, __prot, pgtable_alloc, flags);
+		init_pmd(pmdp, addr, next, phys, __prot, pgtable_alloc, flags);
 
+		pmdp += pmd_index(next) - pmd_index(addr);
 		phys += next - addr;
 	} while (addr = next, addr != end);
+
+	pmd_clear_fixmap();
 }
 
 static void alloc_init_pud(pgd_t *pgdp, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
author maintainer
#403 lore raw

PATCH 403/567 arm64: mm: Batch dsb and isb when populating pgtables

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ryan Roberts <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1fcb7cea8a5f7747e02230f816c2c80b060d9517 ]

After removing uneccessary TLBIs, the next bottleneck when creating the page tables for the linear map is DSB and ISB, which were previously issued per-pte in __set_pte(). Since we are writing multiple ptes in a given pte table, we can elide these barriers and insert them once we have finished writing to the table.

Execution time of map_mem(), which creates the kernel linear map page tables, was measured on different machines with different RAM configs:

               | Apple M2 VM | Ampere Altra| Ampere Altra| Ampere Altra
               | VM, 16G     | VM, 64G     | VM, 256G    | Metal, 512G
---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------
               |   ms    (%) |   ms    (%) |   ms    (%) |    ms    (%)
---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------
before         |   78   (0%) |  435   (0%) | 1723   (0%) |  3779   (0%)
after          |   11 (-86%) |  161 (-63%) |  656 (-62%) |  1654 (-56%)
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h |    7 ++++++-
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c              |   11 ++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +6 -1
@@ -262,9 +262,14 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkdevmap(pte_t p
 	return set_pte_bit(pte, __pgprot(PTE_DEVMAP | PTE_SPECIAL));
 }
 
-static inline void set_pte(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
+static inline void set_pte_nosync(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
 {
 	WRITE_ONCE(*ptep, pte);
+}
+
+static inline void set_pte(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
+{
+	set_pte_nosync(ptep, pte);
 
 	/*
 	 * Only if the new pte is valid and kernel, otherwise TLB maintenance
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +10 -1
@@ -175,7 +175,11 @@ static void init_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsign
 	do {
 		pte_t old_pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
 
-		set_pte(ptep, pfn_pte(__phys_to_pfn(phys), prot));
+		/*
+		 * Required barriers to make this visible to the table walker
+		 * are deferred to the end of alloc_init_cont_pte().
+		 */
+		set_pte_nosync(ptep, pfn_pte(__phys_to_pfn(phys), prot));
 
 		/*
 		 * After the PTE entry has been populated once, we
@@ -229,6 +233,11 @@ static void alloc_init_cont_pte(pmd_t *p
 		phys += next - addr;
 	} while (addr = next, addr != end);
 
+	/*
+	 * Note: barriers and maintenance necessary to clear the fixmap slot
+	 * ensure that all previous pgtable writes are visible to the table
+	 * walker.
+	 */
 	pte_clear_fixmap();
 }
 
author maintainer
#404 lore raw

PATCH 404/567 arm64: mm: Dont remap pgtables for allocate vs populate

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ryan Roberts <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0e9df1c905d8293d333ace86c13d147382f5caf9 ]

During linear map pgtable creation, each pgtable is fixmapped / fixunmapped twice; once during allocation to zero the memory, and a again during population to write the entries. This means each table has 2 TLB invalidations issued against it. Let's fix this so that each table is only fixmapped/fixunmapped once, halving the number of TLBIs, and improving performance.

Achieve this by separating allocation and initialization (zeroing) of the page. The allocated page is now fixmapped directly by the walker and initialized, before being populated and finally fixunmapped.

This approach keeps the change small, but has the side effect that late allocations (using __get_free_page()) must also go through the generic memory clearing routine. So let's tell __get_free_page() not to zero the memory to avoid duplication.

Additionally this approach means that fixmap/fixunmap is still used for late pgtable modifications. That's not technically needed since the memory is all mapped in the linear map by that point. That's left as a possible future optimization if found to be needed.

Execution time of map_mem(), which creates the kernel linear map page tables, was measured on different machines with different RAM configs:

               | Apple M2 VM | Ampere Altra| Ampere Altra| Ampere Altra
               | VM, 16G     | VM, 64G     | VM, 256G    | Metal, 512G
---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------
               |   ms    (%) |   ms    (%) |   ms    (%) |    ms    (%)
---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------
before         |   11   (0%) |  161   (0%) |  656   (0%) |  1654   (0%)
after          |   10 (-11%) |  104 (-35%) |  438 (-33%) |  1223 (-26%)
---
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c |   58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +29 -29
@@ -106,28 +106,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(phys_mem_access_prot);
 static phys_addr_t __init early_pgtable_alloc(int shift)
 {
 	phys_addr_t phys;
-	void *ptr;
 
 	phys = memblock_phys_alloc_range(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE, 0,
 					 MEMBLOCK_ALLOC_NOLEAKTRACE);
 	if (!phys)
 		panic("Failed to allocate page table page\n");
 
-	/*
-	 * The FIX_{PGD,PUD,PMD} slots may be in active use, but the FIX_PTE
-	 * slot will be free, so we can (ab)use the FIX_PTE slot to initialise
-	 * any level of table.
-	 */
-	ptr = pte_set_fixmap(phys);
-
-	memset(ptr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
-
-	/*
-	 * Implicit barriers also ensure the zeroed page is visible to the page
-	 * table walker
-	 */
-	pte_clear_fixmap();
-
 	return phys;
 }
 
@@ -169,6 +153,14 @@ bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64
 	return ((old ^ new) & ~mask) == 0;
 }
 
+static void init_clear_pgtable(void *table)
+{
+	clear_page(table);
+
+	/* Ensure the zeroing is observed by page table walks. */
+	dsb(ishst);
+}
+
 static void init_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
 		     phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot)
 {
@@ -211,12 +203,15 @@ static void alloc_init_cont_pte(pmd_t *p
 			pmdval |= PMD_TABLE_PXN;
 		BUG_ON(!pgtable_alloc);
 		pte_phys = pgtable_alloc(PAGE_SHIFT);
+		ptep = pte_set_fixmap(pte_phys);
+		init_clear_pgtable(ptep);
+		ptep += pte_index(addr);
 		__pmd_populate(pmdp, pte_phys, pmdval);
-		pmd = READ_ONCE(*pmdp);
+	} else {
+		BUG_ON(pmd_bad(pmd));
+		ptep = pte_set_fixmap_offset(pmdp, addr);
 	}
-	BUG_ON(pmd_bad(pmd));
 
-	ptep = pte_set_fixmap_offset(pmdp, addr);
 	do {
 		pgprot_t __prot = prot;
 
@@ -295,12 +290,15 @@ static void alloc_init_cont_pmd(pud_t *p
 			pudval |= PUD_TABLE_PXN;
 		BUG_ON(!pgtable_alloc);
 		pmd_phys = pgtable_alloc(PMD_SHIFT);
+		pmdp = pmd_set_fixmap(pmd_phys);
+		init_clear_pgtable(pmdp);
+		pmdp += pmd_index(addr);
 		__pud_populate(pudp, pmd_phys, pudval);
-		pud = READ_ONCE(*pudp);
+	} else {
+		BUG_ON(pud_bad(pud));
+		pmdp = pmd_set_fixmap_offset(pudp, addr);
 	}
-	BUG_ON(pud_bad(pud));
 
-	pmdp = pmd_set_fixmap_offset(pudp, addr);
 	do {
 		pgprot_t __prot = prot;
 
@@ -338,12 +336,15 @@ static void alloc_init_pud(pgd_t *pgdp,
 			p4dval |= P4D_TABLE_PXN;
 		BUG_ON(!pgtable_alloc);
 		pud_phys = pgtable_alloc(PUD_SHIFT);
+		pudp = pud_set_fixmap(pud_phys);
+		init_clear_pgtable(pudp);
+		pudp += pud_index(addr);
 		__p4d_populate(p4dp, pud_phys, p4dval);
-		p4d = READ_ONCE(*p4dp);
+	} else {
+		BUG_ON(p4d_bad(p4d));
+		pudp = pud_set_fixmap_offset(p4dp, addr);
 	}
-	BUG_ON(p4d_bad(p4d));
 
-	pudp = pud_set_fixmap_offset(p4dp, addr);
 	do {
 		pud_t old_pud = READ_ONCE(*pudp);
 
@@ -425,11 +426,10 @@ void create_kpti_ng_temp_pgd(pgd_t *pgdi
 
 static phys_addr_t __pgd_pgtable_alloc(int shift)
 {
-	void *ptr = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_PGTABLE_KERNEL);
-	BUG_ON(!ptr);
+	/* Page is zeroed by init_clear_pgtable() so don't duplicate effort. */
+	void *ptr = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_PGTABLE_KERNEL & ~__GFP_ZERO);
 
-	/* Ensure the zeroed page is visible to the page table walker */
-	dsb(ishst);
+	BUG_ON(!ptr);
 	return __pa(ptr);
 }
 
author maintainer
#405 lore raw

PATCH 405/567 btrfs: fix NULL dereference on root when tracing inode eviction

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Miquel Sabaté Solà <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f157dd661339fc6f5f2b574fe2429c43bd309534 ]

When evicting an inode the first thing we do is to setup tracing for it, which implies fetching the root's id. But in btrfs_evict_inode() the root might be NULL, as implied in the next check that we do in btrfs_evict_inode().

Hence, we either should set the ->root_objectid to 0 in case the root is NULL, or we move tracing setup after checking that the root is not NULL. Setting the rootid to 0 at least gives us the possibility to trace this call even in the case when the root is NULL, so that's the solution taken here.

Fixes 1abe9b8a138c ("Btrfs: add initial tracepoint support for btrfs")
Reported-by [email protected]
[ Adjust context ]
---
 include/trace/events/btrfs.h |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/trace/events/btrfs.h +2 -2
@@ -225,8 +225,8 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(btrfs__inode,
 		__entry->generation = BTRFS_I(inode)->generation;
 		__entry->last_trans = BTRFS_I(inode)->last_trans;
 		__entry->logged_trans = BTRFS_I(inode)->logged_trans;
-		__entry->root_objectid =
-				BTRFS_I(inode)->root->root_key.objectid;
+		__entry->root_objectid = BTRFS_I(inode)->root ?
+					 btrfs_root_id(BTRFS_I(inode)->root) : 0;
 	),
 
 	TP_printk_btrfs("root=%llu(%s) gen=%llu ino=%llu blocks=%llu "
author maintainer
#406 lore raw

PATCH 406/567 dst: fix races in rt6_uncached_list_del() and rt_del_uncached_list()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9a6f0c4d5796ab89b5a28a890ce542344d58bd69 ]

syzbot was able to crash the kernel in rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev() in an interesting way [1]

Crash happens in list_del_init()/INIT_LIST_HEAD() while writing list->prev, while the prior write on list->next went well.

static inline void INIT_LIST_HEAD(struct list_head *list)

{
	WRITE_ONCE(list->next, list); // This went well
	WRITE_ONCE(list->prev, list); // Crash, @list has been freed.
}

Issue here is that rt6_uncached_list_del() did not attempt to lock ul->lock, as list_empty(&rt->dst.rt_uncached) returned
true because the WRITE_ONCE(list->next, list) happened on the other CPU.

We might use list_del_init_careful() and list_empty_careful(), or make sure rt6_uncached_list_del() always grabs the spinlock whenever rt->dst.rt_uncached_list has been set.

A similar fix is neeed for IPv4.

[1]

 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in INIT_LIST_HEAD include/linux/list.h:46 [inline]
 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in list_del_init include/linux/list.h:296 [inline]
 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:191 [inline]
 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt6_disable_ip+0x633/0x730 net/ipv6/route.c:5020
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880294cfa78 by task kworker/u8:14/3450

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3450 Comm: kworker/u8:14 Tainted: G             L      syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)}
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
  print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
  print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482
  kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
  INIT_LIST_HEAD include/linux/list.h:46 [inline]
  list_del_init include/linux/list.h:296 [inline]
  rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:191 [inline]
  rt6_disable_ip+0x633/0x730 net/ipv6/route.c:5020
  addrconf_ifdown+0x143/0x18a0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3853
 addrconf_notify+0x1bc/0x1050 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:-1
  notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85
  call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2268 [inline]
  call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2282 [inline]
  netif_close_many+0x29c/0x410 net/core/dev.c:1785
  unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0xb50/0x2330 net/core/dev.c:12353
  ops_exit_rtnl_list net/core/net_namespace.c:187 [inline]
  ops_undo_list+0x3dc/0x990 net/core/net_namespace.c:248
  cleanup_net+0x4de/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:696
  process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
  process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
  worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
  kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
  ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 803:
  kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
  kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
  unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:340 [inline]
  __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:366
  kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:253 [inline]
  slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4953 [inline]
  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline]
  kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x18d/0x6c0 mm/slub.c:5270
  dst_alloc+0x105/0x170 net/core/dst.c:89
  ip6_dst_alloc net/ipv6/route.c:342 [inline]
  icmp6_dst_alloc+0x75/0x460 net/ipv6/route.c:3333
  mld_sendpack+0x683/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1844
  mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline]
  mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693
  process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
  process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
  worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
  kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
  ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246

Freed by task 20:
  kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
  kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
  kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:584
  poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253 [inline]
  __kasan_slab_free+0x5c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:285
  kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 [inline]
  slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2540 [inline]
  slab_free mm/slub.c:6670 [inline]
  kmem_cache_free+0x18f/0x8d0 mm/slub.c:6781
  dst_destroy+0x235/0x350 net/core/dst.c:121
  rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2605 [inline]
  rcu_core kernel/rcu/tree.c:2857 [inline]
  rcu_cpu_kthread+0xba5/0x1af0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2945
  smpboot_thread_fn+0x542/0xa60 kernel/smpboot.c:160
  kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
  ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246

Last potentially related work creation:
  kasan_save_stack+0x3e/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:57
  kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbd/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:556
  __call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:3119 [inline]
  call_rcu+0xee/0x890 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3239
  refdst_drop include/net/dst.h:266 [inline]
  skb_dst_drop include/net/dst.h:278 [inline]
  skb_release_head_state+0x71/0x360 net/core/skbuff.c:1156
  skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1180 [inline]
  __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1196 [inline]
  sk_skb_reason_drop+0xe9/0x170 net/core/skbuff.c:1234
  kfree_skb_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:1322 [inline]
  tcf_kfree_skb_list include/net/sch_generic.h:1127 [inline]
  __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:4260 [inline]
  __dev_queue_xmit+0x26aa/0x3210 net/core/dev.c:4785
  NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline]
  ip6_output+0x340/0x550 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247
  NF_HOOK+0x9e/0x380 include/linux/netfilter.h:318
  mld_sendpack+0x8d4/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1855
  mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline]
  mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693
  process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
  process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
  worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
  kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
  ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880294cfa00
 which belongs to the cache ip6_dst_cache of size 232

The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of
freed 232-byte region [ffff8880294cfa00, ffff8880294cfae8)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x294cf
memcg:ffff88803536b781
flags: 0x80000000000000(node=0|zone=1)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0080000000000000 ffff88802ff1c8c0 ffffea0000bf2bc0 dead000000000006
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000000f5000000 ffff88803536b781
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x52820(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP), pid 9, tgid 9 (kworker/0:0), ts 91119585830, free_ts 91088628818
  set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
  post_alloc_hook+0x234/0x290 mm/page_alloc.c:1857
  prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1865 [inline]
  get_page_from_freelist+0x28c0/0x2960 mm/page_alloc.c:3915
  __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x181/0x370 mm/page_alloc.c:5210
  alloc_pages_mpol+0xd1/0x380 mm/mempolicy.c:2486
  alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:3075 [inline]
  allocate_slab+0x86/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:3248
  new_slab mm/slub.c:3302 [inline]
  ___slab_alloc+0xb10/0x13e0 mm/slub.c:4656
  __slab_alloc+0xc6/0x1f0 mm/slub.c:4779
  __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4855 [inline]
  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5251 [inline]
  kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x101/0x6c0 mm/slub.c:5270
  dst_alloc+0x105/0x170 net/core/dst.c:89
  ip6_dst_alloc net/ipv6/route.c:342 [inline]
  icmp6_dst_alloc+0x75/0x460 net/ipv6/route.c:3333
  mld_sendpack+0x683/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1844
  mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline]
  mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693
  process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
  process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
  worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
  kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
  ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
page last free pid 5859 tgid 5859 stack trace:
  reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
  free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1406 [inline]
  __free_frozen_pages+0xfe1/0x1170 mm/page_alloc.c:2943
  discard_slab mm/slub.c:3346 [inline]
  __put_partials+0x149/0x170 mm/slub.c:3886
  __slab_free+0x2af/0x330 mm/slub.c:5952
  qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline]
  qlist_free_all+0x97/0x100 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179
  kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x148/0x160 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286
  __kasan_slab_alloc+0x22/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:350
  kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:253 [inline]
  slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4953 [inline]
  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline]
  kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x18d/0x6c0 mm/slub.c:5270
  getname_flags+0xb8/0x540 fs/namei.c:146
  getname include/linux/fs.h:2498 [inline]
  do_sys_openat2+0xbc/0x200 fs/open.c:1426
  do_sys_open fs/open.c:1436 [inline]
  __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1452 [inline]
  __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1447 [inline]
  __x64_sys_openat+0x138/0x170 fs/open.c:1447
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
Fixes 8d0b94afdca8 ("ipv6: Keep track of DST_NOCACHE routes in case of iface down/unregister")
Fixes 78df76a065ae ("ipv4: take rt_uncached_lock only if needed")
Reported-by [email protected]
Cc Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>
---
 net/core/dst.c   |    1 +
 net/ipv4/route.c |    4 ++--
 net/ipv6/route.c |    4 ++--
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/core/dst.c +1 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ void dst_init(struct dst_entry *dst, str
 	dst->lwtstate = NULL;
 	rcuref_init(&dst->__rcuref, initial_ref);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dst->rt_uncached);
+	dst->rt_uncached_list = NULL;
 	dst->__use = 0;
 	dst->lastuse = jiffies;
 	dst->flags = flags;
net/ipv4/route.c +2 -2
@@ -1546,9 +1546,9 @@ void rt_add_uncached_list(struct rtable
 
 void rt_del_uncached_list(struct rtable *rt)
 {
-	if (!list_empty(&rt->dst.rt_uncached)) {
-		struct uncached_list *ul = rt->dst.rt_uncached_list;
+	struct uncached_list *ul = rt->dst.rt_uncached_list;
 
+	if (ul) {
 		spin_lock_bh(&ul->lock);
 		list_del_init(&rt->dst.rt_uncached);
 		spin_unlock_bh(&ul->lock);
net/ipv6/route.c +2 -2
@@ -149,9 +149,9 @@ void rt6_uncached_list_add(struct rt6_in
 
 void rt6_uncached_list_del(struct rt6_info *rt)
 {
-	if (!list_empty(&rt->dst.rt_uncached)) {
-		struct uncached_list *ul = rt->dst.rt_uncached_list;
+	struct uncached_list *ul = rt->dst.rt_uncached_list;
 
+	if (ul) {
 		spin_lock_bh(&ul->lock);
 		list_del_init(&rt->dst.rt_uncached);
 		spin_unlock_bh(&ul->lock);
author maintainer
#407 lore raw

PATCH 407/567 nfs: pass explicit offset/count to trace events

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fada32ed6dbc748f447c8d050a961b75d946055a ]

nfs_folio_length is unsafe to use without having the folio locked and a check for a NULL ->f_mapping that protects against truncations and can lead to kernel crashes. E.g. when running xfstests generic/065 with all nfs trace points enabled.

Follow the model of the XFS trace points and pass in an explіcit offset and length. This has the additional benefit that these values can be more accurate as some of the users touch partial folio ranges.

Fixes eb5654b3b89d ("NFS: Enable tracing of nfs_invalidate_folio() and nfs_launder_folio()")
[ Minor conflict resolved. ]
---
 fs/nfs/file.c     |    5 +++--
 fs/nfs/nfstrace.h |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 fs/nfs/read.c     |    8 +++++---
 fs/nfs/write.c    |   10 +++++-----
 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/file.c +3 -2
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ static void nfs_invalidate_folio(struct
 	/* Cancel any unstarted writes on this page */
 	nfs_wb_folio_cancel(inode, folio);
 	folio_wait_fscache(folio);
-	trace_nfs_invalidate_folio(inode, folio);
+	trace_nfs_invalidate_folio(inode, folio_pos(folio) + offset, length);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -509,7 +509,8 @@ static int nfs_launder_folio(struct foli
 
 	folio_wait_fscache(folio);
 	ret = nfs_wb_folio(inode, folio);
-	trace_nfs_launder_folio_done(inode, folio, ret);
+	trace_nfs_launder_folio_done(inode, folio_pos(folio),
+			folio_size(folio), ret);
 	return ret;
 }
 
fs/nfs/nfstrace.h +20 -16
@@ -933,10 +933,11 @@ TRACE_EVENT(nfs_sillyrename_unlink,
 DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(nfs_folio_event,
 		TP_PROTO(
 			const struct inode *inode,
-			struct folio *folio
+			loff_t offset,
+			size_t count
 		),
 
-		TP_ARGS(inode, folio),
+		TP_ARGS(inode, offset, count),
 
 		TP_STRUCT__entry(
 			__field(dev_t, dev)
@@ -944,7 +945,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(nfs_folio_event,
 			__field(u64, fileid)
 			__field(u64, version)
 			__field(loff_t, offset)
-			__field(u32, count)
+			__field(size_t, count)
 		),
 
 		TP_fast_assign(
@@ -954,13 +955,13 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(nfs_folio_event,
 			__entry->fileid = nfsi->fileid;
 			__entry->fhandle = nfs_fhandle_hash(&nfsi->fh);
 			__entry->version = inode_peek_iversion_raw(inode);
-			__entry->offset = folio_file_pos(folio);
-			__entry->count = nfs_folio_length(folio);
+			__entry->offset = offset,
+			__entry->count = count;
 		),
 
 		TP_printk(
 			"fileid=%02x:%02x:%llu fhandle=0x%08x version=%llu "
-			"offset=%lld count=%u",
+			"offset=%lld count=%zu",
 			MAJOR(__entry->dev), MINOR(__entry->dev),
 			(unsigned long long)__entry->fileid,
 			__entry->fhandle, __entry->version,
@@ -972,18 +973,20 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(nfs_folio_event,
 	DEFINE_EVENT(nfs_folio_event, name, \
 			TP_PROTO( \
 				const struct inode *inode, \
-				struct folio *folio \
+				loff_t offset, \
+				size_t count \
 			), \
-			TP_ARGS(inode, folio))
+			TP_ARGS(inode, offset, count))
 
 DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(nfs_folio_event_done,
 		TP_PROTO(
 			const struct inode *inode,
-			struct folio *folio,
+			loff_t offset,
+			size_t count,
 			int ret
 		),
 
-		TP_ARGS(inode, folio, ret),
+		TP_ARGS(inode, offset, count, ret),
 
 		TP_STRUCT__entry(
 			__field(dev_t, dev)
@@ -992,7 +995,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(nfs_folio_event_done
 			__field(u64, fileid)
 			__field(u64, version)
 			__field(loff_t, offset)
-			__field(u32, count)
+			__field(size_t, count)
 		),
 
 		TP_fast_assign(
@@ -1002,14 +1005,14 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(nfs_folio_event_done
 			__entry->fileid = nfsi->fileid;
 			__entry->fhandle = nfs_fhandle_hash(&nfsi->fh);
 			__entry->version = inode_peek_iversion_raw(inode);
-			__entry->offset = folio_file_pos(folio);
-			__entry->count = nfs_folio_length(folio);
+			__entry->offset = offset,
+			__entry->count = count,
 			__entry->ret = ret;
 		),
 
 		TP_printk(
 			"fileid=%02x:%02x:%llu fhandle=0x%08x version=%llu "
-			"offset=%lld count=%u ret=%d",
+			"offset=%lld count=%zu ret=%d",
 			MAJOR(__entry->dev), MINOR(__entry->dev),
 			(unsigned long long)__entry->fileid,
 			__entry->fhandle, __entry->version,
@@ -1021,10 +1024,11 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(nfs_folio_event_done
 	DEFINE_EVENT(nfs_folio_event_done, name, \
 			TP_PROTO( \
 				const struct inode *inode, \
-				struct folio *folio, \
+				loff_t offset, \
+				size_t count, \
 				int ret \
 			), \
-			TP_ARGS(inode, folio, ret))
+			TP_ARGS(inode, offset, count, ret))
 
 DEFINE_NFS_FOLIO_EVENT(nfs_aop_readpage);
 DEFINE_NFS_FOLIO_EVENT_DONE(nfs_aop_readpage_done);
fs/nfs/read.c +5 -3
@@ -333,13 +333,15 @@ out:
 int nfs_read_folio(struct file *file, struct folio *folio)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	loff_t pos = folio_pos(folio);
+	size_t len = folio_size(folio);
 	struct nfs_pageio_descriptor pgio;
 	struct nfs_open_context *ctx;
 	int ret;
 
-	trace_nfs_aop_readpage(inode, folio);
+	trace_nfs_aop_readpage(inode, pos, len);
 	nfs_inc_stats(inode, NFSIOS_VFSREADPAGE);
-	task_io_account_read(folio_size(folio));
+	task_io_account_read(len);
 
 	/*
 	 * Try to flush any pending writes to the file..
@@ -382,7 +384,7 @@ int nfs_read_folio(struct file *file, st
 out_put:
 	put_nfs_open_context(ctx);
 out:
-	trace_nfs_aop_readpage_done(inode, folio, ret);
+	trace_nfs_aop_readpage_done(inode, pos, len, ret);
 	return ret;
 out_unlock:
 	folio_unlock(folio);
fs/nfs/write.c +5 -5
@@ -2131,17 +2131,17 @@ int nfs_wb_folio_cancel(struct inode *in
  */
 int nfs_wb_folio(struct inode *inode, struct folio *folio)
 {
-	loff_t range_start = folio_file_pos(folio);
-	loff_t range_end = range_start + (loff_t)folio_size(folio) - 1;
+	loff_t range_start = folio_pos(folio);
+	size_t len = folio_size(folio);
 	struct writeback_control wbc = {
 		.sync_mode = WB_SYNC_ALL,
 		.nr_to_write = 0,
 		.range_start = range_start,
-		.range_end = range_end,
+		.range_end = range_start + len - 1,
 	};
 	int ret;
 
-	trace_nfs_writeback_folio(inode, folio);
+	trace_nfs_writeback_folio(inode, range_start, len);
 
 	for (;;) {
 		folio_wait_writeback(folio);
@@ -2159,7 +2159,7 @@ int nfs_wb_folio(struct inode *inode, st
 			goto out_error;
 	}
 out_error:
-	trace_nfs_writeback_folio_done(inode, folio, ret);
+	trace_nfs_writeback_folio_done(inode, range_start, len, ret);
 	return ret;
 }
 
author maintainer
#408 lore raw

PATCH 408/567 NFS: Fix a deadlock involving nfs_release_folio()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cce0be6eb4971456b703aaeafd571650d314bcca ]

Wang Zhaolong reports a deadlock involving NFSv4.1 state recovery waiting on kthreadd, which is attempting to reclaim memory by calling nfs_release_folio(). The latter cannot make progress due to state recovery being needed.

It seems that the only safe thing to do here is to kick off a writeback of the folio, without waiting for completion, or else kicking off an asynchronous commit.

Fixes 96780ca55e3c ("NFS: fix up nfs_release_folio() to try to release the page")
[ Minor conflict resolved. ]
---
 fs/nfs/file.c          |    3 ++-
 fs/nfs/nfstrace.h      |    3 +++
 fs/nfs/write.c         |   33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/nfs_fs.h |    1 +
 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfs/file.c +2 -1
@@ -459,7 +459,8 @@ static bool nfs_release_folio(struct fol
 		if ((current_gfp_context(gfp) & GFP_KERNEL) != GFP_KERNEL ||
 		    current_is_kswapd() || current_is_kcompactd())
 			return false;
-		if (nfs_wb_folio(folio_file_mapping(folio)->host, folio) < 0)
+		if (nfs_wb_folio_reclaim(folio_file_mapping(folio)->host, folio) < 0 ||
+		    folio_test_private(folio))
 			return false;
 	}
 	return nfs_fscache_release_folio(folio, gfp);
fs/nfs/nfstrace.h +3 -0
@@ -1033,6 +1033,9 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(nfs_folio_event_done
 DEFINE_NFS_FOLIO_EVENT(nfs_aop_readpage);
 DEFINE_NFS_FOLIO_EVENT_DONE(nfs_aop_readpage_done);
 
+DEFINE_NFS_FOLIO_EVENT(nfs_writeback_folio_reclaim);
+DEFINE_NFS_FOLIO_EVENT_DONE(nfs_writeback_folio_reclaim_done);
+
 DEFINE_NFS_FOLIO_EVENT(nfs_writeback_folio);
 DEFINE_NFS_FOLIO_EVENT_DONE(nfs_writeback_folio_done);
 
fs/nfs/write.c +33 -0
@@ -2122,6 +2122,39 @@ int nfs_wb_folio_cancel(struct inode *in
 }
 
 /**
+ * nfs_wb_folio_reclaim - Write back all requests on one page
+ * @inode: pointer to page
+ * @folio: pointer to folio
+ *
+ * Assumes that the folio has been locked by the caller
+ */
+int nfs_wb_folio_reclaim(struct inode *inode, struct folio *folio)
+{
+	loff_t range_start = folio_pos(folio);
+	size_t len = folio_size(folio);
+	struct writeback_control wbc = {
+		.sync_mode = WB_SYNC_ALL,
+		.nr_to_write = 0,
+		.range_start = range_start,
+		.range_end = range_start + len - 1,
+		.for_sync = 1,
+	};
+	int ret;
+
+	if (folio_test_writeback(folio))
+		return -EBUSY;
+	if (folio_clear_dirty_for_io(folio)) {
+		trace_nfs_writeback_folio_reclaim(inode, range_start, len);
+		ret = nfs_writepage_locked(folio, &wbc);
+		trace_nfs_writeback_folio_reclaim_done(inode, range_start, len,
+						       ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+	nfs_commit_inode(inode, 0);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
  * nfs_wb_folio - Write back all requests on one page
  * @inode: pointer to page
  * @folio: pointer to folio
include/linux/nfs_fs.h +1 -0
@@ -608,6 +608,7 @@ extern int  nfs_update_folio(struct file
 extern int nfs_sync_inode(struct inode *inode);
 extern int nfs_wb_all(struct inode *inode);
 extern int nfs_wb_folio(struct inode *inode, struct folio *folio);
+extern int nfs_wb_folio_reclaim(struct inode *inode, struct folio *folio);
 int nfs_wb_folio_cancel(struct inode *inode, struct folio *folio);
 extern int  nfs_commit_inode(struct inode *, int);
 extern struct nfs_commit_data *nfs_commitdata_alloc(void);
author maintainer
#409 lore raw

PATCH 409/567 pNFS: Fix a deadlock when returning a delegation during open()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 857bf9056291a16785ae3be1d291026b2437fc48 ]

Ben Coddington reports seeing a hang in the following stack trace:
0 [ffffd0b50e1774e0] __schedule at ffffffff9ca05415
1 [ffffd0b50e177548] schedule at ffffffff9ca05717
2 [ffffd0b50e177558] bit_wait at ffffffff9ca061e1
3 [ffffd0b50e177568] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff9ca05cfb
4 [ffffd0b50e1775c8] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff9ca05ea5 5 [ffffd0b50e177618] pnfs_roc at ffffffffc154207b [nfsv4]
6 [ffffd0b50e1776b8] _nfs4_proc_delegreturn at ffffffffc1506586 [nfsv4] 7 [ffffd0b50e177788] nfs4_proc_delegreturn at ffffffffc1507480 [nfsv4] 8 [ffffd0b50e1777f8] nfs_do_return_delegation at ffffffffc1523e41 [nfsv4] 9 [ffffd0b50e177838] nfs_inode_set_delegation at ffffffffc1524a75 [nfsv4]
10 [ffffd0b50e177888] nfs4_process_delegation at ffffffffc14f41dd [nfsv4] 11 [ffffd0b50e1778a0] _nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state at ffffffffc1503edf [nfsv4] 12 [ffffd0b50e1778c0] _nfs4_open_and_get_state at ffffffffc1504e56 [nfsv4] 13 [ffffd0b50e177978] _nfs4_do_open at ffffffffc15051b8 [nfsv4] 14 [ffffd0b50e1779f8] nfs4_do_open at ffffffffc150559c [nfsv4]
15 [ffffd0b50e177a80] nfs4_atomic_open at ffffffffc15057fb [nfsv4] 16 [ffffd0b50e177ad0] nfs4_file_open at ffffffffc15219be [nfsv4] 17 [ffffd0b50e177b78] do_dentry_open at ffffffff9c09e6ea
18 [ffffd0b50e177ba8] vfs_open at ffffffff9c0a082e
19 [ffffd0b50e177bd0] dentry_open at ffffffff9c0a0935

The issue is that the delegreturn is being asked to wait for a layout return that cannot complete because a state recovery was initiated. The state recovery cannot complete until the open() finishes processing the delegations it was given.

The solution is to propagate the existing flags that indicate a non-blocking call to the function pnfs_roc(), so that it knows not to wait in this situation.

Fixes 29ade5db1293 ("pNFS: Wait on outstanding layoutreturns to complete in pnfs_roc()")
[ Minor conflict resolved. ]
---
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c |    6 ++---
 fs/nfs/pnfs.c     |   58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 fs/nfs/pnfs.h     |   17 ++++++---------
 3 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +3 -3
@@ -3792,8 +3792,8 @@ int nfs4_do_close(struct nfs4_state *sta
 	calldata->res.seqid = calldata->arg.seqid;
 	calldata->res.server = server;
 	calldata->res.lr_ret = -NFS4ERR_NOMATCHING_LAYOUT;
-	calldata->lr.roc = pnfs_roc(state->inode,
-			&calldata->lr.arg, &calldata->lr.res, msg.rpc_cred);
+	calldata->lr.roc = pnfs_roc(state->inode, &calldata->lr.arg,
+				    &calldata->lr.res, msg.rpc_cred, wait);
 	if (calldata->lr.roc) {
 		calldata->arg.lr_args = &calldata->lr.arg;
 		calldata->res.lr_res = &calldata->lr.res;
@@ -6742,7 +6742,7 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_delegreturn(struct
 	data->inode = nfs_igrab_and_active(inode);
 	if (data->inode || issync) {
 		data->lr.roc = pnfs_roc(inode, &data->lr.arg, &data->lr.res,
-					cred);
+					cred, issync);
 		if (data->lr.roc) {
 			data->args.lr_args = &data->lr.arg;
 			data->res.lr_res = &data->lr.res;
fs/nfs/pnfs.c +41 -17

97 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/nfs/pnfs.h +7 -10
@@ -295,10 +295,9 @@ int pnfs_mark_matching_lsegs_return(stru
 				u32 seq);
 int pnfs_mark_layout_stateid_invalid(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo,
 		struct list_head *lseg_list);
-bool pnfs_roc(struct inode *ino,
-		struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args *args,
-		struct nfs4_layoutreturn_res *res,
-		const struct cred *cred);
+bool pnfs_roc(struct inode *ino, struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args *args,
+	      struct nfs4_layoutreturn_res *res, const struct cred *cred,
+	      bool sync);
 int pnfs_roc_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args **argpp,
 		  struct nfs4_layoutreturn_res **respp, int *ret);
 void pnfs_roc_release(struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args *args,
@@ -769,12 +768,10 @@ pnfs_layoutcommit_outstanding(struct ino
 	return false;
 }
 
-
-static inline bool
-pnfs_roc(struct inode *ino,
-		struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args *args,
-		struct nfs4_layoutreturn_res *res,
-		const struct cred *cred)
+static inline bool pnfs_roc(struct inode *ino,
+			    struct nfs4_layoutreturn_args *args,
+			    struct nfs4_layoutreturn_res *res,
+			    const struct cred *cred, bool sync)
 {
 	return false;
 }
author maintainer
#410 lore raw

PATCH 410/567 usb: typec: ucsi: Move unregister out of atomic section

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 11bb2ffb679399f99041540cf662409905179e3a ]

Commit '9329933699b3 ("soc: qcom: pmic_glink: Make client-lock non-sleeping")' moved the pmic_glink client list under a spinlock, as it is accessed by the rpmsg/glink callback, which in turn is invoked from IRQ context.

This means that ucsi_unregister() is now called from atomic context, which isn't feasible as it's expecting a sleepable context. An effort is under way to get GLINK to invoke its callbacks in a sleepable context, but until then lets schedule the unregistration.

A side effect of this is that ucsi_unregister() can now happen after the remote processor, and thereby the communication link with it, is gone. pmic_glink_send() is amended with a check to avoid the resulting NULL pointer dereference.
This does however result in the user being informed about this error by the following entry in the kernel log:

ucsi_glink.pmic_glink_ucsi pmic_glink.ucsi.0: failed to send UCSI write request: -5

[ The context change is due to the commit 584e8df58942 ("usb: typec: ucsi: extract common code for command handling") in v6.11 which is irrelevant to the logic of this patch. ]

---
 drivers/soc/qcom/pmic_glink.c       |   10 +++++++++-
 drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi_glink.c |   27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/qcom/pmic_glink.c +9 -1
@@ -115,8 +115,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pmic_glink_client_regi
 int pmic_glink_send(struct pmic_glink_client *client, void *data, size_t len)
 {
 	struct pmic_glink *pg = client->pg;
+	int ret;
 
-	return rpmsg_send(pg->ept, data, len);
+	mutex_lock(&pg->state_lock);
+	if (!pg->ept)
+		ret = -ECONNRESET;
+	else
+		ret = rpmsg_send(pg->ept, data, len);
+	mutex_unlock(&pg->state_lock);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pmic_glink_send);
 
drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi_glink.c +22 -5
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ struct pmic_glink_ucsi {
 
 	struct work_struct notify_work;
 	struct work_struct register_work;
+	spinlock_t state_lock;
+	bool ucsi_registered;
+	bool pd_running;
 
 	u8 read_buf[UCSI_BUF_SIZE];
 };
@@ -270,8 +273,20 @@ static void pmic_glink_ucsi_notify(struc
 static void pmic_glink_ucsi_register(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	struct pmic_glink_ucsi *ucsi = container_of(work, struct pmic_glink_ucsi, register_work);
+	unsigned long flags;
+	bool pd_running;
 
-	ucsi_register(ucsi->ucsi);
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&ucsi->state_lock, flags);
+	pd_running = ucsi->pd_running;
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ucsi->state_lock, flags);
+
+	if (!ucsi->ucsi_registered && pd_running) {
+		ucsi_register(ucsi->ucsi);
+		ucsi->ucsi_registered = true;
+	} else if (ucsi->ucsi_registered && !pd_running) {
+		ucsi_unregister(ucsi->ucsi);
+		ucsi->ucsi_registered = false;
+	}
 }
 
 static void pmic_glink_ucsi_callback(const void *data, size_t len, void *priv)
@@ -295,11 +310,12 @@ static void pmic_glink_ucsi_callback(con
 static void pmic_glink_ucsi_pdr_notify(void *priv, int state)
 {
 	struct pmic_glink_ucsi *ucsi = priv;
+	unsigned long flags;
 
-	if (state == SERVREG_SERVICE_STATE_UP)
-		schedule_work(&ucsi->register_work);
-	else if (state == SERVREG_SERVICE_STATE_DOWN)
-		ucsi_unregister(ucsi->ucsi);
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&ucsi->state_lock, flags);
+	ucsi->pd_running = (state == SERVREG_SERVICE_STATE_UP);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ucsi->state_lock, flags);
+	schedule_work(&ucsi->register_work);
 }
 
 static void pmic_glink_ucsi_destroy(void *data)
@@ -332,6 +348,7 @@ static int pmic_glink_ucsi_probe(struct
 	init_completion(&ucsi->read_ack);
 	init_completion(&ucsi->write_ack);
 	init_completion(&ucsi->sync_ack);
+	spin_lock_init(&ucsi->state_lock);
 	mutex_init(&ucsi->lock);
 
 	ucsi->ucsi = ucsi_create(dev, &pmic_glink_ucsi_ops);
author maintainer
#411 lore raw

PATCH 411/567 eth: bnxt: always recalculate features after XDP clearing, fix null-deref

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f0aa6a37a3dbb40b272df5fc6db93c114688adcd ]

Recalculate features when XDP is detached.

Before:

  # ip li set dev eth0 xdp obj xdp_dummy.bpf.o sec xdp
  # ip li set dev eth0 xdp off
  # ethtool -k eth0 | grep gro
  rx-gro-hw: off [requested on]

After:

  # ip li set dev eth0 xdp obj xdp_dummy.bpf.o sec xdp
  # ip li set dev eth0 xdp off
  # ethtool -k eth0 | grep gro
  rx-gro-hw: on

The fact that HW-GRO doesn't get re-enabled automatically is just a minor annoyance. The real issue is that the features will randomly come back during another reconfiguration which just happens to invoke netdev_update_features(). The driver doesn't handle reconfiguring two things at a time very robustly.

Starting with commit 98ba1d931f61 ("bnxt_en: Fix RSS logic in __bnxt_reserve_rings()") we only reconfigure the RSS hash table if the "effective" number of Rx rings has changed. If HW-GRO is enabled "effective" number of rings is 2x what user sees. So if we are in the bad state, with HW-GRO re-enablement "pending" after XDP off, and we lower the rings by / 2 - the HW-GRO rings doing 2x and the ethtool -L doing / 2 may cancel each other out, and the:

if (old_rx_rings != bp->hw_resc.resv_rx_rings &&

condition in __bnxt_reserve_rings() will be false. The RSS map won't get updated, and we'll crash with:

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000168
  RIP: 0010:__bnxt_hwrm_vnic_set_rss+0x13a/0x1a0
    bnxt_hwrm_vnic_rss_cfg_p5+0x47/0x180
    __bnxt_setup_vnic_p5+0x58/0x110
    bnxt_init_nic+0xb72/0xf50
    __bnxt_open_nic+0x40d/0xab0
    bnxt_open_nic+0x2b/0x60
    ethtool_set_channels+0x18c/0x1d0

As we try to access a freed ring.

The issue is present since XDP support was added, really, but prior to commit 98ba1d931f61 ("bnxt_en: Fix RSS logic in __bnxt_reserve_rings()") it wasn't causing major issues.

Fixes 1054aee82321 ("bnxt_en: Use NETIF_F_GRO_HW.")
Fixes 98ba1d931f61 ("bnxt_en: Fix RSS logic in __bnxt_reserve_rings()")

[ The context change is due to the commit 1f6e77cb9b32 ("bnxt_en: Add bnxt_l2_filter hash table.") in v6.8 and the commit 8336a974f37d ("bnxt_en: Save user configured filters in a lookup list") in v6.9 which are irrelevant to the logic of this patch. ]

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c     |   25 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h     |    2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_xdp.c |    7 -------
 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +20 -5
@@ -3996,7 +3996,7 @@ void bnxt_set_ring_params(struct bnxt *b
 /* Changing allocation mode of RX rings.
  * TODO: Update when extending xdp_rxq_info to support allocation modes.
  */
-int bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(struct bnxt *bp, bool page_mode)
+static void __bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(struct bnxt *bp, bool page_mode)
 {
 	struct net_device *dev = bp->dev;
 
@@ -4017,15 +4017,30 @@ int bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(struct bnxt *bp
 			bp->rx_skb_func = bnxt_rx_page_skb;
 		}
 		bp->rx_dir = DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL;
-		/* Disable LRO or GRO_HW */
-		netdev_update_features(dev);
 	} else {
 		dev->max_mtu = bp->max_mtu;
 		bp->flags &= ~BNXT_FLAG_RX_PAGE_MODE;
 		bp->rx_dir = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
 		bp->rx_skb_func = bnxt_rx_skb;
 	}
-	return 0;
+}
+
+void bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(struct bnxt *bp, bool page_mode)
+{
+	__bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(bp, page_mode);
+
+	if (!page_mode) {
+		int rx, tx;
+
+		bnxt_get_max_rings(bp, &rx, &tx, true);
+		if (rx > 1) {
+			bp->flags &= ~BNXT_FLAG_NO_AGG_RINGS;
+			bp->dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_LRO;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Update LRO and GRO_HW availability */
+	netdev_update_features(bp->dev);
 }
 
 static void bnxt_free_vnic_attributes(struct bnxt *bp)
@@ -13773,7 +13788,7 @@ static int bnxt_init_one(struct pci_dev
 	if (rc)
 		goto init_err_pci_clean;
 
-	bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(bp, false);
+	__bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(bp, false);
 	bnxt_set_tpa_flags(bp);
 	bnxt_set_ring_params(bp);
 	rc = bnxt_set_dflt_rings(bp, true);
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h +1 -1
@@ -2332,7 +2332,7 @@ void bnxt_reuse_rx_data(struct bnxt_rx_r
 u32 bnxt_fw_health_readl(struct bnxt *bp, int reg_idx);
 void bnxt_set_tpa_flags(struct bnxt *bp);
 void bnxt_set_ring_params(struct bnxt *);
-int bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(struct bnxt *bp, bool page_mode);
+void bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(struct bnxt *bp, bool page_mode);
 int bnxt_hwrm_func_drv_rgtr(struct bnxt *bp, unsigned long *bmap,
 			    int bmap_size, bool async_only);
 int bnxt_hwrm_func_drv_unrgtr(struct bnxt *bp);
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_xdp.c +0 -7
@@ -422,15 +422,8 @@ static int bnxt_xdp_set(struct bnxt *bp,
 		bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(bp, true);
 		xdp_features_set_redirect_target(dev, true);
 	} else {
-		int rx, tx;
-
 		xdp_features_clear_redirect_target(dev);
 		bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(bp, false);
-		bnxt_get_max_rings(bp, &rx, &tx, true);
-		if (rx > 1) {
-			bp->flags &= ~BNXT_FLAG_NO_AGG_RINGS;
-			bp->dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_LRO;
-		}
 	}
 	bp->tx_nr_rings_xdp = tx_xdp;
 	bp->tx_nr_rings = bp->tx_nr_rings_per_tc * tc + tx_xdp;
author maintainer
#412 lore raw

PATCH 412/567 ext4: always allocate blocks only from groups inode can use

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4865c768b563deff1b6a6384e74a62f143427b42 ]

For filesystems with more than 2^32 blocks inodes using indirect block based format cannot use blocks beyond the 32-bit limit. ext4_mb_scan_groups_linear() takes care to not select these unsupported groups for such inodes however other functions selecting groups for allocation don't. So far this is harmless because the other selection functions are used only with mb_optimize_scan and this is currently disabled for inodes with indirect blocks however in the following patch we want to enable mb_optimize_scan regardless of inode format.

---
 fs/ext4/mballoc.c |   20 ++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/mballoc.c +16 -4
@@ -883,6 +883,21 @@ mb_update_avg_fragment_size(struct super
 	}
 }
 
+static ext4_group_t ext4_get_allocation_groups_count(
+				struct ext4_allocation_context *ac)
+{
+	ext4_group_t ngroups = ext4_get_groups_count(ac->ac_sb);
+
+	/* non-extent files are limited to low blocks/groups */
+	if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(ac->ac_inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)))
+		ngroups = EXT4_SB(ac->ac_sb)->s_blockfile_groups;
+
+	/* Pairs with smp_wmb() in ext4_update_super() */
+	smp_rmb();
+
+	return ngroups;
+}
+
 /*
  * Choose next group by traversing largest_free_order lists. Updates *new_cr if
  * cr level needs an update.
@@ -2817,10 +2832,7 @@ ext4_mb_regular_allocator(struct ext4_al
 
 	sb = ac->ac_sb;
 	sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
-	ngroups = ext4_get_groups_count(sb);
-	/* non-extent files are limited to low blocks/groups */
-	if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(ac->ac_inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)))
-		ngroups = sbi->s_blockfile_groups;
+	ngroups = ext4_get_allocation_groups_count(ac);
 
 	BUG_ON(ac->ac_status == AC_STATUS_FOUND);
 
author maintainer
#413 lore raw

PATCH 413/567 rxrpc: Fix recvmsg() unconditional requeue

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2c28769a51deb6022d7fbd499987e237a01dd63a ]

If rxrpc_recvmsg() fails because MSG_DONTWAIT was specified but the call at the front of the recvmsg queue already has its mutex locked, it requeues the call - whether or not the call is already queued. The call may be on the queue because MSG_PEEK was also passed and so the call was not dequeued or because the I/O thread requeued it.

The unconditional requeue may then corrupt the recvmsg queue, leading to things like UAFs or refcount underruns.

Fix this by only requeuing the call if it isn't already on the queue - and moving it to the front if it is already queued. If we don't queue it, we have to put the ref we obtained by dequeuing it.

Also, MSG_PEEK doesn't dequeue the call so shouldn't call rxrpc_notify_socket() for the call if we didn't use up all the data on the queue, so fix that also.

Fixes 540b1c48c37a ("rxrpc: Fix deadlock between call creation and sendmsg/recvmsg")
cc Nir Ohfeld <[email protected]>
cc Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
cc Simon Horman <[email protected]>
[Use spin_unlock instead of spin_unlock_irq to maintain context consistency.]
---
 include/trace/events/rxrpc.h |    4 ++++
 net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c          |   19 +++++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/trace/events/rxrpc.h +4 -0
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@
 	EM(rxrpc_call_put_kernel,		"PUT kernel  ") \
 	EM(rxrpc_call_put_poke,			"PUT poke    ") \
 	EM(rxrpc_call_put_recvmsg,		"PUT recvmsg ") \
+	EM(rxrpc_call_put_recvmsg_peek_nowait,	"PUT peek-nwt") \
 	EM(rxrpc_call_put_release_sock,		"PUT rls-sock") \
 	EM(rxrpc_call_put_release_sock_tba,	"PUT rls-sk-a") \
 	EM(rxrpc_call_put_sendmsg,		"PUT sendmsg ") \
@@ -287,6 +288,9 @@
 	EM(rxrpc_call_see_distribute_error,	"SEE dist-err") \
 	EM(rxrpc_call_see_input,		"SEE input   ") \
 	EM(rxrpc_call_see_recvmsg,		"SEE recvmsg ") \
+	EM(rxrpc_call_see_recvmsg_requeue,	"SEE recv-rqu") \
+	EM(rxrpc_call_see_recvmsg_requeue_first, "SEE recv-rqF") \
+	EM(rxrpc_call_see_recvmsg_requeue_move,	"SEE recv-rqM") \
 	EM(rxrpc_call_see_release,		"SEE release ") \
 	EM(rxrpc_call_see_userid_exists,	"SEE u-exists") \
 	EM(rxrpc_call_see_waiting_call,		"SEE q-conn  ") \
net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c +15 -4
@@ -430,7 +430,8 @@ try_again:
 	if (rxrpc_call_has_failed(call))
 		goto call_failed;
 
-	if (!skb_queue_empty(&call->recvmsg_queue))
+	if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK) &&
+	    !skb_queue_empty(&call->recvmsg_queue))
 		rxrpc_notify_socket(call);
 	goto not_yet_complete;
 
@@ -461,11 +462,21 @@ error_unlock_call:
 error_requeue_call:
 	if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
 		spin_lock(&rx->recvmsg_lock);
-		list_add(&call->recvmsg_link, &rx->recvmsg_q);
-		spin_unlock(&rx->recvmsg_lock);
+		if (list_empty(&call->recvmsg_link)) {
+			list_add(&call->recvmsg_link, &rx->recvmsg_q);
+			rxrpc_see_call(call, rxrpc_call_see_recvmsg_requeue);
+			spin_unlock(&rx->recvmsg_lock);
+		} else if (list_is_first(&call->recvmsg_link, &rx->recvmsg_q)) {
+			spin_unlock(&rx->recvmsg_lock);
+			rxrpc_put_call(call, rxrpc_call_see_recvmsg_requeue_first);
+		} else {
+			list_move(&call->recvmsg_link, &rx->recvmsg_q);
+			spin_unlock(&rx->recvmsg_lock);
+			rxrpc_put_call(call, rxrpc_call_see_recvmsg_requeue_move);
+		}
 		trace_rxrpc_recvmsg(call_debug_id, rxrpc_recvmsg_requeue, 0);
 	} else {
-		rxrpc_put_call(call, rxrpc_call_put_recvmsg);
+		rxrpc_put_call(call, rxrpc_call_put_recvmsg_peek_nowait);
 	}
 error_no_call:
 	release_sock(&rx->sk);
author maintainer
#414 lore raw

PATCH 414/567 dm-verity: disable recursive forward error correction

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d9f3e47d3fae0c101d9094bc956ed24e7a0ee801 ]

There are two problems with the recursive correction:

1. It may cause denial-of-service. In fec_read_bufs, there is a loop that has 253 iterations. For each iteration, we may call verity_hash_for_block recursively. There is a limit of 4 nested recursions - that means that there may be at most 253^4 (4 billion) iterations. Red Hat QE team actually created an image that pushes dm-verity to this limit - and this image just makes the udev-worker process get stuck in the 'D' state.

2. It doesn't work. In fec_read_bufs we store data into the variable "fio->bufs", but fio bufs is shared between recursive invocations, if "verity_hash_for_block" invoked correction recursively, it would overwrite partially filled fio->bufs.

[ The context change is due to the commit bdf253d580d7 ("dm-verity: remove support for asynchronous hashes") in v6.18 and the commit 9356fcfe0ac4
("dm verity: set DM_TARGET_SINGLETON feature flag") in v6.9 which are irrelevant to the logic of this patch. ]

---
 drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.c |    4 +---
 drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.h |    3 ---
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.c +1 -3
@@ -439,10 +439,8 @@ int verity_fec_decode(struct dm_verity *
 	if (!verity_fec_is_enabled(v))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	if (fio->level >= DM_VERITY_FEC_MAX_RECURSION) {
-		DMWARN_LIMIT("%s: FEC: recursion too deep", v->data_dev->name);
+	if (fio->level)
 		return -EIO;
-	}
 
 	fio->level++;
 
drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.h +0 -3
@@ -23,9 +23,6 @@
 #define DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_MAX \
 	(1 << (PAGE_SHIFT - DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_RS_BITS))
 
-/* maximum recursion level for verity_fec_decode */
-#define DM_VERITY_FEC_MAX_RECURSION	4
-
 #define DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_DEV		"use_fec_from_device"
 #define DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_BLOCKS	"fec_blocks"
 #define DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_START		"fec_start"
author maintainer
#415 lore raw

PATCH 415/567 ipv6: use RCU in ip6_xmit()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

commit 9085e56501d93af9f2d7bd16f7fcfacdde47b99c upstream.

Use RCU in ip6_xmit() in order to use dst_dev_rcu() to prevent possible UAF.

---
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c |   35 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +21 -14
@@ -261,35 +261,36 @@ bool ip6_autoflowlabel(struct net *net,
 int ip6_xmit(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi6 *fl6,
 	     __u32 mark, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt, int tclass, u32 priority)
 {
-	struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
 	const struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
 	struct in6_addr *first_hop = &fl6->daddr;
 	struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
-	struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;
 	struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(dst);
 	struct hop_jumbo_hdr *hop_jumbo;
 	int hoplen = sizeof(*hop_jumbo);
+	struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
 	unsigned int head_room;
+	struct net_device *dev;
 	struct ipv6hdr *hdr;
 	u8  proto = fl6->flowi6_proto;
 	int seg_len = skb->len;
-	int hlimit = -1;
+	int ret, hlimit = -1;
 	u32 mtu;
 
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	dev = dst_dev_rcu(dst);
 	head_room = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + hoplen + LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev);
 	if (opt)
 		head_room += opt->opt_nflen + opt->opt_flen;
 
 	if (unlikely(head_room > skb_headroom(skb))) {
-		/* Make sure idev stays alive */
-		rcu_read_lock();
+		/* idev stays alive while we hold rcu_read_lock(). */
 		skb = skb_expand_head(skb, head_room);
 		if (!skb) {
 			IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
-			rcu_read_unlock();
-			return -ENOBUFS;
+			ret = -ENOBUFS;
+			goto unlock;
 		}
-		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}
 
 	if (opt) {
@@ -351,17 +352,21 @@ int ip6_xmit(const struct sock *sk, stru
 		 * skb to its handler for processing
 		 */
 		skb = l3mdev_ip6_out((struct sock *)sk, skb);
-		if (unlikely(!skb))
-			return 0;
+		if (unlikely(!skb)) {
+			ret = 0;
+			goto unlock;
+		}
 
 		/* hooks should never assume socket lock is held.
 		 * we promote our socket to non const
 		 */
-		return NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
-			       net, (struct sock *)sk, skb, NULL, dev,
-			       dst_output);
+		ret = NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+			      net, (struct sock *)sk, skb, NULL, dev,
+			      dst_output);
+		goto unlock;
 	}
 
+	ret = -EMSGSIZE;
 	skb->dev = dev;
 	/* ipv6_local_error() does not require socket lock,
 	 * we promote our socket to non const
@@ -370,7 +375,9 @@ int ip6_xmit(const struct sock *sk, stru
 
 	IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
 	kfree_skb(skb);
-	return -EMSGSIZE;
+unlock:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip6_xmit);
 
author maintainer
#416 lore raw

PATCH 416/567 x86/sev: Harden #VC instruction emulation somewhat

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e3ef461af35a8c74f2f4ce6616491ddb355a208f ]

Compare the opcode bytes at rIP for each #VC exit reason to verify the instruction which raised the #VC exception is actually the right one.

---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c |    4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c   |  102 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/sev.c          |    5 +-
 3 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +4 -0
@@ -277,6 +277,10 @@ void do_boot_stage2_vc(struct pt_regs *r
 	if (result != ES_OK)
 		goto finish;
 
+	result = vc_check_opcode_bytes(&ctxt, exit_code);
+	if (result != ES_OK)
+		goto finish;
+
 	switch (exit_code) {
 	case SVM_EXIT_RDTSC:
 	case SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP:
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +100 -2

126 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +4 -1
@@ -1749,7 +1749,10 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode
 					 struct ghcb *ghcb,
 					 unsigned long exit_code)
 {
-	enum es_result result;
+	enum es_result result = vc_check_opcode_bytes(ctxt, exit_code);
+
+	if (result != ES_OK)
+		return result;
 
 	switch (exit_code) {
 	case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7:
author maintainer
#417 lore raw

PATCH 417/567 x86/sev: Check for MWAITX and MONITORX opcodes in the #VC handler

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e70316d17f6ab49a6038ffd115397fd68f8c7be8 ]

The MWAITX and MONITORX instructions generate the same #VC error code as the MWAIT and MONITOR instructions, respectively. Update the #VC handler opcode checking to also support the MWAITX and MONITORX opcodes.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +4 -2
@@ -1237,12 +1237,14 @@ static enum es_result vc_check_opcode_by
 		break;
 
 	case SVM_EXIT_MONITOR:
-		if (opcode == 0x010f && modrm == 0xc8)
+		/* MONITOR and MONITORX instructions generate the same error code */
+		if (opcode == 0x010f && (modrm == 0xc8 || modrm == 0xfa))
 			return ES_OK;
 		break;
 
 	case SVM_EXIT_MWAIT:
-		if (opcode == 0x010f && modrm == 0xc9)
+		/* MWAIT and MWAITX instructions generate the same error code */
+		if (opcode == 0x010f && (modrm == 0xc9 || modrm == 0xfb))
 			return ES_OK;
 		break;
 
author maintainer
#418 lore raw

PATCH 418/567 rxrpc: Fix data-race warning and potential load/store tearing

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5d5fe8bcd331f1e34e0943ec7c18432edfcf0e8b ]

Fix the following:

        BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker / rxrpc_send_data_packet

which is reporting an issue with the reads and writes to ->last_tx_at in:

        conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds();

and:

        keepalive_at = peer->last_tx_at + RXRPC_KEEPALIVE_TIME;

The lockless accesses to these to values aren't actually a problem as the read only needs an approximate time of last transmission for the purposes of deciding whether or not the transmission of a keepalive packet is warranted yet.

Also, as ->last_tx_at is a 64-bit value, tearing can occur on a 32-bit arch.

Fix both of these by switching to an unsigned int for ->last_tx_at and only storing the LSW of the time64_t. It can then be reconstructed at need provided no more than 68 years has elapsed since the last transmission.

[ The context change is due to the commit f3a123b25429 ("rxrpc: Allow the app to store private data on peer structs"), the commit 372d12d191cb
("rxrpc: Add a reason indicator to the tx_data tracepoint"), the commit 153f90a066dd
("rxrpc: Use ktimes for call timeout tracking and set the timer lazily") and the commit 9d1d2b59341f
("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)) which are irrelevant to the logic of this patch. ]

---
 net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h |    9 ++++++++-
 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c  |    2 +-
 net/rxrpc/output.c      |   11 ++++++-----
 net/rxrpc/peer_event.c  |   17 ++++++++++++++++-
 net/rxrpc/proc.c        |    4 ++--
 net/rxrpc/rxkad.c       |    2 +-
 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h +8 -1
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ struct rxrpc_peer {
 	struct hlist_head	error_targets;	/* targets for net error distribution */
 	struct rb_root		service_conns;	/* Service connections */
 	struct list_head	keepalive_link;	/* Link in net->peer_keepalive[] */
-	time64_t		last_tx_at;	/* Last time packet sent here */
+	unsigned int		last_tx_at;	/* Last time packet sent here (time64_t LSW) */
 	seqlock_t		service_conn_lock;
 	spinlock_t		lock;		/* access lock */
 	unsigned int		if_mtu;		/* interface MTU for this peer */
@@ -1171,6 +1171,13 @@ void rxrpc_transmit_one(struct rxrpc_cal
 void rxrpc_input_error(struct rxrpc_local *, struct sk_buff *);
 void rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker(struct work_struct *);
 
+/* Update the last transmission time on a peer for keepalive purposes. */
+static inline void rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(struct rxrpc_peer *peer)
+{
+	/* To avoid tearing on 32-bit systems, we only keep the LSW. */
+	WRITE_ONCE(peer->last_tx_at, ktime_get_seconds());
+}
+
 /*
  * peer_object.c
  */
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c +1 -1
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ void rxrpc_conn_retransmit_call(struct r
 	}
 
 	ret = kernel_sendmsg(conn->local->socket, &msg, iov, ioc, len);
-	conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds();
+	rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(conn->peer);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		trace_rxrpc_tx_fail(chan->call_debug_id, serial, ret,
 				    rxrpc_tx_point_call_final_resend);
net/rxrpc/output.c +6 -5
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ int rxrpc_send_ack_packet(struct rxrpc_c
 
 	iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, iov, 1, len);
 	ret = do_udp_sendmsg(conn->local->socket, &msg, len);
-	call->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds();
+	rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(call->peer);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		trace_rxrpc_tx_fail(call->debug_id, serial, ret,
 				    rxrpc_tx_point_call_ack);
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ int rxrpc_send_abort_packet(struct rxrpc
 
 	iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, iov, 1, sizeof(pkt));
 	ret = do_udp_sendmsg(conn->local->socket, &msg, sizeof(pkt));
-	conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds();
+	rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(conn->peer);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		trace_rxrpc_tx_fail(call->debug_id, serial, ret,
 				    rxrpc_tx_point_call_abort);
@@ -392,6 +392,7 @@ dont_set_request_ack:
 					    txb->wire.flags,
 					    test_bit(RXRPC_TXBUF_RESENT, &txb->flags),
 					    true);
+			rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(conn->peer);
 			goto done;
 		}
 	}
@@ -425,7 +426,7 @@ dont_set_request_ack:
 	 */
 	rxrpc_inc_stat(call->rxnet, stat_tx_data_send);
 	ret = do_udp_sendmsg(conn->local->socket, &msg, len);
-	conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds();
+	rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(conn->peer);
 
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		rxrpc_inc_stat(call->rxnet, stat_tx_data_send_fail);
@@ -572,7 +573,7 @@ void rxrpc_send_conn_abort(struct rxrpc_
 
 	trace_rxrpc_tx_packet(conn->debug_id, &whdr, rxrpc_tx_point_conn_abort);
 
-	conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds();
+	rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(conn->peer);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -691,7 +692,7 @@ void rxrpc_send_keepalive(struct rxrpc_p
 		trace_rxrpc_tx_packet(peer->debug_id, &whdr,
 				      rxrpc_tx_point_version_keepalive);
 
-	peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds();
+	rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(peer);
 	_leave("");
 }
 
net/rxrpc/peer_event.c +16 -1
@@ -225,6 +225,21 @@ static void rxrpc_distribute_error(struc
 }
 
 /*
+ * Reconstruct the last transmission time.  The difference calculated should be
+ * valid provided no more than ~68 years elapsed since the last transmission.
+ */
+static time64_t rxrpc_peer_get_tx_mark(const struct rxrpc_peer *peer, time64_t base)
+{
+	s32 last_tx_at = READ_ONCE(peer->last_tx_at);
+	s32 base_lsw = base;
+	s32 diff = last_tx_at - base_lsw;
+
+	diff = clamp(diff, -RXRPC_KEEPALIVE_TIME, RXRPC_KEEPALIVE_TIME);
+
+	return diff + base;
+}
+
+/*
  * Perform keep-alive pings.
  */
 static void rxrpc_peer_keepalive_dispatch(struct rxrpc_net *rxnet,
@@ -252,7 +267,7 @@ static void rxrpc_peer_keepalive_dispatc
 		spin_unlock(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock);
 
 		if (use) {
-			keepalive_at = peer->last_tx_at + RXRPC_KEEPALIVE_TIME;
+			keepalive_at = rxrpc_peer_get_tx_mark(peer, base) + RXRPC_KEEPALIVE_TIME;
 			slot = keepalive_at - base;
 			_debug("%02x peer %u t=%d {%pISp}",
 			       cursor, peer->debug_id, slot, &peer->srx.transport);
net/rxrpc/proc.c +2 -2
@@ -225,13 +225,13 @@ static int rxrpc_peer_seq_show(struct se
 	now = ktime_get_seconds();
 	seq_printf(seq,
 		   "UDP   %-47.47s %-47.47s %3u"
-		   " %3u %5u %6llus %8u %8u\n",
+		   " %3u %5u %6ds %8u %8u\n",
 		   lbuff,
 		   rbuff,
 		   refcount_read(&peer->ref),
 		   peer->cong_ssthresh,
 		   peer->mtu,
-		   now - peer->last_tx_at,
+		   (s32)now - (s32)READ_ONCE(peer->last_tx_at),
 		   peer->srtt_us >> 3,
 		   jiffies_to_usecs(peer->rto_j));
 
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +1 -1
@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ static int rxkad_issue_challenge(struct
 		return -EAGAIN;
 	}
 
-	conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds();
+	rxrpc_peer_mark_tx(conn->peer);
 	trace_rxrpc_tx_packet(conn->debug_id, &whdr,
 			      rxrpc_tx_point_rxkad_challenge);
 	_leave(" = 0");
author maintainer
#419 lore raw

PATCH 419/567 iomap: allocate s_dio_done_wq for async reads as well

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

commit 7fd8720dff2d9c70cf5a1a13b7513af01952ec02 upstream.

Since commit 222f2c7c6d14 ("iomap: always run error completions in user context"), read error completions are deferred to s_dio_done_wq. This means the workqueue also needs to be allocated for async reads.

---
 fs/iomap/direct-io.c |   10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/iomap/direct-io.c +5 -5
@@ -659,12 +659,12 @@ __iomap_dio_rw(struct kiocb *iocb, struc
 			}
 			goto out_free_dio;
 		}
+	}
 
-		if (!wait_for_completion && !inode->i_sb->s_dio_done_wq) {
-			ret = sb_init_dio_done_wq(inode->i_sb);
-			if (ret < 0)
-				goto out_free_dio;
-		}
+	if (!wait_for_completion && !inode->i_sb->s_dio_done_wq) {
+		ret = sb_init_dio_done_wq(inode->i_sb);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto out_free_dio;
 	}
 
 	inode_dio_begin(inode);
author maintainer
#420 lore raw

PATCH 420/567 btrfs: do not strictly require dirty metadata threshold for metadata writepages

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4e159150a9a56d66d247f4b5510bed46fe58aa1c ]

[BUG]
There is an internal report that over 1000 processes are waiting at the io_schedule_timeout() of balance_dirty_pages(), causing a system hang and trigger a kernel coredump.

The kernel is v6.4 kernel based, but the root problem still applies to any upstream kernel before v6.18.

[CAUSE]

Quoted 1 line

From Jan Kara for his wisdom on the dirty page balance behavior first.

This cgroup dirty limit was what was actually playing the role here because the cgroup had only a small amount of memory and so the dirty limit for it was something like 16MB.

Dirty throttling is responsible for enforcing that nobody can dirty (significantly) more dirty memory than there's dirty limit. Thus when a task is dirtying pages it periodically enters into balance_dirty_pages() and we let it sleep there to slow down the dirtying.

When the system is over dirty limit already (either globally or within a cgroup of the running task), we will not let the task exit from balance_dirty_pages() until the number of dirty pages drops below the limit.

So in this particular case, as I already mentioned, there was a cgroup with relatively small amount of memory and as a result with dirty limit set at 16MB. A task from that cgroup has dirtied about 28MB worth of pages in btrfs btree inode and these were practically the only dirty pages in that cgroup.

So that means the only way to reduce the dirty pages of that cgroup is to writeback the dirty pages of btrfs btree inode, and only after that those processes can exit balance_dirty_pages().

Now back to the btrfs part, btree_writepages() is responsible for writing back dirty btree inode pages.

The problem here is, there is a btrfs internal threshold that if the btree inode's dirty bytes are below the 32M threshold, it will not do any writeback.

This behavior is to batch as much metadata as possible so we won't write back those tree blocks and then later re-COW them again for another modification.

This internal 32MiB is higher than the existing dirty page size (28MiB), meaning no writeback will happen, causing a deadlock between btrfs and cgroup:

- Btrfs doesn't want to write back btree inode until more dirty pages

- Cgroup/MM doesn't want more dirty pages for btrfs btree inode Thus any process touching that btree inode is put into sleep until the number of dirty pages is reduced.

Thanks Jan Kara a lot for the analysis of the root cause.

[ENHANCEMENT]
Since kernel commit b55102826d7d ("btrfs: set AS_KERNEL_FILE on the btree_inode"), btrfs btree inode pages will only be charged to the root cgroup which should have a much larger limit than btrfs' 32MiB threshold.
So it should not affect newer kernels.

But for all current LTS kernels, they are all affected by this problem, and backporting the whole AS_KERNEL_FILE may not be a good idea.

Even for newer kernels I still think it's a good idea to get rid of the internal threshold at btree_writepages(), since for most cases cgroup/MM has a better view of full system memory usage than btrfs' fixed threshold.

For internal callers using btrfs_btree_balance_dirty() since that function is already doing internal threshold check, we don't need to bother them.

But for external callers of btree_writepages(), just respect their requests and write back whatever they want, ignoring the internal btrfs threshold to avoid such deadlock on btree inode dirty page balancing.

[ The context change is due to the commit 41044b41ad2c ("btrfs: add helper to get fs_info from struct inode pointer") in v6.9 and the commit c66f2afc7148
("btrfs: remove pointless writepages callback wrapper") in v6.10 which are irrelevant to the logic of this patch. ]

---
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c   |   22 ----------------------
 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c |    3 +--
 fs/btrfs/extent_io.h |    3 +--
 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +0 -22
@@ -470,28 +470,6 @@ static int btree_migrate_folio(struct ad
 #define btree_migrate_folio NULL
 #endif
 
-static int btree_writepages(struct address_space *mapping,
-			    struct writeback_control *wbc)
-{
-	struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info;
-	int ret;
-
-	if (wbc->sync_mode == WB_SYNC_NONE) {
-
-		if (wbc->for_kupdate)
-			return 0;
-
-		fs_info = BTRFS_I(mapping->host)->root->fs_info;
-		/* this is a bit racy, but that's ok */
-		ret = __percpu_counter_compare(&fs_info->dirty_metadata_bytes,
-					     BTRFS_DIRTY_METADATA_THRESH,
-					     fs_info->dirty_metadata_batch);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return 0;
-	}
-	return btree_write_cache_pages(mapping, wbc);
-}
-
 static bool btree_release_folio(struct folio *folio, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 {
 	if (folio_test_writeback(folio) || folio_test_dirty(folio))
fs/btrfs/extent_io.c +1 -2
@@ -1921,8 +1921,7 @@ static int submit_eb_page(struct page *p
 	return 1;
 }
 
-int btree_write_cache_pages(struct address_space *mapping,
-				   struct writeback_control *wbc)
+int btree_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, struct writeback_control *wbc)
 {
 	struct btrfs_eb_write_context ctx = { .wbc = wbc };
 	struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = BTRFS_I(mapping->host)->root->fs_info;
fs/btrfs/extent_io.h +1 -2
@@ -189,8 +189,7 @@ void extent_write_locked_range(struct in
 			       bool pages_dirty);
 int extent_writepages(struct address_space *mapping,
 		      struct writeback_control *wbc);
-int btree_write_cache_pages(struct address_space *mapping,
-			    struct writeback_control *wbc);
+int btree_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, struct writeback_control *wbc);
 void extent_readahead(struct readahead_control *rac);
 int extent_fiemap(struct btrfs_inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo,
 		  u64 start, u64 len);
author maintainer
#421 lore raw

PATCH 421/567 riscv: Sanitize syscall table indexing under speculation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lukas Gerlach <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 25fd7ee7bf58ac3ec7be3c9f82ceff153451946c ]

The syscall number is a user-controlled value used to index into the syscall table. Use array_index_nospec() to clamp this value after the bounds check to prevent speculative out-of-bounds access and subsequent data leakage via cache side channels.

[ Added linux/nospec.h for array_index_nospec() to make sure compile without error ]
---
 arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c +4 -1
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/irq.h>
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/entry-common.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <asm/asm-prototypes.h>
 #include <asm/bug.h>
@@ -317,8 +318,10 @@ asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void
 
 		syscall = syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, syscall);
 
-		if (syscall >= 0 && syscall < NR_syscalls)
+		if (syscall >= 0 && syscall < NR_syscalls) {
+			syscall = array_index_nospec(syscall, NR_syscalls);
 			syscall_handler(regs, syscall);
+		}
 
 		syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
 	} else {
author maintainer
#422 lore raw

PATCH 422/567 dmaengine: mmp_pdma: Fix race condition in mmp_pdma_residue()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guodong Xu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a143545855bc2c6e1330f6f57ae375ac44af00a7 ]

Add proper locking in mmp_pdma_residue() to prevent use-after-free when accessing descriptor list and descriptor contents.

The race occurs when multiple threads call tx_status() while the tasklet on another CPU is freeing completed descriptors:

CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----
mmp_pdma_tx_status()
mmp_pdma_residue()
-> NO LOCK held

     list_for_each_entry(sw, ..)
                                   DMA interrupt
                                   dma_do_tasklet()
                                     -> spin_lock(&desc_lock)
                                        list_move(sw->node, ...)
                                        spin_unlock(&desc_lock)

| dma_pool_free(sw) <- FREED!
-> access sw->desc <- UAF!

This issue can be reproduced when running dmatest on the same channel with multiple threads (threads_per_chan > 1).

Fix by protecting the chain_running list iteration and descriptor access with the chan->desc_lock spinlock.

---
 drivers/dma/mmp_pdma.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/dma/mmp_pdma.c +6 -0
@@ -764,6 +764,7 @@ static unsigned int mmp_pdma_residue(str
 {
 	struct mmp_pdma_desc_sw *sw;
 	u32 curr, residue = 0;
+	unsigned long flags;
 	bool passed = false;
 	bool cyclic = chan->cyclic_first != NULL;
 
@@ -779,6 +780,8 @@ static unsigned int mmp_pdma_residue(str
 	else
 		curr = readl(chan->phy->base + DSADR(chan->phy->idx));
 
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&chan->desc_lock, flags);
+
 	list_for_each_entry(sw, &chan->chain_running, node) {
 		u32 start, end, len;
 
@@ -822,6 +825,7 @@ static unsigned int mmp_pdma_residue(str
 			continue;
 
 		if (sw->async_tx.cookie == cookie) {
+			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&chan->desc_lock, flags);
 			return residue;
 		} else {
 			residue = 0;
@@ -829,6 +833,8 @@ static unsigned int mmp_pdma_residue(str
 		}
 	}
 
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&chan->desc_lock, flags);
+
 	/* We should only get here in case of cyclic transactions */
 	return residue;
 }
author maintainer
#423 lore raw

PATCH 423/567 tracing: Add recursion protection in kernel stack trace recording

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5f1ef0dfcb5b7f4a91a9b0e0ba533efd9f7e2cdb ]

A bug was reported about an infinite recursion caused by tracing the rcu events with the kernel stack trace trigger enabled. The stack trace code called back into RCU which then called the stack trace again.

Expand the ftrace recursion protection to add a set of bits to protect events from recursion. Each bit represents the context that the event is in (normal, softirq, interrupt and NMI).

Have the stack trace code use the interrupt context to protect against recursion.

Note, the bug showed an issue in both the RCU code as well as the tracing stacktrace code. This only handles the tracing stack trace side of the bug. The RCU fix will be handled separately.

Cc Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Cc Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]>
Cc Joel Fernandes <[email protected]>
Cc "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>
Cc Boqun Feng <[email protected]>
Fixes 5f5fa7ea89dc ("rcu: Don't use negative nesting depth in __rcu_read_unlock()")
---
 include/linux/trace_recursion.h |    9 +++++++++
 kernel/trace/trace.c            |    6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
include/linux/trace_recursion.h +9 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,13 @@ enum {
 	TRACE_INTERNAL_SIRQ_BIT,
 	TRACE_INTERNAL_TRANSITION_BIT,
 
+	/* Internal event use recursion bits */
+	TRACE_INTERNAL_EVENT_BIT,
+	TRACE_INTERNAL_EVENT_NMI_BIT,
+	TRACE_INTERNAL_EVENT_IRQ_BIT,
+	TRACE_INTERNAL_EVENT_SIRQ_BIT,
+	TRACE_INTERNAL_EVENT_TRANSITION_BIT,
+
 	TRACE_BRANCH_BIT,
 /*
  * Abuse of the trace_recursion.
@@ -97,6 +104,8 @@ enum {
 
 #define TRACE_LIST_START	TRACE_INTERNAL_BIT
 
+#define TRACE_EVENT_START	TRACE_INTERNAL_EVENT_BIT
+
 #define TRACE_CONTEXT_MASK	((1 << (TRACE_LIST_START + TRACE_CONTEXT_BITS)) - 1)
 
 /*
kernel/trace/trace.c +6 -0
@@ -3105,6 +3105,11 @@ static void __ftrace_trace_stack(struct
 	struct ftrace_stack *fstack;
 	struct stack_entry *entry;
 	int stackidx;
+	int bit;
+
+	bit = trace_test_and_set_recursion(_THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_, TRACE_EVENT_START);
+	if (bit < 0)
+		return;
 
 	/*
 	 * Add one, for this function and the call to save_stack_trace()
@@ -3162,6 +3167,7 @@ static void __ftrace_trace_stack(struct
 	__this_cpu_dec(ftrace_stack_reserve);
 	preempt_enable_notrace();
 
+	trace_clear_recursion(bit);
 }
 
 static inline void ftrace_trace_stack(struct trace_array *tr,
author maintainer
#424 lore raw

PATCH 424/567 net: add support for segmenting TCP fraglist GSO packets

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bee88cd5bd83d40b8aec4d6cb729378f707f6197 ]

Preparation for adding TCP fraglist GRO support. It expects packets to be combined in a similar way as UDP fraglist GSO packets.
For IPv4 packets, NAT is handled in the same way as UDP fraglist GSO.

---
 net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c   |   67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/ipv6/tcpv6_offload.c |   58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 125 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c +67 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,70 @@ static void tcp_gso_tstamp(struct sk_buf
 	}
 }
 
+static void __tcpv4_gso_segment_csum(struct sk_buff *seg,
+				     __be32 *oldip, __be32 newip,
+				     __be16 *oldport, __be16 newport)
+{
+	struct tcphdr *th;
+	struct iphdr *iph;
+
+	if (*oldip == newip && *oldport == newport)
+		return;
+
+	th = tcp_hdr(seg);
+	iph = ip_hdr(seg);
+
+	inet_proto_csum_replace4(&th->check, seg, *oldip, newip, true);
+	inet_proto_csum_replace2(&th->check, seg, *oldport, newport, false);
+	*oldport = newport;
+
+	csum_replace4(&iph->check, *oldip, newip);
+	*oldip = newip;
+}
+
+static struct sk_buff *__tcpv4_gso_segment_list_csum(struct sk_buff *segs)
+{
+	const struct tcphdr *th;
+	const struct iphdr *iph;
+	struct sk_buff *seg;
+	struct tcphdr *th2;
+	struct iphdr *iph2;
+
+	seg = segs;
+	th = tcp_hdr(seg);
+	iph = ip_hdr(seg);
+	th2 = tcp_hdr(seg->next);
+	iph2 = ip_hdr(seg->next);
+
+	if (!(*(const u32 *)&th->source ^ *(const u32 *)&th2->source) &&
+	    iph->daddr == iph2->daddr && iph->saddr == iph2->saddr)
+		return segs;
+
+	while ((seg = seg->next)) {
+		th2 = tcp_hdr(seg);
+		iph2 = ip_hdr(seg);
+
+		__tcpv4_gso_segment_csum(seg,
+					 &iph2->saddr, iph->saddr,
+					 &th2->source, th->source);
+		__tcpv4_gso_segment_csum(seg,
+					 &iph2->daddr, iph->daddr,
+					 &th2->dest, th->dest);
+	}
+
+	return segs;
+}
+
+static struct sk_buff *__tcp4_gso_segment_list(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					      netdev_features_t features)
+{
+	skb = skb_segment_list(skb, features, skb_mac_header_len(skb));
+	if (IS_ERR(skb))
+		return skb;
+
+	return __tcpv4_gso_segment_list_csum(skb);
+}
+
 static struct sk_buff *tcp4_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
 					netdev_features_t features)
 {
@@ -40,6 +104,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *tcp4_gso_segment(
 	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct tcphdr)))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
+	if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST)
+		return __tcp4_gso_segment_list(skb, features);
+
 	if (unlikely(skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)) {
 		const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
 		struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
net/ipv6/tcpv6_offload.c +58 -0

70 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#425 lore raw

PATCH 425/567 net: gso: fix tcp fraglist segmentation after pull from frag_list

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 17bd3bd82f9f79f3feba15476c2b2c95a9b11ff8 ]

Detect tcp gso fraglist skbs with corrupted geometry (see below) and pass these to skb_segment instead of skb_segment_list, as the first can segment them correctly.

Valid SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs
- consist of two or more segments
- the head_skb holds the protocol headers plus first gso_size
- one or more frag_list skbs hold exactly one segment
- all but the last must be gso_size

Optional datapath hooks such as NAT and BPF (bpf_skb_pull_data) can modify these skbs, breaking these invariants.

In extreme cases they pull all data into skb linear. For TCP, this causes a NULL ptr deref in __tcpv4_gso_segment_list_csum at tcp_hdr(seg->next).

Detect invalid geometry due to pull, by checking head_skb size. Don't just drop, as this may blackhole a destination. Convert to be able to pass to regular skb_segment.

Approach and description based on a patch by Willem de Bruijn.

---
 net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c   |   10 ++++++++--
 net/ipv6/tcpv6_offload.c |   10 ++++++++--
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c +8 -2
@@ -104,8 +104,14 @@ static struct sk_buff *tcp4_gso_segment(
 	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct tcphdr)))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST)
-		return __tcp4_gso_segment_list(skb, features);
+	if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST) {
+		struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
+
+		if (skb_pagelen(skb) - th->doff * 4 == skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size)
+			return __tcp4_gso_segment_list(skb, features);
+
+		skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
+	}
 
 	if (unlikely(skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)) {
 		const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
net/ipv6/tcpv6_offload.c +8 -2
@@ -106,8 +106,14 @@ static struct sk_buff *tcp6_gso_segment(
 	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*th)))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST)
-		return __tcp6_gso_segment_list(skb, features);
+	if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST) {
+		struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
+
+		if (skb_pagelen(skb) - th->doff * 4 == skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size)
+			return __tcp6_gso_segment_list(skb, features);
+
+		skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
+	}
 
 	if (unlikely(skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)) {
 		const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
author maintainer
#426 lore raw

PATCH 426/567 net: fix segmentation of forwarding fraglist GRO

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jibin Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 426ca15c7f6cb6562a081341ca88893a50c59fa2 ]

This patch enhances GSO segment handling by properly checking the SKB_GSO_DODGY flag for frag_list GSO packets, addressing low throughput issues observed when a station accesses IPv4 servers via hotspots with an IPv6-only upstream interface.

Specifically, it fixes a bug in GSO segmentation when forwarding GRO packets containing a frag_list. The function skb_segment_list cannot correctly process GRO skbs that have been converted by XLAT, since XLAT only translates the header of the head skb. Consequently, skbs in the frag_list may remain untranslated, resulting in protocol inconsistencies and reduced throughput.

To address this, the patch explicitly sets the SKB_GSO_DODGY flag for GSO packets in XLAT's IPv4/IPv6 protocol translation helpers (bpf_skb_proto_4_to_6 and bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4). This marks GSO packets as potentially modified after protocol translation. As a result, GSO segmentation will avoid using skb_segment_list and instead falls back to skb_segment for packets with the SKB_GSO_DODGY flag. This ensures that only safe and fully translated frag_list packets are processed by skb_segment_list, resolving protocol inconsistencies and improving throughput when forwarding GRO packets converted by XLAT.

---
 net/core/filter.c        |    2 ++
 net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c   |    3 ++-
 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c   |    3 ++-
 net/ipv6/tcpv6_offload.c |    3 ++-
 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/core/filter.c +2 -0
@@ -3340,6 +3340,7 @@ static int bpf_skb_proto_4_to_6(struct s
 			shinfo->gso_type &= ~SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
 			shinfo->gso_type |=  SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
 		}
+		shinfo->gso_type |=  SKB_GSO_DODGY;
 	}
 
 	bpf_skb_change_protocol(skb, ETH_P_IPV6);
@@ -3370,6 +3371,7 @@ static int bpf_skb_proto_6_to_4(struct s
 			shinfo->gso_type &= ~SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
 			shinfo->gso_type |=  SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
 		}
+		shinfo->gso_type |=  SKB_GSO_DODGY;
 	}
 
 	bpf_skb_change_protocol(skb, ETH_P_IP);
net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c +2 -1
@@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *tcp4_gso_segment(
 	if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST) {
 		struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
 
-		if (skb_pagelen(skb) - th->doff * 4 == skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size)
+		if ((skb_pagelen(skb) - th->doff * 4 == skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size) &&
+		    !(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_DODGY))
 			return __tcp4_gso_segment_list(skb, features);
 
 		skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
net/ipv4/udp_offload.c +2 -1
@@ -352,7 +352,8 @@ struct sk_buff *__udp_gso_segment(struct
 
 	if (skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST) {
 		 /* Detect modified geometry and pass those to skb_segment. */
-		if (skb_pagelen(gso_skb) - sizeof(*uh) == skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->gso_size)
+		if ((skb_pagelen(gso_skb) - sizeof(*uh) == skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->gso_size) &&
+		    !(skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_DODGY))
 			return __udp_gso_segment_list(gso_skb, features, is_ipv6);
 
 		ret = __skb_linearize(gso_skb);
net/ipv6/tcpv6_offload.c +2 -1
@@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *tcp6_gso_segment(
 	if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST) {
 		struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
 
-		if (skb_pagelen(skb) - th->doff * 4 == skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size)
+		if ((skb_pagelen(skb) - th->doff * 4 == skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size) &&
+		    !(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_DODGY))
 			return __tcp6_gso_segment_list(skb, features);
 
 		skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
author maintainer
#427 lore raw

PATCH 427/567 bpf: Forget ranges when refining tnum after JSET

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Chaignon <[email protected]>

commit 6279846b9b2532e1b04559ef8bd0dec049f29383 upstream.

Syzbot reported a kernel warning due to a range invariant violation on the following BPF program.

0: call bpf_get_netns_cookie
1: if r0 == 0 goto <exit>
2: if r0 & Oxffffffff goto <exit>

The issue is on the path where we fall through both jumps.

That path is unreachable at runtime: after insn 1, we know r0 != 0, but with the sign extension on the jset, we would only fallthrough insn 2 if r0 == 0. Unfortunately, is_branch_taken() isn't currently able to figure this out, so the verifier walks all branches. The verifier then refines the register bounds using the second condition and we end up with inconsistent bounds on this unreachable path:

1: if r0 == 0 goto <exit>

    r0: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0xffffffffffffffff)
  2: if r0 & 0xffffffff goto <exit>
    r0 before reg_bounds_sync: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0)
    r0 after reg_bounds_sync:  u64=[0x1, 0] var_off=(0, 0)

Improving the range refinement for JSET to cover all cases is tricky. We also don't expect many users to rely on JSET given LLVM doesn't generate those instructions. So instead of improving the range refinement for JSETs, Eduard suggested we forget the ranges whenever we're narrowing tnums after a JSET. This patch implements that approach.

[ shung-hsi.yu: no detection or kernel warning for invariant violation before
6.8, but the same umin=1,umax=0 state can occur when jset is preceed by r0 < 1. Changes were made to adapt to older range refinement logic before commit 67420501e868 ("bpf: generalize reg_set_min_max() to handle non-const register comparisons"). ]

---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +4 -0
@@ -14158,6 +14158,10 @@ static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_r
 		}
 		break;
 	case BPF_JSET:
+		/* Forget the ranges before narrowing tnums, to avoid invariant
+		 * violations if we're on a dead branch.
+		 */
+		__mark_reg_unbounded(false_reg);
 		if (is_jmp32) {
 			false_32off = tnum_and(false_32off, tnum_const(~val32));
 			if (is_power_of_2(val32))
author maintainer
#428 lore raw

PATCH 428/567 net: dsa: properly keep track of conduit reference

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]>

commit 06e219f6a706c367c93051f408ac61417643d2f9 upstream.

Problem description
-------------------

DSA has a mumbo-jumbo of reference handling of the conduit net device and its kobject which, sadly, is just wrong and doesn't make sense.

There are two distinct problems.

1. The OF path, which uses of_find_net_device_by_node(), never releases the elevated refcount on the conduit's kobject. Nominally, the OF and non-OF paths should result in objects having identical reference counts taken, and it is already suspicious that dsa_dev_to_net_device() has a put_device() call which is missing in dsa_port_parse_of(), but we can actually even verify that an issue exists. With CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, if we run this command "before" and "after" applying this patch:

(unbind the conduit driver for net device eno2) echo 0000:00:00.2 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/fsl_enetc/unbind

we see these lines in the output diff which appear only with the patch applied:

kobject: 'eno2' (ffff002009a3a6b8): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)
kobject: '109' (ffff0020099d59a0): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)

2. After we find the conduit interface one way (OF) or another (non-OF), it can get unregistered at any time, and DSA remains with a long-lived, but in this case stale, cpu_dp->conduit pointer. Holding the net device's underlying kobject isn't actually of much help, it just prevents it from being freed (but we never need that kobject directly). What helps us to prevent the net device from being unregistered is the parallel netdev reference mechanism (dev_hold() and dev_put()).

Actually we actually use that netdev tracker mechanism implicitly on user ports since commit 2f1e8ea726e9 ("net: dsa: link interfaces with the DSA master to get rid of lockdep warnings"), via netdev_upper_dev_link(). But time still passes at DSA switch probe time between the initial of_find_net_device_by_node() code and the user port creation time, time during which the conduit could unregister itself and DSA wouldn't know about it.

So we have to run of_find_net_device_by_node() under rtnl_lock() to prevent that from happening, and release the lock only with the netdev tracker having acquired the reference.

Do we need to keep the reference until dsa_unregister_switch() / dsa_switch_shutdown()?
1: Maybe yes. A switch device will still be registered even if all user
ports failed to probe, see commit 86f8b1c01a0a ("net: dsa: Do not make user port errors fatal"), and the cpu_dp->conduit pointers remain valid. I haven't audited all call paths to see whether they will actually use the conduit in lack of any user port, but if they do, it seems safer to not rely on user ports for that reference.
2. Definitely yes. We support changing the conduit which a user port is associated to, and we can get into a situation where we've moved all user ports away from a conduit, thus no longer hold any reference to it via the net device tracker. But we shouldn't let it go nonetheless
- see the next change in relation to dsa_tree_find_first_conduit() and LAG conduits which disappear.
We have to be prepared to return to the physical conduit, so the CPU port must explicitly keep another reference to it. This is also to
say: the user ports and their CPU ports may not always keep a reference to the same conduit net device, and both are needed.

As for the conduit's kobject for the /sys/class/net/ entry, we don't care about it, we can release it as soon as we hold the net device object itself.

History and blame attribution
-----------------------------

The code has been refactored so many times, it is very difficult to follow and properly attribute a blame, but I'll try to make a short history which I hope to be correct.

We have two distinct probing paths:
- one for OF, introduced in 2016 in commit 83c0afaec7b7 ("net: dsa: Add new binding implementation")
- one for non-OF, introduced in 2017 in commit 71e0bbde0d88 ("net: dsa:
Add support for platform data")

These are both complete rewrites of the original probing paths (which used struct dsa_switch_driver and other weird stuff, instead of regular devices on their respective buses for register access, like MDIO, SPI, I2C etc):
- one for OF, introduced in 2013 in commit 5e95329b701c ("dsa: add device tree bindings to register DSA switches")
- one for non-OF, introduced in 2008 in commit 91da11f870f0 ("net:
Distributed Switch Architecture protocol support")

except for tiny bits and pieces like dsa_dev_to_net_device() which were seemingly carried over since the original commit, and used to this day.

The point is that the original probing paths received a fix in 2015 in the form of commit 679fb46c5785 ("net: dsa: Add missing master netdev dev_put() calls"), but the fix never made it into the "new" (dsa2) probing paths that can still be traced to today, and the fixed probing path was later deleted in 2019 in commit 93e86b3bc842 ("net: dsa: Remove legacy probing support").

That is to say, the new probing paths were never quite correct in this area.

The existence of the legacy probing support which was deleted in 2019 explains why dsa_dev_to_net_device() returns a conduit with elevated refcount (because it was supposed to be released during dsa_remove_dst()). After the removal of the legacy code, the only user of dsa_dev_to_net_device() calls dev_put(conduit) immediately after this function returns. This pattern makes no sense today, and can only be interpreted historically to understand why dev_hold() was there in the first place.

Change details
--------------

Today we have a better netdev tracking infrastructure which we should use. Logically netdev_hold() belongs in common code (dsa_port_parse_cpu(), where dp->conduit is assigned), but there is a tradeoff to be made with the rtnl_lock() section which would become a bit too long if we did that - dsa_port_parse_cpu() also calls request_module(). So we duplicate a bit of logic in order for the callers of dsa_port_parse_cpu() to be the ones responsible of holding the conduit reference and releasing it on error. This shortens the rtnl_lock() section significantly.

In the dsa_switch_probe() error path, dsa_switch_release_ports() will be called in a number of situations, one being where dsa_port_parse_cpu() maybe didn't get the chance to run at all (a different port failed earlier, etc). So we have to test for the conduit being NULL prior to calling netdev_put().

There have still been so many transformations to the code since the blamed commits (rename master -> conduit, commit 0650bf52b31f ("net:
dsa: be compatible with masters which unregister on shutdown")), that it only makes sense to fix the code using the best methods available today and see how it can be backported to stable later. I suspect the fix cannot even be backported to kernels which lack dsa_switch_shutdown(), and I suspect this is also maybe why the long-lived conduit reference didn't make it into the new DSA probing paths at the time (problems during shutdown).

Because dsa_dev_to_net_device() has a single call site and has to be changed anyway, the logic was just absorbed into the non-OF dsa_port_parse().

Tested on the ocelot/felix switch and on dsa_loop, both on the NXP LS1028A with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y.

Fixes 83c0afaec7b7 ("net: dsa: Add new binding implementation")
Fixes 71e0bbde0d88 ("net: dsa: Add support for platform data")
[ backport: "conduit" -> "master" in code, kept original commit message ]
---
 include/net/dsa.h |    1 
 net/dsa/dsa.c     |   59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
include/net/dsa.h +1 -0
@@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ struct dsa_port {
 	struct devlink_port	devlink_port;
 	struct phylink		*pl;
 	struct phylink_config	pl_config;
+	netdevice_tracker	master_tracker;
 	struct dsa_lag		*lag;
 	struct net_device	*hsr_dev;
 
net/dsa/dsa.c +34 -25

99 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#429 lore raw

PATCH 429/567 drm/amd/display: Add pixel_clock to amd_pp_display_configuration

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Timur Kristóf <[email protected]>

commit b515dcb0dc4e85d8254f5459cfb32fce88dacbfb upstream.

This commit adds the pixel_clock field to the display config struct so that power management (DPM) can use it.

We currently don't have a proper bandwidth calculation on old GPUs with DCE 6-10 because dce_calcs only supports DCE 11+. So the power management (DPM) on these GPUs may need to make ad-hoc decisions for display based on the pixel clock.

Also rename sym_clock to pixel_clock in dm_pp_single_disp_config to avoid confusion with other code where the sym_clock refers to the DisplayPort symbol clock.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_pp_smu.c       |    1 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dce110/dce110_clk_mgr.c |    2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dm_services_types.h             |    2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/include/dm_pp_interface.h                  |    1 +
 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_pp_smu.c +1 -0
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ bool dm_pp_apply_display_requirements(
 			const struct dm_pp_single_disp_config *dc_cfg =
 						&pp_display_cfg->disp_configs[i];
 			adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.displays[i].controller_id = dc_cfg->pipe_idx + 1;
+			adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.displays[i].pixel_clock = dc_cfg->pixel_clock;
 		}
 
 		amdgpu_dpm_display_configuration_change(adev, &adev->pm.pm_display_cfg);
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dce110/dce110_clk_mgr.c +1 -1
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ void dce110_fill_display_configs(
 			stream->link->cur_link_settings.link_rate;
 		cfg->link_settings.link_spread =
 			stream->link->cur_link_settings.link_spread;
-		cfg->sym_clock = stream->phy_pix_clk;
+		cfg->pixel_clock = stream->phy_pix_clk;
 		/* Round v_refresh*/
 		cfg->v_refresh = stream->timing.pix_clk_100hz * 100;
 		cfg->v_refresh /= stream->timing.h_total;
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dm_services_types.h +1 -1
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ struct dm_pp_single_disp_config {
 	uint32_t src_height;
 	uint32_t src_width;
 	uint32_t v_refresh;
-	uint32_t sym_clock; /* HDMI only */
+	uint32_t pixel_clock; /* Pixel clock in KHz (for HDMI only: normalized) */
 	struct dc_link_settings link_settings; /* DP only */
 };
 
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/include/dm_pp_interface.h +1 -0
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ struct single_display_configuration
 	uint32_t view_resolution_cy;
 	enum amd_pp_display_config_type displayconfigtype;
 	uint32_t vertical_refresh; /* for active display */
+	uint32_t pixel_clock; /* Pixel clock in KHz (for HDMI only: normalized) */
 };
 
 #define MAX_NUM_DISPLAY 32
author maintainer
#430 lore raw

PATCH 430/567 drm/amd/pm: Use pm_display_cfg in legacy DPM (v2)

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Timur Kristóf <[email protected]>

commit 9d73b107a61b73e7101d4b728ddac3d2c77db111 upstream.

This commit is necessary for DC to function well with chips that use the legacy power management code, ie. SI and KV. Communicate display information from DC to the legacy PM code.

Currently DC uses pm_display_cfg to communicate power management requirements from the display code to the DPM code. However, the legacy (non-DC) code path used different fields and therefore could not take into account anything from DC.

Change the legacy display code to fill the same pm_display_cfg struct as DC and use the same in the legacy DPM code.

To ease review and reduce churn, this commit does not yet delete the now unneeded code, that is done in the next commit.

v2:
Rebase.
Fix single_display in amdgpu_dpm_pick_power_state.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/amdgpu_dpm_internal.c     |   67 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/inc/amdgpu_dpm_internal.h |    2 
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/kv_dpm.c       |    4 -
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/legacy_dpm.c   |    6 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/si_dpm.c       |   65 +++++++---------------
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/amd_powerplay.c |   11 ---
 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/amdgpu_dpm_internal.c +67 -0
@@ -100,3 +100,70 @@ u32 amdgpu_dpm_get_vrefresh(struct amdgp
 
 	return vrefresh;
 }
+
+void amdgpu_dpm_get_display_cfg(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
+{
+	struct drm_device *ddev = adev_to_drm(adev);
+	struct amd_pp_display_configuration *cfg = &adev->pm.pm_display_cfg;
+	struct single_display_configuration *display_cfg;
+	struct drm_crtc *crtc;
+	struct amdgpu_crtc *amdgpu_crtc;
+	struct amdgpu_connector *conn;
+	int num_crtcs = 0;
+	int vrefresh;
+	u32 vblank_in_pixels, vblank_time_us;
+
+	cfg->min_vblank_time = 0xffffffff; /* if the displays are off, vblank time is max */
+
+	if (adev->mode_info.num_crtc && adev->mode_info.mode_config_initialized) {
+		list_for_each_entry(crtc, &ddev->mode_config.crtc_list, head) {
+			amdgpu_crtc = to_amdgpu_crtc(crtc);
+
+			/* The array should only contain active displays. */
+			if (!amdgpu_crtc->enabled)
+				continue;
+
+			conn = to_amdgpu_connector(amdgpu_crtc->connector);
+			display_cfg = &adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.displays[num_crtcs++];
+
+			if (amdgpu_crtc->hw_mode.clock) {
+				vrefresh = drm_mode_vrefresh(&amdgpu_crtc->hw_mode);
+
+				vblank_in_pixels =
+					amdgpu_crtc->hw_mode.crtc_htotal *
+					(amdgpu_crtc->hw_mode.crtc_vblank_end -
+					amdgpu_crtc->hw_mode.crtc_vdisplay +
+					(amdgpu_crtc->v_border * 2));
+
+				vblank_time_us =
+					vblank_in_pixels * 1000 / amdgpu_crtc->hw_mode.clock;
+
+				/* The legacy (non-DC) code has issues with mclk switching
+				 * with refresh rates over 120 Hz. Disable mclk switching.
+				 */
+				if (vrefresh > 120)
+					vblank_time_us = 0;
+
+				/* Find minimum vblank time. */
+				if (vblank_time_us < cfg->min_vblank_time)
+					cfg->min_vblank_time = vblank_time_us;
+
+				/* Find vertical refresh rate of first active display. */
+				if (!cfg->vrefresh)
+					cfg->vrefresh = vrefresh;
+			}
+
+			if (amdgpu_crtc->crtc_id < cfg->crtc_index) {
+				/* Find first active CRTC and its line time. */
+				cfg->crtc_index = amdgpu_crtc->crtc_id;
+				cfg->line_time_in_us = amdgpu_crtc->line_time;
+			}
+
+			display_cfg->controller_id = amdgpu_crtc->crtc_id;
+			display_cfg->pixel_clock = conn->pixelclock_for_modeset;
+		}
+	}
+
+	cfg->display_clk = adev->clock.default_dispclk;
+	cfg->num_display = num_crtcs;
+}
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/inc/amdgpu_dpm_internal.h +2 -0
@@ -29,4 +29,6 @@ u32 amdgpu_dpm_get_vblank_time(struct am
 
 u32 amdgpu_dpm_get_vrefresh(struct amdgpu_device *adev);
 
+void amdgpu_dpm_get_display_cfg(struct amdgpu_device *adev);
+
 #endif
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/kv_dpm.c +2 -2
@@ -2299,7 +2299,7 @@ static void kv_apply_state_adjust_rules(
 
 		if (pi->sys_info.nb_dpm_enable) {
 			force_high = (mclk >= pi->sys_info.nbp_memory_clock[3]) ||
-				pi->video_start || (adev->pm.dpm.new_active_crtc_count >= 3) ||
+				pi->video_start || (adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.num_display >= 3) ||
 				pi->disable_nb_ps3_in_battery;
 			ps->dpm0_pg_nb_ps_lo = force_high ? 0x2 : 0x3;
 			ps->dpm0_pg_nb_ps_hi = 0x2;
@@ -2358,7 +2358,7 @@ static int kv_calculate_nbps_level_setti
 			return 0;
 
 		force_high = ((mclk >= pi->sys_info.nbp_memory_clock[3]) ||
-			      (adev->pm.dpm.new_active_crtc_count >= 3) || pi->video_start);
+			      (adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.num_display >= 3) || pi->video_start);
 
 		if (force_high) {
 			for (i = pi->lowest_valid; i <= pi->highest_valid; i++)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/legacy_dpm.c +3 -3
@@ -797,8 +797,7 @@ static struct amdgpu_ps *amdgpu_dpm_pick
 	int i;
 	struct amdgpu_ps *ps;
 	u32 ui_class;
-	bool single_display = (adev->pm.dpm.new_active_crtc_count < 2) ?
-		true : false;
+	bool single_display = adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.num_display < 2;
 
 	/* check if the vblank period is too short to adjust the mclk */
 	if (single_display && adev->powerplay.pp_funcs->vblank_too_short) {
@@ -1003,7 +1002,8 @@ void amdgpu_legacy_dpm_compute_clocks(vo
 {
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = (struct amdgpu_device *)handle;
 
-	amdgpu_dpm_get_active_displays(adev);
+	if (!adev->dc_enabled)
+		amdgpu_dpm_get_display_cfg(adev);
 
 	amdgpu_dpm_change_power_state_locked(adev);
 }
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/si_dpm.c +22 -43

150 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/amd_powerplay.c +1 -10
@@ -1567,16 +1567,7 @@ static void pp_pm_compute_clocks(void *h
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = hwmgr->adev;
 
 	if (!adev->dc_enabled) {
-		amdgpu_dpm_get_active_displays(adev);
-		adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.num_display = adev->pm.dpm.new_active_crtc_count;
-		adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.vrefresh = amdgpu_dpm_get_vrefresh(adev);
-		adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.min_vblank_time = amdgpu_dpm_get_vblank_time(adev);
-		/* we have issues with mclk switching with
-		 * refresh rates over 120 hz on the non-DC code.
-		 */
-		if (adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.vrefresh > 120)
-			adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.min_vblank_time = 0;
-
+		amdgpu_dpm_get_display_cfg(adev);
 		pp_display_configuration_change(handle,
 						&adev->pm.pm_display_cfg);
 	}
author maintainer
#431 lore raw

PATCH 431/567 l2tp: do not use sock_hold() in pppol2tp_session_get_sock()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

commit 9b8c88f875c04d4cb9111bd5dd9291c7e9691bf5 upstream.

pppol2tp_session_get_sock() is using RCU, it must be ready for sk_refcnt being zero.

Commit ee40fb2e1eb5 ("l2tp: protect sock pointer of
struct pppol2tp_session with RCU") was correct because it
had a call_rcu(..., pppol2tp_put_sk) which was later removed in blamed commit.

pppol2tp_recv() can use pppol2tp_session_get_sock() as well.

---
 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c |   25 ++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +8 -17
@@ -130,22 +130,12 @@ static const struct ppp_channel_ops pppo
 
 static const struct proto_ops pppol2tp_ops;
 
-/* Retrieves the pppol2tp socket associated to a session.
- * A reference is held on the returned socket, so this function must be paired
- * with sock_put().
- */
+/* Retrieves the pppol2tp socket associated to a session. */
 static struct sock *pppol2tp_session_get_sock(struct l2tp_session *session)
 {
 	struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
-	struct sock *sk;
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	sk = rcu_dereference(ps->sk);
-	if (sk)
-		sock_hold(sk);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-
-	return sk;
+	return rcu_dereference(ps->sk);
 }
 
 /* Helpers to obtain tunnel/session contexts from sockets.
@@ -211,14 +201,13 @@ end:
 
 static void pppol2tp_recv(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb, int data_len)
 {
-	struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
-	struct sock *sk = NULL;
+	struct sock *sk;
 
 	/* If the socket is bound, send it in to PPP's input queue. Otherwise
 	 * queue it on the session socket.
 	 */
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	sk = rcu_dereference(ps->sk);
+	sk = pppol2tp_session_get_sock(session);
 	if (!sk)
 		goto no_sock;
 
@@ -528,13 +517,14 @@ static void pppol2tp_show(struct seq_fil
 	struct l2tp_session *session = arg;
 	struct sock *sk;
 
+	rcu_read_lock();
 	sk = pppol2tp_session_get_sock(session);
 	if (sk) {
 		struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk);
 
 		seq_printf(m, "   interface %s\n", ppp_dev_name(&po->chan));
-		sock_put(sk);
 	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
 static void pppol2tp_session_init(struct l2tp_session *session)
@@ -1540,6 +1530,7 @@ static void pppol2tp_seq_session_show(st
 		port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
 	}
 
+	rcu_read_lock();
 	sk = pppol2tp_session_get_sock(session);
 	if (sk) {
 		state = sk->sk_state;
@@ -1575,8 +1566,8 @@ static void pppol2tp_seq_session_show(st
 		struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk);
 
 		seq_printf(m, "   interface %s\n", ppp_dev_name(&po->chan));
-		sock_put(sk);
 	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
 static int pppol2tp_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
author maintainer
#432 lore raw

PATCH 432/567 drm/amdgpu: Add basic validation for RAS header

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lijo Lazar <[email protected]>

commit 5df0d6addb7e9b6f71f7162d1253762a5be9138e upstream.

If RAS header read from EEPROM is corrupted, it could result in trying to allocate huge memory for reading the records. Add some validation to header fields.

[ RAS_TABLE_VER_V3 is not supported in v6.6.y. ]
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ras_eeprom.c |   20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ras_eeprom.c +18 -2
@@ -1338,15 +1338,31 @@ int amdgpu_ras_eeprom_init(struct amdgpu
 
 	__decode_table_header_from_buf(hdr, buf);
 
-	if (hdr->version == RAS_TABLE_VER_V2_1) {
+	switch (hdr->version) {
+	case RAS_TABLE_VER_V2_1:
 		control->ras_num_recs = RAS_NUM_RECS_V2_1(hdr);
 		control->ras_record_offset = RAS_RECORD_START_V2_1;
 		control->ras_max_record_count = RAS_MAX_RECORD_COUNT_V2_1;
-	} else {
+		break;
+	case RAS_TABLE_VER_V1:
 		control->ras_num_recs = RAS_NUM_RECS(hdr);
 		control->ras_record_offset = RAS_RECORD_START;
 		control->ras_max_record_count = RAS_MAX_RECORD_COUNT;
+		break;
+	default:
+		dev_err(adev->dev,
+			"RAS header invalid, unsupported version: %u",
+			hdr->version);
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
+
+	if (control->ras_num_recs > control->ras_max_record_count) {
+		dev_err(adev->dev,
+			"RAS header invalid, records in header: %u max allowed :%u",
+			control->ras_num_recs, control->ras_max_record_count);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	control->ras_fri = RAS_OFFSET_TO_INDEX(control, hdr->first_rec_offset);
 
 	if (hdr->header == RAS_TABLE_HDR_VAL) {
author maintainer
#433 lore raw

PATCH 433/567 drm/exynos: vidi: use priv->vidi_dev for ctx lookup in vidi_connection_ioctl()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d3968a0d85b211e197f2f4f06268a7031079e0d0 ]

vidi_connection_ioctl() retrieves the driver_data from drm_dev->dev to obtain a struct vidi_context pointer. However, drm_dev->dev is the exynos-drm master device, and the driver_data contained therein is not the vidi component device, but a completely different device.

This can lead to various bugs, ranging from null pointer dereferences and garbage value accesses to, in unlucky cases, out-of-bounds errors, use-after-free errors, and more.

To resolve this issue, we need to store/delete the vidi device pointer in exynos_drm_private->vidi_dev during bind/unbind, and then read this exynos_drm_private->vidi_dev within ioctl() to obtain the correct struct vidi_context pointer.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_drv.h  |    1 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_vidi.c |   14 +++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_drv.h +1 -0
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ struct drm_exynos_file_private {
 struct exynos_drm_private {
 	struct device *g2d_dev;
 	struct device *dma_dev;
+	struct device *vidi_dev;
 	void *mapping;
 
 	/* for atomic commit */
drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_vidi.c +13 -1
@@ -224,9 +224,14 @@ ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(vidi);
 int vidi_connection_ioctl(struct drm_device *drm_dev, void *data,
 				struct drm_file *file_priv)
 {
-	struct vidi_context *ctx = dev_get_drvdata(drm_dev->dev);
+	struct exynos_drm_private *priv = drm_dev->dev_private;
+	struct device *dev = priv ? priv->vidi_dev : NULL;
+	struct vidi_context *ctx = dev ? dev_get_drvdata(dev) : NULL;
 	struct drm_exynos_vidi_connection *vidi = data;
 
+	if (!ctx)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
 	if (!vidi) {
 		DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(ctx->dev,
 				  "user data for vidi is null.\n");
@@ -386,6 +391,7 @@ static int vidi_bind(struct device *dev,
 {
 	struct vidi_context *ctx = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
 	struct drm_device *drm_dev = data;
+	struct exynos_drm_private *priv = drm_dev->dev_private;
 	struct drm_encoder *encoder = &ctx->encoder;
 	struct exynos_drm_plane *exynos_plane;
 	struct exynos_drm_plane_config plane_config = { 0 };
@@ -393,6 +399,8 @@ static int vidi_bind(struct device *dev,
 	int ret;
 
 	ctx->drm_dev = drm_dev;
+	if (priv)
+		priv->vidi_dev = dev;
 
 	plane_config.pixel_formats = formats;
 	plane_config.num_pixel_formats = ARRAY_SIZE(formats);
@@ -438,8 +446,12 @@ static int vidi_bind(struct device *dev,
 static void vidi_unbind(struct device *dev, struct device *master, void *data)
 {
 	struct vidi_context *ctx = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	struct drm_device *drm_dev = data;
+	struct exynos_drm_private *priv = drm_dev->dev_private;
 
 	del_timer_sync(&ctx->timer);
+	if (priv)
+		priv->vidi_dev = NULL;
 }
 
 static const struct component_ops vidi_component_ops = {
author maintainer
#434 lore raw

PATCH 434/567 drm/exynos: vidi: fix to avoid directly dereferencing user pointer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d4c98c077c7fb2dfdece7d605e694b5ea2665085 ]

In vidi_connection_ioctl(), vidi->edid(user pointer) is directly dereferenced in the kernel.

This allows arbitrary kernel memory access from the user space, so instead of directly accessing the user pointer in the kernel, we should modify it to copy edid to kernel memory using copy_from_user() and use it.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_vidi.c |   15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_vidi.c +11 -4
@@ -252,19 +252,26 @@ int vidi_connection_ioctl(struct drm_dev
 
 	if (vidi->connection) {
 		struct edid *raw_edid;
+		struct edid edid_buf;
+		void *edid_userptr = u64_to_user_ptr(vidi->edid);
 
-		raw_edid = (struct edid *)(unsigned long)vidi->edid;
-		if (!drm_edid_is_valid(raw_edid)) {
+		if (copy_from_user(&edid_buf, edid_userptr, sizeof(struct edid)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		if (!drm_edid_is_valid(&edid_buf)) {
 			DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(ctx->dev,
 					  "edid data is invalid.\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
-		ctx->raw_edid = drm_edid_duplicate(raw_edid);
-		if (!ctx->raw_edid) {
+
+		raw_edid = drm_edid_duplicate(&edid_buf);
+
+		if (!raw_edid) {
 			DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(ctx->dev,
 					  "failed to allocate raw_edid.\n");
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
+		ctx->raw_edid = raw_edid;
 	} else {
 		/*
 		 * with connection = 0, free raw_edid
author maintainer
#435 lore raw

PATCH 435/567 drm/exynos: vidi: use ctx->lock to protect struct vidi_context member variables related to memory alloc/free

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 52b330799e2d6f825ae2bb74662ec1b10eb954bb ]

Exynos Virtual Display driver performs memory alloc/free operations without lock protection, which easily causes concurrency problem.

For example, use-after-free can occur in race scenario like this:

```
	CPU0				CPU1				CPU2
	----				----				----
  vidi_connection_ioctl()
    if (vidi->connection) // true
      drm_edid = drm_edid_alloc(); // alloc drm_edid
      ...
      ctx->raw_edid = drm_edid;
      ...
								drm_mode_getconnector()
								  drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes()
								    vidi_get_modes()
								      if (ctx->raw_edid) // true
								        drm_edid_dup(ctx->raw_edid);
								          if (!drm_edid) // false
								          ...
				vidi_connection_ioctl()
				  if (vidi->connection) // false
				    drm_edid_free(ctx->raw_edid); // free drm_edid
				    ...
								          drm_edid_alloc(drm_edid->edid)
								            kmemdup(edid); // UAF!!
								            ...
```

To prevent these vulns, at least in vidi_context, member variables related to memory alloc/free should be protected with ctx->lock.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_vidi.c |   43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_vidi.c +35 -8
@@ -186,15 +186,17 @@ static ssize_t vidi_store_connection(str
 				const char *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	struct vidi_context *ctx = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-	int ret;
+	int ret, new_connected;
 
-	ret = kstrtoint(buf, 0, &ctx->connected);
+	ret = kstrtoint(buf, 0, &new_connected);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	if (ctx->connected > 1)
+	if (new_connected > 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	mutex_lock(&ctx->lock);
+
 	/* use fake edid data for test. */
 	if (!ctx->raw_edid)
 		ctx->raw_edid = (struct edid *)fake_edid_info;
@@ -202,14 +204,21 @@ static ssize_t vidi_store_connection(str
 	/* if raw_edid isn't same as fake data then it can't be tested. */
 	if (ctx->raw_edid != (struct edid *)fake_edid_info) {
 		DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(dev, "edid data is not fake data.\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto fail;
 	}
 
+	ctx->connected = new_connected;
+	mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
+
 	DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(dev, "requested connection.\n");
 
 	drm_helper_hpd_irq_event(ctx->drm_dev);
 
 	return len;
+fail:
+	mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static DEVICE_ATTR(connection, 0644, vidi_show_connection,
@@ -244,11 +253,14 @@ int vidi_connection_ioctl(struct drm_dev
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	mutex_lock(&ctx->lock);
 	if (ctx->connected == vidi->connection) {
+		mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
 		DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(ctx->dev,
 				  "same connection request.\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
+	mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
 
 	if (vidi->connection) {
 		struct edid *raw_edid;
@@ -271,20 +283,27 @@ int vidi_connection_ioctl(struct drm_dev
 					  "failed to allocate raw_edid.\n");
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
+		mutex_lock(&ctx->lock);
 		ctx->raw_edid = raw_edid;
+		mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
 	} else {
 		/*
 		 * with connection = 0, free raw_edid
 		 * only if raw edid data isn't same as fake data.
 		 */
+		mutex_lock(&ctx->lock);
 		if (ctx->raw_edid && ctx->raw_edid !=
 				(struct edid *)fake_edid_info) {
 			kfree(ctx->raw_edid);
 			ctx->raw_edid = NULL;
 		}
+		mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
 	}
 
+	mutex_lock(&ctx->lock);
 	ctx->connected = vidi->connection;
+	mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
+
 	drm_helper_hpd_irq_event(ctx->drm_dev);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -299,7 +318,7 @@ static enum drm_connector_status vidi_de
 	 * connection request would come from user side
 	 * to do hotplug through specific ioctl.
 	 */
-	return ctx->connected ? connector_status_connected :
+	return READ_ONCE(ctx->connected) ? connector_status_connected :
 			connector_status_disconnected;
 }
 
@@ -321,22 +340,24 @@ static int vidi_get_modes(struct drm_con
 	struct vidi_context *ctx = ctx_from_connector(connector);
 	struct edid *edid;
 	int edid_len;
-	int count;
+	int count = 0;
 
 	/*
 	 * the edid data comes from user side and it would be set
 	 * to ctx->raw_edid through specific ioctl.
 	 */
+
+	mutex_lock(&ctx->lock);
 	if (!ctx->raw_edid) {
 		DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(ctx->dev, "raw_edid is null.\n");
-		return 0;
+		goto fail;
 	}
 
 	edid_len = (1 + ctx->raw_edid->extensions) * EDID_LENGTH;
 	edid = kmemdup(ctx->raw_edid, edid_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!edid) {
 		DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(ctx->dev, "failed to allocate edid\n");
-		return 0;
+		goto fail;
 	}
 
 	drm_connector_update_edid_property(connector, edid);
@@ -345,6 +366,8 @@ static int vidi_get_modes(struct drm_con
 
 	kfree(edid);
 
+fail:
+	mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
 	return count;
 }
 
@@ -490,11 +513,15 @@ static int vidi_remove(struct platform_d
 {
 	struct vidi_context *ctx = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 
+	mutex_lock(&ctx->lock);
+
 	if (ctx->raw_edid != (struct edid *)fake_edid_info) {
 		kfree(ctx->raw_edid);
 		ctx->raw_edid = NULL;
 	}
 
+	mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
+
 	component_del(&pdev->dev, &vidi_component_ops);
 
 	return 0;
author maintainer
#436 lore raw

PATCH 436/567 net: dst: add four helpers to annotate data-races around dst->dev

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 88fe14253e181878c2ddb51a298ae8c468a63010 ]

dst->dev is read locklessly in many contexts,
and written in dst_dev_put().

Fixing all the races is going to need many changes.

We probably will have to add full RCU protection.

Add three helpers to ease this painful process.

static inline struct net_device *dst_dev(const struct dst_entry *dst)

{
       return READ_ONCE(dst->dev);
}

static inline struct net_device *skb_dst_dev(const struct sk_buff *skb)

{
       return dst_dev(skb_dst(skb));
}

static inline struct net *skb_dst_dev_net(const struct sk_buff *skb)

{
       return dev_net(skb_dst_dev(skb));
}

static inline struct net *skb_dst_dev_net_rcu(const struct sk_buff *skb)

{
       return dev_net_rcu(skb_dst_dev(skb));
}
Fixes 4a6ce2b6f2ec ("net: introduce a new function dst_dev_put()")
[ Minor context conflict resolved. ]
---
 include/net/dst.h |   20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 net/core/dst.c    |    4 ++--
 net/core/sock.c   |    8 ++++----
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/net/dst.h +20 -0
@@ -581,6 +581,26 @@ static inline struct net_device *skb_dst
 	return dst_dev_rcu(skb_dst(skb));
 }
 
+static inline struct net_device *dst_dev(const struct dst_entry *dst)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(dst->dev);
+}
+
+static inline struct net_device *skb_dst_dev(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return dst_dev(skb_dst(skb));
+}
+
+static inline struct net *skb_dst_dev_net(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return dev_net(skb_dst_dev(skb));
+}
+
+static inline struct net *skb_dst_dev_net_rcu(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return dev_net_rcu(skb_dst_dev(skb));
+}
+
 struct dst_entry *dst_blackhole_check(struct dst_entry *dst, u32 cookie);
 void dst_blackhole_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk,
 			       struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu, bool confirm_neigh);
net/core/dst.c +2 -2
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ void dst_dev_put(struct dst_entry *dst)
 		dst->ops->ifdown(dst, dev);
 	WRITE_ONCE(dst->input, dst_discard);
 	WRITE_ONCE(dst->output, dst_discard_out);
-	dst->dev = blackhole_netdev;
+	WRITE_ONCE(dst->dev, blackhole_netdev);
 	netdev_ref_replace(dev, blackhole_netdev, &dst->dev_tracker,
 			   GFP_ATOMIC);
 }
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ unsigned int dst_blackhole_mtu(const str
 {
 	unsigned int mtu = dst_metric_raw(dst, RTAX_MTU);
 
-	return mtu ? : dst->dev->mtu;
+	return mtu ? : dst_dev(dst)->mtu;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dst_blackhole_mtu);
 
net/core/sock.c +4 -4
@@ -2450,8 +2450,8 @@ static u32 sk_dst_gso_max_size(struct so
 		   !ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr));
 #endif
 	/* pairs with the WRITE_ONCE() in netif_set_gso(_ipv4)_max_size() */
-	max_size = is_ipv6 ? READ_ONCE(dst->dev->gso_max_size) :
-			READ_ONCE(dst->dev->gso_ipv4_max_size);
+	max_size = is_ipv6 ? READ_ONCE(dst_dev(dst)->gso_max_size) :
+			READ_ONCE(dst_dev(dst)->gso_ipv4_max_size);
 	if (max_size > GSO_LEGACY_MAX_SIZE && !sk_is_tcp(sk))
 		max_size = GSO_LEGACY_MAX_SIZE;
 
@@ -2462,7 +2462,7 @@ void sk_setup_caps(struct sock *sk, stru
 {
 	u32 max_segs = 1;
 
-	sk->sk_route_caps = dst->dev->features;
+	sk->sk_route_caps = dst_dev(dst)->features;
 	if (sk_is_tcp(sk))
 		sk->sk_route_caps |= NETIF_F_GSO;
 	if (sk->sk_route_caps & NETIF_F_GSO)
@@ -2476,7 +2476,7 @@ void sk_setup_caps(struct sock *sk, stru
 			sk->sk_route_caps |= NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_HW_CSUM;
 			sk->sk_gso_max_size = sk_dst_gso_max_size(sk, dst);
 			/* pairs with the WRITE_ONCE() in netif_set_gso_max_segs() */
-			max_segs = max_t(u32, READ_ONCE(dst->dev->gso_max_segs), 1);
+			max_segs = max_t(u32, READ_ONCE(dst_dev(dst)->gso_max_segs), 1);
 		}
 	}
 	sk->sk_gso_max_segs = max_segs;
author maintainer
#437 lore raw

PATCH 437/567 net: dst: introduce dst->dev_rcu

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit caedcc5b6df1b2e2b5f39079e3369c1d4d5c5f50 ]

Followup of commit 88fe14253e18 ("net: dst: add four helpers to annotate data-races around dst->dev").

We want to gradually add explicit RCU protection to dst->dev, including lockdep support.

Add an union to alias dst->dev_rcu and dst->dev.

Add dst_dev_net_rcu() helper.

Fixes 4a6ce2b6f2ec ("net: introduce a new function dst_dev_put()")
[ Minor context conflict resolved. ]
---
 include/net/dst.h |   16 +++++++++++-----
 net/core/dst.c    |    2 +-
 net/ipv4/route.c  |    4 ++--
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
include/net/dst.h +11 -5
@@ -24,7 +24,10 @@
 struct sk_buff;
 
 struct dst_entry {
-	struct net_device       *dev;
+	union {
+		struct net_device       *dev;
+		struct net_device __rcu *dev_rcu;
+	};
 	struct  dst_ops	        *ops;
 	unsigned long		_metrics;
 	unsigned long           expires;
@@ -571,9 +574,12 @@ static inline void skb_dst_update_pmtu_n
 
 static inline struct net_device *dst_dev_rcu(const struct dst_entry *dst)
 {
-	/* In the future, use rcu_dereference(dst->dev) */
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held());
-	return READ_ONCE(dst->dev);
+	return rcu_dereference(dst->dev_rcu);
+}
+
+static inline struct net *dst_dev_net_rcu(const struct dst_entry *dst)
+{
+	return dev_net_rcu(dst_dev_rcu(dst));
 }
 
 static inline struct net_device *skb_dst_dev_rcu(const struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -598,7 +604,7 @@ static inline struct net *skb_dst_dev_ne
 
 static inline struct net *skb_dst_dev_net_rcu(const struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return dev_net_rcu(skb_dst_dev(skb));
+	return dev_net_rcu(skb_dst_dev_rcu(skb));
 }
 
 struct dst_entry *dst_blackhole_check(struct dst_entry *dst, u32 cookie);
net/core/dst.c +1 -1
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ void dst_dev_put(struct dst_entry *dst)
 		dst->ops->ifdown(dst, dev);
 	WRITE_ONCE(dst->input, dst_discard);
 	WRITE_ONCE(dst->output, dst_discard_out);
-	WRITE_ONCE(dst->dev, blackhole_netdev);
+	rcu_assign_pointer(dst->dev_rcu, blackhole_netdev);
 	netdev_ref_replace(dev, blackhole_netdev, &dst->dev_tracker,
 			   GFP_ATOMIC);
 }
net/ipv4/route.c +2 -2
@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ static void __ip_rt_update_pmtu(struct r
 		return;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	net = dev_net_rcu(dst->dev);
+	net = dst_dev_net_rcu(dst);
 	if (mtu < net->ipv4.ip_rt_min_pmtu) {
 		lock = true;
 		mtu = min(old_mtu, net->ipv4.ip_rt_min_pmtu);
@@ -1340,7 +1340,7 @@ static unsigned int ipv4_default_advmss(
 	struct net *net;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	net = dev_net_rcu(dst->dev);
+	net = dst_dev_net_rcu(dst);
 	advmss = max_t(unsigned int, ipv4_mtu(dst) - header_size,
 				   net->ipv4.ip_rt_min_advmss);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
author maintainer
#438 lore raw

PATCH 438/567 net: use dst_dev_rcu() in sk_setup_caps()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 99a2ace61b211b0be861b07fbaa062fca4b58879 ]

Use RCU to protect accesses to dst->dev from sk_setup_caps() and sk_dst_gso_max_size().

Also use dst_dev_rcu() in ip6_dst_mtu_maybe_forward(), and ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward().

ip4_dst_hoplimit() can use dst_dev_net_rcu().

Fixes 4a6ce2b6f2ec ("net: introduce a new function dst_dev_put()")
[ Adjust context ]
---
 include/net/ip.h        |    7 +++++--
 include/net/ip6_route.h |    2 +-
 include/net/route.h     |    2 +-
 net/core/sock.c         |   16 ++++++++++------
 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
include/net/ip.h +5 -2
@@ -458,9 +458,12 @@ static inline unsigned int ip_dst_mtu_ma
 						    bool forwarding)
 {
 	const struct rtable *rt = container_of(dst, struct rtable, dst);
-	struct net *net = dev_net(dst->dev);
+	struct net *net;
+	const struct net_device *dev;
 	unsigned int mtu;
 
+	dev = dst_dev_rcu(dst);
+	net = dev_net_rcu(dev);
 	if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_fwd_use_pmtu) ||
 	    ip_mtu_locked(dst) ||
 	    !forwarding) {
@@ -474,7 +477,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ip_dst_mtu_ma
 	if (mtu)
 		goto out;
 
-	mtu = READ_ONCE(dst->dev->mtu);
+	mtu = READ_ONCE(dev->mtu);
 
 	if (unlikely(ip_mtu_locked(dst))) {
 		if (rt->rt_uses_gateway && mtu > 576)
include/net/ip6_route.h +1 -1
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ip6_dst_mtu_m
 
 	mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	idev = __in6_dev_get(dst->dev);
+	idev = __in6_dev_get(dst_dev_rcu(dst));
 	if (idev)
 		mtu = idev->cnf.mtu6;
 	rcu_read_unlock();
include/net/route.h +1 -1
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ static inline int ip4_dst_hoplimit(const
 		const struct net *net;
 
 		rcu_read_lock();
-		net = dev_net_rcu(dst->dev);
+		net = dst_dev_net_rcu(dst);
 		hoplimit = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_default_ttl);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}
net/core/sock.c +10 -6
@@ -2440,7 +2440,7 @@ void sk_free_unlock_clone(struct sock *s
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sk_free_unlock_clone);
 
-static u32 sk_dst_gso_max_size(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst)
+static u32 sk_dst_gso_max_size(struct sock *sk, const struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	bool is_ipv6 = false;
 	u32 max_size;
@@ -2450,8 +2450,8 @@ static u32 sk_dst_gso_max_size(struct so
 		   !ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr));
 #endif
 	/* pairs with the WRITE_ONCE() in netif_set_gso(_ipv4)_max_size() */
-	max_size = is_ipv6 ? READ_ONCE(dst_dev(dst)->gso_max_size) :
-			READ_ONCE(dst_dev(dst)->gso_ipv4_max_size);
+	max_size = is_ipv6 ? READ_ONCE(dev->gso_max_size) :
+			READ_ONCE(dev->gso_ipv4_max_size);
 	if (max_size > GSO_LEGACY_MAX_SIZE && !sk_is_tcp(sk))
 		max_size = GSO_LEGACY_MAX_SIZE;
 
@@ -2460,9 +2460,12 @@ static u32 sk_dst_gso_max_size(struct so
 
 void sk_setup_caps(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst)
 {
+	const struct net_device *dev;
 	u32 max_segs = 1;
 
-	sk->sk_route_caps = dst_dev(dst)->features;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	dev = dst_dev_rcu(dst);
+	sk->sk_route_caps = dev->features;
 	if (sk_is_tcp(sk))
 		sk->sk_route_caps |= NETIF_F_GSO;
 	if (sk->sk_route_caps & NETIF_F_GSO)
@@ -2474,13 +2477,14 @@ void sk_setup_caps(struct sock *sk, stru
 			sk->sk_route_caps &= ~NETIF_F_GSO_MASK;
 		} else {
 			sk->sk_route_caps |= NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_HW_CSUM;
-			sk->sk_gso_max_size = sk_dst_gso_max_size(sk, dst);
+			sk->sk_gso_max_size = sk_dst_gso_max_size(sk, dev);
 			/* pairs with the WRITE_ONCE() in netif_set_gso_max_segs() */
-			max_segs = max_t(u32, READ_ONCE(dst_dev(dst)->gso_max_segs), 1);
+			max_segs = max_t(u32, READ_ONCE(dev->gso_max_segs), 1);
 		}
 	}
 	sk->sk_gso_max_segs = max_segs;
 	sk_dst_set(sk, dst);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sk_setup_caps);
 
#439 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 6.6 438/567] net: use dst_dev_rcu() in sk_setup_caps()

Hi Greg, Ruohan,

Quoted 1 line · Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

I do!

Quoted 12 lines

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 99a2ace61b211b0be861b07fbaa062fca4b58879 ]

Use RCU to protect accesses to dst->dev from sk_setup_caps() and sk_dst_gso_max_size().

Also use dst_dev_rcu() in ip6_dst_mtu_maybe_forward(), and ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward().

Quoted 8 lines

ip4_dst_hoplimit() can use dst_dev_net_rcu().

Fixes 4a6ce2b6f2ec ("net: introduce a new function dst_dev_put()")
[ Adjust context ]

It looks like more adjustments are required: with this patch, running the MPTCP 'diag.sh' selftest using kernel/configs/debug.config causes this warning:

=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.6.129 #1 Tainted: G N
-----------------------------
include/net/dst.h:577 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
2 locks held by mptcp_connect/213:
#0: ffff88810f9b0130 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:747) #1: ffff88810fe28130 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_connect (net/mptcp/protocol.c:3883)

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 3 PID: 213 Comm: mptcp_connect Tainted: G                 N 6.6.129 #1
  Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107) 
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious (include/linux/context_tracking.h:153) 
  ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward.constprop.0 (include/net/dst.h:577 (discriminator 13)) 
  ? __build_flow_key.constprop.0 (include/net/ip.h:457) 
  ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5719) 
  ? tcp_mtup_init (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1779 (discriminator 4)) 
  tcp_connect_init (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3804 (discriminator 1)) 
  ? tcp_sync_mss (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3786) 
  ? ipv4_dst_check (net/ipv4/route.c:1232) 
  ? __sk_dst_check (net/core/sock.c:601 (discriminator 2)) 
  ? inet_sk_rebuild_header (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1316) 
  ? reacquire_held_locks (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5405) 
  ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5719) 
  tcp_connect (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3986) 
  ? mark_held_locks (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4274 (discriminator 1)) 
  ? tcp_send_syn_data (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3974) 
  ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:62 (discriminator 1)) 
  tcp_v4_connect (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:335 (discriminator 1)) 
  ? trace_tcp_bad_csum (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:214) 
  mptcp_connect (net/mptcp/protocol.c:3892) 
  __inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:676) 
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare.part.0 (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4300) 
  inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:748) 
  __sys_connect (net/socket.c:2056 (discriminator 2)) 
  ? __sys_connect_file (net/socket.c:2063) 
  ? update_socket_protocol+0x10/0x10
   
  __x64_sys_connect (net/socket.c:2083 (discriminator 1)) 
  ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42) 
  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 (discriminator 1)) 
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) 
  RIP: 0033:0x7f2b23041186
  Code: 47 ba 04 00 00 00 48 8b 05 87 3c 19 00 64 89 10 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff c9 48 89 d0 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <48> 89 c2 48 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0f c9 48 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
  All code
  ========
     0:	47 ba 04 00 00 00    	rex.RXB mov $0x4,%r10d
     6:	48 8b 05 87 3c 19 00 	mov    0x193c87(%rip),%rax        # 0x193c94
     d:	64 89 10             	mov    %edx,%fs:(%rax)
    10:	48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 	mov    $0xffffffffffffffff,%rdx
    17:	c9                   	leave
    18:	48 89 d0             	mov    %rdx,%rax
    1b:	c3                   	ret
    1c:	0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 	nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
    23:	00 
    24:	48 8b 45 10          	mov    0x10(%rbp),%rax
    28:	0f 05                	syscall
    2a:*	48 89 c2             	mov    %rax,%rdx		<-- trapping instruction
    2d:	48 3d 00 f0 ff ff    	cmp    $0xfffffffffffff000,%rax
    33:	77 0f                	ja     0x44
    35:	c9                   	leave
    36:	48 89 d0             	mov    %rdx,%rax
    39:	c3                   	ret
    3a:	66                   	data16
    3b:	2e                   	cs
    3c:	0f                   	.byte 0xf
    3d:	1f                   	(bad)
    3e:	84 00                	test   %al,(%rax)

Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================

     0:	48 89 c2             	mov    %rax,%rdx
     3:	48 3d 00 f0 ff ff    	cmp    $0xfffffffffffff000,%rax
     9:	77 0f                	ja     0x1a
     b:	c9                   	leave
     c:	48 89 d0             	mov    %rdx,%rax
     f:	c3                   	ret
    10:	66                   	data16
    11:	2e                   	cs
    12:	0f                   	.byte 0xf
    13:	1f                   	(bad)
    14:	84 00                	test   %al,(%rax)
  RSP: 002b:00007fff4638afa0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f2b23041186
  RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000557a15fd7360 RDI: 0000000000000003
  RBP: 00007fff4638afb0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000106
  R13: 000000000000000a R14: 00007f2b2328a000 R15: 0000557a15fd7330
   </TASK>

=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.6.129 #1 Tainted: G N
-----------------------------
include/net/net_namespace.h:411 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
2 locks held by mptcp_connect/213:
#0: ffff88810f9b0130 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:747) #1: ffff88810fe28130 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_connect (net/mptcp/protocol.c:3883)

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 3 PID: 213 Comm: mptcp_connect Tainted: G                 N 6.6.129 #1
  Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107) 
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious (include/linux/context_tracking.h:153) 
  ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward.constprop.0 (include/net/net_namespace.h:411 (discriminator 13)) 
  ? __build_flow_key.constprop.0 (include/net/ip.h:457) 
  ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5719) 
  ? tcp_mtup_init (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1779 (discriminator 4)) 
  tcp_connect_init (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3804 (discriminator 1)) 
  ? tcp_sync_mss (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3786) 
  ? ipv4_dst_check (net/ipv4/route.c:1232) 
  ? __sk_dst_check (net/core/sock.c:601 (discriminator 2)) 
  ? inet_sk_rebuild_header (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1316) 
  ? reacquire_held_locks (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5405) 
  ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5719) 
  tcp_connect (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3986) 
  ? mark_held_locks (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4274 (discriminator 1)) 
  ? tcp_send_syn_data (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3974) 
  ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:62 (discriminator 1)) 
  tcp_v4_connect (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:335 (discriminator 1)) 
  ? trace_tcp_bad_csum (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:214) 
  mptcp_connect (net/mptcp/protocol.c:3892) 
  __inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:676) 
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare.part.0 (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4300) 
  inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:748) 
  __sys_connect (net/socket.c:2056 (discriminator 2)) 
  ? __sys_connect_file (net/socket.c:2063) 
  ? update_socket_protocol+0x10/0x10
   
  __x64_sys_connect (net/socket.c:2083 (discriminator 1)) 
  ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42) 
  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 (discriminator 1)) 
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) 
  RIP: 0033:0x7f2b23041186
  Code: 47 ba 04 00 00 00 48 8b 05 87 3c 19 00 64 89 10 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff c9 48 89 d0 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <48> 89 c2 48 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0f c9 48 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
  All code
  ========
     0:	47 ba 04 00 00 00    	rex.RXB mov $0x4,%r10d
     6:	48 8b 05 87 3c 19 00 	mov    0x193c87(%rip),%rax        # 0x193c94
     d:	64 89 10             	mov    %edx,%fs:(%rax)
    10:	48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 	mov    $0xffffffffffffffff,%rdx
    17:	c9                   	leave
    18:	48 89 d0             	mov    %rdx,%rax
    1b:	c3                   	ret
    1c:	0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 	nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
    23:	00 
    24:	48 8b 45 10          	mov    0x10(%rbp),%rax
    28:	0f 05                	syscall
    2a:*	48 89 c2             	mov    %rax,%rdx		<-- trapping instruction
    2d:	48 3d 00 f0 ff ff    	cmp    $0xfffffffffffff000,%rax
    33:	77 0f                	ja     0x44
    35:	c9                   	leave
    36:	48 89 d0             	mov    %rdx,%rax
    39:	c3                   	ret
    3a:	66                   	data16
    3b:	2e                   	cs
    3c:	0f                   	.byte 0xf
    3d:	1f                   	(bad)
    3e:	84 00                	test   %al,(%rax)

Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================

     0:	48 89 c2             	mov    %rax,%rdx
     3:	48 3d 00 f0 ff ff    	cmp    $0xfffffffffffff000,%rax
     9:	77 0f                	ja     0x1a
     b:	c9                   	leave
     c:	48 89 d0             	mov    %rdx,%rax
     f:	c3                   	ret
    10:	66                   	data16
    11:	2e                   	cs
    12:	0f                   	.byte 0xf
    13:	1f                   	(bad)
    14:	84 00                	test   %al,(%rax)
  RSP: 002b:00007fff4638afa0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f2b23041186
  RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000557a15fd7360 RDI: 0000000000000003
  RBP: 00007fff4638afb0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000106
  R13: 000000000000000a R14: 00007f2b2328a000 R15: 0000557a15fd7330
   </TASK>

@Greg: Is it possible to drop this patch for the moment? (This patch was probably coming with dependences.)

@Ruohan: do you mind looking at this please? I didn't execute TCP specific tests, only MPTCP ones.

See: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/actions/runs/23479015653/job/68317986391

Cheers,
Matt

Signature · 1 line
Sponsored by the NGI0 Core fund.
author maintainer
#440 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 6.6 438/567] net: use dst_dev_rcu() in sk_setup_caps()

Quoted 2 lines · Matthieu Baerts

@Greg: Is it possible to drop this patch for the moment? (This patch was probably coming with dependences.)

All now dropped, thanks for testing and letting me know.

greg k-h

author maintainer
#441 lore raw

PATCH 439/567 x86/uprobes: Fix XOL allocation failure for 32-bit tasks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d55c571e4333fac71826e8db3b9753fadfbead6a ]

This script

#!/usr/bin/bash

echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space

echo 'void main(void) {}' > TEST.c

# -fcf-protection to ensure that the 1st endbr32 insn can't be emulated gcc -m32 -fcf-protection=branch TEST.c -o test

bpftrace -e 'uprobe:./test:main {}' -c ./test

"hangs", the probed ./test task enters an endless loop.

The problem is that with randomize_va_space == 0 get_unmapped_area(TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE) called by xol_add_vma() can not just return the "addr == TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE" hint, this addr is used by the stack vma.

arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown() doesn't take TIF_ADDR32 into account and in_32bit_syscall() is false, this leads to info.high_limit > TASK_SIZE. vm_unmapped_area() happily returns the high address > TASK_SIZE and then get_unmapped_area() returns -ENOMEM after the "if (addr > TASK_SIZE - len)" check.

handle_swbp() doesn't report this failure (probably it should) and silently restarts the probed insn. Endless loop.

I think that the right fix should change the x86 get_unmapped_area() paths to rely on TIF_ADDR32 rather than in_32bit_syscall(). Note also that if CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y, in_x32_syscall() falsely returns true in this case because ->orig_ax = -1.

But we need a simple fix for -stable, so this patch just sets TS_COMPAT if the probed task is 32-bit to make in_ia32_syscall() true.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c |   24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/uprobes.h   |    1 +
 kernel/events/uprobes.c   |   10 +++++++---
 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c +24 -0
@@ -1102,3 +1102,27 @@ bool arch_uretprobe_is_alive(struct retu
 	else
 		return regs->sp <= ret->stack;
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
+unsigned long arch_uprobe_get_xol_area(void)
+{
+	struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
+	unsigned long vaddr;
+
+	/*
+	 * HACK: we are not in a syscall, but x86 get_unmapped_area() paths
+	 * ignore TIF_ADDR32 and rely on in_32bit_syscall() to calculate
+	 * vm_unmapped_area_info.high_limit.
+	 *
+	 * The #ifdef above doesn't cover the CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y case,
+	 * but in this case in_32bit_syscall() -> in_x32_syscall() always
+	 * (falsely) returns true because ->orig_ax == -1.
+	 */
+	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32))
+		ti->status |= TS_COMPAT;
+	vaddr = get_unmapped_area(NULL, TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0);
+	ti->status &= ~TS_COMPAT;
+
+	return vaddr;
+}
+#endif
include/linux/uprobes.h +1 -0
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ extern bool arch_uretprobe_is_alive(stru
 extern bool arch_uprobe_ignore(struct arch_uprobe *aup, struct pt_regs *regs);
 extern void arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(struct page *page, unsigned long vaddr,
 					 void *src, unsigned long len);
+extern unsigned long arch_uprobe_get_xol_area(void);
 #else /* !CONFIG_UPROBES */
 struct uprobes_state {
 };
kernel/events/uprobes.c +7 -3
@@ -1449,6 +1449,12 @@ void uprobe_munmap(struct vm_area_struct
 		set_bit(MMF_RECALC_UPROBES, &vma->vm_mm->flags);
 }
 
+unsigned long __weak arch_uprobe_get_xol_area(void)
+{
+	/* Try to map as high as possible, this is only a hint. */
+	return get_unmapped_area(NULL, TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0);
+}
+
 /* Slot allocation for XOL */
 static int xol_add_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, struct xol_area *area)
 {
@@ -1464,9 +1470,7 @@ static int xol_add_vma(struct mm_struct
 	}
 
 	if (!area->vaddr) {
-		/* Try to map as high as possible, this is only a hint. */
-		area->vaddr = get_unmapped_area(NULL, TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE,
-						PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0);
+		area->vaddr = arch_uprobe_get_xol_area();
 		if (IS_ERR_VALUE(area->vaddr)) {
 			ret = area->vaddr;
 			goto fail;
author maintainer
#442 lore raw

PATCH 440/567 platform/x86/amd/pmc: Add support for Van Gogh SoC

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Antheas Kapenekakis <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit db4a3f0fbedb0398f77b9047e8b8bb2b49f355bb ]

The ROG Xbox Ally (non-X) SoC features a similar architecture to the Steam Deck. While the Steam Deck supports S3 (s2idle causes a crash), this support was dropped by the Xbox Ally which only S0ix suspend.

Since the handler is missing here, this causes the device to not suspend and the AMD GPU driver to crash while trying to resume afterwards due to a power hang.

---
 drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c |    3 +++
 drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c +3 -0
@@ -294,6 +294,7 @@ static void amd_pmc_get_ip_info(struct a
 	switch (dev->cpu_id) {
 	case AMD_CPU_ID_PCO:
 	case AMD_CPU_ID_RN:
+	case AMD_CPU_ID_VG:
 	case AMD_CPU_ID_YC:
 	case AMD_CPU_ID_CB:
 		dev->num_ips = 12;
@@ -698,6 +699,7 @@ static int amd_pmc_get_os_hint(struct am
 	case AMD_CPU_ID_PCO:
 		return MSG_OS_HINT_PCO;
 	case AMD_CPU_ID_RN:
+	case AMD_CPU_ID_VG:
 	case AMD_CPU_ID_YC:
 	case AMD_CPU_ID_CB:
 	case AMD_CPU_ID_PS:
@@ -908,6 +910,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id pmc_pc
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, AMD_CPU_ID_PCO) },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, AMD_CPU_ID_RV) },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, AMD_CPU_ID_SP) },
+	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, AMD_CPU_ID_VG) },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M20H_ROOT) },
 	{ }
 };
drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.h +1 -0
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ void amd_pmc_quirks_init(struct amd_pmc_
 #define AMD_CPU_ID_RN			0x1630
 #define AMD_CPU_ID_PCO			AMD_CPU_ID_RV
 #define AMD_CPU_ID_CZN			AMD_CPU_ID_RN
+#define AMD_CPU_ID_VG			0x1645
 #define AMD_CPU_ID_YC			0x14B5
 #define AMD_CPU_ID_CB			0x14D8
 #define AMD_CPU_ID_PS			0x14E8
author maintainer
#443 lore raw

PATCH 441/567 rcu/nocb: Fix possible invalid rdps->nocb_cb_kthread pointer access

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zqiang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1bba3900ca18bdae28d1b9fa10f16a8f8cb2ada1 ]

In the preparation stage of CPU online, if the corresponding the rdp's->nocb_cb_kthread does not exist, will be created, there is a situation where the rdp's rcuop kthreads creation fails, and then de-offload this CPU's rdp, does not assign this CPU's rdp->nocb_cb_kthread pointer, but this rdp's->nocb_gp_rdp and rdp's->rdp_gp->nocb_gp_kthread is still valid.

This will cause the subsequent re-offload operation of this offline CPU, which will pass the conditional check and the kthread_unpark() will access invalid rdp's->nocb_cb_kthread pointer.

This commit therefore use rdp's->nocb_gp_kthread instead of rdp_gp's->nocb_gp_kthread for safety check.

---
 kernel/rcu/tree_nocb.h |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/rcu/tree_nocb.h +2 -3
@@ -1221,7 +1221,6 @@ static long rcu_nocb_rdp_offload(void *a
 	struct rcu_segcblist *cblist = &rdp->cblist;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int wake_gp;
-	struct rcu_data *rdp_gp = rdp->nocb_gp_rdp;
 
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(rdp->cpu != raw_smp_processor_id());
 	/*
@@ -1231,7 +1230,7 @@ static long rcu_nocb_rdp_offload(void *a
 	if (!rdp->nocb_gp_rdp)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!rdp_gp->nocb_gp_kthread))
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!rdp->nocb_gp_kthread))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	pr_info("Offloading %d\n", rdp->cpu);
@@ -1260,7 +1259,7 @@ static long rcu_nocb_rdp_offload(void *a
 	 */
 	wake_gp = rdp_offload_toggle(rdp, true, flags);
 	if (wake_gp)
-		wake_up_process(rdp_gp->nocb_gp_kthread);
+		wake_up_process(rdp->nocb_gp_kthread);
 	swait_event_exclusive(rdp->nocb_state_wq,
 			      rcu_segcblist_test_flags(cblist, SEGCBLIST_KTHREAD_CB) &&
 			      rcu_segcblist_test_flags(cblist, SEGCBLIST_KTHREAD_GP));
author maintainer
#444 lore raw

PATCH 442/567 f2fs: zone: fix to avoid inconsistence in between SIT and SSA

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 773704c1ef96a8b70d0d186ab725f50548de82c4 ]

w/ below testcase, it will cause inconsistence in between SIT and SSA.

create_null_blk 512 2 1024 1024
mkfs.f2fs -m /dev/nullb0
mount /dev/nullb0 /mnt/f2fs/
touch /mnt/f2fs/file
f2fs_io pinfile set /mnt/f2fs/file
fallocate -l 4GiB /mnt/f2fs/file

F2FS-fs (nullb0): Inconsistent segment (0) type [1, 0] in SSA and SIT

CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 2398 Comm: fallocate Tainted: G           O       6.13.0-rc1 #84
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0xb3/0xd0
 dump_stack+0x14/0x20
 f2fs_handle_critical_error+0x18c/0x220 [f2fs]
 f2fs_stop_checkpoint+0x38/0x50 [f2fs]
 do_garbage_collect+0x674/0x6e0 [f2fs]
 f2fs_gc_range+0x12b/0x230 [f2fs]
 f2fs_allocate_pinning_section+0x5c/0x150 [f2fs]
 f2fs_expand_inode_data+0x1cc/0x3c0 [f2fs]
 f2fs_fallocate+0x3c3/0x410 [f2fs]
 vfs_fallocate+0x15f/0x4b0
 __x64_sys_fallocate+0x4a/0x80
 x64_sys_call+0x15e8/0x1b80
 do_syscall_64+0x68/0x130
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f
RIP: 0033:0x7f9dba5197ca

F2FS-fs (nullb0): Stopped filesystem due to reason: 4

The reason is f2fs_gc_range() may try to migrate block in curseg, however, its SSA block is not uptodate due to the last summary block data is still in cache of curseg.

In this patch, we add a condition in f2fs_gc_range() to check whether section is opened or not, and skip block migration for opened section.

Fixes 9703d69d9d15 ("f2fs: support file pinning for zoned devices")
Cc Daeho Jeong <[email protected]>
[ Minor conflict resolved. ]
---
 fs/f2fs/gc.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/f2fs/gc.c +3 -0
@@ -2019,6 +2019,9 @@ int f2fs_gc_range(struct f2fs_sb_info *s
 		if (!get_valid_blocks(sbi, segno, true))
 			continue;
 
+		if (IS_CURSEC(sbi, GET_SEC_FROM_SEG(sbi, segno)))
+			continue;
+
 		do_garbage_collect(sbi, segno, &gc_list, FG_GC,
 						dry_run_sections == 0);
 		put_gc_inode(&gc_list);
author maintainer
#445 lore raw

PATCH 443/567 sched/fair: Fix pelt clock sync when entering idle

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 98c88dc8a1ace642d9021b103b28cba7b51e3abc ]

Samuel and Alex reported regressions of the util_avg of RT rq with commit 17e3e88ed0b6 ("sched/fair: Fix pelt lost idle time detection"). It happens that fair is updating and syncing the pelt clock with task one when pick_next_task_fair() fails to pick a task but before the prev scheduling class got a chance to update its pelt signals.

Move update_idle_rq_clock_pelt() in set_next_task_idle() which is called after prev class has been called.

[ wusamuel: Did not include line 'exec_start = rq_clock_task()', which is not present in 6.6.y but found in mainline ]

---
 kernel/sched/fair.c |    6 ------
 kernel/sched/idle.c |    6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/fair.c +0 -6
@@ -8557,12 +8557,6 @@ idle:
 			goto again;
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * rq is about to be idle, check if we need to update the
-	 * lost_idle_time of clock_pelt
-	 */
-	update_idle_rq_clock_pelt(rq);
-
 	return NULL;
 }
 
kernel/sched/idle.c +6 -0
@@ -423,6 +423,12 @@ static void set_next_task_idle(struct rq
 {
 	update_idle_core(rq);
 	schedstat_inc(rq->sched_goidle);
+
+	/*
+	 * rq is about to be idle, check if we need to update the
+	 * lost_idle_time of clock_pelt
+	 */
+	update_idle_rq_clock_pelt(rq);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
author maintainer
#446 lore raw

PATCH 444/567 binfmt_misc: restore write access before closing files opened by open_exec()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zilin Guan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 90f601b497d76f40fa66795c3ecf625b6aced9fd ]

bm_register_write() opens an executable file using open_exec(), which internally calls do_open_execat() and denies write access on the file to avoid modification while it is being executed.

However, when an error occurs, bm_register_write() closes the file using filp_close() directly. This does not restore the write permission, which may cause subsequent write operations on the same file to fail.

Fix this by calling exe_file_allow_write_access() before filp_close() to restore the write permission properly.

Fixes e7850f4d844e ("binfmt_misc: fix possible deadlock in bm_register_write")

[ Use allow_write_access() instead of exe_file_allow_write_access() according to commit 0357ef03c94ef
("fs: don't block write during exec on pre-content watched files"). ]

---
 fs/binfmt_misc.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/binfmt_misc.c +3 -1
@@ -815,8 +815,10 @@ out:
 	inode_unlock(d_inode(root));
 
 	if (err) {
-		if (f)
+		if (f) {
+			allow_write_access(f);
 			filp_close(f, NULL);
+		}
 		kfree(e);
 		return err;
 	}
author maintainer
#447 lore raw

PATCH 445/567 net: stmmac: remove support for lpi_intr_o

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Russell King (Oracle)" <[email protected]>

commit 14eb64db8ff07b58a35b98375f446d9e20765674 upstream.

The dwmac databook for v3.74a states that lpi_intr_o is a sideband signal which should be used to ungate the application clock, and this signal is synchronous to the receive clock. The receive clock can run at 2.5, 25 or 125MHz depending on the media speed, and can stop under the control of the link partner. This means that the time it takes to clear is dependent on the negotiated media speed, and thus can be 8, 40, or 400ns after reading the LPI control and status register.

It has been observed with some aggressive link partners, this clock can stop while lpi_intr_o is still asserted, meaning that the signal remains asserted for an indefinite period that the local system has no direct control over.

The LPI interrupts will still be signalled through the main interrupt path in any case, and this path is not dependent on the receive clock.

This, since we do not gate the application clock, and the chances of adding clock gating in the future are slim due to the clocks being ill-defined, lpi_intr_o serves no useful purpose. Remove the code which requests the interrupt, and all associated code.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/common.h          |    1 
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-intel.c     |    4 --
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-loongson.c  |    7 ---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac.h          |    2 -
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c     |   36 ------------------
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_platform.c |    8 ----
 include/linux/stmmac.h                                |    1 
 7 files changed, 59 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/common.h +0 -1
@@ -371,7 +371,6 @@ enum request_irq_err {
 	REQ_IRQ_ERR_RX,
 	REQ_IRQ_ERR_SFTY_UE,
 	REQ_IRQ_ERR_SFTY_CE,
-	REQ_IRQ_ERR_LPI,
 	REQ_IRQ_ERR_WOL,
 	REQ_IRQ_ERR_MAC,
 	REQ_IRQ_ERR_NO,
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-intel.c +0 -4
@@ -612,7 +612,6 @@ static int intel_mgbe_common_data(struct
 
 	/* Setup MSI vector offset specific to Intel mGbE controller */
 	plat->msi_mac_vec = 29;
-	plat->msi_lpi_vec = 28;
 	plat->msi_sfty_ce_vec = 27;
 	plat->msi_sfty_ue_vec = 26;
 	plat->msi_rx_base_vec = 0;
@@ -998,8 +997,6 @@ static int stmmac_config_multi_msi(struc
 		res->irq = pci_irq_vector(pdev, plat->msi_mac_vec);
 	if (plat->msi_wol_vec < STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX)
 		res->wol_irq = pci_irq_vector(pdev, plat->msi_wol_vec);
-	if (plat->msi_lpi_vec < STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX)
-		res->lpi_irq = pci_irq_vector(pdev, plat->msi_lpi_vec);
 	if (plat->msi_sfty_ce_vec < STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX)
 		res->sfty_ce_irq = pci_irq_vector(pdev, plat->msi_sfty_ce_vec);
 	if (plat->msi_sfty_ue_vec < STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX)
@@ -1081,7 +1078,6 @@ static int intel_eth_pci_probe(struct pc
 	 */
 	plat->msi_mac_vec = STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX;
 	plat->msi_wol_vec = STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX;
-	plat->msi_lpi_vec = STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX;
 	plat->msi_sfty_ce_vec = STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX;
 	plat->msi_sfty_ue_vec = STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX;
 	plat->msi_rx_base_vec = STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX;
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-loongson.c +0 -7
@@ -138,13 +138,6 @@ static int loongson_dwmac_probe(struct p
 		res.wol_irq = res.irq;
 	}
 
-	res.lpi_irq = of_irq_get_byname(np, "eth_lpi");
-	if (res.lpi_irq < 0) {
-		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "IRQ eth_lpi not found\n");
-		ret = -ENODEV;
-		goto err_disable_msi;
-	}
-
 	ret = stmmac_dvr_probe(&pdev->dev, plat, &res);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err_disable_msi;
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac.h +0 -2
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ struct stmmac_resources {
 	void __iomem *addr;
 	u8 mac[ETH_ALEN];
 	int wol_irq;
-	int lpi_irq;
 	int irq;
 	int sfty_ce_irq;
 	int sfty_ue_irq;
@@ -260,7 +259,6 @@ struct stmmac_priv {
 	bool wol_irq_disabled;
 	int clk_csr;
 	struct timer_list eee_ctrl_timer;
-	int lpi_irq;
 	int eee_enabled;
 	int eee_active;
 	int tx_lpi_timer;
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c +0 -36
@@ -3496,10 +3496,6 @@ static void stmmac_free_irq(struct net_d
 			free_irq(priv->sfty_ce_irq, dev);
 		fallthrough;
 	case REQ_IRQ_ERR_SFTY_CE:
-		if (priv->lpi_irq > 0 && priv->lpi_irq != dev->irq)
-			free_irq(priv->lpi_irq, dev);
-		fallthrough;
-	case REQ_IRQ_ERR_LPI:
 		if (priv->wol_irq > 0 && priv->wol_irq != dev->irq)
 			free_irq(priv->wol_irq, dev);
 		fallthrough;
@@ -3554,24 +3550,6 @@ static int stmmac_request_irq_multi_msi(
 		}
 	}
 
-	/* Request the LPI IRQ in case of another line
-	 * is used for LPI
-	 */
-	if (priv->lpi_irq > 0 && priv->lpi_irq != dev->irq) {
-		int_name = priv->int_name_lpi;
-		sprintf(int_name, "%s:%s", dev->name, "lpi");
-		ret = request_irq(priv->lpi_irq,
-				  stmmac_mac_interrupt,
-				  0, int_name, dev);
-		if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
-			netdev_err(priv->dev,
-				   "%s: alloc lpi MSI %d (error: %d)\n",
-				   __func__, priv->lpi_irq, ret);
-			irq_err = REQ_IRQ_ERR_LPI;
-			goto irq_error;
-		}
-	}
-
 	/* Request the Safety Feature Correctible Error line in
 	 * case of another line is used
 	 */
@@ -3695,19 +3673,6 @@ static int stmmac_request_irq_single(str
 		}
 	}
 
-	/* Request the IRQ lines */
-	if (priv->lpi_irq > 0 && priv->lpi_irq != dev->irq) {
-		ret = request_irq(priv->lpi_irq, stmmac_interrupt,
-				  IRQF_SHARED, dev->name, dev);
-		if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
-			netdev_err(priv->dev,
-				   "%s: ERROR: allocating the LPI IRQ %d (%d)\n",
-				   __func__, priv->lpi_irq, ret);
-			irq_err = REQ_IRQ_ERR_LPI;
-			goto irq_error;
-		}
-	}
-
 	return 0;
 
 irq_error:
@@ -7436,7 +7401,6 @@ int stmmac_dvr_probe(struct device *devi
 
 	priv->dev->irq = res->irq;
 	priv->wol_irq = res->wol_irq;
-	priv->lpi_irq = res->lpi_irq;
 	priv->sfty_ce_irq = res->sfty_ce_irq;
 	priv->sfty_ue_irq = res->sfty_ue_irq;
 	for (i = 0; i < MTL_MAX_RX_QUEUES; i++)
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_platform.c +0 -8
@@ -762,14 +762,6 @@ int stmmac_get_platform_resources(struct
 		stmmac_res->wol_irq = stmmac_res->irq;
 	}
 
-	stmmac_res->lpi_irq =
-		platform_get_irq_byname_optional(pdev, "eth_lpi");
-	if (stmmac_res->lpi_irq < 0) {
-		if (stmmac_res->lpi_irq == -EPROBE_DEFER)
-			return -EPROBE_DEFER;
-		dev_info(&pdev->dev, "IRQ eth_lpi not found\n");
-	}
-
 	stmmac_res->addr = devm_platform_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0);
 
 	return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(stmmac_res->addr);
include/linux/stmmac.h +0 -1
@@ -306,7 +306,6 @@ struct plat_stmmacenet_data {
 	int ext_snapshot_num;
 	int msi_mac_vec;
 	int msi_wol_vec;
-	int msi_lpi_vec;
 	int msi_sfty_ce_vec;
 	int msi_sfty_ue_vec;
 	int msi_rx_base_vec;
author maintainer
#448 lore raw

PATCH 446/567 mptcp: pm: in-kernel: always set ID as avail when rm endp

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" <[email protected]>

commit d191101dee25567c2af3b28565f45346c33d65f5 upstream.

Syzkaller managed to find a combination of actions that was generating this warning:

  WARNING: net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1074 at __mark_subflow_endp_available net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1074 [inline], CPU#1: syz.7.48/2535
  WARNING: net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1074 at mptcp_pm_nl_fullmesh net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1446 [inline], CPU#1: syz.7.48/2535
  WARNING: net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1074 at mptcp_pm_nl_set_flags_all net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1474 [inline], CPU#1: syz.7.48/2535
  WARNING: net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1074 at mptcp_pm_nl_set_flags+0x5de/0x640 net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1538, CPU#1: syz.7.48/2535
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2535 Comm: syz.7.48 Not tainted 6.18.0-03987-gea5f5e676cf5 #17 PREEMPT(voluntary)
  Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:__mark_subflow_endp_available net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1074 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:mptcp_pm_nl_fullmesh net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1446 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:mptcp_pm_nl_set_flags_all net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1474 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:mptcp_pm_nl_set_flags+0x5de/0x640 net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1538
  Code: 89 c7 e8 c5 8c 73 fe e9 f7 fd ff ff 49 83 ef 80 e8 b7 8c 73 fe 4c 89 ff be 03 00 00 00 e8 4a 29 e3 fe eb ac e8 a3 8c 73 fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 3d ff ff ff e8 95 8c 73 fe b8 a1 ff ff ff eb 1a e8 89
  RSP: 0018:ffffc9001535b820 EFLAGS: 00010287
  netdevsim0: tun_chr_ioctl cmd 1074025677
  RAX: ffffffff82da294d RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000080000
  RDX: ffffc900096d0000 RSI: 00000000000006d6 RDI: 00000000000006d7
  netdevsim0: linktype set to 823
  RBP: ffff88802cdb2240 R08: 00000000000104ae R09: ffffffffffffffff
  R10: ffffffff82da27d4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: ffff88801246d8c0 R14: ffffc9001535b8b8 R15: ffff88802cdb1800
  FS:  00007fc6ac5a76c0(0000) GS:ffff8880f90c8000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  netlink: 'syz.3.50': attribute type 5 has an invalid length.
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  netlink: 1232 bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process `syz.3.50'.
  CR2: 0000200000010000 CR3: 0000000025b1a000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   mptcp_pm_set_flags net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:277 [inline]
   mptcp_pm_nl_set_flags_doit+0x1d7/0x210 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:282
   genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x117/0x180 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115
   genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline]
   genl_rcv_msg+0x3a8/0x3f0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210
   netlink_rcv_skb+0x16d/0x240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550
   genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219
   netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1318 [inline]
   netlink_unicast+0x3e9/0x4c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344
   netlink_sendmsg+0x4ab/0x5b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894
   sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline]
   __sock_sendmsg+0xc9/0xf0 net/socket.c:733
   ____sys_sendmsg+0x272/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2608
   ___sys_sendmsg+0x2de/0x320 net/socket.c:2662
   __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2694 [inline]
   __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2699 [inline]
   __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2697 [inline]
   __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2697
   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xed/0x360 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
  RIP: 0033:0x7fc6adb66f6d
  Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
  RSP: 002b:00007fc6ac5a6ff8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc6addf5fa0 RCX: 00007fc6adb66f6d
  RDX: 0000000000048084 RSI: 00002000000002c0 RDI: 000000000000000e
  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
  netlink: 'syz.5.51': attribute type 2 has an invalid length.
  R13: 00007fff25e91fe0 R14: 00007fc6ac5a7ce4 R15: 00007fff25e920d7
   </TASK>

The actions that caused that seem to be:

- Create an MPTCP endpoint for address A without any flags
- Create a new MPTCP connection from address A
- Remove the MPTCP endpoint: the corresponding subflows will be removed
- Recreate the endpoint with the same ID, but with the subflow flag
- Change the same endpoint to add the fullmesh flag

In this case, msk->pm.local_addr_used has been kept to 0 as expected, but the corresponding bit in msk->pm.id_avail_bitmap was still unset after having removed the endpoint, causing the splat later on.

When removing an endpoint, the corresponding endpoint ID was only marked as available for "signal" types with an announced address, plus all "subflow" types, but not the other types like an endpoint corresponding to the initial subflow. In these cases, re-creating an endpoint with the same ID didn't signal/create anything. Here, adding the fullmesh flag was creating the splat when calling __mark_subflow_endp_available() from mptcp_pm_nl_fullmesh(), because msk->pm.local_addr_used was set to 0 while the ID was marked as used.

To fix this issue, the corresponding bit in msk->pm.id_avail_bitmap can always be set as available when removing an MPTCP in-kernel endpoint. In other words, moving the call to __set_bit() to do it in all cases, except for "subflow" types where this bit is handled in a dedicated helper.

Note: instead of adding a new spin_(un)lock_bh that would be taken in all cases, do all the actions requiring the spin lock under the same block.

This modification potentially fixes another issue reported by syzbot, see [1]. But without a reproducer or more details about what exactly happened before, it is hard to confirm.

[ Conflict in pm_netlink.c, because commit 8617e85e04bd ("mptcp: pm:
split in-kernel PM specific code") is not in this version, and move code from pm_netlink.c to pm_kernel.c. Also, commit 636113918508 ("mptcp: pm: remove '_nl' from mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr_received") renamed mptcp_pm_nl_rm_subflow_received() to mptcp_pm_rm_subflow(). Apart from that, the same patch can be applied in pm_netlink.c. ]

---
 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c |   20 ++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c +8 -12
@@ -1647,10 +1647,8 @@ static bool mptcp_pm_remove_anno_addr(st
 	ret = remove_anno_list_by_saddr(msk, addr);
 	if (ret || force) {
 		spin_lock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
-		if (ret) {
-			__set_bit(addr->id, msk->pm.id_avail_bitmap);
+		if (ret)
 			msk->pm.add_addr_signaled--;
-		}
 		mptcp_pm_remove_addr(msk, &list);
 		spin_unlock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
 	}
@@ -1688,17 +1686,15 @@ static int mptcp_nl_remove_subflow_and_s
 					  !(entry->flags & MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_IMPLICIT));
 
 		list.ids[0] = mptcp_endp_get_local_id(msk, addr);
-		if (remove_subflow) {
-			spin_lock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
-			mptcp_pm_nl_rm_subflow_received(msk, &list);
-			spin_unlock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
-		}
 
-		if (entry->flags & MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_SUBFLOW) {
-			spin_lock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
+		spin_lock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
+		if (remove_subflow)
+			mptcp_pm_nl_rm_subflow_received(msk, &list);
+		if (entry->flags & MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_SUBFLOW)
 			__mark_subflow_endp_available(msk, list.ids[0]);
-			spin_unlock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
-		}
+		else /* mark endp ID as available, e.g. Signal or MPC endp */
+			__set_bit(addr->id, msk->pm.id_avail_bitmap);
+		spin_unlock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
 
 		if (msk->mpc_endpoint_id == entry->addr.id)
 			msk->mpc_endpoint_id = 0;
author maintainer
#449 lore raw

PATCH 447/567 s390/xor: Fix xor_xc_2() inline assembly constraints

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>

commit f775276edc0c505dc0f782773796c189f31a1123 upstream.

The inline assembly constraints for xor_xc_2() are incorrect. "bytes", "p1", and "p2" are input operands, while all three of them are modified within the inline assembly. Given that the function consists only of this inline assembly it seems unlikely that this may cause any problems, however fix this in any case.

Fixes 2cfc5f9ce7f5 ("s390/xor: optimized xor routing using the XC instruction")
---
 arch/s390/lib/xor.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/s390/lib/xor.c +2 -2
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ static void xor_xc_2(unsigned long bytes
 		"	j	3f\n"
 		"2:	xc	0(1,%1),0(%2)\n"
 		"3:\n"
-		: : "d" (bytes), "a" (p1), "a" (p2)
-		: "0", "1", "cc", "memory");
+		: "+d" (bytes), "+a" (p1), "+a" (p2)
+		: : "0", "1", "cc", "memory");
 }
 
 static void xor_xc_3(unsigned long bytes, unsigned long * __restrict p1,
author maintainer
#450 lore raw

PATCH 448/567 s390/stackleak: Fix __stackleak_poison() inline assembly constraint

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>

commit 674c5ff0f440a051ebf299d29a4c013133d81a65 upstream.

The __stackleak_poison() inline assembly comes with a "count" operand where the "d" constraint is used. "count" is used with the exrl instruction and "d" means that the compiler may allocate any register from 0 to 15.

If the compiler would allocate register 0 then the exrl instruction would not or the value of "count" into the executed instruction - resulting in a stackframe which is only partially poisoned.

Use the correct "a" constraint, which excludes register 0 from register allocation.

Fixes 2a405f6bb3a5 ("s390/stackleak: provide fast __stackleak_poison() implementation")
---
 arch/s390/include/asm/processor.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/s390/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static __always_inline void __stackleak_
 		"	j	4f\n"
 		"3:	mvc	8(1,%[addr]),0(%[addr])\n"
 		"4:\n"
-		: [addr] "+&a" (erase_low), [count] "+&d" (count), [tmp] "=&a" (tmp)
+		: [addr] "+&a" (erase_low), [count] "+&a" (count), [tmp] "=&a" (tmp)
 		: [poison] "d" (poison)
 		: "memory", "cc"
 		);
author maintainer
#451 lore raw

PATCH 449/567 s390/zcrypt: Enable AUTOSEL_DOM for CCA serialnr sysfs attribute

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>

commit 598bbefa8032cc58b564a81d1ad68bd815c8dc0f upstream.

The serialnr sysfs attribute for CCA cards when queried always used the default domain for sending the request down to the card. If for any reason exactly this default domain is disabled then the attribute code fails to retrieve the CCA info and the sysfs entry shows an empty string. Works as designed but the serial number is a card attribute and thus it does not matter which domain is used for the query. So if there are other domains on this card available, these could be used.

So extend the code to use AUTOSEL_DOM for the domain value to address any online domain within the card for querying the cca info and thus show the serialnr as long as there is one domain usable regardless of the default domain setting.

Fixes 8f291ebf3270 ("s390/zcrypt: enable card/domain autoselect on ep11 cprbs")
[ preserved zc->online as the fourth argument to cca_get_info() ]
---
 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c |   12 +++++++-----
 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cex4.c    |    3 +--
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +7 -5
@@ -1687,11 +1687,13 @@ static int fetch_cca_info(u16 cardnr, u1
 
 	memset(ci, 0, sizeof(*ci));
 
-	/* get first info from zcrypt device driver about this apqn */
-	rc = zcrypt_device_status_ext(cardnr, domain, &devstat);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-	ci->hwtype = devstat.hwtype;
+	/* if specific domain given, fetch status and hw info for this apqn */
+	if (domain != AUTOSEL_DOM) {
+		rc = zcrypt_device_status_ext(cardnr, domain, &devstat);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		ci->hwtype = devstat.hwtype;
+	}
 
 	/* prep page for rule array and var array use */
 	pg = (u8 *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cex4.c +1 -2
@@ -85,8 +85,7 @@ static ssize_t cca_serialnr_show(struct
 
 	memset(&ci, 0, sizeof(ci));
 
-	if (ap_domain_index >= 0)
-		cca_get_info(ac->id, ap_domain_index, &ci, zc->online);
+	cca_get_info(ac->id, AUTOSEL_DOM, &ci, zc->online);
 
 	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", ci.serial);
 }
author maintainer
#452 lore raw

PATCH 450/567 mm/mempolicy: fix wrong mmap_read_unlock() in migrate_to_node()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <[email protected]>

The backport of commit 091c1dd2d4df ("mm/mempolicy: fix migrate_to_node() assuming there is at least one VMA in a MM") contains an error:
migrate_to_node() does not lock the mmap_lock itself, that is handled by the caller instead.

So let's drop the wrong mmap_read_unlock(). Fortunately, this path is very hard to hit in practice.

Fixes a13b2b9b0b0b ("mm/mempolicy: fix migrate_to_node() assuming there is at least one VMA in a MM")
Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
---
 mm/mempolicy.c |    4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/mempolicy.c +1 -3
@@ -1071,10 +1071,8 @@ static long migrate_to_node(struct mm_st
 
 	VM_BUG_ON(!(flags & (MPOL_MF_MOVE | MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL)));
 	vma = find_vma(mm, 0);
-	if (unlikely(!vma)) {
-		mmap_read_unlock(mm);
+	if (unlikely(!vma))
 		return 0;
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * This does not migrate the range, but isolates all pages that
author maintainer
#453 lore raw

PATCH 451/567 io_uring/kbuf: check if target buffer list is still legacy on recycle

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

Commit c2c185be5c85d37215397c8e8781abf0a69bec1f upstream.

There's a gap between when the buffer was grabbed and when it potentially gets recycled, where if the list is empty, someone could've upgraded it to a ring provided type. This can happen if the request is forced via io-wq. The legacy recycling is missing checking if the buffer_list still exists, and if it's of the correct type. Add those checks.

Fixes c7fb19428d67 ("io_uring: add support for ring mapped supplied buffers")
---
 io_uring/kbuf.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
io_uring/kbuf.c +7 -1
@@ -70,9 +70,15 @@ void io_kbuf_recycle_legacy(struct io_ki
 
 	buf = req->kbuf;
 	bl = io_buffer_get_list(ctx, buf->bgid);
-	list_add(&buf->list, &bl->buf_list);
+	/*
+	 * If the buffer list was upgraded to a ring-based one, or removed,
+	 * while the request was in-flight in io-wq, drop it.
+	 */
+	if (bl && !bl->is_mapped)
+		list_add(&buf->list, &bl->buf_list);
 	req->flags &= ~REQ_F_BUFFER_SELECTED;
 	req->buf_index = buf->bgid;
+	req->kbuf = NULL;
 
 	io_ring_submit_unlock(ctx, issue_flags);
 	return;
author maintainer
#454 lore raw

PATCH 452/567 NFSD: Hold net reference for the lifetime of /proc/fs/nfs/exports fd

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>

commit e7fcf179b82d3a3730fd8615da01b087cc654d0b upstream.

The /proc/fs/nfs/exports proc entry is created at module init and persists for the module's lifetime. exports_proc_open() captures the caller's current network namespace and stores its svc_export_cache in seq->private, but takes no reference on the namespace. If the namespace is subsequently torn down (e.g. container destruction after the opener does setns() to a different namespace), nfsd_net_exit() calls nfsd_export_shutdown() which frees the cache. Subsequent reads on the still-open fd dereference the freed cache_detail, walking a freed hash table.

Hold a reference on the struct net for the lifetime of the open file descriptor. This prevents nfsd_net_exit() from running -- and thus prevents nfsd_export_shutdown() from freeing the cache -- while any exports fd is open. cache_detail already stores its net pointer (cd->net, set by cache_create_net()), so exports_release() can retrieve it without additional per-file storage.

---
 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c |   14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c +12 -2
@@ -151,9 +151,19 @@ static int exports_net_open(struct net *
 
 	seq = file->private_data;
 	seq->private = nn->svc_export_cache;
+	get_net(net);
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int exports_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
+	struct cache_detail *cd = seq->private;
+
+	put_net(cd->net);
+	return seq_release(inode, file);
+}
+
 static int exports_nfsd_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	return exports_net_open(inode->i_sb->s_fs_info, file);
@@ -163,7 +173,7 @@ static const struct file_operations expo
 	.open		= exports_nfsd_open,
 	.read		= seq_read,
 	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
-	.release	= seq_release,
+	.release	= exports_release,
 };
 
 static int export_features_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
@@ -1476,7 +1486,7 @@ static const struct proc_ops exports_pro
 	.proc_open	= exports_proc_open,
 	.proc_read	= seq_read,
 	.proc_lseek	= seq_lseek,
-	.proc_release	= seq_release,
+	.proc_release	= exports_release,
 };
 
 static int create_proc_exports_entry(void)
author maintainer
#455 lore raw

PATCH 453/567 sunrpc: fix cache_request leak in cache_release

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

commit 17ad31b3a43b72aec3a3d83605891e1397d0d065 upstream.

When a reader's file descriptor is closed while in the middle of reading a cache_request (rp->offset != 0), cache_release() decrements the request's readers count but never checks whether it should free the request.

In cache_read(), when readers drops to 0 and CACHE_PENDING is clear, the cache_request is removed from the queue and freed along with its buffer and cache_head reference. cache_release() lacks this cleanup.

The only other path that frees requests with readers == 0 is cache_dequeue(), but it runs only when CACHE_PENDING transitions from set to clear. If that transition already happened while readers was still non-zero, cache_dequeue() will have skipped the request, and no subsequent call will clean it up.

Add the same cleanup logic from cache_read() to cache_release(): after decrementing readers, check if it reached 0 with CACHE_PENDING clear, and if so, dequeue and free the cache_request.

---
 net/sunrpc/cache.c |   26 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/cache.c +21 -5
@@ -1052,14 +1052,25 @@ static int cache_release(struct inode *i
 	struct cache_reader *rp = filp->private_data;
 
 	if (rp) {
+		struct cache_request *rq = NULL;
+
 		spin_lock(&queue_lock);
 		if (rp->offset) {
 			struct cache_queue *cq;
-			for (cq= &rp->q; &cq->list != &cd->queue;
-			     cq = list_entry(cq->list.next, struct cache_queue, list))
+			for (cq = &rp->q; &cq->list != &cd->queue;
+			     cq = list_entry(cq->list.next,
+					     struct cache_queue, list))
 				if (!cq->reader) {
-					container_of(cq, struct cache_request, q)
-						->readers--;
+					struct cache_request *cr =
+						container_of(cq,
+						struct cache_request, q);
+					cr->readers--;
+					if (cr->readers == 0 &&
+					    !test_bit(CACHE_PENDING,
+						      &cr->item->flags)) {
+						list_del(&cr->q.list);
+						rq = cr;
+					}
 					break;
 				}
 			rp->offset = 0;
@@ -1067,9 +1078,14 @@ static int cache_release(struct inode *i
 		list_del(&rp->q.list);
 		spin_unlock(&queue_lock);
 
+		if (rq) {
+			cache_put(rq->item, cd);
+			kfree(rq->buf);
+			kfree(rq);
+		}
+
 		filp->private_data = NULL;
 		kfree(rp);
-
 	}
 	if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
 		atomic_dec(&cd->writers);
author maintainer
#456 lore raw

PATCH 454/567 nvdimm/bus: Fix potential use after free in asynchronous initialization

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>

commit a8aec14230322ed8f1e8042b6d656c1631d41163 upstream.

Dingisoul with KASAN reports a use after free if device_add() fails in nd_async_device_register().

Commit b6eae0f61db2 ("libnvdimm: Hold reference on parent while scheduling async init") correctly added a reference on the parent device to be held until asynchronous initialization was complete. However, if device_add() results in an allocation failure the ref count of the device drops to 0 prior to the parent pointer being accessed. Thus resulting in use after free.

The bug bot AI correctly identified the fix. Save a reference to the parent pointer to be used to drop the parent reference regardless of the outcome of device_add().

---
 drivers/nvdimm/bus.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/nvdimm/bus.c +3 -2
@@ -486,14 +486,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nd_synchronize);
 static void nd_async_device_register(void *d, async_cookie_t cookie)
 {
 	struct device *dev = d;
+	struct device *parent = dev->parent;
 
 	if (device_add(dev) != 0) {
 		dev_err(dev, "%s: failed\n", __func__);
 		put_device(dev);
 	}
 	put_device(dev);
-	if (dev->parent)
-		put_device(dev->parent);
+	if (parent)
+		put_device(parent);
 }
 
 static void nd_async_device_unregister(void *d, async_cookie_t cookie)
author maintainer
#457 lore raw

PATCH 455/567 LoongArch: Give more information if kmem access failed

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>

commit a47f0754bdd01f971c9715acdbdd3a07515c8f83 upstream.

If memory access such as copy_{from, to}_kernel_nofault() failed, its users do not know what happened, so it is very useful to print the exception code for such cases. Furthermore, it is better to print the caller function to know where is the entry.

Here are the low level call chains:

copy_from_kernel_nofault()

    copy_from_kernel_nofault_loop()
      __get_kernel_nofault()

copy_to_kernel_nofault()

    copy_to_kernel_nofault_loop()
      __put_kernel_nofault()
---
 arch/loongarch/include/asm/uaccess.h |   14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/loongarch/include/asm/uaccess.h +12 -2
@@ -196,8 +196,13 @@ do {									\
 									\
 	__get_kernel_common(*((type *)(dst)), sizeof(type),		\
 			    (__force type *)(src));			\
-	if (unlikely(__gu_err))						\
+	if (unlikely(__gu_err))	{					\
+		pr_info("%s: memory access failed, ecode 0x%x\n",	\
+			__func__, read_csr_excode());			\
+		pr_info("%s: the caller is %pS\n",			\
+			__func__, __builtin_return_address(0));		\
 		goto err_label;						\
+	}								\
 } while (0)
 
 #define __put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label)			\
@@ -207,8 +212,13 @@ do {									\
 									\
 	__pu_val = *(__force type *)(src);				\
 	__put_kernel_common(((type *)(dst)), sizeof(type));		\
-	if (unlikely(__pu_err))						\
+	if (unlikely(__pu_err))	{					\
+		pr_info("%s: memory access failed, ecode 0x%x\n",	\
+			__func__, read_csr_excode());			\
+		pr_info("%s: the caller is %pS\n",			\
+			__func__, __builtin_return_address(0));		\
 		goto err_label;						\
+	}								\
 } while (0)
 
 extern unsigned long __copy_user(void *to, const void *from, __kernel_size_t n);
author maintainer
#458 lore raw

PATCH 456/567 NFC: nxp-nci: allow GPIOs to sleep

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ian Ray <[email protected]>

commit 55dc632ab2ac2889b15995a9eef56c753d48ebc7 upstream.

Allow the firmware and enable GPIOs to sleep.

This fixes a `WARN_ON' and allows the driver to operate GPIOs which are connected to I2C GPIO expanders.

-- >8 --
kernel: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2636 at drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c:3880 gpiod_set_value+0x88/0x98 -- >8 --

Fixes 43201767b44c ("NFC: nxp-nci: Convert to use GPIO descriptor")
---
 drivers/nfc/nxp-nci/i2c.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/nfc/nxp-nci/i2c.c +2 -2
@@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ static int nxp_nci_i2c_set_mode(void *ph
 {
 	struct nxp_nci_i2c_phy *phy = (struct nxp_nci_i2c_phy *) phy_id;
 
-	gpiod_set_value(phy->gpiod_fw, (mode == NXP_NCI_MODE_FW) ? 1 : 0);
-	gpiod_set_value(phy->gpiod_en, (mode != NXP_NCI_MODE_COLD) ? 1 : 0);
+	gpiod_set_value_cansleep(phy->gpiod_fw, (mode == NXP_NCI_MODE_FW) ? 1 : 0);
+	gpiod_set_value_cansleep(phy->gpiod_en, (mode != NXP_NCI_MODE_COLD) ? 1 : 0);
 	usleep_range(10000, 15000);
 
 	if (mode == NXP_NCI_MODE_COLD)
author maintainer
#459 lore raw

PATCH 457/567 net: macb: fix use-after-free access to PTP clock

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>

commit 8da13e6d63c1a97f7302d342c89c4a56a55c7015 upstream.

PTP clock is registered on every opening of the interface and destroyed on every closing. However it may be accessed via get_ts_info ethtool call which is possible while the interface is just present in the kernel.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ptp_clock_index+0x47/0x50 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:426
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880194345cc by task syz.0.6/948

CPU: 1 PID: 948 Comm: syz.0.6 Not tainted 6.1.164+ #109
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.1-0-g3208b098f51a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xba lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:316 [inline]
 print_report+0x17f/0x496 mm/kasan/report.c:420
 kasan_report+0xd9/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:524
 ptp_clock_index+0x47/0x50 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:426
 gem_get_ts_info+0x138/0x1e0 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c:3349
 macb_get_ts_info+0x68/0xb0 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c:3371
 __ethtool_get_ts_info+0x17c/0x260 net/ethtool/common.c:558
 ethtool_get_ts_info net/ethtool/ioctl.c:2367 [inline]
 __dev_ethtool net/ethtool/ioctl.c:3017 [inline]
 dev_ethtool+0x2b05/0x6290 net/ethtool/ioctl.c:3095
 dev_ioctl+0x637/0x1070 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:510
 sock_do_ioctl+0x20d/0x2c0 net/socket.c:1215
 sock_ioctl+0x577/0x6d0 net/socket.c:1320
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18c/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:856
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:76
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 457:
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:563 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:699 [inline]
 ptp_clock_register+0x144/0x10e0 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:235
 gem_ptp_init+0x46f/0x930 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_ptp.c:375
 macb_open+0x901/0xd10 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c:2920
 __dev_open+0x2ce/0x500 net/core/dev.c:1501
 __dev_change_flags+0x56a/0x740 net/core/dev.c:8651
 dev_change_flags+0x92/0x170 net/core/dev.c:8722
 do_setlink+0xaf8/0x3a80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2833
 __rtnl_newlink+0xbf4/0x1940 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3608
 rtnl_newlink+0x63/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3655
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3c6/0xed0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6150
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x15d/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2511
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1318 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x6d7/0xa30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344
 netlink_sendmsg+0x97e/0xeb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1872
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x14b/0x180 net/socket.c:730
 __sys_sendto+0x320/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2152
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2160 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2160
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:76
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

Freed by task 938:
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline]
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1729 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1755 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3687 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_free+0xbc/0x320 mm/slub.c:3700
 device_release+0xa0/0x240 drivers/base/core.c:2507
 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:681 [inline]
 kobject_release lib/kobject.c:712 [inline]
 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
 kobject_put+0x1cd/0x350 lib/kobject.c:729
 put_device+0x1b/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:3805
 ptp_clock_unregister+0x171/0x270 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:391
 gem_ptp_remove+0x4e/0x1f0 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_ptp.c:404
 macb_close+0x1c8/0x270 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c:2966
 __dev_close_many+0x1b9/0x310 net/core/dev.c:1585
 __dev_close net/core/dev.c:1597 [inline]
 __dev_change_flags+0x2bb/0x740 net/core/dev.c:8649
 dev_change_flags+0x92/0x170 net/core/dev.c:8722
 dev_ifsioc+0x151/0xe00 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:326
 dev_ioctl+0x33e/0x1070 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:572
 sock_do_ioctl+0x20d/0x2c0 net/socket.c:1215
 sock_ioctl+0x577/0x6d0 net/socket.c:1320
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18c/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:856
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:76
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

Set the PTP clock pointer to NULL after unregistering.

Fixes c2594d804d5c ("macb: Common code to enable ptp support for MACB/GEM")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_ptp.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_ptp.c +3 -1
@@ -355,8 +355,10 @@ void gem_ptp_remove(struct net_device *n
 {
 	struct macb *bp = netdev_priv(ndev);
 
-	if (bp->ptp_clock)
+	if (bp->ptp_clock) {
 		ptp_clock_unregister(bp->ptp_clock);
+		bp->ptp_clock = NULL;
+	}
 
 	gem_ptp_clear_timer(bp);
 
author maintainer
#460 lore raw

PATCH 458/567 parisc: Flush correct cache in cacheflush() syscall

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>

commit 2c98a8fbd6aa647414c6248dacf254ebe91c79ad upstream.

The assembly flush instructions were swapped for I- and D-cache flags:

SYSCALL_DEFINE3(cacheflush, ...)

{
	if (cache & DCACHE) {
			"fic ...\n"
	}
	if (cache & ICACHE && error == 0) {
			"fdc ...\n"
	}

Fix it by using fdc for DCACHE, and fic for ICACHE flushing.

Fixes c6d96328fecd ("parisc: Add cacheflush() syscall")
Cc <[email protected]> # v6.5+
---
 arch/parisc/kernel/cache.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/parisc/kernel/cache.c +2 -2
index 4c5240d3a3c7..b189265785dc 100644
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(cacheflush, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, bytes,
 #else
 			"1: cmpb,<<,n	%0,%2,1b\n"
 #endif
-			"   fic,m	%3(%4,%0)\n"
+			"   fdc,m	%3(%4,%0)\n"
 			"2: sync\n"
 			ASM_EXCEPTIONTABLE_ENTRY_EFAULT(1b, 2b, "%1")
 			: "+r" (start), "+r" (error)
@@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(cacheflush, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, bytes,
 #else
 			"1: cmpb,<<,n	%0,%2,1b\n"
 #endif
-			"   fdc,m	%3(%4,%0)\n"
+			"   fic,m	%3(%4,%0)\n"
 			"2: sync\n"
 			ASM_EXCEPTIONTABLE_ENTRY_EFAULT(1b, 2b, "%1")
 			: "+r" (start), "+r" (error)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#461 lore raw

PATCH 459/567 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix type confusion in l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lukas Johannes Möller <[email protected]>

commit 15145675690cab2de1056e7ed68e59cbd0452529 upstream.

l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() casts the incoming data to struct l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp (the ECRED *connection* response, 8 bytes with result at offset 6) instead of struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp (2 bytes with result at offset 0).

This causes two problems:

- The sizeof(*rsp) length check requires 8 bytes instead of the correct 2, so valid L2CAP_ECRED_RECONF_RSP packets are rejected with -EPROTO.

- rsp->result reads from offset 6 instead of offset 0, returning wrong data when the packet is large enough to pass the check.

Fix by using the correct type. Also pass the already byte-swapped result variable to BT_DBG instead of the raw __le16 field.

Fixes 15f02b910562 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Add initial code for Enhanced Credit Based Mode")
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +2 -2
@@ -5372,7 +5372,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp
 					 u8 *data)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan, *tmp;
-	struct l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp *rsp = (void *) data;
+	struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp *rsp = (void *)data;
 	u16 result;
 
 	if (cmd_len < sizeof(*rsp))
@@ -5380,7 +5380,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp
 
 	result = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->result);
 
-	BT_DBG("result 0x%4.4x", rsp->result);
+	BT_DBG("result 0x%4.4x", result);
 
 	if (!result)
 		return 0;
author maintainer
#462 lore raw

PATCH 460/567 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Validate L2CAP_INFO_RSP payload length before access

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lukas Johannes Möller <[email protected]>

commit dd815e6e3918dc75a49aaabac36e4f024d675101 upstream.

l2cap_information_rsp() checks that cmd_len covers the fixed l2cap_info_rsp header (type + result, 4 bytes) but then reads rsp->data without verifying that the payload is present:

- L2CAP_IT_FEAT_MASK calls get_unaligned_le32(rsp->data), which reads 4 bytes past the header (needs cmd_len >= 8).

- L2CAP_IT_FIXED_CHAN reads rsp->data[0], 1 byte past the header (needs cmd_len >= 5).

A truncated L2CAP_INFO_RSP with result == L2CAP_IR_SUCCESS triggers an out-of-bounds read of adjacent skb data.

Guard each data access with the required payload length check. If the payload is too short, skip the read and let the state machine complete with safe defaults (feat_mask and remote_fixed_chan remain zero from kzalloc), so the info timer cleanup and l2cap_conn_start() still run and the connection is not stalled.

Fixes 4e8402a3f884 ("[Bluetooth] Retrieve L2CAP features mask on connection setup")
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +4 -2
@@ -4585,7 +4585,8 @@ static inline int l2cap_information_rsp(
 
 	switch (type) {
 	case L2CAP_IT_FEAT_MASK:
-		conn->feat_mask = get_unaligned_le32(rsp->data);
+		if (cmd_len >= sizeof(*rsp) + sizeof(u32))
+			conn->feat_mask = get_unaligned_le32(rsp->data);
 
 		if (conn->feat_mask & L2CAP_FEAT_FIXED_CHAN) {
 			struct l2cap_info_req req;
@@ -4604,7 +4605,8 @@ static inline int l2cap_information_rsp(
 		break;
 
 	case L2CAP_IT_FIXED_CHAN:
-		conn->remote_fixed_chan = rsp->data[0];
+		if (cmd_len >= sizeof(*rsp) + sizeof(rsp->data[0]))
+			conn->remote_fixed_chan = rsp->data[0];
 		conn->info_state |= L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE;
 		conn->info_ident = 0;
 
author maintainer
#463 lore raw

PATCH 461/567 smb: client: fix krb5 mount with username option

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>

commit 12b4c5d98cd7ca46d5035a57bcd995df614c14e1 upstream.

Customer reported that some of their krb5 mounts were failing against a single server as the client was trying to mount the shares with wrong credentials. It turned out the client was reusing SMB session from first mount to try mounting the other shares, even though a different username= option had been specified to the other mounts.

By using username mount option along with sec=krb5 to search for principals from keytab is supported by cifs.upcall(8) since cifs-utils-4.8. So fix this by matching username mount option in match_session() even with Kerberos.

For example, the second mount below should fail with -ENOKEY as there is no 'foobar' principal in keytab (/etc/krb5.keytab). The client ends up reusing SMB session from first mount to perform the second one, which is wrong.

```
$ ktutil
ktutil:  add_entry -password -p testuser -k 1 -e aes256-cts
Password for [email protected]:
ktutil:  write_kt /etc/krb5.keytab
ktutil:  quit
$ klist -ke
Keytab name: FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab
KVNO Principal
 ---- ----------------------------------------------------------------
   1 [email protected] (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
$ mount.cifs //w22-root2/scratch /mnt/1 -o sec=krb5,username=testuser
$ mount.cifs //w22-root2/scratch /mnt/2 -o sec=krb5,username=foobar
$ mount -t cifs | grep -Po 'username=\K\w+'
testuser
testuser
```
---
 fs/smb/client/connect.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
fs/smb/client/connect.c +4 -0
@@ -1922,6 +1922,10 @@ static int match_session(struct cifs_ses
 	case Kerberos:
 		if (!uid_eq(ctx->cred_uid, ses->cred_uid))
 			return 0;
+		if (strncmp(ses->user_name ?: "",
+			    ctx->username ?: "",
+			    CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN))
+			return 0;
 		break;
 	case NTLMv2:
 	case RawNTLMSSP:
author maintainer
#464 lore raw

PATCH 462/567 ksmbd: unset conn->binding on failed binding request

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>

commit 282343cf8a4a5a3603b1cb0e17a7083e4a593b03 upstream.

When a multichannel SMB2_SESSION_SETUP request with SMB2_SESSION_REQ_FLAG_BINDING fails ksmbd sets conn->binding = true but never clears it on the error path. This leaves the connection in a binding state where all subsequent ksmbd_session_lookup_all() calls fall back to the global sessions table. This fix it by clearing conn->binding = false in the error path.

---
 fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +1 -0
@@ -1934,6 +1934,7 @@ out_err:
 			}
 		}
 		smb2_set_err_rsp(work);
+		conn->binding = false;
 	} else {
 		unsigned int iov_len;
 
author maintainer
#465 lore raw

PATCH 463/567 kprobes: Remove unneeded goto

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5e5b8b49335971b68b54afeb0e7ded004945af07 ]

Remove unneeded gotos. Since the labels referred by these gotos have only one reference for each, we can replace those gotos with the referred code.

Stable-dep-of: 5ef268cb7a0a ("kprobes: Remove unneeded warnings from __arm_kprobe_ftrace()")

---
 kernel/kprobes.c |   45 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
kernel/kprobes.c +21 -24
@@ -1083,20 +1083,18 @@ static int __arm_kprobe_ftrace(struct kp
 
 	if (*cnt == 0) {
 		ret = register_ftrace_function(ops);
-		if (WARN(ret < 0, "Failed to register kprobe-ftrace (error %d)\n", ret))
-			goto err_ftrace;
+		if (WARN(ret < 0, "Failed to register kprobe-ftrace (error %d)\n", ret)) {
+			/*
+			 * At this point, sinec ops is not registered, we should be sefe from
+			 * registering empty filter.
+			 */
+			ftrace_set_filter_ip(ops, (unsigned long)p->addr, 1, 0);
+			return ret;
+		}
 	}
 
 	(*cnt)++;
 	return ret;
-
-err_ftrace:
-	/*
-	 * At this point, sinec ops is not registered, we should be sefe from
-	 * registering empty filter.
-	 */
-	ftrace_set_filter_ip(ops, (unsigned long)p->addr, 1, 0);
-	return ret;
 }
 
 static int arm_kprobe_ftrace(struct kprobe *p)
@@ -1457,7 +1455,7 @@ _kprobe_addr(kprobe_opcode_t *addr, cons
 	     unsigned long offset, bool *on_func_entry)
 {
 	if ((symbol_name && addr) || (!symbol_name && !addr))
-		goto invalid;
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	if (symbol_name) {
 		/*
@@ -1487,11 +1485,10 @@ _kprobe_addr(kprobe_opcode_t *addr, cons
 	 * at the start of the function.
 	 */
 	addr = arch_adjust_kprobe_addr((unsigned long)addr, offset, on_func_entry);
-	if (addr)
-		return addr;
+	if (!addr)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-invalid:
-	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	return addr;
 }
 
 static kprobe_opcode_t *kprobe_addr(struct kprobe *p)
@@ -1514,15 +1511,15 @@ static struct kprobe *__get_valid_kprobe
 	if (unlikely(!ap))
 		return NULL;
 
-	if (p != ap) {
-		list_for_each_entry(list_p, &ap->list, list)
-			if (list_p == p)
-			/* kprobe p is a valid probe */
-				goto valid;
-		return NULL;
-	}
-valid:
-	return ap;
+	if (p == ap)
+		return ap;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(list_p, &ap->list, list)
+		if (list_p == p)
+		/* kprobe p is a valid probe */
+			return ap;
+
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /*
author maintainer
#466 lore raw

PATCH 464/567 kprobes: Remove unneeded warnings from __arm_kprobe_ftrace()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5ef268cb7a0aac55521fd9881f1939fa94a8988e ]

Remove unneeded warnings for handled errors from __arm_kprobe_ftrace() because all caller handled the error correctly.

---
 kernel/kprobes.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/kprobes.c +2 -2
@@ -1078,12 +1078,12 @@ static int __arm_kprobe_ftrace(struct kp
 	lockdep_assert_held(&kprobe_mutex);
 
 	ret = ftrace_set_filter_ip(ops, (unsigned long)p->addr, 0, 0);
-	if (WARN_ONCE(ret < 0, "Failed to arm kprobe-ftrace at %pS (error %d)\n", p->addr, ret))
+	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
 	if (*cnt == 0) {
 		ret = register_ftrace_function(ops);
-		if (WARN(ret < 0, "Failed to register kprobe-ftrace (error %d)\n", ret)) {
+		if (ret < 0) {
 			/*
 			 * At this point, sinec ops is not registered, we should be sefe from
 			 * registering empty filter.
author maintainer
#467 lore raw

PATCH 465/567 btrfs: fix transaction abort when snapshotting received subvolumes

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e1b18b959025e6b5dbad668f391f65d34b39595a ]

Currently a user can trigger a transaction abort by snapshotting a previously received snapshot a bunch of times until we reach a BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL item overflow (the maximum item size we can store in a leaf). This is very likely not common in practice, but if it happens, it turns the filesystem into RO mode. The snapshot, send and set_received_subvol and subvol_setflags (used by receive) don't require CAP_SYS_ADMIN, just inode_owner_or_capable(). A malicious user could use this to turn a filesystem into RO mode and disrupt a system.

Reproducer script:

  $ cat test.sh
  #!/bin/bash

DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi

  # Use smallest node size to make the test faster.
  mkfs.btrfs -f --nodesize 4K $DEV
  mount $DEV $MNT

# Create a subvolume and set it to RO so that it can be used for send. btrfs subvolume create $MNT/sv
touch $MNT/sv/foo
btrfs property set $MNT/sv ro true

# Send and receive the subvolume into snaps/sv.
mkdir $MNT/snaps
btrfs send $MNT/sv | btrfs receive $MNT/snaps

# Now snapshot the received subvolume, which has a received_uuid, a

  # lot of times to trigger the leaf overflow.
  total=500
  for ((i = 1; i <= $total; i++)); do
      echo -ne "\rCreating snapshot $i/$total"
      btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT/snaps/sv $MNT/snaps/sv_$i > /dev/null
  done
  echo

umount $MNT

When running the test:

  $ ./test.sh
  (...)
  Create subvolume '/mnt/sdi/sv'
  At subvol /mnt/sdi/sv
  At subvol sv
  Creating snapshot 496/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Value too large for defined data type
  Creating snapshot 497/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
  Creating snapshot 498/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
  Creating snapshot 499/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
  Creating snapshot 500/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system

And in dmesg/syslog:

  $ dmesg
  (...)
  [251067.627338] BTRFS warning (device sdi): insert uuid item failed -75 (0x4628b21c4ac8d898, 0x2598bee2b1515c91) type 252!
  [251067.629212] ------------[ cut here ]------------
  [251067.630033] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -75)
  [251067.630871] WARNING: fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1907 at create_pending_snapshot.cold+0x52/0x465 [btrfs], CPU#10: btrfs/615235
  [251067.632851] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_zero (...)
  [251067.644071] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 615235 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G        W           6.19.0-rc8-btrfs-next-225+ #1 PREEMPT(full)
  [251067.646165] Tainted: [W]=WARN
  [251067.646733] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  [251067.648735] RIP: 0010:create_pending_snapshot.cold+0x55/0x465 [btrfs]
  [251067.649984] Code: f0 48 0f (...)
  [251067.653313] RSP: 0018:ffffce644908fae8 EFLAGS: 00010292
  [251067.653987] RAX: 00000000ffffff01 RBX: ffff8e5639e63a80 RCX: 00000000ffffffd3
  [251067.655042] RDX: ffff8e53faa76b00 RSI: 00000000ffffffb5 RDI: ffffffffc0919750
  [251067.656077] RBP: ffffce644908fbd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffce644908f820
  [251067.657068] R10: ffff8e5adc1fffa8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8e53c0431bd0
  [251067.658050] R13: ffff8e5414593600 R14: ffff8e55efafd000 R15: 00000000ffffffb5
  [251067.659019] FS:  00007f2a4944b3c0(0000) GS:ffff8e5b27dae000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [251067.660115] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [251067.660943] CR2: 00007ffc5aa57898 CR3: 00000005813a2003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
  [251067.661972] Call Trace:
  [251067.662292]  <TASK>
  [251067.662653]  create_pending_snapshots+0x97/0xc0 [btrfs]
  [251067.663413]  btrfs_commit_transaction+0x26e/0xc00 [btrfs]
  [251067.664257]  ? btrfs_qgroup_convert_reserved_meta+0x35/0x390 [btrfs]
  [251067.665238]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x15/0x30
  [251067.665837]  ? record_root_in_trans+0xa2/0xd0 [btrfs]
  [251067.666531]  btrfs_mksubvol+0x330/0x580 [btrfs]
  [251067.667145]  btrfs_mksnapshot+0x74/0xa0 [btrfs]
  [251067.667827]  __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x194/0x1d0 [btrfs]
  [251067.668595]  btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x107/0x130 [btrfs]
  [251067.669479]  btrfs_ioctl+0x1580/0x2690 [btrfs]
  [251067.670093]  ? count_memcg_events+0x6d/0x180
  [251067.670849]  ? handle_mm_fault+0x1a0/0x2a0
  [251067.671652]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x92/0xe0
  [251067.672406]  do_syscall_64+0x50/0xf20
  [251067.673129]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  [251067.674096] RIP: 0033:0x7f2a495648db
  [251067.674812] Code: 00 48 89 (...)
  [251067.678227] RSP: 002b:00007ffc5aa57840 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
  [251067.679691] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f2a495648db
  [251067.681145] RDX: 00007ffc5aa588b0 RSI: 0000000050009417 RDI: 0000000000000004
  [251067.682511] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  [251067.683842] R10: 000000000000000a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc5aa59910
  [251067.685176] R13: 00007ffc5aa588b0 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: 0000000000000006
  [251067.686524]  </TASK>
  [251067.686972] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  [251067.687890] BTRFS: error (device sdi state A) in create_pending_snapshot:1907: errno=-75 unknown
  [251067.689049] BTRFS info (device sdi state EA): forced readonly
  [251067.689054] BTRFS warning (device sdi state EA): Skipping commit of aborted transaction.
  [251067.690119] BTRFS: error (device sdi state EA) in cleanup_transaction:2043: errno=-75 unknown
  [251067.702028] BTRFS info (device sdi state EA): last unmount of filesystem 46dc3975-30a2-4a69-a18f-418b859cccda

Fix this by ignoring -EOVERFLOW errors from btrfs_uuid_tree_add() in the snapshot creation code when attempting to add the BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL item. This is OK because it's not critical and we are still able to delete the snapshot, as snapshot/subvolume deletion ignores if a BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL is missing (see inode.c:btrfs_delete_subvolume()). As for send/receive, we can still do send/receive operations since it always peeks the first root ID in the existing BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL (it could peek any since all snapshots have the same content), and even if the key is missing, it falls back to searching by BTRFS_UUID_KEY_SUBVOL key.

A test case for fstests will be sent soon.

Fixes dd5f9615fc5c ("Btrfs: maintain subvolume items in the UUID tree")
[ adapted error check condition to omit unlikely() wrapper ]
---
 fs/btrfs/transaction.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/transaction.c +16 -0
@@ -1877,6 +1877,22 @@ static noinline int create_pending_snaps
 		ret = btrfs_uuid_tree_add(trans, new_root_item->received_uuid,
 					  BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL,
 					  objectid);
+		/*
+		 * We are creating of lot of snapshots of the same root that was
+		 * received (has a received UUID) and reached a leaf's limit for
+		 * an item. We can safely ignore this and avoid a transaction
+		 * abort. A deletion of this snapshot will still work since we
+		 * ignore if an item with a BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL key
+		 * is missing (see btrfs_delete_subvolume()). Send/receive will
+		 * work too since it peeks the first root id from the existing
+		 * item (it could peek any), and in case it's missing it
+		 * falls back to search by BTRFS_UUID_KEY_SUBVOL keys.
+		 * Creation of a snapshot does not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so
+		 * we don't want users triggering transaction aborts, either
+		 * intentionally or not.
+		 */
+		if (ret == -EOVERFLOW)
+			ret = 0;
 		if (ret && ret != -EEXIST) {
 			btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, ret);
 			goto fail;
author maintainer
#468 lore raw

PATCH 466/567 btrfs: fix transaction abort on set received ioctl due to item overflow

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 87f2c46003fce4d739138aab4af1942b1afdadac ]

If the set received ioctl fails due to an item overflow when attempting to add the BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL we have to abort the transaction since we did some metadata updates before.

This means that if a user calls this ioctl with the same received UUID field for a lot of subvolumes, we will hit the overflow, trigger the transaction abort and turn the filesystem into RO mode. A malicious user could exploit this, and this ioctl does not even requires that a user has admin privileges (CAP_SYS_ADMIN), only that he/she owns the subvolume.

Fix this by doing an early check for item overflow before starting a transaction. This is also race safe because we are holding the subvol_sem semaphore in exclusive (write) mode.

A test case for fstests will follow soon.

Fixes dd5f9615fc5c ("Btrfs: maintain subvolume items in the UUID tree")
[ adapted BTRFS_PATH_AUTO_FREE macro to manual btrfs_free_path calls ]
---
 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c     |   21 +++++++++++++++++++--
 fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.c |   43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.h |    2 ++
 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +19 -2
@@ -3999,6 +3999,25 @@ static long _btrfs_ioctl_set_received_su
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	received_uuid_changed = memcmp(root_item->received_uuid, sa->uuid,
+				       BTRFS_UUID_SIZE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Before we attempt to add the new received uuid, check if we have room
+	 * for it in case there's already an item. If the size of the existing
+	 * item plus this root's ID (u64) exceeds the maximum item size, we can
+	 * return here without the need to abort a transaction. If we don't do
+	 * this check, the btrfs_uuid_tree_add() call below would fail with
+	 * -EOVERFLOW and result in a transaction abort. Malicious users could
+	 * exploit this to turn the fs into RO mode.
+	 */
+	if (received_uuid_changed && !btrfs_is_empty_uuid(sa->uuid)) {
+		ret = btrfs_uuid_tree_check_overflow(fs_info, sa->uuid,
+						     BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * 1 - root item
 	 * 2 - uuid items (received uuid + subvol uuid)
@@ -4014,8 +4033,6 @@ static long _btrfs_ioctl_set_received_su
 	sa->rtime.sec = ct.tv_sec;
 	sa->rtime.nsec = ct.tv_nsec;
 
-	received_uuid_changed = memcmp(root_item->received_uuid, sa->uuid,
-				       BTRFS_UUID_SIZE);
 	if (received_uuid_changed &&
 	    !btrfs_is_empty_uuid(root_item->received_uuid)) {
 		ret = btrfs_uuid_tree_remove(trans, root_item->received_uuid,
fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.c +43 -0

49 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.h +2 -0
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ int btrfs_uuid_tree_add(struct btrfs_tra
 			u64 subid);
 int btrfs_uuid_tree_remove(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, u8 *uuid, u8 type,
 			u64 subid);
+int btrfs_uuid_tree_check_overflow(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
+				   u8 *uuid, u8 type);
 int btrfs_uuid_tree_iterate(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info);
 
 #endif
author maintainer
#469 lore raw

PATCH 467/567 btrfs: fix transaction abort on file creation due to name hash collision

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2d1ababdedd4ba38867c2500eb7f95af5ddeeef7 ]

If we attempt to create several files with names that result in the same hash, we have to pack them in same dir item and that has a limit inherent to the leaf size. However if we reach that limit, we trigger a transaction abort and turns the filesystem into RO mode. This allows for a malicious user to disrupt a system, without the need to have administration privileges/capabilities.

Reproducer:

  $ cat exploit-hash-collisions.sh
  #!/bin/bash

DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi

  # Use smallest node size to make the test faster and require fewer file
  # names that result in hash collision.
  mkfs.btrfs -f --nodesize 4K $DEV
  mount $DEV $MNT

# List of names that result in the same crc32c hash for btrfs.
declare -a names=(
'foobar' '%a8tYkxfGMLWRGr55QSeQc4PBNH9PCLIvR6jZnkDtUUru1t@RouaUe_L:@xGkbO3nCwvLNYeK9vhE628gss:T$yZjZ5l-Nbd6CbC$M=hqE-ujhJICXyIxBvYrIU9-TDC' 'AQci3EUB%shMsg-N%frgU:02ByLs=IPJU0OpgiWit5nexSyxZDncY6WB:=zKZuk5Zy0DD$Ua78%MelgBuMqaHGyKsJUFf9s=UW80PcJmKctb46KveLSiUtNmqrMiL9-Y0I_l5Fnam04CGIg=8@U:Z' 'CvVqJpJzueKcuA$wqwePfyu7VxuWNN3ho$p0zi2H8QFYK$7YlEqOhhb%:hHgjhIjW5vnqWHKNP4' 'ET:vk@rFU4tsvMB0$C_p=xQHaYZjvoF%-BTc%wkFW8yaDAPcCYoR%x$FH5O:' 'HwTon%v7SGSP4FE08jBwwiu5aot2CFKXHTeEAa@38fUcNGOWvE@Mz6WBeDH_VooaZ6AgsXPkVGwy9l@@ZbNXabUU9csiWrrOp0MWUdfi$EZ3w9GkIqtz7I_eOsByOkBOO' 'Ij%2VlFGXSuPvxJGf5UWy6O@1svxGha%b@=%wjkq:CIgE6u7eJOjmQY5qTtxE2Rjbis9@us' 'KBkjG5%9R8K9sOG8UTnAYjxLNAvBmvV5vz3IiZaPmKuLYO03-6asI9lJ_j4@6Xo$KZicaLWJ3Pv8XEwVeUPMwbHYWwbx0pYvNlGMO9F:ZhHAwyctnGy%_eujl%WPd4U2BI7qooOSr85J-C2V$LfY' 'NcRfDfuUQ2=zP8K3CCF5dFcpfiOm6mwenShsAb_F%n6GAGC7fT2JFFn:c35X-3aYwoq7jNX5$ZJ6hI3wnZs$7KgGi7wjulffhHNUxAT0fRRLF39vJ@NvaEMxsMO' 'Oj42AQAEzRoTxa5OuSKIr=A_lwGMy132v4g3Pdq1GvUG9874YseIFQ6QU'
'Ono7avN5GjC:_6dBJ_'
'WHmN2gnmaN-9dVDy4aWo:yNGFzz8qsJyJhWEWcud7$QzN2D9R0efIWWEdu5kwWr73NZm4=@CoCDxrrZnRITr-kGtU_cfW2:%2_am' 'WiFnuTEhAG9FEC6zopQmj-A-$LDQ0T3WULz%ox3UZAPybSV6v1Z$b4L_XBi4M4BMBtJZpz93r9xafpB77r:lbwvitWRyo$odnAUYlYMmU4RvgnNd--e=I5hiEjGLETTtaScWlQp8mYsBovZwM2k' 'XKyH=OsOAF3p%uziGF_ZVr$ivrvhVgD@1u%5RtrV-gl_vqAwHkK@x7YwlxX3qT6WKKQ%PR56NrUBU2dOAOAdzr2=5nJuKPM-T-$ZpQfCL7phxQbUcb:BZOTPaFExc-qK-gDRCDW2' 'd3uUR6OFEwZr%ns1XH_@tbxA@cCPmbBRLdyh7p6V45H$P2$F%w0RqrD3M0g8aGvWpoTFMiBdOTJXjD:JF7=h9a_43xBywYAP%r$SPZi%zDg%ql-KvkdUCtF9OLaQlxmd' 'ePTpbnit%hyNm@WELlpKzNZYOzOTf8EQ$sEfkMy1VOfIUu3coyvIr13-Y7Sv5v-Ivax2Go_GQRFMU1b3362nktT9WOJf3SpT%z8sZmM3gvYQBDgmKI%%RM-G7hyrhgYflOw%z::ZRcv5O:lDCFm' 'evqk743Y@dvZAiG5J05L_ROFV@$2%rVWJ2%3nxV72-W7$e$-SK3tuSHA2mBt$qloC5jwNx33GmQUjD%akhBPu=VJ5g$xhlZiaFtTrjeeM5x7dt4cHpX0cZkmfImndYzGmvwQG:$euFYmXn$_2rA9mKZ' 'gkgUtnihWXsZQTEkrMAWIxir09k3t7jk_IK25t1:cy1XWN0GGqC%FrySdcmU7M8MuPO_ppkLw3=Dfr0UuBAL4%GFk2$Ma10V1jDRGJje%Xx9EV2ERaWKtjpwiZwh0gCSJsj5UL7CR8RtW5opCVFKGGy8Cky' 'hNgsG_8lNRik3PvphqPm0yEH3P%%fYG:kQLY=6O-61Wa6nrV_WVGR6TLB09vHOv%g4VQRP8Gzx7VXUY1qvZyS' 'isA7JVzN12xCxVPJZ_qoLm-pTBuhjjHMvV7o=F:EaClfYNyFGlsfw-Kf%uxdqW-kwk1sPl2vhbjyHU1A6$hz' 'kiJ_fgcdZFDiOptjgH5PN9-PSyLO4fbk_:u5_2tz35lV_iXiJ6cx7pwjTtKy-XGaQ5IefmpJ4N_ZqGsqCsKuqOOBgf9LkUdffHet@Wu' 'lvwtxyhE9:%Q3UxeHiViUyNzJsy:fm38pg_b6s25JvdhOAT=1s0$pG25x=LZ2rlHTszj=gN6M4zHZYr_qrB49i=pA--@WqWLIuX7o1S_SfS@2FSiUZN' 'rC24cw3UBDZ=5qJBUMs9e$=S4Y94ni%Z8639vnrGp=0Hv4z3dNFL0fBLmQ40=EYIY:Z=SLc@QLMSt2zsss2ZXrP7j4=' 'uwGl2s-fFrf@GqS=DQqq2I0LJSsOmM%xzTjS:lzXguE3wChdMoHYtLRKPvfaPOZF2fER@j53evbKa7R%A7r4%YEkD=kicJe@SFiGtXHbKe4gCgPAYbnVn' 'UG37U6KKua2bgc:IHzRs7BnB6FD:2Mt5Cc5NdlsW%$1tyvnfz7S27FvNkroXwAW:mBZLA1@qa9WnDbHCDmQmfPMC9z-Eq6QT0jhhPpqyymaD:R02ghwYo%yx7SAaaq-:x33LYpei$5g8DMl3C' 'y2vjek0FE1PDJC0qpfnN:x8k2wCFZ9xiUF2ege=JnP98R%wxjKkdfEiLWvQzmnW' '8-HCSgH5B%K7P8_jaVtQhBXpBk:pE-$P7ts58U0J@iR9YZntMPl7j$s62yAJO@_9eanFPS54b=UTw$94C-t=HLxT8n6o9P=QnIxq-f1=Ne2dvhe6WbjEQtc' 'YPPh:IFt2mtR6XWSmjHptXL_hbSYu8bMw-JP8@PNyaFkdNFsk$M=xfL6LDKCDM-mSyGA_2MBwZ8Dr4=R1D%7-mCaaKGxb990jzaagRktDTyp' '9hD2ApKa_t_7x-a@GCG28kY:7$M@5udI1myQ$x5udtggvagmCQcq9QXWRC5hoB0o-_zHQUqZI5rMcz_kbMgvN5jr63LeYA4Cj-c6F5Ugmx6DgVf@2Jqm%MafecpgooqreJ53P-QTS'
)

  # Now create files with all those names in the same parent directory.
  # It should not fail since a 4K leaf has enough space for them.
  for name in "${names[@]}"; do
       touch $MNT/$name
  done

# Now add one more file name that causes a crc32c hash collision. # This should fail, but it should not turn the filesystem into RO mode # (which could be exploited by malicious users) due to a transaction

  # abort.
  touch $MNT/'W6tIm-VK2@BGC@IBfcgg6j_p:pxp_QUqtWpGD5Ok_GmijKOJJt'

# Check that we are able to create another file, with a name that does not cause

  # a crc32c hash collision.
  echo -n "hello world" > $MNT/baz
  # Unmount and mount again, verify file baz exists and with the right content.
  umount $MNT
  mount $DEV $MNT
  echo "File baz content: $(cat $MNT/baz)"

umount $MNT

When running the reproducer:

  $ ./exploit-hash-collisions.sh
  (...)
  touch: cannot touch '/mnt/sdi/W6tIm-VK2@BGC@IBfcgg6j_p:pxp_QUqtWpGD5Ok_GmijKOJJt': Value too large for defined data type
  ./exploit-hash-collisions.sh: line 57: /mnt/sdi/baz: Read-only file system
  cat: /mnt/sdi/baz: No such file or directory
  File baz content:

And the transaction abort stack trace in dmesg/syslog:

  $ dmesg
  (...)
  [758240.509761] ------------[ cut here ]------------
  [758240.510668] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -75)
  [758240.511577] WARNING: fs/btrfs/inode.c:6854 at btrfs_create_new_inode+0x805/0xb50 [btrfs], CPU#6: touch/888644
  [758240.513513] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_zero (...)
  [758240.523221] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 888644 Comm: touch Tainted: G        W           6.19.0-rc8-btrfs-next-225+ #1 PREEMPT(full)
  [758240.524621] Tainted: [W]=WARN
  [758240.525037] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  [758240.526331] RIP: 0010:btrfs_create_new_inode+0x80b/0xb50 [btrfs]
  [758240.527093] Code: 0f 82 cf (...)
  [758240.529211] RSP: 0018:ffffce64418fbb48 EFLAGS: 00010292
  [758240.529935] RAX: 00000000ffffffd3 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000ffffffb5
  [758240.531040] RDX: 0000000d04f33e06 RSI: 00000000ffffffb5 RDI: ffffffffc0919dd0
  [758240.531920] RBP: ffffce64418fbc10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffffb5
  [758240.532928] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8e52c0000000 R12: ffff8e53eee7d0f0
  [758240.533818] R13: ffff8e57f70932a0 R14: ffff8e5417629568 R15: 0000000000000000
  [758240.534664] FS:  00007f1959a2a740(0000) GS:ffff8e5b27cae000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [758240.535821] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [758240.536644] CR2: 00007f1959b10ce0 CR3: 000000012a2cc005 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
  [758240.537517] Call Trace:
  [758240.537828]  <TASK>
  [758240.538099]  btrfs_create_common+0xbf/0x140 [btrfs]
  [758240.538760]  path_openat+0x111a/0x15b0
  [758240.539252]  do_filp_open+0xc2/0x170
  [758240.539699]  ? preempt_count_add+0x47/0xa0
  [758240.540200]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0xe4/0x1a0
  [758240.540800]  ? __check_object_size+0x1b3/0x230
  [758240.541661]  ? alloc_fd+0x118/0x180
  [758240.542315]  do_sys_openat2+0x70/0xd0
  [758240.543012]  __x64_sys_openat+0x50/0xa0
  [758240.543723]  do_syscall_64+0x50/0xf20
  [758240.544462]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  [758240.545397] RIP: 0033:0x7f1959abc687
  [758240.546019] Code: 48 89 fa (...)
  [758240.548522] RSP: 002b:00007ffe16ff8690 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
  [758240.566278] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1959a2a740 RCX: 00007f1959abc687
  [758240.567068] RDX: 0000000000000941 RSI: 00007ffe16ffa333 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c
  [758240.567860] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  [758240.568707] R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000561eec7c4b90
  [758240.569712] R13: 0000561eec7c311f R14: 00007ffe16ffa333 R15: 0000000000000000
  [758240.570758]  </TASK>
  [758240.571040] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  [758240.571681] BTRFS: error (device sdi state A) in btrfs_create_new_inode:6854: errno=-75 unknown
  [758240.572899] BTRFS info (device sdi state EA): forced readonly

Fix this by checking for hash collision, and if the adding a new name is possible, early in btrfs_create_new_inode() before we do any tree updates, so that we don't need to abort the transaction if we cannot add the new name due to the leaf size limit.

A test case for fstests will be sent soon.

Fixes caae78e03234 ("btrfs: move common inode creation code into btrfs_create_new_inode()")
---
 fs/btrfs/inode.c |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/inode.c +19 -0
@@ -6227,6 +6227,25 @@ int btrfs_create_new_inode(struct btrfs_
 	unsigned long ptr;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (!args->orphan && !args->subvol) {
+		/*
+		 * Before anything else, check if we can add the name to the
+		 * parent directory. We want to avoid a dir item overflow in
+		 * case we have an existing dir item due to existing name
+		 * hash collisions. We do this check here before we call
+		 * btrfs_add_link() down below so that we can avoid a
+		 * transaction abort (which could be exploited by malicious
+		 * users).
+		 *
+		 * For subvolumes we already do this in btrfs_mksubvol().
+		 */
+		ret = btrfs_check_dir_item_collision(BTRFS_I(dir)->root,
+						     btrfs_ino(BTRFS_I(dir)),
+						     name);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
 	path = btrfs_alloc_path();
 	if (!path)
 		return -ENOMEM;
author maintainer
#470 lore raw

PATCH 468/567 iio: light: bh1780: fix PM runtime leak on error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Antoniu Miclaus <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dd72e6c3cdea05cad24e99710939086f7a113fb5 ]

Move pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() before the error check to ensure the PM runtime reference count is always decremented after pm_runtime_get_sync(), regardless of whether the read operation succeeds or fails.

Fixes 1f0477f18306 ("iio: light: new driver for the ROHM BH1780")
[ moved both pm_runtime_mark_last_busy() and pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() before the error check instead of just pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() ]
---
 drivers/iio/light/bh1780.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/light/bh1780.c +2 -2
@@ -109,10 +109,10 @@ static int bh1780_read_raw(struct iio_de
 		case IIO_LIGHT:
 			pm_runtime_get_sync(&bh1780->client->dev);
 			value = bh1780_read_word(bh1780, BH1780_REG_DLOW);
-			if (value < 0)
-				return value;
 			pm_runtime_mark_last_busy(&bh1780->client->dev);
 			pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(&bh1780->client->dev);
+			if (value < 0)
+				return value;
 			*val = value;
 
 			return IIO_VAL_INT;
author maintainer
#471 lore raw

PATCH 469/567 batman-adv: avoid OGM aggregation when skb tailroom is insufficient

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yang Yang <[email protected]>

commit 0d4aef630be9d5f9c1227d07669c26c4383b5ad0 upstream.

When OGM aggregation state is toggled at runtime, an existing forwarded packet may have been allocated with only packet_len bytes, while a later packet can still be selected for aggregation. Appending in this case can hit skb_put overflow conditions.

Reject aggregation when the target skb tailroom cannot accommodate the new packet. The caller then falls back to creating a new forward packet instead of appending.

---
 net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c +3 -0
@@ -464,6 +464,9 @@ batadv_iv_ogm_can_aggregate(const struct
 	    !time_after_eq(aggregation_end_time, forw_packet->send_time))
 		return false;
 
+	if (skb_tailroom(forw_packet->skb) < packet_len)
+		return false;
+
 	if (aggregated_bytes > BATADV_MAX_AGGREGATION_BYTES)
 		return false;
 
author maintainer
#472 lore raw

PATCH 470/567 nfsd: fix heap overflow in NFSv4.0 LOCK replay cache

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5133b61aaf437e5f25b1b396b14242a6bb0508e2 ]

The NFSv4.0 replay cache uses a fixed 112-byte inline buffer (rp_ibuf[NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE]) to store encoded operation responses. This size was calculated based on OPEN responses and does not account for LOCK denied responses, which include the conflicting lock owner as a variable-length field up to 1024 bytes (NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT).

When a LOCK operation is denied due to a conflict with an existing lock that has a large owner, nfsd4_encode_operation() copies the full encoded response into the undersized replay buffer via read_bytes_from_xdr_buf() with no bounds check. This results in a slab-out-of-bounds write of up to 944 bytes past the end of the buffer, corrupting adjacent heap memory.

This can be triggered remotely by an unauthenticated attacker with two cooperating NFSv4.0 clients: one sets a lock with a large owner string, then the other requests a conflicting lock to provoke the denial.

We could fix this by increasing NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE to allow for a full opaque, but that would increase the size of every stateowner, when most lockowners are not that large.

Instead, fix this by checking the encoded response length against NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE before copying into the replay buffer. If the response is too large, set rp_buflen to 0 to skip caching the replay payload. The status is still cached, and the client already received the correct response on the original request.

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
[ replaced `op_status_offset + XDR_UNIT` with existing `post_err_offset` variable ]
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c |    9 +++++++--
 fs/nfsd/state.h   |   17 ++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +7 -2
@@ -5425,9 +5425,14 @@ nfsd4_encode_operation(struct nfsd4_comp
 		int len = xdr->buf->len - post_err_offset;
 
 		so->so_replay.rp_status = op->status;
-		so->so_replay.rp_buflen = len;
-		read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(xdr->buf, post_err_offset,
+		if (len <= NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE) {
+			so->so_replay.rp_buflen = len;
+			read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(xdr->buf,
+						post_err_offset,
 						so->so_replay.rp_buf, len);
+		} else {
+			so->so_replay.rp_buflen = 0;
+		}
 	}
 status:
 	*p = op->status;
fs/nfsd/state.h +12 -5
@@ -430,11 +430,18 @@ struct nfs4_client_reclaim {
 	struct xdr_netobj	cr_princhash;
 };
 
-/* A reasonable value for REPLAY_ISIZE was estimated as follows:  
- * The OPEN response, typically the largest, requires 
- *   4(status) + 8(stateid) + 20(changeinfo) + 4(rflags) +  8(verifier) + 
- *   4(deleg. type) + 8(deleg. stateid) + 4(deleg. recall flag) + 
- *   20(deleg. space limit) + ~32(deleg. ace) = 112 bytes 
+/*
+ * REPLAY_ISIZE is sized for an OPEN response with delegation:
+ *   4(status) + 8(stateid) + 20(changeinfo) + 4(rflags) +
+ *   8(verifier) + 4(deleg. type) + 8(deleg. stateid) +
+ *   4(deleg. recall flag) + 20(deleg. space limit) +
+ *   ~32(deleg. ace) = 112 bytes
+ *
+ * Some responses can exceed this. A LOCK denial includes the conflicting
+ * lock owner, which can be up to 1024 bytes (NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT). Responses
+ * larger than REPLAY_ISIZE are not cached in rp_ibuf; only rp_status is
+ * saved. Enlarging this constant increases the size of every
+ * nfs4_stateowner.
  */
 
 #define NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE       112 
author maintainer
#473 lore raw

PATCH 471/567 net: macb: queue tie-off or disable during WOL suspend

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vineeth Karumanchi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 759cc793ebfc2d1a02f357ae97e5dcdcd63f758f ]

When GEM is used as a wake device, it is not mandatory for the RX DMA to be active. The RX engine in IP only needs to receive and identify a wake packet through an interrupt. The wake packet is of no further significance; hence, it is not required to be copied into memory. By disabling RX DMA during suspend, we can avoid unnecessary DMA processing of any incoming traffic.

During suspend, perform either of the below operations:

- tie-off/dummy descriptor: Disable unused queues by connecting them to a looped descriptor chain without free slots.

- queue disable: The newer IP version allows disabling individual queues.

Stable-dep-of: 718d0766ce4c ("net: macb: Reinitialize tx/rx queue pointer registers and rx ring during resume")

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb.h      |    7 +++
 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c |   60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb.h +7 -0
@@ -645,6 +645,10 @@
 #define GEM_T2OFST_OFFSET			0 /* offset value */
 #define GEM_T2OFST_SIZE				7
 
+/* Bitfields in queue pointer registers */
+#define MACB_QUEUE_DISABLE_OFFSET		0 /* disable queue */
+#define MACB_QUEUE_DISABLE_SIZE			1
+
 /* Offset for screener type 2 compare values (T2CMPOFST).
  * Note the offset is applied after the specified point,
  * e.g. GEM_T2COMPOFST_ETYPE denotes the EtherType field, so an offset
@@ -733,6 +737,7 @@
 #define MACB_CAPS_NEEDS_RSTONUBR		0x00000100
 #define MACB_CAPS_MIIONRGMII			0x00000200
 #define MACB_CAPS_NEED_TSUCLK			0x00000400
+#define MACB_CAPS_QUEUE_DISABLE			0x00000800
 #define MACB_CAPS_PCS				0x01000000
 #define MACB_CAPS_HIGH_SPEED			0x02000000
 #define MACB_CAPS_CLK_HW_CHG			0x04000000
@@ -1253,6 +1258,8 @@ struct macb {
 	u32	(*macb_reg_readl)(struct macb *bp, int offset);
 	void	(*macb_reg_writel)(struct macb *bp, int offset, u32 value);
 
+	struct macb_dma_desc	*rx_ring_tieoff;
+	dma_addr_t		rx_ring_tieoff_dma;
 	size_t			rx_buffer_size;
 
 	unsigned int		rx_ring_size;
drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c +57 -3

110 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#474 lore raw

PATCH 472/567 net: macb: Introduce gem_init_rx_ring()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kevin Hao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1a7124ecd655bcaf1845197fe416aa25cff4c3ea ]

Extract the initialization code for the GEM RX ring into a new function. This change will be utilized in a subsequent patch. No functional changes are introduced.

Stable-dep-of: 718d0766ce4c ("net: macb: Reinitialize tx/rx queue pointer registers and rx ring during resume")

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c |   13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c +9 -4
@@ -2700,6 +2700,14 @@ static void macb_init_tieoff(struct macb
 	desc->ctrl = 0;
 }
 
+static void gem_init_rx_ring(struct macb_queue *queue)
+{
+	queue->rx_tail = 0;
+	queue->rx_prepared_head = 0;
+
+	gem_rx_refill(queue);
+}
+
 static void gem_init_rings(struct macb *bp)
 {
 	struct macb_queue *queue;
@@ -2717,10 +2725,7 @@ static void gem_init_rings(struct macb *
 		queue->tx_head = 0;
 		queue->tx_tail = 0;
 
-		queue->rx_tail = 0;
-		queue->rx_prepared_head = 0;
-
-		gem_rx_refill(queue);
+		gem_init_rx_ring(queue);
 	}
 
 	macb_init_tieoff(bp);
author maintainer
#475 lore raw

PATCH 473/567 net: macb: Reinitialize tx/rx queue pointer registers and rx ring during resume

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kevin Hao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 718d0766ce4c7634ce62fa78b526ea7263487edd ]

On certain platforms, such as AMD Versal boards, the tx/rx queue pointer registers are cleared after suspend, and the rx queue pointer register is also disabled during suspend if WOL is enabled. Previously, we assumed that these registers would be restored by macb_mac_link_up(). However, in commit bf9cf80cab81, macb_init_buffers() was moved from macb_mac_link_up() to macb_open(). Therefore, we should call macb_init_buffers() to reinitialize the tx/rx queue pointer registers during resume.

Due to the reset of these two registers, we also need to adjust the tx/rx rings accordingly. The tx ring will be handled by gem_shuffle_tx_rings() in macb_mac_link_up(), so we only need to initialize the rx ring here.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c +10 -0
@@ -5500,8 +5500,18 @@ static int __maybe_unused macb_resume(st
 		rtnl_unlock();
 	}
 
+	if (!(bp->caps & MACB_CAPS_MACB_IS_EMAC))
+		macb_init_buffers(bp);
+
 	for (q = 0, queue = bp->queues; q < bp->num_queues;
 	     ++q, ++queue) {
+		if (!(bp->caps & MACB_CAPS_MACB_IS_EMAC)) {
+			if (macb_is_gem(bp))
+				gem_init_rx_ring(queue);
+			else
+				macb_init_rx_ring(queue);
+		}
+
 		napi_enable(&queue->napi_rx);
 		napi_enable(&queue->napi_tx);
 	}
author maintainer
#476 lore raw

PATCH 474/567 mmc: sdhci-pci-gli: fix GL9750 DMA write corruption

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Matthew Schwartz <[email protected]>

commit 2b76e0cc7803e5ab561c875edaba7f6bbd87fbb0 upstream.

The GL9750 SD host controller has intermittent data corruption during DMA write operations. The GM_BURST register's R_OSRC_Lmt field (bits 17:16), which limits outstanding DMA read requests from system memory, is not being cleared during initialization. The Windows driver sets R_OSRC_Lmt to zero, limiting requests to the smallest unit.

Clear R_OSRC_Lmt to match the Windows driver behavior. This eliminates write corruption verified with f3write/f3read tests while maintaining DMA performance.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-gli.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-gli.c +9 -0
@@ -70,6 +70,9 @@
 #define   GLI_9750_MISC_TX1_DLY_VALUE    0x5
 #define   SDHCI_GLI_9750_MISC_SSC_OFF    BIT(26)
 
+#define SDHCI_GLI_9750_GM_BURST_SIZE		  0x510
+#define   SDHCI_GLI_9750_GM_BURST_SIZE_R_OSRC_LMT  GENMASK(17, 16)
+
 #define SDHCI_GLI_9750_TUNING_CONTROL	          0x540
 #define   SDHCI_GLI_9750_TUNING_CONTROL_EN          BIT(4)
 #define   GLI_9750_TUNING_CONTROL_EN_ON             0x1
@@ -277,10 +280,16 @@ static void gli_set_9750(struct sdhci_ho
 	u32 misc_value;
 	u32 parameter_value;
 	u32 control_value;
+	u32 burst_value;
 	u16 ctrl2;
 
 	gl9750_wt_on(host);
 
+	/* clear R_OSRC_Lmt to avoid DMA write corruption */
+	burst_value = sdhci_readl(host, SDHCI_GLI_9750_GM_BURST_SIZE);
+	burst_value &= ~SDHCI_GLI_9750_GM_BURST_SIZE_R_OSRC_LMT;
+	sdhci_writel(host, burst_value, SDHCI_GLI_9750_GM_BURST_SIZE);
+
 	driving_value = sdhci_readl(host, SDHCI_GLI_9750_DRIVING);
 	pll_value = sdhci_readl(host, SDHCI_GLI_9750_PLL);
 	sw_ctrl_value = sdhci_readl(host, SDHCI_GLI_9750_SW_CTRL);
author maintainer
#477 lore raw

PATCH 475/567 mmc: sdhci: fix timing selection for 1-bit bus width

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luke Wang <[email protected]>

commit 5e3486e64094c28a526543f1e8aa0d5964b7f02d upstream.

When 1-bit bus width is used with HS200/HS400 capabilities set, mmc_select_hs200() returns 0 without actually switching. This causes mmc_select_timing() to skip mmc_select_hs(), leaving eMMC in legacy mode (26MHz) instead of High Speed SDR (52MHz).

Per JEDEC eMMC spec section 5.3.2, 1-bit mode supports High Speed SDR. Drop incompatible HS200/HS400/UHS/DDR caps early so timing selection falls through to mmc_select_hs() correctly.

Fixes f2119df6b764 ("mmc: sd: add support for signal voltage switch procedure")
---
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci.c +8 -1
@@ -4497,8 +4497,15 @@ int sdhci_setup_host(struct sdhci_host *
 	 * their platform code before calling sdhci_add_host(), and we
 	 * won't assume 8-bit width for hosts without that CAP.
 	 */
-	if (!(host->quirks & SDHCI_QUIRK_FORCE_1_BIT_DATA))
+	if (host->quirks & SDHCI_QUIRK_FORCE_1_BIT_DATA) {
+		host->caps1 &= ~(SDHCI_SUPPORT_SDR104 | SDHCI_SUPPORT_SDR50 | SDHCI_SUPPORT_DDR50);
+		if (host->quirks2 & SDHCI_QUIRK2_CAPS_BIT63_FOR_HS400)
+			host->caps1 &= ~SDHCI_SUPPORT_HS400;
+		mmc->caps2 &= ~(MMC_CAP2_HS200 | MMC_CAP2_HS400 | MMC_CAP2_HS400_ES);
+		mmc->caps &= ~(MMC_CAP_DDR | MMC_CAP_UHS);
+	} else {
 		mmc->caps |= MMC_CAP_4_BIT_DATA;
+	}
 
 	if (host->quirks2 & SDHCI_QUIRK2_HOST_NO_CMD23)
 		mmc->caps &= ~MMC_CAP_CMD23;
author maintainer
#478 lore raw

PATCH 476/567 pmdomain: bcm: bcm2835-power: Increase ASB control timeout

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maíra Canal <[email protected]>

commit b826d2c0b0ecb844c84431ba6b502e744f5d919a upstream.

The bcm2835_asb_control() function uses a tight polling loop to wait for the ASB bridge to acknowledge a request. During intensive workloads, this handshake intermittently fails for V3D's master ASB on BCM2711, resulting in "Failed to disable ASB master for v3d" errors during runtime PM suspend. As a consequence, the failed power-off leaves V3D in a broken state, leading to bus faults or system hangs on later accesses.

As the timeout is insufficient in some scenarios, increase the polling timeout from 1us to 5us, which is still negligible in the context of a power domain transition. Also, replace the open-coded ktime_get_ns()/ cpu_relax() polling loop with readl_poll_timeout_atomic().

Fixes 670c672608a1 ("soc: bcm: bcm2835-pm: Add support for power domains under a new binding.")
---
 drivers/pmdomain/bcm/bcm2835-power.c |   12 ++++--------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/pmdomain/bcm/bcm2835-power.c +4 -8
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <linux/clk.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/iopoll.h>
 #include <linux/mfd/bcm2835-pm.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
@@ -152,7 +153,6 @@ struct bcm2835_power {
 static int bcm2835_asb_control(struct bcm2835_power *power, u32 reg, bool enable)
 {
 	void __iomem *base = power->asb;
-	u64 start;
 	u32 val;
 
 	switch (reg) {
@@ -165,8 +165,6 @@ static int bcm2835_asb_control(struct bc
 		break;
 	}
 
-	start = ktime_get_ns();
-
 	/* Enable the module's async AXI bridges. */
 	if (enable) {
 		val = readl(base + reg) & ~ASB_REQ_STOP;
@@ -175,11 +173,9 @@ static int bcm2835_asb_control(struct bc
 	}
 	writel(PM_PASSWORD | val, base + reg);
 
-	while (!!(readl(base + reg) & ASB_ACK) == enable) {
-		cpu_relax();
-		if (ktime_get_ns() - start >= 1000)
-			return -ETIMEDOUT;
-	}
+	if (readl_poll_timeout_atomic(base + reg, val,
+				      !!(val & ASB_ACK) != enable, 0, 5))
+		return -ETIMEDOUT;
 
 	return 0;
 }
author maintainer
#479 lore raw

PATCH 477/567 spi: fix use-after-free on controller registration failure

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 8634e05b08ead636e926022f4a98416e13440df9 upstream.

Make sure to deregister from driver core also in the unlikely event that per-cpu statistics allocation fails during controller registration to avoid use-after-free (of driver resources) and unclocked register accesses.

Fixes 6598b91b5ac3 ("spi: spi.c: Convert statistics to per-cpu u64_stats_t")
Cc David Jander <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/spi/spi.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/spi/spi.c +4 -4
@@ -3213,10 +3213,8 @@ int spi_register_controller(struct spi_c
 		dev_info(dev, "controller is unqueued, this is deprecated\n");
 	} else if (ctlr->transfer_one || ctlr->transfer_one_message) {
 		status = spi_controller_initialize_queue(ctlr);
-		if (status) {
-			device_del(&ctlr->dev);
-			goto free_bus_id;
-		}
+		if (status)
+			goto del_ctrl;
 	}
 	/* Add statistics */
 	ctlr->pcpu_statistics = spi_alloc_pcpu_stats(dev);
@@ -3239,6 +3237,8 @@ int spi_register_controller(struct spi_c
 
 destroy_queue:
 	spi_destroy_queue(ctlr);
+del_ctrl:
+	device_del(&ctlr->dev);
 free_bus_id:
 	mutex_lock(&board_lock);
 	idr_remove(&spi_master_idr, ctlr->bus_num);
author maintainer
#480 lore raw

PATCH 478/567 spi: fix statistics allocation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit dee0774bbb2abb172e9069ce5ffef579b12b3ae9 upstream.

The controller per-cpu statistics is not allocated until after the controller has been registered with driver core, which leaves a window where accessing the sysfs attributes can trigger a NULL-pointer dereference.

Fix this by moving the statistics allocation to controller allocation while tying its lifetime to that of the controller (rather than using implicit devres).

Fixes 6598b91b5ac3 ("spi: spi.c: Convert statistics to per-cpu u64_stats_t")
Cc David Jander <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/spi/spi.c |   17 ++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/spi/spi.c +8 -9
@@ -2777,6 +2777,8 @@ static void spi_controller_release(struc
 	struct spi_controller *ctlr;
 
 	ctlr = container_of(dev, struct spi_controller, dev);
+
+	free_percpu(ctlr->pcpu_statistics);
 	kfree(ctlr);
 }
 
@@ -2928,6 +2930,12 @@ struct spi_controller *__spi_alloc_contr
 	if (!ctlr)
 		return NULL;
 
+	ctlr->pcpu_statistics = spi_alloc_pcpu_stats(NULL);
+	if (!ctlr->pcpu_statistics) {
+		kfree(ctlr);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
 	device_initialize(&ctlr->dev);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctlr->queue);
 	spin_lock_init(&ctlr->queue_lock);
@@ -3216,13 +3224,6 @@ int spi_register_controller(struct spi_c
 		if (status)
 			goto del_ctrl;
 	}
-	/* Add statistics */
-	ctlr->pcpu_statistics = spi_alloc_pcpu_stats(dev);
-	if (!ctlr->pcpu_statistics) {
-		dev_err(dev, "Error allocating per-cpu statistics\n");
-		status = -ENOMEM;
-		goto destroy_queue;
-	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&board_lock);
 	list_add_tail(&ctlr->list, &spi_controller_list);
@@ -3235,8 +3236,6 @@ int spi_register_controller(struct spi_c
 	acpi_register_spi_devices(ctlr);
 	return status;
 
-destroy_queue:
-	spi_destroy_queue(ctlr);
 del_ctrl:
 	device_del(&ctlr->dev);
 free_bus_id:
author maintainer
#481 lore raw

PATCH 479/567 mtd: rawnand: pl353: make sure optimal timings are applied

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Olivier Sobrie <[email protected]>

commit b9465b04de4b90228de03db9a1e0d56b00814366 upstream.

Timings of the nand are adjusted by pl35x_nfc_setup_interface() but actually applied by the pl35x_nand_select_target() function. If there is only one nand chip, the pl35x_nand_select_target() will only apply the timings once since the test at its beginning will always be true after the first call to this function. As a result, the hardware will keep using the default timings set at boot to detect the nand chip, not the optimal ones.

With this patch, we program directly the new timings when pl35x_nfc_setup_interface() is called.

Fixes 08d8c62164a3 ("mtd: rawnand: pl353: Add support for the ARM PL353 SMC NAND controller")
---
 drivers/mtd/nand/raw/pl35x-nand-controller.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/pl35x-nand-controller.c +3 -0
@@ -862,6 +862,9 @@ static int pl35x_nfc_setup_interface(str
 			  PL35X_SMC_NAND_TAR_CYCLES(tmgs.t_ar) |
 			  PL35X_SMC_NAND_TRR_CYCLES(tmgs.t_rr);
 
+	writel(plnand->timings, nfc->conf_regs + PL35X_SMC_CYCLES);
+	pl35x_smc_update_regs(nfc);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
author maintainer
#482 lore raw

PATCH 480/567 mtd: rawnand: cadence: Fix error check for dma_alloc_coherent() in cadence_nand_init()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chen Ni <[email protected]>

commit 0410e1a4c545c769c59c6eda897ad5d574d0c865 upstream.

Fix wrong variable used for error checking after dma_alloc_coherent() call. The function checks cdns_ctrl->dma_cdma_desc instead of cdns_ctrl->cdma_desc, which could lead to incorrect error handling.

Fixes ec4ba01e894d ("mtd: rawnand: Add new Cadence NAND driver to MTD subsystem")
---
 drivers/mtd/nand/raw/cadence-nand-controller.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/cadence-nand-controller.c +1 -1
@@ -2883,7 +2883,7 @@ static int cadence_nand_init(struct cdns
 						  sizeof(*cdns_ctrl->cdma_desc),
 						  &cdns_ctrl->dma_cdma_desc,
 						  GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!cdns_ctrl->dma_cdma_desc)
+	if (!cdns_ctrl->cdma_desc)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	cdns_ctrl->buf_size = SZ_16K;
author maintainer
#483 lore raw

PATCH 481/567 mtd: Avoid boot crash in RedBoot partition table parser

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Finn Thain <[email protected]>

commit 8e2f8020270af7777d49c2e7132260983e4fc566 upstream.

Given CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y and a recent compiler,
commit 439a1bcac648 ("fortify: Use __builtin_dynamic_object_size() when available") produces the warning below and an oops.

    Searching for RedBoot partition table in 50000000.flash at offset 0x7e0000
    ------------[ cut here ]------------
    WARNING: lib/string_helpers.c:1035 at 0xc029e04c, CPU#0: swapper/0/1
    memcmp: detected buffer overflow: 15 byte read of buffer size 14
    Modules linked in:
    CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.19.0 #1 NONE

As Kees said, "'names' is pointing to the final 'namelen' many bytes of the allocation ... 'namelen' could be basically any length at all. This fortify warning looks legit to me -- this code used to be reading beyond the end of the allocation."

Since the size of the dynamic allocation is calculated with strlen() we can use strcmp() instead of memcmp() and remain within bounds.

---
 drivers/mtd/parsers/redboot.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/parsers/redboot.c +3 -3
@@ -270,9 +270,9 @@ nogood:
 
 		strcpy(names, fl->img->name);
 #ifdef CONFIG_MTD_REDBOOT_PARTS_READONLY
-		if (!memcmp(names, "RedBoot", 8) ||
-		    !memcmp(names, "RedBoot config", 15) ||
-		    !memcmp(names, "FIS directory", 14)) {
+		if (!strcmp(names, "RedBoot") ||
+		    !strcmp(names, "RedBoot config") ||
+		    !strcmp(names, "FIS directory")) {
 			parts[i].mask_flags = MTD_WRITEABLE;
 		}
 #endif
author maintainer
#484 lore raw

PATCH 482/567 iommu/vt-d: Fix intel iommu iotlb sync hardlockup and retry

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guanghui Feng <[email protected]>

commit fe89277c9ceb0d6af0aa665bcf24a41d8b1b79cd upstream.

During the qi_check_fault process after an IOMMU ITE event, requests at odd-numbered positions in the queue are set to QI_ABORT, only satisfying single-request submissions. However, qi_submit_sync now supports multiple simultaneous submissions, and can't guarantee that the wait_desc will be at an odd-numbered position. Therefore, if an item times out, IOMMU can't re-initiate the request, resulting in an infinite polling wait.

This modifies the process by setting the status of all requests already fetched by IOMMU and recorded as QI_IN_USE status (including wait_desc requests) to QI_ABORT, thus enabling multiple requests to be resubmitted.

Fixes 8a1d82462540 ("iommu/vt-d: Multiple descriptors per qi_submit_sync()")
Fixes 8a1d82462540 ("iommu/vt-d: Multiple descriptors per qi_submit_sync()")
---
 drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c +1 -2
@@ -1309,7 +1309,6 @@ static int qi_check_fault(struct intel_i
 	if (fault & DMA_FSTS_ITE) {
 		head = readl(iommu->reg + DMAR_IQH_REG);
 		head = ((head >> shift) - 1 + QI_LENGTH) % QI_LENGTH;
-		head |= 1;
 		tail = readl(iommu->reg + DMAR_IQT_REG);
 		tail = ((tail >> shift) - 1 + QI_LENGTH) % QI_LENGTH;
 
@@ -1319,7 +1318,7 @@ static int qi_check_fault(struct intel_i
 		do {
 			if (qi->desc_status[head] == QI_IN_USE)
 				qi->desc_status[head] = QI_ABORT;
-			head = (head - 2 + QI_LENGTH) % QI_LENGTH;
+			head = (head - 1 + QI_LENGTH) % QI_LENGTH;
 		} while (head != tail);
 
 		if (qi->desc_status[wait_index] == QI_ABORT)
author maintainer
#485 lore raw

PATCH 483/567 serial: 8250_pci: add support for the AX99100

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Martin Roukala (né Peres) <[email protected]>

commit 9c0072bc33d349c83d223e64be30794e11938a6b upstream.

This is found in popular brands such as StarTech.com or Delock, and has been a source of frustration to quite a few people, if I can trust Amazon comments complaining about Linux support via the official out-of-the-tree driver.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_pci.c |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_pci.c +17 -0
@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ struct serial_private {
 };
 
 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_HPE_PCI_SERIAL	0x37e
+#define PCIE_VENDOR_ID_ASIX		0x125B
+#define PCIE_DEVICE_ID_AX99100		0x9100
 
 static const struct pci_device_id pci_use_msi[] = {
 	{ PCI_DEVICE_SUB(PCI_VENDOR_ID_NETMOS, PCI_DEVICE_ID_NETMOS_9900,
@@ -71,6 +73,8 @@ static const struct pci_device_id pci_us
 			 0xA000, 0x1000) },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE_SUB(PCI_VENDOR_ID_HP_3PAR, PCI_DEVICE_ID_HPE_PCI_SERIAL,
 			 PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID) },
+	{ PCI_DEVICE_SUB(PCIE_VENDOR_ID_ASIX, PCIE_DEVICE_ID_AX99100,
+			 0xA000, 0x1000) },
 	{ }
 };
 
@@ -834,6 +838,7 @@ static int pci_netmos_init(struct pci_de
 	case PCI_DEVICE_ID_NETMOS_9912:
 	case PCI_DEVICE_ID_NETMOS_9922:
 	case PCI_DEVICE_ID_NETMOS_9900:
+	case PCIE_DEVICE_ID_AX99100:
 		num_serial = pci_netmos_9900_numports(dev);
 		break;
 
@@ -2396,6 +2401,14 @@ static struct pci_serial_quirk pci_seria
 		.init		= pci_netmos_init,
 		.setup		= pci_netmos_9900_setup,
 	},
+	{
+		.vendor		= PCIE_VENDOR_ID_ASIX,
+		.device		= PCI_ANY_ID,
+		.subvendor	= PCI_ANY_ID,
+		.subdevice	= PCI_ANY_ID,
+		.init		= pci_netmos_init,
+		.setup		= pci_netmos_9900_setup,
+	},
 	/*
 	 * EndRun Technologies
 	*/
@@ -5940,6 +5953,10 @@ static const struct pci_device_id serial
 		0xA000, 0x3002,
 		0, 0, pbn_NETMOS9900_2s_115200 },
 
+	{	PCIE_VENDOR_ID_ASIX, PCIE_DEVICE_ID_AX99100,
+		0xA000, 0x1000,
+		0, 0, pbn_b0_1_115200 },
+
 	/*
 	 * Best Connectivity and Rosewill PCI Multi I/O cards
 	 */
author maintainer
#486 lore raw

PATCH 484/567 serial: 8250: Fix TX deadlock when using DMA

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Raul E Rangel <[email protected]>

commit a424a34b8faddf97b5af41689087e7a230f79ba7 upstream.

dmaengine_terminate_async does not guarantee that the __dma_tx_complete callback will run. The callback is currently the only place where dma->tx_running gets cleared. If the transaction is canceled and the callback never runs, then dma->tx_running will never get cleared and we will never schedule new TX DMA transactions again.

This change makes it so we clear dma->tx_running after we terminate the DMA transaction. This is "safe" because serial8250_tx_dma_flush is holding the UART port lock. The first thing the callback does is also grab the UART port lock, so access to dma->tx_running is serialized.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dma.c |   15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dma.c +15 -0
@@ -152,7 +152,22 @@ void serial8250_tx_dma_flush(struct uart
 	 */
 	dma->tx_size = 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * We can't use `dmaengine_terminate_sync` because `uart_flush_buffer` is
+	 * holding the uart port spinlock.
+	 */
 	dmaengine_terminate_async(dma->txchan);
+
+	/*
+	 * The callback might or might not run. If it doesn't run, we need to ensure
+	 * that `tx_running` is cleared so that we can schedule new transactions.
+	 * If it does run, then the zombie callback will clear `tx_running` again
+	 * and perform a no-op since `tx_size` was cleared above.
+	 *
+	 * In either case, we ASSUME the DMA transaction will terminate before we
+	 * issue a new `serial8250_tx_dma`.
+	 */
+	dma->tx_running = 0;
 }
 
 int serial8250_rx_dma(struct uart_8250_port *p)
author maintainer
#487 lore raw

PATCH 485/567 serial: 8250: Add late synchronize_irq() to shutdown to handle DW UART BUSY

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]>

commit e0a368ae79531ff92105a2692f10d83052055856 upstream.

When DW UART is !uart_16550_compatible, it can indicate BUSY at any point (when under constant Rx pressure) unless a complex sequence of steps is performed. Any LCR write can run a foul with the condition that prevents writing LCR while the UART is BUSY, which triggers BUSY_DETECT interrupt that seems unmaskable using IER bits.

Normal flow is that dw8250_handle_irq() handles BUSY_DETECT condition by reading USR register. This BUSY feature, however, breaks the assumptions made in serial8250_do_shutdown(), which runs synchronize_irq() after clearing IER and assumes no interrupts can occur after that point but then proceeds to update LCR, which on DW UART can trigger an interrupt.

If serial8250_do_shutdown() releases the interrupt handler before the handler has run and processed the BUSY_DETECT condition by read the USR register, the IRQ is not deasserted resulting in interrupt storm that triggers "irq x: nobody cared" warning leading to disabling the IRQ.

Add late synchronize_irq() into serial8250_do_shutdown() to ensure BUSY_DETECT from DW UART is handled before port's interrupt handler is released. Alternative would be to add DW UART specific shutdown function but it would mostly duplicate the generic code and the extra synchronize_irq() seems pretty harmless in serial8250_do_shutdown().

---
 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c +6 -0
@@ -2533,6 +2533,12 @@ void serial8250_do_shutdown(struct uart_
 	 * the IRQ chain.
 	 */
 	serial_port_in(port, UART_RX);
+	/*
+	 * LCR writes on DW UART can trigger late (unmaskable) IRQs.
+	 * Handle them before releasing the handler.
+	 */
+	synchronize_irq(port->irq);
+
 	serial8250_rpm_put(up);
 
 	up->ops->release_irq(up);
author maintainer
#488 lore raw

PATCH 486/567 serial: uartlite: fix PM runtime usage count underflow on probe

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej Andrzejewski ICEYE <[email protected]>

commit d54801cd509515f674a5aac1d3ea1401d2a05863 upstream.

ulite_probe() calls pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() at the end of probe without holding a corresponding PM runtime reference for non-console ports.

During ulite_assign(), uart_add_one_port() triggers uart_configure_port() which calls ulite_pm() via uart_change_pm(). For non-console ports, the UART core performs a balanced get/put cycle:

uart_change_pm(ON) -> ulite_pm() -> pm_runtime_get_sync() +1
uart_change_pm(OFF) -> ulite_pm() -> pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() -1

This leaves no spare reference for the pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() at the end of probe. The PM runtime core prevents the count from actually going below zero, and instead triggers a
"Runtime PM usage count underflow!" warning.

For console ports the bug is masked: the UART core skips the uart_change_pm(OFF) call, so the UART core's unbalanced get happens to pair with probe's trailing put.

Add pm_runtime_get_noresume() before pm_runtime_enable() to take an explicit probe-owned reference that the trailing pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() can release. This ensures a correct usage count regardless of whether the port is a console.

Fixes 5bbe10a6942d ("tty: serial: uartlite: Add runtime pm support")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/tty/serial/uartlite.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/tty/serial/uartlite.c +1 -0
@@ -870,6 +870,7 @@ of_err:
 	pm_runtime_use_autosuspend(&pdev->dev);
 	pm_runtime_set_autosuspend_delay(&pdev->dev, UART_AUTOSUSPEND_TIMEOUT);
 	pm_runtime_set_active(&pdev->dev);
+	pm_runtime_get_noresume(&pdev->dev);
 	pm_runtime_enable(&pdev->dev);
 
 	ret = ulite_assign(&pdev->dev, id, res->start, irq, pdata);
author maintainer
#489 lore raw

PATCH 487/567 drm/amdgpu/gmc9.0: add bounds checking for cid

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit f39e1270277f4b06db0b2c6ec9405b6dd766fb13 upstream.

The value should never exceed the array size as those are the only values the hardware is expected to return, but add checks anyway.

Cc Benjamin Cheng <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit e14d468304832bcc4a082d95849bc0a41b18ddea)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gmc_v9_0.c |   21 ++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gmc_v9_0.c +14 -7
@@ -672,28 +672,35 @@ static int gmc_v9_0_process_interrupt(st
 	} else {
 		switch (adev->ip_versions[MMHUB_HWIP][0]) {
 		case IP_VERSION(9, 0, 0):
-			mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_vega10[cid][rw];
+			mmhub_cid = cid < ARRAY_SIZE(mmhub_client_ids_vega10) ?
+				mmhub_client_ids_vega10[cid][rw] : NULL;
 			break;
 		case IP_VERSION(9, 3, 0):
-			mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_vega12[cid][rw];
+			mmhub_cid = cid < ARRAY_SIZE(mmhub_client_ids_vega12) ?
+				mmhub_client_ids_vega12[cid][rw] : NULL;
 			break;
 		case IP_VERSION(9, 4, 0):
-			mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_vega20[cid][rw];
+			mmhub_cid = cid < ARRAY_SIZE(mmhub_client_ids_vega20) ?
+				mmhub_client_ids_vega20[cid][rw] : NULL;
 			break;
 		case IP_VERSION(9, 4, 1):
-			mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_arcturus[cid][rw];
+			mmhub_cid = cid < ARRAY_SIZE(mmhub_client_ids_arcturus) ?
+				mmhub_client_ids_arcturus[cid][rw] : NULL;
 			break;
 		case IP_VERSION(9, 1, 0):
 		case IP_VERSION(9, 2, 0):
-			mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_raven[cid][rw];
+			mmhub_cid = cid < ARRAY_SIZE(mmhub_client_ids_raven) ?
+				mmhub_client_ids_raven[cid][rw] : NULL;
 			break;
 		case IP_VERSION(1, 5, 0):
 		case IP_VERSION(2, 4, 0):
-			mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_renoir[cid][rw];
+			mmhub_cid = cid < ARRAY_SIZE(mmhub_client_ids_renoir) ?
+				mmhub_client_ids_renoir[cid][rw] : NULL;
 			break;
 		case IP_VERSION(1, 8, 0):
 		case IP_VERSION(9, 4, 2):
-			mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_aldebaran[cid][rw];
+			mmhub_cid = cid < ARRAY_SIZE(mmhub_client_ids_aldebaran) ?
+				mmhub_client_ids_aldebaran[cid][rw] : NULL;
 			break;
 		default:
 			mmhub_cid = NULL;
author maintainer
#490 lore raw

PATCH 488/567 drm/amdgpu/mmhub2.0: add bounds checking for cid

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit 0b26edac4ac5535df1f63e6e8ab44c24fe1acad7 upstream.

The value should never exceed the array size as those are the only values the hardware is expected to return, but add checks anyway.

(cherry picked from commit e064cef4b53552602bb6ac90399c18f662f3cacd)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v2_0.c |    9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v2_0.c +6 -3
@@ -154,14 +154,17 @@ mmhub_v2_0_print_l2_protection_fault_sta
 	switch (adev->ip_versions[MMHUB_HWIP][0]) {
 	case IP_VERSION(2, 0, 0):
 	case IP_VERSION(2, 0, 2):
-		mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_navi1x[cid][rw];
+		mmhub_cid = cid < ARRAY_SIZE(mmhub_client_ids_navi1x) ?
+			mmhub_client_ids_navi1x[cid][rw] : NULL;
 		break;
 	case IP_VERSION(2, 1, 0):
 	case IP_VERSION(2, 1, 1):
-		mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_sienna_cichlid[cid][rw];
+		mmhub_cid = cid < ARRAY_SIZE(mmhub_client_ids_sienna_cichlid) ?
+			mmhub_client_ids_sienna_cichlid[cid][rw] : NULL;
 		break;
 	case IP_VERSION(2, 1, 2):
-		mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_beige_goby[cid][rw];
+		mmhub_cid = cid < ARRAY_SIZE(mmhub_client_ids_beige_goby) ?
+			mmhub_client_ids_beige_goby[cid][rw] : NULL;
 		break;
 	default:
 		mmhub_cid = NULL;
author maintainer
#491 lore raw

PATCH 489/567 drm/amdgpu/mmhub2.3: add bounds checking for cid

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit a54403a534972af5d9ba5aaa3bb6ead612500ec6 upstream.

The value should never exceed the array size as those are the only values the hardware is expected to return, but add checks anyway.

(cherry picked from commit 89cd90375c19fb45138990b70e9f4ba4806f05c4)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v2_3.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v2_3.c +2 -1
@@ -94,7 +94,8 @@ mmhub_v2_3_print_l2_protection_fault_sta
 	case IP_VERSION(2, 3, 0):
 	case IP_VERSION(2, 4, 0):
 	case IP_VERSION(2, 4, 1):
-		mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_vangogh[cid][rw];
+		mmhub_cid = cid < ARRAY_SIZE(mmhub_client_ids_vangogh) ?
+			mmhub_client_ids_vangogh[cid][rw] : NULL;
 		break;
 	default:
 		mmhub_cid = NULL;
author maintainer
#492 lore raw

PATCH 490/567 drm/amdgpu/mmhub3.0.1: add bounds checking for cid

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit 5d4e88bcfef29569a1db224ef15e28c603666c6d upstream.

The value should never exceed the array size as those are the only values the hardware is expected to return, but add checks anyway.

(cherry picked from commit 5f76083183363c4528a4aaa593f5d38c28fe7d7b)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v3_0_1.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v3_0_1.c +2 -1
@@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ mmhub_v3_0_1_print_l2_protection_fault_s
 
 	switch (adev->ip_versions[MMHUB_HWIP][0]) {
 	case IP_VERSION(3, 0, 1):
-		mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_1[cid][rw];
+		mmhub_cid = cid < ARRAY_SIZE(mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_1) ?
+			mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_1[cid][rw] : NULL;
 		break;
 	default:
 		mmhub_cid = NULL;
author maintainer
#493 lore raw

PATCH 491/567 drm/amdgpu/mmhub3.0.2: add bounds checking for cid

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit e5e6d67b1ce9764e67aef2d0eef9911af53ad99a upstream.

The value should never exceed the array size as those are the only values the hardware is expected to return, but add checks anyway.

(cherry picked from commit 1441f52c7f6ae6553664aa9e3e4562f6fc2fe8ea)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v3_0_2.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v3_0_2.c +2 -1
@@ -108,7 +108,8 @@ mmhub_v3_0_2_print_l2_protection_fault_s
 		"MMVM_L2_PROTECTION_FAULT_STATUS:0x%08X\n",
 		status);
 
-	mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_2[cid][rw];
+	mmhub_cid = cid < ARRAY_SIZE(mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_2) ?
+		mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_2[cid][rw] : NULL;
 	dev_err(adev->dev, "\t Faulty UTCL2 client ID: %s (0x%x)\n",
 		mmhub_cid ? mmhub_cid : "unknown", cid);
 	dev_err(adev->dev, "\t MORE_FAULTS: 0x%lx\n",
author maintainer
#494 lore raw

PATCH 492/567 drm/amdgpu/mmhub3.0: add bounds checking for cid

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit cdb82ecbeccb55fae75a3c956b605f7801a30db1 upstream.

The value should never exceed the array size as those are the only values the hardware is expected to return, but add checks anyway.

(cherry picked from commit f14f27bbe2a3ed7af32d5f6eaf3f417139f45253)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v3_0.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v3_0.c +2 -1
@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ mmhub_v3_0_print_l2_protection_fault_sta
 	switch (adev->ip_versions[MMHUB_HWIP][0]) {
 	case IP_VERSION(3, 0, 0):
 	case IP_VERSION(3, 0, 1):
-		mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_0[cid][rw];
+		mmhub_cid = cid < ARRAY_SIZE(mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_0) ?
+			mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_0[cid][rw] : NULL;
 		break;
 	default:
 		mmhub_cid = NULL;
author maintainer
#495 lore raw

PATCH 493/567 drm/radeon: apply state adjust rules to some additional HAINAN vairants

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit 86650ee2241ff84207eaa298ab318533f3c21a38 upstream.

They need a similar workaround.

(cherry picked from commit 87327658c848f56eac166cb382b57b83bf06c5ac)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/si_dpm.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/si_dpm.c +3 -1
@@ -2959,9 +2959,11 @@ static void si_apply_state_adjust_rules(
 	if (rdev->family == CHIP_HAINAN) {
 		if ((rdev->pdev->revision == 0x81) ||
 		    (rdev->pdev->revision == 0xC3) ||
+		    (rdev->pdev->device == 0x6660) ||
 		    (rdev->pdev->device == 0x6664) ||
 		    (rdev->pdev->device == 0x6665) ||
-		    (rdev->pdev->device == 0x6667)) {
+		    (rdev->pdev->device == 0x6667) ||
+		    (rdev->pdev->device == 0x666F)) {
 			max_sclk = 75000;
 		}
 		if ((rdev->pdev->revision == 0xC3) ||
author maintainer
#496 lore raw

PATCH 494/567 drm/amdgpu: apply state adjust rules to some additional HAINAN vairants

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit 9787f7da186ee8143b7b6d914cfa0b6e7fee2648 upstream.

They need a similar workaround.

(cherry picked from commit 0de31d92a173d3d94f28051b0b80a6c98913aed4)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/si_dpm.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/si_dpm.c +3 -1
@@ -3440,9 +3440,11 @@ static void si_apply_state_adjust_rules(
 	if (adev->asic_type == CHIP_HAINAN) {
 		if ((adev->pdev->revision == 0x81) ||
 		    (adev->pdev->revision == 0xC3) ||
+		    (adev->pdev->device == 0x6660) ||
 		    (adev->pdev->device == 0x6664) ||
 		    (adev->pdev->device == 0x6665) ||
-		    (adev->pdev->device == 0x6667)) {
+		    (adev->pdev->device == 0x6667) ||
+		    (adev->pdev->device == 0x666F)) {
 			max_sclk = 75000;
 		}
 		if ((adev->pdev->revision == 0xC3) ||
author maintainer
#497 lore raw

PATCH 495/567 drm/amd/display: Wrap dcn32_override_min_req_memclk() in DC_FP_{START, END}

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xi Ruoyao <[email protected]>

commit ebe82c6e75cfc547154d0fd843b0dd6cca3d548f upstream.

[Why]
The dcn32_override_min_req_memclk function is in dcn32_fpu.c, which is compiled with CC_FLAGS_FPU into FP instructions. So when we call it we must use DC_FP_{START,END} to save and restore the FP context, and prepare the FP unit on architectures like LoongArch where the FP unit isn't always on.

Fixes ee7be8f3de1c ("drm/amd/display: Limit DCN32 8 channel or less parts to DPM1 for FPO")
(cherry picked from commit 25bb1d54ba3983c064361033a8ec15474fece37e)
[ dropped missing `dcn32_override_min_req_dcfclk()` call since ]
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c +2 -0
@@ -1872,7 +1872,9 @@ bool dcn32_validate_bandwidth(struct dc
 
 	dc->res_pool->funcs->calculate_wm_and_dlg(dc, context, pipes, pipe_cnt, vlevel);
 
+	DC_FP_START();
 	dcn32_override_min_req_memclk(dc, context);
+	DC_FP_END();
 
 	BW_VAL_TRACE_END_WATERMARKS();
 
author maintainer
#498 lore raw

PATCH 496/567 btrfs: log new dentries when logging parent dir of a conflicting inode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9573a365ff9ff45da9222d3fe63695ce562beb24 ]

If we log the parent directory of a conflicting inode, we are not logging the new dentries of the directory, so when we finish we have the parent directory's inode marked as logged but we did not log its new dentries. As a consequence if the parent directory is explicitly fsynced later and it does not have any new changes since we logged it, the fsync is a no-op and after a power failure the new dentries are missing.

Example scenario:

  $ mkdir foo
  $ sync

$rmdir foo

  $ mkdir dir1
  $ mkdir dir2

# A file with the same name and parent as the directory we just deleted

  # and was persisted in a past transaction. So the deleted directory's
  # inode is a conflicting inode of this new file's inode.
  $ touch foo
  $ ln foo dir2/link

# The fsync on dir2 will log the parent directory (".") because the

  # conflicting inode (deleted directory) does not exists anymore, but it
  # it does not log its new dentries (dir1).
  $ xfs_io -c "fsync" dir2

# This fsync on the parent directory is no-op, since the previous fsync

  # logged it (but without logging its new dentries).
  $ xfs_io -c "fsync" .

<power failure>

# After log replay dir1 is missing.

Fix this by ensuring we log new dir dentries whenever we log the parent directory of a no longer existing conflicting inode.

A test case for fstests will follow soon.

---
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/tree-log.c +6 -0
index 882bb3c04c23f..c77852dc32399 100644
@@ -5856,6 +5856,7 @@ static int log_conflicting_inodes(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 				  struct btrfs_root *root,
 				  struct btrfs_log_ctx *ctx)
 {
+	const bool orig_log_new_dentries = ctx->log_new_dentries;
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -5917,7 +5918,11 @@ static int log_conflicting_inodes(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 			 * dir index key range logged for the directory. So we
 			 * must make sure the deletion is recorded.
 			 */
+			ctx->log_new_dentries = false;
 			ret = btrfs_log_inode(trans, inode, LOG_INODE_ALL, ctx);
+			if (!ret && ctx->log_new_dentries)
+				ret = log_new_dir_dentries(trans, inode, ctx);
+
 			btrfs_add_delayed_iput(inode);
 			if (ret)
 				break;
@@ -5952,6 +5957,7 @@ static int log_conflicting_inodes(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 			break;
 	}
 
+	ctx->log_new_dentries = orig_log_new_dentries;
 	ctx->logging_conflict_inodes = false;
 	if (ret)
 		free_conflicting_inodes(ctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#499 lore raw

PATCH 497/567 btrfs: tree-checker: fix misleading root drop_level error message

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: ZhengYuan Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fc1cd1f18c34f91e78362f9629ab9fd43b9dcab9 ]

Fix tree-checker error message to report "invalid root drop_level" instead of the misleading "invalid root level".

Fixes 259ee7754b67 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add ROOT_ITEM check")
---
 fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c +1 -1
index e38994ac14848..d2c36b765c83a 100644
@@ -1220,7 +1220,7 @@ static int check_root_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key,
 	}
 	if (unlikely(btrfs_root_drop_level(&ri) >= BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL)) {
 		generic_err(leaf, slot,
-			    "invalid root level, have %u expect [0, %u]",
+			    "invalid root drop_level, have %u expect [0, %u]",
 			    btrfs_root_drop_level(&ri), BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL - 1);
 		return -EUCLEAN;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#500 lore raw

PATCH 498/567 cache: ax45mp: Fix device node reference leak in ax45mp_cache_init()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Felix Gu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0528a348b04b327a4611e29589beb4c9ae81304a ]

In ax45mp_cache_init(), of_find_matching_node() returns a device node with an incremented reference count that must be released with of_node_put(). The current code fails to call of_node_put() which causes a reference leak.

Use the __free(device_node) attribute to ensure automatic cleanup when the variable goes out of scope.

Fixes d34599bcd2e4 ("cache: Add L2 cache management for Andes AX45MP RISC-V core")
---
 drivers/cache/ax45mp_cache.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/cache/ax45mp_cache.c +2 -2
index 1d7dd3d2c101c..934c5087ec2bd 100644
@@ -178,11 +178,11 @@ static const struct of_device_id ax45mp_cache_ids[] = {
 
 static int __init ax45mp_cache_init(void)
 {
-	struct device_node *np;
 	struct resource res;
 	int ret;
 
-	np = of_find_matching_node(NULL, ax45mp_cache_ids);
+	struct device_node *np __free(device_node) =
+		of_find_matching_node(NULL, ax45mp_cache_ids);
 	if (!of_device_is_available(np))
 		return -ENODEV;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#501 lore raw

PATCH 499/567 soc: fsl: qbman: fix race condition in qman_destroy_fq

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Richard Genoud <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 014077044e874e270ec480515edbc1cadb976cf2 ]

When QMAN_FQ_FLAG_DYNAMIC_FQID is set, there's a race condition between fq_table[fq->idx] state and freeing/allocating from the pool and WARN_ON(fq_table[fq->idx]) in qman_create_fq() gets triggered.

Indeed, we can have:

         Thread A                             Thread B
    qman_destroy_fq()                    qman_create_fq()
      qman_release_fqid()
        qman_shutdown_fq()
        gen_pool_free()
           -- At this point, the fqid is available again --
                                           qman_alloc_fqid()
           -- so, we can get the just-freed fqid in thread B --
                                           fq->fqid = fqid;
                                           fq->idx = fqid * 2;
                                           WARN_ON(fq_table[fq->idx]);
                                           fq_table[fq->idx] = fq;
     fq_table[fq->idx] = NULL;

And adding some logs between qman_release_fqid() and fq_table[fq->idx] = NULL makes the WARN_ON() trigger a lot more.

To prevent that, ensure that fq_table[fq->idx] is set to NULL before gen_pool_free() is called by using smp_wmb().

---
 drivers/soc/fsl/qbman/qman.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/fsl/qbman/qman.c +22 -2
index 7e9074519ad22..bcbf6bf2e8f45 100644
@@ -1827,6 +1827,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(qman_create_fq);
 
 void qman_destroy_fq(struct qman_fq *fq)
 {
+	int leaked;
+
 	/*
 	 * We don't need to lock the FQ as it is a pre-condition that the FQ be
 	 * quiesced. Instead, run some checks.
@@ -1834,11 +1836,29 @@ void qman_destroy_fq(struct qman_fq *fq)
 	switch (fq->state) {
 	case qman_fq_state_parked:
 	case qman_fq_state_oos:
-		if (fq_isset(fq, QMAN_FQ_FLAG_DYNAMIC_FQID))
-			qman_release_fqid(fq->fqid);
+		/*
+		 * There's a race condition here on releasing the fqid,
+		 * setting the fq_table to NULL, and freeing the fqid.
+		 * To prevent it, this order should be respected:
+		 */
+		if (fq_isset(fq, QMAN_FQ_FLAG_DYNAMIC_FQID)) {
+			leaked = qman_shutdown_fq(fq->fqid);
+			if (leaked)
+				pr_debug("FQID %d leaked\n", fq->fqid);
+		}
 
 		DPAA_ASSERT(fq_table[fq->idx]);
 		fq_table[fq->idx] = NULL;
+
+		if (fq_isset(fq, QMAN_FQ_FLAG_DYNAMIC_FQID) && !leaked) {
+			/*
+			 * fq_table[fq->idx] should be set to null before
+			 * freeing fq->fqid otherwise it could by allocated by
+			 * qman_alloc_fqid() while still being !NULL
+			 */
+			smp_wmb();
+			gen_pool_free(qm_fqalloc, fq->fqid | DPAA_GENALLOC_OFF, 1);
+		}
 		return;
 	default:
 		break;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#502 lore raw

PATCH 500/567 wifi: mac80211: Fix static_branch_dec() underflow for aql_disable.

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b94ae8e0d5fe1bdbbfdc3854ff6ce98f6876a828 ]

syzbot reported static_branch_dec() underflow in aql_enable_write(). [0]

The problem is that aql_enable_write() does not serialise concurrent write()s to the debugfs.

aql_enable_write() checks static_key_false(&aql_disable.key) and later calls static_branch_inc() or static_branch_dec(), but the state may change between the two calls.

aql_disable does not need to track inc/dec.

Let's use static_branch_enable() and static_branch_disable().

[0]:
val == 0

WARNING: kernel/jump_label.c:311 at __static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked.part.0+0x107/0x120 kernel/jump_label.c:311, CPU#0: syz.1.3155/20288
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 20288 Comm: syz.1.3155 Tainted: G     U       L      syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [U]=USER, [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/24/2026
RIP: 0010:__static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked.part.0+0x107/0x120 kernel/jump_label.c:311
Code: f2 c9 ff 5b 5d c3 cc cc cc cc e8 54 f2 c9 ff 48 89 df e8 ac f9 ff ff eb ad e8 45 f2 c9 ff 90 0f 0b 90 eb a2 e8 3a f2 c9 ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 eb 97 48 89 df e8 5c 4b 33 00 e9 36 ff ff ff 0f 1f 80 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b9f7c10 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff9b3e5d40 RCX: ffffffff823c57b4
RDX: ffff8880285a0000 RSI: ffffffff823c5846 RDI: ffff8880285a0000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000000a
R13: 1ffff9200173ef88 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffc9000b9f7e98
FS:  00007f530dd726c0(0000) GS:ffff8881245e3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000200000001140 CR3: 000000007cc4a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked kernel/jump_label.c:297 [inline]
 __static_key_slow_dec kernel/jump_label.c:321 [inline]
 static_key_slow_dec+0x7c/0xc0 kernel/jump_label.c:336
 aql_enable_write+0x2b2/0x310 net/mac80211/debugfs.c:343
 short_proxy_write+0x133/0x1a0 fs/debugfs/file.c:383
 vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:684
 ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:793 [inline]
 __do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:801 [inline]
 __se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:798 [inline]
 __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x1eb/0x250 fs/read_write.c:798
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xc9/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f530cf9aeb9
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f530dd72028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000012
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f530d215fa0 RCX: 00007f530cf9aeb9
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000010
RBP: 00007f530d008c1f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 4200000000000005 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f530d216038 R14: 00007f530d215fa0 R15: 00007ffde89fb978
 </TASK>
---
 net/mac80211/debugfs.c | 14 +++++---------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/mac80211/debugfs.c +5 -9
index 207f772bd8ce2..bd7c5dfeaa8c5 100644
@@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ static ssize_t aql_enable_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
 static ssize_t aql_enable_write(struct file *file, const char __user *user_buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	bool aql_disabled = static_key_false(&aql_disable.key);
 	char buf[3];
 	size_t len;
 
@@ -341,15 +340,12 @@ static ssize_t aql_enable_write(struct file *file, const char __user *user_buf,
 	if (len > 0 && buf[len - 1] == '\n')
 		buf[len - 1] = 0;
 
-	if (buf[0] == '0' && buf[1] == '\0') {
-		if (!aql_disabled)
-			static_branch_inc(&aql_disable);
-	} else if (buf[0] == '1' && buf[1] == '\0') {
-		if (aql_disabled)
-			static_branch_dec(&aql_disable);
-	} else {
+	if (buf[0] == '0' && buf[1] == '\0')
+		static_branch_enable(&aql_disable);
+	else if (buf[0] == '1' && buf[1] == '\0')
+		static_branch_disable(&aql_disable);
+	else
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	return count;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#503 lore raw

PATCH 501/567 wifi: cfg80211: cancel pmsr_free_wk in cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peddolla Harshavardhan Reddy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6dccbc9f3e1d38565dff7730d2b7d1e8b16c9b09 ]

When the nl80211 socket that originated a PMSR request is closed, cfg80211_release_pmsr() sets the request's nl_portid to zero and schedules pmsr_free_wk to process the abort asynchronously. If the interface is concurrently torn down before that work runs, cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down() calls cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort() directly. However, the already- scheduled pmsr_free_wk work item remains pending and may run after the interface has been removed from the driver. This could cause the driver's abort_pmsr callback to operate on a torn-down interface, leading to undefined behavior and potential crashes.

Cancel pmsr_free_wk synchronously in cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down() before calling cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort(). This ensures any pending or in-progress work is drained before interface teardown proceeds, preventing the work from invoking the driver abort callback after the interface is gone.

Fixes 9bb7e0f24e7e ("cfg80211: add peer measurement with FTM initiator API")
---
 net/wireless/pmsr.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/wireless/pmsr.c +1 -0
index 841a4516793b1..77cb1de9fc13b 100644
@@ -641,6 +641,7 @@ void cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down(struct wireless_dev *wdev)
 	}
 	spin_unlock_bh(&wdev->pmsr_lock);
 
+	cancel_work_sync(&wdev->pmsr_free_wk);
 	if (found)
 		cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort(wdev);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#504 lore raw

PATCH 502/567 firmware: arm_scpi: Fix device_node reference leak in probe path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Felix Gu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 879c001afbac3df94160334fe5117c0c83b2cf48 ]

A device_node reference obtained from the device tree is not released on all error paths in the arm_scpi probe path. Specifically, a node returned by of_parse_phandle() could be leaked when the probe failed after the node was acquired. The probe function returns early and the shmem reference is not released.

Use __free(device_node) scope-based cleanup to automatically release the reference when the variable goes out of scope.

Fixes ed7ecb883901 ("firmware: arm_scpi: Add compatibility checks for shmem node")

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 drivers/firmware/arm_scpi.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/arm_scpi.c +3 -2
index 3de25e9d18ef8..2d85e783ae267 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/bitmap.h>
 #include <linux/bitfield.h>
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
@@ -945,13 +946,13 @@ static int scpi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		int idx = scpi_drvinfo->num_chans;
 		struct scpi_chan *pchan = scpi_drvinfo->channels + idx;
 		struct mbox_client *cl = &pchan->cl;
-		struct device_node *shmem = of_parse_phandle(np, "shmem", idx);
+		struct device_node *shmem __free(device_node) =
+			of_parse_phandle(np, "shmem", idx);
 
 		if (!of_match_node(shmem_of_match, shmem))
 			return -ENXIO;
 
 		ret = of_address_to_resource(shmem, 0, &res);
-		of_node_put(shmem);
 		if (ret) {
 			dev_err(dev, "failed to get SCPI payload mem resource\n");
 			return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#505 lore raw

PATCH 503/567 Bluetooth: LE L2CAP: Disconnect if received packets SDU exceeds IMTU

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Eggers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e1d9a66889867c232657a9b6f25d451d7c3ab96f ]

Core 6.0, Vol 3, Part A, 3.4.3:
"If the SDU length field value exceeds the receiver's MTU, the receiver shall disconnect the channel..."

This fixes L2CAP/LE/CFC/BV-26-C (running together with 'l2test -r -P 0x0027 -V le_public -I 100').

Fixes aac23bf63659 ("Bluetooth: Implement LE L2CAP reassembly")
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +7 -3
index 0253bdbbfc593..94dee7c227f74 100644
@@ -6610,8 +6610,10 @@ static int l2cap_ecred_data_rcv(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return -ENOBUFS;
 	}
 
-	if (chan->imtu < skb->len) {
-		BT_ERR("Too big LE L2CAP PDU");
+	if (skb->len > chan->imtu) {
+		BT_ERR("Too big LE L2CAP PDU: len %u > %u", skb->len,
+		       chan->imtu);
+		l2cap_send_disconn_req(chan, ECONNRESET);
 		return -ENOBUFS;
 	}
 
@@ -6637,7 +6639,9 @@ static int l2cap_ecred_data_rcv(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		       sdu_len, skb->len, chan->imtu);
 
 		if (sdu_len > chan->imtu) {
-			BT_ERR("Too big LE L2CAP SDU length received");
+			BT_ERR("Too big LE L2CAP SDU length: len %u > %u",
+			       skb->len, sdu_len);
+			l2cap_send_disconn_req(chan, ECONNRESET);
 			err = -EMSGSIZE;
 			goto failed;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#506 lore raw

PATCH 504/567 Bluetooth: LE L2CAP: Disconnect if sum of payload sizes exceed SDU

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Eggers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b6a2bf43aa37670432843bc73ae2a6288ba4d6f8 ]

Core 6.0, Vol 3, Part A, 3.4.3:
"... If the sum of the payload sizes for the K-frames exceeds the specified SDU length, the receiver shall disconnect the channel."

This fixes L2CAP/LE/CFC/BV-27-C (running together with 'l2test -r -P 0x0027 -V le_public').

Fixes aac23bf63659 ("Bluetooth: Implement LE L2CAP reassembly")
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +1 -0
index 94dee7c227f74..4ab738e651837 100644
@@ -6677,6 +6677,7 @@ static int l2cap_ecred_data_rcv(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	if (chan->sdu->len + skb->len > chan->sdu_len) {
 		BT_ERR("Too much LE L2CAP data received");
+		l2cap_send_disconn_req(chan, ECONNRESET);
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto failed;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#507 lore raw

PATCH 505/567 Bluetooth: SMP: make SM/PER/KDU/BI-04-C happy

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Eggers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0e4d4dcc1a6e82cc6f9abf32193558efa7e1613d ]

The last test step ("Test with Invalid public key X and Y, all set to 0") expects to get an "DHKEY check failed" instead of "unspecified".

Fixes 6d19628f539f ("Bluetooth: SMP: Fail if remote and local public keys are identical")
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/smp.c +1 -1
index e7ee13fe83a74..62c8eab1b84a5 100644
@@ -2744,7 +2744,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags) &&
 	    !crypto_memneq(key, smp->local_pk, 64)) {
 		bt_dev_err(hdev, "Remote and local public keys are identical");
-		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
 	}
 
 	memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#508 lore raw

PATCH 506/567 Bluetooth: ISO: Fix defer tests being unstable

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 62bcaa6b351b6dc400f6c6b83762001fd9f5c12d ]

iso-tester defer tests seem to fail with hci_conn_hash_lookup_cig being unable to resolve a cig in set_cig_params_sync due a race where it is run immediatelly before hci_bind_cis is able to set the QoS settings into the hci_conn object.

So this moves the assigning of the QoS settings to be done directly by hci_le_set_cig_params to prevent that from happening again.

Fixes 26afbd826ee3 ("Bluetooth: Add initial implementation of CIS connections")
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +2 -2
index 30feeaf7e6424..97e48c1f69aff 100644
@@ -1837,6 +1837,8 @@ static bool hci_le_set_cig_params(struct hci_conn *conn, struct bt_iso_qos *qos)
 		return false;
 
 done:
+	conn->iso_qos = *qos;
+
 	if (hci_cmd_sync_queue(hdev, set_cig_params_sync,
 			       UINT_PTR(qos->ucast.cig), NULL) < 0)
 		return false;
@@ -1903,8 +1905,6 @@ struct hci_conn *hci_bind_cis(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst,
 	}
 
 	hci_conn_hold(cis);
-
-	cis->iso_qos = *qos;
 	cis->state = BT_BOUND;
 
 	return cis;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#509 lore raw

PATCH 507/567 Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix hci_le_create_conn_sync

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Grzeschik <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2cabe7ff1001b7a197009cf50ba71701f9cbd354 ]

While introducing hci_le_create_conn_sync the functionality of hci_connect_le was ported to hci_le_create_conn_sync including the disable of the scan before starting the connection.

When this code was run non synchronously the immediate call that was setting the flag HCI_LE_SCAN_INTERRUPTED had an impact. Since the completion handler for the LE_SCAN_DISABLE was not immediately called. In the completion handler of the LE_SCAN_DISABLE event, this flag is checked to set the state of the hdev to DISCOVERY_STOPPED.

With the synchronised approach the later setting of the HCI_LE_SCAN_INTERRUPTED flag has not the same effect. The completion handler would immediately fire in the LE_SCAN_DISABLE call, check for the flag, which is then not yet set and do nothing.

To fix this issue and make the function call work as before, we move the setting of the flag HCI_LE_SCAN_INTERRUPTED before disabling the scan.

Fixes 8e8b92ee60de ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Add hci_le_create_conn_sync")
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +1 -1
index 6a14f76071077..6192f70e4d393 100644
@@ -6555,8 +6555,8 @@ static int hci_le_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data)
 	 * state.
 	 */
 	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_SCAN)) {
-		hci_scan_disable_sync(hdev);
 		hci_dev_set_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_SCAN_INTERRUPTED);
+		hci_scan_disable_sync(hdev);
 	}
 
 	/* Update random address, but set require_privacy to false so
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#511 lore raw

PATCH 508/567 Bluetooth: HIDP: Fix possible UAF

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dbf666e4fc9bdd975a61bf682b3f75cb0145eedd ]

This fixes the following trace caused by not dropping l2cap_conn reference when user->remove callback is called:

[   97.809249] l2cap_conn_free: freeing conn ffff88810a171c00
[   97.809907] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1419 Comm: repro_standalon Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1-dirty #14 PREEMPT(lazy)
[   97.809935] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
[   97.809947] Call Trace:
[   97.809954]  <TASK>
[   97.809961]  dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122)
[   97.809990]  l2cap_conn_free (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1808)
[   97.810017]  l2cap_conn_del (./include/linux/kref.h:66 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1821 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1798)
[   97.810055]  l2cap_disconn_cfm (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7347 (discriminator 1) net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7340 (discriminator 1))
[   97.810086]  ? __pfx_l2cap_disconn_cfm (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7341)
[   97.810117]  hci_conn_hash_flush (./include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2152 (discriminator 2) net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2644 (discriminator 2))
[   97.810148]  hci_dev_close_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5360)
[   97.810180]  ? __pfx_hci_dev_close_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5285)
[   97.810212]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   97.810242]  ? up_write (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:87 (discriminator 5) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2852 (discriminator 5) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:268 (discriminator 5) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:3391 (discriminator 5) kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1385 (discriminator 5) kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1643 (discriminator 5))
[   97.810267]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   97.810290]  ? rcu_is_watching (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:23 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:457 ./include/linux/context_tracking.h:128 kernel/rcu/tree.c:752)
[   97.810320]  hci_unregister_dev (net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:504 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2716)
[   97.810346]  vhci_release (drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:691)
[   97.810375]  ? __pfx_vhci_release (drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:678)
[   97.810404]  __fput (fs/file_table.c:470)
[   97.810430]  task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:235)
[   97.810451]  ? __pfx_task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:201)
[   97.810472]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   97.810495]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock (./include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:128 (discriminator 5) kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:142 (discriminator 5))
[   97.810527]  do_exit (kernel/exit.c:972)
[   97.810547]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   97.810574]  ? __pfx_do_exit (kernel/exit.c:897)
[   97.810594]  ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:470 (discriminator 6) kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5870 (discriminator 6) kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 (discriminator 6))
[   97.810616]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   97.810639]  ? do_raw_spin_lock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:95 (discriminator 4) kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:118 (discriminator 4))
[   97.810664]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   97.810688]  ? find_held_lock (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5350 (discriminator 1))
[   97.810721]  do_group_exit (kernel/exit.c:1093)
[   97.810745]  get_signal (kernel/signal.c:3007 (discriminator 1))
[   97.810772]  ? security_file_permission (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:37 security/security.c:2366)
[   97.810803]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   97.810826]  ? vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:555)
[   97.810854]  ? __pfx_get_signal (kernel/signal.c:2800)
[   97.810880]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   97.810905]  ? __pfx_vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:555)
[   97.810932]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   97.810960]  arch_do_signal_or_restart (arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 (discriminator 1))
[   97.810990]  ? __pfx_arch_do_signal_or_restart (arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:334)
[   97.811021]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   97.811055]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   97.811078]  ? ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:707)
[   97.811106]  ? __pfx_ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:707)
[   97.811137]  exit_to_user_mode_loop (kernel/entry/common.c:66 kernel/entry/common.c:98)
[   97.811169]  ? rcu_is_watching (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:23 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:457 ./include/linux/context_tracking.h:128 kernel/rcu/tree.c:752)
[   97.811192]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   97.811215]  ? trace_hardirqs_off (./include/trace/events/preemptirq.h:36 (discriminator 33) kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:95 (discriminator 33) kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:90 (discriminator 33))
[   97.811240]  do_syscall_64 (./include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:226 ./include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:256 ./include/linux/entry-common.h:325 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100)
[   97.811268]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   97.811292]  ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1480 (discriminator 3) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1527 (discriminator 3))
[   97.811318]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
[   97.811338] RIP: 0033:0x445cfe
[   97.811352] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x445cd4.

Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================

[   97.811360] RSP: 002b:00007f65c41c6dc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[   97.811378] RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 00007f65c41c76c0 RCX: 0000000000445cfe
[   97.811391] RDX: 0000000000000400 RSI: 00007f65c41c6e40 RDI: 0000000000000004
[   97.811403] RBP: 00007f65c41c7250 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   97.811415] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffe8
[   97.811428] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff780a8c00 R15: 00007f65c41c76c0
[   97.811453]  </TASK>
[   98.402453] ==================================================================
[   98.403560] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:199 kernel/locking/mutex.c:694 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776)
[   98.404541] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888113ee40a8 by task khidpd_00050004/1430
[   98.405361]
[   98.405563] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1430 Comm: khidpd_00050004 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1-dirty #14 PREEMPT(lazy)
[   98.405588] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
[   98.405600] Call Trace:
[   98.405607]  <TASK>
[   98.405614]  dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122)
[   98.405641]  print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
[   98.405667]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.405691]  ? __virt_addr_valid (arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:55)
[   98.405724]  ? __mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:199 kernel/locking/mutex.c:694 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776)
[   98.405748]  kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:221 mm/kasan/report.c:597)
[   98.405778]  ? __mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:199 kernel/locking/mutex.c:694 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776)
[   98.405807]  __mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:199 kernel/locking/mutex.c:694 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776)
[   98.405832]  ? do_raw_spin_lock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:95 (discriminator 4) kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:118 (discriminator 4))
[   98.405859]  ? l2cap_unregister_user (./include/linux/list.h:381 (discriminator 2) net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1723 (discriminator 2))
[   98.405888]  ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:114)
[   98.405915]  ? __pfx___mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:775)
[   98.405939]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.405963]  ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:470 (discriminator 6) kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5870 (discriminator 6) kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 (discriminator 6))
[   98.405984]  ? find_held_lock (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5350 (discriminator 1))
[   98.406015]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.406038]  ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5536 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5889 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5875)
[   98.406061]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.406085]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:159 ./include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:178 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194)
[   98.406107]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.406130]  ? __timer_delete_sync (kernel/time/timer.c:1592)
[   98.406158]  ? l2cap_unregister_user (./include/linux/list.h:381 (discriminator 2) net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1723 (discriminator 2))
[   98.406186]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.406210]  l2cap_unregister_user (./include/linux/list.h:381 (discriminator 2) net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1723 (discriminator 2))
[   98.406263]  hidp_session_thread (./include/linux/instrumented.h:112 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:400 ./include/linux/refcount.h:389 ./include/linux/refcount.h:432 ./include/linux/refcount.h:450 ./include/linux/kref.h:64 net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:996 net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1305)
[   98.406293]  ? __pfx_hidp_session_thread (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1264)
[   98.406323]  ? kthread (kernel/kthread.c:433)
[   98.406340]  ? __pfx_hidp_session_wake_function (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1251)
[   98.406370]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.406393]  ? find_held_lock (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5350 (discriminator 1))
[   98.406424]  ? __pfx_hidp_session_wake_function (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1251)
[   98.406453]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.406476]  ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:79 (discriminator 1))
[   98.406499]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.406523]  ? kthread (kernel/kthread.c:433)
[   98.406539]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.406565]  ? kthread (kernel/kthread.c:433)
[   98.406581]  ? __pfx_hidp_session_thread (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1264)
[   98.406610]  kthread (kernel/kthread.c:467)
[   98.406627]  ? __pfx_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412)
[   98.406645]  ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164)
[   98.406674]  ? __pfx_ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153)
[   98.406704]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.406728]  ? __pfx_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412)
[   98.406747]  ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:258)
[   98.406774]  </TASK>
[   98.406780]
[   98.433693] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[   98.434405] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888113ee7c40 pfn:0x113ee4
[   98.435557] flags: 0x200000000000000(node=0|zone=2)
[   98.436198] raw: 0200000000000000 ffffea0004244308 ffff8881f6f3ebc0 0000000000000000
[   98.437195] raw: ffff888113ee7c40 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[   98.438115] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   98.438951]
[   98.439211] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   98.439871]  ffff888113ee3f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[   98.440714]  ffff888113ee4000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[   98.441580] >ffff888113ee4080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[   98.442458]                                   ^
[   98.443011]  ffff888113ee4100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[   98.443889]  ffff888113ee4180: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[   98.444768] ==================================================================
[   98.445719] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[   98.448074] l2cap_conn_free: freeing conn ffff88810c22b400
[   98.450012] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1430 Comm: khidpd_00050004 Tainted: G    B               7.0.0-rc1-dirty #14 PREEMPT(lazy)
[   98.450040] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
[   98.450047] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
[   98.450059] Call Trace:
[   98.450065]  <TASK>
[   98.450071]  dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122)
[   98.450099]  l2cap_conn_free (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1808)
[   98.450125]  l2cap_conn_put (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1822)
[   98.450154]  session_free (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:990)
[   98.450181]  hidp_session_thread (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1307)
[   98.450213]  ? __pfx_hidp_session_thread (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1264)
[   98.450271]  ? kthread (kernel/kthread.c:433)
[   98.450293]  ? __pfx_hidp_session_wake_function (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1251)
[   98.450339]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.450368]  ? find_held_lock (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5350 (discriminator 1))
[   98.450406]  ? __pfx_hidp_session_wake_function (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1251)
[   98.450442]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.450471]  ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:79 (discriminator 1))
[   98.450499]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.450528]  ? kthread (kernel/kthread.c:433)
[   98.450547]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.450578]  ? kthread (kernel/kthread.c:433)
[   98.450598]  ? __pfx_hidp_session_thread (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1264)
[   98.450637]  kthread (kernel/kthread.c:467)
[   98.450657]  ? __pfx_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412)
[   98.450680]  ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164)
[   98.450715]  ? __pfx_ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153)
[   98.450752]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[   98.450782]  ? __pfx_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412)
[   98.450804]  ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:258)
[   98.450836]  </TASK>
Fixes b4f34d8d9d26 ("Bluetooth: hidp: add new session-management helpers")
---
 net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c +14 -2
index 707f229f896a1..40a6f1e20babc 100644
@@ -986,7 +986,8 @@ static void session_free(struct kref *ref)
 	skb_queue_purge(&session->intr_transmit);
 	fput(session->intr_sock->file);
 	fput(session->ctrl_sock->file);
-	l2cap_conn_put(session->conn);
+	if (session->conn)
+		l2cap_conn_put(session->conn);
 	kfree(session);
 }
 
@@ -1164,6 +1165,15 @@ static void hidp_session_remove(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 
 	down_write(&hidp_session_sem);
 
+	/* Drop L2CAP reference immediately to indicate that
+	 * l2cap_unregister_user() shall not be called as it is already
+	 * considered removed.
+	 */
+	if (session->conn) {
+		l2cap_conn_put(session->conn);
+		session->conn = NULL;
+	}
+
 	hidp_session_terminate(session);
 
 	cancel_work_sync(&session->dev_init);
@@ -1301,7 +1311,9 @@ static int hidp_session_thread(void *arg)
 	 * Instead, this call has the same semantics as if user-space tried to
 	 * delete the session.
 	 */
-	l2cap_unregister_user(session->conn, &session->user);
+	if (session->conn)
+		l2cap_unregister_user(session->conn, &session->user);
+
 	hidp_session_put(session);
 
 	module_put_and_kthread_exit(0);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#512 lore raw

PATCH 509/567 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_unregister_user

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shaurya Rane <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 752a6c9596dd25efd6978a73ff21f3b592668f4a ]

After commit ab4eedb790ca ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix corrupted list in hci_chan_del"), l2cap_conn_del() uses conn->lock to protect access to conn->users. However, l2cap_register_user() and l2cap_unregister_user() don't use conn->lock, creating a race condition where these functions can access conn->users and conn->hchan concurrently with l2cap_conn_del().

This can lead to use-after-free and list corruption bugs, as reported by syzbot.

Fix this by changing l2cap_register_user() and l2cap_unregister_user() to use conn->lock instead of hci_dev_lock(), ensuring consistent locking for the l2cap_conn structure.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes ab4eedb790ca ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix corrupted list in hci_chan_del")
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 20 ++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +8 -12
index 4ab738e651837..7f807e0b0992f 100644
@@ -1686,17 +1686,15 @@ static void l2cap_info_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
 
 int l2cap_register_user(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_user *user)
 {
-	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
 	int ret;
 
 	/* We need to check whether l2cap_conn is registered. If it is not, we
-	 * must not register the l2cap_user. l2cap_conn_del() is unregisters
-	 * l2cap_conn objects, but doesn't provide its own locking. Instead, it
-	 * relies on the parent hci_conn object to be locked. This itself relies
-	 * on the hci_dev object to be locked. So we must lock the hci device
-	 * here, too. */
+	 * must not register the l2cap_user. l2cap_conn_del() unregisters
+	 * l2cap_conn objects under conn->lock, and we use the same lock here
+	 * to protect access to conn->users and conn->hchan.
+	 */
 
-	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
+	mutex_lock(&conn->lock);
 
 	if (!list_empty(&user->list)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -1717,16 +1715,14 @@ int l2cap_register_user(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_user *user)
 	ret = 0;
 
 out_unlock:
-	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+	mutex_unlock(&conn->lock);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(l2cap_register_user);
 
 void l2cap_unregister_user(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_user *user)
 {
-	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
-
-	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
+	mutex_lock(&conn->lock);
 
 	if (list_empty(&user->list))
 		goto out_unlock;
@@ -1735,7 +1731,7 @@ void l2cap_unregister_user(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_user *user)
 	user->remove(conn, user);
 
 out_unlock:
-	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+	mutex_unlock(&conn->lock);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(l2cap_unregister_user);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#513 lore raw

PATCH 510/567 Bluetooth: qca: fix ROM version reading on WCN3998 chips

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 99b2c531e0e797119ae1b9195a8764ee98b00e65 ]

WCN3998 uses a bit different format for rom version:

[    5.479978] Bluetooth: hci0: setting up wcn399x
[    5.633763] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA Product ID   :0x0000000a
[    5.645350] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA SOC Version  :0x40010224
[    5.650906] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA ROM Version  :0x00001001
[    5.665173] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA Patch Version:0x00006699
[    5.679356] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA controller version 0x02241001
[    5.691109] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA Downloading qca/crbtfw21.tlv
[    6.680102] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA Downloading qca/crnv21.bin
[    6.842948] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA setup on UART is completed
Fixes 523760b7ff88 ("Bluetooth: hci_qca: Added support for WCN3998")
---
 drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c +2 -0
index 5651f40db1736..5b34da23adce7 100644
@@ -826,6 +826,8 @@ int qca_uart_setup(struct hci_dev *hdev, uint8_t baudrate,
 	 */
 	if (soc_type == QCA_WCN3988)
 		rom_ver = ((soc_ver & 0x00000f00) >> 0x05) | (soc_ver & 0x0000000f);
+	else if (soc_type == QCA_WCN3998)
+		rom_ver = ((soc_ver & 0x0000f000) >> 0x07) | (soc_ver & 0x0000000f);
 	else
 		rom_ver = ((soc_ver & 0x00000f00) >> 0x04) | (soc_ver & 0x0000000f);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#514 lore raw

PATCH 511/567 net/rose: fix NULL pointer dereference in rose_transmit_link on reconnect

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e1f0a18c9564cdb16523c802e2c6fe5874e3d944 ]

syzkaller reported a bug [1], and the reproducer is available at [2].

ROSE sockets use four sk->sk_state values: TCP_CLOSE, TCP_LISTEN, TCP_SYN_SENT, and TCP_ESTABLISHED. rose_connect() already rejects calls for TCP_ESTABLISHED (-EISCONN) and TCP_CLOSE with SS_CONNECTING (-ECONNREFUSED), but lacks a check for TCP_SYN_SENT.

When rose_connect() is called a second time while the first connection attempt is still in progress (TCP_SYN_SENT), it overwrites rose->neighbour via rose_get_neigh(). If that returns NULL, the socket is left with rose->state == ROSE_STATE_1 but rose->neighbour == NULL. When the socket is subsequently closed, rose_release() sees ROSE_STATE_1 and calls rose_write_internal() -> rose_transmit_link(skb, NULL), causing a NULL pointer dereference.

Per connect(2), a second connect() while a connection is already in progress should return -EALREADY. Add this missing check for TCP_SYN_SENT to complete the state validation in rose_connect().

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d00f90e0af54102fb271
[2] https://gist.github.com/mrpre/9e6779e0d13e2c66779b1653fef80516

---
 net/rose/af_rose.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
net/rose/af_rose.c +5 -0
index 1cc5eaeb1c608..e80bc7788bec5 100644
@@ -810,6 +810,11 @@ static int rose_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_le
 		goto out_release;
 	}
 
+	if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_SENT) {
+		err = -EALREADY;
+		goto out_release;
+	}
+
 	sk->sk_state   = TCP_CLOSE;
 	sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#515 lore raw

PATCH 512/567 mpls: add missing unregister_netdevice_notifier to mpls_init

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 99600f79b28c83c68bae199a3d8e95049a758308 ]

If mpls_init() fails after registering mpls_dev_notifier, it never gets removed. Add the missing unregister_netdevice_notifier() call to the error handling path.

---
 net/mpls/af_mpls.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/mpls/af_mpls.c +1 -0
index 5a4b175b78c8c..0561a530ecf0d 100644
@@ -2775,6 +2775,7 @@ static int __init mpls_init(void)
 out_unregister_rtnl_af:
 	rtnl_af_unregister(&mpls_af_ops);
 	dev_remove_pack(&mpls_packet_type);
+	unregister_netdevice_notifier(&mpls_dev_notifier);
 out_unregister_pernet:
 	unregister_pernet_subsys(&mpls_net_ops);
 	goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#516 lore raw

PATCH 513/567 netfilter: ctnetlink: remove refcounting in expectation dumpers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1492e3dcb2be3aa46d1963da96aa9593e4e4db5a ]

Same pattern as previous patch: do not keep the expectation object alive via refcount, only store a cookie value and then use that as the skip hint for dump resumption.

AFAICS this has the same issue as the one resolved in the conntrack dumper, when we do
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&exp->use))

to increment the refcount, there is a chance that exp == last, which causes a double-increment of the refcount and subsequent memory leak.

Fixes cf6994c2b981 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack_netlink: sync expectation dumping with conntrack table dumping")
Fixes e844a928431f ("netfilter: ctnetlink: allow to dump expectation per master conntrack")

Stable-dep-of: 5cb81eeda909 ("netfilter: ctnetlink: fix use-after-free in ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct()")

---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 41 ++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +17 -24
index 928bd2013289a..237468202a0be 100644
@@ -3140,23 +3140,27 @@ ctnetlink_expect_event(unsigned int events, const struct nf_exp_event *item)
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif
-static int ctnetlink_exp_done(struct netlink_callback *cb)
+
+static unsigned long ctnetlink_exp_id(const struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp)
 {
-	if (cb->args[1])
-		nf_ct_expect_put((struct nf_conntrack_expect *)cb->args[1]);
-	return 0;
+	unsigned long id = (unsigned long)exp;
+
+	id += nf_ct_get_id(exp->master);
+	id += exp->class;
+
+	return id ? id : 1;
 }
 
 static int
 ctnetlink_exp_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 {
 	struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
-	struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp, *last;
 	struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(cb->nlh);
 	u_int8_t l3proto = nfmsg->nfgen_family;
+	unsigned long last_id = cb->args[1];
+	struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	last = (struct nf_conntrack_expect *)cb->args[1];
 	for (; cb->args[0] < nf_ct_expect_hsize; cb->args[0]++) {
 restart:
 		hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(exp, &nf_ct_expect_hash[cb->args[0]],
@@ -3168,7 +3172,7 @@ ctnetlink_exp_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 				continue;
 
 			if (cb->args[1]) {
-				if (exp != last)
+				if (ctnetlink_exp_id(exp) != last_id)
 					continue;
 				cb->args[1] = 0;
 			}
@@ -3177,9 +3181,7 @@ ctnetlink_exp_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 						    cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
 						    IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_NEW,
 						    exp) < 0) {
-				if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&exp->use))
-					continue;
-				cb->args[1] = (unsigned long)exp;
+				cb->args[1] = ctnetlink_exp_id(exp);
 				goto out;
 			}
 		}
@@ -3190,32 +3192,30 @@ ctnetlink_exp_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 	}
 out:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-	if (last)
-		nf_ct_expect_put(last);
-
 	return skb->len;
 }
 
 static int
 ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 {
-	struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp, *last;
 	struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(cb->nlh);
 	struct nf_conn *ct = cb->data;
 	struct nf_conn_help *help = nfct_help(ct);
 	u_int8_t l3proto = nfmsg->nfgen_family;
+	unsigned long last_id = cb->args[1];
+	struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp;
 
 	if (cb->args[0])
 		return 0;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	last = (struct nf_conntrack_expect *)cb->args[1];
+
 restart:
 	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(exp, &help->expectations, lnode) {
 		if (l3proto && exp->tuple.src.l3num != l3proto)
 			continue;
 		if (cb->args[1]) {
-			if (exp != last)
+			if (ctnetlink_exp_id(exp) != last_id)
 				continue;
 			cb->args[1] = 0;
 		}
@@ -3223,9 +3223,7 @@ ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 					    cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
 					    IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_NEW,
 					    exp) < 0) {
-			if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&exp->use))
-				continue;
-			cb->args[1] = (unsigned long)exp;
+			cb->args[1] = ctnetlink_exp_id(exp);
 			goto out;
 		}
 	}
@@ -3236,9 +3234,6 @@ ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 	cb->args[0] = 1;
 out:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-	if (last)
-		nf_ct_expect_put(last);
-
 	return skb->len;
 }
 
@@ -3257,7 +3252,6 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
 	struct nf_conntrack_zone zone;
 	struct netlink_dump_control c = {
 		.dump = ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table,
-		.done = ctnetlink_exp_done,
 	};
 
 	err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &tuple, CTA_EXPECT_MASTER,
@@ -3307,7 +3301,6 @@ static int ctnetlink_get_expect(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		else {
 			struct netlink_dump_control c = {
 				.dump = ctnetlink_exp_dump_table,
-				.done = ctnetlink_exp_done,
 			};
 			return netlink_dump_start(info->sk, skb, info->nlh, &c);
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#517 lore raw

PATCH 514/567 netfilter: ctnetlink: fix use-after-free in ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hyunwoo Kim <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5cb81eeda909dbb2def209dd10636b51549a3f8a ]

ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct() stores a conntrack pointer in cb->data for the netlink dump callback ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(), but drops the conntrack reference immediately after netlink_dump_start(). When the dump spans multiple rounds, the second recvmsg() triggers the dump callback which dereferences the now-freed conntrack via nfct_help(ct), leading to a use-after-free on ct->ext.

The bug is that the netlink_dump_control has no .start or .done callbacks to manage the conntrack reference across dump rounds. Other dump functions in the same file (e.g. ctnetlink_get_conntrack) properly use .start/.done callbacks for this purpose.

Fix this by adding .start and .done callbacks that hold and release the conntrack reference for the duration of the dump, and move the nfct_help() call after the cb->args[0] early-return check in the dump callback to avoid dereferencing ct->ext unnecessarily.

 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table+0x4f/0x2e0
 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810597ebf0 by task ctnetlink_poc/133

 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 133 Comm: ctnetlink_poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2+ #3 PREEMPTLAZY
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table+0x4f/0x2e0
  netlink_dump+0x333/0x880
  netlink_recvmsg+0x3e2/0x4b0
  ? aa_sk_perm+0x184/0x450
  sock_recvmsg+0xde/0xf0

 Allocated by task 133:
  kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x134/0x440
  __nf_conntrack_alloc+0xa8/0x2b0
  ctnetlink_create_conntrack+0xa1/0x900
  ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x3cf/0x7d0
  nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x48e/0x510
  netlink_rcv_skb+0xc9/0x1f0
  nfnetlink_rcv+0xdb/0x220
  netlink_unicast+0x3ec/0x590
  netlink_sendmsg+0x397/0x690
  __sys_sendmsg+0xf4/0x180

 Freed by task 0:
  slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0xad/0x1e0
  rcu_core+0x5c3/0x9c0
Fixes e844a928431f ("netfilter: ctnetlink: allow to dump expectation per master conntrack")
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +25 -1
index 237468202a0be..b4761a060e7a0 100644
@@ -3200,7 +3200,7 @@ ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 {
 	struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(cb->nlh);
 	struct nf_conn *ct = cb->data;
-	struct nf_conn_help *help = nfct_help(ct);
+	struct nf_conn_help *help;
 	u_int8_t l3proto = nfmsg->nfgen_family;
 	unsigned long last_id = cb->args[1];
 	struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp;
@@ -3208,6 +3208,10 @@ ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 	if (cb->args[0])
 		return 0;
 
+	help = nfct_help(ct);
+	if (!help)
+		return 0;
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
 restart:
@@ -3237,6 +3241,24 @@ ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 	return skb->len;
 }
 
+static int ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct_start(struct netlink_callback *cb)
+{
+	struct nf_conn *ct = cb->data;
+
+	if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct->ct_general.use))
+		return -ENOENT;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct_done(struct netlink_callback *cb)
+{
+	struct nf_conn *ct = cb->data;
+
+	if (ct)
+		nf_ct_put(ct);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
 				 struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
@@ -3252,6 +3274,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
 	struct nf_conntrack_zone zone;
 	struct netlink_dump_control c = {
 		.dump = ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table,
+		.start = ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct_start,
+		.done = ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct_done,
 	};
 
 	err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &tuple, CTA_EXPECT_MASTER,
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#518 lore raw

PATCH 515/567 netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: fix Content-Length u32 truncation in sip_help_tcp()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lukas Johannes Möller <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fbce58e719a17aa215c724473fd5baaa4a8dc57c ]

sip_help_tcp() parses the SIP Content-Length header with simple_strtoul(), which returns unsigned long, but stores the result in unsigned int clen. On 64-bit systems, values exceeding UINT_MAX are silently truncated before computing the SIP message boundary.

For example, Content-Length 4294967328 (2^32 + 32) is truncated to 32, causing the parser to miscalculate where the current message ends. The loop then treats trailing data in the TCP segment as a second SIP message and processes it through the SDP parser.

Fix this by changing clen to unsigned long to match the return type of simple_strtoul(), and reject Content-Length values that exceed the remaining TCP payload length.

Fixes f5b321bd37fb ("netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: add TCP support")
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c +5 -1
index d0eac27f6ba03..657839a58782a 100644
@@ -1534,11 +1534,12 @@ static int sip_help_tcp(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 {
 	struct tcphdr *th, _tcph;
 	unsigned int dataoff, datalen;
-	unsigned int matchoff, matchlen, clen;
+	unsigned int matchoff, matchlen;
 	unsigned int msglen, origlen;
 	const char *dptr, *end;
 	s16 diff, tdiff = 0;
 	int ret = NF_ACCEPT;
+	unsigned long clen;
 	bool term;
 
 	if (ctinfo != IP_CT_ESTABLISHED &&
@@ -1573,6 +1574,9 @@ static int sip_help_tcp(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 		if (dptr + matchoff == end)
 			break;
 
+		if (clen > datalen)
+			break;
+
 		term = false;
 		for (; end + strlen("\r\n\r\n") <= dptr + datalen; end++) {
 			if (end[0] == '\r' && end[1] == '\n' &&
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#519 lore raw

PATCH 516/567 netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: fix OOB read in decode_int() CONS case

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jenny Guanni Qu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1e3a3593162c96e8a8de48b1e14f60c3b57fca8a ]

In decode_int(), the CONS case calls get_bits(bs, 2) to read a length value, then calls get_uint(bs, len) without checking that len bytes remain in the buffer. The existing boundary check only validates the 2 bits for get_bits(), not the subsequent 1-4 bytes that get_uint() reads. This allows a malformed H.323/RAS packet to cause a 1-4 byte slab-out-of-bounds read.

Add a boundary check for len bytes after get_bits() and before get_uint().

Fixes 5e35941d9901 ("[NETFILTER]: Add H.323 conntrack/NAT helper")
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c +2 -0
index 62aa22a078769..c972e9488e16f 100644
@@ -331,6 +331,8 @@ static int decode_int(struct bitstr *bs, const struct field_t *f,
 		if (nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, 0, 2))
 			return H323_ERROR_BOUND;
 		len = get_bits(bs, 2) + 1;
+		if (nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, len, 0))
+			return H323_ERROR_BOUND;
 		BYTE_ALIGN(bs);
 		if (base && (f->attr & DECODE)) {	/* timeToLive */
 			unsigned int v = get_uint(bs, len) + f->lb;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#520 lore raw

PATCH 517/567 netfilter: nft_ct: add seqadj extension for natted connections

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrii Melnychenko <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 90918e3b6404c2a37837b8f11692471b4c512de2 ]

Sequence adjustment may be required for FTP traffic with PASV/EPSV modes. due to need to re-write packet payload (IP, port) on the ftp control connection. This can require changes to the TCP length and expected seq / ack_seq.

The easiest way to reproduce this issue is with PASV mode. Example ruleset:

table inet ftp_nat {
        ct helper ftp_helper {
                type "ftp" protocol tcp
                l3proto inet
        }

        chain prerouting {
                type filter hook prerouting priority 0; policy accept;
                tcp dport 21 ct state new ct helper set "ftp_helper"
        }
}
table ip nat {
        chain prerouting {
                type nat hook prerouting priority -100; policy accept;
                tcp dport 21 dnat ip prefix to ip daddr map {
			192.168.100.1 : 192.168.13.2/32 }
        }

        chain postrouting {
                type nat hook postrouting priority 100 ; policy accept;
                tcp sport 21 snat ip prefix to ip saddr map {
			192.168.13.2 : 192.168.100.1/32 }
        }
}

Note that the ftp helper gets assigned *after* the dnat setup.

The inverse (nat after helper assign) is handled by an existing check in nf_nat_setup_info() and will not show the problem.

Topoloy:

 +-------------------+     +----------------------------------+
 | FTP: 192.168.13.2 | <-> | NAT: 192.168.13.3, 192.168.100.1 |
 +-------------------+     +----------------------------------+
                                      |
                         +-----------------------+
                         | Client: 192.168.100.2 |
                         +-----------------------+

ftp nat changes do not work as expected in this case:
Connected to 192.168.100.1.
[..]
ftp> epsv
EPSV/EPRT on IPv4 off.
ftp> ls
227 Entering passive mode (192,168,100,1,209,129). 421 Service not available, remote server has closed connection.

Kernel logs:
Missing nfct_seqadj_ext_add() setup call

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_seqadj.c:41
[..]
 __nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet+0x100/0x160 [nf_nat]
 nf_nat_ftp+0x142/0x280 [nf_nat_ftp]
 help+0x4d1/0x880 [nf_conntrack_ftp]
 nf_confirm+0x122/0x2e0 [nf_conntrack]
 nf_hook_slow+0x3c/0xb0
 ..

Fix this by adding the required extension when a conntrack helper is assigned to a connection that has a nat binding.

Fixes 1a64edf54f55 ("netfilter: nft_ct: add helper set support")

Stable-dep-of: 36eae0956f65 ("netfilter: nft_ct: drop pending enqueued packets on removal")

---
 net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/nft_ct.c +5 -0
index 3ec63852d058f..1070d68f9e77f 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h>
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l4proto.h>
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h>
+#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_seqadj.h>
 
 struct nft_ct_helper_obj  {
 	struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper4;
@@ -1173,6 +1174,10 @@ static void nft_ct_helper_obj_eval(struct nft_object *obj,
 	if (help) {
 		rcu_assign_pointer(help->helper, to_assign);
 		set_bit(IPS_HELPER_BIT, &ct->status);
+
+		if ((ct->status & IPS_NAT_MASK) && !nfct_seqadj(ct))
+			if (!nfct_seqadj_ext_add(ct))
+				regs->verdict.code = NF_DROP;
 	}
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#521 lore raw

PATCH 518/567 netfilter: nft_ct: drop pending enqueued packets on removal

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 36eae0956f659e48d5366d9b083d9417f3263ddc ]

Packets sitting in nfqueue might hold a reference to:

- templates that specify the conntrack zone, because a percpu area is used and module removal is possible.
- conntrack timeout policies and helper, where object removal leave a stale reference.

Since these objects can just go away, drop enqueued packets to avoid stale reference to them.

If there is a need for finer grain removal, this logic can be revisited to make selective packet drop upon dependencies.

Fixes 7e0b2b57f01d ("netfilter: nft_ct: add ct timeout support")
---
 net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/nft_ct.c +4 -0
index 1070d68f9e77f..128eb0ac37742 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l4proto.h>
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h>
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_seqadj.h>
+#include "nf_internals.h"
 
 struct nft_ct_helper_obj  {
 	struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper4;
@@ -527,6 +528,7 @@ static void __nft_ct_set_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_ct *priv)
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_ZONES
 	case NFT_CT_ZONE:
+		nf_queue_nf_hook_drop(ctx->net);
 		mutex_lock(&nft_ct_pcpu_mutex);
 		if (--nft_ct_pcpu_template_refcnt == 0)
 			nft_ct_tmpl_put_pcpu();
@@ -997,6 +999,7 @@ static void nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 	struct nft_ct_timeout_obj *priv = nft_obj_data(obj);
 	struct nf_ct_timeout *timeout = priv->timeout;
 
+	nf_queue_nf_hook_drop(ctx->net);
 	nf_ct_untimeout(ctx->net, timeout);
 	nf_ct_netns_put(ctx->net, ctx->family);
 	kfree(priv->timeout);
@@ -1129,6 +1132,7 @@ static void nft_ct_helper_obj_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 {
 	struct nft_ct_helper_obj *priv = nft_obj_data(obj);
 
+	nf_queue_nf_hook_drop(ctx->net);
 	if (priv->helper4)
 		nf_conntrack_helper_put(priv->helper4);
 	if (priv->helper6)
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#522 lore raw

PATCH 519/567 netfilter: xt_CT: drop pending enqueued packets on template removal

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f62a218a946b19bb59abdd5361da85fa4606b96b ]

Templates refer to objects that can go away while packets are sitting in nfqueue refer to:

- helper, this can be an issue on module removal.
- timeout policy, nfnetlink_cttimeout might remove it.

The use of templates with zone and event cache filter are safe, since this just copies values.

Flush these enqueued packets in case the template rule gets removed.

Fixes 24de58f46516 ("netfilter: xt_CT: allow to attach timeout policy + glue code")
---
 net/netfilter/xt_CT.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/xt_CT.c +4 -0
index 3ba94c34297cf..498f5871c84a0 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.h>
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h>
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_zones.h>
+#include "nf_internals.h"
 
 static inline int xt_ct_target(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct)
 {
@@ -283,6 +284,9 @@ static void xt_ct_tg_destroy(const struct xt_tgdtor_param *par,
 	struct nf_conn_help *help;
 
 	if (ct) {
+		if (info->helper[0] || info->timeout[0])
+			nf_queue_nf_hook_drop(par->net);
+
 		help = nfct_help(ct);
 		xt_ct_put_helper(help);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#523 lore raw

PATCH 520/567 netfilter: xt_time: use unsigned int for monthday bit shift

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jenny Guanni Qu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 00050ec08cecfda447e1209b388086d76addda3a ]

The monthday field can be up to 31, and shifting a signed integer 1 by 31 positions (1 << 31) is undefined behavior in C, as the result overflows a 32-bit signed int. Use 1U to ensure well-defined behavior for all valid monthday values.

Change the weekday shift to 1U as well for consistency.

---
 net/netfilter/xt_time.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/xt_time.c +2 -2
index 6aa12d0f54e23..61de85e02a40f 100644
@@ -227,13 +227,13 @@ time_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)
 
 	localtime_2(&current_time, stamp);
 
-	if (!(info->weekdays_match & (1 << current_time.weekday)))
+	if (!(info->weekdays_match & (1U << current_time.weekday)))
 		return false;
 
 	/* Do not spend time computing monthday if all days match anyway */
 	if (info->monthdays_match != XT_TIME_ALL_MONTHDAYS) {
 		localtime_3(&current_time, stamp);
-		if (!(info->monthdays_match & (1 << current_time.monthday)))
+		if (!(info->monthdays_match & (1U << current_time.monthday)))
 			return false;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#524 lore raw

PATCH 521/567 netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: check for zero length in DecodeQ931()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jenny Guanni Qu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f173d0f4c0f689173f8cdac79991043a4a89bf66 ]

In DecodeQ931(), the UserUserIE code path reads a 16-bit length from the packet, then decrements it by 1 to skip the protocol discriminator byte before passing it to DecodeH323_UserInformation(). If the encoded length is 0, the decrement wraps to -1, which is then passed as a large value to the decoder, leading to an out-of-bounds read.

Add a check to ensure len is positive after the decrement.

Fixes 5e35941d9901 ("[NETFILTER]: Add H.323 conntrack/NAT helper")
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c +2 -0
index c972e9488e16f..7b1497ed97d26 100644
@@ -924,6 +924,8 @@ int DecodeQ931(unsigned char *buf, size_t sz, Q931 *q931)
 				break;
 			p++;
 			len--;
+			if (len <= 0)
+				break;
 			return DecodeH323_UserInformation(buf, p, len,
 							  &q931->UUIE);
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#525 lore raw

PATCH 522/567 net: bcmgenet: increase WoL poll timeout

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Justin Chen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6cfc3bc02b977f2fba5f7268e6504d1931a774f7 ]

Some systems require more than 5ms to get into WoL mode. Increase the timeout value to 50ms.

Fixes c51de7f3976b ("net: bcmgenet: add Wake-on-LAN support code")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet_wol.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet_wol.c +1 -1
index 3b082114f2e53..2033fb9d893e0 100644
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static int bcmgenet_poll_wol_status(struct bcmgenet_priv *priv)
 	while (!(bcmgenet_rbuf_readl(priv, RBUF_STATUS)
 		& RBUF_STATUS_WOL)) {
 		retries++;
-		if (retries > 5) {
+		if (retries > 50) {
 			netdev_crit(dev, "polling wol mode timeout\n");
 			return -ETIMEDOUT;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#526 lore raw

PATCH 523/567 net: mana: fix use-after-free in mana_hwc_destroy_channel() by reordering teardown

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dipayaan Roy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fa103fc8f56954a60699a29215cb713448a39e87 ]

A potential race condition exists in mana_hwc_destroy_channel() where hwc->caller_ctx is freed before the HWC's Completion Queue (CQ) and Event Queue (EQ) are destroyed. This allows an in-flight CQ interrupt handler to dereference freed memory, leading to a use-after-free or NULL pointer dereference in mana_hwc_handle_resp().

mana_smc_teardown_hwc() signals the hardware to stop but does not synchronize against IRQ handlers already executing on other CPUs. The IRQ synchronization only happens in mana_hwc_destroy_cq() via mana_gd_destroy_eq() -> mana_gd_deregister_irq(). Since this runs after kfree(hwc->caller_ctx), a concurrent mana_hwc_rx_event_handler() can dereference freed caller_ctx (and rxq->msg_buf) in mana_hwc_handle_resp().

Fix this by reordering teardown to reverse-of-creation order: destroy the TX/RX work queues and CQ/EQ before freeing hwc->caller_ctx. This ensures all in-flight interrupt handlers complete before the memory they access is freed.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/hw_channel.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/hw_channel.c +3 -3
index 9d6426d4158e3..148dda6570fc5 100644
@@ -776,9 +776,6 @@ void mana_hwc_destroy_channel(struct gdma_context *gc)
 		gc->max_num_cqs = 0;
 	}
 
-	kfree(hwc->caller_ctx);
-	hwc->caller_ctx = NULL;
-
 	if (hwc->txq)
 		mana_hwc_destroy_wq(hwc, hwc->txq);
 
@@ -788,6 +785,9 @@ void mana_hwc_destroy_channel(struct gdma_context *gc)
 	if (hwc->cq)
 		mana_hwc_destroy_cq(hwc->gdma_dev->gdma_context, hwc->cq);
 
+	kfree(hwc->caller_ctx);
+	hwc->caller_ctx = NULL;
+
 	mana_gd_free_res_map(&hwc->inflight_msg_res);
 
 	hwc->num_inflight_msg = 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#527 lore raw

PATCH 524/567 sched: idle: Consolidate the handling of two special cases

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f4c31b07b136839e0fb3026f8a5b6543e3b14d2f ]

There are two special cases in the idle loop that are handled inconsistently even though they are analogous.

The first one is when a cpuidle driver is absent and the default CPU idle time power management implemented by the architecture code is used. In that case, the scheduler tick is stopped every time before invoking default_idle_call().

The second one is when a cpuidle driver is present, but there is only one idle state in its table. In that case, the scheduler tick is never stopped at all.

Since each of these approaches has its drawbacks, reconcile them with the help of one simple heuristic. Namely, stop the tick if the CPU has been woken up by it in the previous iteration of the idle loop, or let it tick otherwise.

Fixes ed98c3491998 ("sched: idle: Do not stop the tick before cpuidle_idle_call()")
[ rjw: Added Fixes tag, changelog edits ]
---
 kernel/sched/idle.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/idle.c +21 -9
index ecf555ad158ab..20a8f0f972e63 100644
@@ -134,6 +134,14 @@ static int call_cpuidle(struct cpuidle_driver *drv, struct cpuidle_device *dev,
 	return cpuidle_enter(drv, dev, next_state);
 }
 
+static void idle_call_stop_or_retain_tick(bool stop_tick)
+{
+	if (stop_tick || tick_nohz_tick_stopped())
+		tick_nohz_idle_stop_tick();
+	else
+		tick_nohz_idle_retain_tick();
+}
+
 /**
  * cpuidle_idle_call - the main idle function
  *
@@ -143,7 +151,7 @@ static int call_cpuidle(struct cpuidle_driver *drv, struct cpuidle_device *dev,
  * set, and it returns with polling set.  If it ever stops polling, it
  * must clear the polling bit.
  */
-static void cpuidle_idle_call(void)
+static void cpuidle_idle_call(bool stop_tick)
 {
 	struct cpuidle_device *dev = cpuidle_get_device();
 	struct cpuidle_driver *drv = cpuidle_get_cpu_driver(dev);
@@ -165,7 +173,7 @@ static void cpuidle_idle_call(void)
 	 */
 
 	if (cpuidle_not_available(drv, dev)) {
-		tick_nohz_idle_stop_tick();
+		idle_call_stop_or_retain_tick(stop_tick);
 
 		default_idle_call();
 		goto exit_idle;
@@ -200,17 +208,19 @@ static void cpuidle_idle_call(void)
 		next_state = cpuidle_find_deepest_state(drv, dev, max_latency_ns);
 		call_cpuidle(drv, dev, next_state);
 	} else if (drv->state_count > 1) {
-		bool stop_tick = true;
+		/*
+		 * stop_tick is expected to be true by default by cpuidle
+		 * governors, which allows them to select idle states with
+		 * target residency above the tick period length.
+		 */
+		stop_tick = true;
 
 		/*
 		 * Ask the cpuidle framework to choose a convenient idle state.
 		 */
 		next_state = cpuidle_select(drv, dev, &stop_tick);
 
-		if (stop_tick || tick_nohz_tick_stopped())
-			tick_nohz_idle_stop_tick();
-		else
-			tick_nohz_idle_retain_tick();
+		idle_call_stop_or_retain_tick(stop_tick);
 
 		entered_state = call_cpuidle(drv, dev, next_state);
 		/*
@@ -218,7 +228,7 @@ static void cpuidle_idle_call(void)
 		 */
 		cpuidle_reflect(dev, entered_state);
 	} else {
-		tick_nohz_idle_retain_tick();
+		idle_call_stop_or_retain_tick(stop_tick);
 
 		/*
 		 * If there is only a single idle state (or none), there is
@@ -246,6 +256,7 @@ static void cpuidle_idle_call(void)
 static void do_idle(void)
 {
 	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+	bool got_tick = false;
 
 	/*
 	 * Check if we need to update blocked load
@@ -288,8 +299,9 @@ static void do_idle(void)
 			tick_nohz_idle_restart_tick();
 			cpu_idle_poll();
 		} else {
-			cpuidle_idle_call();
+			cpuidle_idle_call(got_tick);
 		}
+		got_tick = tick_nohz_idle_got_tick();
 		arch_cpu_idle_exit();
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#528 lore raw

PATCH 525/567 PM: runtime: Fix a race condition related to device removal

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 29ab768277617452d88c0607c9299cdc63b6e9ff ]

The following code in pm_runtime_work() may dereference the dev->parent pointer after the parent device has been freed:

	/* Maybe the parent is now able to suspend. */
	if (parent && !parent->power.ignore_children) {
		spin_unlock(&dev->power.lock);

		spin_lock(&parent->power.lock);
		rpm_idle(parent, RPM_ASYNC);
		spin_unlock(&parent->power.lock);

		spin_lock(&dev->power.lock);
	}

Fix this by inserting a flush_work() call in pm_runtime_remove().

Without this patch blktest block/001 triggers the following complaint sporadically:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_acquire+0x70/0x160
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88812bef7198 by task kworker/u553:1/3081
Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x80
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x8b/0x310
 print_report+0xfd/0x1d7
 kasan_report+0xd8/0x1d0
 __kasan_check_byte+0x42/0x60
 lock_acquire.part.0+0x38/0x230
 lock_acquire+0x70/0x160
 _raw_spin_lock+0x36/0x50
 rpm_suspend+0xc6a/0xfe0
 rpm_idle+0x578/0x770
 pm_runtime_work+0xee/0x120
 process_one_work+0xde3/0x1410
 worker_thread+0x5eb/0xfe0
 kthread+0x37b/0x480
 ret_from_fork+0x6cb/0x920
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 4314:
 kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50
 kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40
 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3d/0x50
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xb0
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x311/0x990
 scsi_alloc_target+0x122/0xb60 [scsi_mod]
 __scsi_scan_target+0x101/0x460 [scsi_mod]
 scsi_scan_channel+0x179/0x1c0 [scsi_mod]
 scsi_scan_host_selected+0x259/0x2d0 [scsi_mod]
 store_scan+0x2d2/0x390 [scsi_mod]
 dev_attr_store+0x43/0x80
 sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3ef/0x670
 vfs_write+0x506/0x1470
 ksys_write+0xfd/0x230
 __x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0
 x64_sys_call+0x213/0x1810
 do_syscall_64+0xee/0xfc0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Freed by task 4314:
 kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50
 kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40
 kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x50
 __kasan_slab_free+0x67/0x80
 kfree+0x225/0x6c0
 scsi_target_dev_release+0x3d/0x60 [scsi_mod]
 device_release+0xa3/0x220
 kobject_cleanup+0x105/0x3a0
 kobject_put+0x72/0xd0
 put_device+0x17/0x20
 scsi_device_dev_release+0xacf/0x12c0 [scsi_mod]
 device_release+0xa3/0x220
 kobject_cleanup+0x105/0x3a0
 kobject_put+0x72/0xd0
 put_device+0x17/0x20
 scsi_device_put+0x7f/0xc0 [scsi_mod]
 sdev_store_delete+0xa5/0x120 [scsi_mod]
 dev_attr_store+0x43/0x80
 sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3ef/0x670
 vfs_write+0x506/0x1470
 ksys_write+0xfd/0x230
 __x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0
 x64_sys_call+0x213/0x1810
---
 drivers/base/power/runtime.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/base/power/runtime.c +1 -0
index b28fb11cd6db8..2766bdc9158ab 100644
@@ -1854,6 +1854,7 @@ void pm_runtime_reinit(struct device *dev)
 void pm_runtime_remove(struct device *dev)
 {
 	__pm_runtime_disable(dev, false);
+	flush_work(&dev->power.work);
 	pm_runtime_reinit(dev);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#529 lore raw

PATCH 526/567 net/smc: fix NULL dereference and UAF in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6d5e4538364b9ceb1ac2941a4deb86650afb3538 ]

Syzkaller reported a panic in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() [1].

smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in the TCP receive path (softirq) via icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock on the clcsock (TCP listening socket). It reads sk_user_data to get the smc_sock pointer. However, when the SMC listen socket is being closed concurrently, smc_close_active() sets clcsock->sk_user_data to NULL under sk_callback_lock, and then the smc_sock itself can be freed via sock_put() in smc_release().

This leads to two issues:

1) NULL pointer dereference: sk_user_data is NULL when accessed.
2) Use-after-free: sk_user_data is read as non-NULL, but the smc_sock is freed before its fields (e.g., queued_smc_hs, ori_af_ops) are accessed.

The race window looks like this (the syzkaller crash [1] triggers via the SYN cookie path: tcp_get_cookie_sock() -> smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(), but the normal tcp_check_req() path has the same race):

CPU A (softirq) CPU B (process ctx)

tcp_v4_rcv()

    TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV:
    sk = req->rsk_listener
    sock_hold(sk)
    /* No lock on listener */
                               smc_close_active():
                                 write_lock_bh(cb_lock)
                                 sk_user_data = NULL
                                 write_unlock_bh(cb_lock)
                                 ...
                                 smc_clcsock_release()
                                 sock_put(smc->sk) x2
                                   -> smc_sock freed!
    tcp_check_req()
      smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock():
        smc = user_data(sk)
          -> NULL or dangling
        smc->queued_smc_hs
          -> crash!

Note that the clcsock and smc_sock are two independent objects with separate refcounts. TCP stack holds a reference on the clcsock, which keeps it alive, but this does NOT prevent the smc_sock from being freed.

Fix this by using RCU and refcount_inc_not_zero() to safely access smc_sock. Since smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in the TCP three-way handshake path, taking read_lock_bh on sk_callback_lock is too heavy and would not survive a SYN flood attack. Using rcu_read_lock() is much more lightweight.

- Set SOCK_RCU_FREE on the SMC listen socket so that smc_sock freeing is deferred until after the RCU grace period. This guarantees the memory is still valid when accessed inside rcu_read_lock().
- Use rcu_read_lock() to protect reading sk_user_data.
- Use refcount_inc_not_zero(&smc->sk.sk_refcnt) to pin the smc_sock. If the refcount has already reached zero (close path completed), it returns false and we bail out safely.

Note: smc_hs_congested() has a similar lockless read of sk_user_data without rcu_read_lock(), but it only checks for NULL and accesses the global smc_hs_wq, never dereferencing any smc_sock field, so it is not affected.

Reproducer was verified with mdelay injection and smc_run, the issue no longer occurs with this patch applied.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=827ae2bfb3a3529333e9

---
 net/smc/af_smc.c    | 23 +++++++++++++++++------
 net/smc/smc.h       |  5 +++++
 net/smc/smc_close.c |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
net/smc/af_smc.c +17 -6
index b3bfd0f18d418..0e9a3b8da6a63 100644
@@ -124,7 +124,14 @@ static struct sock *smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,
 	struct smc_sock *smc;
 	struct sock *child;
 
-	smc = smc_clcsock_user_data(sk);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	smc = smc_clcsock_user_data_rcu(sk);
+	if (!smc || !refcount_inc_not_zero(&smc->sk.sk_refcnt)) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		smc = NULL;
+		goto drop;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog) + atomic_read(&smc->queued_smc_hs) >
 				sk->sk_max_ack_backlog)
@@ -146,11 +153,14 @@ static struct sock *smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,
 		if (inet_csk(child)->icsk_af_ops == inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops)
 			inet_csk(child)->icsk_af_ops = smc->ori_af_ops;
 	}
+	sock_put(&smc->sk);
 	return child;
 
 drop:
 	dst_release(dst);
 	tcp_listendrop(sk);
+	if (smc)
+		sock_put(&smc->sk);
 	return NULL;
 }
 
@@ -249,7 +259,7 @@ static void smc_fback_restore_callbacks(struct smc_sock *smc)
 	struct sock *clcsk = smc->clcsock->sk;
 
 	write_lock_bh(&clcsk->sk_callback_lock);
-	clcsk->sk_user_data = NULL;
+	rcu_assign_sk_user_data(clcsk, NULL);
 
 	smc_clcsock_restore_cb(&clcsk->sk_state_change, &smc->clcsk_state_change);
 	smc_clcsock_restore_cb(&clcsk->sk_data_ready, &smc->clcsk_data_ready);
@@ -882,7 +892,7 @@ static void smc_fback_replace_callbacks(struct smc_sock *smc)
 	struct sock *clcsk = smc->clcsock->sk;
 
 	write_lock_bh(&clcsk->sk_callback_lock);
-	clcsk->sk_user_data = (void *)((uintptr_t)smc | SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY);
+	__rcu_assign_sk_user_data_with_flags(clcsk, smc, SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY);
 
 	smc_clcsock_replace_cb(&clcsk->sk_state_change, smc_fback_state_change,
 			       &smc->clcsk_state_change);
@@ -2651,8 +2661,8 @@ static int smc_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 	 * smc-specific sk_data_ready function
 	 */
 	write_lock_bh(&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_callback_lock);
-	smc->clcsock->sk->sk_user_data =
-		(void *)((uintptr_t)smc | SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY);
+	__rcu_assign_sk_user_data_with_flags(smc->clcsock->sk, smc,
+					     SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY);
 	smc_clcsock_replace_cb(&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_data_ready,
 			       smc_clcsock_data_ready, &smc->clcsk_data_ready);
 	write_unlock_bh(&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_callback_lock);
@@ -2673,10 +2683,11 @@ static int smc_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 		write_lock_bh(&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_callback_lock);
 		smc_clcsock_restore_cb(&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_data_ready,
 				       &smc->clcsk_data_ready);
-		smc->clcsock->sk->sk_user_data = NULL;
+		rcu_assign_sk_user_data(smc->clcsock->sk, NULL);
 		write_unlock_bh(&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_callback_lock);
 		goto out;
 	}
+	sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE);
 	sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
 	sk->sk_ack_backlog = 0;
 	sk->sk_state = SMC_LISTEN;
net/smc/smc.h +5 -0
index 36699ba551887..49bf6971610df 100644
@@ -304,6 +304,11 @@ static inline struct smc_sock *smc_clcsock_user_data(const struct sock *clcsk)
 	       ((uintptr_t)clcsk->sk_user_data & ~SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY);
 }
 
+static inline struct smc_sock *smc_clcsock_user_data_rcu(const struct sock *clcsk)
+{
+	return (struct smc_sock *)rcu_dereference_sk_user_data(clcsk);
+}
+
 /* save target_cb in saved_cb, and replace target_cb with new_cb */
 static inline void smc_clcsock_replace_cb(void (**target_cb)(struct sock *),
 					  void (*new_cb)(struct sock *),
net/smc/smc_close.c +1 -1
index 10219f55aad14..bb0313ef5f7c1 100644
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ int smc_close_active(struct smc_sock *smc)
 			write_lock_bh(&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_callback_lock);
 			smc_clcsock_restore_cb(&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_data_ready,
 					       &smc->clcsk_data_ready);
-			smc->clcsock->sk->sk_user_data = NULL;
+			rcu_assign_sk_user_data(smc->clcsock->sk, NULL);
 			write_unlock_bh(&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_callback_lock);
 			rc = kernel_sock_shutdown(smc->clcsock, SHUT_RDWR);
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#530 lore raw

PATCH 527/567 net/sched: teql: Fix double-free in teql_master_xmit

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 66360460cab63c248ca5b1070a01c0c29133b960 ]

Whenever a TEQL devices has a lockless Qdisc as root, qdisc_reset should be called using the seq_lock to avoid racing with the datapath. Failure to do so may cause crashes like the following:

[  238.028993][  T318] BUG: KASAN: double-free in skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139)
[  238.029328][  T318] Free of addr ffff88810c67ec00 by task poc_teql_uaf_ke/318
[  238.029749][  T318]
[  238.029900][  T318] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 318 Comm: poc_teql_ke Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3-00149-ge5b31d988a41 #704 PREEMPT(full)
[  238.029906][  T318] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[  238.029910][  T318] Call Trace:
[  238.029913][  T318]  <TASK>
[  238.029916][  T318]  dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122)
[  238.029928][  T318]  print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
[  238.029940][  T318]  ? skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139)
[  238.029944][  T318]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
...
[  238.029957][  T318]  ? skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139)
[  238.029969][  T318]  kasan_report_invalid_free (mm/kasan/report.c:221 mm/kasan/report.c:563)
[  238.029979][  T318]  ? skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139)
[  238.029989][  T318]  check_slab_allocation (mm/kasan/common.c:231)
[  238.029995][  T318]  kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:2637 (discriminator 1) mm/slub.c:6168 (discriminator 1) mm/slub.c:6298 (discriminator 1))
[  238.030004][  T318]  skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139)
...
[  238.030025][  T318]  sk_skb_reason_drop (net/core/skbuff.c:1256)
[  238.030032][  T318]  pfifo_fast_reset (./include/linux/ptr_ring.h:171 ./include/linux/ptr_ring.h:309 ./include/linux/skb_array.h:98 net/sched/sch_generic.c:827)
[  238.030039][  T318]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
...
[  238.030054][  T318]  qdisc_reset (net/sched/sch_generic.c:1034)
[  238.030062][  T318]  teql_destroy (./include/linux/spinlock.h:395 net/sched/sch_teql.c:157)
[  238.030071][  T318]  __qdisc_destroy (./include/net/pkt_sched.h:328 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1077)
[  238.030077][  T318]  qdisc_graft (net/sched/sch_api.c:1062 net/sched/sch_api.c:1053 net/sched/sch_api.c:1159)
[  238.030089][  T318]  ? __pfx_qdisc_graft (net/sched/sch_api.c:1091)
[  238.030095][  T318]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[  238.030102][  T318]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[  238.030106][  T318]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221)
[  238.030114][  T318]  tc_get_qdisc (net/sched/sch_api.c:1529 net/sched/sch_api.c:1556)
...
[  238.072958][  T318] Allocated by task 303 on cpu 5 at 238.026275s:
[  238.073392][  T318]  kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58)
[  238.073884][  T318]  kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:64 (discriminator 5) mm/kasan/common.c:79 (discriminator 5))
[  238.074230][  T318]  __kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:369)
[  238.074578][  T318]  kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof (./include/linux/kasan.h:253 mm/slub.c:4542 mm/slub.c:4869 mm/slub.c:4921)
[  238.076091][  T318]  kmalloc_reserve (net/core/skbuff.c:616 (discriminator 107))
[  238.076450][  T318]  __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:713)
[  238.076834][  T318]  alloc_skb_with_frags (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1383 net/core/skbuff.c:6763)
[  238.077178][  T318]  sock_alloc_send_pskb (net/core/sock.c:2997)
[  238.077520][  T318]  packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:2926 net/packet/af_packet.c:3019 net/packet/af_packet.c:3108)
[  238.081469][  T318]
[  238.081870][  T318] Freed by task 299 on cpu 1 at 238.028496s:
[  238.082761][  T318]  kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58)
[  238.083481][  T318]  kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:64 (discriminator 5) mm/kasan/common.c:79 (discriminator 5))
[  238.085348][  T318]  kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:587 (discriminator 1))
[  238.085900][  T318]  __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:287)
[  238.086439][  T318]  kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:6168 (discriminator 3) mm/slub.c:6298 (discriminator 3))
[  238.087007][  T318]  skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139)
[  238.087491][  T318]  consume_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:1451)
[  238.087757][  T318]  teql_master_xmit (net/sched/sch_teql.c:358)
[  238.088116][  T318]  dev_hard_start_xmit (./include/linux/netdevice.h:5324 ./include/linux/netdevice.h:5333 net/core/dev.c:3871 net/core/dev.c:3887)
[  238.088468][  T318]  sch_direct_xmit (net/sched/sch_generic.c:347)
[  238.088820][  T318]  __qdisc_run (net/sched/sch_generic.c:420 (discriminator 1))
[  238.089166][  T318]  __dev_queue_xmit (./include/net/sch_generic.h:229 ./include/net/pkt_sched.h:121 ./include/net/pkt_sched.h:117 net/core/dev.c:4196 net/core/dev.c:4802)

Workflow to reproduce:
1. Initialize a TEQL topology (dummy0 and ifb0 as slaves, teql0 up).
2. Start multiple sender workers continuously transmitting packets through teql0 to drive teql_master_xmit().
3. In parallel, repeatedly delete and re-add the root qdisc on dummy0 and ifb0 via RTNETLINK, forcing frequent teardown and reset activity (teql_destroy() / qdisc_reset()).
4. After running both workloads concurrently for several iterations, KASAN reports slab-use-after-free or double-free in the skb free path.

Fix this by moving dev_reset_queue to sch_generic.h and calling it, instead of qdisc_reset, in teql_destroy since it handles both the lock and lockless cases correctly for root qdiscs.

---
 include/net/sch_generic.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/sched/sch_generic.c   | 27 ---------------------------
 net/sched/sch_teql.c      |  7 ++-----
 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
include/net/sch_generic.h +28 -0
index 232b7b22e993a..15f4a0548d824 100644
@@ -694,6 +694,34 @@ void qdisc_destroy(struct Qdisc *qdisc);
 void qdisc_put(struct Qdisc *qdisc);
 void qdisc_put_unlocked(struct Qdisc *qdisc);
 void qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog(struct Qdisc *qdisc, int n, int len);
+
+static inline void dev_reset_queue(struct net_device *dev,
+				   struct netdev_queue *dev_queue,
+				   void *_unused)
+{
+	struct Qdisc *qdisc;
+	bool nolock;
+
+	qdisc = rtnl_dereference(dev_queue->qdisc_sleeping);
+	if (!qdisc)
+		return;
+
+	nolock = qdisc->flags & TCQ_F_NOLOCK;
+
+	if (nolock)
+		spin_lock_bh(&qdisc->seqlock);
+	spin_lock_bh(qdisc_lock(qdisc));
+
+	qdisc_reset(qdisc);
+
+	spin_unlock_bh(qdisc_lock(qdisc));
+	if (nolock) {
+		clear_bit(__QDISC_STATE_MISSED, &qdisc->state);
+		clear_bit(__QDISC_STATE_DRAINING, &qdisc->state);
+		spin_unlock_bh(&qdisc->seqlock);
+	}
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_NET_SCHED
 int qdisc_offload_dump_helper(struct Qdisc *q, enum tc_setup_type type,
 			      void *type_data);
net/sched/sch_generic.c +0 -27
index c1c67da2d3fc4..714e51f8d46e9 100644
@@ -1290,33 +1290,6 @@ static void dev_deactivate_queue(struct net_device *dev,
 	}
 }
 
-static void dev_reset_queue(struct net_device *dev,
-			    struct netdev_queue *dev_queue,
-			    void *_unused)
-{
-	struct Qdisc *qdisc;
-	bool nolock;
-
-	qdisc = rtnl_dereference(dev_queue->qdisc_sleeping);
-	if (!qdisc)
-		return;
-
-	nolock = qdisc->flags & TCQ_F_NOLOCK;
-
-	if (nolock)
-		spin_lock_bh(&qdisc->seqlock);
-	spin_lock_bh(qdisc_lock(qdisc));
-
-	qdisc_reset(qdisc);
-
-	spin_unlock_bh(qdisc_lock(qdisc));
-	if (nolock) {
-		clear_bit(__QDISC_STATE_MISSED, &qdisc->state);
-		clear_bit(__QDISC_STATE_DRAINING, &qdisc->state);
-		spin_unlock_bh(&qdisc->seqlock);
-	}
-}
-
 static bool some_qdisc_is_busy(struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
net/sched/sch_teql.c +2 -5
index c89cb6eba27da..efcca26966213 100644
@@ -146,15 +146,12 @@ teql_destroy(struct Qdisc *sch)
 					master->slaves = NEXT_SLAVE(q);
 					if (q == master->slaves) {
 						struct netdev_queue *txq;
-						spinlock_t *root_lock;
 
 						txq = netdev_get_tx_queue(master->dev, 0);
 						master->slaves = NULL;
 
-						root_lock = qdisc_root_sleeping_lock(rtnl_dereference(txq->qdisc));
-						spin_lock_bh(root_lock);
-						qdisc_reset(rtnl_dereference(txq->qdisc));
-						spin_unlock_bh(root_lock);
+						dev_reset_queue(master->dev,
+								txq, NULL);
 					}
 				}
 				skb_queue_purge(&dat->q);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#531 lore raw

PATCH 528/567 net: usb: cdc_ncm: add ndpoffset to NDP16 nframes bounds check

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tobi Gaertner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2aa8a4fa8d5b7d0e1ebcec100e1a4d80a1f4b21a ]

cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16() validates that the NDP header and its DPE entries fit within the skb. The first check correctly accounts for ndpoffset:

if ((ndpoffset + sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16)) > skb_in->len)

but the second check omits it:

if ((sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16) +

       ret * (sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16))) > skb_in->len)

This validates the DPE array size against the total skb length as if the NDP were at offset 0, rather than at ndpoffset. When the NDP is placed near the end of the NTB (large wNdpIndex), the DPE entries can extend past the skb data buffer even though the check passes. cdc_ncm_rx_fixup() then reads out-of-bounds memory when iterating the DPE array.

Add ndpoffset to the nframes bounds check and use struct_size_t() to express the NDP-plus-DPE-array size more clearly.

Fixes ff06ab13a4cc ("net: cdc_ncm: splitting rx_fixup for code reuse")
---
 drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c +3 -2
index 22554daaf6ff1..ae7a2829fe49d 100644
@@ -1656,6 +1656,7 @@ int cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int ndpoffset)
 	struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(skb_in->dev);
 	struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 *ndp16;
 	int ret = -EINVAL;
+	size_t ndp_len;
 
 	if ((ndpoffset + sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16)) > skb_in->len) {
 		netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "invalid NDP offset  <%u>\n",
@@ -1675,8 +1676,8 @@ int cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int ndpoffset)
 					sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16));
 	ret--; /* we process NDP entries except for the last one */
 
-	if ((sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16) +
-	     ret * (sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16))) > skb_in->len) {
+	ndp_len = struct_size_t(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16, dpe16, ret);
+	if (ndpoffset + ndp_len > skb_in->len) {
 		netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "Invalid nframes = %d\n", ret);
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#532 lore raw

PATCH 529/567 net: usb: cdc_ncm: add ndpoffset to NDP32 nframes bounds check

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tobi Gaertner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 77914255155e68a20aa41175edeecf8121dac391 ]

The same bounds-check bug fixed for NDP16 in the previous patch also exists in cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp32(). The DPE array size is validated against the total skb length without accounting for ndpoffset, allowing out-of-bounds reads when the NDP32 is placed near the end of the NTB.

Add ndpoffset to the nframes bounds check and use struct_size_t() to express the NDP-plus-DPE-array size more clearly.

Compile-tested only.

Fixes 0fa81b304a79 ("cdc_ncm: Implement the 32-bit version of NCM Transfer Block")
---
 drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c +3 -2
index ae7a2829fe49d..56dfd4cd2aa4f 100644
@@ -1693,6 +1693,7 @@ int cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp32(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int ndpoffset)
 	struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(skb_in->dev);
 	struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp32 *ndp32;
 	int ret = -EINVAL;
+	size_t ndp_len;
 
 	if ((ndpoffset + sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp32)) > skb_in->len) {
 		netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "invalid NDP offset  <%u>\n",
@@ -1712,8 +1713,8 @@ int cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp32(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int ndpoffset)
 					sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe32));
 	ret--; /* we process NDP entries except for the last one */
 
-	if ((sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp32) +
-	     ret * (sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe32))) > skb_in->len) {
+	ndp_len = struct_size_t(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp32, dpe32, ret);
+	if (ndpoffset + ndp_len > skb_in->len) {
 		netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "Invalid nframes = %d\n", ret);
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#533 lore raw

PATCH 530/567 clsact: Fix use-after-free in init/destroy rollback asymmetry

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a0671125d4f55e1e98d9bde8a0b671941987e208 ]

Fix a use-after-free in the clsact qdisc upon init/destroy rollback asymmetry. The latter is achieved by first fully initializing a clsact instance, and then in a second step having a replacement failure for the new clsact qdisc instance. clsact_init() initializes ingress first and then takes care of the egress part. This can fail midway, for example, via tcf_block_get_ext(). Upon failure, the kernel will trigger the clsact_destroy() callback.

Commit 1cb6f0bae504 ("bpf: Fix too early release of tcx_entry") details the way how the transition is happening. If tcf_block_get_ext on the q->ingress_block ends up failing, we took the tcx_miniq_inc reference count on the ingress side, but not yet on the egress side. clsact_destroy() tests whether the {ingress,egress}_entry was non-NULL. However, even in midway failure on the replacement, both are in fact non-NULL with a valid egress_entry from the previous clsact instance.

What we really need to test for is whether the qdisc instance-specific ingress or egress side previously got initialized. This adds a small helper for checking the miniq initialization called mini_qdisc_pair_inited, and utilizes that upon clsact_destroy() in order to fix the use-after-free scenario. Convert the ingress_destroy() side as well so both are consistent to each other.

---
 include/net/sch_generic.h |  5 +++++
 net/sched/sch_ingress.c   | 14 ++++++++------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/net/sch_generic.h +5 -0
index 15f4a0548d824..385af747b0b4e 100644
@@ -1365,6 +1365,11 @@ void mini_qdisc_pair_init(struct mini_Qdisc_pair *miniqp, struct Qdisc *qdisc,
 void mini_qdisc_pair_block_init(struct mini_Qdisc_pair *miniqp,
 				struct tcf_block *block);
 
+static inline bool mini_qdisc_pair_inited(struct mini_Qdisc_pair *miniqp)
+{
+	return !!miniqp->p_miniq;
+}
+
 void mq_change_real_num_tx(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned int new_real_tx);
 
 int sch_frag_xmit_hook(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*xmit)(struct sk_buff *skb));
net/sched/sch_ingress.c +8 -6
index 8dde3548dc11c..70d668cb0db81 100644
@@ -113,14 +113,15 @@ static void ingress_destroy(struct Qdisc *sch)
 {
 	struct ingress_sched_data *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
 	struct net_device *dev = qdisc_dev(sch);
-	struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry = rtnl_dereference(dev->tcx_ingress);
+	struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry;
 
 	if (sch->parent != TC_H_INGRESS)
 		return;
 
 	tcf_block_put_ext(q->block, sch, &q->block_info);
 
-	if (entry) {
+	if (mini_qdisc_pair_inited(&q->miniqp)) {
+		entry = rtnl_dereference(dev->tcx_ingress);
 		tcx_miniq_dec(entry);
 		if (!tcx_entry_is_active(entry)) {
 			tcx_entry_update(dev, NULL, true);
@@ -289,10 +290,9 @@ static int clsact_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
 
 static void clsact_destroy(struct Qdisc *sch)
 {
+	struct bpf_mprog_entry *ingress_entry, *egress_entry;
 	struct clsact_sched_data *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
 	struct net_device *dev = qdisc_dev(sch);
-	struct bpf_mprog_entry *ingress_entry = rtnl_dereference(dev->tcx_ingress);
-	struct bpf_mprog_entry *egress_entry = rtnl_dereference(dev->tcx_egress);
 
 	if (sch->parent != TC_H_CLSACT)
 		return;
@@ -300,7 +300,8 @@ static void clsact_destroy(struct Qdisc *sch)
 	tcf_block_put_ext(q->ingress_block, sch, &q->ingress_block_info);
 	tcf_block_put_ext(q->egress_block, sch, &q->egress_block_info);
 
-	if (ingress_entry) {
+	if (mini_qdisc_pair_inited(&q->miniqp_ingress)) {
+		ingress_entry = rtnl_dereference(dev->tcx_ingress);
 		tcx_miniq_dec(ingress_entry);
 		if (!tcx_entry_is_active(ingress_entry)) {
 			tcx_entry_update(dev, NULL, true);
@@ -308,7 +309,8 @@ static void clsact_destroy(struct Qdisc *sch)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (egress_entry) {
+	if (mini_qdisc_pair_inited(&q->miniqp_egress)) {
+		egress_entry = rtnl_dereference(dev->tcx_egress);
 		tcx_miniq_dec(egress_entry);
 		if (!tcx_entry_is_active(egress_entry)) {
 			tcx_entry_update(dev, NULL, false);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
author maintainer
#534 lore raw

PATCH 531/567 net: usb: aqc111: Do not perform PM inside suspend callback

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nikola Z. Ivanov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 069c8f5aebe4d5224cf62acc7d4b3486091c658a ]

syzbot reports "task hung in rpm_resume"

This is caused by aqc111_suspend calling
the PM variant of its write_cmd routine.

The simplified call trace looks like this:

rpm_suspend()
usb_suspend_both() - here udev->dev.power.runtime_status == RPM_SUSPENDING
aqc111_suspend() - called for the usb device interface
aqc111_write32_cmd()
usb_autopm_get_interface()
pm_runtime_resume_and_get()
rpm_resume() - here we call rpm_resume() on our parent
rpm_resume() - Here we wait for a status change that will never happen.

At this point we block another task which holds rtnl_lock and locks up the whole networking stack.

Fix this by replacing the write_cmd calls with their _nopm variants

---
 drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c +6 -6
index 3ebb1f84d3025..f1820c0d4830f 100644
@@ -1400,14 +1400,14 @@ static int aqc111_suspend(struct usb_interface *intf, pm_message_t message)
 		aqc111_write16_cmd_nopm(dev, AQ_ACCESS_MAC,
 					SFR_MEDIUM_STATUS_MODE, 2, &reg16);
 
-		aqc111_write_cmd(dev, AQ_WOL_CFG, 0, 0,
-				 WOL_CFG_SIZE, &wol_cfg);
-		aqc111_write32_cmd(dev, AQ_PHY_OPS, 0, 0,
-				   &aqc111_data->phy_cfg);
+		aqc111_write_cmd_nopm(dev, AQ_WOL_CFG, 0, 0,
+				      WOL_CFG_SIZE, &wol_cfg);
+		aqc111_write32_cmd_nopm(dev, AQ_PHY_OPS, 0, 0,
+					&aqc111_data->phy_cfg);
 	} else {
 		aqc111_data->phy_cfg |= AQ_LOW_POWER;
-		aqc111_write32_cmd(dev, AQ_PHY_OPS, 0, 0,
-				   &aqc111_data->phy_cfg);
+		aqc111_write32_cmd_nopm(dev, AQ_PHY_OPS, 0, 0,
+					&aqc111_data->phy_cfg);
 
 		/* Disable RX path */
 		aqc111_read16_cmd_nopm(dev, AQ_ACCESS_MAC,
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0