Skip to contentSkip to conversation

6.12.86-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 11 participants 226 messages May 4 – May 7 Page 1 of 2

Subsystems (4)
lore
Share & tools
lore

Greg Kroah-Hartman

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover 6.12.86-rc1 review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.86 release. There are 215 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 06 May 2026 13:50:52 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.12.86-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.12.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 6.12.86-rc1

Kai Ma <[email protected]>
netfilter: reject zero shift in nft_bitwise

Andrea Mayer <[email protected]>
net: ipv6: fix NOREF dst use in seg6 and rpl lwtunnels

Deepanshu Kartikey <[email protected]>
ALSA: caiaq: fix usb_dev refcount leak on probe failure

Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
drm/amdgpu: fix zero-size GDS range init on RDNA4

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
ipv6: rpl: reserve mac_len headroom when recompressed SRH grows

David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix rxrpc_input_call_event() to only unshare DATA packets

Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: caiaq: Don't abort when no input device is available

Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: caiaq: Fix potentially leftover ep1_in_urb at error path

Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
driver core: Add kernel-doc for DEV_FLAG_COUNT enum value

Xiang Mei <[email protected]>
net: bonding: fix use-after-free in bond_xmit_broadcast()

Yucheng Lu <[email protected]>
crypto: authencesn - reject short ahash digests during instance creation

Anthony Yznaga <[email protected]>
mm: prevent droppable mappings from being locked

Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
spi: fix resource leaks on device setup failure

Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
net: qrtr: ns: Limit the total number of nodes

Yuan Zhaoming <[email protected]>
net: mctp: fix don't require received header reserved bits to be zero

Zhengchuan Liang <[email protected]>
net: bridge: use a stable FDB dst snapshot in RCU readers

Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
net: qrtr: ns: Limit the maximum number of lookups

Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
net: qrtr: ns: Limit the maximum server registration per node

David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix potential UAF after skb_unshare() failure

Antoniu Miclaus <[email protected]>
iio: frequency: admv1013: fix NULL pointer dereference on str

Antoniu Miclaus <[email protected]>
iio: frequency: admv1013: add dev variable

Naman Jain <[email protected]>
block: relax pgmap check in bio_add_page for compatible zone device pages

Long Li <[email protected]>
RDMA/mana_ib: Disable RX steering on RSS QP destroy

Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
media: rc: igorplugusb: heed coherency rules

Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
ALSA: aoa: Skip devices with no codecs in i2sbus_resume()

Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
media: rc: ttusbir: respect DMA coherency rules

Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>
mm/zsmalloc: copy KMSAN metadata in zs_page_migrate()

Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: aoa: i2sbus: clear stale prepared state

Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: aoa: Use guard() for mutex locks

Usama Arif <[email protected]>
mm: migrate: requeue destination folio on deferred split queue

David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
mm/migrate: move movable_ops page handling out of move_to_new_folio()

David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
mm/migrate: factor out movable_ops page handling into migrate_movable_ops_page()

Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>
wifi: mwifiex: fix use-after-free in mwifiex_adapter_cleanup()

Sean Wang <[email protected]>
wifi: mt76: mt792x: fix mt7925u USB WFSYS reset handling

Sean Wang <[email protected]>
wifi: mt76: mt792x: describe USB WFSYS reset with a descriptor

Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
thermal: core: Fix thermal zone governor cleanup issues

DaeMyung Kang <[email protected]>
ksmbd: reset rcount per connection in ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id()

Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
ksmbd: replace connection list with hash table

Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
ksmbd: use msleep instaed of schedule_timeout_interruptible()

Chao Yu <[email protected]>

    f2fs: fix to do sanity check on dcc->discard_cmd_cnt conditionally

Alistair Popple <[email protected]>
lib: test_hmm: evict device pages on file close to avoid use-after-free

Yongpeng Yang <[email protected]>

    f2fs: fix UAF caused by decrementing sbi->nr_pages[] in f2fs_write_end_io()

Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl

Andrea Mayer <[email protected]>
seg6: fix seg6 lwtunnel output redirect for L2 reduced encap mode

Yang Xiuwei <[email protected]>
scsi: sd: fix missing put_disk() when device_add(&disk_dev) fails

Keenan Dong <[email protected]>
rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()

Tobias Gaertner <[email protected]>
ntfs3: fix integer overflow in run_unpack() volume boundary check

Tobias Gaertner <[email protected]>
ntfs3: add buffer boundary checks to run_unpack()

Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
ktest: Fix the month in the name of the failure directory

Chen Zhao <[email protected]>
IB/core: Fix zero dmac race in neighbor resolution

Max Kellermann <[email protected]>
ceph: only d_add() negative dentries when they are unhashed

Junrui Luo <[email protected]>
dm mirror: fix integer overflow in create_dirty_log()

Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
crypto: nx - Fix packed layout in struct nx842_crypto_header

Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix uninitialized data access on OTP read error

Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix potential UAF and memory leak in remove path

Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix error codes in OTP reads

Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: atmel-tdes - fix DMA sync direction

Haoxiang Li <[email protected]>
crypto: ccree - fix a memory leak in cc_mac_digest()

Thomas Fourier <[email protected]>
crypto: hisilicon - Fix dma_unmap_single() direction

Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: atmel-ecc - Release client on allocation failure

Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: atmel-aes - Fix 3-page memory leak in atmel_aes_buff_cleanup

Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: arm64/aes - Fix 32-bit aes_mac_update() arg treated as 64-bit

Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
can: ucan: fix devres lifetime

Qiang Yu <[email protected]>
bus: mhi: host: pci_generic: Switch to async power up to avoid boot delays

Shuvam Pandey <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: hci_event: fix potential UAF in SSP passkey handlers

Cengiz Can <[email protected]>
apparmor: use target task's context in apparmor_getprocattr()

Brian Mak <[email protected]>
mfd: core: Preserve OF node when ACPI handle is present

Yiyang Chen <[email protected]>
taskstats: set version in TGID exit notifications

Zhenzhong Wu <[email protected]>
tcp: call sk_data_ready() after listener migration

Yi Cong <[email protected]>
wifi: rtl8xxxu: fix potential use of uninitialized value

Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
x86/cpu: Disable FRED when PTI is forced on

Chia-Ming Chang <[email protected]>
inotify: fix watch count leak when fsnotify_add_inode_mark_locked() fails

Aditya Garg <[email protected]>
HID: apple: ensure the keyboard backlight is off if suspending

Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
check-uapi: link into shared objects

Junrui Luo <[email protected]>
md/raid5: validate payload size before accessing journal metadata

Chia-Ming Chang <[email protected]>
md/raid5: fix soft lockup in retry_aligned_read()

David (Ming Qiang) Wu <[email protected]>
amdgpu/jpeg: fix deepsleep register for jpeg 5_0_0 and 5_0_2

Sanjaikumar V S <[email protected]>
mtd: spi-nor: sst: Fix write enable before AAI sequence

Sohei Koyama <[email protected]>
ext4: fix missing brelse() in ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all()

Deepanshu Kartikey <[email protected]>
ext4: fix bounds check in check_xattrs() to prevent out-of-bounds access

Rong Bao <[email protected]>
perf annotate: Use jump__delete when freeing LoongArch jumps

Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
io_uring/poll: fix multishot recv missing EOF on wakeup race

Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Always intercept VMMCALL when L2 is active

Kevin Cheng <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Raise #UD if unhandled VMMCALL isn't intercepted by L1

Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Add missing consistency check for nCR3 validity

Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Add missing consistency check for EFER, CR0, CR4, and CS

Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>

    KVM: nSVM: Clear tracking of L1->L2 NMI and soft IRQ on nested #VMEXIT

Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Clear EVENTINJ fields in vmcb12 on nested #VMEXIT

Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Clear GIF on nested #VMEXIT(INVALID)

Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Always inject a #GP if mapping VMCB12 fails on nested VMRUN

Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>

    KVM: nSVM: Use vcpu->arch.cr2 when updating vmcb12 on nested #VMEXIT

Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Ensure AVIC is inhibited when restoring a vCPU to guest mode

Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: SVM: Explicitly mark vmcb01 dirty after modifying VMCB intercepts

Kevin Cheng <[email protected]>
KVM: SVM: Inject #UD for INVLPGA if EFER.SVME=0

Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Sync interrupt shadow to cached vmcb12 after VMRUN of L2

Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Sync NextRIP to cached vmcb12 after VMRUN of L2

Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Mark all of vmcb02 dirty when restoring nested state

Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: x86: Defer non-architectural deliver of exception payload to userspace read

Denis M. Karpov <[email protected]>
userfaultfd: allow registration of ranges below mmap_min_addr

SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
mm/damon/core: use time_in_range_open() for damos quota window start

Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
rtc: ntxec: fix OF node reference imbalance

Jacqueline Wong <[email protected]>
tpm: tpm_tis: stop transmit if retries are exhausted

Jacqueline Wong <[email protected]>
tpm: tpm_tis: add error logging for data transfer

Gunnar Kudrjavets <[email protected]>
tpm: Use kfree_sensitive() to free auth session in tpm_dev_release()

Gunnar Kudrjavets <[email protected]>
tpm: Fix auth session leak in tpm2_get_random() error path

Viorel Suman (OSS) <[email protected]>
pwm: imx-tpm: Count the number of enabled channels in probe

Paul Louvel <[email protected]>
crypto: talitos - rename first/last to first_desc/last_desc

Paul Louvel <[email protected]>
crypto: talitos - fix SEC1 32k ahash request limitation

Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>
firmware: google: framebuffer: Do not unregister platform device

Haoxiang Li <[email protected]>
xfs: fix a resource leak in xfs_alloc_buftarg()

Francesco Dolcini <[email protected]>
arm64: dts: ti: am62-verdin: Enable pullup for eMMC data pins

Shawn Lin <[email protected]>
mmc: sdhci-of-dwcmshc: Disable clock before DLL configuration

Bin Liu <[email protected]>
mmc: block: use single block write in retry

Ryan Roberts <[email protected]>
randomize_kstack: Maintain kstack_offset per task

Sanman Pradhan <[email protected]>

    hwmon: (pt5161l) Fix bugs in pt5161l_read_block_data()

Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
power: supply: axp288_charger: Do not cancel work before initializing it

Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
LoongArch: Show CPU vulnerabilites correctly

Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
tpm: avoid -Wunused-but-set-variable

Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
extract-cert: Wrap key_pass with '#ifdef USE_PKCS11_ENGINE'

Raphael Zimmer <[email protected]>
libceph: Prevent potential null-ptr-deref in ceph_handle_auth_reply()

Ruide Cao <[email protected]>
ipv4: icmp: validate reply type before using icmp_pointers

hkbinbin <[email protected]>
RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv

Luca Ceresoli <[email protected]>
drm/arcpgu: fix device node leak

Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
net: ks8851: Avoid excess softirq scheduling

Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
netconsole: avoid out-of-bounds access on empty string in trim_newline()

Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
net: ks8851: Reinstate disabling of BHs around IRQ handler

Ruijie Li <[email protected]>
net/smc: avoid early lgr access in smc_clc_wait_msg

Jiawen Wu <[email protected]>
net: txgbe: fix firmware version check

Ao Zhou <[email protected]>
net: rds: fix MR cleanup on copy error

Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
net: qrtr: ns: Free the node during ctrl_cmd_bye()

Robert Marko <[email protected]>
arm64: dts: marvell: uDPU: add ethernet aliases

Yiyang Chen <[email protected]>
tools/accounting: handle truncated taskstats netlink messages

David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix re-decryption of RESPONSE packets

David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix rxkad crypto unalignment handling

David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix memory leaks in rxkad_verify_response()

Jonathan Santos <[email protected]>
iio: adc: ad7768-1: fix one-shot mode data acquisition

Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: pcmtest: Fix resource leaks in module init error paths

Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>
ALSA: pcmtest: fix reference leak on failed device registration

Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: 6fire: Fix input volume change detection

Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: caiaq: Handle probe errors properly

Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: caiaq: Fix control_put() result and cache rollback

Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: core: Fix potential data race at fasync handling

Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
io_uring/poll: ensure EPOLL_ONESHOT is propagated for EPOLL_URING_WAKE

Longxuan Yu <[email protected]>
io_uring/poll: fix signed comparison in io_poll_get_ownership()

David Lechner <[email protected]>
iio: adc: ti-ads7950: use iio_push_to_buffers_with_ts_unaligned()

Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
io_uring/timeout: check unused sqe fields

Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
block: fix zone write plugs refcount handling in disk_zone_wplug_schedule_bio_work()

Dawei Feng <[email protected]>
rbd: fix null-ptr-deref when device_add_disk() fails

Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
selftests/landlock: Fix format warning for __u64 in net_test

Simon Liebold <[email protected]>
selftests/mqueue: Fix incorrectly named file

Joseph Salisbury <[email protected]>
sched: Use u64 for bandwidth ratio calculations

Ben Levinsky <[email protected]>
remoteproc: xlnx: Only access buffer information if IPI is buffered

Helge Deller <[email protected]>
parisc: _llseek syscall is only available for 32-bit userspace

Robert Beckett <[email protected]>
nvme: respect NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES when wzsl is set

Robert Beckett <[email protected]>
nvme-pci: add NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES for Kingston OM3SGP4

James Kim <[email protected]>
mtd: docg3: fix use-after-free in docg3_release()

Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
mfd: stpmic1: Attempt system shutdown twice in case PMIC is confused

Josh Hunt <[email protected]>
md/raid10: fix deadlock with check operation and nowait requests

Zhang Yi <[email protected]>
jbd2: fix deadlock in jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke()

Gao Xiang <[email protected]>
erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents

Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: seq_oss: return full count for successful SEQ_FULLSIZE writes

Harin Lee <[email protected]>
ALSA: ctxfi: Add fallback to default RSR for S/PDIF

Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: aoa: i2sbus: fix OF node lifetime handling

Vasiliy Kovalev <[email protected]>
ext2: reject inodes with zero i_nlink and valid mode in ext2_iget()

Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
net: qrtr: ns: Fix use-after-free in driver remove()

Chen Ni <[email protected]>
media: i2c: imx219: Check return value of devm_gpiod_get_optional() in imx219_probe()

Josh Law <[email protected]>
lib/ts_kmp: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation

Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>
PCI: epf-mhi: Return 0, not remaining timeout, when eDMA ops complete

Rong Zhang <[email protected]>
Revert "ALSA: usb: Increase volume range that triggers a warning"

Koichiro Den <[email protected]>
PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-ntb: Remove duplicate resource teardown

Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix OTP sysfs read and error handling

Fan Wu <[email protected]>
media: mtk-jpeg: fix use-after-free in release path due to uncancelled work

Luxiao Xu <[email protected]>
net: strparser: fix skb_head leak in strp_abort_strp()

Zhengchuan Liang <[email protected]>
net: caif: clear client service pointer on teardown

Ziqing Chen <[email protected]>
ALSA: control: Validate buf_len before strnlen() in snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names()

Ming Qian <[email protected]>
media: amphion: Fix race between m2m job_abort and device_run

Sanman Pradhan <[email protected]>
hwmon: (powerz) Fix missing usb_kill_urb() on signal interrupt

Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
of: unittest: fix use-after-free in testdrv_probe()

Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
of: unittest: fix use-after-free in of_unittest_changeset()

Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
crypto: pcrypt - Fix handling of MAY_BACKLOG requests

Jinjiang Tu <[email protected]>
mm/memory_hotplug: fix hwpoisoned large folio handling in do_migrate_range()

Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
spi: ch341: fix memory leaks on probe failures

Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
spi: imx: fix use-after-free on unbind

Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
um: drivers: call kernel_strrchr() explicitly in cow_user.c

Prasanna Kumar T S M <[email protected]>
vfio/cdx: Fix NULL pointer dereference in interrupt trigger path

Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
vfio/cdx: Serialize VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS with a per-device mutex

Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>
wifi: rtw88: check for PCI upstream bridge existence

Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
zram: do not forget to endio for partial discard requests

Heming Zhao <[email protected]>
ocfs2: split transactions in dio completion to avoid credit exhaustion

Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
device property: Make modifications of fwnode "flags" thread safe

Jesse.Zhang <[email protected]>
drm/amdgpu: Limit BO list entry count to prevent resource exhaustion

Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>
drm/amdgpu: Use vmemdup_array_user in amdgpu_bo_create_list_entry_array

Miguel Ojeda <[email protected]>
rust: init: fix clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks warnings

Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
padata: Remove comment for reorder_work

Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
padata: Fix pd UAF once and for all

Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>
arm64/mm: Enable batched TLB flush in unmap_hotplug_range()

Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>
firmware: google: framebuffer: Do not mark framebuffer as busy

Miguel Ojeda <[email protected]>
kbuild: rust: allow clippy::uninlined_format_args

David Carlier <[email protected]>
drm/nouveau: fix nvkm_device leak on aperture removal failure

Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
driver core: Don't let a device probe until it's ready

Tyllis Xu <[email protected]>
ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message()

Tyllis Xu <[email protected]>
ibmasm: fix OOB reads in command_file_write due to missing size checks

Tyllis Xu <[email protected]>
misc: ibmasm: fix OOB MMIO read in ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt()

Weigang He <[email protected]>
greybus: gb-beagleplay: fix sleep in atomic context in hdlc_tx_frames()

Pengpeng Hou <[email protected]>
greybus: gb-beagleplay: bound bootloader receive buffering

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
leds: qcom-lpg: Check for array overflow when selecting the high resolution

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
drm/nouveau: fix u32 overflow in pushbuf reloc bounds check

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
LoongArch: Add spectre boundry for syscall dispatch table

Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: usb-audio: Evaluate packsize caps at the right place

Xu Yang <[email protected]>
usb: chipidea: core: allow ci_irq_handler() handle both ID and VBUS change

Xu Yang <[email protected]>
usb: chipidea: otg: not wait vbus drop if use role_switch

Michal Pecio <[email protected]>
usb: xhci: Make usb_host_endpoint.hcpriv survive endpoint_disable()

Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix Audio Advantage Micro II SPDIF switch

Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: usb-audio: Avoid false E-MU sample-rate notifications

Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: usb-audio: stop parsing UAC2 rates at MAX_NR_RATES

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                           |   5 +-
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-3720-uDPU.dtsi  |   5 +
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/ti/k3-am62-verdin.dtsi         |  20 +-
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S                      |   4 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c                                |  36 ++-
 arch/loongarch/kernel/cpu-probe.c                  |   7 +
 arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c                    |   3 +-
 arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl            |   2 +-
 arch/um/drivers/cow_user.c                         |   8 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h                              |   8 -
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.h                          |   9 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c                          |  55 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c                             |  32 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h                             |   1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                                 |  62 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                                  |   5 +
 block/bio-integrity.c                              |   2 +
 block/bio.c                                        |  14 +-
 block/blk-zoned.c                                  |  12 +-
 block/blk.h                                        |  19 ++
 certs/extract-cert.c                               |   6 +-
 crypto/authencesn.c                                |   5 +
 crypto/pcrypt.c                                    |   7 +-
 drivers/base/core.c                                |  39 ++-
 drivers/base/dd.c                                  |  20 ++
 drivers/block/rbd.c                                |   6 +-
 drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c                      |   3 +-
 drivers/bus/imx-weim.c                             |   2 +-
 drivers/bus/mhi/host/pci_generic.c                 |   2 +-
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c                        |   2 +-
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c                        |   6 +-
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c                    |  11 +-
 drivers/crypto/atmel-aes.c                         |   2 +-
 drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c                         |   1 +
 drivers/crypto/atmel-i2c.c                         |   4 +-
 drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c                     |  37 ++-
 drivers/crypto/atmel-tdes.c                        |   8 +-
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c                     |   1 +
 drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec/sec_algs.c            |   2 +-
 drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842.h                         |   4 +-
 drivers/crypto/talitos.c                           | 340 +++++++++++++--------
 drivers/firmware/google/framebuffer-coreboot.c     |  12 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_bo_list.c        |  43 ++-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c            |   3 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v4_0_3.c           |  52 +++-
 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_drm.c              |   2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c              |   2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/arcpgu.c                      |   3 +-
 drivers/greybus/gb-beagleplay.c                    | 112 ++++++-
 drivers/hid/hid-apple.c                            |   2 +
 drivers/hwmon/powerz.c                             |  11 +-
 drivers/hwmon/pt5161l.c                            |   4 +-
 drivers/i2c/i2c-core-of.c                          |   2 +-
 drivers/iio/adc/ad7768-1.c                         |   9 +-
 drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads7950.c                       |  11 +-
 drivers/iio/frequency/admv1013.c                   |  90 +++---
 drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c                     |   3 +
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mana/qp.c                    |  15 +
 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c               |   3 +-
 drivers/leds/rgb/leds-qcom-lpg.c                   |   7 +-
 drivers/md/dm-raid1.c                              |   6 +-
 drivers/md/raid10.c                                |   4 +-
 drivers/md/raid5-cache.c                           |  48 ++-
 drivers/md/raid5.c                                 |   8 +-
 drivers/media/i2c/imx219.c                         |   3 +
 drivers/media/platform/amphion/vpu_v4l2.c          |   9 +-
 .../media/platform/mediatek/jpeg/mtk_jpeg_core.c   |   1 +
 drivers/media/rc/igorplugusb.c                     |  16 +-
 drivers/media/rc/ttusbir.c                         |  13 +-
 drivers/mfd/mfd-core.c                             |  12 +-
 drivers/mfd/stpmic1.c                              |  20 +-
 drivers/misc/ibmasm/ibmasmfs.c                     |   7 +
 drivers/misc/ibmasm/lowlevel.c                     |  12 +-
 drivers/misc/ibmasm/remote.c                       |   5 +
 drivers/mmc/core/block.c                           |  12 +-
 drivers/mmc/core/queue.h                           |   3 +
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-dwcmshc.c                |  19 +-
 drivers/mtd/devices/docg3.c                        |   3 +-
 drivers/mtd/spi-nor/sst.c                          |  13 +
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c                    |  12 +-
 drivers/net/can/usb/ucan.c                         |   2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h               |   6 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c        |  69 ++---
 drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c           |  15 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c           |  11 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_en.c      |  11 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/wangxun/txgbe/txgbe_main.c    |   3 +-
 drivers/net/netconsole.c                           |   2 +
 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c                         |   4 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/init.c        |   2 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt792x_regs.h   |   4 +
 drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt792x_usb.c    |  51 +++-
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/core.c       |  28 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c           |   3 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c                           |   2 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c                            |   2 +
 drivers/of/base.c                                  |   2 +-
 drivers/of/dynamic.c                               |   2 +-
 drivers/of/platform.c                              |   2 +-
 drivers/of/unittest.c                              |   4 +-
 drivers/pci/endpoint/functions/pci-epf-mhi.c       |   4 +
 drivers/pci/endpoint/functions/pci-epf-ntb.c       |  56 +---
 drivers/power/supply/axp288_charger.c              |  19 +-
 drivers/pwm/pwm-imx-tpm.c                          |   9 +-
 drivers/remoteproc/xlnx_r5_remoteproc.c            |  20 +-
 drivers/rtc/rtc-ntxec.c                            |   2 +-
 drivers/scsi/sd.c                                  |   1 +
 drivers/spi/spi-ch341.c                            |  36 ++-
 drivers/spi/spi-imx.c                              |   4 +
 drivers/spi/spi.c                                  |  63 ++--
 drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c                     |   7 +-
 drivers/usb/chipidea/core.c                        |  45 +--
 drivers/usb/chipidea/otg.c                         |   7 +-
 drivers/usb/host/xhci.c                            |   1 -
 drivers/vfio/cdx/intr.c                            |  13 +-
 drivers/vfio/cdx/main.c                            |  19 ++
 drivers/vfio/cdx/private.h                         |   3 +
 fs/ceph/dir.c                                      |   6 +-
 fs/erofs/dir.c                                     |  28 +-
 fs/ext2/inode.c                                    |  14 +-
 fs/ext4/xattr.c                                    |   6 +-
 fs/f2fs/data.c                                     |   4 +-
 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h                                     |   2 +-
 fs/f2fs/segment.c                                  |   6 +-
 fs/f2fs/super.c                                    |  11 +-
 fs/jbd2/revoke.c                                   |   8 +-
 fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c                   |   1 +
 fs/ntfs3/run.c                                     |  18 +-
 fs/ocfs2/aops.c                                    |  74 +++--
 fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c                            | 116 +++++--
 fs/smb/server/connection.c                         |  28 +-
 fs/smb/server/connection.h                         |   6 +-
 fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c                            |   4 +-
 fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c                     |   5 +
 fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c                      |  25 +-
 fs/userfaultfd.c                                   |   2 -
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c                                   |   1 +
 include/linux/device.h                             |  45 +++
 include/linux/fwnode.h                             |  44 ++-
 include/linux/hugetlb_inline.h                     |   4 +-
 include/linux/padata.h                             |   4 -
 include/linux/randomize_kstack.h                   |  26 +-
 include/linux/sched.h                              |   4 +
 include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h                       |   9 +-
 include/linux/usb.h                                |   3 +-
 include/net/mana/mana.h                            |   1 +
 include/net/mctp.h                                 |   3 +
 include/trace/events/rxrpc.h                       |   6 +-
 init/main.c                                        |   1 -
 io_uring/poll.c                                    |  15 +-
 io_uring/timeout.c                                 |   4 +
 kernel/fork.c                                      |   2 +
 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c                           |  13 +-
 kernel/padata.c                                    | 136 +++------
 kernel/sched/core.c                                |   2 +-
 kernel/sched/rt.c                                  |   2 +-
 kernel/sched/sched.h                               |   2 +-
 kernel/taskstats.c                                 |   1 +
 lib/test_hmm.c                                     |  86 +++---
 lib/ts_kmp.c                                       |  18 +-
 mm/damon/core.c                                    |   3 +-
 mm/internal.h                                      |  10 +
 mm/memory_hotplug.c                                |  10 +-
 mm/migrate.c                                       | 152 +++++----
 mm/mlock.c                                         |  10 +-
 mm/mmap.c                                          |   4 +-
 mm/zsmalloc.c                                      |   1 +
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c                          |  18 +-
 net/bridge/br_arp_nd_proxy.c                       |   8 +-
 net/bridge/br_fdb.c                                |  28 +-
 net/caif/cfsrvl.c                                  |  14 +-
 net/ceph/auth.c                                    |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/icmp.c                                    |   5 +-
 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c                    |   3 +
 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c                                 |   9 +-
 net/ipv6/rpl_iptunnel.c                            |   9 +
 net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c                           |  12 +-
 net/mctp/route.c                                   |   8 +-
 net/netfilter/nft_bitwise.c                        |   3 +-
 net/qrtr/ns.c                                      |  86 +++++-
 net/rds/rdma.c                                     |   4 -
 net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h                            |   1 -
 net/rxrpc/call_event.c                             |  25 +-
 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c                             |  14 +-
 net/rxrpc/io_thread.c                              |  24 +-
 net/rxrpc/rxkad.c                                  | 112 +++----
 net/rxrpc/skbuff.c                                 |   9 -
 net/smc/smc_clc.c                                  |   4 +-
 net/strparser/strparser.c                          |   8 +
 rust/kernel/init/macros.rs                         |   7 +-
 scripts/check-uapi.sh                              |   7 +-
 security/apparmor/lsm.c                            |  16 +-
 sound/aoa/codecs/onyx.c                            | 104 ++-----
 sound/aoa/codecs/tas.c                             | 113 +++----
 sound/aoa/core/gpio-feature.c                      |  20 +-
 sound/aoa/core/gpio-pmf.c                          |  26 +-
 sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/core.c                   |  12 +-
 sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c                    | 143 ++++-----
 sound/core/control.c                               |   4 +
 sound/core/misc.c                                  |  13 +-
 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_rw.c                    |   6 +-
 sound/drivers/pcmtest.c                            |  19 +-
 sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c                            |   3 +-
 sound/usb/6fire/control.c                          |  10 +-
 sound/usb/caiaq/control.c                          |  52 +++-
 sound/usb/caiaq/device.c                           |  35 ++-
 sound/usb/caiaq/input.c                            |   2 +-
 sound/usb/endpoint.c                               |   6 +-
 sound/usb/format.c                                 |   2 +-
 sound/usb/mixer.c                                  |   7 +-
 sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c                           |  12 +-
 tools/accounting/getdelays.c                       |  41 ++-
 tools/accounting/procacct.c                        |  40 ++-
 tools/perf/arch/loongarch/annotate/instructions.c  |   1 +
 tools/perf/util/disasm.c                           |   1 +
 tools/testing/ktest/ktest.pl                       |   2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c        |   2 +-
 .../testing/selftests/mqueue/{setting => settings} |   0
 218 files changed, 2506 insertions(+), 1555 deletions(-)
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/215 ALSA: usb-audio: stop parsing UAC2 rates at MAX_NR_RATES

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>

commit 3c318f97dcc50b2e0556a1813bd6958678e881fd upstream.

parse_uac2_sample_rate_range() caps the number of enumerated rates at MAX_NR_RATES, but it only breaks out of the current rate loop. A malformed UAC2 RANGE response with additional triplets continues parsing the remaining triplets and repeatedly prints "invalid uac2 rates" while probe still holds register_mutex.

Stop the whole parse once the cap is reached and return the number of rates collected so far.

Fixes 4fa0e81b8350 ("ALSA: usb-audio: fix possible hang and overflow in parse_uac2_sample_rate_range()")
Reported-by [email protected]
---
 sound/usb/format.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/usb/format.c +1 -1
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ static int parse_uac2_sample_rate_range(
 			nr_rates++;
 			if (nr_rates >= MAX_NR_RATES) {
 				usb_audio_err(chip, "invalid uac2 rates\n");
-				break;
+				return nr_rates;
 			}
 
 skip_rate:
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/215 ALSA: usb-audio: Avoid false E-MU sample-rate notifications

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>

commit fca9c850042a7ab4828ce3a9caa8bc40ea09856a upstream.

snd_emuusb_set_samplerate() unconditionally notifies the E-MU SampleRate Extension Unit control after issuing SET_CUR.

If snd_usb_mixer_set_ctl_value() fails, the control value has not changed, yet snd_usb_mixer_notify_id() still invalidates the cache and emits a value-change event to userspace.

Notify the control only after a successful write.

---
 sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c +6 -4
@@ -1559,15 +1559,17 @@ void snd_emuusb_set_samplerate(struct sn
 {
 	struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer;
 	struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval;
+	int err;
 	int unitid = 12; /* SampleRate ExtensionUnit ID */
 
 	list_for_each_entry(mixer, &chip->mixer_list, list) {
 		if (mixer->id_elems[unitid]) {
 			cval = mixer_elem_list_to_info(mixer->id_elems[unitid]);
-			snd_usb_mixer_set_ctl_value(cval, UAC_SET_CUR,
-						    cval->control << 8,
-						    samplerate_id);
-			snd_usb_mixer_notify_id(mixer, unitid);
+			err = snd_usb_mixer_set_ctl_value(cval, UAC_SET_CUR,
+							  cval->control << 8,
+							  samplerate_id);
+			if (!err)
+				snd_usb_mixer_notify_id(mixer, unitid);
 			break;
 		}
 	}
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/215 ALSA: usb-audio: Fix Audio Advantage Micro II SPDIF switch

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>

commit a9224f26b754b5034719248891ff3c2ea0d11144 upstream.

snd_microii_spdif_switch_put() returns 0 when the requested vendor register value differs from the cached one.

This comparison was inverted by the resume-support conversion, so real SPDIF switch toggles are ignored while no-op writes still issue SET_CUR and report success.

Return early only when the requested value matches the cached one.

Fixes 288673beae6c ("ALSA: usb-audio: Add resume support for MicroII SPDIF ctls")
---
 sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c +1 -1
@@ -2064,7 +2064,7 @@ static int snd_microii_spdif_switch_put(
 	int err;
 
 	reg = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] ? 0x28 : 0x2a;
-	if (reg != list->kctl->private_value)
+	if (reg == list->kctl->private_value)
 		return 0;
 
 	kcontrol->private_value = reg;
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/215 usb: xhci: Make usb_host_endpoint.hcpriv survive endpoint_disable()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michal Pecio <[email protected]>

commit 25e531b422dc2ac90cdae3b6e74b5cdeb081440d upstream.

xHCI hardware maintains its endpoint state between add_endpoint() and drop_endpoint() calls followed by successful check_bandwidth(). So does the driver.

Core may call endpoint_disable() during xHCI endpoint life, so don't clear host_ep->hcpriv then, because this breaks endpoint_reset().

If a driver calls usb_set_interface(), submits URBs which make host sequence state non-zero and calls usb_clear_halt(), the device clears its sequence state but xhci_endpoint_reset() bails out. The next URB
malfunctions: USB2 loses one packet, USB3 gets Transaction Error or may not complete at all on some (buggy?) HCs from ASMedia and AMD. This is triggered by uvcvideo on bulk video devices.

The code was copied from ehci_endpoint_disable() but it isn't needed here - hcpriv should only be NULL on emulated root hub endpoints. It might prevent resetting and inadvertently enabling a disabled and dropped endpoint, but core shouldn't try to reset dropped endpoints.

Document xhci requirements regarding hcpriv. They are currently met.

Fixes 18b74067ac78 ("xhci: Fix use-after-free regression in xhci clear hub TT implementation")
---
 drivers/usb/host/xhci.c |    1 -
 include/linux/usb.h     |    3 ++-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/host/xhci.c +0 -1
@@ -3080,7 +3080,6 @@ rescan:
 		xhci_dbg(xhci, "endpoint disable with ep_state 0x%x\n",
 			 ep->ep_state);
 done:
-	host_ep->hcpriv = NULL;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xhci->lock, flags);
 }
 
include/linux/usb.h +2 -1
@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ struct ep_device;
  * @ssp_isoc_ep_comp: SuperSpeedPlus isoc companion descriptor for this endpoint
  * @urb_list: urbs queued to this endpoint; maintained by usbcore
  * @hcpriv: for use by HCD; typically holds hardware dma queue head (QH)
- *	with one or more transfer descriptors (TDs) per urb
+ *	with one or more transfer descriptors (TDs) per urb; must be preserved
+ *	by core while BW is allocated for the endpoint
  * @ep_dev: ep_device for sysfs info
  * @extra: descriptors following this endpoint in the configuration
  * @extralen: how many bytes of "extra" are valid
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/215 usb: chipidea: otg: not wait vbus drop if use role_switch

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xu Yang <[email protected]>

commit a4e99587102a83ee911c670752fbca694c7e557f upstream.

The usb role switch will update ID and VBUS states at the same time, and vbus will not drop when execute data role swap in Type-C usecase. So lets not wait vbus drop in usb role switch case too.

Fixes e1b5d2bed67c ("usb: chipidea: core: handle usb role switch in a common way")
---
 drivers/usb/chipidea/otg.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/chipidea/otg.c +2 -2
@@ -187,8 +187,8 @@ void ci_handle_id_switch(struct ci_hdrc
 
 		ci_role_stop(ci);
 
-		if (role == CI_ROLE_GADGET &&
-				IS_ERR(ci->platdata->vbus_extcon.edev))
+		if (role == CI_ROLE_GADGET && !ci->role_switch &&
+		    IS_ERR(ci->platdata->vbus_extcon.edev))
 			/*
 			 * Wait vbus lower than OTGSC_BSV before connecting
 			 * to host. If connecting status is from an external
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/215 usb: chipidea: core: allow ci_irq_handler() handle both ID and VBUS change

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xu Yang <[email protected]>

commit b94b631d9f78e653855f7fb58dbcb86c2a856f6f upstream.

For USB role switch-triggered IRQ, ID and VBUS change come together, for example when switching from host to device mode. ID indicate a role switch and VBUS is required to determine whether the device controller can start operating. Currently, ci_irq_handler() handles only a single event per invocation. This can cause an issue where switching to device mode results in the device controller not working at all. Allowing ci_irq_handler() to handle both ID and VBUS change in one call resolves this issue.

Meanwhile, this change also affects the VBUS event handling logic. Previously, if an ID event indicated host mode the VBUS IRQ will be ignored as the device disable BSE when stop() is called. With the new behavior, if ID and VBUS IRQ occur together and the target mode is host, the VBUS event is queued and ci_handle_vbus_change() will call usb_gadget_vbus_connect(), after which USBMODE is switched to device mode, causing host mode to stop working. To prevent this, an additional check is added to skip handling VBUS event when current role is not device mode.

Fixes e1b5d2bed67c ("usb: chipidea: core: handle usb role switch in a common way")
---
 drivers/usb/chipidea/core.c |   45 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 drivers/usb/chipidea/otg.c  |    3 ++
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/chipidea/core.c +23 -22
@@ -543,30 +543,31 @@ static irqreturn_t ci_irq_handler(int ir
 			if (ret == IRQ_HANDLED)
 				return ret;
 		}
-	}
 
-	/*
-	 * Handle id change interrupt, it indicates device/host function
-	 * switch.
-	 */
-	if (ci->is_otg && (otgsc & OTGSC_IDIE) && (otgsc & OTGSC_IDIS)) {
-		ci->id_event = true;
-		/* Clear ID change irq status */
-		hw_write_otgsc(ci, OTGSC_IDIS, OTGSC_IDIS);
-		ci_otg_queue_work(ci);
-		return IRQ_HANDLED;
-	}
+		/*
+		 * Handle id change interrupt, it indicates device/host function
+		 * switch.
+		 */
+		if ((otgsc & OTGSC_IDIE) && (otgsc & OTGSC_IDIS)) {
+			ci->id_event = true;
+			/* Clear ID change irq status */
+			hw_write_otgsc(ci, OTGSC_IDIS, OTGSC_IDIS);
+		}
 
-	/*
-	 * Handle vbus change interrupt, it indicates device connection
-	 * and disconnection events.
-	 */
-	if (ci->is_otg && (otgsc & OTGSC_BSVIE) && (otgsc & OTGSC_BSVIS)) {
-		ci->b_sess_valid_event = true;
-		/* Clear BSV irq */
-		hw_write_otgsc(ci, OTGSC_BSVIS, OTGSC_BSVIS);
-		ci_otg_queue_work(ci);
-		return IRQ_HANDLED;
+		/*
+		 * Handle vbus change interrupt, it indicates device connection
+		 * and disconnection events.
+		 */
+		if ((otgsc & OTGSC_BSVIE) && (otgsc & OTGSC_BSVIS)) {
+			ci->b_sess_valid_event = true;
+			/* Clear BSV irq */
+			hw_write_otgsc(ci, OTGSC_BSVIS, OTGSC_BSVIS);
+		}
+
+		if (ci->id_event || ci->b_sess_valid_event) {
+			ci_otg_queue_work(ci);
+			return IRQ_HANDLED;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* Handle device/host interrupt */
drivers/usb/chipidea/otg.c +3 -0
@@ -130,6 +130,9 @@ enum ci_role ci_otg_role(struct ci_hdrc
 
 void ci_handle_vbus_change(struct ci_hdrc *ci)
 {
+	if (ci->role != CI_ROLE_GADGET)
+		return;
+
 	if (!ci->is_otg) {
 		if (ci->platdata->flags & CI_HDRC_FORCE_VBUS_ACTIVE_ALWAYS)
 			usb_gadget_vbus_connect(&ci->gadget);
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/215 ALSA: usb-audio: Evaluate packsize caps at the right place

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit 52521e8398839105ef8eb22b3f0993f9b0d11a57 upstream.

We introduced the upper bound checks of the packet sizes by the ep->maxframesize for avoiding the URB submission errors. However, the check was applied at an incorrect place in the function snd_usb_endpoint_set_params() where ep->maxframesize isn't defined yet; the value is defined at a bit later position. So this ended up with a failure at the first run while the second run works.

For fixing it, move the check at the correct place, right after the calculation of ep->maxframesize in the same function.

---
 sound/usb/endpoint.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
sound/usb/endpoint.c +3 -3
@@ -1400,9 +1400,6 @@ int snd_usb_endpoint_set_params(struct s
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
-	ep->packsize[0] = min(ep->packsize[0], ep->maxframesize);
-	ep->packsize[1] = min(ep->packsize[1], ep->maxframesize);
-
 	/* calculate the frequency in 16.16 format */
 	ep->freqm = ep->freqn;
 	ep->freqshift = INT_MIN;
@@ -1429,6 +1426,9 @@ int snd_usb_endpoint_set_params(struct s
 	ep->maxframesize = ep->maxpacksize / ep->cur_frame_bytes;
 	ep->curframesize = ep->curpacksize / ep->cur_frame_bytes;
 
+	ep->packsize[0] = min(ep->packsize[0], ep->maxframesize);
+	ep->packsize[1] = min(ep->packsize[1], ep->maxframesize);
+
 	err = update_clock_ref_rate(chip, ep);
 	if (err >= 0) {
 		ep->need_setup = false;
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/215 LoongArch: Add spectre boundry for syscall dispatch table

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 0c965d2784fbbd7f8e3b96d875c9cfdf7c00da3d upstream.

The LoongArch syscall number is directly controlled by userspace, but does not have a array_index_nospec() boundry to prevent access past the syscall function pointer tables.

---
 arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c +2 -1
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <linux/entry-common.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/objtool.h>
 #include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ void noinstr __no_stack_protector do_sys
 	add_random_kstack_offset();
 
 	if (nr < NR_syscalls) {
-		syscall_fn = sys_call_table[nr];
+		syscall_fn = sys_call_table[array_index_nospec(nr, NR_syscalls)];
 		regs->regs[4] = syscall_fn(regs->orig_a0, regs->regs[5], regs->regs[6],
 					   regs->regs[7], regs->regs[8], regs->regs[9]);
 	}
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/215 drm/nouveau: fix u32 overflow in pushbuf reloc bounds check

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 2fc87d37be1b730a149b035f9375fdb8cc5333a5 upstream.

nouveau_gem_pushbuf_reloc_apply() validates each relocation with

    if (r->reloc_bo_offset + 4 > nvbo->bo.base.size)

but reloc_bo_offset is __u32 (uapi/drm/nouveau_drm.h) and the integer literal 4 promotes to unsigned int, so the addition is performed in 32 bits and wraps before the comparison against the size_t bo size.

Cast to u64 so the addition happens in 64-bit arithmetic.

Cc Lyude Paul <[email protected]>
Cc Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]>
Cc Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]>
Cc Maxime Ripard <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>
Cc David Airlie <[email protected]>
Cc Simona Vetter <[email protected]>
Reported-by Anthropic
Cc stable <[email protected]>
Assisted-by gkh_clanker_t1000
Fixes a1606a9596e5 ("drm/nouveau: new gem pushbuf interface, bump to 0.0.16")
[ Add Fixes: tag. - Danilo ]
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c +1 -1
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ nouveau_gem_pushbuf_reloc_apply(struct n
 		}
 		nvbo = (void *)(unsigned long)bo[r->reloc_bo_index].user_priv;
 
-		if (unlikely(r->reloc_bo_offset + 4 >
+		if (unlikely((u64)r->reloc_bo_offset + 4 >
 			     nvbo->bo.base.size)) {
 			NV_PRINTK(err, cli, "reloc outside of bo\n");
 			ret = -EINVAL;
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/215 leds: qcom-lpg: Check for array overflow when selecting the high resolution

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit d45963a93c1495e9f1338fde91d0ebba8fd22474 upstream.

When selecting the high resolution values from the array, FIELD_GET() is used to pull from a 3 bit register, yet the array being indexed has only 5 values in it. Odds are the hardware is sane, but just to be safe, properly check before just overflowing and reading random data and then setting up chip values based on that.

---
 drivers/leds/rgb/leds-qcom-lpg.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/leds/rgb/leds-qcom-lpg.c +6 -1
@@ -1272,7 +1272,12 @@ static int lpg_pwm_get_state(struct pwm_
 		return ret;
 
 	if (chan->subtype == LPG_SUBTYPE_HI_RES_PWM) {
-		refclk = lpg_clk_rates_hi_res[FIELD_GET(PWM_CLK_SELECT_HI_RES_MASK, val)];
+		unsigned int clk_idx = FIELD_GET(PWM_CLK_SELECT_HI_RES_MASK, val);
+
+		if (clk_idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(lpg_clk_rates_hi_res))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		refclk = lpg_clk_rates_hi_res[clk_idx];
 		resolution = lpg_pwm_resolution_hi_res[FIELD_GET(PWM_SIZE_HI_RES_MASK, val)];
 	} else {
 		refclk = lpg_clk_rates[FIELD_GET(PWM_CLK_SELECT_MASK, val)];
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/215 greybus: gb-beagleplay: bound bootloader receive buffering

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pengpeng Hou <[email protected]>

commit 1214bf28965ceaf584fb20d357731264dd2e10e1 upstream.

cc1352_bootloader_rx() appends each serdev chunk into the fixed rx_buffer before parsing bootloader packets. The helper can keep leftover bytes between callbacks and may receive multiple packets in one callback, so a single count value is not constrained by one packet length.

Check that the incoming chunk fits in the remaining receive buffer space before memcpy(). If it does not, drop the staged data and consume the bytes instead of overflowing rx_buffer.

Fixes 0cf7befa3ea2 ("greybus: gb-beagleplay: Add firmware upload API")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/greybus/gb-beagleplay.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/greybus/gb-beagleplay.c +7 -0
@@ -535,6 +535,13 @@ static size_t cc1352_bootloader_rx(struc
 	int ret;
 	size_t off = 0;
 
+	if (count > sizeof(bg->rx_buffer) - bg->rx_buffer_len) {
+		dev_warn(&bg->sd->dev,
+			 "dropping oversized bootloader receive chunk");
+		bg->rx_buffer_len = 0;
+		return count;
+	}
+
 	memcpy(bg->rx_buffer + bg->rx_buffer_len, data, count);
 	bg->rx_buffer_len += count;
 
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/215 greybus: gb-beagleplay: fix sleep in atomic context in hdlc_tx_frames()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Weigang He <[email protected]>

commit 6b526dca0966f2370835765019a54319b78fca8d upstream.

hdlc_append() calls usleep_range() to wait for circular buffer space, but it is called with tx_producer_lock (a spinlock) held via hdlc_tx_frames() -> hdlc_append_tx_frame()/hdlc_append_tx_u8()/etc. Sleeping while holding a spinlock is illegal and can trigger "BUG: scheduling while atomic".

Fix this by moving the buffer-space wait out of hdlc_append() and into hdlc_tx_frames(), before the spinlock is acquired. The new flow:

1. Pre-calculate the worst-case encoded frame length.
2. Wait (with sleep) outside the lock until enough space is available, kicking the TX consumer work to drain the buffer.
3. Acquire the spinlock, re-verify space, and write the entire frame atomically.

This ensures that sleeping only happens without any lock held, and that frames are either fully enqueued or not written at all.

This bug is found by CodeQL static analysis tool (interprocedural sleep-in-atomic query) and my code review.

Fixes ec558bbfea67 ("greybus: Add BeaglePlay Linux Driver")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
Cc Ayush Singh <[email protected]>
Cc Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Cc Alex Elder <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/greybus/gb-beagleplay.c |  107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
drivers/greybus/gb-beagleplay.c +90 -17
@@ -242,30 +242,26 @@ static void hdlc_write(struct gb_beaglep
 }
 
 /**
- * hdlc_append() - Queue HDLC data for sending.
+ * hdlc_append() - Queue a single HDLC byte for sending.
  * @bg: beagleplay greybus driver
  * @value: hdlc byte to transmit
  *
- * Assumes that producer lock as been acquired.
+ * Caller must hold tx_producer_lock and must have ensured sufficient
+ * space in the circular buffer before calling (see hdlc_tx_frames()).
  */
 static void hdlc_append(struct gb_beagleplay *bg, u8 value)
 {
-	int tail, head = bg->tx_circ_buf.head;
+	int head = bg->tx_circ_buf.head;
+	int tail = READ_ONCE(bg->tx_circ_buf.tail);
 
-	while (true) {
-		tail = READ_ONCE(bg->tx_circ_buf.tail);
-
-		if (CIRC_SPACE(head, tail, TX_CIRC_BUF_SIZE) >= 1) {
-			bg->tx_circ_buf.buf[head] = value;
-
-			/* Finish producing HDLC byte */
-			smp_store_release(&bg->tx_circ_buf.head,
-					  (head + 1) & (TX_CIRC_BUF_SIZE - 1));
-			return;
-		}
-		dev_warn(&bg->sd->dev, "Tx circ buf full");
-		usleep_range(3000, 5000);
-	}
+	lockdep_assert_held(&bg->tx_producer_lock);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(CIRC_SPACE(head, tail, TX_CIRC_BUF_SIZE) < 1))
+		return;
+
+	bg->tx_circ_buf.buf[head] = value;
+	/* Ensure buffer write is visible before advancing head. */
+	smp_store_release(&bg->tx_circ_buf.head,
+			  (head + 1) & (TX_CIRC_BUF_SIZE - 1));
 }
 
 static void hdlc_append_escaped(struct gb_beagleplay *bg, u8 value)
@@ -313,13 +309,90 @@ static void hdlc_transmit(struct work_st
 	spin_unlock_bh(&bg->tx_consumer_lock);
 }
 
+/**
+ * hdlc_encoded_length() - Calculate worst-case encoded length of an HDLC frame.
+ * @payloads: array of payload buffers
+ * @count: number of payloads
+ *
+ * Returns the maximum number of bytes needed in the circular buffer.
+ */
+static size_t hdlc_encoded_length(const struct hdlc_payload payloads[],
+				  size_t count)
+{
+	size_t i, payload_len = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+		payload_len += payloads[i].len;
+
+	/*
+	 * Worst case: every data byte needs escaping (doubles in size).
+	 * data bytes = address(1) + control(1) + payload + crc(2)
+	 * framing    = opening flag(1) + closing flag(1)
+	 */
+	return 2 + (1 + 1 + payload_len + 2) * 2;
+}
+
+#define HDLC_TX_BUF_WAIT_RETRIES	500
+#define HDLC_TX_BUF_WAIT_US_MIN	3000
+#define HDLC_TX_BUF_WAIT_US_MAX	5000
+
+/**
+ * hdlc_tx_frames() - Encode and queue an HDLC frame for transmission.
+ * @bg: beagleplay greybus driver
+ * @address: HDLC address field
+ * @control: HDLC control field
+ * @payloads: array of payload buffers
+ * @count: number of payloads
+ *
+ * Sleeps outside the spinlock until enough circular-buffer space is
+ * available, then verifies space under the lock and writes the entire
+ * frame atomically.  Either a complete frame is enqueued or nothing is
+ * written, avoiding both sleeping in atomic context and partial frames.
+ */
 static void hdlc_tx_frames(struct gb_beagleplay *bg, u8 address, u8 control,
 			   const struct hdlc_payload payloads[], size_t count)
 {
+	size_t needed = hdlc_encoded_length(payloads, count);
+	int retries = HDLC_TX_BUF_WAIT_RETRIES;
 	size_t i;
+	int head, tail;
+
+	/* Wait outside the lock for sufficient buffer space. */
+	while (retries--) {
+		/* Pairs with smp_store_release() in hdlc_append(). */
+		head = smp_load_acquire(&bg->tx_circ_buf.head);
+		tail = READ_ONCE(bg->tx_circ_buf.tail);
+
+		if (CIRC_SPACE(head, tail, TX_CIRC_BUF_SIZE) >= needed)
+			break;
+
+		/* Kick the consumer and sleep — no lock held. */
+		schedule_work(&bg->tx_work);
+		usleep_range(HDLC_TX_BUF_WAIT_US_MIN, HDLC_TX_BUF_WAIT_US_MAX);
+	}
+
+	if (retries < 0) {
+		dev_warn_ratelimited(&bg->sd->dev,
+				     "Tx circ buf full, dropping frame\n");
+		return;
+	}
 
 	spin_lock(&bg->tx_producer_lock);
 
+	/*
+	 * Re-check under the lock.  Should not fail since
+	 * tx_producer_lock serialises all producers and the
+	 * consumer only frees space, but guard against it.
+	 */
+	head = bg->tx_circ_buf.head;
+	tail = READ_ONCE(bg->tx_circ_buf.tail);
+	if (unlikely(CIRC_SPACE(head, tail, TX_CIRC_BUF_SIZE) < needed)) {
+		spin_unlock(&bg->tx_producer_lock);
+		dev_warn_ratelimited(&bg->sd->dev,
+				     "Tx circ buf space lost, dropping frame\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	hdlc_append_tx_frame(bg);
 	hdlc_append_tx_u8(bg, address);
 	hdlc_append_tx_u8(bg, control);
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/215 misc: ibmasm: fix OOB MMIO read in ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tyllis Xu <[email protected]>

commit 4b6e6ead556734bdc14024c5f837132b1e7a4b84 upstream.

ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt() performs an out-of-bounds MMIO read when the queue reader or writer index from hardware exceeds REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE (60).

A compromised service processor can trigger this by writing an out-of-range value to the reader or writer MMIO register before asserting an interrupt. Since writer is re-read from hardware on every loop iteration, it can also be set to an out-of-range value after the loop has already started.

The root cause is that get_queue_reader() and get_queue_writer() return raw readl() values that are passed directly into get_queue_entry(), which computes:

queue_begin + reader * sizeof(struct remote_input)

with no bounds check. This unchecked MMIO address is then passed to memcpy_fromio(), reading 8 bytes from unintended device registers. For sufficiently large values the address falls outside the PCI BAR mapping entirely, triggering a machine check exception.

Fix by checking both indices against REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE at the top of the loop body, before any call to get_queue_entry(). On an out-of-range value, reset the reader register to 0 via set_queue_reader() before breaking, so that normal queue operation can resume if the corrupted hardware state is transient.

Fixes 278d72ae8803 ("[PATCH] ibmasm driver: redesign handling of remote control events")
---
 drivers/misc/ibmasm/remote.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/misc/ibmasm/remote.c +5 -0
@@ -177,6 +177,11 @@ void ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt(struc
 	writer = get_queue_writer(sp);
 
 	while (reader != writer) {
+		if (reader >= REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE || writer >= REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE) {
+			set_queue_reader(sp, 0);
+			break;
+		}
+
 		memcpy_fromio(&input, get_queue_entry(sp, reader),
 				sizeof(struct remote_input));
 
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 14/215 ibmasm: fix OOB reads in command_file_write due to missing size checks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tyllis Xu <[email protected]>

commit 0eb09f737428e482a32a2e31e5e223f2b35a71d3 upstream.

The command_file_write() handler allocates a kernel buffer of exactly count bytes and copies user data into it, but does not validate the buffer against the dot command protocol before passing it to get_dot_command_size() and get_dot_command_timeout().

Since both the allocation size (count) and the header fields (command_size, data_size) are independently user-controlled, an attacker can cause get_dot_command_size() to return a value exceeding the allocation, triggering OOB reads in get_dot_command_timeout() and an out-of-bounds memcpy_toio() that leaks kernel heap memory to the service processor.

Fix with two guards: reject writes smaller than sizeof(struct dot_command_header) before allocation, then after copying user data reject commands where the buffer is smaller than the total size declared by the header (sizeof(header) + command_size + data_size). This ensures all subsequent header and payload field accesses stay within the buffer.

---
 drivers/misc/ibmasm/ibmasmfs.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/misc/ibmasm/ibmasmfs.c +7 -0
@@ -303,6 +303,8 @@ static ssize_t command_file_write(struct
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (count == 0 || count > IBMASM_CMD_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE)
 		return 0;
+	if (count < sizeof(struct dot_command_header))
+		return -EINVAL;
 	if (*offset != 0)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -319,6 +321,11 @@ static ssize_t command_file_write(struct
 		return -EFAULT;
 	}
 
+	if (count < get_dot_command_size(cmd->buffer)) {
+		command_put(cmd);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&command_data->sp->lock, flags);
 	if (command_data->command) {
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&command_data->sp->lock, flags);
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 15/215 ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tyllis Xu <[email protected]>

commit 9aad71144fa3682cca3837a06c8623016790e7ec upstream.

The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8,
data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size. A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor over MMIO.

Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning failure.

Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware frame from the controller's free pool, and returning without a corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it.

Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame, consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size() for the header field.

---
 drivers/misc/ibmasm/lowlevel.c |   12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/ibmasm/lowlevel.c +8 -4
@@ -19,17 +19,21 @@ static struct i2o_header header = I2O_HE
 int ibmasm_send_i2o_message(struct service_processor *sp)
 {
 	u32 mfa;
-	unsigned int command_size;
+	size_t command_size;
 	struct i2o_message *message;
 	struct command *command = sp->current_command;
 
+	command_size = get_dot_command_size(command->buffer);
+	if (command_size > command->buffer_size)
+		return 1;
+	if (command_size > I2O_COMMAND_SIZE)
+		command_size = I2O_COMMAND_SIZE;
+
 	mfa = get_mfa_inbound(sp->base_address);
 	if (!mfa)
 		return 1;
 
-	command_size = get_dot_command_size(command->buffer);
-	header.message_size = outgoing_message_size(command_size);
-
+	header.message_size = outgoing_message_size((unsigned int)command_size);
 	message = get_i2o_message(sp->base_address, mfa);
 
 	memcpy_toio(&message->header, &header, sizeof(struct i2o_header));
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 16/215 driver core: Dont let a device probe until its ready

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>

commit a2225b6e834a838ae3c93709760edc0a169eb2f2 upstream.

The moment we link a "struct device" into the list of devices for the bus, it's possible probe can happen. This is because another thread can load the driver at any time and that can cause the device to probe. This has been seen in practice with a stack crawl that looks like this [1]:

really_probe()
__driver_probe_device()
driver_probe_device()
__driver_attach()
bus_for_each_dev()
driver_attach()
bus_add_driver()
driver_register()
__platform_driver_register()
init_module() [some module]
do_one_initcall()
do_init_module()
load_module()
__arm64_sys_finit_module()
invoke_syscall()

As a result of the above, it was seen that device_links_driver_bound() could be called for the device before "dev->fwnode->dev" was assigned. This prevented __fw_devlink_pickup_dangling_consumers() from being called which meant that other devices waiting on our driver's sub-nodes were stuck deferring forever.

It's believed that this problem is showing up suddenly for two reasons:
1. Android has recently (last ~1 year) implemented an optimization to the order it loads modules [2]. When devices opt-in to this faster loading, modules are loaded one-after-the-other very quickly. This is unlike how other distributions do it. The reproduction of this problem has only been seen on devices that opt-in to Android's "parallel module loading".
2. Android devices typically opt-in to fw_devlink, and the most noticeable issue is the NULL "dev->fwnode->dev" in device_links_driver_bound(). fw_devlink is somewhat new code and also not in use by all Linux devices.

Even though the specific symptom where "dev->fwnode->dev" wasn't assigned could be fixed by moving that assignment higher in device_add(), other parts of device_add() (like the call to device_pm_add()) are also important to run before probe. Only moving the "dev->fwnode->dev" assignment would likely fix the current symptoms but lead to difficult-to-debug problems in the future.

Fix the problem by preventing probe until device_add() has run far enough that the device is ready to probe. If somehow we end up trying to probe before we're allowed, __driver_probe_device() will return -EPROBE_DEFER which will make certain the device is noticed.

In the race condition that was seen with Android's faster module loading, we will temporarily add the device to the deferred list and then take it off immediately when device_add() probes the device.

Instead of adding another flag to the bitfields already in "struct device", instead add a new "flags" field and use that. This allows us to freely change the bit from different thread without worrying about corrupting nearby bits (and means threads changing other bit won't corrupt us).

[1] Captured on a machine running a downstream 6.6 kernel
[2] https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/core/libmodprobe/libmodprobe.cpp?q=LoadModulesParallel

---
 drivers/base/core.c    |   15 +++++++++++++++
 drivers/base/dd.c      |   20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/device.h |   44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+)
drivers/base/core.c +15 -0
@@ -3691,6 +3691,21 @@ int device_add(struct device *dev)
 		fw_devlink_link_device(dev);
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * The moment the device was linked into the bus's "klist_devices" in
+	 * bus_add_device() then it's possible that probe could have been
+	 * attempted in a different thread via userspace loading a driver
+	 * matching the device. "ready_to_probe" being unset would have
+	 * blocked those attempts. Now that all of the above initialization has
+	 * happened, unblock probe. If probe happens through another thread
+	 * after this point but before bus_probe_device() runs then it's fine.
+	 * bus_probe_device() -> device_initial_probe() -> __device_attach()
+	 * will notice (under device_lock) that the device is already bound.
+	 */
+	device_lock(dev);
+	dev_set_ready_to_probe(dev);
+	device_unlock(dev);
+
 	bus_probe_device(dev);
 
 	/*
drivers/base/dd.c +20 -0
@@ -844,6 +844,26 @@ static int __driver_probe_device(const s
 	if (dev->driver)
 		return -EBUSY;
 
+	/*
+	 * In device_add(), the "struct device" gets linked into the subsystem's
+	 * list of devices and broadcast to userspace (via uevent) before we're
+	 * quite ready to probe. Those open pathways to driver probe before
+	 * we've finished enough of device_add() to reliably support probe.
+	 * Detect this and tell other pathways to try again later. device_add()
+	 * itself will also try to probe immediately after setting
+	 * "ready_to_probe".
+	 */
+	if (!dev_ready_to_probe(dev))
+		return dev_err_probe(dev, -EPROBE_DEFER, "Device not ready to probe\n");
+
+	/*
+	 * Set can_match = true after calling dev_ready_to_probe(), so
+	 * driver_deferred_probe_add() won't actually add the device to the
+	 * deferred probe list when dev_ready_to_probe() returns false.
+	 *
+	 * When dev_ready_to_probe() returns false, it means that device_add()
+	 * will do another probe() attempt for us.
+	 */
 	dev->can_match = true;
 	dev_dbg(dev, "bus: '%s': %s: matched device with driver %s\n",
 		drv->bus->name, __func__, drv->name);
include/linux/device.h +44 -0

64 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 17/215 drm/nouveau: fix nvkm_device leak on aperture removal failure

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Carlier <[email protected]>

commit 6597ff1d8de3f583be169587efeafd8af134e138 upstream.

When aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_devices() fails during probe, the error path returns directly without unwinding the nvkm_device that was just allocated by nvkm_device_pci_new(). This leaks both the device wrapper and the pci_enable_device() reference taken inside it.

Jump to the existing fail_nvkm label so nvkm_device_del() runs and balances both. The leak was introduced when the intermediate nvkm_device_del() between detection and aperture removal was dropped in favor of creating the pci device once.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_drm.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_drm.c +1 -1
@@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ static int nouveau_drm_probe(struct pci_
 	/* Remove conflicting drivers (vesafb, efifb etc). */
 	ret = drm_aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers(pdev, &driver_pci);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto fail_nvkm;
 
 	pci_set_master(pdev);
 
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 18/215 kbuild: rust: allow `clippy::uninlined_format_args`

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Miguel Ojeda <[email protected]>

commit 10eea3c147141c90cf409b8df56d245c9d7f88d9 upstream.

Clippy in Rust 1.88.0 (only) reports [1]:

    warning: variables can be used directly in the `format!` string
       --> rust/macros/module.rs:112:23
        |
    112 |         let content = format!("{param}:{content}", param = param, content = content);
        |                       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
        |
        = help: for further information visit https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#uninlined_format_args
        = note: `-W clippy::uninlined-format-args` implied by `-W clippy::all`
        = help: to override `-W clippy::all` add `#[allow(clippy::uninlined_format_args)]`
    help: change this to
        |
    112 -         let content = format!("{param}:{content}", param = param, content = content);
    112 +         let content = format!("{param}:{content}");

    warning: variables can be used directly in the `format!` string
       --> rust/macros/module.rs:198:14
        |
    198 |         t => panic!("Unsupported parameter type {}", t),
        |              ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
        |
        = help: for further information visit https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#uninlined_format_args
        = note: `-W clippy::uninlined-format-args` implied by `-W clippy::all`
        = help: to override `-W clippy::all` add `#[allow(clippy::uninlined_format_args)]`
    help: change this to
        |
    198 -         t => panic!("Unsupported parameter type {}", t),
    198 +         t => panic!("Unsupported parameter type {t}"),
        |

The reason it only triggers in that version is that the lint was moved from pedantic to style in Rust 1.88.0 and then back to pedantic in Rust 1.89.0 [2][3].

In the first case, the suggestion is fair and a pure simplification, thus we will clean it up separately.

To keep the behavior the same across all versions, and since the lint does not work for all macros (e.g. custom ones like pr_info!), disable it globally.

---
 Makefile |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
Makefile +1 -0
@@ -459,6 +459,7 @@ export rust_common_flags := --edition=20
 			    -Aclippy::needless_lifetimes \
 			    -Wclippy::no_mangle_with_rust_abi \
 			    -Wclippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks \
+			    -Aclippy::uninlined_format_args \
 			    -Wclippy::unnecessary_safety_comment \
 			    -Wclippy::unnecessary_safety_doc \
 			    -Wrustdoc::missing_crate_level_docs \
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH 19/215 firmware: google: framebuffer: Do not mark framebuffer as busy

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>

commit f3850d399de3b6142b02315227ef9e772ed0c302 upstream.

Remove the flag IORESOURCE_BUSY flag from coreboot's framebuffer resource. It prevents simpledrm from successfully requesting the range for its own use; resulting in errors such as

[    2.775430] simple-framebuffer simple-framebuffer.0: [drm] could not acquire memory region [mem 0x80000000-0x80407fff flags 0x80000200]

As with other uses of simple-framebuffer, the simple-framebuffer device should only declare it's I/O resources, but not actively use them.

Fixes 851b4c14532d ("firmware: coreboot: Add coreboot framebuffer driver")
Cc Samuel Holland <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Tzung-Bi Shih <[email protected]>
Cc Brian Norris <[email protected]>
Cc Julius Werner <[email protected]>
Cc <[email protected]> # v4.18+
---
 drivers/firmware/google/framebuffer-coreboot.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/google/framebuffer-coreboot.c +1 -1
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static int framebuffer_probe(struct core
 		return -ENODEV;
 
 	memset(&res, 0, sizeof(res));
-	res.flags = IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
+	res.flags = IORESOURCE_MEM;
 	res.name = "Coreboot Framebuffer";
 	res.start = fb->physical_address;
 	length = PAGE_ALIGN(fb->y_resolution * fb->bytes_per_line);
author maintainer
#20 lore raw

PATCH 20/215 arm64/mm: Enable batched TLB flush in unmap_hotplug_range()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>

commit 48478b9f791376b4b89018d7afdfd06865498f65 upstream.

During a memory hot remove operation, both linear and vmemmap mappings for the memory range being removed, get unmapped via unmap_hotplug_range() but mapped pages get freed only for vmemmap mapping. This is just a sequential operation where each table entry gets cleared, followed by a leaf specific TLB flush, and then followed by memory free operation when applicable.

This approach was simple and uniform both for vmemmap and linear mappings. But linear mapping might contain CONT marked block memory where it becomes necessary to first clear out all entire in the range before a TLB flush. This is as per the architecture requirement. Hence batch all TLB flushes during the table tear down walk and finally do it in unmap_hotplug_range().

Prior to this fix, it was hypothetically possible for a speculative access to a higher address in the contiguous block to fill the TLB with shattered entries for the entire contiguous range after a lower address had already been cleared and invalidated. Due to the table entries being shattered, the subsequent TLB invalidation for the higher address would not then clear the TLB entries for the lower address, meaning stale TLB entries could persist.

Besides it also helps in improving the performance via TLBI range operation along with reduced synchronization instructions. The time spent executing unmap_hotplug_range() improved 97% measured over a 2GB memory hot removal in KVM guest.

This scheme is not applicable during vmemmap mapping tear down where memory needs to be freed and hence a TLB flush is required after clearing out page table entry.

---
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +20 -16
@@ -869,10 +869,14 @@ static void unmap_hotplug_pte_range(pmd_
 
 		WARN_ON(!pte_present(pte));
 		__pte_clear(&init_mm, addr, ptep);
-		flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE);
-		if (free_mapped)
+		if (free_mapped) {
+			/* CONT blocks are not supported in the vmemmap */
+			WARN_ON(pte_cont(pte));
+			flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE);
 			free_hotplug_page_range(pte_page(pte),
 						PAGE_SIZE, altmap);
+		}
+		/* unmap_hotplug_range() flushes TLB for !free_mapped */
 	} while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr < end);
 }
 
@@ -893,15 +897,14 @@ static void unmap_hotplug_pmd_range(pud_
 		WARN_ON(!pmd_present(pmd));
 		if (pmd_sect(pmd)) {
 			pmd_clear(pmdp);
-
-			/*
-			 * One TLBI should be sufficient here as the PMD_SIZE
-			 * range is mapped with a single block entry.
-			 */
-			flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE);
-			if (free_mapped)
+			if (free_mapped) {
+				/* CONT blocks are not supported in the vmemmap */
+				WARN_ON(pmd_cont(pmd));
+				flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PMD_SIZE);
 				free_hotplug_page_range(pmd_page(pmd),
 							PMD_SIZE, altmap);
+			}
+			/* unmap_hotplug_range() flushes TLB for !free_mapped */
 			continue;
 		}
 		WARN_ON(!pmd_table(pmd));
@@ -926,15 +929,12 @@ static void unmap_hotplug_pud_range(p4d_
 		WARN_ON(!pud_present(pud));
 		if (pud_sect(pud)) {
 			pud_clear(pudp);
-
-			/*
-			 * One TLBI should be sufficient here as the PUD_SIZE
-			 * range is mapped with a single block entry.
-			 */
-			flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE);
-			if (free_mapped)
+			if (free_mapped) {
+				flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PUD_SIZE);
 				free_hotplug_page_range(pud_page(pud),
 							PUD_SIZE, altmap);
+			}
+			/* unmap_hotplug_range() flushes TLB for !free_mapped */
 			continue;
 		}
 		WARN_ON(!pud_table(pud));
@@ -964,6 +964,7 @@ static void unmap_hotplug_p4d_range(pgd_
 static void unmap_hotplug_range(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
 				bool free_mapped, struct vmem_altmap *altmap)
 {
+	unsigned long start = addr;
 	unsigned long next;
 	pgd_t *pgdp, pgd;
 
@@ -985,6 +986,9 @@ static void unmap_hotplug_range(unsigned
 		WARN_ON(!pgd_present(pgd));
 		unmap_hotplug_p4d_range(pgdp, addr, next, free_mapped, altmap);
 	} while (addr = next, addr < end);
+
+	if (!free_mapped)
+		flush_tlb_kernel_range(start, end);
 }
 
 static void free_empty_pte_table(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,
author maintainer
#21 lore raw

PATCH 21/215 padata: Fix pd UAF once and for all

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 71203f68c7749609d7fc8ae6ad054bdedeb24f91 ]

There is a race condition/UAF in padata_reorder that goes back to the initial commit. A reference count is taken at the start of the process in padata_do_parallel, and released at the end in padata_serial_worker.

This reference count is (and only is) required for padata_replace to function correctly. If padata_replace is never called then there is no issue.

In the function padata_reorder which serves as the core of padata, as soon as padata is added to queue->serial.list, and the associated spin lock released, that padata may be processed and the reference count on pd would go away.

Fix this by getting the next padata before the squeue->serial lock is released.

In order to make this possible, simplify padata_reorder by only calling it once the next padata arrives.

Fixes 16295bec6398 ("padata: Generic parallelization/serialization interface")

[ Adjust context of padata_find_next(). Replace cpumask_next_wrap(cpu, pd->cpumask.pcpu) with cpumask_next_wrap(cpu, pd->cpumask.pcpu, -1, false) in padata_reorder() in v6.12 according to dc5bb9b769c9 ("cpumask: deprecate cpumask_next_wrap()") and f954a2d37637 ("padata: switch padata_find_next() to using cpumask_next_wrap()") . ]

---
 include/linux/padata.h |   3 -
 kernel/padata.c        | 136 +++++++++++------------------------------
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-)
include/linux/padata.h +0 -3
index 0146daf344306..b486c7359de2b 100644
@@ -91,7 +91,6 @@ struct padata_cpumask {
  * @cpu: Next CPU to be processed.
  * @cpumask: The cpumasks in use for parallel and serial workers.
  * @reorder_work: work struct for reordering.
- * @lock: Reorder lock.
  */
 struct parallel_data {
 	struct padata_shell		*ps;
@@ -102,8 +101,6 @@ struct parallel_data {
 	unsigned int			processed;
 	int				cpu;
 	struct padata_cpumask		cpumask;
-	struct work_struct		reorder_work;
-	spinlock_t                      ____cacheline_aligned lock;
 };
 
 /**
kernel/padata.c +37 -99

202 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#22 lore raw

PATCH 22/215 padata: Remove comment for reorder_work

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 82a0302e7167d0b7c6cde56613db3748f8dd806d ]

Remove comment for reorder_work which no longer exists.

Fixes 71203f68c774 ("padata: Fix pd UAF once and for all")
---
 include/linux/padata.h | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/padata.h +0 -1
index b486c7359de2b..765f2778e264a 100644
@@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ struct padata_cpumask {
  * @processed: Number of already processed objects.
  * @cpu: Next CPU to be processed.
  * @cpumask: The cpumasks in use for parallel and serial workers.
- * @reorder_work: work struct for reordering.
  */
 struct parallel_data {
 	struct padata_shell		*ps;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#23 lore raw

PATCH 23/215 rust: init: fix `clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks` warnings

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Miguel Ojeda <[email protected]>

The stable backport in commit acc105db0826 ("rust: pin-init:
add references to previously initialized fields") introduced some clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks warnings [1], e.g.

error: unsafe block missing a safety comment
--> rust/kernel/init/macros.rs:1015:25

As well as:

    --> rust/kernel/init/macros.rs:1243:45
    --> rust/kernel/init/macros.rs:1286:22
    --> rust/kernel/init/macros.rs:1374:45

After discussing it with Benno and Gary, we decided to clean the build log by doing a minimal targeted stable commit.

Thus, depending on the case:

- Reorder the attributes so that the existing // SAFETY: comments may be seen by Clippy.

- Add a placeholder // SAFETY: TODO. comment.

Cc Benno Lossin <[email protected]>
Cc Gary Guo <[email protected]>
Fixes acc105db0826 ("rust: pin-init: add references to previously initialized fields")
---
 rust/kernel/init/macros.rs | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
rust/kernel/init/macros.rs +4 -3
index e477e4de817bf..d6e27c5221155 100644
@@ -1012,6 +1012,7 @@ macro_rules! __pin_data {
                         self,
                         slot: &'__slot mut $p_type,
                     ) -> ::core::pin::Pin<&'__slot mut $p_type> {
+                        // SAFETY: TODO.
                         unsafe { ::core::pin::Pin::new_unchecked(slot) }
                     }
                 )*
@@ -1235,11 +1236,11 @@ macro_rules! __init_internal {
         // Unaligned fields will cause the compiler to emit E0793. We do not support
         // unaligned fields since `Init::__init` requires an aligned pointer; the call to
         // `ptr::write` below has the same requirement.
+        #[allow(unused_variables, unused_assignments)]
         // SAFETY:
         // - the project function does the correct field projection,
         // - the field has been initialized,
         // - the reference is only valid until the end of the initializer.
-        #[allow(unused_variables, unused_assignments)]
         let $field = $crate::macros::paste!(unsafe { $data.[< __project_ $field >](&mut (*$slot).$field) });
 
         // Create the drop guard:
@@ -1278,11 +1279,11 @@ macro_rules! __init_internal {
         // Unaligned fields will cause the compiler to emit E0793. We do not support
         // unaligned fields since `Init::__init` requires an aligned pointer; the call to
         // `ptr::write` below has the same requirement.
+        #[allow(unused_variables, unused_assignments)]
         // SAFETY:
         // - the field is not structurally pinned, since the line above must compile,
         // - the field has been initialized,
         // - the reference is only valid until the end of the initializer.
-        #[allow(unused_variables, unused_assignments)]
         let $field = unsafe { &mut (*$slot).$field };
 
         // Create the drop guard:
@@ -1366,11 +1367,11 @@ macro_rules! __init_internal {
         // Unaligned fields will cause the compiler to emit E0793. We do not support
         // unaligned fields since `Init::__init` requires an aligned pointer; the call to
         // `ptr::write` below has the same requirement.
+        #[allow(unused_variables, unused_assignments)]
         // SAFETY:
         // - the project function does the correct field projection,
         // - the field has been initialized,
         // - the reference is only valid until the end of the initializer.
-        #[allow(unused_variables, unused_assignments)]
         let $field = $crate::macros::paste!(unsafe { $data.[< __project_ $field >](&mut (*$slot).$field) });
 
         // Create the drop guard:
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#24 lore raw

PATCH 24/215 drm/amdgpu: Use vmemdup_array_user in amdgpu_bo_create_list_entry_array

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c4ac100e9ae252b09986766ad23b1f83ca3a369d ]

Replace kvmalloc_array() + copy_from_user() with vmemdup_array_user() on the fast path.

This shrinks the source code and improves separation between the kernel and userspace slabs.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_bo_list.c | 41 +++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_bo_list.c +17 -24
index 702f6610d0243..66fb37b643882 100644
@@ -184,43 +184,36 @@ void amdgpu_bo_list_put(struct amdgpu_bo_list *list)
 int amdgpu_bo_create_list_entry_array(struct drm_amdgpu_bo_list_in *in,
 				      struct drm_amdgpu_bo_list_entry **info_param)
 {
-	const void __user *uptr = u64_to_user_ptr(in->bo_info_ptr);
 	const uint32_t info_size = sizeof(struct drm_amdgpu_bo_list_entry);
+	const void __user *uptr = u64_to_user_ptr(in->bo_info_ptr);
+	const uint32_t bo_info_size = in->bo_info_size;
+	const uint32_t bo_number = in->bo_number;
 	struct drm_amdgpu_bo_list_entry *info;
-	int r;
-
-	info = kvmalloc_array(in->bo_number, info_size, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!info)
-		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/* copy the handle array from userspace to a kernel buffer */
-	r = -EFAULT;
-	if (likely(info_size == in->bo_info_size)) {
-		unsigned long bytes = in->bo_number *
-			in->bo_info_size;
-
-		if (copy_from_user(info, uptr, bytes))
-			goto error_free;
-
+	if (likely(info_size == bo_info_size)) {
+		info = vmemdup_array_user(uptr, bo_number, info_size);
+		if (IS_ERR(info))
+			return PTR_ERR(info);
 	} else {
-		unsigned long bytes = min(in->bo_info_size, info_size);
+		const uint32_t bytes = min(bo_info_size, info_size);
 		unsigned i;
 
-		memset(info, 0, in->bo_number * info_size);
-		for (i = 0; i < in->bo_number; ++i) {
-			if (copy_from_user(&info[i], uptr, bytes))
-				goto error_free;
+		info = kvmalloc_array(bo_number, info_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!info)
+			return -ENOMEM;
 
-			uptr += in->bo_info_size;
+		memset(info, 0, bo_number * info_size);
+		for (i = 0; i < bo_number; ++i, uptr += bo_info_size) {
+			if (copy_from_user(&info[i], uptr, bytes)) {
+				kvfree(info);
+				return -EFAULT;
+			}
 		}
 	}
 
 	*info_param = info;
 	return 0;
-
-error_free:
-	kvfree(info);
-	return r;
 }
 
 int amdgpu_bo_list_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#25 lore raw

PATCH 25/215 drm/amdgpu: Limit BO list entry count to prevent resource exhaustion

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jesse.Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6270b1a5dab94665d7adce3dc78bc9066ed28bdd ]

Userspace can pass an arbitrary number of BO list entries via the bo_number field. Although the previous multiplication overflow check prevents out-of-bounds allocation, a large number of entries could still cause excessive memory allocation (up to potentially gigabytes) and unnecessarily long list processing times.

Introduce a hard limit of 128k entries per BO list, which is more than sufficient for any realistic use case (e.g., a single list containing all buffers in a large scene). This prevents memory exhaustion attacks and ensures predictable performance.

Return -EINVAL if the requested entry count exceeds the limit

(cherry picked from commit 688b87d39e0aa8135105b40dc167d74b5ada5332)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_bo_list.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_bo_list.c +4 -0
index 66fb37b643882..ded22f244adab 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 
 #define AMDGPU_BO_LIST_MAX_PRIORITY	32u
 #define AMDGPU_BO_LIST_NUM_BUCKETS	(AMDGPU_BO_LIST_MAX_PRIORITY + 1)
+#define AMDGPU_BO_LIST_MAX_ENTRIES	(128 * 1024)
 
 static void amdgpu_bo_list_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
 {
@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ int amdgpu_bo_create_list_entry_array(struct drm_amdgpu_bo_list_in *in,
 	const uint32_t bo_number = in->bo_number;
 	struct drm_amdgpu_bo_list_entry *info;
 
+	if (bo_number > AMDGPU_BO_LIST_MAX_ENTRIES)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* copy the handle array from userspace to a kernel buffer */
 	if (likely(info_size == bo_info_size)) {
 		info = vmemdup_array_user(uptr, bo_number, info_size);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#26 lore raw

PATCH 26/215 device property: Make modifications of fwnode "flags" thread safe

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>

commit f72e77c33e4b5657af35125e75bab249256030f3 upstream.

In various places in the kernel, we modify the fwnode "flags" member by doing either:
fwnode->flags |= SOME_FLAG;
fwnode->flags &= ~SOME_FLAG;

This type of modification is not thread-safe. If two threads are both mucking with the flags at the same time then one can clobber the other.

While flags are often modified while under the "fwnode_link_lock", this is not universally true.

Create some accessor functions for setting, clearing, and testing the FWNODE flags and move all users to these accessor functions. New accessor functions use set_bit() and clear_bit(), which are thread-safe.

[ Fix fwnode_clear_flag() argument alignment, restore dropped blank
line in fwnode_dev_initialized(), and remove unnecessary parentheses around fwnode_test_flag() calls. - Danilo ]

(cherry picked from commit f72e77c33e4b5657af35125e75bab249256030f3)
---
 drivers/base/core.c        |   24 ++++++++++++------------
 drivers/bus/imx-weim.c     |    2 +-
 drivers/i2c/i2c-core-of.c  |    2 +-
 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c |    4 ++--
 drivers/of/base.c          |    2 +-
 drivers/of/dynamic.c       |    2 +-
 drivers/of/platform.c      |    2 +-
 drivers/spi/spi.c          |    2 +-
 include/linux/fwnode.h     |   44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 9 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
drivers/base/core.c +12 -12
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ void fw_devlink_purge_absent_suppliers(s
 	if (fwnode->dev)
 		return;
 
-	fwnode->flags |= FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE;
+	fwnode_set_flag(fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE);
 	fwnode_links_purge_consumers(fwnode);
 
 	fwnode_for_each_available_child_node(fwnode, child)
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static void __fw_devlink_pickup_dangling
 	if (fwnode->dev && fwnode->dev->bus)
 		return;
 
-	fwnode->flags |= FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE;
+	fwnode_set_flag(fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE);
 	__fwnode_links_move_consumers(fwnode, new_sup);
 
 	fwnode_for_each_available_child_node(fwnode, child)
@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ static void device_links_missing_supplie
 static bool dev_is_best_effort(struct device *dev)
 {
 	return (fw_devlink_best_effort && dev->can_match) ||
-		(dev->fwnode && (dev->fwnode->flags & FWNODE_FLAG_BEST_EFFORT));
+		(dev->fwnode && fwnode_test_flag(dev->fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_BEST_EFFORT));
 }
 
 static struct fwnode_handle *fwnode_links_check_suppliers(
@@ -1724,11 +1724,11 @@ bool fw_devlink_is_strict(void)
 
 static void fw_devlink_parse_fwnode(struct fwnode_handle *fwnode)
 {
-	if (fwnode->flags & FWNODE_FLAG_LINKS_ADDED)
+	if (fwnode_test_flag(fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_LINKS_ADDED))
 		return;
 
 	fwnode_call_int_op(fwnode, add_links);
-	fwnode->flags |= FWNODE_FLAG_LINKS_ADDED;
+	fwnode_set_flag(fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_LINKS_ADDED);
 }
 
 static void fw_devlink_parse_fwtree(struct fwnode_handle *fwnode)
@@ -1888,7 +1888,7 @@ static bool fwnode_init_without_drv(stru
 	struct device *dev;
 	bool ret;
 
-	if (!(fwnode->flags & FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED))
+	if (!fwnode_test_flag(fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED))
 		return false;
 
 	dev = get_dev_from_fwnode(fwnode);
@@ -2004,10 +2004,10 @@ static bool __fw_devlink_relax_cycles(st
 	 * We aren't trying to find all cycles. Just a cycle between con and
 	 * sup_handle.
 	 */
-	if (sup_handle->flags & FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED)
+	if (fwnode_test_flag(sup_handle, FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED))
 		return false;
 
-	sup_handle->flags |= FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED;
+	fwnode_set_flag(sup_handle, FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED);
 
 	/* Termination condition. */
 	if (sup_handle == con_handle) {
@@ -2077,7 +2077,7 @@ static bool __fw_devlink_relax_cycles(st
 	}
 
 out:
-	sup_handle->flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED;
+	fwnode_clear_flag(sup_handle, FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED);
 	put_device(sup_dev);
 	put_device(con_dev);
 	put_device(par_dev);
@@ -2130,7 +2130,7 @@ static int fw_devlink_create_devlink(str
 	 * When such a flag is set, we can't create device links where P is the
 	 * supplier of C as that would delay the probe of C.
 	 */
-	if (sup_handle->flags & FWNODE_FLAG_NEEDS_CHILD_BOUND_ON_ADD &&
+	if (fwnode_test_flag(sup_handle, FWNODE_FLAG_NEEDS_CHILD_BOUND_ON_ADD) &&
 	    fwnode_is_ancestor_of(sup_handle, con->fwnode))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -2153,7 +2153,7 @@ static int fw_devlink_create_devlink(str
 	else
 		flags = FW_DEVLINK_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
 
-	if (sup_handle->flags & FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE)
+	if (fwnode_test_flag(sup_handle, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE))
 		sup_dev = fwnode_get_next_parent_dev(sup_handle);
 	else
 		sup_dev = get_dev_from_fwnode(sup_handle);
@@ -2165,7 +2165,7 @@ static int fw_devlink_create_devlink(str
 		 * supplier device indefinitely.
 		 */
 		if (sup_dev->links.status == DL_DEV_NO_DRIVER &&
-		    sup_handle->flags & FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) {
+		    fwnode_test_flag(sup_handle, FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED)) {
 			dev_dbg(con,
 				"Not linking %pfwf - dev might never probe\n",
 				sup_handle);
drivers/bus/imx-weim.c +1 -1
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static int of_weim_notify(struct notifie
 			 * fw_devlink doesn't skip adding consumers to this
 			 * device.
 			 */
-			rd->dn->fwnode.flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE;
+			fwnode_clear_flag(&rd->dn->fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE);
 			if (!of_platform_device_create(rd->dn, NULL, &pdev->dev)) {
 				dev_err(&pdev->dev,
 					"Failed to create child device '%pOF'\n",
drivers/i2c/i2c-core-of.c +1 -1
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ static int of_i2c_notify(struct notifier
 		 * Clear the flag before adding the device so that fw_devlink
 		 * doesn't skip adding consumers to this device.
 		 */
-		rd->dn->fwnode.flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE;
+		fwnode_clear_flag(&rd->dn->fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE);
 		client = of_i2c_register_device(adap, rd->dn);
 		if (IS_ERR(client)) {
 			dev_err(&adap->dev, "failed to create client for '%pOF'\n",
drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c +2 -2
@@ -705,8 +705,8 @@ int __mdiobus_register(struct mii_bus *b
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (bus->parent && bus->parent->of_node)
-		bus->parent->of_node->fwnode.flags |=
-					FWNODE_FLAG_NEEDS_CHILD_BOUND_ON_ADD;
+		fwnode_set_flag(&bus->parent->of_node->fwnode,
+				FWNODE_FLAG_NEEDS_CHILD_BOUND_ON_ADD);
 
 	WARN(bus->state != MDIOBUS_ALLOCATED &&
 	     bus->state != MDIOBUS_UNREGISTERED,
drivers/of/base.c +1 -1
@@ -1793,7 +1793,7 @@ void of_alias_scan(void * (*dt_alloc)(u6
 		if (name)
 			of_stdout = of_find_node_opts_by_path(name, &of_stdout_options);
 		if (of_stdout)
-			of_stdout->fwnode.flags |= FWNODE_FLAG_BEST_EFFORT;
+			fwnode_set_flag(&of_stdout->fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_BEST_EFFORT);
 	}
 
 	if (!of_aliases)
drivers/of/dynamic.c +1 -1
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static void __of_attach_node(struct devi
 	np->sibling = np->parent->child;
 	np->parent->child = np;
 	of_node_clear_flag(np, OF_DETACHED);
-	np->fwnode.flags |= FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE;
+	fwnode_set_flag(&np->fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE);
 
 	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&devtree_lock, flags);
 
drivers/of/platform.c +1 -1
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ static int of_platform_notify(struct not
 		 * Clear the flag before adding the device so that fw_devlink
 		 * doesn't skip adding consumers to this device.
 		 */
-		rd->dn->fwnode.flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE;
+		fwnode_clear_flag(&rd->dn->fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE);
 		/* pdev_parent may be NULL when no bus platform device */
 		pdev_parent = of_find_device_by_node(parent);
 		pdev = of_platform_device_create(rd->dn, NULL,
drivers/spi/spi.c +1 -1
@@ -4811,7 +4811,7 @@ static int of_spi_notify(struct notifier
 		 * Clear the flag before adding the device so that fw_devlink
 		 * doesn't skip adding consumers to this device.
 		 */
-		rd->dn->fwnode.flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE;
+		fwnode_clear_flag(&rd->dn->fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE);
 		spi = of_register_spi_device(ctlr, rd->dn);
 		put_device(&ctlr->dev);
 
include/linux/fwnode.h +33 -11

74 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#27 lore raw

PATCH 27/215 ocfs2: split transactions in dio completion to avoid credit exhaustion

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Heming Zhao <[email protected]>

commit d647c5b2fbf81560818dacade360abc8c00a9665 upstream.

During ocfs2 dio operations, JBD2 may report warnings via following
call trace:
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent
ocfs2_extend_rotate_transaction
ocfs2_extend_trans
jbd2__journal_restart
start_this_handle
output: JBD2: kworker/6:2 wants too many credits credits:5450 rsv_credits:0 max:5449

To prevent exceeding the credits limit, modify ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() to handle extents in a batch of transaction.

Additionally, relocate ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan(). The orphan inode should only be removed from the orphan list after the extent tree update is complete. This ensures that if a crash occurs in the middle of extent tree updates, we won't leave stale blocks beyond EOF.

This patch also changes the logic for updating the inode size and removing orphan, making it similar to ext4_dio_write_end_io(). Both operations are performed only when everything looks good.

Finally, thanks to Jans and Joseph for providing the bug fix prototype and suggestions.

---
 fs/ocfs2/aops.c |   74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
fs/ocfs2/aops.c +45 -29
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
 #include "namei.h"
 #include "sysfile.h"
 
+#define OCFS2_DIO_MARK_EXTENT_BATCH 200
+
 static int ocfs2_symlink_get_block(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,
 				   struct buffer_head *bh_result, int create)
 {
@@ -2301,7 +2303,7 @@ static int ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(struct
 	struct ocfs2_alloc_context *meta_ac = NULL;
 	handle_t *handle = NULL;
 	loff_t end = offset + bytes;
-	int ret = 0, credits = 0;
+	int ret = 0, credits = 0, batch = 0;
 
 	ocfs2_init_dealloc_ctxt(&dealloc);
 
@@ -2318,18 +2320,6 @@ static int ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(struct
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	/* Delete orphan before acquire i_rwsem. */
-	if (dwc->dw_orphaned) {
-		BUG_ON(dwc->dw_writer_pid != task_pid_nr(current));
-
-		end = end > i_size_read(inode) ? end : 0;
-
-		ret = ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan(osb, inode, di_bh,
-				!!end, end);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			mlog_errno(ret);
-	}
-
 	down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
 	di = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)di_bh->b_data;
 
@@ -2350,24 +2340,25 @@ static int ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(struct
 
 	credits = ocfs2_calc_extend_credits(inode->i_sb, &di->id2.i_list);
 
-	handle = ocfs2_start_trans(osb, credits);
-	if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
-		mlog_errno(ret);
-		goto unlock;
-	}
-	ret = ocfs2_journal_access_di(handle, INODE_CACHE(inode), di_bh,
-				      OCFS2_JOURNAL_ACCESS_WRITE);
-	if (ret) {
-		mlog_errno(ret);
-		goto commit;
-	}
-
 	list_for_each_entry(ue, &dwc->dw_zero_list, ue_node) {
+		if (!handle) {
+			handle = ocfs2_start_trans(osb, credits);
+			if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
+				ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
+				mlog_errno(ret);
+				goto unlock;
+			}
+			ret = ocfs2_journal_access_di(handle, INODE_CACHE(inode), di_bh,
+					OCFS2_JOURNAL_ACCESS_WRITE);
+			if (ret) {
+				mlog_errno(ret);
+				goto commit;
+			}
+		}
 		ret = ocfs2_assure_trans_credits(handle, credits);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			mlog_errno(ret);
-			break;
+			goto commit;
 		}
 		ret = ocfs2_mark_extent_written(inode, &et, handle,
 						ue->ue_cpos, 1,
@@ -2375,19 +2366,44 @@ static int ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(struct
 						meta_ac, &dealloc);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			mlog_errno(ret);
-			break;
+			goto commit;
+		}
+
+		if (++batch == OCFS2_DIO_MARK_EXTENT_BATCH) {
+			ocfs2_commit_trans(osb, handle);
+			handle = NULL;
+			batch = 0;
 		}
 	}
 
 	if (end > i_size_read(inode)) {
+		if (!handle) {
+			handle = ocfs2_start_trans(osb, credits);
+			if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
+				ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
+				mlog_errno(ret);
+				goto unlock;
+			}
+		}
 		ret = ocfs2_set_inode_size(handle, inode, di_bh, end);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			mlog_errno(ret);
 	}
+
 commit:
-	ocfs2_commit_trans(osb, handle);
+	if (handle)
+		ocfs2_commit_trans(osb, handle);
 unlock:
 	up_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
+
+	/* everything looks good, let's start the cleanup */
+	if (!ret && dwc->dw_orphaned) {
+		BUG_ON(dwc->dw_writer_pid != task_pid_nr(current));
+
+		ret = ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan(osb, inode, di_bh, 0, 0);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			mlog_errno(ret);
+	}
 	ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1);
 	brelse(di_bh);
 out:
author maintainer
#28 lore raw

PATCH 28/215 zram: do not forget to endio for partial discard requests

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>

commit e3668b371329ea036ff022ce8ecc82f8befcf003 upstream.

As reported by Qu Wenruo and Avinesh Kumar, the following

getconf PAGESIZE
65536
blkdiscard -p 4k /dev/zram0

takes literally forever to complete. zram doesn't support partial discards and just returns immediately w/o doing any discard work in such cases. The problem is that we forget to endio on our way out, so blkdiscard sleeps forever in submit_bio_wait(). Fix this by jumping to end_bio label, which does bio_endio().

---
 drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c +2 -1
@@ -2017,7 +2017,7 @@ static void zram_bio_discard(struct zram
 	 */
 	if (offset) {
 		if (n <= (PAGE_SIZE - offset))
-			return;
+			goto end_bio;
 
 		n -= (PAGE_SIZE - offset);
 		index++;
@@ -2032,6 +2032,7 @@ static void zram_bio_discard(struct zram
 		n -= PAGE_SIZE;
 	}
 
+end_bio:
 	bio_endio(bio);
 }
 
author maintainer
#29 lore raw

PATCH 29/215 wifi: rtw88: check for PCI upstream bridge existence

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>

commit eb101d2abdcccb514ca4fccd3b278dd8267374f6 upstream.

pci_upstream_bridge() returns NULL if the device is on a root bus. If 8821CE is installed in the system with such a PCI topology, the probing routine will crash. This has probably been unnoticed as 8821CE is mostly supplied in laptops where there is a PCI-to-PCI bridge located upstream from the device. However the card might be installed on a system with different configuration.

Check if the bridge does exist for the specific workaround to be applied.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace static analysis tool.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c +2 -1
@@ -1767,7 +1767,8 @@ int rtw_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
 	}
 
 	/* Disable PCIe ASPM L1 while doing NAPI poll for 8821CE */
-	if (rtwdev->chip->id == RTW_CHIP_TYPE_8821C && bridge->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL)
+	if (rtwdev->chip->id == RTW_CHIP_TYPE_8821C &&
+	    bridge && bridge->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL)
 		rtwpci->rx_no_aspm = true;
 
 	rtw_pci_phy_cfg(rtwdev);
author maintainer
#30 lore raw

PATCH 30/215 vfio/cdx: Serialize VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS with a per-device mutex

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>

commit 670e8864b1a218d72f08db40d0103adf38fa1d9b upstream.

vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger() reads vdev->config_msi and operates on the vdev->cdx_irqs array based on its value, but provides no serialization against concurrent VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctls. Two callers can race such that one observes config_msi as set while another clears it and frees cdx_irqs via vfio_cdx_msi_disable(), resulting in a use-after-free of the cdx_irqs array.

Add a cdx_irqs_lock mutex to struct vfio_cdx_device and acquire it in vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger(), which is the single chokepoint through which all updates to config_msi, cdx_irqs, and msi_count flow, covering both the ioctl path and the close-device cleanup path. This keeps the test of config_msi atomic with the subsequent enable, disable, or trigger operations.

Drop the pre-call !cdx_irqs test from vfio_cdx_irqs_cleanup() as part of this change: the optimization it provided is redundant with the !config_msi early-return inside vfio_cdx_msi_disable(), and leaving the test in place would be an unsynchronized read of state the new lock is meant to protect.

Fixes 848e447e000c ("vfio/cdx: add interrupt support")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 drivers/vfio/cdx/intr.c    |    9 ++-------
 drivers/vfio/cdx/main.c    |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/vfio/cdx/private.h |    3 +++
 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/vfio/cdx/intr.c +2 -7
@@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ static int vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger(stru
 	if (start + count > cdx_dev->num_msi)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	guard(mutex)(&vdev->cdx_irqs_lock);
+
 	if (!count && (flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE)) {
 		vfio_cdx_msi_disable(vdev);
 		return 0;
@@ -206,12 +208,5 @@ int vfio_cdx_set_irqs_ioctl(struct vfio_
 /* Free All IRQs for the given device */
 void vfio_cdx_irqs_cleanup(struct vfio_cdx_device *vdev)
 {
-	/*
-	 * Device does not support any interrupt or the interrupts
-	 * were not configured
-	 */
-	if (!vdev->cdx_irqs)
-		return;
-
 	vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger(vdev, 0, 0, 0, VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, NULL);
 }
drivers/vfio/cdx/main.c +19 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,23 @@
 
 #include "private.h"
 
+static int vfio_cdx_init_dev(struct vfio_device *core_vdev)
+{
+	struct vfio_cdx_device *vdev =
+		container_of(core_vdev, struct vfio_cdx_device, vdev);
+
+	mutex_init(&vdev->cdx_irqs_lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void vfio_cdx_release_dev(struct vfio_device *core_vdev)
+{
+	struct vfio_cdx_device *vdev =
+		container_of(core_vdev, struct vfio_cdx_device, vdev);
+
+	mutex_destroy(&vdev->cdx_irqs_lock);
+}
+
 static int vfio_cdx_open_device(struct vfio_device *core_vdev)
 {
 	struct vfio_cdx_device *vdev =
@@ -281,6 +298,8 @@ static int vfio_cdx_mmap(struct vfio_dev
 
 static const struct vfio_device_ops vfio_cdx_ops = {
 	.name		= "vfio-cdx",
+	.init		= vfio_cdx_init_dev,
+	.release	= vfio_cdx_release_dev,
 	.open_device	= vfio_cdx_open_device,
 	.close_device	= vfio_cdx_close_device,
 	.ioctl		= vfio_cdx_ioctl,
drivers/vfio/cdx/private.h +3 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 #ifndef VFIO_CDX_PRIVATE_H
 #define VFIO_CDX_PRIVATE_H
 
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+
 #define VFIO_CDX_OFFSET_SHIFT    40
 
 static inline u64 vfio_cdx_index_to_offset(u32 index)
@@ -31,6 +33,7 @@ struct vfio_cdx_region {
 struct vfio_cdx_device {
 	struct vfio_device	vdev;
 	struct vfio_cdx_region	*regions;
+	struct mutex		cdx_irqs_lock;
 	struct vfio_cdx_irq	*cdx_irqs;
 	u32			flags;
 #define BME_SUPPORT BIT(0)
author maintainer
#31 lore raw

PATCH 31/215 vfio/cdx: Fix NULL pointer dereference in interrupt trigger path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Prasanna Kumar T S M <[email protected]>

commit 5ea5880764cbb164afb17a62e76ca75dc371409d upstream.

Add validation to ensure MSI is configured before accessing cdx_irqs array in vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger(). Without this check, userspace can trigger a NULL pointer dereference by calling VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS with VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_BOOL or VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE flags before ever setting up interrupts via VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_EVENTFD.

The vfio_cdx_msi_enable() function allocates the cdx_irqs array and sets config_msi to 1 only when called through the EVENTFD path. The trigger loop (for DATA_BOOL/DATA_NONE) assumed this had already been done, but there was no enforcement of this call ordering.

This matches the protection used in the PCI VFIO driver where vfio_pci_set_msi_trigger() checks irq_is() before the trigger loop.

---
 drivers/vfio/cdx/intr.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/vfio/cdx/intr.c +4 -0
@@ -177,6 +177,10 @@ static int vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger(stru
 		return ret;
 	}
 
+	/* Ensure MSI is configured before accessing cdx_irqs */
+	if (!vdev->config_msi)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	for (i = start; i < start + count; i++) {
 		if (!vdev->cdx_irqs[i].trigger)
 			continue;
author maintainer
#32 lore raw

PATCH 32/215 um: drivers: call kernel_strrchr() explicitly in cow_user.c

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 91e901c65b4da02a6fd543e3f0049829ae9645b7 upstream.

Building ARCH=um on glibc >= 2.43 fails:

arch/um/drivers/cow_user.c: error: implicit declaration of function 'strrchr' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]

glibc 2.43's C23 const-preserving strrchr() macro does not survive UML's global -Dstrrchr=kernel_strrchr remap from arch/um/Makefile. Call kernel_strrchr() directly in cow_user.c so the source no longer depends on the -D rewrite.

Fixes 2c51a4bc0233 ("um: fix strrchr() problems")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5-4
[remove unnecessary 'extern']
---
 arch/um/drivers/cow_user.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/um/drivers/cow_user.c +7 -1
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@
 #include "cow.h"
 #include "cow_sys.h"
 
+/*
+ * arch/um/Makefile remaps strrchr to kernel_strrchr; call the kernel
+ * name directly to avoid glibc >= 2.43's C23 strrchr macro.
+ */
+char *kernel_strrchr(const char *, int);
+
 #define PATH_LEN_V1 256
 
 /* unsigned time_t works until year 2106 */
@@ -153,7 +159,7 @@ static int absolutize(char *to, int size
 			   errno);
 		return -1;
 	}
-	slash = strrchr(from, '/');
+	slash = kernel_strrchr(from, '/');
 	if (slash != NULL) {
 		*slash = '\0';
 		if (chdir(from)) {
author maintainer
#33 lore raw

PATCH 33/215 spi: imx: fix use-after-free on unbind

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 1c78c2002380a1fe31bfb01a3d5f29809e55a096 upstream.

The SPI subsystem frees the controller and any subsystem allocated driver data as part of deregistration (unless the allocation is device managed).

Take another reference before deregistering the controller so that the driver data is not freed until the driver is done with it.

Fixes 307c897db762 ("spi: spi-imx: replace struct spi_imx_data::bitbang by pointer to struct spi_controller")
---
 drivers/spi/spi-imx.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/spi/spi-imx.c +4 -0
@@ -1893,6 +1893,8 @@ static void spi_imx_remove(struct platfo
 	struct spi_imx_data *spi_imx = spi_controller_get_devdata(controller);
 	int ret;
 
+	spi_controller_get(controller);
+
 	spi_unregister_controller(controller);
 
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(spi_imx->dev);
@@ -1906,6 +1908,8 @@ static void spi_imx_remove(struct platfo
 	pm_runtime_disable(spi_imx->dev);
 
 	spi_imx_sdma_exit(spi_imx);
+
+	spi_controller_put(controller);
 }
 
 static int spi_imx_runtime_resume(struct device *dev)
author maintainer
#34 lore raw

PATCH 34/215 spi: ch341: fix memory leaks on probe failures

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit b99e3ddb91b499d920e63a2daff8880be68cfe9e upstream.

Make sure to deregister the controller, disable pins, and kill and free the RX URB on probe failures to mirror disconnect and avoid memory leaks and use-after-free.

Also add an explicit URB kill on disconnect for symmetry (even if that is not strictly required as USB core would have stopped it in the current setup).

Fixes 8846739f52af ("spi: add ch341a usb2spi driver")
Cc Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/spi/spi-ch341.c |   36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/spi/spi-ch341.c +25 -11
@@ -173,17 +173,17 @@ static int ch341_probe(struct usb_interf
 
 	ch341->tx_buf =
 		devm_kzalloc(&udev->dev, CH341_PACKET_LENGTH, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!ch341->tx_buf)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (!ch341->tx_buf) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_free_urb;
+	}
 
 	usb_fill_bulk_urb(ch341->rx_urb, udev, ch341->read_pipe, ch341->rx_buf,
 			  ch341->rx_len, ch341_recv, ch341);
 
 	ret = usb_submit_urb(ch341->rx_urb, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (ret) {
-		usb_free_urb(ch341->rx_urb);
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	}
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_free_urb;
 
 	ctrl->bus_num = -1;
 	ctrl->mode_bits = SPI_CPHA;
@@ -195,21 +195,34 @@ static int ch341_probe(struct usb_interf
 
 	ret = ch341_config_stream(ch341);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto err_kill_urb;
 
 	ret = ch341_enable_pins(ch341, true);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto err_kill_urb;
 
 	ret = spi_register_controller(ctrl);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto err_disable_pins;
 
 	ch341->spidev = spi_new_device(ctrl, &chip);
-	if (!ch341->spidev)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (!ch341->spidev) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_unregister;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
+
+err_unregister:
+	spi_unregister_controller(ctrl);
+err_disable_pins:
+	ch341_enable_pins(ch341, false);
+err_kill_urb:
+	usb_kill_urb(ch341->rx_urb);
+err_free_urb:
+	usb_free_urb(ch341->rx_urb);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static void ch341_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
@@ -219,6 +232,7 @@ static void ch341_disconnect(struct usb_
 	spi_unregister_device(ch341->spidev);
 	spi_unregister_controller(ch341->ctrl);
 	ch341_enable_pins(ch341, false);
+	usb_kill_urb(ch341->rx_urb);
 	usb_free_urb(ch341->rx_urb);
 }
 
author maintainer
#35 lore raw

PATCH 35/215 mm/memory_hotplug: fix hwpoisoned large folio handling in do_migrate_range()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jinjiang Tu <[email protected]>

commit 397f6d14f9c370e4910e6885294c340f39dedbf5 upstream.

In do_migrate_range(), the hwpoisoned folio may be large folio, which can't be handled by unmap_poisoned_folio().

I can reproduce this issue in qemu after adding delay in memory_failure()

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
Workqueue: kacpi_hotplug acpi_hotplug_work_fn
RIP: 0010:try_to_unmap_one+0x16a/0xfc0
  <TASK>
  rmap_walk_anon+0xda/0x1f0
  try_to_unmap+0x78/0x80
  ? __pfx_try_to_unmap_one+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_folio_not_mapped+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_folio_lock_anon_vma_read+0x10/0x10
  unmap_poisoned_folio+0x60/0x140
  do_migrate_range+0x4d1/0x600
  ? slab_memory_callback+0x6a/0x190
  ? notifier_call_chain+0x56/0xb0
  offline_pages+0x3e6/0x460
  memory_subsys_offline+0x130/0x1f0
  device_offline+0xba/0x110
  acpi_bus_offline+0xb7/0x130
  acpi_scan_hot_remove+0x77/0x290
  acpi_device_hotplug+0x1e0/0x240
  acpi_hotplug_work_fn+0x1a/0x30
  process_one_work+0x186/0x340

Besides, do_migrate_range() may be called between memory_failure set hwpoison flag and isolate the folio from lru, so remove WARN_ON(). In other places, unmap_poisoned_folio() is called when the folio is isolated, obey it in do_migrate_range() too.

[[email protected]: don't abort offlining, fixed typo, add comment]
Fixes b15c87263a69 ("hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to be offlined")
Cc Kefeng Wang <[email protected]>
Cc Luis Chamberalin <[email protected]>
Cc Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc Oscar Salvador <[email protected]>
Cc Pankaj Raghav <[email protected]>
---
 mm/memory_hotplug.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/memory_hotplug.c +8 -2
index 0a42e9a8caba2..16d788547b9b6 100644
@@ -1802,8 +1802,14 @@ static void do_migrate_range(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn)
 			goto put_folio;
 
 		if (folio_contain_hwpoisoned_page(folio)) {
-			if (WARN_ON(folio_test_lru(folio)))
-				folio_isolate_lru(folio);
+			/*
+			 * unmap_poisoned_folio() cannot handle large folios
+			 * in all cases yet.
+			 */
+			if (folio_test_large(folio) && !folio_test_hugetlb(folio))
+				goto put_folio;
+			if (folio_test_lru(folio) && !folio_isolate_lru(folio))
+				goto put_folio;
 			if (folio_mapped(folio)) {
 				folio_lock(folio);
 				unmap_poisoned_folio(folio, pfn, false);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#36 lore raw

PATCH 36/215 crypto: pcrypt - Fix handling of MAY_BACKLOG requests

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>

commit 915b692e6cb723aac658c25eb82c58fd81235110 upstream.

MAY_BACKLOG requests can return EBUSY. Handle them by checking for that value and filtering out EINPROGRESS notifications.

Fixes 5a1436beec57 ("crypto: pcrypt - call the complete function on error")
Cc Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
---
 crypto/pcrypt.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
crypto/pcrypt.c +5 -2
@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ static void pcrypt_aead_done(void *data,
 	struct pcrypt_request *preq = aead_request_ctx(req);
 	struct padata_priv *padata = pcrypt_request_padata(preq);
 
+	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+		return;
+
 	padata->info = err;
 
 	padata_do_serial(padata);
@@ -82,7 +85,7 @@ static void pcrypt_aead_enc(struct padat
 
 	ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(req);
 
-	if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
+	if (ret == -EINPROGRESS || ret == -EBUSY)
 		return;
 
 	padata->info = ret;
@@ -133,7 +136,7 @@ static void pcrypt_aead_dec(struct padat
 
 	ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
 
-	if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
+	if (ret == -EINPROGRESS || ret == -EBUSY)
 		return;
 
 	padata->info = ret;
author maintainer
#37 lore raw

PATCH 37/215 of: unittest: fix use-after-free in of_unittest_changeset()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>

commit faecdd423c27f0d6090156a435ba9dbbac0eaddb upstream.

The variable 'parent' is assigned the value of 'nchangeset' earlier in the function, meaning both point to the same struct device_node. The call to of_node_put(nchangeset) can decrement the reference count to zero and free the node if there are no other holders. After that, the code still uses 'parent' to check for the presence of a property and to read a string property, leading to a use-after-free.

Fix this by moving the of_node_put() call after the last access to 'parent', avoiding the UAF.

---
 drivers/of/unittest.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/of/unittest.c +1 -2
@@ -887,8 +887,6 @@ static void __init of_unittest_changeset
 
 	unittest(!of_changeset_apply(&chgset), "apply failed\n");
 
-	of_node_put(nchangeset);
-
 	/* Make sure node names are constructed correctly */
 	unittest((np = of_find_node_by_path("/testcase-data/changeset/n2/n21")),
 		 "'%pOF' not added\n", n21);
@@ -910,6 +908,7 @@ static void __init of_unittest_changeset
 	if (!ret)
 		unittest(strcmp(propstr, "hello") == 0, "original value not in updated property after revert");
 
+	of_node_put(nchangeset);
 	of_changeset_destroy(&chgset);
 
 	of_node_put(n1);
author maintainer
#38 lore raw

PATCH 38/215 of: unittest: fix use-after-free in testdrv_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>

commit 07fd339b2c253205794bea5d9b4b7548a4546c56 upstream.

The function testdrv_probe() retrieves the device_node from the PCI device, applies an overlay, and then immediately calls of_node_put(dn). This releases the reference held by the PCI core, potentially freeing the node if the reference count drops to zero. Later, the same freed pointer 'dn' is passed to of_platform_default_populate(), leading to a use-after-free.

The reference to pdev->dev.of_node is owned by the device model and should not be released by the driver. Remove the erroneous of_node_put() to prevent premature freeing.

---
 drivers/of/unittest.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/of/unittest.c +0 -1
@@ -4095,7 +4095,6 @@ static int testdrv_probe(struct pci_dev
 
 	size = info->dtbo_end - info->dtbo_begin;
 	ret = of_overlay_fdt_apply(info->dtbo_begin, size, &ovcs_id, dn);
-	of_node_put(dn);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
author maintainer
#39 lore raw

PATCH 39/215 hwmon: (powerz) Fix missing usb_kill_urb() on signal interrupt

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sanman Pradhan <[email protected]>

commit b66437cb20a2d9ef201f40b675569f8ea7787c9f upstream.

wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() returns -ERESTARTSYS when interrupted. This needs to abort the URB and return an error. No data has been received from the device so any reads from the transfer buffer are invalid.

The original code tests !ret, which only catches the timeout case (0). On signal delivery (-ERESTARTSYS), !ret is false so the function skips usb_kill_urb() and falls through to read from the unfilled transfer buffer.

Fix by capturing the return value into a long (matching the function return type) and handling signal (negative) and timeout (zero) cases with separate checks that both call usb_kill_urb() before returning.

---
 drivers/hwmon/powerz.c |   11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hwmon/powerz.c +9 -2
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ static void powerz_usb_cmd_complete(stru
 
 static int powerz_read_data(struct usb_device *udev, struct powerz_priv *priv)
 {
+	long rc;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!priv->urb)
@@ -133,8 +134,14 @@ static int powerz_read_data(struct usb_d
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	if (!wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout
-	    (&priv->completion, msecs_to_jiffies(5))) {
+	rc = wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(&priv->completion,
+						       msecs_to_jiffies(5));
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		usb_kill_urb(priv->urb);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (rc == 0) {
 		usb_kill_urb(priv->urb);
 		return -EIO;
 	}
author maintainer
#40 lore raw

PATCH 40/215 media: amphion: Fix race between m2m job_abort and device_run

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ming Qian <[email protected]>

commit 8cd35ceadcfc8c5da2eb7f7ce24525ce9d4ee62e upstream.

Fix kernel panic caused by race condition where v4l2_m2m_ctx_release() frees m2m_ctx while v4l2_m2m_try_run() is about to call device_run with the same context.

Race sequence:
v4l2_m2m_try_run(): v4l2_m2m_ctx_release():

    lock/unlock                   v4l2_m2m_cancel_job()
                                    job_abort()
                                      v4l2_m2m_job_finish()
                                  kfree(m2m_ctx)  <- frees ctx
    device_run()  <- use-after-free crash at 0x538

Crash trace:

  Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address
  0000000000000538
  v4l2_m2m_try_run+0x78/0x138
  v4l2_m2m_device_run_work+0x14/0x20

The amphion vpu driver does not rely on the m2m framework's device_run callback to perform encode/decode operations.

Fix the race by preventing m2m framework job scheduling entirely:
- Add job_ready callback returning 0 (no jobs ready for m2m framework)
- Remove job_abort callback to avoid the race condition

Fixes 3cd084519c6f ("media: amphion: add vpu v4l2 m2m support")
---
 drivers/media/platform/amphion/vpu_v4l2.c |    9 +++------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/amphion/vpu_v4l2.c +3 -6
@@ -448,17 +448,14 @@ static void vpu_m2m_device_run(void *pri
 {
 }
 
-static void vpu_m2m_job_abort(void *priv)
+static int vpu_m2m_job_ready(void *priv)
 {
-	struct vpu_inst *inst = priv;
-	struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx = inst->fh.m2m_ctx;
-
-	v4l2_m2m_job_finish(m2m_ctx->m2m_dev, m2m_ctx);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static const struct v4l2_m2m_ops vpu_m2m_ops = {
 	.device_run = vpu_m2m_device_run,
-	.job_abort = vpu_m2m_job_abort
+	.job_ready = vpu_m2m_job_ready,
 };
 
 static int vpu_vb2_queue_setup(struct vb2_queue *vq,
author maintainer
#41 lore raw

PATCH 41/215 ALSA: control: Validate buf_len before strnlen() in snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ziqing Chen <[email protected]>

commit e0da8a8cac74f4b9f577979d131f0d2b88a84487 upstream.

snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names() advances pointer p through the names buffer while decrementing buf_len. If buf_len reaches zero but items remain, the next iteration calls strnlen(p, 0).

While strnlen(p, 0) returns 0 and would hit the existing name_len == 0 error path, CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE's fortified strnlen() first checks maxlen against __builtin_dynamic_object_size(). When Clang loses track of p's object size inside the loop, this triggers a BRK exception panic before the return value is examined.

Add a buf_len == 0 guard at the loop entry to prevent calling fortified strnlen() on an exhausted buffer.

Found by kernel fuzz testing through Xiaomi Smartphone.

Fixes 8d448162bda5 ("ALSA: control: add support for ENUMERATED user space controls")
---
 sound/core/control.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
sound/core/control.c +4 -0
@@ -1574,6 +1574,10 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names(
 	/* check that there are enough valid names */
 	p = names;
 	for (i = 0; i < ue->info.value.enumerated.items; ++i) {
+		if (buf_len == 0) {
+			kvfree(names);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 		name_len = strnlen(p, buf_len);
 		if (name_len == 0 || name_len >= 64 || name_len == buf_len) {
 			kvfree(names);
author maintainer
#42 lore raw

PATCH 42/215 net: caif: clear client service pointer on teardown

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhengchuan Liang <[email protected]>

commit f7cf8ece8cee3c1ee361991470cdb1eb65ab02e8 upstream.

caif_connect() can tear down an existing client after remote shutdown by calling caif_disconnect_client() followed by caif_free_client(). caif_free_client() releases the service layer referenced by adap_layer->dn, but leaves that pointer stale.

When the socket is later destroyed, caif_sock_destructor() calls caif_free_client() again and dereferences the freed service pointer.

Clear the client/service links before releasing the service object so repeated teardown becomes harmless.

---
 net/caif/cfsrvl.c |   14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/caif/cfsrvl.c +12 -2
@@ -197,10 +197,20 @@ bool cfsrvl_phyid_match(struct cflayer *
 
 void caif_free_client(struct cflayer *adap_layer)
 {
+	struct cflayer *serv_layer;
 	struct cfsrvl *servl;
-	if (adap_layer == NULL || adap_layer->dn == NULL)
+
+	if (!adap_layer)
+		return;
+
+	serv_layer = adap_layer->dn;
+	if (!serv_layer)
 		return;
-	servl = container_obj(adap_layer->dn);
+
+	layer_set_dn(adap_layer, NULL);
+	layer_set_up(serv_layer, NULL);
+
+	servl = container_obj(serv_layer);
 	servl->release(&servl->layer);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(caif_free_client);
author maintainer
#43 lore raw

PATCH 43/215 net: strparser: fix skb_head leak in strp_abort_strp()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luxiao Xu <[email protected]>

commit fe72340daaf1af588be88056faf98965f39e6032 upstream.

When the stream parser is aborted, for example after a message assembly timeout, it can still hold a reference to a partially assembled message in strp->skb_head.

That skb is not released in strp_abort_strp(), which leaks the partially assembled message and can be triggered repeatedly to exhaust memory.

Fix this by freeing strp->skb_head and resetting the parser state in the abort path. Leave strp_stop() unchanged so final cleanup still happens in strp_done() after the work and timer have been synchronized.

---
 net/strparser/strparser.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
net/strparser/strparser.c +8 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,14 @@ static void strp_abort_strp(struct strpa
 
 	strp->stopped = 1;
 
+	if (strp->skb_head) {
+		kfree_skb(strp->skb_head);
+		strp->skb_head = NULL;
+	}
+
+	strp->skb_nextp = NULL;
+	strp->need_bytes = 0;
+
 	if (strp->sk) {
 		struct sock *sk = strp->sk;
 
author maintainer
#44 lore raw

PATCH 44/215 media: mtk-jpeg: fix use-after-free in release path due to uncancelled work

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fan Wu <[email protected]>

commit 34c519feef3e4fcff1078dc8bdb25fbbbd10303f upstream.

The mtk_jpeg_release() function frees the context structure (ctx) without first cancelling any pending or running work in ctx->jpeg_work. This creates a race window where the workqueue callback may still be accessing the context memory after it has been freed.

Race condition:

    CPU 0 (release)                    CPU 1 (workqueue)
    ----------------                   ------------------
    close()
      mtk_jpeg_release()
                                       mtk_jpegenc_worker()
                                         ctx = work->data
                                         // accessing ctx

        kfree(ctx)  // freed!
                                         access ctx  // UAF!

The work is queued via queue_work() during JPEG encode/decode operations (via mtk_jpeg_device_run). If the device is closed while work is pending or running, the work handler will access freed memory.

Fix this by calling cancel_work_sync() BEFORE acquiring the mutex. This ordering is critical: if cancel_work_sync() is called after mutex_lock(), and the work handler also tries to acquire the same mutex, it would cause a deadlock.

Note: The open error path does NOT need cancel_work_sync() because INIT_WORK() only initializes the work structure - it does not schedule it. Work is only scheduled later during ioctl operations.

Fixes 5fb1c2361e56 ("mtk-jpegenc: add jpeg encode worker interface")
---
 drivers/media/platform/mediatek/jpeg/mtk_jpeg_core.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/media/platform/mediatek/jpeg/mtk_jpeg_core.c +1 -0
@@ -1213,6 +1213,7 @@ static int mtk_jpeg_release(struct file
 	struct mtk_jpeg_dev *jpeg = video_drvdata(file);
 	struct mtk_jpeg_ctx *ctx = mtk_jpeg_fh_to_ctx(file->private_data);
 
+	cancel_work_sync(&ctx->jpeg_work);
 	mutex_lock(&jpeg->lock);
 	v4l2_m2m_ctx_release(ctx->fh.m2m_ctx);
 	v4l2_ctrl_handler_free(&ctx->ctrl_hdl);
author maintainer
#45 lore raw

PATCH 45/215 crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix OTP sysfs read and error handling

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>

commit 635c3a757a567b2479639237f5f0d4d9439015f1 upstream.

Fix otp_show() to read and print all 64 bytes of the OTP zone. Previously, the loop only printed half of the OTP (32 bytes), and partial output was returned on read errors.

Propagate the actual error from atmel_sha204a_otp_read() instead of producing partial output.

Replace sprintf() with sysfs_emit_at(), which is preferred for formatting sysfs output because it provides safer bounds checking.

Fixes 13909a0c8897 ("crypto: atmel-sha204a - provide the otp content")
---
 drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c |   20 +++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c +11 -9
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include "atmel-i2c.h"
 
@@ -120,21 +121,22 @@ static ssize_t otp_show(struct device *d
 {
 	u16 addr;
 	u8 otp[OTP_ZONE_SIZE];
-	char *str = buf;
 	struct i2c_client *client = to_i2c_client(dev);
-	int i;
+	ssize_t len = 0;
+	int i, ret;
 
-	for (addr = 0; addr < OTP_ZONE_SIZE/4; addr++) {
-		if (atmel_sha204a_otp_read(client, addr, otp + addr * 4) < 0) {
+	for (addr = 0; addr < OTP_ZONE_SIZE / 4; addr++) {
+		ret = atmel_sha204a_otp_read(client, addr, otp + addr * 4);
+		if (ret < 0) {
 			dev_err(dev, "failed to read otp zone\n");
-			break;
+			return ret;
 		}
 	}
 
-	for (i = 0; i < addr*2; i++)
-		str += sprintf(str, "%02X", otp[i]);
-	str += sprintf(str, "\n");
-	return str - buf;
+	for (i = 0; i < OTP_ZONE_SIZE; i++)
+		len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "%02X", otp[i]);
+	len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len, "\n");
+	return len;
 }
 static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(otp);
 
author maintainer
#46 lore raw

PATCH 46/215 PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-ntb: Remove duplicate resource teardown

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Koichiro Den <[email protected]>

commit 3446beddba450c8d6f9aca2f028712ac527fead3 upstream.

epf_ntb_epc_destroy() duplicates the teardown that the caller is supposed to do later. This leads to an oops when .allow_link fails or when .drop_link is performed. Remove the helper.

Also drop pci_epc_put(). EPC device refcounting is tied to configfs EPC group lifetime, and pci_epc_put() in the .drop_link path is sufficient.

Fixes 8b821cf76150 ("PCI: endpoint: Add EP function driver to provide NTB functionality")
---
 drivers/pci/endpoint/functions/pci-epf-ntb.c |   56 ---------------------------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/endpoint/functions/pci-epf-ntb.c +2 -54
@@ -1495,47 +1495,6 @@ err_alloc_peer_mem:
 }
 
 /**
- * epf_ntb_epc_destroy_interface() - Cleanup NTB EPC interface
- * @ntb: NTB device that facilitates communication between HOST1 and HOST2
- * @type: PRIMARY interface or SECONDARY interface
- *
- * Unbind NTB function device from EPC and relinquish reference to pci_epc
- * for each of the interface.
- */
-static void epf_ntb_epc_destroy_interface(struct epf_ntb *ntb,
-					  enum pci_epc_interface_type type)
-{
-	struct epf_ntb_epc *ntb_epc;
-	struct pci_epc *epc;
-	struct pci_epf *epf;
-
-	if (type < 0)
-		return;
-
-	epf = ntb->epf;
-	ntb_epc = ntb->epc[type];
-	if (!ntb_epc)
-		return;
-	epc = ntb_epc->epc;
-	pci_epc_remove_epf(epc, epf, type);
-	pci_epc_put(epc);
-}
-
-/**
- * epf_ntb_epc_destroy() - Cleanup NTB EPC interface
- * @ntb: NTB device that facilitates communication between HOST1 and HOST2
- *
- * Wrapper for epf_ntb_epc_destroy_interface() to cleanup all the NTB interfaces
- */
-static void epf_ntb_epc_destroy(struct epf_ntb *ntb)
-{
-	enum pci_epc_interface_type type;
-
-	for (type = PRIMARY_INTERFACE; type <= SECONDARY_INTERFACE; type++)
-		epf_ntb_epc_destroy_interface(ntb, type);
-}
-
-/**
  * epf_ntb_epc_create_interface() - Create and initialize NTB EPC interface
  * @ntb: NTB device that facilitates communication between HOST1 and HOST2
  * @epc: struct pci_epc to which a particular NTB interface should be associated
@@ -1614,15 +1573,8 @@ static int epf_ntb_epc_create(struct epf
 
 	ret = epf_ntb_epc_create_interface(ntb, epf->sec_epc,
 					   SECONDARY_INTERFACE);
-	if (ret) {
+	if (ret)
 		dev_err(dev, "SECONDARY intf: Fail to create NTB EPC\n");
-		goto err_epc_create;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-
-err_epc_create:
-	epf_ntb_epc_destroy_interface(ntb, PRIMARY_INTERFACE);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1887,7 +1839,7 @@ static int epf_ntb_bind(struct pci_epf *
 	ret = epf_ntb_init_epc_bar(ntb);
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_err(dev, "Failed to create NTB EPC\n");
-		goto err_bar_init;
+		return ret;
 	}
 
 	ret = epf_ntb_config_spad_bar_alloc_interface(ntb);
@@ -1909,9 +1861,6 @@ static int epf_ntb_bind(struct pci_epf *
 err_bar_alloc:
 	epf_ntb_config_spad_bar_free(ntb);
 
-err_bar_init:
-	epf_ntb_epc_destroy(ntb);
-
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1927,7 +1876,6 @@ static void epf_ntb_unbind(struct pci_ep
 
 	epf_ntb_epc_cleanup(ntb);
 	epf_ntb_config_spad_bar_free(ntb);
-	epf_ntb_epc_destroy(ntb);
 }
 
 #define EPF_NTB_R(_name)						\
author maintainer
#47 lore raw

PATCH 47/215 Revert "ALSA: usb: Increase volume range that triggers a warning"

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rong Zhang <[email protected]>

commit 41d78cb724f4b40b7548af420ccfe524b14023bb upstream.

UAC uses 2 bytes to store volume values, so the maximum volume range is 0xFFFF (65535, val = -32768/32767/1).

The reverted commit bumpped the range of triggering the warning to > 65535, effectively making the range check a no-op. It didn't fix anything but covered any potential problems and deviated from the original intention of the range check.

This reverts commit 6b971191fcfc9e3c2c0143eea22534f1f48dbb62.

Fixes 6b971191fcfc ("ALSA: usb: Increase volume range that triggers a warning")
---
 sound/usb/mixer.c |    7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
sound/usb/mixer.c +4 -3
@@ -1814,10 +1814,11 @@ static void __build_feature_ctl(struct u
 
 	range = (cval->max - cval->min) / cval->res;
 	/*
-	 * There are definitely devices with a range of ~20,000, so let's be
-	 * conservative and allow for a bit more.
+	 * Are there devices with volume range more than 255? I use a bit more
+	 * to be sure. 384 is a resolution magic number found on Logitech
+	 * devices. It will definitively catch all buggy Logitech devices.
 	 */
-	if (range > 65535) {
+	if (range > 384) {
 		usb_audio_warn(mixer->chip,
 			       "Warning! Unlikely big volume range (=%u), cval->res is probably wrong.",
 			       range);
author maintainer
#48 lore raw

PATCH 48/215 PCI: epf-mhi: Return 0, not remaining timeout, when eDMA ops complete

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>

commit 36bfc3642b19a98f1302aed4437c331df9b481f0 upstream.

pci_epf_mhi_edma_read() and pci_epf_mhi_edma_write() start DMA operations and wait for completion with a timeout.

On successful completion, they previously returned the remaining timeout, which callers may treat as an error. In particular, mhi_ep_ring_add_element(), which calls pci_epf_mhi_edma_write() via mhi_cntrl->write_sync(), interprets any non-zero return value as failure.

Return 0 on success instead of the remaining timeout to prevent mhi_ep_ring_add_element() from treating successful completion as an error.

Fixes 7b99aaaddabb ("PCI: epf-mhi: Add eDMA support")
[mani: changed commit log as per https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/20260227191510.GA3904799@bhelgaas]
---
 drivers/pci/endpoint/functions/pci-epf-mhi.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/pci/endpoint/functions/pci-epf-mhi.c +4 -0
@@ -367,6 +367,8 @@ static int pci_epf_mhi_edma_read(struct
 		dev_err(dev, "DMA transfer timeout\n");
 		dmaengine_terminate_sync(chan);
 		ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
+	} else {
+		ret = 0;
 	}
 
 err_unmap:
@@ -438,6 +440,8 @@ static int pci_epf_mhi_edma_write(struct
 		dev_err(dev, "DMA transfer timeout\n");
 		dmaengine_terminate_sync(chan);
 		ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
+	} else {
+		ret = 0;
 	}
 
 err_unmap:
author maintainer
#49 lore raw

PATCH 49/215 lib/ts_kmp: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Law <[email protected]>

commit 8cdf30813ea8ce881cecc08664144416dbdb3e16 upstream.

The ts_kmp algorithm stores its prefix_tbl[] table and pattern in a single allocation sized from the pattern length. If the prefix_tbl[] size calculation wraps, the resulting allocation can be too small and subsequent pattern copies can overflow it.

Fix this by rejecting zero-length patterns and by using overflow helpers before calculating the combined allocation size.

This fixes a potential heap overflow. The pattern length calculation can wrap during a size_t addition, leading to an undersized allocation. Because the textsearch library is reachable from userspace via Netfilter's xt_string module, this is a security risk that should be backported to LTS kernels.

---
 lib/ts_kmp.c |   18 ++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
lib/ts_kmp.c +16 -2
@@ -94,8 +94,22 @@ static struct ts_config *kmp_init(const
 	struct ts_config *conf;
 	struct ts_kmp *kmp;
 	int i;
-	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
-	size_t priv_size = sizeof(*kmp) + len + prefix_tbl_len;
+	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len;
+	size_t priv_size;
+
+	/* Zero-length patterns would make kmp_find() read beyond kmp->pattern. */
+	if (unlikely(!len))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	/*
+	 * kmp->pattern is stored immediately after the prefix_tbl[] table.
+	 * Reject lengths that would wrap while sizing either region.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(len, sizeof(*kmp->prefix_tbl),
+					&prefix_tbl_len) ||
+		     check_add_overflow(sizeof(*kmp), (size_t)len, &priv_size) ||
+		     check_add_overflow(priv_size, prefix_tbl_len, &priv_size)))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	conf = alloc_ts_config(priv_size, gfp_mask);
 	if (IS_ERR(conf))
author maintainer
#50 lore raw

PATCH 50/215 media: i2c: imx219: Check return value of devm_gpiod_get_optional() in imx219_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chen Ni <[email protected]>

commit 943b1f27a3eead21b22e2531a5432ea5910b60eb upstream.

The devm_gpiod_get_optional() function may return an error pointer (ERR_PTR) in case of a genuine failure during GPIO acquisition, not just NULL which indicates the legitimate absence of an optional GPIO.

Add an IS_ERR() check after the function call to catch such errors and propagate them to the probe function, ensuring the driver fails to load safely rather than proceeding with an invalid pointer.

Fixes 1283b3b8f82b ("media: i2c: Add driver for Sony IMX219 sensor")
---
 drivers/media/i2c/imx219.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/media/i2c/imx219.c +3 -0
@@ -1176,6 +1176,9 @@ static int imx219_probe(struct i2c_clien
 	/* Request optional enable pin */
 	imx219->reset_gpio = devm_gpiod_get_optional(dev, "reset",
 						     GPIOD_OUT_HIGH);
+	if (IS_ERR(imx219->reset_gpio))
+		return dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(imx219->reset_gpio),
+				     "failed to get reset gpio\n");
 
 	/*
 	 * The sensor must be powered for imx219_identify_module()
author maintainer
#51 lore raw

PATCH 51/215 net: qrtr: ns: Fix use-after-free in driver remove()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>

commit 7809fea20c9404bfcfa6112ec08d1fe1d3520beb upstream.

In the remove callback, if a packet arrives after destroy_workqueue() is called, but before sock_release(), the qrtr_ns_data_ready() callback will try to queue the work, causing use-after-free issue.

Fix this issue by saving the default 'sk_data_ready' callback during qrtr_ns_init() and use it to replace the qrtr_ns_data_ready() callback at the start of remove(). This ensures that even if a packet arrives after destroy_workqueue(), the work struct will not be dereferenced.

Note that it is also required to ensure that the RX threads are completed before destroying the workqueue, because the threads could be using the qrtr_ns_data_ready() callback.

Fixes 0c2204a4ad71 ("net: qrtr: Migrate nameservice to kernel from userspace")
---
 net/qrtr/ns.c |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
net/qrtr/ns.c +11 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static struct {
 	struct list_head lookups;
 	struct workqueue_struct *workqueue;
 	struct work_struct work;
+	void (*saved_data_ready)(struct sock *sk);
 	int local_node;
 } qrtr_ns;
 
@@ -709,6 +710,7 @@ int qrtr_ns_init(void)
 		goto err_sock;
 	}
 
+	qrtr_ns.saved_data_ready = qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_data_ready;
 	qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_data_ready = qrtr_ns_data_ready;
 
 	sq.sq_port = QRTR_PORT_CTRL;
@@ -749,6 +751,10 @@ int qrtr_ns_init(void)
 	return 0;
 
 err_wq:
+	write_lock_bh(&qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_callback_lock);
+	qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_data_ready = qrtr_ns.saved_data_ready;
+	write_unlock_bh(&qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_callback_lock);
+
 	destroy_workqueue(qrtr_ns.workqueue);
 err_sock:
 	sock_release(qrtr_ns.sock);
@@ -758,7 +764,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(qrtr_ns_init);
 
 void qrtr_ns_remove(void)
 {
+	write_lock_bh(&qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_callback_lock);
+	qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_data_ready = qrtr_ns.saved_data_ready;
+	write_unlock_bh(&qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_callback_lock);
+
 	cancel_work_sync(&qrtr_ns.work);
+	synchronize_net();
 	destroy_workqueue(qrtr_ns.workqueue);
 
 	/* sock_release() expects the two references that were put during
author maintainer
#52 lore raw

PATCH 52/215 ext2: reject inodes with zero i_nlink and valid mode in ext2_iget()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vasiliy Kovalev <[email protected]>

commit 25947cc5b2374cd5bf627fe3141496444260d04f upstream.

ext2_iget() already rejects inodes with i_nlink == 0 when i_mode is zero or i_dtime is set, treating them as deleted. However, the case of i_nlink == 0 with a non-zero mode and zero dtime slips through. Since ext2 has no orphan list, such a combination can only result from filesystem corruption - a legitimate inode deletion always sets either i_dtime or clears i_mode before freeing the inode.

A crafted image can exploit this gap to present such an inode to the VFS, which then triggers WARN_ON inside drop_nlink() (fs/inode.c) via ext2_unlink(), ext2_rename() and ext2_rmdir():

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 609 at fs/inode.c:336 drop_nlink+0xad/0xd0 fs/inode.c:336
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 609 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.12.77+ #1
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 inode_dec_link_count include/linux/fs.h:2518 [inline]
 ext2_unlink+0x26c/0x300 fs/ext2/namei.c:295
 vfs_unlink+0x2fc/0x9b0 fs/namei.c:4477
 do_unlinkat+0x53e/0x730 fs/namei.c:4541
 __x64_sys_unlink+0xc6/0x110 fs/namei.c:4587
 do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
 </TASK>

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 646 at fs/inode.c:336 drop_nlink+0xad/0xd0 fs/inode.c:336
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 646 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted 6.12.77+ #1
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 inode_dec_link_count include/linux/fs.h:2518 [inline]
 ext2_rename+0x35e/0x850 fs/ext2/namei.c:374
 vfs_rename+0xf2f/0x2060 fs/namei.c:5021
 do_renameat2+0xbe2/0xd50 fs/namei.c:5178
 __x64_sys_rename+0x7e/0xa0 fs/namei.c:5223
 do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
 </TASK>

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 634 at fs/inode.c:336 drop_nlink+0xad/0xd0 fs/inode.c:336
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 634 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.12.77+ #1
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 inode_dec_link_count include/linux/fs.h:2518 [inline]
 ext2_rmdir+0xca/0x110 fs/ext2/namei.c:311
 vfs_rmdir+0x204/0x690 fs/namei.c:4348
 do_rmdir+0x372/0x3e0 fs/namei.c:4407
 __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xf0/0x130 fs/namei.c:4577
 do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
 </TASK>

Extend the existing i_nlink == 0 check to also catch this case, reporting the corruption via ext2_error() and returning -EFSCORRUPTED. This rejects the inode at load time and prevents it from reaching any of the namei.c paths.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

---
 fs/ext2/inode.c |   14 +++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ext2/inode.c +11 -3
@@ -1429,9 +1429,17 @@ struct inode *ext2_iget (struct super_bl
 	 * the test is that same one that e2fsck uses
 	 * NeilBrown 1999oct15
 	 */
-	if (inode->i_nlink == 0 && (inode->i_mode == 0 || ei->i_dtime)) {
-		/* this inode is deleted */
-		ret = -ESTALE;
+	if (inode->i_nlink == 0) {
+		if (inode->i_mode == 0 || ei->i_dtime) {
+			/* this inode is deleted */
+			ret = -ESTALE;
+		} else {
+			ext2_error(sb, __func__,
+				   "inode %lu has zero i_nlink with mode 0%o and no dtime, "
+				   "filesystem may be corrupt",
+				   ino, inode->i_mode);
+			ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+		}
 		goto bad_inode;
 	}
 	inode->i_blocks = le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_blocks);
author maintainer
#53 lore raw

PATCH 53/215 ALSA: aoa: i2sbus: fix OF node lifetime handling

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>

commit 4ec93f070eda6b765b62efcaed9241c3b3b0b6ad upstream.

i2sbus_add_dev() keeps the matched "sound" child pointer after for_each_child_of_node() has dropped the iterator reference. Take an extra reference before saving that node and drop it after the layout-id/device-id lookup is complete.

The function also stores np in dev->sound.ofdev.dev.of_node without taking a reference for the embedded soundbus device. Since i2sbus overrides the embedded platform device release callback, balance that reference explicitly in the local error path and in i2sbus_release_dev().

---
 sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/core.c |    9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/core.c +6 -3
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static void i2sbus_release_dev(struct de
 	for (i = aoa_resource_i2smmio; i <= aoa_resource_rxdbdma; i++)
 		free_irq(i2sdev->interrupts[i], i2sdev);
 	i2sbus_control_remove_dev(i2sdev->control, i2sdev);
+	of_node_put(i2sdev->sound.ofdev.dev.of_node);
 	mutex_destroy(&i2sdev->lock);
 	kfree(i2sdev);
 }
@@ -149,7 +150,6 @@ static int i2sbus_get_and_fixup_rsrc(str
 }
 
 /* Returns 1 if added, 0 for otherwise; don't return a negative value! */
-/* FIXME: look at device node refcounting */
 static int i2sbus_add_dev(struct macio_dev *macio,
 			  struct i2sbus_control *control,
 			  struct device_node *np)
@@ -180,8 +180,9 @@ static int i2sbus_add_dev(struct macio_d
 	i = 0;
 	for_each_child_of_node(np, child) {
 		if (of_node_name_eq(child, "sound")) {
+			of_node_put(sound);
 			i++;
-			sound = child;
+			sound = of_node_get(child);
 		}
 	}
 	if (i == 1) {
@@ -207,6 +208,7 @@ static int i2sbus_add_dev(struct macio_d
 			}
 		}
 	}
+	of_node_put(sound);
 	/* for the time being, until we can handle non-layout-id
 	 * things in some fabric, refuse to attach if there is no
 	 * layout-id property or we haven't been forced to attach.
@@ -221,7 +223,7 @@ static int i2sbus_add_dev(struct macio_d
 	mutex_init(&dev->lock);
 	spin_lock_init(&dev->low_lock);
 	dev->sound.ofdev.archdata.dma_mask = macio->ofdev.archdata.dma_mask;
-	dev->sound.ofdev.dev.of_node = np;
+	dev->sound.ofdev.dev.of_node = of_node_get(np);
 	dev->sound.ofdev.dev.dma_mask = &dev->sound.ofdev.archdata.dma_mask;
 	dev->sound.ofdev.dev.parent = &macio->ofdev.dev;
 	dev->sound.ofdev.dev.release = i2sbus_release_dev;
@@ -329,6 +331,7 @@ static int i2sbus_add_dev(struct macio_d
 	for (i=0;i<3;i++)
 		release_and_free_resource(dev->allocated_resource[i]);
 	mutex_destroy(&dev->lock);
+	of_node_put(dev->sound.ofdev.dev.of_node);
 	kfree(dev);
 	return 0;
 }
author maintainer
#54 lore raw

PATCH 54/215 ALSA: ctxfi: Add fallback to default RSR for S/PDIF

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Harin Lee <[email protected]>

commit 7d61662197ecdc458e33e475b6ada7f6da61d364 upstream.

spdif_passthru_playback_get_resources() uses atc->pll_rate as the RSR for the MSR calculation loop. However, pll_rate is only updated in atc_pll_init() and not in hw_pll_init(), so it remains 0 after the card init.

When spdif_passthru_playback_setup() skips atc_pll_init() for 32000 Hz, (rsr * desc.msr) always becomes 0, causing the loop to spin indefinitely.

Add fallback to use atc->rsr when atc->pll_rate is 0. This reflects the hardware state, since hw_card_init() already configures the PLL to the default RSR.

---
 sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c +2 -1
@@ -788,7 +788,8 @@ static int spdif_passthru_playback_get_r
 	struct src *src;
 	int err;
 	int n_amixer = apcm->substream->runtime->channels, i;
-	unsigned int pitch, rsr = atc->pll_rate;
+	unsigned int pitch;
+	unsigned int rsr = atc->pll_rate ? atc->pll_rate : atc->rsr;
 
 	/* first release old resources */
 	atc_pcm_release_resources(atc, apcm);
author maintainer
#55 lore raw

PATCH 55/215 ALSA: seq_oss: return full count for successful SEQ_FULLSIZE writes

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>

commit bbc6c0dda54fc0ad8f8aed0b796c23e186e1a188 upstream.

snd_seq_oss_write() currently returns the raw load_patch() callback result for SEQ_FULLSIZE events.

That callback is documented as returning 0 on success and -errno on failure, but snd_seq_oss_write() is the file write path and should report the number of user bytes consumed on success. Some in-tree backends also return backend-specific positive values, which can still be shorter than the original write size.

Return the full byte count for successful SEQ_FULLSIZE writes. Preserve negative errors and convert any nonnegative completion to the original count.

---
 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_rw.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_rw.c +3 -3
@@ -101,9 +101,9 @@ snd_seq_oss_write(struct seq_oss_devinfo
 				break;
 			}
 			fmt = (*(unsigned short *)rec.c) & 0xffff;
-			/* FIXME the return value isn't correct */
-			return snd_seq_oss_synth_load_patch(dp, rec.s.dev,
-							    fmt, buf, 0, count);
+			err = snd_seq_oss_synth_load_patch(dp, rec.s.dev,
+							   fmt, buf, 0, count);
+			return err < 0 ? err : count;
 		}
 		if (ev_is_long(&rec)) {
 			/* extended code */
author maintainer
#56 lore raw

PATCH 56/215 erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gao Xiang <[email protected]>

commit d18a3b5d337fa412a38e776e6b4b857a58836575 upstream.

Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with strnlen() with unchecked nameoffs.

If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff >= maxsize, maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing strnlen() to read past the directory block.

nameoff0 should also be verified to be a multiple of sizeof(struct erofs_dirent) as well [1].

[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com

Fixes 3aa8ec716e52 ("staging: erofs: add directory operations")
Fixes 33bac912840f ("staging: erofs: keep corrupted fs from crashing kernel in erofs_readdir()")
---
 fs/erofs/dir.c |   28 +++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/erofs/dir.c +15 -13
@@ -18,20 +18,18 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct in
 		const char *de_name = (char *)dentry_blk + nameoff;
 		unsigned int de_namelen;
 
-		/* the last dirent in the block? */
-		if (de + 1 >= end)
-			de_namelen = strnlen(de_name, maxsize - nameoff);
-		else
+		/* non-trailing dirent in the directory block? */
+		if (de + 1 < end)
 			de_namelen = le16_to_cpu(de[1].nameoff) - nameoff;
+		else if (maxsize <= nameoff)
+			goto err_bogus;
+		else
+			de_namelen = strnlen(de_name, maxsize - nameoff);
 
-		/* a corrupted entry is found */
-		if (nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize ||
-		    de_namelen > EROFS_NAME_LEN) {
-			erofs_err(dir->i_sb, "bogus dirent @ nid %llu",
-				  EROFS_I(dir)->nid);
-			DBG_BUGON(1);
-			return -EFSCORRUPTED;
-		}
+		/* a corrupted entry is found (including negative namelen) */
+		if (!in_range32(de_namelen, 1, EROFS_NAME_LEN) ||
+		    nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize)
+			goto err_bogus;
 
 		if (!dir_emit(ctx, de_name, de_namelen,
 			      le64_to_cpu(de->nid), d_type))
@@ -40,6 +38,10 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct in
 		ctx->pos += sizeof(struct erofs_dirent);
 	}
 	return 0;
+err_bogus:
+	erofs_err(dir->i_sb, "bogus dirent @ nid %llu", EROFS_I(dir)->nid);
+	DBG_BUGON(1);
+	return -EFSCORRUPTED;
 }
 
 static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx)
@@ -67,7 +69,7 @@ static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f,
 		}
 
 		nameoff = le16_to_cpu(de->nameoff);
-		if (nameoff < sizeof(struct erofs_dirent) || nameoff >= bsz) {
+		if (!nameoff || nameoff >= bsz || (nameoff % sizeof(*de))) {
 			erofs_err(sb, "invalid de[0].nameoff %u @ nid %llu",
 				  nameoff, EROFS_I(dir)->nid);
 			err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
author maintainer
#57 lore raw

PATCH 57/215 jbd2: fix deadlock in jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Yi <[email protected]>

commit 981fcc5674e67158d24d23e841523eccba19d0e7 upstream.

Commit f76d4c28a46a ("fs/jbd2: use sleeping version of __find_get_block()") changed jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke() to use __find_get_block_nonatomic() which holds the folio lock instead of i_private_lock. This breaks the lock ordering (folio -> buffer) and causes an ABBA deadlock when the filesystem blocksize < pagesize:

T1 T2
ext4_mkdir()
ext4_init_new_dir()
ext4_append()
ext4_getblk()
lock_buffer() <- A
sync_blockdev()
blkdev_writepages()
writeback_iter()
writeback_get_folio()
folio_lock() <- B
ext4_journal_get_create_access()
jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke()
__find_get_block_nonatomic()
folio_lock() <- B
block_write_full_folio()
lock_buffer() <- A

This can occasionally cause generic/013 to hang.

Fix by only calling __find_get_block_nonatomic() when the passed buffer_head doesn't belong to the bdev, which is the only case that we need to look up its bdev alias. Otherwise, the lookup is redundant since the found buffer_head is equal to the one we passed in.

Fixes f76d4c28a46a ("fs/jbd2: use sleeping version of __find_get_block()")
---
 fs/jbd2/revoke.c |    8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/jbd2/revoke.c +5 -3
@@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ int jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke(handle_t
 	int need_cancel;
 	int did_revoke = 0;	/* akpm: debug */
 	struct buffer_head *bh = jh2bh(jh);
+	struct address_space *bh_mapping = bh->b_folio->mapping;
 
 	jbd2_debug(4, "journal_head %p, cancelling revoke\n", jh);
 
@@ -466,13 +467,14 @@ int jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke(handle_t
 	 * buffer_head?  If so, we'd better make sure we clear the
 	 * revoked status on any hashed alias too, otherwise the revoke
 	 * state machine will get very upset later on. */
-	if (need_cancel) {
+	if (need_cancel && !sb_is_blkdev_sb(bh_mapping->host->i_sb)) {
 		struct buffer_head *bh2;
+
 		bh2 = __find_get_block_nonatomic(bh->b_bdev, bh->b_blocknr,
 						 bh->b_size);
 		if (bh2) {
-			if (bh2 != bh)
-				clear_buffer_revoked(bh2);
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(bh2 == bh);
+			clear_buffer_revoked(bh2);
 			__brelse(bh2);
 		}
 	}
author maintainer
#58 lore raw

PATCH 58/215 md/raid10: fix deadlock with check operation and nowait requests

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Hunt <[email protected]>

commit 7d96f3120a7fb7210d21b520c5b6f495da6ba436 upstream.

When an array check is running it will raise the barrier at which point normal requests will become blocked and increment the nr_pending value to signal there is work pending inside of wait_barrier(). NOWAIT requests do not block and so will return immediately with an error, and additionally do not increment nr_pending in wait_barrier(). Upstream change commit 43806c3d5b9b ("raid10: cleanup memleak at raid10_make_request") added a call to raid_end_bio_io() to fix a memory leak when NOWAIT requests hit this condition. raid_end_bio_io() eventually calls allow_barrier() and it will unconditionally do an atomic_dec_and_test(&conf->nr_pending) even though the corresponding increment on nr_pending didn't happen in the NOWAIT case.

This can be easily seen by starting a check operation while an application is doing nowait IO on the same array. This results in a deadlocked state due to nr_pending value underflowing and so the md resync thread gets stuck waiting for nr_pending to == 0.

Output of r10conf state of the array when we hit this condition:

crash> struct r10conf

	barrier = 1,
        nr_pending = {
          counter = -41
        },
        nr_waiting = 15,
        nr_queued = 0,

Example of md_sync thread stuck waiting on raise_barrier() and other requests stuck in wait_barrier():

md1_resync

[<0>] raise_barrier+0xce/0x1c0
[<0>] raid10_sync_request+0x1ca/0x1ed0
[<0>] md_do_sync+0x779/0x1110
[<0>] md_thread+0x90/0x160
[<0>] kthread+0xbe/0xf0
[<0>] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
[<0>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

kworker/u1040:2+flush-253:4

[<0>] wait_barrier+0x1de/0x220
[<0>] regular_request_wait+0x30/0x180
[<0>] raid10_make_request+0x261/0x1000
[<0>] md_handle_request+0x13b/0x230
[<0>] __submit_bio+0x107/0x1f0
[<0>] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x16f/0x390
[<0>] ext4_io_submit+0x24/0x40
[<0>] ext4_do_writepages+0x254/0xc80
[<0>] ext4_writepages+0x84/0x120
[<0>] do_writepages+0x7a/0x260
[<0>] __writeback_single_inode+0x3d/0x300
[<0>] writeback_sb_inodes+0x1dd/0x470
[<0>] __writeback_inodes_wb+0x4c/0xe0
[<0>] wb_writeback+0x18b/0x2d0
[<0>] wb_workfn+0x2a1/0x400
[<0>] process_one_work+0x149/0x330
[<0>] worker_thread+0x2d2/0x410
[<0>] kthread+0xbe/0xf0
[<0>] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
[<0>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Fixes 43806c3d5b9b ("raid10: cleanup memleak at raid10_make_request")
---
 drivers/md/raid10.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/md/raid10.c +2 -2
@@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ static void raid10_read_request(struct m
 	}
 
 	if (!regular_request_wait(mddev, conf, bio, r10_bio->sectors)) {
-		raid_end_bio_io(r10_bio);
+		free_r10bio(r10_bio);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -1381,7 +1381,7 @@ static void raid10_write_request(struct
 
 	sectors = r10_bio->sectors;
 	if (!regular_request_wait(mddev, conf, bio, sectors)) {
-		raid_end_bio_io(r10_bio);
+		free_r10bio(r10_bio);
 		return;
 	}
 
author maintainer
#59 lore raw

PATCH 59/215 mfd: stpmic1: Attempt system shutdown twice in case PMIC is confused

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marek Vasut <[email protected]>

commit ffdc5c51f8bcd0e5e8255ca275a0a3b958475d99 upstream.

Attempt to shut down again, in case the first attempt failed. The STPMIC1 might get confused and the first regmap_update_bits() returns with -ETIMEDOUT / -110 . If that or similar transient failure occurs, try to shut down again. If the second attempt fails, there is some bigger problem, report it to user.

Fixes 6e9df38f359a ("mfd: stpmic1: Add PMIC poweroff via sys-off handler")
---
 drivers/mfd/stpmic1.c |   20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mfd/stpmic1.c +18 -2
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
 
 #include <dt-bindings/mfd/st,stpmic1.h>
 
+#define STPMIC1_MAX_RETRIES 2
+
 #define STPMIC1_MAIN_IRQ 0
 
 static const struct regmap_range stpmic1_readable_ranges[] = {
@@ -121,9 +123,23 @@ static const struct regmap_irq_chip stpm
 static int stpmic1_power_off(struct sys_off_data *data)
 {
 	struct stpmic1 *ddata = data->cb_data;
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Attempt to shut down again, in case the first attempt failed.
+	 * The STPMIC1 might get confused and the first regmap_update_bits()
+	 * returns with -ETIMEDOUT / -110 . If that or similar transient
+	 * failure occurs, try to shut down again. If the second attempt
+	 * fails, there is some bigger problem, report it to user.
+	 */
+	for (int retries = 0; retries < STPMIC1_MAX_RETRIES; retries++) {
+		ret = regmap_update_bits(ddata->regmap, MAIN_CR, SOFTWARE_SWITCH_OFF,
+					 SOFTWARE_SWITCH_OFF);
+		if (!ret)
+			return NOTIFY_DONE;
+	}
 
-	regmap_update_bits(ddata->regmap, MAIN_CR,
-			   SOFTWARE_SWITCH_OFF, SOFTWARE_SWITCH_OFF);
+	dev_err(ddata->dev, "Failed to access PMIC I2C bus (%d)\n", ret);
 
 	return NOTIFY_DONE;
 }
author maintainer
#60 lore raw

PATCH 60/215 mtd: docg3: fix use-after-free in docg3_release()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: James Kim <[email protected]>

commit ca19808bc6fac7e29420d8508df569b346b3e339 upstream.

In docg3_release(), the docg3 pointer is obtained from cascade->floors[0]->priv before the loop that calls doc_release_device() on each floor. doc_release_device() frees the docg3 struct via kfree(docg3) at line 1881. After the loop, docg3->cascade->bch dereferences the already-freed pointer.

Fix this by accessing cascade->bch directly, which is equivalent since docg3->cascade points back to the same cascade struct, and is already available as a local variable. This also removes the now-unused docg3 local variable.

Fixes c8ae3f744ddc ("lib/bch: Rework a little bit the exported function names")
---
 drivers/mtd/devices/docg3.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/devices/docg3.c +1 -2
@@ -2049,7 +2049,6 @@ err_probe:
 static void docg3_release(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	struct docg3_cascade *cascade = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
-	struct docg3 *docg3 = cascade->floors[0]->priv;
 	int floor;
 
 	doc_unregister_sysfs(pdev, cascade);
@@ -2057,7 +2056,7 @@ static void docg3_release(struct platfor
 		if (cascade->floors[floor])
 			doc_release_device(cascade->floors[floor]);
 
-	bch_free(docg3->cascade->bch);
+	bch_free(cascade->bch);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_OF
author maintainer
#61 lore raw

PATCH 61/215 nvme-pci: add NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES for Kingston OM3SGP4

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Robert Beckett <[email protected]>

commit a8eebf9699d69987cc49cec4e4fdb4111ab32423 upstream.

The Kingston OM3SGP42048K2-A00 (PCI ID 2646:502f) firmware has a race condition when processing concurrent write zeroes and DSM (discard) commands, causing spurious "LBA Out of Range" errors and IOMMU page faults at address 0x0.

The issue is reliably triggered by running two concurrent mkfs commands on different partitions of the same drive, which generates interleaved write zeroes and discard operations.

Disable write zeroes for this device, matching the pattern used for other Kingston OM* drives that have similar firmware issues.

---
 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +2 -0
@@ -3716,6 +3716,8 @@ static const struct pci_device_id nvme_i
 		.driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES, },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(0x2646, 0x501E),   /* KINGSTON OM3PGP4xxxxQ OS21011 NVMe SSD */
 		.driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES, },
+	{ PCI_DEVICE(0x2646, 0x502F),   /* KINGSTON OM3SGP4xxxxK NVMe SSD */
+		.driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES, },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(0x1f40, 0x1202),   /* Netac Technologies Co. NV3000 NVMe SSD */
 		.driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_BOGUS_NID, },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(0x1f40, 0x5236),   /* Netac Technologies Co. NV7000 NVMe SSD */
author maintainer
#62 lore raw

PATCH 62/215 nvme: respect NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES when wzsl is set

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Robert Beckett <[email protected]>

commit 40f0496b617b431f8d2dd94d7f785c1121f8a68a upstream.

The NVM Command Set Identify Controller data may report a non-zero Write Zeroes Size Limit (wzsl). When present, nvme_init_non_mdts_limits() unconditionally overrides max_zeroes_sectors from wzsl, even if NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES previously set it to zero.

This effectively re-enables write zeroes for devices that need it disabled, defeating the quirk. Several Kingston OM* drives rely on this quirk to avoid firmware issues with write zeroes commands.

Check for the quirk before applying the wzsl override.

Fixes 5befc7c26e5a ("nvme: implement non-mdts command limits")
Assisted-by claude-opus-4-6-v1
---
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nvme/host/core.c +1 -1
@@ -3169,7 +3169,7 @@ static int nvme_init_non_mdts_limits(str
 
 	ctrl->dmrl = id->dmrl;
 	ctrl->dmrsl = le32_to_cpu(id->dmrsl);
-	if (id->wzsl)
+	if (id->wzsl && !(ctrl->quirks & NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES))
 		ctrl->max_zeroes_sectors = nvme_mps_to_sectors(ctrl, id->wzsl);
 
 free_data:
author maintainer
#63 lore raw

PATCH 63/215 parisc: _llseek syscall is only available for 32-bit userspace

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>

commit da3680f564bd787ce974f9931e6e924d908b3b2a upstream.

---
 arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -1
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@
 # 137 was afs_syscall
 138	common	setfsuid		sys_setfsuid
 139	common	setfsgid		sys_setfsgid
-140	common	_llseek			sys_llseek
+140	32	_llseek			sys_llseek
 141	common	getdents		sys_getdents			compat_sys_getdents
 142	common	_newselect		sys_select			compat_sys_select
 143	common	flock			sys_flock
author maintainer
#64 lore raw

PATCH 64/215 remoteproc: xlnx: Only access buffer information if IPI is buffered

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ben Levinsky <[email protected]>

commit 38dd6ccfdfbbe865569a52fe1ba9fa1478f672e6 upstream.

In the receive callback check if message is NULL to prevent possibility of crash by NULL pointer dereferencing.

---
 drivers/remoteproc/xlnx_r5_remoteproc.c |   20 +++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/remoteproc/xlnx_r5_remoteproc.c +11 -9
@@ -232,17 +232,19 @@ static void zynqmp_r5_mb_rx_cb(struct mb
 
 	ipi = container_of(cl, struct mbox_info, mbox_cl);
 
-	/* copy data from ipi buffer to r5_core */
+	/* copy data from ipi buffer to r5_core if IPI is buffered. */
 	ipi_msg = (struct zynqmp_ipi_message *)msg;
-	buf_msg = (struct zynqmp_ipi_message *)ipi->rx_mc_buf;
-	len = ipi_msg->len;
-	if (len > IPI_BUF_LEN_MAX) {
-		dev_warn(cl->dev, "msg size exceeded than %d\n",
-			 IPI_BUF_LEN_MAX);
-		len = IPI_BUF_LEN_MAX;
+	if (ipi_msg) {
+		buf_msg = (struct zynqmp_ipi_message *)ipi->rx_mc_buf;
+		len = ipi_msg->len;
+		if (len > IPI_BUF_LEN_MAX) {
+			dev_warn(cl->dev, "msg size exceeded than %d\n",
+				 IPI_BUF_LEN_MAX);
+			len = IPI_BUF_LEN_MAX;
+		}
+		buf_msg->len = len;
+		memcpy(buf_msg->data, ipi_msg->data, len);
 	}
-	buf_msg->len = len;
-	memcpy(buf_msg->data, ipi_msg->data, len);
 
 	/* received and processed interrupt ack */
 	if (mbox_send_message(ipi->rx_chan, NULL) < 0)
author maintainer
#65 lore raw

PATCH 65/215 sched: Use u64 for bandwidth ratio calculations

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Joseph Salisbury <[email protected]>

commit c6e80201e057dfb7253385e60bf541121bf5dc33 upstream.

to_ratio() computes BW_SHIFT-scaled bandwidth ratios from u64 period and runtime values, but it returns unsigned long. tg_rt_schedulable() also stores the current group limit and the accumulated child sum in unsigned long.

On 32-bit builds, large bandwidth ratios can be truncated and the RT group sum can wrap when enough siblings are present. That can let an overcommitted RT hierarchy pass the schedulability check, and it also narrows the helper result for other callers.

Return u64 from to_ratio() and use u64 for the RT group totals so bandwidth ratios are preserved and compared at full width on both 32-bit and 64-bit builds.

Fixes b40b2e8eb521 ("sched: rt: multi level group constraints")
Assisted-by Codex:GPT-5
---
 kernel/sched/core.c  |    2 +-
 kernel/sched/rt.c    |    2 +-
 kernel/sched/sched.h |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/core.c +1 -1
@@ -4794,7 +4794,7 @@ void sched_post_fork(struct task_struct
 	scx_post_fork(p);
 }
 
-unsigned long to_ratio(u64 period, u64 runtime)
+u64 to_ratio(u64 period, u64 runtime)
 {
 	if (runtime == RUNTIME_INF)
 		return BW_UNIT;
kernel/sched/rt.c +1 -1
@@ -2707,7 +2707,7 @@ static int tg_rt_schedulable(struct task
 {
 	struct rt_schedulable_data *d = data;
 	struct task_group *child;
-	unsigned long total, sum = 0;
+	u64 total, sum = 0;
 	u64 period, runtime;
 
 	period = ktime_to_ns(tg->rt_bandwidth.rt_period);
kernel/sched/sched.h +1 -1
@@ -2698,7 +2698,7 @@ extern void init_dl_entity(struct sched_
 #define MAX_BW_BITS		(64 - BW_SHIFT)
 #define MAX_BW			((1ULL << MAX_BW_BITS) - 1)
 
-extern unsigned long to_ratio(u64 period, u64 runtime);
+extern u64 to_ratio(u64 period, u64 runtime);
 
 extern void init_entity_runnable_average(struct sched_entity *se);
 extern void post_init_entity_util_avg(struct task_struct *p);
author maintainer
#66 lore raw

PATCH 66/215 selftests/mqueue: Fix incorrectly named file

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Simon Liebold <[email protected]>

commit 64fac99037689020ad97e472ae898e96ea3616dc upstream.

Commit 85506aca2eb4 ("selftests/mqueue: Set timeout to 180 seconds") intended to increase the timeout for mq_perf_tests from the default kselftest limit of 45 seconds to 180 seconds.

Unfortunately, the file storing this information was incorrectly named setting instead of settings, causing the kselftest runner not to pick up the limit and keep using the default 45 seconds limit.

Fix this by renaming it to settings to ensure that the kselftest runner uses the increased timeout of 180 seconds for this test.

Fixes 85506aca2eb4 ("selftests/mqueue: Set timeout to 180 seconds")
Cc <[email protected]> # 5.10.y
---
 tools/testing/selftests/mqueue/{setting => settings} | 0
 tools/testing/selftests/mqueue/setting  |    1 -
 tools/testing/selftests/mqueue/settings |    1 +
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 rename tools/testing/selftests/mqueue/{setting => settings} (100%)
tools/testing/selftests/mqueue/setting deleted +0 -1
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-timeout=180
tools/testing/selftests/mqueue/settings new file +1 -0
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+timeout=180
author maintainer
#67 lore raw

PATCH 67/215 selftests/landlock: Fix format warning for __u64 in net_test

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

commit a060ac0b8c3345639f5f4a01e2c435d34adf7e3d upstream.

On architectures where __u64 is unsigned long (e.g. powerpc64), using %llx to format a __u64 triggers a -Wformat warning because %llx expects unsigned long long. Cast the argument to unsigned long long.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c +1 -1
@@ -1343,7 +1343,7 @@ TEST_F(mini, network_access_rights)
 					    &net_port, 0))
 		{
 			TH_LOG("Failed to add rule with access 0x%llx: %s",
-			       access, strerror(errno));
+			       (unsigned long long)access, strerror(errno));
 		}
 	}
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
author maintainer
#68 lore raw

PATCH 68/215 rbd: fix null-ptr-deref when device_add_disk() fails

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dawei Feng <[email protected]>

commit d1fef92e414433ca7b89abf85cb0df42b8d475eb upstream.

do_rbd_add() publishes the device with device_add() before calling device_add_disk(). If device_add_disk() fails after device_add() succeeds, the error path calls rbd_free_disk() directly and then later falls through to rbd_dev_device_release(), which calls rbd_free_disk() again. This double teardown can leave blk-mq cleanup operating on invalid state and trigger a null-ptr-deref in __blk_mq_free_map_and_rqs(), reached from blk_mq_free_tag_set().

Fix this by following the normal remove ordering: call device_del() before rbd_dev_device_release() when device_add_disk() fails after device_add(). That keeps the teardown sequence consistent and avoids re-entering disk cleanup through the wrong path.

The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available.

We reproduced the bug on v7.0 with a real Ceph backend and a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN and CONFIG_FAILSLAB enabled. The reproducer confines failslab injections to the __add_disk() range and injects fail-nth while mapping an RBD image through /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major.

On the unpatched kernel, fail-nth=4 reliably triggered the fault:

	Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
	KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
	CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 273 Comm: bash Not tainted 7.0.0-01247-gd60bc1401583 #6 PREEMPT(lazy)
	Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
	RIP: 0010:__blk_mq_free_map_and_rqs+0x8c/0x240
	Code: 00 00 48 8b 6b 60 41 89 f4 49 c1 e4 03 4c 01 e5 45 85 ed 0f 85 0a 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 e9 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 01 00 0f 85 31 01 00 00 4c 8b 6d 00 4d 85 ed 0f 84 e2 00 00
	RSP: 0018:ff1100000ab0fac8 EFLAGS: 00000246
	RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ff1100000c4806a0 RCX: 0000000000000000
	RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ff1100000c4806f4
	RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffe21c000189001b
	R10: ff1100000c4800df R11: ff1100006cf37be0 R12: 0000000000000000
	R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ff1100000c480700 R15: ff1100000c480004
	FS:  00007f0fbe8fe740(0000) GS:ff110000e5851000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
	CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
	CR2: 00007fe53473b2e0 CR3: 0000000012eef000 CR4: 00000000007516f0
	PKRU: 55555554
	Call Trace:
	 <TASK>
	 blk_mq_free_tag_set+0x77/0x460
	 do_rbd_add+0x1446/0x2b80
	 ? __pfx_do_rbd_add+0x10/0x10
	 ? lock_acquire+0x18c/0x300
	 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
	 ? sysfs_file_kobj+0xb6/0x1b0
	 ? __pfx_sysfs_kf_write+0x10/0x10
	 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2f4/0x4a0
	 vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000
	 ? expand_files+0x51f/0x850
	 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10
	 ksys_write+0xf2/0x1d0
	 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10
	 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x690
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
	RIP: 0033:0x7f0fbea15907
	Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24
	RSP: 002b:00007ffe22346ea8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
	RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000058 RCX: 00007f0fbea15907
	RDX: 0000000000000058 RSI: 0000563ace6c0ef0 RDI: 0000000000000001
	RBP: 0000563ace6c0ef0 R08: 0000563ace6c0ef0 R09: 6b6435726d694141
	R10: 5250337279762f78 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000058
	R13: 00007f0fbeb1c780 R14: ff1100000c480700 R15: ff1100000c480004
	 </TASK>

With this fix applied, rerunning the reproducer over fail-nth=1..256 yields no KASAN reports.

[ idryomov: rename err_out_device_del -> err_out_device ]

Fixes 27c97abc30e2 ("rbd: add add_disk() error handling")
---
 drivers/block/rbd.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/block/rbd.c +3 -3
@@ -7166,7 +7166,7 @@ static ssize_t do_rbd_add(const char *bu
 
 	rc = device_add_disk(&rbd_dev->dev, rbd_dev->disk, NULL);
 	if (rc)
-		goto err_out_cleanup_disk;
+		goto err_out_device;
 
 	spin_lock(&rbd_dev_list_lock);
 	list_add_tail(&rbd_dev->node, &rbd_dev_list);
@@ -7180,8 +7180,8 @@ out:
 	module_put(THIS_MODULE);
 	return rc;
 
-err_out_cleanup_disk:
-	rbd_free_disk(rbd_dev);
+err_out_device:
+	device_del(&rbd_dev->dev);
 err_out_image_lock:
 	rbd_dev_image_unlock(rbd_dev);
 	rbd_dev_device_release(rbd_dev);
author maintainer
#69 lore raw

PATCH 69/215 block: fix zone write plugs refcount handling in disk_zone_wplug_schedule_bio_work()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>

commit 0a8b8af896e0ef83e188e1fe20f98f2bbb1c2459 upstream.

The function disk_zone_wplug_schedule_bio_work() always takes a reference on the zone write plug of the BIO work being scheduled. This ensures that the zone write plug cannot be freed while the BIO work is being scheduled but has not run yet. However, this unconditional reference taking is fragile since the reference taken is released by the BIO work blk_zone_wplug_bio_work() function, which implies that there always must be a 1:1 relation between the work being scheduled and the work running.

Make sure to drop the reference taken when scheduling the BIO work if the work is already scheduled, that is, when queue_work() returns false.

Fixes 9e78c38ab30b ("block: Hold a reference on zone write plugs to schedule submission")
---
 block/blk-zoned.c |   12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
block/blk-zoned.c +8 -4
@@ -811,13 +811,17 @@ static void disk_zone_wplug_schedule_bio
 					      struct blk_zone_wplug *zwplug)
 {
 	/*
-	 * Take a reference on the zone write plug and schedule the submission
-	 * of the next plugged BIO. blk_zone_wplug_bio_work() will release the
-	 * reference we take here.
+	 * Schedule the submission of the next plugged BIO. Taking a reference
+	 * to the zone write plug is required as the bio_work belongs to the
+	 * plug, and thus we must ensure that the write plug does not go away
+	 * while the work is being scheduled but has not run yet.
+	 * blk_zone_wplug_bio_work() will release the reference we take here,
+	 * and we also drop this reference if the work is already scheduled.
 	 */
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(!(zwplug->flags & BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_PLUGGED));
 	refcount_inc(&zwplug->ref);
-	queue_work(disk->zone_wplugs_wq, &zwplug->bio_work);
+	if (!queue_work(disk->zone_wplugs_wq, &zwplug->bio_work))
+		disk_put_zone_wplug(zwplug);
 }
 
 static inline void disk_zone_wplug_add_bio(struct gendisk *disk,
author maintainer
#70 lore raw

PATCH 70/215 io_uring/timeout: check unused sqe fields

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>

commit 484ae637a3e3d909718de7c07afd3bb34b6b8504 upstream.

Zero check unused SQE fields addr3 and pad2 for timeout and timeout update requests. They're not needed now, but could be used sometime in the future.

---
 io_uring/timeout.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
io_uring/timeout.c +4 -0
@@ -424,6 +424,8 @@ int io_timeout_remove_prep(struct io_kio
 
 	if (unlikely(req->flags & (REQ_F_FIXED_FILE | REQ_F_BUFFER_SELECT)))
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (sqe->addr3 || sqe->__pad2[0])
+		return -EINVAL;
 	if (sqe->buf_index || sqe->len || sqe->splice_fd_in)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -496,6 +498,8 @@ static int __io_timeout_prep(struct io_k
 	unsigned flags;
 	u32 off = READ_ONCE(sqe->off);
 
+	if (sqe->addr3 || sqe->__pad2[0])
+		return -EINVAL;
 	if (sqe->buf_index || sqe->len != 1 || sqe->splice_fd_in)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (off && is_timeout_link)
author maintainer
#71 lore raw

PATCH 71/215 iio: adc: ti-ads7950: use iio_push_to_buffers_with_ts_unaligned()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Lechner <[email protected]>

commit 7806c060cceb2d6895efbb6cff2f2f17cf1ec5de upstream.

Use iio_push_to_buffers_with_ts_unaligned() to avoid unaligned access when writing the timestamp in the rx_buf.

The previous implementation would have been fine on architectures that support 4-byte alignment of 64-bit integers but could cause issues on architectures that require 8-byte alignment.

Fixes 902c4b2446d4 ("iio: adc: New driver for TI ADS7950 chips")
---
 drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads7950.c |   11 +++++------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads7950.c +5 -6
@@ -47,8 +47,6 @@
 #define TI_ADS7950_MAX_CHAN	16
 #define TI_ADS7950_NUM_GPIOS	4
 
-#define TI_ADS7950_TIMESTAMP_SIZE (sizeof(int64_t) / sizeof(__be16))
-
 /* val = value, dec = left shift, bits = number of bits of the mask */
 #define TI_ADS7950_EXTRACT(val, dec, bits) \
 	(((val) >> (dec)) & ((1 << (bits)) - 1))
@@ -105,8 +103,7 @@ struct ti_ads7950_state {
 	 * DMA (thus cache coherency maintenance) may require the
 	 * transfer buffers to live in their own cache lines.
 	 */
-	u16 rx_buf[TI_ADS7950_MAX_CHAN + 2 + TI_ADS7950_TIMESTAMP_SIZE]
-		__aligned(IIO_DMA_MINALIGN);
+	u16 rx_buf[TI_ADS7950_MAX_CHAN + 2] __aligned(IIO_DMA_MINALIGN);
 	u16 tx_buf[TI_ADS7950_MAX_CHAN + 2];
 	u16 single_tx;
 	u16 single_rx;
@@ -313,8 +310,10 @@ static irqreturn_t ti_ads7950_trigger_ha
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(indio_dev, &st->rx_buf[2],
-					   iio_get_time_ns(indio_dev));
+	iio_push_to_buffers_with_ts_unaligned(indio_dev, &st->rx_buf[2],
+					      sizeof(*st->rx_buf) *
+					      TI_ADS7950_MAX_CHAN,
+					      iio_get_time_ns(indio_dev));
 
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&st->slock);
author maintainer
#72 lore raw

PATCH 72/215 io_uring/poll: fix signed comparison in io_poll_get_ownership()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Longxuan Yu <[email protected]>

commit 326941b22806cbf2df1fbfe902b7908b368cce42 upstream.

io_poll_get_ownership() uses a signed comparison to check whether poll_refs has reached the threshold for the slowpath:

    if (unlikely(atomic_read(&req->poll_refs) >= IO_POLL_REF_BIAS))

atomic_read() returns int (signed). When IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG (BIT(31)) is set in poll_refs, the value becomes negative in signed arithmetic, so the >= 128 comparison always evaluates to false and the slowpath is never taken.

Fix this by casting the atomic_read() result to unsigned int before the comparison, so that the cancel flag is treated as a large positive value and correctly triggers the slowpath.

---
 io_uring/poll.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
io_uring/poll.c +1 -1
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static bool io_poll_get_ownership_slowpa
  */
 static inline bool io_poll_get_ownership(struct io_kiocb *req)
 {
-	if (unlikely(atomic_read(&req->poll_refs) >= IO_POLL_REF_BIAS))
+	if (unlikely((unsigned int)atomic_read(&req->poll_refs) >= IO_POLL_REF_BIAS))
 		return io_poll_get_ownership_slowpath(req);
 	return !(atomic_fetch_inc(&req->poll_refs) & IO_POLL_REF_MASK);
 }
author maintainer
#73 lore raw

PATCH 73/215 io_uring/poll: ensure EPOLL_ONESHOT is propagated for EPOLL_URING_WAKE

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

commit 1967f0b1cafdde37aa9e08e6021c14bcc484b7a5 upstream.

Commit:

aacf2f9f382c ("io_uring: fix req->apoll_events")

fixed an issue where poll->events and req->apoll_events weren't synchronized, but then when the commit referenced in Fixes got added, it didn't ensure the same thing.

If we mask in EPOLLONESHOT in the regular EPOLL_URING_WAKE path, then ensure it's done for both. Including a link to the original report below, even though it's mostly nonsense. But it includes a reproducer that does show that IORING_CQE_F_MORE is set in the previous CQE, while no more CQEs will be generated for this request. Just ignore anything that pretends this is security related in any way, it's just the typical AI nonsense.

---
 io_uring/poll.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
io_uring/poll.c +3 -1
@@ -446,8 +446,10 @@ static int io_poll_wake(struct wait_queu
 		 * disable multishot as there is a circular dependency between
 		 * CQ posting and triggering the event.
 		 */
-		if (mask & EPOLL_URING_WAKE)
+		if (mask & EPOLL_URING_WAKE) {
 			poll->events |= EPOLLONESHOT;
+			req->apoll_events |= EPOLLONESHOT;
+		}
 
 		/* optional, saves extra locking for removal in tw handler */
 		if (mask && poll->events & EPOLLONESHOT) {
author maintainer
#74 lore raw

PATCH 74/215 ALSA: core: Fix potential data race at fasync handling

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit 8146cd333d235ed32d48bb803fdf743472d7c783 upstream.

In snd_fasync_work_fn(), which is the offload work for traversing and processing the pending fasync list, the call of kill_fasync() is done outside the snd_fasync_lock for avoiding deadlocks. The problem is that its the references of fasync->on, fasync->signal and fasync->poll are done there also outside the lock. Since these may be modified by snd_kill_fasync() call concurrently from other process, inconsistent values might be passed to kill_fasync(). Although there shouldn't be critical UAF, it's still better to be addressed.

This patch moves the kill_fasync() argument evaluations inside the snd_fasync_lock for avoiding the data races above. The handling in fasync->on flag is optimized in the loop to skip directly.

Also, for more clarity, snd_fasync_free() takes the lock and unlink the pending entry more directly instead of clearing fasync->on flag.

---
 sound/core/misc.c |   13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
sound/core/misc.c +10 -3
@@ -100,14 +100,18 @@ static LIST_HEAD(snd_fasync_list);
 static void snd_fasync_work_fn(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	struct snd_fasync *fasync;
+	int signal, poll;
 
 	spin_lock_irq(&snd_fasync_lock);
 	while (!list_empty(&snd_fasync_list)) {
 		fasync = list_first_entry(&snd_fasync_list, struct snd_fasync, list);
 		list_del_init(&fasync->list);
+		if (!fasync->on)
+			continue;
+		signal = fasync->signal;
+		poll = fasync->poll;
 		spin_unlock_irq(&snd_fasync_lock);
-		if (fasync->on)
-			kill_fasync(&fasync->fasync, fasync->signal, fasync->poll);
+		kill_fasync(&fasync->fasync, signal, poll);
 		spin_lock_irq(&snd_fasync_lock);
 	}
 	spin_unlock_irq(&snd_fasync_lock);
@@ -163,7 +167,10 @@ void snd_fasync_free(struct snd_fasync *
 {
 	if (!fasync)
 		return;
-	fasync->on = 0;
+
+	scoped_guard(spinlock_irq, &snd_fasync_lock)
+		list_del_init(&fasync->list);
+
 	flush_work(&snd_fasync_work);
 	kfree(fasync);
 }
author maintainer
#75 lore raw

PATCH 75/215 ALSA: caiaq: Fix control_put() result and cache rollback

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>

commit a3542d1b30f92307f545f2def14e8d988dffdff0 upstream.

control_put() always returns 1 and updates cdev->control_state[] before sending the USB command. It also ignores transport errors from usb_bulk_msg(), snd_usb_caiaq_send_command(), and snd_usb_caiaq_send_command_bank().

That breaks the ALSA .put() contract and can leave control_get() reporting a cached value the device never accepted.

Return 0 for unchanged values, propagate transport failures, and restore the cached byte when the write fails.

Fixes 8e3cd08ed8e59 ("[ALSA] caiaq - add control API and more input features")
---
 sound/usb/caiaq/control.c |   54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
sound/usb/caiaq/control.c +37 -17
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static int control_put(struct snd_kcontr
 	struct snd_usb_caiaqdev *cdev = caiaqdev(chip->card);
 	int pos = kcontrol->private_value;
 	int v = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0];
+	int ret;
 	unsigned char cmd;
 
 	switch (cdev->chip.usb_id) {
@@ -103,6 +104,10 @@ static int control_put(struct snd_kcontr
 
 	if (pos & CNT_INTVAL) {
 		int i = pos & ~CNT_INTVAL;
+		unsigned char old = cdev->control_state[i];
+
+		if (old == v)
+			return 0;
 
 		cdev->control_state[i] = v;
 
@@ -113,10 +118,11 @@ static int control_put(struct snd_kcontr
 			cdev->ep8_out_buf[0] = i;
 			cdev->ep8_out_buf[1] = v;
 
-			usb_bulk_msg(cdev->chip.dev,
-				     usb_sndbulkpipe(cdev->chip.dev, 8),
-				     cdev->ep8_out_buf, sizeof(cdev->ep8_out_buf),
-				     &actual_len, 200);
+			ret = usb_bulk_msg(cdev->chip.dev,
+					   usb_sndbulkpipe(cdev->chip.dev, 8),
+					   cdev->ep8_out_buf,
+					   sizeof(cdev->ep8_out_buf),
+					   &actual_len, 200);
 		} else if (cdev->chip.usb_id ==
 			USB_ID(USB_VID_NATIVEINSTRUMENTS, USB_PID_MASCHINECONTROLLER)) {
 
@@ -128,21 +134,36 @@ static int control_put(struct snd_kcontr
 				offset = MASCHINE_BANK_SIZE;
 			}
 
-			snd_usb_caiaq_send_command_bank(cdev, cmd, bank,
-					cdev->control_state + offset,
-					MASCHINE_BANK_SIZE);
+			ret = snd_usb_caiaq_send_command_bank(cdev, cmd, bank,
+							      cdev->control_state + offset,
+							      MASCHINE_BANK_SIZE);
 		} else {
-			snd_usb_caiaq_send_command(cdev, cmd,
-					cdev->control_state, sizeof(cdev->control_state));
+			ret = snd_usb_caiaq_send_command(cdev, cmd,
+							 cdev->control_state,
+							 sizeof(cdev->control_state));
 		}
-	} else {
-		if (v)
-			cdev->control_state[pos / 8] |= 1 << (pos % 8);
-		else
-			cdev->control_state[pos / 8] &= ~(1 << (pos % 8));
 
-		snd_usb_caiaq_send_command(cdev, cmd,
-				cdev->control_state, sizeof(cdev->control_state));
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			cdev->control_state[i] = old;
+			return ret;
+		}
+	} else {
+		int idx = pos / 8;
+		unsigned char mask = 1 << (pos % 8);
+		unsigned char old = cdev->control_state[idx];
+		unsigned char val = v ? (old | mask) : (old & ~mask);
+
+		if (old == val)
+			return 0;
+
+		cdev->control_state[idx] = val;
+		ret = snd_usb_caiaq_send_command(cdev, cmd,
+						 cdev->control_state,
+						 sizeof(cdev->control_state));
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			cdev->control_state[idx] = old;
+			return ret;
+		}
 	}
 
 	return 1;
@@ -640,4 +661,3 @@ int snd_usb_caiaq_control_init(struct sn
 
 	return ret;
 }
-
author maintainer
#76 lore raw

PATCH 76/215 ALSA: caiaq: Handle probe errors properly

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit 28abd224db4a49560b452115bca3672a20e45b2f upstream.

The probe procedure of setup_card() in caiaq driver doesn't treat the error cases gracefully, e.g. the error from snd_card_register() calls snd_card_free() but continues. This would lead to a UAF for the further calls like snd_usb_caiaq_control_init(), as Berk suggested in another patch in the link below.

However, the problem is not only that; in general, this function drops the all error handlings (as it's a void function) although its caller can propagate an error to snd_probe(), which eventually calls snd_card_free() as a proper error path. That said, we should treat each error case in setup_card(), and just return the error code promptly, which is then handled later as a fatal error in snd_probe().

This patch achieves it by changing the setup_card() to return an error code. Also, the superfluous snd_card_free() call is removed, too.

Note that card->private_free can be set still safely at returning an error. All called functions in card_free() have checks of the unassigned resources or NULL checks.

---
 sound/usb/caiaq/device.c |   33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
sound/usb/caiaq/device.c +24 -9
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ int snd_usb_caiaq_set_auto_msg(struct sn
 					  tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 }
 
-static void setup_card(struct snd_usb_caiaqdev *cdev)
+static int setup_card(struct snd_usb_caiaqdev *cdev)
 {
 	int ret;
 	char val[4];
@@ -325,8 +325,10 @@ static void setup_card(struct snd_usb_ca
 		snd_usb_caiaq_send_command(cdev, EP1_CMD_READ_IO, NULL, 0);
 
 		if (!wait_event_timeout(cdev->ep1_wait_queue,
-					cdev->control_state[0] != 0xff, HZ))
-			return;
+					cdev->control_state[0] != 0xff, HZ)) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Read timeout for control state\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 
 		/* fix up some defaults */
 		if ((cdev->control_state[1] != 2) ||
@@ -347,33 +349,43 @@ static void setup_card(struct snd_usb_ca
 	    cdev->spec.num_digital_audio_out +
 	    cdev->spec.num_digital_audio_in > 0) {
 		ret = snd_usb_caiaq_audio_init(cdev);
-		if (ret < 0)
+		if (ret < 0) {
 			dev_err(dev, "Unable to set up audio system (ret=%d)\n", ret);
+			return ret;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (cdev->spec.num_midi_in +
 	    cdev->spec.num_midi_out > 0) {
 		ret = snd_usb_caiaq_midi_init(cdev);
-		if (ret < 0)
+		if (ret < 0) {
 			dev_err(dev, "Unable to set up MIDI system (ret=%d)\n", ret);
+			return ret;
+		}
 	}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SND_USB_CAIAQ_INPUT
 	ret = snd_usb_caiaq_input_init(cdev);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
 		dev_err(dev, "Unable to set up input system (ret=%d)\n", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
 #endif
 
 	/* finally, register the card and all its sub-instances */
 	ret = snd_card_register(cdev->chip.card);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		dev_err(dev, "snd_card_register() returned %d\n", ret);
-		snd_card_free(cdev->chip.card);
+		return ret;
 	}
 
 	ret = snd_usb_caiaq_control_init(cdev);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
 		dev_err(dev, "Unable to set up control system (ret=%d)\n", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void card_free(struct snd_card *card)
@@ -499,8 +511,11 @@ static int init_card(struct snd_usb_caia
 	scnprintf(card->longname, sizeof(card->longname), "%s %s (%s)",
 		       cdev->vendor_name, cdev->product_name, usbpath);
 
-	setup_card(cdev);
 	card->private_free = card_free;
+	err = setup_card(cdev);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
 	return 0;
 
  err_kill_urb:
author maintainer
#77 lore raw

PATCH 77/215 ALSA: 6fire: Fix input volume change detection

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>

commit dc88eef8f55e85e92d016cdf7e291f5560efd79b upstream.

usb6fire_control_input_vol_put() stores the analog capture volume as a signed offset in rt->input_vol[] (-15..+15), but it compares the cached value against the user-visible mixer value (0..30) before subtracting 15.

This mixes two domains in the change detection path. Since the runtime is zero-initialized, the visible default is 15; writing 0 right after probe is ignored, while writing 15 is reported as a change even though the cached value remains 0.

Normalize the user value before comparing it with the cached offset.

---
 sound/usb/6fire/control.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
sound/usb/6fire/control.c +6 -4
@@ -290,15 +290,17 @@ static int usb6fire_control_input_vol_pu
 		struct snd_ctl_elem_value *ucontrol)
 {
 	struct control_runtime *rt = snd_kcontrol_chip(kcontrol);
+	int vol0 = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] - 15;
+	int vol1 = ucontrol->value.integer.value[1] - 15;
 	int changed = 0;
 
-	if (rt->input_vol[0] != ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]) {
-		rt->input_vol[0] = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] - 15;
+	if (rt->input_vol[0] != vol0) {
+		rt->input_vol[0] = vol0;
 		rt->ivol_updated &= ~(1 << 0);
 		changed = 1;
 	}
-	if (rt->input_vol[1] != ucontrol->value.integer.value[1]) {
-		rt->input_vol[1] = ucontrol->value.integer.value[1] - 15;
+	if (rt->input_vol[1] != vol1) {
+		rt->input_vol[1] = vol1;
 		rt->ivol_updated &= ~(1 << 1);
 		changed = 1;
 	}
author maintainer
#78 lore raw

PATCH 78/215 ALSA: pcmtest: fix reference leak on failed device registration

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>

commit 4ff036f95238f02c87e5d7c0a9d93748582a8950 upstream.

When platform_device_register() fails in mod_init(), the embedded struct device in pcmtst_pdev has already been initialized by device_initialize(), but the failure path returns the error without dropping the device reference for the current platform device:

mod_init()

    -> platform_device_register(&pcmtst_pdev)
       -> device_initialize(&pcmtst_pdev.dev)
       -> setup_pdev_dma_masks(&pcmtst_pdev)
       -> platform_device_add(&pcmtst_pdev)

This leads to a reference leak when platform_device_register() fails. Fix this by calling platform_device_put() before returning the error.

The issue was identified by a static analysis tool I developed and confirmed by manual review.

Fixes 315a3d57c64c5 ("ALSA: Implement the new Virtual PCM Test Driver")
---
 sound/drivers/pcmtest.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/drivers/pcmtest.c +3 -1
@@ -755,8 +755,10 @@ static int __init mod_init(void)
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 	err = platform_device_register(&pcmtst_pdev);
-	if (err)
+	if (err) {
+		platform_device_put(&pcmtst_pdev);
 		return err;
+	}
 	err = platform_driver_register(&pcmtst_pdrv);
 	if (err)
 		platform_device_unregister(&pcmtst_pdev);
author maintainer
#79 lore raw

PATCH 79/215 ALSA: pcmtest: Fix resource leaks in module init error paths

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>

commit d5d5f80416a3a749906c04d56575e2290792654b upstream.

pcmtest allocates its pattern buffers and creates its debugfs tree before registering the platform device and driver, but mod_init() does not release those resources when a later init step fails.

As a result, a debugfs directory creation failure leaks the pattern buffers, while platform_device_register() and platform_driver_register() failures leave both the pattern buffers and the debugfs tree behind. The recent fix for failed device registration only dropped the embedded device reference.

Add the missing cleanup for the debugfs tree and pattern buffers in the remaining module init error paths.

Fixes 315a3d57c64c ("ALSA: Implement the new Virtual PCM Test Driver")
---
 sound/drivers/pcmtest.c |   15 ++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
sound/drivers/pcmtest.c +12 -3
@@ -753,15 +753,24 @@ static int __init mod_init(void)
 
 	err = init_debug_files(buf_allocated);
 	if (err)
-		return err;
+		goto err_free_patterns;
 	err = platform_device_register(&pcmtst_pdev);
 	if (err) {
 		platform_device_put(&pcmtst_pdev);
-		return err;
+		goto err_clear_debug;
 	}
 	err = platform_driver_register(&pcmtst_pdrv);
-	if (err)
+	if (err) {
 		platform_device_unregister(&pcmtst_pdev);
+		goto err_clear_debug;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_clear_debug:
+	clear_debug_files();
+err_free_patterns:
+	free_pattern_buffers();
 	return err;
 }
 
author maintainer
#80 lore raw

PATCH 80/215 iio: adc: ad7768-1: fix one-shot mode data acquisition

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jonathan Santos <[email protected]>

commit 8be19e233744961db6069da9c9ab63eb085a0447 upstream.

According to the datasheet, one-shot mode requires a SYNC_IN pulse to trigger a new sample conversion. In the current implementation, No sync pulse was sent after switching to one-shot mode and reinit_completion() was called before mode switching, creating a race condition where spurious interrupts during mode change could trigger completion prematurely.

Fix by sending a sync pulse after configuring one-shot mode and reinit_completion() to ensure it only waits for the actual conversion completion.

Fixes a5f8c7da3dbe ("iio: adc: Add AD7768-1 ADC basic support")
---
 drivers/iio/adc/ad7768-1.c |    9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/adc/ad7768-1.c +7 -2
@@ -241,12 +241,17 @@ static int ad7768_scan_direct(struct iio
 	struct ad7768_state *st = iio_priv(indio_dev);
 	int readval, ret;
 
-	reinit_completion(&st->completion);
-
 	ret = ad7768_set_mode(st, AD7768_ONE_SHOT);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
+	reinit_completion(&st->completion);
+
+	/* One-shot mode requires a SYNC pulse to generate a new sample */
+	ret = ad7768_send_sync_pulse(st);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	ret = wait_for_completion_timeout(&st->completion,
 					  msecs_to_jiffies(1000));
 	if (!ret)
author maintainer
#81 lore raw

PATCH 81/215 rxrpc: Fix memory leaks in rxkad_verify_response()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

commit 34f61a07e0cdefaecd3ec03bb5fb22215643678f upstream.

Fix rxkad_verify_response() to free the ticket and the server key under all circumstances by initialising the ticket pointer to NULL and then making all paths through the function after the first allocation has been done go through a single common epilogue that just releases everything - where all the releases skip on a NULL pointer.

Fixes 57af281e5389 ("rxrpc: Tidy up abort generation infrastructure")
Fixes ec832bd06d6f ("rxrpc: Don't retain the server key in the connection")
cc Marc Dionne <[email protected]>
cc Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
cc Simon Horman <[email protected]>
---
 net/rxrpc/rxkad.c |  103 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +42 -61
@@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct
 	struct rxrpc_crypt session_key;
 	struct key *server_key;
 	time64_t expiry;
-	void *ticket;
+	void *ticket = NULL;
 	u32 version, kvno, ticket_len, level;
 	__be32 csum;
 	int ret, i;
@@ -1074,13 +1074,13 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	response = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rxkad_response), GFP_NOFS);
 	if (!response)
-		goto temporary_error;
+		goto error;
 
 	if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header),
 			  response, sizeof(*response)) < 0) {
-		rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO,
-				 rxkad_abort_resp_short);
-		goto protocol_error;
+		ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO,
+				       rxkad_abort_resp_short);
+		goto error;
 	}
 
 	version = ntohl(response->version);
@@ -1090,62 +1090,62 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct
 	trace_rxrpc_rx_response(conn, sp->hdr.serial, version, kvno, ticket_len);
 
 	if (version != RXKAD_VERSION) {
-		rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADINCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO,
-				 rxkad_abort_resp_version);
-		goto protocol_error;
+		ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADINCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO,
+				       rxkad_abort_resp_version);
+		goto error;
 	}
 
 	if (ticket_len < 4 || ticket_len > MAXKRB5TICKETLEN) {
-		rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADTICKETLEN, -EPROTO,
-				 rxkad_abort_resp_tkt_len);
-		goto protocol_error;
+		ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADTICKETLEN, -EPROTO,
+				       rxkad_abort_resp_tkt_len);
+		goto error;
 	}
 
 	if (kvno >= RXKAD_TKT_TYPE_KERBEROS_V5) {
-		rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADUNKNOWNKEY, -EPROTO,
-				 rxkad_abort_resp_unknown_tkt);
-		goto protocol_error;
+		ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADUNKNOWNKEY, -EPROTO,
+				       rxkad_abort_resp_unknown_tkt);
+		goto error;
 	}
 
 	/* extract the kerberos ticket and decrypt and decode it */
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	ticket = kmalloc(ticket_len, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (!ticket)
-		goto temporary_error_free_resp;
+		goto error;
 
 	if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header) + sizeof(*response),
 			  ticket, ticket_len) < 0) {
-		rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO,
-				 rxkad_abort_resp_short_tkt);
-		goto protocol_error;
+		ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO,
+				       rxkad_abort_resp_short_tkt);
+		goto error;
 	}
 
 	ret = rxkad_decrypt_ticket(conn, server_key, skb, ticket, ticket_len,
 				   &session_key, &expiry);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto temporary_error_free_ticket;
+		goto error;
 
 	/* use the session key from inside the ticket to decrypt the
 	 * response */
 	ret = rxkad_decrypt_response(conn, response, &session_key);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto temporary_error_free_ticket;
+		goto error;
 
 	if (ntohl(response->encrypted.epoch) != conn->proto.epoch ||
 	    ntohl(response->encrypted.cid) != conn->proto.cid ||
 	    ntohl(response->encrypted.securityIndex) != conn->security_ix) {
-		rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
-				 rxkad_abort_resp_bad_param);
-		goto protocol_error_free;
+		ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
+				       rxkad_abort_resp_bad_param);
+		goto error;
 	}
 
 	csum = response->encrypted.checksum;
 	response->encrypted.checksum = 0;
 	rxkad_calc_response_checksum(response);
 	if (response->encrypted.checksum != csum) {
-		rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
-				 rxkad_abort_resp_bad_checksum);
-		goto protocol_error_free;
+		ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
+				       rxkad_abort_resp_bad_checksum);
+		goto error;
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < RXRPC_MAXCALLS; i++) {
@@ -1153,38 +1153,38 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct
 		u32 counter = READ_ONCE(conn->channels[i].call_counter);
 
 		if (call_id > INT_MAX) {
-			rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
-					 rxkad_abort_resp_bad_callid);
-			goto protocol_error_free;
+			ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
+					       rxkad_abort_resp_bad_callid);
+			goto error;
 		}
 
 		if (call_id < counter) {
-			rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
-					 rxkad_abort_resp_call_ctr);
-			goto protocol_error_free;
+			ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
+					       rxkad_abort_resp_call_ctr);
+			goto error;
 		}
 
 		if (call_id > counter) {
 			if (conn->channels[i].call) {
-				rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
+				ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO,
 						 rxkad_abort_resp_call_state);
-				goto protocol_error_free;
+				goto error;
 			}
 			conn->channels[i].call_counter = call_id;
 		}
 	}
 
 	if (ntohl(response->encrypted.inc_nonce) != conn->rxkad.nonce + 1) {
-		rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADOUTOFSEQUENCE, -EPROTO,
-				 rxkad_abort_resp_ooseq);
-		goto protocol_error_free;
+		ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADOUTOFSEQUENCE, -EPROTO,
+				       rxkad_abort_resp_ooseq);
+		goto error;
 	}
 
 	level = ntohl(response->encrypted.level);
 	if (level > RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT) {
-		rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADLEVELFAIL, -EPROTO,
-				 rxkad_abort_resp_level);
-		goto protocol_error_free;
+		ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADLEVELFAIL, -EPROTO,
+				       rxkad_abort_resp_level);
+		goto error;
 	}
 	conn->security_level = level;
 
@@ -1192,31 +1192,12 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct
 	 * this the connection security can be handled in exactly the same way
 	 * as for a client connection */
 	ret = rxrpc_get_server_data_key(conn, &session_key, expiry, kvno);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto temporary_error_free_ticket;
-
-	kfree(ticket);
-	kfree(response);
-	_leave(" = 0");
-	return 0;
-
-protocol_error_free:
-	kfree(ticket);
-protocol_error:
-	kfree(response);
-	key_put(server_key);
-	return -EPROTO;
 
-temporary_error_free_ticket:
+error:
 	kfree(ticket);
-temporary_error_free_resp:
 	kfree(response);
-temporary_error:
-	/* Ignore the response packet if we got a temporary error such as
-	 * ENOMEM.  We just want to send the challenge again.  Note that we
-	 * also come out this way if the ticket decryption fails.
-	 */
 	key_put(server_key);
+	_leave(" = %d", ret);
 	return ret;
 }
 
author maintainer
#82 lore raw

PATCH 82/215 rxrpc: Fix rxkad crypto unalignment handling

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

commit def304aae2edf321d2671fd6ca766a93c21f877e upstream.

Fix handling of a packet with a misaligned crypto length. Also handle non-ENOMEM errors from decryption by aborting. Further, remove the WARN_ON_ONCE() so that it can't be remotely triggered (a trace line can still be emitted).

---
 include/trace/events/rxrpc.h |    1 +
 net/rxrpc/rxkad.c            |    9 +++++++--
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/trace/events/rxrpc.h +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 	EM(rxkad_abort_1_short_encdata,		"rxkad1-short-encdata")	\
 	EM(rxkad_abort_1_short_header,		"rxkad1-short-hdr")	\
 	EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_check,		"rxkad2-short-check")	\
+	EM(rxkad_abort_2_crypto_unaligned,	"rxkad2-crypto-unaligned") \
 	EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_data,		"rxkad2-short-data")	\
 	EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_header,		"rxkad2-short-hdr")	\
 	EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_len,		"rxkad2-short-len")	\
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +7 -2
@@ -494,6 +494,9 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct
 		return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON,
 					  rxkad_abort_2_short_header);
 
+	/* Don't let the crypto algo see a misaligned length. */
+	sp->len = round_down(sp->len, 8);
+
 	/* Decrypt the skbuff in-place.  TODO: We really want to decrypt
 	 * directly into the target buffer.
 	 */
@@ -527,8 +530,10 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct
 	if (sg != _sg)
 		kfree(sg);
 	if (ret < 0) {
-		WARN_ON_ONCE(ret != -ENOMEM);
-		return ret;
+		if (ret == -ENOMEM)
+			return ret;
+		return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON,
+					  rxkad_abort_2_crypto_unaligned);
 	}
 
 	/* Extract the decrypted packet length */
author maintainer
#83 lore raw

PATCH 83/215 rxrpc: Fix re-decryption of RESPONSE packets

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

commit 0422e7a4883f25101903f3e8105c0808aa5f4ce9 upstream.

If a RESPONSE packet gets a temporary failure during processing, it may end up in a partially decrypted state - and then get requeued for a retry.

Fix this by just discarding the packet; we will send another CHALLENGE packet and thereby elicit a further response. Similarly, discard an incoming CHALLENGE packet if we get an error whilst generating a RESPONSE; the server will send another CHALLENGE.

Fixes 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
cc Marc Dionne <[email protected]>
cc Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
cc Simon Horman <[email protected]>
---
 include/trace/events/rxrpc.h |    1 -
 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c       |   14 ++------------
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
include/trace/events/rxrpc.h +0 -1
@@ -236,7 +236,6 @@
 	EM(rxrpc_conn_put_unidle,		"PUT unidle  ") \
 	EM(rxrpc_conn_put_work,			"PUT work    ") \
 	EM(rxrpc_conn_queue_challenge,		"QUE chall   ") \
-	EM(rxrpc_conn_queue_retry_work,		"QUE retry-wk") \
 	EM(rxrpc_conn_queue_rx_work,		"QUE rx-work ") \
 	EM(rxrpc_conn_see_new_service_conn,	"SEE new-svc ") \
 	EM(rxrpc_conn_see_reap_service,		"SEE reap-svc") \
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c +2 -12
@@ -344,7 +344,6 @@ again:
 static void rxrpc_do_process_connection(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
-	int ret;
 
 	if (test_and_clear_bit(RXRPC_CONN_EV_CHALLENGE, &conn->events))
 		rxrpc_secure_connection(conn);
@@ -353,17 +352,8 @@ static void rxrpc_do_process_connection(
 	 * connection that each one has when we've finished with it */
 	while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&conn->rx_queue))) {
 		rxrpc_see_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_see_conn_work);
-		ret = rxrpc_process_event(conn, skb);
-		switch (ret) {
-		case -ENOMEM:
-		case -EAGAIN:
-			skb_queue_head(&conn->rx_queue, skb);
-			rxrpc_queue_conn(conn, rxrpc_conn_queue_retry_work);
-			break;
-		default:
-			rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_put_conn_work);
-			break;
-		}
+		rxrpc_process_event(conn, skb);
+		rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_put_conn_work);
 	}
 }
 
author maintainer
#84 lore raw

PATCH 84/215 tools/accounting: handle truncated taskstats netlink messages

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yiyang Chen <[email protected]>

commit cc82b3dcc6a8fa259fbda12ab00d6fc00908a49e upstream.

procacct and getdelays use a fixed receive buffer for taskstats generic netlink messages. A multi-threaded process exit can emit a single PID+TGID notification large enough to exceed that buffer on newer kernels.

Switch to recvmsg() so MSG_TRUNC is detected explicitly, increase the message buffer size, and report truncated datagrams clearly instead of misparsing them as fatal netlink errors.

Also print the taskstats version in debug output to make version mismatches easier to diagnose while inspecting taskstats traffic.

---
 tools/accounting/getdelays.c |   41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 tools/accounting/procacct.c  |   40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
tools/accounting/getdelays.c +37 -4
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ int print_task_context_switch_counts;
 	}
 
 /* Maximum size of response requested or message sent */
-#define MAX_MSG_SIZE	1024
+#define MAX_MSG_SIZE	2048
 /* Maximum number of cpus expected to be specified in a cpumask */
 #define MAX_CPUS	32
 
@@ -114,6 +114,32 @@ error:
 	return -1;
 }
 
+static int recv_taskstats_msg(int sd, struct msgtemplate *msg)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_nl nladdr;
+	struct iovec iov = {
+		.iov_base = msg,
+		.iov_len = sizeof(*msg),
+	};
+	struct msghdr hdr = {
+		.msg_name = &nladdr,
+		.msg_namelen = sizeof(nladdr),
+		.msg_iov = &iov,
+		.msg_iovlen = 1,
+	};
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = recvmsg(sd, &hdr, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return -1;
+	if (hdr.msg_flags & MSG_TRUNC) {
+		errno = EMSGSIZE;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 
 static int send_cmd(int sd, __u16 nlmsg_type, __u32 nlmsg_pid,
 	     __u8 genl_cmd, __u16 nla_type,
@@ -465,12 +491,16 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	}
 
 	do {
-		rep_len = recv(nl_sd, &msg, sizeof(msg), 0);
+		rep_len = recv_taskstats_msg(nl_sd, &msg);
 		PRINTF("received %d bytes\n", rep_len);
 
 		if (rep_len < 0) {
-			fprintf(stderr, "nonfatal reply error: errno %d\n",
-				errno);
+			if (errno == EMSGSIZE)
+				fprintf(stderr,
+					"dropped truncated taskstats netlink message, please increase MAX_MSG_SIZE\n");
+			else
+				fprintf(stderr, "nonfatal reply error: errno %d\n",
+					errno);
 			continue;
 		}
 		if (msg.n.nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR ||
@@ -512,6 +542,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 							printf("TGID\t%d\n", rtid);
 						break;
 					case TASKSTATS_TYPE_STATS:
+						PRINTF("version %u\n",
+						       ((struct taskstats *)
+							NLA_DATA(na))->version);
 						if (print_delays)
 							print_delayacct((struct taskstats *) NLA_DATA(na));
 						if (print_io_accounting)
tools/accounting/procacct.c +36 -4
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ int print_task_context_switch_counts;
 	}
 
 /* Maximum size of response requested or message sent */
-#define MAX_MSG_SIZE	1024
+#define MAX_MSG_SIZE	2048
 /* Maximum number of cpus expected to be specified in a cpumask */
 #define MAX_CPUS	32
 
@@ -121,6 +121,32 @@ error:
 	return -1;
 }
 
+static int recv_taskstats_msg(int sd, struct msgtemplate *msg)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_nl nladdr;
+	struct iovec iov = {
+		.iov_base = msg,
+		.iov_len = sizeof(*msg),
+	};
+	struct msghdr hdr = {
+		.msg_name = &nladdr,
+		.msg_namelen = sizeof(nladdr),
+		.msg_iov = &iov,
+		.msg_iovlen = 1,
+	};
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = recvmsg(sd, &hdr, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return -1;
+	if (hdr.msg_flags & MSG_TRUNC) {
+		errno = EMSGSIZE;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 
 static int send_cmd(int sd, __u16 nlmsg_type, __u32 nlmsg_pid,
 	     __u8 genl_cmd, __u16 nla_type,
@@ -239,6 +265,8 @@ void handle_aggr(int mother, struct nlat
 			PRINTF("TGID\t%d\n", rtid);
 			break;
 		case TASKSTATS_TYPE_STATS:
+			PRINTF("version %u\n",
+			       ((struct taskstats *)NLA_DATA(na))->version);
 			if (mother == TASKSTATS_TYPE_AGGR_PID)
 				print_procacct((struct taskstats *) NLA_DATA(na));
 			if (fd) {
@@ -348,12 +376,16 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	}
 
 	do {
-		rep_len = recv(nl_sd, &msg, sizeof(msg), 0);
+		rep_len = recv_taskstats_msg(nl_sd, &msg);
 		PRINTF("received %d bytes\n", rep_len);
 
 		if (rep_len < 0) {
-			fprintf(stderr, "nonfatal reply error: errno %d\n",
-				errno);
+			if (errno == EMSGSIZE)
+				fprintf(stderr,
+					"dropped truncated taskstats netlink message, please increase MAX_MSG_SIZE\n");
+			else
+				fprintf(stderr, "nonfatal reply error: errno %d\n",
+					errno);
 			continue;
 		}
 		if (msg.n.nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR ||
author maintainer
#85 lore raw

PATCH 85/215 arm64: dts: marvell: uDPU: add ethernet aliases

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Robert Marko <[email protected]>

commit 38f09c97340cd23f976242e6cb1e7aa4c8ed28d0 upstream.

On eDPU plus, which is an updated revision of eDPU which uses an external MV88E6361 switch we are relying on U-Boot to detect the board, and then enable and disable the required nodes for that revision.

However, it seems that I missed adding the required aliases for ethernet controllers, and this worked as in OpenWrt we had added those locally.

Fixes 660b8b2f3944 ("arm64: dts: marvell: eDPU: add support for version with external switch")
---
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-3720-uDPU.dtsi |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-3720-uDPU.dtsi +5 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,11 @@
 #include "armada-372x.dtsi"
 
 / {
+	aliases {
+		ethernet0 = &eth0;
+		ethernet1 = &eth1;
+	};
+
 	chosen {
 		stdout-path = "serial0:115200n8";
 	};
author maintainer
#86 lore raw

PATCH 86/215 net: qrtr: ns: Free the node during ctrl_cmd_bye()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>

commit 68efba36446a7774ea5b971257ade049272a07ac upstream.

A node sends the BYE packet when it is about to go down. So the nameserver should advertise the removal of the node to all remote and local observers and free the node finally. But currently, the nameserver doesn't free the node memory even after processing the BYE packet. This causes the node memory to leak.

Hence, remove the node from Xarray list and free the node memory during both success and failure case of ctrl_cmd_bye().

Fixes 0c2204a4ad71 ("net: qrtr: Migrate nameservice to kernel from userspace")
---
 net/qrtr/ns.c |   20 +++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/qrtr/ns.c +15 -5
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static int ctrl_cmd_bye(struct sockaddr_
 	struct qrtr_node *node;
 	unsigned long index;
 	struct kvec iv;
-	int ret;
+	int ret = 0;
 
 	iv.iov_base = &pkt;
 	iv.iov_len = sizeof(pkt);
@@ -357,8 +357,10 @@ static int ctrl_cmd_bye(struct sockaddr_
 
 	/* Advertise the removal of this client to all local servers */
 	local_node = node_get(qrtr_ns.local_node);
-	if (!local_node)
-		return 0;
+	if (!local_node) {
+		ret = 0;
+		goto delete_node;
+	}
 
 	memset(&pkt, 0, sizeof(pkt));
 	pkt.cmd = cpu_to_le32(QRTR_TYPE_BYE);
@@ -375,10 +377,18 @@ static int ctrl_cmd_bye(struct sockaddr_
 		ret = kernel_sendmsg(qrtr_ns.sock, &msg, &iv, 1, sizeof(pkt));
 		if (ret < 0 && ret != -ENODEV) {
 			pr_err("failed to send bye cmd\n");
-			return ret;
+			goto delete_node;
 		}
 	}
-	return 0;
+
+	/* Ignore -ENODEV */
+	ret = 0;
+
+delete_node:
+	xa_erase(&nodes, from->sq_node);
+	kfree(node);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int ctrl_cmd_del_client(struct sockaddr_qrtr *from,
author maintainer
#87 lore raw

PATCH 87/215 net: rds: fix MR cleanup on copy error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ao Zhou <[email protected]>

commit 8141a2dc70080eda1aedc0389ed2db2b292af5bd upstream.

__rds_rdma_map() hands sg/pages ownership to the transport after get_mr() succeeds. If copying the generated cookie back to user space fails after that point, the error path must not free those resources again before dropping the MR reference.

Remove the duplicate unpin/free from the put_user() failure branch so that MR teardown is handled only through the existing final cleanup path.

---
 net/rds/rdma.c |    4 ----
 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
net/rds/rdma.c +0 -4
@@ -326,10 +326,6 @@ static int __rds_rdma_map(struct rds_soc
 
 	if (args->cookie_addr &&
 	    put_user(cookie, (u64 __user *)(unsigned long)args->cookie_addr)) {
-		if (!need_odp) {
-			unpin_user_pages(pages, nr_pages);
-			kfree(sg);
-		}
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 		goto out;
 	}
author maintainer
#88 lore raw

PATCH 88/215 net: txgbe: fix firmware version check

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiawen Wu <[email protected]>

commit c263f644add3d6ad81f9d62a99284fde408f0caa upstream.

For the device SP, the firmware version is a 32-bit value where the lower 20 bits represent the base version number. And the customized firmware version populates the upper 12 bits with a specific identification number.

For other devices AML 25G and 40G, the upper 12 bits of the firmware version is always non-zero, and they have other naming conventions.

Only SP devices need to check this to tell if XPCS will work properly. So the judgement of MAC type is added here.

And the original logic compared the entire 32-bit value against 0x20010, which caused the outdated base firmwares bypass the version check without a warning. Apply a mask 0xfffff to isolate the lower 20 bits for an accurate base version comparison.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/wangxun/txgbe/txgbe_main.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/wangxun/txgbe/txgbe_main.c +2 -1
@@ -668,7 +668,8 @@ static int txgbe_probe(struct pci_dev *p
 			 "0x%08x", etrack_id);
 	}
 
-	if (etrack_id < 0x20010)
+	if (wx->mac.type == wx_mac_sp &&
+	    ((etrack_id & 0xfffff) < 0x20010))
 		dev_warn(&pdev->dev, "Please upgrade the firmware to 0x20010 or above.\n");
 
 	txgbe = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*txgbe), GFP_KERNEL);
author maintainer
#89 lore raw

PATCH 89/215 net/smc: avoid early lgr access in smc_clc_wait_msg

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ruijie Li <[email protected]>

commit 5a8db80f721deee8e916c2cfdee78decda02ce4f upstream.

A CLC decline can be received while the handshake is still in an early stage, before the connection has been associated with a link group.

The decline handling in smc_clc_wait_msg() updates link-group level sync state for first-contact declines, but that state only exists after link group setup has completed. Guard the link-group update accordingly and keep the per-socket peer diagnosis handling unchanged.

This preserves the existing sync_err handling for established link-group contexts and avoids touching link-group state before it is available.

---
 net/smc/smc_clc.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/smc/smc_clc.c +2 -2
@@ -785,8 +785,8 @@ int smc_clc_wait_msg(struct smc_sock *sm
 		dclc = (struct smc_clc_msg_decline *)clcm;
 		reason_code = SMC_CLC_DECL_PEERDECL;
 		smc->peer_diagnosis = ntohl(dclc->peer_diagnosis);
-		if (((struct smc_clc_msg_decline *)buf)->hdr.typev2 &
-						SMC_FIRST_CONTACT_MASK) {
+		if ((dclc->hdr.typev2 & SMC_FIRST_CONTACT_MASK) &&
+		    smc->conn.lgr) {
 			smc->conn.lgr->sync_err = 1;
 			smc_lgr_terminate_sched(smc->conn.lgr);
 		}
author maintainer
#90 lore raw

PATCH 90/215 net: ks8851: Reinstate disabling of BHs around IRQ handler

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marek Vasut <[email protected]>

commit 5c9fcac3c872224316714d0d8914d9af16c76a6d upstream.

If the driver executes ks8851_irq() AND a TX packet has been sent, then the driver enables TX queue via netif_wake_queue() which schedules TX softirq to queue packets for this device.

If CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y is set AND a packet has also been received by the MAC, then ks8851_rx_pkts() calls netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align() to allocate SKBs for the received packets. If netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align() is called with BH enabled, then local_bh_enable() at the end of netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align() will trigger the pending softirq processing, which may ultimately call the .xmit callback ks8851_start_xmit_par(). The ks8851_start_xmit_par() will try to lock struct ks8851_net_par .lock spinlock, which is already locked by ks8851_irq() from which ks8851_start_xmit_par() was called. This leads to a deadlock, which is reported by the kernel, including a trace listed below.

If CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT is not set, then since commit 0913ec336a6c0 ("net: ks8851: Fix deadlock with the SPI chip variant") the deadlock can also be triggered without received packet in the RX FIFO. The pending softirqs will be processed on return from spin_unlock_bh(&ks->statelock) in ks8851_irq(), which triggers the deadlock as well.

Fix the problem by disabling BH around critical sections, including the IRQ handler, thus preventing the net_tx_action() softirq from triggering during these critical sections. The net_tx_action() softirq is triggered once BH are re-enabled and at the end of the IRQ handler, once all the other IRQ handler actions have been completed.

__schedule from schedule_rtlock+0x1c/0x34 schedule_rtlock from rtlock_slowlock_locked+0x548/0x904 rtlock_slowlock_locked from rt_spin_lock+0x60/0x9c rt_spin_lock from ks8851_start_xmit_par+0x74/0x1a8 ks8851_start_xmit_par from netdev_start_xmit+0x20/0x44 netdev_start_xmit from dev_hard_start_xmit+0xd0/0x188 dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit+0xb8/0x25c sch_direct_xmit from __qdisc_run+0x1f8/0x4ec __qdisc_run from qdisc_run+0x1c/0x28
qdisc_run from net_tx_action+0x1f0/0x268 net_tx_action from handle_softirqs+0x1a4/0x270 handle_softirqs from __local_bh_enable_ip+0xcc/0xe0 __local_bh_enable_ip from __alloc_skb+0xd8/0x128 __alloc_skb from __netdev_alloc_skb+0x3c/0x19c __netdev_alloc_skb from ks8851_irq+0x388/0x4d4 ks8851_irq from irq_thread_fn+0x24/0x64 irq_thread_fn from irq_thread+0x178/0x28c irq_thread from kthread+0x12c/0x138
kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28

Fixes e0863634bf9f ("net: ks8851: Queue RX packets in IRQ handler instead of disabling BHs")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h        |    6 --
 drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c |   64 +++++++++++-----------------
 drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c    |   15 ++----
 drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c    |   11 +---
 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h +2 -4
@@ -408,10 +408,8 @@ struct ks8851_net {
 	struct gpio_desc	*gpio;
 	struct mii_bus		*mii_bus;
 
-	void			(*lock)(struct ks8851_net *ks,
-					unsigned long *flags);
-	void			(*unlock)(struct ks8851_net *ks,
-					  unsigned long *flags);
+	void			(*lock)(struct ks8851_net *ks);
+	void			(*unlock)(struct ks8851_net *ks);
 	unsigned int		(*rdreg16)(struct ks8851_net *ks,
 					   unsigned int reg);
 	void			(*wrreg16)(struct ks8851_net *ks,
drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c +26 -38

243 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c +6 -9
@@ -55,29 +55,27 @@ struct ks8851_net_par {
 /**
  * ks8851_lock_par - register access lock
  * @ks: The chip state
- * @flags: Spinlock flags
  *
  * Claim chip register access lock
  */
-static void ks8851_lock_par(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags)
+static void ks8851_lock_par(struct ks8851_net *ks)
 {
 	struct ks8851_net_par *ksp = to_ks8851_par(ks);
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&ksp->lock, *flags);
+	spin_lock_bh(&ksp->lock);
 }
 
 /**
  * ks8851_unlock_par - register access unlock
  * @ks: The chip state
- * @flags: Spinlock flags
  *
  * Release chip register access lock
  */
-static void ks8851_unlock_par(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags)
+static void ks8851_unlock_par(struct ks8851_net *ks)
 {
 	struct ks8851_net_par *ksp = to_ks8851_par(ks);
 
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ksp->lock, *flags);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&ksp->lock);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -233,7 +231,6 @@ static netdev_tx_t ks8851_start_xmit_par
 {
 	struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev);
 	netdev_tx_t ret = NETDEV_TX_OK;
-	unsigned long flags;
 	unsigned int txqcr;
 	u16 txmir;
 	int err;
@@ -241,7 +238,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ks8851_start_xmit_par
 	netif_dbg(ks, tx_queued, ks->netdev,
 		  "%s: skb %p, %d@%p\n", __func__, skb, skb->len, skb->data);
 
-	ks8851_lock_par(ks, &flags);
+	ks8851_lock_par(ks);
 
 	txmir = ks8851_rdreg16_par(ks, KS_TXMIR) & 0x1fff;
 
@@ -262,7 +259,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ks8851_start_xmit_par
 		ret = NETDEV_TX_BUSY;
 	}
 
-	ks8851_unlock_par(ks, &flags);
+	ks8851_unlock_par(ks);
 
 	return ret;
 }
drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c +4 -7
@@ -73,11 +73,10 @@ struct ks8851_net_spi {
 /**
  * ks8851_lock_spi - register access lock
  * @ks: The chip state
- * @flags: Spinlock flags
  *
  * Claim chip register access lock
  */
-static void ks8851_lock_spi(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags)
+static void ks8851_lock_spi(struct ks8851_net *ks)
 {
 	struct ks8851_net_spi *kss = to_ks8851_spi(ks);
 
@@ -87,11 +86,10 @@ static void ks8851_lock_spi(struct ks885
 /**
  * ks8851_unlock_spi - register access unlock
  * @ks: The chip state
- * @flags: Spinlock flags
  *
  * Release chip register access lock
  */
-static void ks8851_unlock_spi(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags)
+static void ks8851_unlock_spi(struct ks8851_net *ks)
 {
 	struct ks8851_net_spi *kss = to_ks8851_spi(ks);
 
@@ -311,7 +309,6 @@ static void ks8851_tx_work(struct work_s
 	struct ks8851_net_spi *kss;
 	unsigned short tx_space;
 	struct ks8851_net *ks;
-	unsigned long flags;
 	struct sk_buff *txb;
 	bool last;
 
@@ -319,7 +316,7 @@ static void ks8851_tx_work(struct work_s
 	ks = &kss->ks8851;
 	last = skb_queue_empty(&ks->txq);
 
-	ks8851_lock_spi(ks, &flags);
+	ks8851_lock_spi(ks);
 
 	while (!last) {
 		txb = skb_dequeue(&ks->txq);
@@ -345,7 +342,7 @@ static void ks8851_tx_work(struct work_s
 	ks->tx_space = tx_space;
 	spin_unlock_bh(&ks->statelock);
 
-	ks8851_unlock_spi(ks, &flags);
+	ks8851_unlock_spi(ks);
 }
 
 /**
author maintainer
#91 lore raw

PATCH 91/215 netconsole: avoid out-of-bounds access on empty string in trim_newline()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>

commit 7079c8c13f2d33992bc846240517d88f4ab07781 upstream.

trim_newline() unconditionally dereferences s[len - 1] after computing len = strnlen(s, maxlen). When the string is empty, len is 0 and the expression underflows to s[(size_t)-1], reading (and potentially writing) one byte before the buffer.

The two callers feed trim_newline() with the result of strscpy() from configfs store callbacks (dev_name_store, userdatum_value_store). configfs guarantees count >= 1 reaches the callback, but the byte itself can be NUL: a userspace write(fd, "\0", 1) leaves the destination empty after strscpy() and triggers the underflow. The OOB write only fires if the adjacent byte happens to be '\n', so this is not a security issue, but the access is undefined behaviour either way.

This pattern is commonly flagged by LLM-based code reviewers. While it is not a security fix, the underlying access is undefined behaviour and the change is small and self-contained, so it is a reasonable candidate for the stable trees.

Guard the dereference on a non-zero length.

---
 drivers/net/netconsole.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/netconsole.c +2 -0
@@ -300,6 +300,8 @@ static void trim_newline(char *s, size_t
 	size_t len;
 
 	len = strnlen(s, maxlen);
+	if (!len)
+		return;
 	if (s[len - 1] == '\n')
 		s[len - 1] = '\0';
 }
author maintainer
#92 lore raw

PATCH 92/215 net: ks8851: Avoid excess softirq scheduling

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marek Vasut <[email protected]>

commit 22230e68b2cf1ab6b027be8cf1198164a949c4fa upstream.

The code injects a packet into netif_rx() repeatedly, which will add it to its internal NAPI and schedule a softirq, and process it. It is more efficient to queue multiple packets and process them all at the local_bh_enable() time.

Fixes e0863634bf9f ("net: ks8851: Queue RX packets in IRQ handler instead of disabling BHs")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c +4 -1
@@ -389,9 +389,12 @@ static irqreturn_t ks8851_irq(int irq, v
 	if (status & IRQ_LCI)
 		mii_check_link(&ks->mii);
 
-	if (status & IRQ_RXI)
+	if (status & IRQ_RXI) {
+		local_bh_disable();
 		while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&rxq)))
 			netif_rx(skb);
+		local_bh_enable();
+	}
 
 	return IRQ_HANDLED;
 }
author maintainer
#93 lore raw

PATCH 93/215 drm/arcpgu: fix device node leak

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luca Ceresoli <[email protected]>

commit ad3ac32a3893a2bbcad545efc005a8e4e7ecf10c upstream.

This function gets a device_node reference via of_graph_get_remote_port_parent() and stores it in encoder_node, but never puts that reference. Add it.

There used to be a of_node_put(encoder_node) but it has been removed by mistake during a rework in commit 3ea66a794fdc ("drm/arc: Inline arcpgu_drm_hdmi_init").

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/arcpgu.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/arcpgu.c +2 -1
@@ -248,7 +248,8 @@ DEFINE_DRM_GEM_DMA_FOPS(arcpgu_drm_ops);
 static int arcpgu_load(struct arcpgu_drm_private *arcpgu)
 {
 	struct platform_device *pdev = to_platform_device(arcpgu->drm.dev);
-	struct device_node *encoder_node = NULL, *endpoint_node = NULL;
+	struct device_node *encoder_node __free(device_node) = NULL;
+	struct device_node *endpoint_node = NULL;
 	struct drm_connector *connector = NULL;
 	struct drm_device *drm = &arcpgu->drm;
 	struct resource *res;
author maintainer
#94 lore raw

PATCH 94/215 RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: hkbinbin <[email protected]>

commit 7244491dab347f648e661da96dc0febadd9daec3 upstream.

rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used.

However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen:

payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt)
- RXE_ICRC_SIZE

This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users.

Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE.

---
 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c +2 -1
@@ -330,7 +330,8 @@ void rxe_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	pkt->qp = NULL;
 	pkt->mask |= rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].mask;
 
-	if (unlikely(skb->len < header_size(pkt)))
+	if (unlikely(pkt->paylen < header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) +
+		       RXE_ICRC_SIZE))
 		goto drop;
 
 	err = hdr_check(pkt);
author maintainer
#95 lore raw

PATCH 95/215 ipv4: icmp: validate reply type before using icmp_pointers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ruide Cao <[email protected]>

commit 67bf002a2d7387a6312138210d0bd06e3cf4879b upstream.

Extended echo replies use ICMP_EXT_ECHOREPLY as the outbound reply type. That value is outside the range covered by icmp_pointers[], which only describes the traditional ICMP types up to NR_ICMP_TYPES.

Avoid consulting icmp_pointers[] for reply types outside that range, and use array_index_nospec() for the remaining in-range lookup. Normal ICMP replies keep their existing behavior unchanged.

---
 net/ipv4/icmp.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/icmp.c +4 -1
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/socket.h>
 #include <linux/in.h>
 #include <linux/inet.h>
@@ -361,7 +362,9 @@ static int icmp_glue_bits(void *from, ch
 				      to, len);
 
 	skb->csum = csum_block_add(skb->csum, csum, odd);
-	if (icmp_pointers[icmp_param->data.icmph.type].error)
+	if (icmp_param->data.icmph.type <= NR_ICMP_TYPES &&
+	    icmp_pointers[array_index_nospec(icmp_param->data.icmph.type,
+					     NR_ICMP_TYPES + 1)].error)
 		nf_ct_attach(skb, icmp_param->skb);
 	return 0;
 }
author maintainer
#96 lore raw

PATCH 96/215 libceph: Prevent potential null-ptr-deref in ceph_handle_auth_reply()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Raphael Zimmer <[email protected]>

commit 5199c125d25aeae8615c4fc31652cc0fe624338e upstream.

If a message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY contains a zero value for both protocol and result, this is currently not treated as an error. In case of ac->negotiating == true and ac->protocol > 0, this leads to setting ac->protocol = 0 and ac->ops = NULL. Thereafter, the check for ac->protocol != protocol returns false, and init_protocol() is not called. Subsequently, ac->ops->handle_reply() is called, which leads to a null pointer dereference, because ac->ops is still NULL.

This patch changes the check for ac->protocol != protocol to !ac->protocol, as this also includes the case when the protocol was set to zero in the message. This causes the message to be treated as containing a bad auth protocol.

---
 net/ceph/auth.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ceph/auth.c +1 -1
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ int ceph_handle_auth_reply(struct ceph_a
 			ac->protocol = 0;
 			ac->ops = NULL;
 		}
-		if (ac->protocol != protocol) {
+		if (!ac->protocol) {
 			ret = init_protocol(ac, protocol);
 			if (ret) {
 				pr_err("auth protocol '%s' init failed: %d\n",
author maintainer
#97 lore raw

PATCH 97/215 extract-cert: Wrap key_pass with #ifdef USE_PKCS11_ENGINE

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

commit 4f96b7c68a9904e01049ef610d701b382dca9574 upstream.

A recent strengthening of -Wunused-but-set-variable (enabled with -Wall) in clang under a new subwarning, -Wunused-but-set-global, points out an unused static global variable in certs/extract-cert.c:

certs/extract-cert.c:46:20: error: variable 'key_pass' set but not used [-Werror,-Wunused-but-set-global]

     46 | static const char *key_pass;
        |                    ^

After commit 558bdc45dfb2 ("sign-file,extract-cert: use pkcs11 provider for OPENSSL MAJOR >= 3"), key_pass is only used with the OpenSSL engine API, not the new provider API. Wrap key_pass's declaration and assignment with '#ifdef USE_PKCS11_ENGINE' so that it is only included with its use to clear up the warning. While this is a little uglier than just marking key_pass with the unused attribute, this will make it easier to clean up all code associated with the use of the engine API if it were ever removed in the future. While in the area, use a tab for the key_pass assignment line to match the rest of the file.

---
 certs/extract-cert.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
certs/extract-cert.c +5 -1
@@ -43,7 +43,9 @@ void format(void)
 	exit(2);
 }
 
+#ifdef USE_PKCS11_ENGINE
 static const char *key_pass;
+#endif
 static BIO *wb;
 static char *cert_dst;
 static bool verbose;
@@ -135,7 +137,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (verbose_env && strchr(verbose_env, '1'))
 		verbose = true;
 
-        key_pass = getenv("KBUILD_SIGN_PIN");
+#ifdef USE_PKCS11_ENGINE
+	key_pass = getenv("KBUILD_SIGN_PIN");
+#endif
 
 	if (argc != 3)
 		format();
author maintainer
#98 lore raw

PATCH 98/215 tpm: avoid -Wunused-but-set-variable

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

commit 6f1d4d2ecfcd1b577dc87350ea965fe81f272e83 upstream.

Outside of the EFI tpm code, the TPM_MEMREMAP()/TPM_MEMUNMAP functions are defined as trivial macros, leading to the mapping_size variable ending up unused:

In file included from drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c:16:
In file included from drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h:28:
include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h:167:6: error: variable 'mapping_size' set but not used [-Werror,-Wunused-but-set-variable]
167 | int mapping_size;

Turn the stubs into inline functions to avoid this warning.

Fixes c46f3405692d ("tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table")
---
 include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h |    9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h +7 -2
@@ -131,11 +131,16 @@ struct tcg_algorithm_info {
 };
 
 #ifndef TPM_MEMREMAP
-#define TPM_MEMREMAP(start, size) NULL
+static inline void *TPM_MEMREMAP(unsigned long start, size_t size)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
 #endif
 
 #ifndef TPM_MEMUNMAP
-#define TPM_MEMUNMAP(start, size) do{} while(0)
+static inline void TPM_MEMUNMAP(void *mapping, size_t size)
+{
+}
 #endif
 
 /**
author maintainer
#99 lore raw

PATCH 99/215 LoongArch: Show CPU vulnerabilites correctly

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Huacai Chen <[email protected]>

commit 37e57e8ad96cdec4a57b55fd10bef50f7370a954 upstream.

Most LoongArch processors are vulnerable to Spectre-V1 Proof-of-Concept (PoC). And the generic mechanism, __user pointer sanitization, can be used as a mitigation. This means to use array_index_nospec() to prevent out of boundry access in syscall and other critical paths.

Implement the arch-specific cpu_show_spectre_v1() to show CPU Spectre-V1 vulnerabilites correctly.

---
 arch/loongarch/kernel/cpu-probe.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
arch/loongarch/kernel/cpu-probe.c +7 -0
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/stddef.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
@@ -352,3 +353,9 @@ void cpu_probe(void)
 
 	cpu_report();
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
+}
author maintainer
#100 lore raw

PATCH 100/215 power: supply: axp288_charger: Do not cancel work before initializing it

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>

commit 658342fd75b582cbb06544d513171c3d645faead upstream.

Driver registered devm handler to cancel_work_sync() before even the work was initialized, thus leading to possible warning from kernel/workqueue.c on (!work->func) check, if the error path was hit before the initialization happened.

Use devm_work_autocancel() on each work item independently, which handles the initialization and handler to cancel work.

Fixes 165c2357744e ("power: supply: axp288_charger: Properly stop work on probe-error / remove")
---
 drivers/power/supply/axp288_charger.c |   19 ++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/power/supply/axp288_charger.c +8 -11
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/acpi.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/devm-helpers.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
 #include <linux/regmap.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
@@ -821,14 +822,6 @@ static int charger_init_hw_regs(struct a
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void axp288_charger_cancel_work(void *data)
-{
-	struct axp288_chrg_info *info = data;
-
-	cancel_work_sync(&info->otg.work);
-	cancel_work_sync(&info->cable.work);
-}
-
 static int axp288_charger_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	int ret, i, pirq;
@@ -911,12 +904,12 @@ static int axp288_charger_probe(struct p
 	}
 
 	/* Cancel our work on cleanup, register this before the notifiers */
-	ret = devm_add_action(dev, axp288_charger_cancel_work, info);
+	ret = devm_work_autocancel(dev, &info->cable.work,
+				   axp288_charger_extcon_evt_worker);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
 	/* Register for extcon notification */
-	INIT_WORK(&info->cable.work, axp288_charger_extcon_evt_worker);
 	info->cable.nb.notifier_call = axp288_charger_handle_cable_evt;
 	ret = devm_extcon_register_notifier_all(dev, info->cable.edev,
 						&info->cable.nb);
@@ -926,8 +919,12 @@ static int axp288_charger_probe(struct p
 	}
 	schedule_work(&info->cable.work);
 
+	ret = devm_work_autocancel(dev, &info->otg.work,
+				   axp288_charger_otg_evt_worker);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	/* Register for OTG notification */
-	INIT_WORK(&info->otg.work, axp288_charger_otg_evt_worker);
 	info->otg.id_nb.notifier_call = axp288_charger_handle_otg_evt;
 	if (info->otg.cable) {
 		ret = devm_extcon_register_notifier(dev, info->otg.cable,
author maintainer
#101 lore raw

PATCH 101/215 hwmon: (pt5161l) Fix bugs in pt5161l_read_block_data()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sanman Pradhan <[email protected]>

commit 24c73e93d6a756e1b8626bb259d2e07c5b89b370 upstream.

Fix two bugs in pt5161l_read_block_data():

1. Buffer overrun: The local buffer rbuf is declared as u8 rbuf[24], but i2c_smbus_read_block_data() can return up to I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (32) bytes. The i2c-core copies the data into the caller's buffer before the return value can be checked, so the post-read length validation does not prevent a stack overrun if a device returns more than 24 bytes. Resize the buffer to I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX.

2. Unexpected positive return on length mismatch: When all three retries are exhausted because the device returns data with an unexpected length, i2c_smbus_read_block_data() returns a positive byte count. The function returns this directly, and callers treat any non-negative return as success, processing stale or incomplete buffer contents. Return -EIO when retries are exhausted with a positive return value, preserving the negative error code on I2C failure.

Fixes 1b2ca93cd0592 ("hwmon: Add driver for Astera Labs PT5161L retimer")
---
 drivers/hwmon/pt5161l.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hwmon/pt5161l.c +2 -2
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static int pt5161l_read_block_data(struc
 	int ret, tries;
 	u8 remain_len = len;
 	u8 curr_len;
-	u8 wbuf[16], rbuf[24];
+	u8 wbuf[16], rbuf[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX];
 	u8 cmd = 0x08; /* [7]:pec_en, [4:2]:func, [1]:start, [0]:end */
 	u8 config = 0x00; /* [6]:cfg_type, [4:1]:burst_len, [0]:address bit16 */
 
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ static int pt5161l_read_block_data(struc
 				break;
 		}
 		if (tries >= 3)
-			return ret;
+			return ret < 0 ? ret : -EIO;
 
 		memcpy(val, rbuf, curr_len);
 		val += curr_len;
author maintainer
#102 lore raw

PATCH 102/215 randomize_kstack: Maintain kstack_offset per task

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ryan Roberts <[email protected]>

commit 37beb42560165869838e7d91724f3e629db64129 upstream.

kstack_offset was previously maintained per-cpu, but this caused a couple of issues. So let's instead make it per-task.

Issue 1: add_random_kstack_offset() and choose_random_kstack_offset() expected and required to be called with interrupts and preemption disabled so that it could manipulate per-cpu state. But arm64, loongarch and risc-v are calling them with interrupts and preemption enabled. I don't _think_ this causes any functional issues, but it's certainly unexpected and could lead to manipulating the wrong cpu's state, which could cause a minor performance degradation due to bouncing the cache lines. By maintaining the state per-task those functions can safely be called in preemptible context.

Issue 2: add_random_kstack_offset() is called before executing the syscall and expands the stack using a previously chosen random offset. choose_random_kstack_offset() is called after executing the syscall and chooses and stores a new random offset for the next syscall. With per-cpu storage for this offset, an attacker could force cpu migration during the execution of the syscall and prevent the offset from being updated for the original cpu such that it is predictable for the next syscall on that cpu. By maintaining the state per-task, this problem goes away because the per-task random offset is updated after the syscall regardless of which cpu it is executing on.

---
 include/linux/randomize_kstack.h |   26 +++++++++++++++-----------
 include/linux/sched.h            |    4 ++++
 init/main.c                      |    1 -
 kernel/fork.c                    |    2 ++
 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
include/linux/randomize_kstack.h +15 -11
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
 
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT,
 			 randomize_kstack_offset);
-DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
 
 /*
  * Do not use this anywhere else in the kernel. This is used here because
@@ -50,15 +49,14 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
  * add_random_kstack_offset - Increase stack utilization by previously
  *			      chosen random offset
  *
- * This should be used in the syscall entry path when interrupts and
- * preempt are disabled, and after user registers have been stored to
- * the stack. For testing the resulting entropy, please see:
- * tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/stack-entropy.sh
+ * This should be used in the syscall entry path after user registers have been
+ * stored to the stack. Preemption may be enabled. For testing the resulting
+ * entropy, please see: tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/stack-entropy.sh
  */
 #define add_random_kstack_offset() do {					\
 	if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT,	\
 				&randomize_kstack_offset)) {		\
-		u32 offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset);		\
+		u32 offset = current->kstack_offset;			\
 		u8 *ptr = __kstack_alloca(KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(offset));	\
 		/* Keep allocation even after "ptr" loses scope. */	\
 		asm volatile("" :: "r"(ptr) : "memory");		\
@@ -69,9 +67,9 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
  * choose_random_kstack_offset - Choose the random offset for the next
  *				 add_random_kstack_offset()
  *
- * This should only be used during syscall exit when interrupts and
- * preempt are disabled. This position in the syscall flow is done to
- * frustrate attacks from userspace attempting to learn the next offset:
+ * This should only be used during syscall exit. Preemption may be enabled. This
+ * position in the syscall flow is done to frustrate attacks from userspace
+ * attempting to learn the next offset:
  * - Maximize the timing uncertainty visible from userspace: if the
  *   offset is chosen at syscall entry, userspace has much more control
  *   over the timing between choosing offsets. "How long will we be in
@@ -85,14 +83,20 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
 #define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand) do {				\
 	if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT,	\
 				&randomize_kstack_offset)) {		\
-		u32 offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset);		\
+		u32 offset = current->kstack_offset;			\
 		offset = ror32(offset, 5) ^ (rand);			\
-		raw_cpu_write(kstack_offset, offset);			\
+		current->kstack_offset = offset;			\
 	}								\
 } while (0)
+
+static inline void random_kstack_task_init(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	tsk->kstack_offset = 0;
+}
 #else /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */
 #define add_random_kstack_offset()		do { } while (0)
 #define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand)	do { } while (0)
+#define random_kstack_task_init(tsk)		do { } while (0)
 #endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */
 
 #endif
include/linux/sched.h +4 -0
@@ -1558,6 +1558,10 @@ struct task_struct {
 	unsigned long			prev_lowest_stack;
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
+	u32				kstack_offset;
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
 	void __user			*mce_vaddr;
 	__u64				mce_kflags;
init/main.c +0 -1
@@ -835,7 +835,6 @@ static inline void initcall_debug_enable
 #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE_RO(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT,
 			   randomize_kstack_offset);
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
 
 static int __init early_randomize_kstack_offset(char *buf)
 {
kernel/fork.c +2 -0
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
 #include <linux/stackleak.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
 #include <linux/scs.h>
 #include <linux/io_uring.h>
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
@@ -2419,6 +2420,7 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *cop
 	if (retval)
 		goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
 
+	random_kstack_task_init(p);
 	stackleak_task_init(p);
 
 	if (pid != &init_struct_pid) {
author maintainer
#103 lore raw

PATCH 103/215 mmc: block: use single block write in retry

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bin Liu <[email protected]>

commit c7c6d4f5103864f73ee3a78bfd6da241f84197dd upstream.

Due to errata i2493[0], multi-block write would still fail in retries.

With i2493, the MMC interface has the potential of write failures when issuing multi-block writes operating in HS200 mode with excessive IO supply noise.

While the errata provides guidance in hardware design and layout to minimize the IO supply noise, in theory the write failure cannot be resolved in hardware. The software solution to ensure the data integrity is to add minimum 5us delay between block writes. Single-block write is the practical way to introduce the delay.

This patch reuses recovery_mode flag, and switches to single-block write in retry when multi-block write fails. It covers both CQE and non-CQE cases.

[0] https://www.ti.com/lit/pdf/sprz582

---
 drivers/mmc/core/block.c |   12 ++++++++++--
 drivers/mmc/core/queue.h |    3 +++
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/core/block.c +10 -2
@@ -1440,6 +1440,9 @@ static void mmc_blk_data_prep(struct mmc
 		    rq_data_dir(req) == WRITE &&
 		    (md->flags & MMC_BLK_REL_WR);
 
+	if (mqrq->flags & MQRQ_XFER_SINGLE_BLOCK)
+		recovery_mode = 1;
+
 	memset(brq, 0, sizeof(struct mmc_blk_request));
 
 	mmc_crypto_prepare_req(mqrq);
@@ -1579,10 +1582,13 @@ static void mmc_blk_cqe_complete_rq(stru
 		err = 0;
 
 	if (err) {
-		if (mqrq->retries++ < MMC_CQE_RETRIES)
+		if (mqrq->retries++ < MMC_CQE_RETRIES) {
+			if (rq_data_dir(req) == WRITE)
+				mqrq->flags |= MQRQ_XFER_SINGLE_BLOCK;
 			blk_mq_requeue_request(req, true);
-		else
+		} else {
 			blk_mq_end_request(req, BLK_STS_IOERR);
+		}
 	} else if (mrq->data) {
 		if (blk_update_request(req, BLK_STS_OK, mrq->data->bytes_xfered))
 			blk_mq_requeue_request(req, true);
@@ -2120,6 +2126,8 @@ static void mmc_blk_mq_complete_rq(struc
 	} else if (!blk_rq_bytes(req)) {
 		__blk_mq_end_request(req, BLK_STS_IOERR);
 	} else if (mqrq->retries++ < MMC_MAX_RETRIES) {
+		if (rq_data_dir(req) == WRITE)
+			mqrq->flags |= MQRQ_XFER_SINGLE_BLOCK;
 		blk_mq_requeue_request(req, true);
 	} else {
 		if (mmc_card_removed(mq->card))
drivers/mmc/core/queue.h +3 -0
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ enum mmc_drv_op {
 	MMC_DRV_OP_GET_EXT_CSD,
 };
 
+#define	MQRQ_XFER_SINGLE_BLOCK		BIT(0)
+
 struct mmc_queue_req {
 	struct mmc_blk_request	brq;
 	struct scatterlist	*sg;
@@ -69,6 +71,7 @@ struct mmc_queue_req {
 	void			*drv_op_data;
 	unsigned int		ioc_count;
 	int			retries;
+	u32			flags;
 };
 
 struct mmc_queue {
author maintainer
#104 lore raw

PATCH 104/215 mmc: sdhci-of-dwcmshc: Disable clock before DLL configuration

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shawn Lin <[email protected]>

commit 6546a49bbe656981d99a389195560999058c89c4 upstream.

According to the ASIC design recommendations, the clock must be disabled before operating the DLL to prevent glitches that could affect the internal digital logic. In extreme cases, failing to do so may cause the controller to malfunction completely.

Adds a step to disable the clock before DLL configuration and re-enables it at the end.

Fixes 08f3dff799d4 ("mmc: sdhci-of-dwcmshc: add rockchip platform support")
---
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-dwcmshc.c |   19 ++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-dwcmshc.c +16 -3
@@ -649,12 +649,15 @@ static void dwcmshc_rk3568_set_clock(str
 	extra &= ~BIT(0);
 	sdhci_writel(host, extra, reg);
 
+	/* Disable clock while config DLL */
+	sdhci_writew(host, 0, SDHCI_CLOCK_CONTROL);
+
 	if (clock <= 52000000) {
 		if (host->mmc->ios.timing == MMC_TIMING_MMC_HS200 ||
 		    host->mmc->ios.timing == MMC_TIMING_MMC_HS400) {
 			dev_err(mmc_dev(host->mmc),
 				"Can't reduce the clock below 52MHz in HS200/HS400 mode");
-			return;
+			goto enable_clk;
 		}
 
 		/*
@@ -674,7 +677,7 @@ static void dwcmshc_rk3568_set_clock(str
 			DLL_STRBIN_DELAY_NUM_SEL |
 			DLL_STRBIN_DELAY_NUM_DEFAULT << DLL_STRBIN_DELAY_NUM_OFFSET;
 		sdhci_writel(host, extra, DWCMSHC_EMMC_DLL_STRBIN);
-		return;
+		goto enable_clk;
 	}
 
 	/* Reset DLL */
@@ -701,7 +704,7 @@ static void dwcmshc_rk3568_set_clock(str
 				 500 * USEC_PER_MSEC);
 	if (err) {
 		dev_err(mmc_dev(host->mmc), "DLL lock timeout!\n");
-		return;
+		goto enable_clk;
 	}
 
 	extra = 0x1 << 16 | /* tune clock stop en */
@@ -734,6 +737,16 @@ static void dwcmshc_rk3568_set_clock(str
 		DLL_STRBIN_TAPNUM_DEFAULT |
 		DLL_STRBIN_TAPNUM_FROM_SW;
 	sdhci_writel(host, extra, DWCMSHC_EMMC_DLL_STRBIN);
+
+enable_clk:
+	/*
+	 * The sdclk frequency select bits in SDHCI_CLOCK_CONTROL are not functional
+	 * on Rockchip's SDHCI implementation. Instead, the clock frequency is fully
+	 * controlled via external clk provider by calling clk_set_rate(). Consequently,
+	 * passing 0 to sdhci_enable_clk() only re-enables the already-configured clock,
+	 * which matches the hardware's actual behavior.
+	 */
+	sdhci_enable_clk(host, 0);
 }
 
 static void rk35xx_sdhci_reset(struct sdhci_host *host, u8 mask)
author maintainer
#105 lore raw

PATCH 105/215 arm64: dts: ti: am62-verdin: Enable pullup for eMMC data pins

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Francesco Dolcini <[email protected]>

commit d5325810814ee995debfa0b6c4a22e0391598bef upstream.

Verdin AM62 board does not have external pullups on eMMC DAT1-DAT7 pins. Enable internal pullups on DAT1-DAT7 considering:

- without a host-side pullup, these lines rely solely on the eMMC device's internal pullup (R_int, 10kohm-150kohm per JEDEC), which may exceed the recommended 50kohm max for 1.8V VCCQ
- JEDEC JESD84-B51 Table 200 requires host-side pullups (R_DAT, 10kohm-100kohm) on all data lines to prevent bus floating

---
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/ti/k3-am62-verdin.dtsi |   20 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/ti/k3-am62-verdin.dtsi +10 -10
@@ -566,16 +566,16 @@
 	/* On-module eMMC */
 	pinctrl_sdhci0: main-mmc0-default-pins {
 		pinctrl-single,pins = <
-			AM62X_IOPAD(0x220, PIN_INPUT, 0) /*  (Y3) MMC0_CMD  */
-			AM62X_IOPAD(0x218, PIN_INPUT, 0) /* (AB1) MMC0_CLK  */
-			AM62X_IOPAD(0x214, PIN_INPUT, 0) /* (AA2) MMC0_DAT0 */
-			AM62X_IOPAD(0x210, PIN_INPUT, 0) /* (AA1) MMC0_DAT1 */
-			AM62X_IOPAD(0x20c, PIN_INPUT, 0) /* (AA3) MMC0_DAT2 */
-			AM62X_IOPAD(0x208, PIN_INPUT, 0) /*  (Y4) MMC0_DAT3 */
-			AM62X_IOPAD(0x204, PIN_INPUT, 0) /* (AB2) MMC0_DAT4 */
-			AM62X_IOPAD(0x200, PIN_INPUT, 0) /* (AC1) MMC0_DAT5 */
-			AM62X_IOPAD(0x1fc, PIN_INPUT, 0) /* (AD2) MMC0_DAT6 */
-			AM62X_IOPAD(0x1f8, PIN_INPUT, 0) /* (AC2) MMC0_DAT7 */
+			AM62X_IOPAD(0x220, PIN_INPUT,        0) /*  (Y3) MMC0_CMD  */
+			AM62X_IOPAD(0x218, PIN_INPUT,        0) /* (AB1) MMC0_CLK  */
+			AM62X_IOPAD(0x214, PIN_INPUT,        0) /* (AA2) MMC0_DAT0 */
+			AM62X_IOPAD(0x210, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP, 0) /* (AA1) MMC0_DAT1 */
+			AM62X_IOPAD(0x20c, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP, 0) /* (AA3) MMC0_DAT2 */
+			AM62X_IOPAD(0x208, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP, 0) /*  (Y4) MMC0_DAT3 */
+			AM62X_IOPAD(0x204, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP, 0) /* (AB2) MMC0_DAT4 */
+			AM62X_IOPAD(0x200, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP, 0) /* (AC1) MMC0_DAT5 */
+			AM62X_IOPAD(0x1fc, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP, 0) /* (AD2) MMC0_DAT6 */
+			AM62X_IOPAD(0x1f8, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP, 0) /* (AC2) MMC0_DAT7 */
 		>;
 	};
 
author maintainer
#106 lore raw

PATCH 106/215 xfs: fix a resource leak in xfs_alloc_buftarg()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Haoxiang Li <[email protected]>

commit 29a7b2614357393b176ef06ba5bc3ff5afc8df69 upstream.

In the error path, call fs_put_dax() to drop the DAX device reference.

Fixes 6f643c57d57c ("xfs: implement ->notify_failure() for XFS")
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c +1 -0
@@ -2127,6 +2127,7 @@ xfs_alloc_buftarg(
 	return btp;
 
 error_free:
+	fs_put_dax(btp->bt_daxdev, mp);
 	kfree(btp);
 	return NULL;
 }
author maintainer
#107 lore raw

PATCH 107/215 firmware: google: framebuffer: Do not unregister platform device

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>

commit 5cd28bd28c8ce426b56ce4230dbd17537181d5ad upstream.

The native driver takes over the framebuffer aperture by removing the system- framebuffer platform device. Afterwards the pointer in drvdata is dangling. Remove the entire logic around drvdata and let the kernel's aperture helpers handle this. The platform device depends on the native hardware device instead of the coreboot device anyway.

When commit 851b4c14532d ("firmware: coreboot: Add coreboot framebuffer driver") added the coreboot framebuffer code, the kernel did not support device-based aperture management. Instead native driviers only removed the conflicting fbdev device. At that point, unregistering the framebuffer device most likely worked correctly. It was definitely broken after commit d9702b2a2171 ("fbdev/simplefb: Do not use struct fb_info.apertures"). So take this commit for the Fixes tag. Earlier releases might work depending on the native hardware driver.

Fixes d9702b2a2171 ("fbdev/simplefb: Do not use struct fb_info.apertures")
Cc Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>
Cc Javier Martinez Canillas <[email protected]>
Cc Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Cc <[email protected]> # v6.3+
---
 drivers/firmware/google/framebuffer-coreboot.c |   10 ----------
 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/google/framebuffer-coreboot.c +0 -10
@@ -67,19 +67,10 @@ static int framebuffer_probe(struct core
 						 sizeof(pdata));
 	if (IS_ERR(pdev))
 		pr_warn("coreboot: could not register framebuffer\n");
-	else
-		dev_set_drvdata(&dev->dev, pdev);
 
 	return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(pdev);
 }
 
-static void framebuffer_remove(struct coreboot_device *dev)
-{
-	struct platform_device *pdev = dev_get_drvdata(&dev->dev);
-
-	platform_device_unregister(pdev);
-}
-
 static const struct coreboot_device_id framebuffer_ids[] = {
 	{ .tag = CB_TAG_FRAMEBUFFER },
 	{ /* sentinel */ }
@@ -88,7 +79,6 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(coreboot, framebuffe
 
 static struct coreboot_driver framebuffer_driver = {
 	.probe = framebuffer_probe,
-	.remove = framebuffer_remove,
 	.drv = {
 		.name = "framebuffer",
 	},
author maintainer
#108 lore raw

PATCH 108/215 crypto: talitos - fix SEC1 32k ahash request limitation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Louvel <[email protected]>

commit 655ef638a2bc3cd0a9eff99a02f83cab94a3a917 upstream.

Since commit c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES"), the crypto core may pass large scatterlists spanning multiple pages to drivers supporting ahash operations. As a result, a driver can now receive large ahash requests.

The SEC1 engine has a limitation where a single descriptor cannot process more than 32k of data. The current implementation attempts to handle the entire request within a single descriptor, which leads to failures raised by the driver:

"length exceeds h/w max limit"

Address this limitation by splitting large ahash requests into multiple descriptors, each respecting the 32k hardware limit. This allows processing arbitrarily large requests.

Fixes c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
---
 drivers/crypto/talitos.c |  216 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 147 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/talitos.c +147 -69
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
  * All rights reserved.
  */
 
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
@@ -870,10 +871,18 @@ struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx {
 	unsigned int swinit;
 	unsigned int first;
 	unsigned int last;
+	unsigned int last_request;
 	unsigned int to_hash_later;
 	unsigned int nbuf;
 	struct scatterlist bufsl[2];
 	struct scatterlist *psrc;
+
+	struct scatterlist request_bufsl[2];
+	struct ahash_request *areq;
+	struct scatterlist *request_sl;
+	unsigned int remaining_ahash_request_bytes;
+	unsigned int current_ahash_request_bytes;
+	struct work_struct sec1_ahash_process_remaining;
 };
 
 struct talitos_export_state {
@@ -1759,7 +1768,20 @@ static void ahash_done(struct device *de
 
 	kfree(edesc);
 
-	ahash_request_complete(areq, err);
+	if (err) {
+		ahash_request_complete(areq, err);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	req_ctx->remaining_ahash_request_bytes -=
+		req_ctx->current_ahash_request_bytes;
+
+	if (!req_ctx->remaining_ahash_request_bytes) {
+		ahash_request_complete(areq, 0);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	schedule_work(&req_ctx->sec1_ahash_process_remaining);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1925,60 +1947,7 @@ static struct talitos_edesc *ahash_edesc
 				   nbytes, 0, 0, 0, areq->base.flags, false);
 }
 
-static int ahash_init(struct ahash_request *areq)
-{
-	struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq);
-	struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
-	struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
-	struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
-	unsigned int size;
-	dma_addr_t dma;
-
-	/* Initialize the context */
-	req_ctx->buf_idx = 0;
-	req_ctx->nbuf = 0;
-	req_ctx->first = 1; /* first indicates h/w must init its context */
-	req_ctx->swinit = 0; /* assume h/w init of context */
-	size =	(crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm) <= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
-			? TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_MD5_SHA1_SHA256
-			: TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_SHA384_SHA512;
-	req_ctx->hw_context_size = size;
-
-	dma = dma_map_single(dev, req_ctx->hw_context, req_ctx->hw_context_size,
-			     DMA_TO_DEVICE);
-	dma_unmap_single(dev, dma, req_ctx->hw_context_size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * on h/w without explicit sha224 support, we initialize h/w context
- * manually with sha224 constants, and tell it to run sha256.
- */
-static int ahash_init_sha224_swinit(struct ahash_request *areq)
-{
-	struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
-
-	req_ctx->hw_context[0] = SHA224_H0;
-	req_ctx->hw_context[1] = SHA224_H1;
-	req_ctx->hw_context[2] = SHA224_H2;
-	req_ctx->hw_context[3] = SHA224_H3;
-	req_ctx->hw_context[4] = SHA224_H4;
-	req_ctx->hw_context[5] = SHA224_H5;
-	req_ctx->hw_context[6] = SHA224_H6;
-	req_ctx->hw_context[7] = SHA224_H7;
-
-	/* init 64-bit count */
-	req_ctx->hw_context[8] = 0;
-	req_ctx->hw_context[9] = 0;
-
-	ahash_init(areq);
-	req_ctx->swinit = 1;/* prevent h/w initting context with sha256 values*/
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int ahash_process_req(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes)
+static int ahash_process_req_one(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes)
 {
 	struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq);
 	struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
@@ -1997,12 +1966,12 @@ static int ahash_process_req(struct ahas
 
 	if (!req_ctx->last && (nbytes + req_ctx->nbuf <= blocksize)) {
 		/* Buffer up to one whole block */
-		nents = sg_nents_for_len(areq->src, nbytes);
+		nents = sg_nents_for_len(req_ctx->request_sl, nbytes);
 		if (nents < 0) {
 			dev_err(dev, "Invalid number of src SG.\n");
 			return nents;
 		}
-		sg_copy_to_buffer(areq->src, nents,
+		sg_copy_to_buffer(req_ctx->request_sl, nents,
 				  ctx_buf + req_ctx->nbuf, nbytes);
 		req_ctx->nbuf += nbytes;
 		return 0;
@@ -2029,7 +1998,7 @@ static int ahash_process_req(struct ahas
 		sg_init_table(req_ctx->bufsl, nsg);
 		sg_set_buf(req_ctx->bufsl, ctx_buf, req_ctx->nbuf);
 		if (nsg > 1)
-			sg_chain(req_ctx->bufsl, 2, areq->src);
+			sg_chain(req_ctx->bufsl, 2, req_ctx->request_sl);
 		req_ctx->psrc = req_ctx->bufsl;
 	} else if (is_sec1 && req_ctx->nbuf && req_ctx->nbuf < blocksize) {
 		int offset;
@@ -2038,26 +2007,26 @@ static int ahash_process_req(struct ahas
 			offset = blocksize - req_ctx->nbuf;
 		else
 			offset = nbytes_to_hash - req_ctx->nbuf;
-		nents = sg_nents_for_len(areq->src, offset);
+		nents = sg_nents_for_len(req_ctx->request_sl, offset);
 		if (nents < 0) {
 			dev_err(dev, "Invalid number of src SG.\n");
 			return nents;
 		}
-		sg_copy_to_buffer(areq->src, nents,
+		sg_copy_to_buffer(req_ctx->request_sl, nents,
 				  ctx_buf + req_ctx->nbuf, offset);
 		req_ctx->nbuf += offset;
-		req_ctx->psrc = scatterwalk_ffwd(req_ctx->bufsl, areq->src,
+		req_ctx->psrc = scatterwalk_ffwd(req_ctx->bufsl, req_ctx->request_sl,
 						 offset);
 	} else
-		req_ctx->psrc = areq->src;
+		req_ctx->psrc = req_ctx->request_sl;
 
 	if (to_hash_later) {
-		nents = sg_nents_for_len(areq->src, nbytes);
+		nents = sg_nents_for_len(req_ctx->request_sl, nbytes);
 		if (nents < 0) {
 			dev_err(dev, "Invalid number of src SG.\n");
 			return nents;
 		}
-		sg_pcopy_to_buffer(areq->src, nents,
+		sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req_ctx->request_sl, nents,
 				   req_ctx->buf[(req_ctx->buf_idx + 1) & 1],
 				      to_hash_later,
 				      nbytes - to_hash_later);
@@ -2065,7 +2034,7 @@ static int ahash_process_req(struct ahas
 	req_ctx->to_hash_later = to_hash_later;
 
 	/* Allocate extended descriptor */
-	edesc = ahash_edesc_alloc(areq, nbytes_to_hash);
+	edesc = ahash_edesc_alloc(req_ctx->areq, nbytes_to_hash);
 	if (IS_ERR(edesc))
 		return PTR_ERR(edesc);
 
@@ -2087,14 +2056,123 @@ static int ahash_process_req(struct ahas
 	if (ctx->keylen && (req_ctx->first || req_ctx->last))
 		edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_HMAC;
 
-	return common_nonsnoop_hash(edesc, areq, nbytes_to_hash, ahash_done);
+	return common_nonsnoop_hash(edesc, req_ctx->areq, nbytes_to_hash, ahash_done);
 }
 
-static int ahash_update(struct ahash_request *areq)
+static void sec1_ahash_process_remaining(struct work_struct *work)
 {
+	struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx =
+		container_of(work, struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx,
+			     sec1_ahash_process_remaining);
+	int err = 0;
+
+	req_ctx->request_sl = scatterwalk_ffwd(req_ctx->request_bufsl,
+					       req_ctx->request_sl, TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN);
+
+	if (req_ctx->remaining_ahash_request_bytes > TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN)
+		req_ctx->current_ahash_request_bytes = TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN;
+	else {
+		req_ctx->current_ahash_request_bytes =
+			req_ctx->remaining_ahash_request_bytes;
+
+		if (req_ctx->last_request)
+			req_ctx->last = 1;
+	}
+
+	err = ahash_process_req_one(req_ctx->areq,
+				    req_ctx->current_ahash_request_bytes);
+
+	if (err != -EINPROGRESS)
+		ahash_request_complete(req_ctx->areq, err);
+}
+
+static int ahash_process_req(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq);
+	struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
+	struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
+	struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
+	struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv);
+
+	req_ctx->areq = areq;
+	req_ctx->request_sl = areq->src;
+	req_ctx->remaining_ahash_request_bytes = nbytes;
+
+	if (is_sec1) {
+		if (nbytes > TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN)
+			nbytes = TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN;
+		else if (req_ctx->last_request)
+			req_ctx->last = 1;
+	}
+
+	req_ctx->current_ahash_request_bytes = nbytes;
+
+	return ahash_process_req_one(req_ctx->areq,
+				     req_ctx->current_ahash_request_bytes);
+}
+
+static int ahash_init(struct ahash_request *areq)
+{
+	struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq);
+	struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
+	struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
 	struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
+	unsigned int size;
+	dma_addr_t dma;
 
+	/* Initialize the context */
+	req_ctx->buf_idx = 0;
+	req_ctx->nbuf = 0;
+	req_ctx->first = 1; /* first indicates h/w must init its context */
+	req_ctx->swinit = 0; /* assume h/w init of context */
+	size =	(crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm) <= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
+			? TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_MD5_SHA1_SHA256
+			: TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_SHA384_SHA512;
+	req_ctx->hw_context_size = size;
+	req_ctx->last_request = 0;
 	req_ctx->last = 0;
+	INIT_WORK(&req_ctx->sec1_ahash_process_remaining, sec1_ahash_process_remaining);
+
+	dma = dma_map_single(dev, req_ctx->hw_context, req_ctx->hw_context_size,
+			     DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+	dma_unmap_single(dev, dma, req_ctx->hw_context_size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * on h/w without explicit sha224 support, we initialize h/w context
+ * manually with sha224 constants, and tell it to run sha256.
+ */
+static int ahash_init_sha224_swinit(struct ahash_request *areq)
+{
+	struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
+
+	req_ctx->hw_context[0] = SHA224_H0;
+	req_ctx->hw_context[1] = SHA224_H1;
+	req_ctx->hw_context[2] = SHA224_H2;
+	req_ctx->hw_context[3] = SHA224_H3;
+	req_ctx->hw_context[4] = SHA224_H4;
+	req_ctx->hw_context[5] = SHA224_H5;
+	req_ctx->hw_context[6] = SHA224_H6;
+	req_ctx->hw_context[7] = SHA224_H7;
+
+	/* init 64-bit count */
+	req_ctx->hw_context[8] = 0;
+	req_ctx->hw_context[9] = 0;
+
+	ahash_init(areq);
+	req_ctx->swinit = 1;/* prevent h/w initting context with sha256 values*/
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ahash_update(struct ahash_request *areq)
+{
+	struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
+
+	req_ctx->last_request = 0;
 
 	return ahash_process_req(areq, areq->nbytes);
 }
@@ -2103,7 +2181,7 @@ static int ahash_final(struct ahash_requ
 {
 	struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
 
-	req_ctx->last = 1;
+	req_ctx->last_request = 1;
 
 	return ahash_process_req(areq, 0);
 }
@@ -2112,7 +2190,7 @@ static int ahash_finup(struct ahash_requ
 {
 	struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
 
-	req_ctx->last = 1;
+	req_ctx->last_request = 1;
 
 	return ahash_process_req(areq, areq->nbytes);
 }
author maintainer
#109 lore raw

PATCH 109/215 crypto: talitos - rename first/last to first_desc/last_desc

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Louvel <[email protected]>

commit a1b80018b8cec27fc06a8b04a7f8b5f6cfe86eae upstream.

Previous commit introduces a new last_request variable in the context structure.

Renaming the first/last existing member variable in the context structure to improve readability.

---
 drivers/crypto/talitos.c |   46 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/talitos.c +23 -23
@@ -869,8 +869,8 @@ struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx {
 	u8 buf[2][HASH_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
 	int buf_idx;
 	unsigned int swinit;
-	unsigned int first;
-	unsigned int last;
+	unsigned int first_desc;
+	unsigned int last_desc;
 	unsigned int last_request;
 	unsigned int to_hash_later;
 	unsigned int nbuf;
@@ -889,8 +889,8 @@ struct talitos_export_state {
 	u32 hw_context[TALITOS_MDEU_MAX_CONTEXT_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
 	u8 buf[HASH_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
 	unsigned int swinit;
-	unsigned int first;
-	unsigned int last;
+	unsigned int first_desc;
+	unsigned int last_desc;
 	unsigned int to_hash_later;
 	unsigned int nbuf;
 };
@@ -1722,7 +1722,7 @@ static void common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(s
 	if (desc->next_desc &&
 	    desc->ptr[5].ptr != desc2->ptr[5].ptr)
 		unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc2->ptr[5], DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
-	if (req_ctx->last)
+	if (req_ctx->last_desc)
 		memcpy(areq->result, req_ctx->hw_context,
 		       crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm));
 
@@ -1759,7 +1759,7 @@ static void ahash_done(struct device *de
 		 container_of(desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc);
 	struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
 
-	if (!req_ctx->last && req_ctx->to_hash_later) {
+	if (!req_ctx->last_desc && req_ctx->to_hash_later) {
 		/* Position any partial block for next update/final/finup */
 		req_ctx->buf_idx = (req_ctx->buf_idx + 1) & 1;
 		req_ctx->nbuf = req_ctx->to_hash_later;
@@ -1825,7 +1825,7 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct t
 	/* first DWORD empty */
 
 	/* hash context in */
-	if (!req_ctx->first || req_ctx->swinit) {
+	if (!req_ctx->first_desc || req_ctx->swinit) {
 		map_single_talitos_ptr_nosync(dev, &desc->ptr[1],
 					      req_ctx->hw_context_size,
 					      req_ctx->hw_context,
@@ -1833,7 +1833,7 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct t
 		req_ctx->swinit = 0;
 	}
 	/* Indicate next op is not the first. */
-	req_ctx->first = 0;
+	req_ctx->first_desc = 0;
 
 	/* HMAC key */
 	if (ctx->keylen)
@@ -1866,7 +1866,7 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct t
 	/* fifth DWORD empty */
 
 	/* hash/HMAC out -or- hash context out */
-	if (req_ctx->last)
+	if (req_ctx->last_desc)
 		map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[5],
 				       crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm),
 				       req_ctx->hw_context, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
@@ -1908,7 +1908,7 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct t
 		if (sg_count > 1)
 			sync_needed = true;
 		copy_talitos_ptr(&desc2->ptr[5], &desc->ptr[5], is_sec1);
-		if (req_ctx->last)
+		if (req_ctx->last_desc)
 			map_single_talitos_ptr_nosync(dev, &desc->ptr[5],
 						      req_ctx->hw_context_size,
 						      req_ctx->hw_context,
@@ -1964,7 +1964,7 @@ static int ahash_process_req_one(struct
 	bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv);
 	u8 *ctx_buf = req_ctx->buf[req_ctx->buf_idx];
 
-	if (!req_ctx->last && (nbytes + req_ctx->nbuf <= blocksize)) {
+	if (!req_ctx->last_desc && (nbytes + req_ctx->nbuf <= blocksize)) {
 		/* Buffer up to one whole block */
 		nents = sg_nents_for_len(req_ctx->request_sl, nbytes);
 		if (nents < 0) {
@@ -1981,7 +1981,7 @@ static int ahash_process_req_one(struct
 	nbytes_to_hash = nbytes + req_ctx->nbuf;
 	to_hash_later = nbytes_to_hash & (blocksize - 1);
 
-	if (req_ctx->last)
+	if (req_ctx->last_desc)
 		to_hash_later = 0;
 	else if (to_hash_later)
 		/* There is a partial block. Hash the full block(s) now */
@@ -2041,19 +2041,19 @@ static int ahash_process_req_one(struct
 	edesc->desc.hdr = ctx->desc_hdr_template;
 
 	/* On last one, request SEC to pad; otherwise continue */
-	if (req_ctx->last)
+	if (req_ctx->last_desc)
 		edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_PAD;
 	else
 		edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_CONT;
 
 	/* request SEC to INIT hash. */
-	if (req_ctx->first && !req_ctx->swinit)
+	if (req_ctx->first_desc && !req_ctx->swinit)
 		edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_INIT;
 
 	/* When the tfm context has a keylen, it's an HMAC.
 	 * A first or last (ie. not middle) descriptor must request HMAC.
 	 */
-	if (ctx->keylen && (req_ctx->first || req_ctx->last))
+	if (ctx->keylen && (req_ctx->first_desc || req_ctx->last_desc))
 		edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_HMAC;
 
 	return common_nonsnoop_hash(edesc, req_ctx->areq, nbytes_to_hash, ahash_done);
@@ -2076,7 +2076,7 @@ static void sec1_ahash_process_remaining
 			req_ctx->remaining_ahash_request_bytes;
 
 		if (req_ctx->last_request)
-			req_ctx->last = 1;
+			req_ctx->last_desc = 1;
 	}
 
 	err = ahash_process_req_one(req_ctx->areq,
@@ -2103,7 +2103,7 @@ static int ahash_process_req(struct ahas
 		if (nbytes > TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN)
 			nbytes = TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN;
 		else if (req_ctx->last_request)
-			req_ctx->last = 1;
+			req_ctx->last_desc = 1;
 	}
 
 	req_ctx->current_ahash_request_bytes = nbytes;
@@ -2124,14 +2124,14 @@ static int ahash_init(struct ahash_reque
 	/* Initialize the context */
 	req_ctx->buf_idx = 0;
 	req_ctx->nbuf = 0;
-	req_ctx->first = 1; /* first indicates h/w must init its context */
+	req_ctx->first_desc = 1; /* first_desc indicates h/w must init its context */
 	req_ctx->swinit = 0; /* assume h/w init of context */
 	size =	(crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm) <= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
 			? TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_MD5_SHA1_SHA256
 			: TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_SHA384_SHA512;
 	req_ctx->hw_context_size = size;
 	req_ctx->last_request = 0;
-	req_ctx->last = 0;
+	req_ctx->last_desc = 0;
 	INIT_WORK(&req_ctx->sec1_ahash_process_remaining, sec1_ahash_process_remaining);
 
 	dma = dma_map_single(dev, req_ctx->hw_context, req_ctx->hw_context_size,
@@ -2224,8 +2224,8 @@ static int ahash_export(struct ahash_req
 	       req_ctx->hw_context_size);
 	memcpy(export->buf, req_ctx->buf[req_ctx->buf_idx], req_ctx->nbuf);
 	export->swinit = req_ctx->swinit;
-	export->first = req_ctx->first;
-	export->last = req_ctx->last;
+	export->first_desc = req_ctx->first_desc;
+	export->last_desc = req_ctx->last_desc;
 	export->to_hash_later = req_ctx->to_hash_later;
 	export->nbuf = req_ctx->nbuf;
 
@@ -2250,8 +2250,8 @@ static int ahash_import(struct ahash_req
 	memcpy(req_ctx->hw_context, export->hw_context, size);
 	memcpy(req_ctx->buf[0], export->buf, export->nbuf);
 	req_ctx->swinit = export->swinit;
-	req_ctx->first = export->first;
-	req_ctx->last = export->last;
+	req_ctx->first_desc = export->first_desc;
+	req_ctx->last_desc = export->last_desc;
 	req_ctx->to_hash_later = export->to_hash_later;
 	req_ctx->nbuf = export->nbuf;
 
author maintainer
#110 lore raw

PATCH 110/215 pwm: imx-tpm: Count the number of enabled channels in probe

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Viorel Suman (OSS) <[email protected]>

commit 3962c24f2d14e8a7f8a23f56b7ce320523947342 upstream.

On a soft reset TPM PWM IP may preserve its internal state from previous runtime, therefore on a subsequent OS boot and driver probe "enable_count" value and TPM PWM IP internal channels "enabled" states may get unaligned. In consequence on a suspend/resume cycle the call "if (--tpm->enable_count == 0)" may lead to "enable_count" overflow the system being blocked from entering suspend due to:

if (tpm->enable_count > 0)

       return -EBUSY;

Fix the problem by counting the enabled channels in probe function.

---
 drivers/pwm/pwm-imx-tpm.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pwm/pwm-imx-tpm.c +8 -1
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static int pwm_imx_tpm_probe(struct plat
 	struct clk *clk;
 	void __iomem *base;
 	int ret;
-	unsigned int npwm;
+	unsigned int i, npwm;
 	u32 val;
 
 	base = devm_platform_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0);
@@ -382,6 +382,13 @@ static int pwm_imx_tpm_probe(struct plat
 
 	mutex_init(&tpm->lock);
 
+	/* count the enabled channels */
+	for (i = 0; i < npwm; ++i) {
+		val = readl(base + PWM_IMX_TPM_CnSC(i));
+		if (FIELD_GET(PWM_IMX_TPM_CnSC_ELS, val))
+			++tpm->enable_count;
+	}
+
 	ret = devm_pwmchip_add(&pdev->dev, chip);
 	if (ret)
 		return dev_err_probe(&pdev->dev, ret, "failed to add PWM chip\n");
author maintainer
#111 lore raw

PATCH 111/215 tpm: Fix auth session leak in tpm2_get_random() error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gunnar Kudrjavets <[email protected]>

commit 666c1a2ca603d8314231200bf8bbb3a81bd64c6b upstream.

When tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() fails inside the do-while loop in tpm2_get_random(), the function returns directly after destroying the buffer, without ending the auth session via tpm2_end_auth_session().

This leaks the TPM auth session resource. All other error paths within the loop correctly reach the 'out' label which calls both tpm_buf_destroy() and tpm2_end_auth_session().

Fix this by replacing the early return with a goto to the existing 'out' label, which already handles both cleanup operations. The redundant tpm_buf_destroy() call is removed since 'out' takes care of it.

Cc [email protected] # v6.19+
Fixes 6e9722e9a7bf ("tpm2-sessions: Fix out of range indexing in name_size")
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c |    6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +2 -4
@@ -338,10 +338,8 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chi
 						NULL, 0);
 		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes);
 		err = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
-		if (err) {
-			tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
-			return err;
-		}
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
 
 		err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf,
 				       offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out,
author maintainer
#112 lore raw

PATCH 112/215 tpm: Use kfree_sensitive() to free auth session in tpm_dev_release()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gunnar Kudrjavets <[email protected]>

commit c424d2664f08c77f08b4580b5f0cbaabf7c229b2 upstream.

tpm_dev_release() uses plain kfree() to free chip->auth, which contains sensitive cryptographic material including HMAC session keys, nonces, and passphrase data (struct tpm2_auth).

Every other code path that frees this structure uses kfree_sensitive() to zero the memory before releasing it: both tpm2_end_auth_session() and tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() do so. The tpm_dev_release() path is the only one that does not, leaving key material in freed slab memory until it is eventually overwritten.

Use kfree_sensitive() for consistency with the rest of the driver and to ensure session keys are scrubbed during device teardown.

Cc [email protected] # v6.10+
Fixes 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions")
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +1 -1
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct devic
 	kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf);
 	kfree(chip->work_space.session_buf);
 #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
-	kfree(chip->auth);
+	kfree_sensitive(chip->auth);
 #endif
 	kfree(chip);
 }
author maintainer
#113 lore raw

PATCH 113/215 tpm: tpm_tis: add error logging for data transfer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jacqueline Wong <[email protected]>

commit 0471921e2d1043dcc6de5cffb49dd37709521abe upstream.

Add logging to more easily determine reason for transmit failure

Fixes 280db21e153d8 ("tpm_tis: Resend command to recover from data transfer errors")
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c +4 -0
@@ -472,6 +472,8 @@ static int tpm_tis_send_data(struct tpm_
 		status = tpm_tis_status(chip);
 		if (!itpm && (status & TPM_STS_DATA_EXPECT) == 0) {
 			rc = -EIO;
+			dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM_STS_DATA_EXPECT should be set. sts = 0x%08x\n",
+				status);
 			goto out_err;
 		}
 	}
@@ -492,6 +494,8 @@ static int tpm_tis_send_data(struct tpm_
 	status = tpm_tis_status(chip);
 	if (!itpm && (status & TPM_STS_DATA_EXPECT) != 0) {
 		rc = -EIO;
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM_STS_DATA_EXPECT should be unset. sts = 0x%08x\n",
+			status);
 		goto out_err;
 	}
 
author maintainer
#114 lore raw

PATCH 114/215 tpm: tpm_tis: stop transmit if retries are exhausted

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jacqueline Wong <[email protected]>

commit 949692da7211572fac419b2986b6abc0cd1aeb76 upstream.

tpm_tis_send_main() will attempt to retry sending data TPM_RETRY times. Currently, if those retries are exhausted, the driver will attempt to call execute. The TPM will be in the wrong state, leading to the operation simply timing out.

Instead, if there is still an error after retries are exhausted, return that error immediately.

Fixes 280db21e153d8 ("tpm_tis: Resend command to recover from data transfer errors")
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c +6 -1
@@ -557,11 +557,16 @@ static int tpm_tis_send_main(struct tpm_
 			break;
 		else if (rc != -EAGAIN && rc != -EIO)
 			/* Data transfer failed, not recoverable */
-			return rc;
+			goto out_err;
 
 		usleep_range(priv->timeout_min, priv->timeout_max);
 	}
 
+	if (rc == -EAGAIN || rc == -EIO) {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "Exhausted %d tpm_tis_send_data retries\n", TPM_RETRY);
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
 	/* go and do it */
 	rc = tpm_tis_write8(priv, TPM_STS(priv->locality), TPM_STS_GO);
 	if (rc < 0)
author maintainer
#115 lore raw

PATCH 115/215 rtc: ntxec: fix OF node reference imbalance

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 30c4d2f26bb3538c328035cea2e6265c8320539e upstream.

The driver reuses the OF node of the parent multi-function device but fails to take another reference to balance the one dropped by the platform bus code when unbinding the MFD and deregistering the child devices.

Fix this by using the intended helper for reusing OF nodes.

Fixes 435af89786c6 ("rtc: New driver for RTC in Netronix embedded controller")
Cc Jonathan Neuschäfer <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/rtc/rtc-ntxec.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-ntxec.c +1 -1
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static int ntxec_rtc_probe(struct platfo
 	struct rtc_device *dev;
 	struct ntxec_rtc *rtc;
 
-	pdev->dev.of_node = pdev->dev.parent->of_node;
+	device_set_of_node_from_dev(&pdev->dev, pdev->dev.parent);
 
 	rtc = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*rtc), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!rtc)
author maintainer
#116 lore raw

PATCH 116/215 mm/damon/core: use time_in_range_open() for damos quota window start

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>

commit 049a57421dd67a28c45ae7e92c36df758033e5fa upstream.

damos_adjust_quota() uses time_after_eq() to show if it is time to start a new quota charge window, comparing the current jiffies and the scheduled next charge window start time. If it is, the next charge window start time is updated and the new charge window starts.

The time check and next window start time update is skipped while the scheme is deactivated by the watermarks. Let's suppose the deactivation is kept more than LONG_MAX jiffies (assuming CONFIG_HZ of 250, more than 99 days in 32 bit systems and more than one billion years in 64 bit systems), resulting in having the jiffies larger than the next charge window start time + LONG_MAX. Then, the time_after_eq() call can return false until another LONG_MAX jiffies are passed.

This means the scheme can continue working after being reactivated by the watermarks. But, soon, the quota will be exceeded and the scheme will again effectively stop working until the next charge window starts. Because the current charge window is extended to up to LONG_MAX jiffies, however, it will look like it stopped unexpectedly and indefinitely, from the user's perspective.

Fix this by using !time_in_range_open() instead.

The issue was discovered [1] by sashiko.

Fixes ee801b7dd782 ("mm/damon/schemes: activate schemes based on a watermarks mechanism")
Cc <[email protected]> # 5.16.x
---
 mm/damon/core.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/damon/core.c +2 -1
@@ -1601,7 +1601,8 @@ static void damos_adjust_quota(struct da
 		quota->charged_from = jiffies;
 
 	/* New charge window starts */
-	if (time_after_eq(jiffies, quota->charged_from +
+	if (!time_in_range_open(jiffies, quota->charged_from,
+				quota->charged_from +
 				msecs_to_jiffies(quota->reset_interval))) {
 		if (quota->esz && quota->charged_sz >= quota->esz)
 			s->stat.qt_exceeds++;
author maintainer
#117 lore raw

PATCH 117/215 userfaultfd: allow registration of ranges below mmap_min_addr

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Denis M. Karpov <[email protected]>

commit 161ce69c2c89781784b945d8e281ff2da9dede9c upstream.

The current implementation of validate_range() in fs/userfaultfd.c performs a hard check against mmap_min_addr. This is redundant because UFFDIO_REGISTER operates on memory ranges that must already be backed by a VMA.

Enforcing mmap_min_addr or capability checks again in userfaultfd is unnecessary and prevents applications like binary compilers from using UFFD for valid memory regions mapped by application.

Remove the redundant check for mmap_min_addr.

We started using UFFD instead of the classic mprotect approach in the binary translator to track application writes. During development, we encountered this bug. The translator cannot control where the translated application chooses to map its memory and if the app requires a low-address area, UFFD fails, whereas mprotect would work just fine. I believe this is a genuine logic bug rather than an improvement, and I would appreciate including the fix in stable.

---
 fs/userfaultfd.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
fs/userfaultfd.c +0 -2
@@ -1215,8 +1215,6 @@ static __always_inline int validate_unal
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (!len)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (start < mmap_min_addr)
-		return -EINVAL;
 	if (start >= task_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (len > task_size - start)
author maintainer
#118 lore raw

PATCH 118/215 KVM: x86: Defer non-architectural deliver of exception payload to userspace read

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit d0ad1b05bbe6f8da159a4dfb6692b3b7ce30ccc8 upstream.

When attempting to play nice with userspace that hasn't enabled KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD, defer KVM's non-architectural delivery of the payload until userspace actually reads relevant vCPU state, and more importantly, force delivery of the payload in *all* paths where userspace saves relevant vCPU state, not just KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS.

Ignoring userspace save/restore for the moment, delivering the payload before the exception is injected is wrong regardless of whether L1 or L2 is running. To make matters even more confusing, the flaw *currently* being papered over by the !is_guest_mode() check isn't even the same bug that commit da998b46d244 ("kvm: x86: Defer setting of CR2 until #PF delivery") was trying to avoid.

At the time of commit da998b46d244, KVM didn't correctly handle exception intercepts, as KVM would wait until VM-Entry into L2 was imminent to check if the queued exception should morph to a nested VM-Exit. I.e. KVM would deliver the payload to L2 and then synthesize a VM-Exit into L1. But the payload was only the most blatant issue, e.g. waiting to check exception intercepts would also lead to KVM incorrectly escalating a should-be-intercepted #PF into a #DF.

That underlying bug was eventually fixed by commit 7709aba8f716 ("KVM: x86:
Morph pending exceptions to pending VM-Exits at queue time"), but in the interim, commit a06230b62b89 ("KVM: x86: Deliver exception payload on KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS") came along and subtly added another dependency on the !is_guest_mode() check.

While not recorded in the changelog, the motivation for deferring the !exception_payload_enabled delivery was to fix a flaw where a synthesized MTF (Monitor Trap Flag) VM-Exit would drop a pending #DB and clobber DR6. On a VM-Exit, VMX CPUs save pending #DB information into the VMCS, which is emulated by KVM in nested_vmx_update_pending_dbg() by grabbing the payload from the queue/pending exception. I.e. prematurely delivering the payload would cause the pending #DB to not be recorded in the VMCS, and of course, clobber L2's DR6 as seen by L1.

Jumping back to save+restore, the quirked behavior of forcing delivery of the payload only works if userspace does KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS *before* CR2 or DR6 is saved, i.e. before KVM_GET_SREGS{,2} and KVM_GET_DEBUGREGS. E.g. if userspace does KVM_GET_SREGS before KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS, then the CR2 saved by userspace won't contain the payload for the exception save by KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS.

Deliberately deliver the payload in the store_regs() path, as it's the least awful option even though userspace may not be doing save+restore. Because if userspace _is_ doing save restore, it could elide KVM_GET_SREGS knowing that SREGS were already saved when the vCPU exited.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c |   62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +39 -23
@@ -875,9 +875,6 @@ static void kvm_multiple_exception(struc
 		vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = error_code;
 		vcpu->arch.exception.has_payload = has_payload;
 		vcpu->arch.exception.payload = payload;
-		if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
-			kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu,
-						      &vcpu->arch.exception);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -5328,18 +5325,8 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_mce(st
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-					       struct kvm_vcpu_events *events)
+static struct kvm_queued_exception *kvm_get_exception_to_save(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	struct kvm_queued_exception *ex;
-
-	process_nmi(vcpu);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
-	if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu))
-		process_smi(vcpu);
-#endif
-
 	/*
 	 * KVM's ABI only allows for one exception to be migrated.  Luckily,
 	 * the only time there can be two queued exceptions is if there's a
@@ -5350,21 +5337,46 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_
 	if (vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending &&
 	    !vcpu->arch.exception.pending &&
 	    !vcpu->arch.exception.injected)
-		ex = &vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit;
-	else
-		ex = &vcpu->arch.exception;
+		return &vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit;
+
+	return &vcpu->arch.exception;
+}
+
+static void kvm_handle_exception_payload_quirk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_queued_exception *ex = kvm_get_exception_to_save(vcpu);
 
 	/*
-	 * In guest mode, payload delivery should be deferred if the exception
-	 * will be intercepted by L1, e.g. KVM should not modifying CR2 if L1
-	 * intercepts #PF, ditto for DR6 and #DBs.  If the per-VM capability,
-	 * KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD, is not set, userspace may or may not
-	 * propagate the payload and so it cannot be safely deferred.  Deliver
-	 * the payload if the capability hasn't been requested.
+	 * If KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD is disabled, then (prematurely) deliver
+	 * the pending exception payload when userspace saves *any* vCPU state
+	 * that interacts with exception payloads to avoid breaking userspace.
+	 *
+	 * Architecturally, KVM must not deliver an exception payload until the
+	 * exception is actually injected, e.g. to avoid losing pending #DB
+	 * information (which VMX tracks in the VMCS), and to avoid clobbering
+	 * state if the exception is never injected for whatever reason.  But
+	 * if KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD isn't enabled, then userspace may or
+	 * may not propagate the payload across save+restore, and so KVM can't
+	 * safely defer delivery of the payload.
 	 */
 	if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.exception_payload_enabled &&
 	    ex->pending && ex->has_payload)
 		kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex);
+}
+
+static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					       struct kvm_vcpu_events *events)
+{
+	struct kvm_queued_exception *ex = kvm_get_exception_to_save(vcpu);
+
+	process_nmi(vcpu);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+	if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu))
+		process_smi(vcpu);
+#endif
+
+	kvm_handle_exception_payload_quirk(vcpu);
 
 	memset(events, 0, sizeof(*events));
 
@@ -5549,6 +5561,8 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugr
 	    vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	kvm_handle_exception_payload_quirk(vcpu);
+
 	memset(dbgregs, 0, sizeof(*dbgregs));
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.db) != ARRAY_SIZE(dbgregs->db));
@@ -11782,6 +11796,8 @@ static void __get_sregs_common(struct kv
 	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
 		goto skip_protected_regs;
 
+	kvm_handle_exception_payload_quirk(vcpu);
+
 	kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &sregs->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
 	kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &sregs->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS);
 	kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &sregs->es, VCPU_SREG_ES);
author maintainer
#119 lore raw

PATCH 119/215 KVM: nSVM: Mark all of vmcb02 dirty when restoring nested state

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>

commit e63fb1379f4b9300a44739964e69549bebbcdca4 upstream.

When restoring a vCPU in guest mode, any state restored before KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE (e.g. KVM_SET_SREGS) will mark the corresponding dirty bits in vmcb01, as it is the active VMCB before switching to vmcb02 in svm_set_nested_state().

Hence, mark all fields in vmcb02 dirty in svm_set_nested_state() to capture any previously restored fields.

Fixes cc440cdad5b7 ("KVM: nSVM: implement KVM_GET_NESTED_STATE and KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE")
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +6 -0
@@ -1755,6 +1755,12 @@ static int svm_set_nested_state(struct k
 	nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(svm, svm->vmcb->save.rip, svm->vmcb->save.cs.base);
 
 	/*
+	 * Any previously restored state (e.g. KVM_SET_SREGS) would mark fields
+	 * dirty in vmcb01 instead of vmcb02, so mark all of vmcb02 dirty here.
+	 */
+	vmcb_mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
+
+	/*
 	 * While the nested guest CR3 is already checked and set by
 	 * KVM_SET_SREGS, it was set when nested state was yet loaded,
 	 * thus MMU might not be initialized correctly.
author maintainer
#120 lore raw

PATCH 120/215 KVM: nSVM: Sync NextRIP to cached vmcb12 after VMRUN of L2

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>

commit 778d8c1b2a6ffe622ddcd3bb35b620e6e41f4da0 upstream.

After VMRUN in guest mode, nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02() syncs fields written by the CPU from vmcb02 to the cached vmcb12. This is because the cached vmcb12 is used as the authoritative copy of some of the controls, and is the payload when saving/restoring nested state.

NextRIP is also written by the CPU (in some cases) after VMRUN, but is not sync'd to the cached vmcb12. As a result, it is corrupted after save/restore (replaced by the original value written by L1 on nested VMRUN). This could cause problems for both KVM (e.g. when injecting a soft IRQ) or L1 (e.g. when using NextRIP to advance RIP after emulating an instruction).

Fix this by sync'ing NextRIP to the cache after VMRUN of L2, but only after completing interrupts (not in nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02()), as KVM may update NextRIP (e.g. when re-injecting a soft IRQ).

Fixes cc440cdad5b7 ("KVM: nSVM: implement KVM_GET_NESTED_STATE and KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE")
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +10 -0
@@ -4445,6 +4445,16 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_ru
 
 	svm_complete_interrupts(vcpu);
 
+	/*
+	 * Update the cache after completing interrupts to get an accurate
+	 * NextRIP, e.g. when re-injecting a soft interrupt.
+	 *
+	 * FIXME: Rework svm_get_nested_state() to not pull data from the
+	 *        cache (except for maybe int_ctl).
+	 */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		svm->nested.ctl.next_rip = svm->vmcb->control.next_rip;
+
 	return svm_exit_handlers_fastpath(vcpu);
 }
 
author maintainer
#121 lore raw

PATCH 121/215 KVM: nSVM: Sync interrupt shadow to cached vmcb12 after VMRUN of L2

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>

commit 03bee264f8ebfd39e0254c98e112d033a7aa9055 upstream.

After VMRUN in guest mode, nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02() syncs fields written by the CPU from vmcb02 to the cached vmcb12. This is because the cached vmcb12 is used as the authoritative copy of some of the controls, and is the payload when saving/restoring nested state.

int_state is also written by the CPU, specifically bit 0 (i.e. SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK) for nested VMs, but it is not sync'd to cached vmcb12. This does not cause a problem if KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE preceeds KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS in the restore path, as an interrupt shadow would be correctly restored to vmcb02 (KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS overwrites what KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE restored in int_state).

However, if KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS preceeds KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE, an interrupt shadow would be restored into vmcb01 instead of vmcb02. This would mostly be benign for L1 (delays an interrupt), but not for L2. For L2, the vCPU could hang (e.g. if a wakeup interrupt is delivered before a HLT that should have been in an interrupt shadow).

Sync int_state to the cached vmcb12 in nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02() to avoid this problem. With that, KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE restores the correct interrupt shadow state, and if KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS follows it would overwrite it with the same value.

Fixes cc440cdad5b7 ("KVM: nSVM: implement KVM_GET_NESTED_STATE and KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE")
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +1 -0
@@ -420,6 +420,7 @@ void nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02(str
 	u32 mask;
 	svm->nested.ctl.event_inj      = svm->vmcb->control.event_inj;
 	svm->nested.ctl.event_inj_err  = svm->vmcb->control.event_inj_err;
+	svm->nested.ctl.int_state	= svm->vmcb->control.int_state;
 
 	/* Only a few fields of int_ctl are written by the processor.  */
 	mask = V_IRQ_MASK | V_TPR_MASK;
author maintainer
#122 lore raw

PATCH 122/215 KVM: SVM: Inject #UD for INVLPGA if EFER.SVME=0

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kevin Cheng <[email protected]>

commit d99df02ff427f461102230f9c5b90a6c64ee8e23 upstream.

INVLPGA should cause a #UD when EFER.SVME is not set. Add a check to properly inject #UD when EFER.SVME=0.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +3 -0
@@ -2555,6 +2555,9 @@ static int invlpga_interception(struct k
 	gva_t gva = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
 	u32 asid = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
 
+	if (nested_svm_check_permissions(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
 	/* FIXME: Handle an address size prefix. */
 	if (!is_long_mode(vcpu))
 		gva = (u32)gva;
author maintainer
#123 lore raw

PATCH 123/215 KVM: SVM: Explicitly mark vmcb01 dirty after modifying VMCB intercepts

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit d5bde6113aed8315a2bfe708730b721be9c2f48b upstream.

When reacting to an intercept update, explicitly mark vmcb01's intercepts dirty, as KVM always initially operates on vmcb01, and nested_svm_vmexit() isn't guaranteed to mark VMCB_INTERCEPTS as dirty. I.e. if L2 is active, KVM will modify the intercepts for L1, but might not mark them as dirty before the next VMRUN of L1.

Fixes 116a0a23676e ("KVM: SVM: Add clean-bit for intercetps, tsc-offset and pause filter count")
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +3 -1
@@ -129,11 +129,13 @@ void recalc_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *
 	struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached *g;
 	unsigned int i;
 
-	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb01.ptr, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
 
 	if (!is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu))
 		return;
 
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
+
 	c = &svm->vmcb->control;
 	h = &svm->vmcb01.ptr->control;
 	g = &svm->nested.ctl;
author maintainer
#124 lore raw

PATCH 124/215 KVM: nSVM: Ensure AVIC is inhibited when restoring a vCPU to guest mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>

commit 24f7d36b824b65cf1a2db3db478059187b2a37b0 upstream.

On nested VMRUN, KVM ensures AVIC is inhibited by requesting KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE, triggering a check of inhibit reasons, finding APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_NESTED, and disabling AVIC.

However, when KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE is performed on a vCPU not in guest mode with AVIC enabled, KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE is not requested, and AVIC is not inhibited.

Request KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE in the KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE path if AVIC is active, similar to the nested VMRUN path.

Fixes f44509f849fe ("KVM: x86: SVM: allow AVIC to co-exist with a nested guest running")
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +3 -0
@@ -1776,6 +1776,9 @@ static int svm_set_nested_state(struct k
 
 	svm->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = true;
 
+	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE, vcpu);
+
 	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES, vcpu);
 	ret = 0;
 out_free:
author maintainer
#125 lore raw

PATCH 125/215 KVM: nSVM: Use vcpu->arch.cr2 when updating vmcb12 on nested #VMEXIT

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>

commit 5c247d08bc81bbad4c662dcf5654137a2f8483ec upstream.

KVM currently uses the value of CR2 from vmcb02 to update vmcb12 on nested #VMEXIT. This value is incorrect in some cases, causing L1 to run L2 with a corrupted CR2. This could lead to segfaults or data corruption if L2 is in the middle of handling a #PF and reads a corrupted CR2. Use the correct value in vcpu->arch.cr2 instead.

The value in vcpu->arch.cr2 is sync'd to vmcb02 shortly before a VMRUN of L2, and sync'd back to vcpu->arch.cr2 shortly after. The value are only out-of-sync in two cases: after save+restore, and after a #PF is injected into L2. In either case, if a #VMEXIT to L1 is synthesized before L2 runs, using the value in vmcb02 would be incorrect.

After save+restore, the value of CR2 is restored by KVM_SET_SREGS into vcpu->arch.cr2. It is not reflect in vmcb02 until a VMRUN of L2. Before that, it holds whatever was in vmcb02 before restore, which would be zero on a new vCPU that never ran nested. If a #VMEXIT to L1 is synthesized before L2 ever runs, using vcpu->arch.cr2 to update vmcb12 is the right thing to do.

The #PF injection case is more nuanced. Although the APM is a bit unclear about when CR2 is written during a #PF, the SDM is more clear:

Processors update CR2 whenever a page fault is detected. If a second page fault occurs while an earlier page fault is being delivered, the faulting linear address of the second fault will overwrite the contents of CR2 (replacing the previous address). These updates to CR2 occur even if the page fault results in a double fault or occurs during the delivery of a double fault.

KVM injecting the exception surely counts as the #PF being "detected". More importantly, when an exception is injected into L2 at the time of a synthesized #VMEXIT, KVM updates exit_int_info in vmcb12 accordingly, such that an L1 hypervisor can re-inject the exception. If CR2 is not written at that point, the L1 hypervisor have no way of correctly re-injecting the #PF. Hence, if a #VMEXIT to L1 is synthesized after the #PF is injected into L2 but before it actually runs, using vcpu->arch.cr2 to update vmcb12 is also the right thing to do.

Note that KVM does _not_ update vcpu->arch.cr2 when a #PF is pending for L2, only when it is injected. The distinction is important, because only injected (but not intercepted) exceptions are propagated to L1 through exit_int_info. It would be incorrect to update CR2 in vmcb12 for a pending #PF, as L1 would perceive an updated CR2 value with no #PF.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +1 -1
@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *s
 	vmcb12->save.efer   = svm->vcpu.arch.efer;
 	vmcb12->save.cr0    = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
 	vmcb12->save.cr3    = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
-	vmcb12->save.cr2    = vmcb02->save.cr2;
+	vmcb12->save.cr2    = vcpu->arch.cr2;
 	vmcb12->save.cr4    = svm->vcpu.arch.cr4;
 	vmcb12->save.rflags = kvm_get_rflags(vcpu);
 	vmcb12->save.rip    = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
author maintainer
#126 lore raw

PATCH 126/215 KVM: nSVM: Always inject a #GP if mapping VMCB12 fails on nested VMRUN

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>

commit 01ddcdc55e097ca38c28ae656711b8e6d1df71f8 upstream.

nested_svm_vmrun() currently only injects a #GP if kvm_vcpu_map() fails with -EINVAL. But it could also fail with -EFAULT if creating a host mapping failed. Inject a #GP in all cases, no reason to treat failure modes differently.

Fixes 8c5fbf1a7231 ("KVM/nSVM: Use the new mapping API for mapping guest memory")
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c |    5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +1 -4
@@ -865,12 +865,9 @@ int nested_svm_vmrun(struct kvm_vcpu *vc
 	}
 
 	vmcb12_gpa = svm->vmcb->save.rax;
-	ret = kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(vmcb12_gpa), &map);
-	if (ret == -EINVAL) {
+	if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(vmcb12_gpa), &map)) {
 		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
 		return 1;
-	} else if (ret) {
-		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
 	}
 
 	ret = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
author maintainer
#127 lore raw

PATCH 127/215 KVM: nSVM: Clear GIF on nested #VMEXIT(INVALID)

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>

commit f85a6ce06e4a0d49652f57967a649ab09e06287c upstream.

According to the APM, GIF is set to 0 on any #VMEXIT, including an #VMEXIT(INVALID) due to failed consistency checks. Clear GIF on consistency check failures.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +1 -0
@@ -886,6 +886,7 @@ int nested_svm_vmrun(struct kvm_vcpu *vc
 		vmcb12->control.exit_code_hi = -1u;
 		vmcb12->control.exit_info_1  = 0;
 		vmcb12->control.exit_info_2  = 0;
+		svm_set_gif(svm, false);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
author maintainer
#128 lore raw

PATCH 128/215 KVM: nSVM: Clear EVENTINJ fields in vmcb12 on nested #VMEXIT

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>

commit 69b721a86d0dcb026f6db7d111dcde7550442d2e upstream.

According to the APM, from the reference of the VMRUN instruction:

Upon #VMEXIT, the processor performs the following actions in order to return to the host execution context:

...

clear EVENTINJ field in VMCB

KVM already syncs EVENTINJ fields from vmcb02 to cached vmcb12 on every L2->L0 #VMEXIT. Since these fields are zeroed by the CPU on #VMEXIT, they will mostly be zeroed in vmcb12 on nested #VMEXIT by nested_svm_vmexit().

However, this is not the case when:

1. Consistency checks fail, as nested_svm_vmexit() is not called.
2. Entering guest mode fails before L2 runs (e.g. due to failed load of

     CR3).

(2) was broken by commit 2d8a42be0e2b ("KVM: nSVM: synchronize VMCB controls updated by the processor on every vmexit"), as prior to that nested_svm_vmexit() always zeroed EVENTINJ fields.

Explicitly clear the fields in all nested #VMEXIT code paths.

Fixes 3d6368ef580a ("KVM: SVM: Add VMRUN handler")
Fixes 2d8a42be0e2b ("KVM: nSVM: synchronize VMCB controls updated by the processor on every vmexit")
[sean: massage changelog formatting]
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +4 -2
@@ -886,6 +886,8 @@ int nested_svm_vmrun(struct kvm_vcpu *vc
 		vmcb12->control.exit_code_hi = -1u;
 		vmcb12->control.exit_info_1  = 0;
 		vmcb12->control.exit_info_2  = 0;
+		vmcb12->control.event_inj = 0;
+		vmcb12->control.event_inj_err = 0;
 		svm_set_gif(svm, false);
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -1027,9 +1029,9 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *s
 	if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
 		vmcb12->control.next_rip  = vmcb02->control.next_rip;
 
+	vmcb12->control.event_inj	  = 0;
+	vmcb12->control.event_inj_err	  = 0;
 	vmcb12->control.int_ctl           = svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl;
-	vmcb12->control.event_inj         = svm->nested.ctl.event_inj;
-	vmcb12->control.event_inj_err     = svm->nested.ctl.event_inj_err;
 
 	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
 		vmcb01->control.pause_filter_count = vmcb02->control.pause_filter_count;
author maintainer
#129 lore raw

PATCH 129/215 KVM: nSVM: Clear tracking of L1->L2 NMI and soft IRQ on nested #VMEXIT

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>

commit 8998e1d012f3f45d0456f16706682cef04c3c436 upstream.

KVM clears tracking of L1->L2 injected NMIs (i.e. nmi_l1_to_l2) and soft IRQs (i.e. soft_int_injected) on a synthesized #VMEXIT(INVALID) due to failed VMRUN. However, they are not explicitly cleared in other synthesized #VMEXITs.

soft_int_injected is always cleared after the first VMRUN of L2 when completing interrupts, as any re-injection is then tracked by KVM (instead of purely in vmcb02).

nmi_l1_to_l2 is not cleared after the first VMRUN if NMI injection failed, as KVM still needs to keep track that the NMI originated from L1 to avoid blocking NMIs for L1. It is only cleared when the NMI injection succeeds.

KVM could synthesize a #VMEXIT to L1 before successfully injecting the NMI into L2 (e.g. due to a #NPF on L2's NMI handler in L1's NPTs). In this case, nmi_l1_to_l2 will remain true, and KVM may not correctly mask NMIs and intercept IRET when injecting an NMI into L1.

Clear both nmi_l1_to_l2 and soft_int_injected in nested_svm_vmexit(), i.e. for all #VMEXITs except those that occur due to failed consistency checks, as those happen before nmi_l1_to_l2 or soft_int_injected are set.

Fixes 159fc6fa3b7d ("KVM: nSVM: Transparently handle L1 -> L2 NMI re-injection")
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +4 -2
@@ -915,8 +915,6 @@ int nested_svm_vmrun(struct kvm_vcpu *vc
 
 out_exit_err:
 	svm->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
-	svm->nmi_l1_to_l2 = false;
-	svm->soft_int_injected = false;
 
 	svm->vmcb->control.exit_code    = SVM_EXIT_ERR;
 	svm->vmcb->control.exit_code_hi = -1u;
@@ -1156,6 +1154,10 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *s
 	if (unlikely(vmcb01->save.rflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF))
 		kvm_queue_exception(&(svm->vcpu), DB_VECTOR);
 
+	/* Drop tracking for L1->L2 injected NMIs and soft IRQs */
+	svm->nmi_l1_to_l2 = false;
+	svm->soft_int_injected = false;
+
 	/*
 	 * Un-inhibit the AVIC right away, so that other vCPUs can start
 	 * to benefit from it right away.
author maintainer
#130 lore raw

PATCH 130/215 KVM: nSVM: Add missing consistency check for EFER, CR0, CR4, and CS

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>

commit 96bd3e76a171a8e21a6387e54e4c420a81968492 upstream.

According to the APM Volume #2, 15.5, Canonicalization and Consistency Checks (24593—Rev. 3.42—March 2024), the following condition (among others) results in a #VMEXIT with VMEXIT_INVALID (aka SVM_EXIT_ERR):

EFER.LME, CR0.PG, CR4.PAE, CS.L, and CS.D are all non-zero.

In the list of consistency checks done when EFER.LME and CR0.PG are set, add a check that CS.L and CS.D are not both set, after the existing check that CR4.PAE is set.

This is functionally a nop because the nested VMRUN results in SVM_EXIT_ERR in HW, which is forwarded to L1, but KVM makes all consistency checks before a VMRUN is actually attempted.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c |    6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h    |    1 +
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +6 -0
@@ -310,6 +310,10 @@ static bool __nested_vmcb_check_save(str
 		    CC(!(save->cr0 & X86_CR0_PE)) ||
 		    CC(!kvm_vcpu_is_legal_cr3(vcpu, save->cr3)))
 			return false;
+
+		if (CC((save->cs.attrib & SVM_SELECTOR_L_MASK) &&
+		       (save->cs.attrib & SVM_SELECTOR_DB_MASK)))
+			return false;
 	}
 
 	/* Note, SVM doesn't have any additional restrictions on CR4. */
@@ -398,6 +402,8 @@ static void __nested_copy_vmcb_save_to_c
 	 * Copy only fields that are validated, as we need them
 	 * to avoid TOC/TOU races.
 	 */
+	to->cs = from->cs;
+
 	to->efer = from->efer;
 	to->cr0 = from->cr0;
 	to->cr3 = from->cr3;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +1 -0
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ struct kvm_vmcb_info {
 };
 
 struct vmcb_save_area_cached {
+	struct vmcb_seg cs;
 	u64 efer;
 	u64 cr4;
 	u64 cr3;
author maintainer
#131 lore raw

PATCH 131/215 KVM: nSVM: Add missing consistency check for nCR3 validity

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>

commit b71138fcc362c67ebe66747bb22cb4e6b4d6a651 upstream.

Quoted 1 line

From the APM Volume #2, 15.25.4 (24593—Rev. 3.42—March 2024):

When VMRUN is executed with nested paging enabled (NP_ENABLE = 1), the following conditions are considered illegal state combinations, in addition to those mentioned in “Canonicalization and Consistency Checks”:
• Any MBZ bit of nCR3 is set.
• Any G_PAT.PA field has an unsupported type encoding or any reserved field in G_PAT has a nonzero value.

Add the consistency check for nCR3 being a legal GPA with no MBZ bits set. Note, the G_PAT.PA check is being handled separately[*].

Fixes 4b16184c1cca ("KVM: SVM: Initialize Nested Nested MMU context on VMRUN")
[sean: capture everything in CC(), massage changelog formatting]
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +4 -0
@@ -271,6 +271,10 @@ static bool __nested_vmcb_check_controls
 	if (CC((control->nested_ctl & SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE) && !npt_enabled))
 		return false;
 
+	if (CC((control->nested_ctl & SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE) &&
+	       !kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, control->nested_cr3)))
+		return false;
+
 	if (CC(!nested_svm_check_bitmap_pa(vcpu, control->msrpm_base_pa,
 					   MSRPM_SIZE)))
 		return false;
author maintainer
#132 lore raw

PATCH 132/215 KVM: nSVM: Raise #UD if unhandled VMMCALL isnt intercepted by L1

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kevin Cheng <[email protected]>

commit c36991c6f8d2ab56ee67aff04e3c357f45cfc76c upstream.

Explicitly synthesize a #UD for VMMCALL if L2 is active, L1 does NOT want to intercept VMMCALL, nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled() is true, and the hypercall is something other than one of the supported Hyper-V hypercalls. When all of the above conditions are met, KVM will intercept VMMCALL but never forward it to L1, i.e. will let L2 make hypercalls as if it were L1.

The TLFS says a whole lot of nothing about this scenario, so go with the architectural behavior, which says that VMMCALL #UDs if it's not intercepted.

Opportunistically do a 2-for-1 stub trade by stub-ifying the new API instead of the helpers it uses. The last remaining "single" stub will soon be dropped as well.

Fixes 3f4a812edf5c ("KVM: nSVM: hyper-v: Enable L2 TLB flush")
Cc Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>
[sean: rewrite changelog and comment, tag for stable, remove defunct stubs]
---
 arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h     |    8 --------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.h |   11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c |    4 +---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c    |   19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h +0 -8
@@ -304,14 +304,6 @@ static inline bool kvm_hv_has_stimer_pen
 {
 	return false;
 }
-static inline bool kvm_hv_is_tlb_flush_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-	return false;
-}
-static inline bool guest_hv_cpuid_has_l2_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-	return false;
-}
 static inline int kvm_hv_verify_vp_assist(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return 0;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.h +11 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,13 @@ static inline bool nested_svm_l2_tlb_flu
 	return hv_vcpu->vp_assist_page.nested_control.features.directhypercall;
 }
 
+static inline bool nested_svm_is_l2_tlb_flush_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return guest_hv_cpuid_has_l2_tlb_flush(vcpu) &&
+	       nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(vcpu) &&
+	       kvm_hv_is_tlb_flush_hcall(vcpu);
+}
+
 void svm_hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 #else /* CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV */
 static inline void nested_svm_hv_update_vm_vp_ids(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
@@ -48,6 +55,10 @@ static inline bool nested_svm_l2_tlb_flu
 {
 	return false;
 }
+static inline bool nested_svm_is_l2_tlb_flush_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return false;
+}
 static inline void svm_hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV */
 
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +1 -3
@@ -1532,9 +1532,7 @@ int nested_svm_exit_special(struct vcpu_
 	}
 	case SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL:
 		/* Hyper-V L2 TLB flush hypercall is handled by L0 */
-		if (guest_hv_cpuid_has_l2_tlb_flush(vcpu) &&
-		    nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(vcpu) &&
-		    kvm_hv_is_tlb_flush_hcall(vcpu))
+		if (nested_svm_is_l2_tlb_flush_hcall(vcpu))
 			return NESTED_EXIT_HOST;
 		break;
 	default:
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +18 -1
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
 #include "svm.h"
 #include "svm_ops.h"
 
+#include "hyperv.h"
 #include "kvm_onhyperv.h"
 #include "svm_onhyperv.h"
 
@@ -3377,6 +3378,22 @@ static int invpcid_interception(struct k
 	return kvm_handle_invpcid(vcpu, type, gva);
 }
 
+static int vmmcall_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Inject a #UD if L2 is active and the VMMCALL isn't a Hyper-V TLB
+	 * hypercall, as VMMCALL #UDs if it's not intercepted, and this path is
+	 * reachable if and only if L1 doesn't want to intercept VMMCALL or has
+	 * enabled L0 (KVM) handling of Hyper-V L2 TLB flush hypercalls.
+	 */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && !nested_svm_is_l2_tlb_flush_hcall(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return kvm_emulate_hypercall(vcpu);
+}
+
 static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
 	[SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0]			= cr_interception,
 	[SVM_EXIT_READ_CR3]			= cr_interception,
@@ -3427,7 +3444,7 @@ static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(
 	[SVM_EXIT_TASK_SWITCH]			= task_switch_interception,
 	[SVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN]			= shutdown_interception,
 	[SVM_EXIT_VMRUN]			= vmrun_interception,
-	[SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL]			= kvm_emulate_hypercall,
+	[SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL]			= vmmcall_interception,
 	[SVM_EXIT_VMLOAD]			= vmload_interception,
 	[SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE]			= vmsave_interception,
 	[SVM_EXIT_STGI]				= stgi_interception,
author maintainer
#133 lore raw

PATCH 133/215 KVM: nSVM: Always intercept VMMCALL when L2 is active

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit 33d3617a52f9930d22b2af59f813c2fbdefa6dd5 upstream.

Always intercept VMMCALL now that KVM properly synthesizes a #UD as appropriate, i.e. when L1 doesn't want to intercept VMMCALL, to avoid putting L2 into an infinite #UD loop if KVM_X86_QUIRK_FIX_HYPERCALL_INSN is enabled.

By letting L2 execute VMMCALL natively and thus #UD, for all intents and purposes KVM morphs the VMMCALL intercept into a #UD intercept (KVM always intercepts #UD). When the hypercall quirk is enabled, KVM "emulates" VMMCALL in response to the #UD by trying to fixup the opcode to the "right" vendor, then restarts the guest, without skipping the VMMCALL. As a result, the guest sees an endless stream of #UDs since it's already executing the correct vendor hypercall instruction, i.e. the emulator doesn't anticipate that the #UD could be due to lack of interception, as opposed to a truly undefined opcode.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.h |    4 ----
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c |    7 -------
 2 files changed, 11 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.h +0 -4
@@ -51,10 +51,6 @@ static inline bool nested_svm_is_l2_tlb_
 void svm_hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 #else /* CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV */
 static inline void nested_svm_hv_update_vm_vp_ids(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
-static inline bool nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-	return false;
-}
 static inline bool nested_svm_is_l2_tlb_flush_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return false;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +0 -7
@@ -159,13 +159,6 @@ void recalc_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *
 			vmcb_clr_intercept(c, INTERCEPT_VINTR);
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * We want to see VMMCALLs from a nested guest only when Hyper-V L2 TLB
-	 * flush feature is enabled.
-	 */
-	if (!nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(&svm->vcpu))
-		vmcb_clr_intercept(c, INTERCEPT_VMMCALL);
-
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_INTERCEPT; i++)
 		c->intercepts[i] |= g->intercepts[i];
 
author maintainer
#134 lore raw

PATCH 134/215 io_uring/poll: fix multishot recv missing EOF on wakeup race

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a68ed2df72131447d131531a08fe4dfcf4fa4653 ]

When a socket send and shutdown() happen back-to-back, both fire wake-ups before the receiver's task_work has a chance to run. The first wake gets poll ownership (poll_refs=1), and the second bumps it to 2. When io_poll_check_events() runs, it calls io_poll_issue() which does a recv that reads the data and returns IOU_RETRY. The loop then drains all accumulated refs (atomic_sub_return(2) -> 0) and exits, even though only the first event was consumed. Since the shutdown is a persistent state change, no further wakeups will happen, and the multishot recv can hang forever.

Check specifically for HUP in the poll loop, and ensure that another loop is done to check for status if more than a single poll activation is pending. This ensures we don't lose the shutdown event.

Backport notes for linux-6.12.y:
- The do-while body in 6.12.y already places v &= IO_POLL_REF_MASK; just before the while-condition; the upstream patch moves it earlier so that v != 1 in the HUP check refers to the ref-count only. The backport does the same.
- io_poll_issue takes ts (struct io_tw_state *) here.

CVE: CVE-2026-23473

Cc [email protected] # 6.12.y
Fixes dbc2564cfe0f ("io_uring: let fast poll support multishot")
[backport for linux-6.12.y, verified 2026-05-01]
---
 io_uring/poll.c | 9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
io_uring/poll.c +7 -2
index 63c3ce50cb83e..002f1ae830b8a 100644
@@ -295,6 +295,7 @@ static int io_poll_check_events(struct io_kiocb *req, struct io_tw_state *ts)
 				atomic_andnot(IO_POLL_RETRY_FLAG, &req->poll_refs);
 				v &= ~IO_POLL_RETRY_FLAG;
 			}
+			v &= IO_POLL_REF_MASK;
 		}
 
 		/* the mask was stashed in __io_poll_execute */
@@ -327,7 +328,12 @@ static int io_poll_check_events(struct io_kiocb *req, struct io_tw_state *ts)
 				return IOU_POLL_REMOVE_POLL_USE_RES;
 			}
 		} else {
-			int ret = io_poll_issue(req, ts);
+			int ret;
+
+			/* multiple refs and HUP, ensure we loop once more */
+			if ((req->cqe.res & (POLLHUP | POLLRDHUP)) && v != 1)
+				v--;
+			ret = io_poll_issue(req, ts);
 			if (ret == IOU_STOP_MULTISHOT)
 				return IOU_POLL_REMOVE_POLL_USE_RES;
 			else if (ret == IOU_REQUEUE)
@@ -343,7 +349,6 @@ static int io_poll_check_events(struct io_kiocb *req, struct io_tw_state *ts)
 		 * Release all references, retry if someone tried to restart
 		 * task_work while we were executing it.
 		 */
-		v &= IO_POLL_REF_MASK;
 	} while (atomic_sub_return(v, &req->poll_refs) & IO_POLL_REF_MASK);
 
 	io_napi_add(req);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#135 lore raw

PATCH 135/215 perf annotate: Use jump__delete when freeing LoongArch jumps

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rong Bao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a355eefc36c4481188249b067832b40a2c45fa5c ]

Currently, the initialization of loongarch_jump_ops does not contain an assignment to its .free field. This causes disasm_line__free() to fall through to ins_ops__delete() for LoongArch jump instructions.

ins_ops__delete() will free ins_operands.source.raw and ins_operands.source.name, and these fields overlaps with ins_operands.jump.raw_comment and ins_operands.jump.raw_func_start. Since in loongarch_jump__parse(), these two fields are populated by strchr()-ing the same buffer, trying to free them will lead to undefined behavior.

This invalid free usually leads to crashes:

        Process 1712902 (perf) of user 1000 dumped core.
        Stack trace of thread 1712902:
        #0  0x00007fffef155c58 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0x95c58)
        #1  0x00007fffef0f7a94 raise (libc.so.6 + 0x37a94)
        #2  0x00007fffef0dd6a8 abort (libc.so.6 + 0x1d6a8)
        #3  0x00007fffef145490 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0x85490)
        #4  0x00007fffef1646f4 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0xa46f4)
        #5  0x00007fffef164718 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0xa4718)
        #6  0x00005555583a6764 __zfree (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x106764)
        #7  0x000055555854fb70 disasm_line__free (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x2afb70)
        #8  0x000055555853d618 annotated_source__purge (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x29d618)
        #9  0x000055555852300c __hist_entry__tui_annotate (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x28300c)
        #10 0x0000555558526718 do_annotate (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x286718)
        #11 0x000055555852ed94 evsel__hists_browse (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x28ed94)
        #12 0x000055555831fdd0 cmd_report (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x7fdd0)
        #13 0x000055555839b644 handle_internal_command (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0xfb644)
        #14 0x00005555582fe6ac main (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x5e6ac)
        #15 0x00007fffef0ddd90 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0x1dd90)
        #16 0x00007fffef0ddf0c __libc_start_main (libc.so.6 + 0x1df0c)
        #17 0x00005555582fed10 _start (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x5ed10)
        ELF object binary architecture: LoongArch

... and it can be confirmed with Valgrind:

        ==1721834== Invalid free() / delete / delete[] / realloc()
        ==1721834==    at 0x4EA9014: free (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-loongarch64-linux.so)
        ==1721834==    by 0x4106287: __zfree (zalloc.c:13)
        ==1721834==    by 0x42ADC8F: disasm_line__free (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
        ==1721834==    by 0x429B737: annotated_source__purge (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
        ==1721834==    by 0x42811EB: __hist_entry__tui_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
        ==1721834==    by 0x42848D7: do_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
        ==1721834==    by 0x428CF33: evsel__hists_browse (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
        ==1721834==  Address 0x7d34303 is 35 bytes inside a block of size 62 alloc'd
        ==1721834==    at 0x4EA59B8: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-loongarch64-linux.so)
        ==1721834==    by 0x6B80B6F: strdup (strdup.c:42)
        ==1721834==    by 0x42AD917: disasm_line__new (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
        ==1721834==    by 0x42AE5A3: symbol__disassemble_objdump (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
        ==1721834==    by 0x42AF0A7: symbol__disassemble (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
        ==1721834==    by 0x429B3CF: symbol__annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
        ==1721834==    by 0x429C233: symbol__annotate2 (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
        ==1721834==    by 0x42804D3: __hist_entry__tui_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
        ==1721834==    by 0x42848D7: do_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
        ==1721834==    by 0x428CF33: evsel__hists_browse (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)

This patch adds the missing free() specialization in loongarch_jump_ops, which prevents disasm_line__free() from invoking the default cleanup function.

Fixes fb7fd2a14a503b9a ("perf annotate: Move raw_comment and raw_func_start fields out of 'struct ins_operands'")
Cc WANG Rui <[email protected]>
Cc Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
Cc WANG Xuerui <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/arch/loongarch/annotate/instructions.c | 1 +
 tools/perf/util/disasm.c                          | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
tools/perf/arch/loongarch/annotate/instructions.c +1 -0
index ab43b1ab51e3b..e16350155bf1d 100644
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ static int loongarch_jump__parse(struct arch *arch, struct ins_operands *ops, st
 }
 
 static struct ins_ops loongarch_jump_ops = {
+	.free	   = jump__delete,
 	.parse	   = loongarch_jump__parse,
 	.scnprintf = jump__scnprintf,
 };
tools/perf/util/disasm.c +1 -0
index 8a6f450c6f8e7..8f35232f7f22c 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ static int jump__scnprintf(struct ins *ins, char *bf, size_t size,
 			   struct ins_operands *ops, int max_ins_name);
 static int call__scnprintf(struct ins *ins, char *bf, size_t size,
 			   struct ins_operands *ops, int max_ins_name);
+static void jump__delete(struct ins_operands *ops);
 
 static void ins__sort(struct arch *arch);
 static int disasm_line__parse(char *line, const char **namep, char **rawp);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#136 lore raw

PATCH 136/215 ext4: fix bounds check in check_xattrs() to prevent out-of-bounds access

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Deepanshu Kartikey <[email protected]>

commit eceafc31ea7b42c984ece10d79d505c0bb6615d5 upstream.

The bounds check for the next xattr entry in check_xattrs() uses (void *)next >= end, which allows next to point within sizeof(u32) bytes of end. On the next loop iteration, IS_LAST_ENTRY() reads 4 bytes via *(__u32 *)(entry), which can overrun the valid xattr region.

For example, if next lands at end - 1, the check passes since next < end, but IS_LAST_ENTRY() reads 4 bytes starting at end - 1, accessing 3 bytes beyond the valid region.

Fix this by changing the check to (void *)next + sizeof(u32) > end, ensuring there is always enough space for the IS_LAST_ENTRY() read on the subsequent iteration.

---
 fs/ext4/xattr.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +1 -1
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ check_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct
 	/* Find the end of the names list */
 	while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(e)) {
 		struct ext4_xattr_entry *next = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(e);
-		if ((void *)next >= end) {
+		if ((void *)next + sizeof(u32) > end) {
 			err_str = "e_name out of bounds";
 			goto errout;
 		}
author maintainer
#137 lore raw

PATCH 137/215 ext4: fix missing brelse() in ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sohei Koyama <[email protected]>

commit 77d059519382bd66283e6a4e83ee186e87e7708f upstream.

The commit c8e008b60492 ("ext4: ignore xattrs past end") introduced a refcount leak in when block_csum is false.

ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all() calls ext4_get_inode_loc() to get iloc.bh, but never releases it with brelse().

---
 fs/ext4/xattr.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +3 -1
@@ -1165,7 +1165,7 @@ ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all(handle_t *h
 {
 	struct inode *ea_inode;
 	struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry;
-	struct ext4_iloc iloc;
+	struct ext4_iloc iloc = { .bh = NULL };
 	bool dirty = false;
 	unsigned int ea_ino;
 	int err;
@@ -1260,6 +1260,8 @@ ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all(handle_t *h
 			ext4_warning_inode(parent,
 					   "handle dirty metadata err=%d", err);
 	}
+
+	brelse(iloc.bh);
 }
 
 /*
author maintainer
#138 lore raw

PATCH 138/215 mtd: spi-nor: sst: Fix write enable before AAI sequence

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sanjaikumar V S <[email protected]>

commit a0f64241d3566a49c0a9b33ba7ae458ae22003a9 upstream.

When writing to SST flash starting at an odd address, a single byte is first programmed using the byte program (BP) command. After this operation completes, the flash hardware automatically clears the Write Enable Latch (WEL) bit.

If an AAI (Auto Address Increment) word program sequence follows, it requires WEL to be set. Without re-enabling writes, the AAI sequence fails.

Add spi_nor_write_enable() after the odd-address byte program when more data needs to be written. Use a local boolean for clarity.

---
 drivers/mtd/spi-nor/sst.c |   13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
drivers/mtd/spi-nor/sst.c +13 -0
@@ -203,6 +203,8 @@ static int sst_nor_write(struct mtd_info
 
 	/* Start write from odd address. */
 	if (to % 2) {
+		bool needs_write_enable = (len > 1);
+
 		/* write one byte. */
 		ret = sst_nor_write_data(nor, to, 1, buf);
 		if (ret < 0)
@@ -210,6 +212,17 @@ static int sst_nor_write(struct mtd_info
 
 		to++;
 		actual++;
+
+		/*
+		 * Byte program clears the write enable latch. If more
+		 * data needs to be written using the AAI sequence,
+		 * re-enable writes.
+		 */
+		if (needs_write_enable) {
+			ret = spi_nor_write_enable(nor);
+			if (ret)
+				goto out;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* Write out most of the data here. */
author maintainer
#139 lore raw

PATCH 139/215 amdgpu/jpeg: fix deepsleep register for jpeg 5_0_0 and 5_0_2

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David (Ming Qiang) Wu <[email protected]>

commit e90dc3b2d73986610476b02c29d0074aa4d92fb0 upstream.

PCTL0__MMHUB_DEEPSLEEP_IB is 0x69004 on MMHUB 4,1,0 and and 0x60804 on MMHUB 4,2,0. 0x62a04 is on MMHUB 1,8,0/1.

The DS bits are adjusted to cover more JPEG engines and MMHUB version.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v4_0_3.c |   52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v4_0_3.c +46 -6
@@ -670,15 +670,35 @@ static void jpeg_v4_0_3_dec_ring_set_wpt
  */
 void jpeg_v4_0_3_dec_ring_insert_start(struct amdgpu_ring *ring)
 {
-	if (!amdgpu_sriov_vf(ring->adev)) {
+	struct amdgpu_device *adev = ring->adev;
+
+	if (!amdgpu_sriov_vf(adev)) {
+		int jpeg_inst = GET_INST(JPEG, ring->me);
+		uint32_t value = 0x80004000; /* default DS14 */
+
 		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKETJ(regUVD_JRBC_EXTERNAL_REG_INTERNAL_OFFSET,
 			0, 0, PACKETJ_TYPE0));
-		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, 0x62a04); /* PCTL0_MMHUB_DEEPSLEEP_IB */
+
+		/* PCTL0__MMHUB_DEEPSLEEP_IB could be different on different mmhub version */
+		switch (amdgpu_ip_version(adev, MMHUB_HWIP, 0)) {
+		case IP_VERSION(4, 1, 0):
+			amdgpu_ring_write(ring, 0x69004);
+			value = 0x80010000;
+			break;
+		case IP_VERSION(4, 2, 0):
+			amdgpu_ring_write(ring, 0x60804);
+			if (jpeg_inst & 1)
+				value = 0x80010000;
+			break;
+		default:
+			amdgpu_ring_write(ring, 0x62a04);
+			break;
+		}
 
 		amdgpu_ring_write(ring,
 				  PACKETJ(JRBC_DEC_EXTERNAL_REG_WRITE_ADDR, 0,
 					  0, PACKETJ_TYPE0));
-		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, 0x80004000);
+		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, value);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -691,15 +711,35 @@ void jpeg_v4_0_3_dec_ring_insert_start(s
  */
 void jpeg_v4_0_3_dec_ring_insert_end(struct amdgpu_ring *ring)
 {
-	if (!amdgpu_sriov_vf(ring->adev)) {
+	struct amdgpu_device *adev = ring->adev;
+
+	if (!amdgpu_sriov_vf(adev)) {
+		int jpeg_inst = GET_INST(JPEG, ring->me);
+		uint32_t value = 0x00004000; /* default DS14 */
+
 		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKETJ(regUVD_JRBC_EXTERNAL_REG_INTERNAL_OFFSET,
 			0, 0, PACKETJ_TYPE0));
-		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, 0x62a04);
+
+		/* PCTL0__MMHUB_DEEPSLEEP_IB could be different on different mmhub version */
+		switch (amdgpu_ip_version(adev, MMHUB_HWIP, 0)) {
+		case IP_VERSION(4, 1, 0):
+			amdgpu_ring_write(ring, 0x69004);
+			value = 0x00010000;
+			break;
+		case IP_VERSION(4, 2, 0):
+			amdgpu_ring_write(ring, 0x60804);
+			if (jpeg_inst & 1)
+				value = 0x00010000;
+			break;
+		default:
+			amdgpu_ring_write(ring, 0x62a04);
+			break;
+		}
 
 		amdgpu_ring_write(ring,
 				  PACKETJ(JRBC_DEC_EXTERNAL_REG_WRITE_ADDR, 0,
 					  0, PACKETJ_TYPE0));
-		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, 0x00004000);
+		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, value);
 	}
 }
 
author maintainer
#140 lore raw

PATCH 140/215 md/raid5: fix soft lockup in retry_aligned_read()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chia-Ming Chang <[email protected]>

commit 7f9f7c697474268d9ef9479df3ddfe7cdcfbbffc upstream.

When retry_aligned_read() encounters an overlapped stripe, it releases the stripe via raid5_release_stripe() which puts it on the lockless released_stripes llist. In the next raid5d loop iteration, release_stripe_list() drains the stripe onto handle_list (since STRIPE_HANDLE is set by the original IO), but retry_aligned_read() runs before handle_active_stripes() and removes the stripe from handle_list via find_get_stripe() -> list_del_init(). This prevents handle_stripe() from ever processing the stripe to resolve the overlap, causing an infinite loop and soft lockup.

Fix this by using __release_stripe() with temp_inactive_list instead of raid5_release_stripe() in the failure path, so the stripe does not go through the released_stripes llist. This allows raid5d to break out of its loop, and the overlap will be resolved when the stripe is eventually processed by handle_stripe().

---
 drivers/md/raid5.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/md/raid5.c +7 -1
@@ -6625,7 +6625,13 @@ static int  retry_aligned_read(struct r5
 		}
 
 		if (!add_stripe_bio(sh, raid_bio, dd_idx, 0, 0)) {
-			raid5_release_stripe(sh);
+			int hash;
+
+			spin_lock_irq(&conf->device_lock);
+			hash = sh->hash_lock_index;
+			__release_stripe(conf, sh,
+					 &conf->temp_inactive_list[hash]);
+			spin_unlock_irq(&conf->device_lock);
 			conf->retry_read_aligned = raid_bio;
 			conf->retry_read_offset = scnt;
 			return handled;
author maintainer
#141 lore raw

PATCH 141/215 md/raid5: validate payload size before accessing journal metadata

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Junrui Luo <[email protected]>

commit b0cc3ae97e893bf54bbce447f4e9fd2e0b88bff9 upstream.

r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block() and r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum_for_mb() iterate over payloads in a journal metadata block using on-disk payload size fields without validating them against the remaining space in the metadata block.

A corrupted journal contains payload sizes extending beyond the PAGE_SIZE boundary can cause out-of-bounds reads when accessing payload fields or computing offsets.

Add bounds validation for each payload type to ensure the full payload fits within meta_size before processing.

---
 drivers/md/raid5-cache.c |   48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/md/raid5-cache.c +33 -15
@@ -2003,15 +2003,27 @@ r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum_for_mb
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	while (mb_offset < le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) {
+		sector_t payload_len;
+
 		payload = (void *)mb + mb_offset;
 		payload_flush = (void *)mb + mb_offset;
 
 		if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_DATA) {
+			payload_len = sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) +
+				(sector_t)sizeof(__le32) *
+				(le32_to_cpu(payload->size) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 9));
+			if (mb_offset + payload_len > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size))
+				goto mismatch;
 			if (r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum(
 				    log, ctx, page, log_offset,
 				    payload->checksum[0]) < 0)
 				goto mismatch;
 		} else if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_PARITY) {
+			payload_len = sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) +
+				(sector_t)sizeof(__le32) *
+				(le32_to_cpu(payload->size) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 9));
+			if (mb_offset + payload_len > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size))
+				goto mismatch;
 			if (r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum(
 				    log, ctx, page, log_offset,
 				    payload->checksum[0]) < 0)
@@ -2024,22 +2036,18 @@ r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum_for_mb
 				    payload->checksum[1]) < 0)
 				goto mismatch;
 		} else if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_FLUSH) {
-			/* nothing to do for R5LOG_PAYLOAD_FLUSH here */
+			payload_len = sizeof(struct r5l_payload_flush) +
+				(sector_t)le32_to_cpu(payload_flush->size);
+			if (mb_offset + payload_len > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size))
+				goto mismatch;
 		} else /* not R5LOG_PAYLOAD_DATA/PARITY/FLUSH */
 			goto mismatch;
 
-		if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_FLUSH) {
-			mb_offset += sizeof(struct r5l_payload_flush) +
-				le32_to_cpu(payload_flush->size);
-		} else {
-			/* DATA or PARITY payload */
+		if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) != R5LOG_PAYLOAD_FLUSH) {
 			log_offset = r5l_ring_add(log, log_offset,
 						  le32_to_cpu(payload->size));
-			mb_offset += sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) +
-				sizeof(__le32) *
-				(le32_to_cpu(payload->size) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 9));
 		}
-
+		mb_offset += payload_len;
 	}
 
 	put_page(page);
@@ -2090,6 +2098,7 @@ r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block(struct r
 	log_offset = r5l_ring_add(log, ctx->pos, BLOCK_SECTORS);
 
 	while (mb_offset < le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) {
+		sector_t payload_len;
 		int dd;
 
 		payload = (void *)mb + mb_offset;
@@ -2098,6 +2107,12 @@ r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block(struct r
 		if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_FLUSH) {
 			int i, count;
 
+			payload_len = sizeof(struct r5l_payload_flush) +
+				(sector_t)le32_to_cpu(payload_flush->size);
+			if (mb_offset + payload_len >
+			    le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size))
+				return -EINVAL;
+
 			count = le32_to_cpu(payload_flush->size) / sizeof(__le64);
 			for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
 				stripe_sect = le64_to_cpu(payload_flush->flush_stripes[i]);
@@ -2111,12 +2126,17 @@ r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block(struct r
 				}
 			}
 
-			mb_offset += sizeof(struct r5l_payload_flush) +
-				le32_to_cpu(payload_flush->size);
+			mb_offset += payload_len;
 			continue;
 		}
 
 		/* DATA or PARITY payload */
+		payload_len = sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) +
+			(sector_t)sizeof(__le32) *
+			(le32_to_cpu(payload->size) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 9));
+		if (mb_offset + payload_len > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		stripe_sect = (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_DATA) ?
 			raid5_compute_sector(
 				conf, le64_to_cpu(payload->location), 0, &dd,
@@ -2181,9 +2201,7 @@ r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block(struct r
 		log_offset = r5l_ring_add(log, log_offset,
 					  le32_to_cpu(payload->size));
 
-		mb_offset += sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) +
-			sizeof(__le32) *
-			(le32_to_cpu(payload->size) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 9));
+		mb_offset += payload_len;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
author maintainer
#142 lore raw

PATCH 142/215 check-uapi: link into shared objects

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

commit a261f6dff3c1653c19c065c3b3650c625447b8a7 upstream.

While testing ABI changes across all architectures, I found that abidiff sometimes produces nonsensical output. Further debugging identified missing or broken libelf support for architecture specific relocations in ET_REL binaries as the source of the problem[1].

Change the script to no longer produce a relocatable object file but instead create a shared library for each header. This makes abidiff work for all of the architectures in upstream linux kernels.

---
 scripts/check-uapi.sh |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
scripts/check-uapi.sh +5 -2
@@ -178,8 +178,11 @@ do_compile() {
 	local -r inc_dir="$1"
 	local -r header="$2"
 	local -r out="$3"
-	printf "int main(void) { return 0; }\n" | \
-		"$CC" -c \
+	printf "int f(void) { return 0; }\n" | \
+		"$CC" \
+		  -shared \
+		  -nostdlib \
+		  -fPIC \
 		  -o "$out" \
 		  -x c \
 		  -O0 \
author maintainer
#143 lore raw

PATCH 143/215 HID: apple: ensure the keyboard backlight is off if suspending

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aditya Garg <[email protected]>

commit 1f95a6cd5ad78ed27a31a20cbd1facff6f10b33d upstream.

Some users reported that upon suspending their keyboard backlight remained on. Fix this by adding the missing LED_CORE_SUSPENDRESUME flag.

Fixes 394ba612f941 ("HID: apple: Add support for magic keyboard backlight on T2 Macs")
Fixes 9018eacbe623 ("HID: apple: Add support for keyboard backlight on certain T2 Macs.")
---
 drivers/hid/hid-apple.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-apple.c +2 -0
@@ -832,6 +832,7 @@ static int apple_backlight_init(struct h
 	asc->backlight->cdev.name = "apple::kbd_backlight";
 	asc->backlight->cdev.max_brightness = rep->backlight_on_max;
 	asc->backlight->cdev.brightness_set_blocking = apple_backlight_led_set;
+	asc->backlight->cdev.flags = LED_CORE_SUSPENDRESUME;
 
 	ret = apple_backlight_set(hdev, 0, 0);
 	if (ret < 0) {
@@ -900,6 +901,7 @@ static int apple_magic_backlight_init(st
 	backlight->cdev.name = ":white:" LED_FUNCTION_KBD_BACKLIGHT;
 	backlight->cdev.max_brightness = backlight->brightness->field[0]->logical_maximum;
 	backlight->cdev.brightness_set_blocking = apple_magic_backlight_led_set;
+	backlight->cdev.flags = LED_CORE_SUSPENDRESUME;
 
 	apple_magic_backlight_set(backlight, 0, 0);
 
author maintainer
#144 lore raw

PATCH 144/215 inotify: fix watch count leak when fsnotify_add_inode_mark_locked() fails

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chia-Ming Chang <[email protected]>

commit 6a320935fa4293e9e599ec9f85dc9eb3be7029f8 upstream.

When fsnotify_add_inode_mark_locked() fails in inotify_new_watch(), the error path calls inotify_remove_from_idr() but does not call dec_inotify_watches() to undo the preceding inc_inotify_watches(). This leaks a watch count, and repeated failures can exhaust the max_user_watches limit with -ENOSPC even when no watches are active.

Prior to commit 1cce1eea0aff ("inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits"), the watch count was incremented after fsnotify_add_mark_locked() succeeded, so this path was not affected. The conversion moved inc_inotify_watches() before the mark insertion without adding the corresponding rollback.

Add the missing dec_inotify_watches() call in the error path.

---
 fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c +1 -0
@@ -621,6 +621,7 @@ static int inotify_new_watch(struct fsno
 	if (ret) {
 		/* we failed to get on the inode, get off the idr */
 		inotify_remove_from_idr(group, tmp_i_mark);
+		dec_inotify_watches(group->inotify_data.ucounts);
 		goto out_err;
 	}
 
author maintainer
#145 lore raw

PATCH 145/215 x86/cpu: Disable FRED when PTI is forced on

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

commit 932d922285ef4d0d655a6f5def2779ae86ca0d73 upstream.

FRED and PTI were never intended to work together. No FRED hardware is vulnerable to Meltdown and all of it should have LASS anyway. Nevertheless, if you boot a system with pti=on and fred=on, the kernel tries to do what is asked of it and dies a horrible death on the first attempt to run userspace (since it never switches to the user page tables).

Disable FRED when PTI is forced on, and print a warning about it.

A quick brain dump about what a FRED+PTI implementation would look like is below. I'm not sure it would make any sense to do it, but never say never. All I know is that it's way too complicated to be worth it today.

<brain dump>
The SWITCH_TO_USER/KERNEL_CR3 bits are simple to fix (or at least we have the assembly tools to do it already), as is sticking the FRED entry text in .entry.text (it's not in there today).

The nasty part is the stacks. Today, the CPU pops into the kernel on MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 which is normal old kernel memory and not mapped to userspace. The hardware pushes gunk on to MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, which is currently the task stacks. MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 would need to point elsewhere, probably cpu_entry_stack(). Then, start playing games with stacks on entry/exit, including copying gunk to and from the task stack.

While I'd *like* to have PTI everywhere, I'm not sure it's worth mucking up the FRED code with PTI kludges. If a user wants fast entry/exit, they use FRED. If you want PTI (and sekuritay), you certainly don't care about fast entry and FRED isn't going to help you *all* that much, so you can just stay with the IDT.

Plus, FRED hardware should have LASS which gives you a similar security profile to PTI without the CR3 munging.
</brain dump>

---
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/x86/mm/pti.c +5 -0
@@ -412,6 +412,11 @@ pti_clone_pgtable(unsigned long start, u
 			BUG();
 		}
 	}
+
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
+		pr_debug("PTI enabled, disabling FRED\n");
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FRED);
+	}
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
author maintainer
#146 lore raw

PATCH 146/215 wifi: rtl8xxxu: fix potential use of uninitialized value

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yi Cong <[email protected]>

commit f8a2fc809bfeb49130709b31a4d357a049f28547 upstream.

The local variables 'mcs' and 'nss' in rtl8xxxu_update_ra_report() are passed to rtl8xxxu_desc_to_mcsrate() as output parameters. If the helper function encounters an unhandled rate index, it may return without setting these values, leading to the use of uninitialized stack data.

Remove the helper rtl8xxxu_desc_to_mcsrate() and inline the logic into rtl8xxxu_update_ra_report(). This fixes the use of uninitialized 'mcs' and 'nss' variables for legacy rates.

The new implementation explicitly handles:
- Legacy rates: Set bitrate only.
- HT rates (MCS0-15): Set MCS flags, index, and NSS (1 or 2) directly.
- Invalid rates: Return early.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/core.c |   28 +++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/core.c +8 -20
@@ -4799,20 +4799,6 @@ static const struct ieee80211_rate rtl8x
 	{.bitrate = 540, .hw_value = 0x0b,},
 };
 
-static void rtl8xxxu_desc_to_mcsrate(u16 rate, u8 *mcs, u8 *nss)
-{
-	if (rate <= DESC_RATE_54M)
-		return;
-
-	if (rate >= DESC_RATE_MCS0 && rate <= DESC_RATE_MCS15) {
-		if (rate < DESC_RATE_MCS8)
-			*nss = 1;
-		else
-			*nss = 2;
-		*mcs = rate - DESC_RATE_MCS0;
-	}
-}
-
 static void rtl8xxxu_set_basic_rates(struct rtl8xxxu_priv *priv, u32 rate_cfg)
 {
 	struct ieee80211_hw *hw = priv->hw;
@@ -4922,23 +4908,25 @@ static void rtl8xxxu_set_aifs(struct rtl
 void rtl8xxxu_update_ra_report(struct rtl8xxxu_ra_report *rarpt,
 			       u8 rate, u8 sgi, u8 bw)
 {
-	u8 mcs, nss;
-
 	rarpt->txrate.flags = 0;
 
 	if (rate <= DESC_RATE_54M) {
 		rarpt->txrate.legacy = rtl8xxxu_legacy_ratetable[rate].bitrate;
-	} else {
-		rtl8xxxu_desc_to_mcsrate(rate, &mcs, &nss);
+	} else if (rate >= DESC_RATE_MCS0 && rate <= DESC_RATE_MCS15) {
 		rarpt->txrate.flags |= RATE_INFO_FLAGS_MCS;
+		if (rate < DESC_RATE_MCS8)
+			rarpt->txrate.nss = 1;
+		else
+			rarpt->txrate.nss = 2;
 
-		rarpt->txrate.mcs = mcs;
-		rarpt->txrate.nss = nss;
+		rarpt->txrate.mcs = rate - DESC_RATE_MCS0;
 
 		if (sgi)
 			rarpt->txrate.flags |= RATE_INFO_FLAGS_SHORT_GI;
 
 		rarpt->txrate.bw = bw;
+	} else {
+		return;
 	}
 
 	rarpt->bit_rate = cfg80211_calculate_bitrate(&rarpt->txrate);
author maintainer
#147 lore raw

PATCH 147/215 tcp: call sk_data_ready() after listener migration

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhenzhong Wu <[email protected]>

commit 3864c6ba1e041bc75342353a70fa2a2c6f909923 upstream.

When inet_csk_listen_stop() migrates an established child socket from a closing listener to another socket in the same SO_REUSEPORT group, the target listener gets a new accept-queue entry via inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(), but that path never notifies the target listener's waiters. A nonblocking accept() still works because it checks the queue directly, but poll()/epoll_wait() waiters and blocking accept() callers can also remain asleep indefinitely.

Call READ_ONCE(nsk->sk_data_ready)(nsk) after a successful migration in inet_csk_listen_stop().

However, after inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() succeeds, the ref acquired in reuseport_migrate_sock() is effectively transferred to nreq->rsk_listener. Another CPU can then dequeue nreq via accept() or listener shutdown, hit reqsk_put(), and drop that listener ref. Since listeners are SOCK_RCU_FREE, wrap the post-queue_add() dereferences of nsk in rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), which also covers the existing sock_net(nsk) access in that path.

The reqsk_timer_handler() path does not need the same changes for two
reasons: half-open requests become readable only after the final ACK, where tcp_child_process() already wakes the listener; and once nreq is visible via inet_ehash_insert(), the success path no longer touches nsk directly.

---
 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c +3 -0
@@ -1486,16 +1486,19 @@ void inet_csk_listen_stop(struct sock *s
 			if (nreq) {
 				refcount_set(&nreq->rsk_refcnt, 1);
 
+				rcu_read_lock();
 				if (inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(nsk, nreq, child)) {
 					__NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(nsk),
 							LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQSUCCESS);
 					reqsk_migrate_reset(req);
+					READ_ONCE(nsk->sk_data_ready)(nsk);
 				} else {
 					__NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(nsk),
 							LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQFAILURE);
 					reqsk_migrate_reset(nreq);
 					__reqsk_free(nreq);
 				}
+				rcu_read_unlock();
 
 				/* inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() has already
 				 * called inet_child_forget() on failure case.
author maintainer
#148 lore raw

PATCH 148/215 taskstats: set version in TGID exit notifications

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yiyang Chen <[email protected]>

commit 16c4f0211aaa1ec1422b11b59f64f1abe9009fc0 upstream.

delay accounting started populating taskstats records with a valid version field via fill_pid() and fill_tgid().

Later, commit ad4ecbcba728 ("[PATCH] delay accounting taskstats interface send tgid once") changed the TGID exit path to send the cached signal->stats aggregate directly instead of building the outgoing record through fill_tgid(). Unlike fill_tgid(), fill_tgid_exit() only accumulates accounting data and never initializes stats->version.

As a result, TGID exit notifications can reach userspace with version == 0 even though PID exit notifications and TASKSTATS_CMD_GET replies carry a valid taskstats version.

This is easy to reproduce with tools/accounting/getdelays.c.

I have a small follow-up patch for that tool which:

1. increases the receive buffer/message size so the pid+tgid combined exit notification is not dropped/truncated

2. prints stats->version.

With that patch, the reproducer is:

Terminal 1:

    ./getdelays -d -v -l -m 0

Terminal 2:

    taskset -c 0 python3 -c 'import threading,time; t=threading.Thread(target=time.sleep,args=(0.1,)); t.start(); t.join()'

That produces both PID and TGID exit notifications for the same process. The PID exit record reports a valid taskstats version, while the TGID exit record reports version 0.

This patch (of 2):

Set stats->version = TASKSTATS_VERSION after copying the cached TGID aggregate into the outgoing netlink payload so all taskstats records are self-describing again.

---
 kernel/taskstats.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
kernel/taskstats.c +1 -0
@@ -655,6 +655,7 @@ void taskstats_exit(struct task_struct *
 		goto err;
 
 	memcpy(stats, tsk->signal->stats, sizeof(*stats));
+	stats->version = TASKSTATS_VERSION;
 
 send:
 	send_cpu_listeners(rep_skb, listeners);