5.15.226-rc1 review
Subsystems (7)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 522/2214 media: v4l2-ctrls: do nothing if controls[0] == NULL in cluster functions
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rohinthan P <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9ff738f93084351ed6e818d4d58679a9e9083a8d ]
The V4L2 control framework is designed to allow drivers to instantiate controls and clusters without checking for errors after each call, checking hdl->error only once at the end.
However, if allocating the master control (controls[0]) fails, e.g. due to memory allocation failure, v4l2_ctrl_cluster() triggers a WARNING:
ncontrols == 0 || controls[0] == NULL
WARNING: drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-core.c:2525 at v4l2_ctrl_clusterAdditionally, v4l2_ctrl_auto_cluster() attempts to dereference master->minimum without checking if controls[0] is NULL, leading to a NULL pointer dereference when master control creation fails.
Update both v4l2_ctrl_cluster() and v4l2_ctrl_auto_cluster() to silently return if controls[0] is NULL, preserving the design that control creation errors are caught at the end when the driver checks hdl->error. Also update function documentation in include/media/v4l2-ctrls.h.
--- drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-core.c | 12 ++++++++++-- include/media/v4l2-ctrls.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-core.c +10 -2
@@ -1636,7 +1636,10 @@ void v4l2_ctrl_cluster(unsigned ncontrols, struct v4l2_ctrl **controls)int i;/* The first control is the master control and it must not be NULL */ -if (WARN_ON (ncontrols ==0 || controls[0 ] ==NULL )) +if (WARN_ON (ncontrols ==0 )) +return ; + +if (!controls[0 ])return ;for (i =0 ; i < ncontrols; i++) {
@@ -1658,8 +1661,13 @@ void v4l2_ctrl_auto_cluster(unsigned ncontrols, struct v4l2_ctrl **controls,u32 flag =0 ;int i; +if (WARN_ON (ncontrols <=1 )) +return ; + +if (!master) +return ; +v4l2_ctrl_cluster (ncontrols, controls); -WARN_ON (ncontrols <=1 );WARN_ON (manual_val < master->minimum || manual_val > master->maximum);WARN_ON (set_volatile && !has_op (master, g_volatile_ctrl)); master->is_auto = true;
include/media/v4l2-ctrls.h +6 -0
@@ -773,6 +773,9 @@ bool v4l2_ctrl_radio_filter(const struct v4l2_ctrl *ctrl);* * @ncontrols: The number of controls in this cluster. * @controls: The cluster control array of size @ncontrols. +* +* If controls[0] is NULL, then this function does nothing and just +* returns. */ void v4l2_ctrl_cluster (unsigned int ncontrols,struct v4l2_ctrl **controls);
@@ -784,6 +787,9 @@ void v4l2_ctrl_cluster(unsigned int ncontrols, struct v4l2_ctrl **controls);* @ncontrols: The number of controls in this cluster. * @controls: The cluster control array of size @ncontrols. The first control * must be the 'auto' control (e.g. autogain, autoexposure, etc.) +* +* If controls[0] is NULL, then this function does nothing and just +* returns. * @manual_val: The value for the first control in the cluster that equals the * manual setting. * @set_volatile: If true, then all controls except the first auto control will
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 523/2214 media: marvell: manage the MMP camera clock provider
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Myeonghun Pak <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9887716132d6c3c58cc67841dfb441c5a4a0d209 ]
mmpcam_probe() registers an OF clock provider before requesting the IRQ. Neither a later probe failure nor driver removal unregisters that provider, although the underlying clock is registered with devm_clk_register(). This leaves the provider referring to a clock whose lifetime has ended.
Use devm_of_clk_add_hw_provider() with the existing mclk_hw so the provider is unregistered before the managed clock and camera storage are released.
This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.
--- drivers/media/platform/marvell-ccic/mmp-driver.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/marvell-ccic/mmp-driver.c +3 -2
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@#include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/pm.h> #include <linux/clk.h> +#include <linux/clk-provider.h> #include "mcam-core.h"
@@ -259,8 +260,8 @@ static int mmpcam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)/* * Add OF clock provider. */ - ret =of_clk_add_provider (pdev->dev.of_node, of_clk_src_simple_get, - mcam->mclk); + ret =devm_of_clk_add_hw_provider (&pdev->dev, of_clk_hw_simple_get, + &mcam->mclk_hw);if (ret) {dev_err (&pdev->dev,"can't add DT clock provider\n" ); goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 524/2214 media: go7007: unregister the I2C adapter on USB probe failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Myeonghun Pak <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 14165cd16fa7c233aec6a407b56b304e7a283911 ]
USB probe failures after I2C adapter registration free the backing go7007 structure without unregistering the adapter.
If i2c_adapter_online is set, unregister the adapter before releasing USB resources so that I2C client removal can still use its callbacks.
This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.
--- drivers/media/usb/go7007/go7007-usb.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/media/usb/go7007/go7007-usb.c +2 -0
@@ -1326,6 +1326,8 @@ static int go7007_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,return 0 ; allocfail: +if (go->i2c_adapter_online) +i2c_del_adapter (&go->i2c_adapter);go7007_usb_release (go);kfree (go);return -ENOMEM ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 525/2214 media: cx18: Disable PCI device on probe failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Myeonghun Pak <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2aefbc29765641e1e1a26b96cee194ac7d34ff49 ]
cx18_setup_pci() enables the PCI device but does not disable it when DMA mask setup or the memory-region reservation fails. Later probe failure paths release the region without balancing the enable either.
Unwind the enable inside cx18_setup_pci() when that helper fails after enabling the device. Once setup succeeds, disable it in the probe cleanup after releasing the memory region. Setup failures skip that cleanup, so each successful enable is balanced exactly once.
Keep the existing error codes and normal removal path unchanged.
This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.
--- drivers/media/pci/cx18/cx18-driver.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/pci/cx18/cx18-driver.c +7 -2
@@ -806,12 +806,12 @@ static int cx18_setup_pci(struct cx18 *cx, struct pci_dev *pci_dev, }if (dma_set_mask (&pci_dev->dev,DMA_BIT_MASK (32 ))) {CX18_ERR ("No suitable DMA available, card %d\n" , cx->instance); -return -EIO ; + goto err_disable_device; }if (!request_mem_region (cx->base_addr,CX18_MEM_SIZE ,"cx18 encoder" )) {CX18_ERR ("Cannot request encoder memory region, card %d\n" , cx->instance); -return -EIO ; + goto err_disable_device; }/* Enable bus mastering and memory mapped IO for the CX23418 */
@@ -835,6 +835,10 @@ static int cx18_setup_pci(struct cx18 *cx, struct pci_dev *pci_dev, cx->pci_dev->irq, pci_latency, (u64)cx->base_addr);return 0 ; + +err_disable_device: +pci_disable_device (pci_dev); +return -EIO ; }static void cx18_init_subdevs (struct cx18 *cx)
@@ -1121,6 +1125,7 @@ static int cx18_probe(struct pci_dev *pci_dev,cx18_iounmap (cx); free_mem:release_mem_region (cx->base_addr,CX18_MEM_SIZE ); +pci_disable_device (pci_dev); free_workqueues:destroy_workqueue (cx->in_work_queue); err:
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 526/2214 media: tw68: balance PCI enable on cleanup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Myeonghun Pak <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fc02261fdca3ea95e4dcb6b38ab77f0f197c3750 ]
tw68_initdev() leaves the PCI device enabled after a later probe failure or tw68_finidev(). Use pcim_enable_device() to balance the enable reference when the driver is detached or probe fails.
The managed disable runs after the managed IRQ has been released.
This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.
--- drivers/media/pci/tw68/tw68-core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/pci/tw68/tw68-core.c +1 -1
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int tw68_initdev(struct pci_dev *pci_dev,/* pci init */ dev->pci = pci_dev; -if (pci_enable_device (pci_dev)) { +if (pcim_enable_device (pci_dev)) { err = -EIO ; goto fail1; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 527/2214 media: adv7180: Initialize mutex before ancillary clients
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Runyu Xiao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9d46d17a65e86010b1f5604e5cf61ce1e197f77a ]
The VPP ancillary-client error path unregisters the CSI client before destroying state->mutex. For I2P variants, the failure can occur before mutex_init(), so cleanup destroys an uninitialized mutex.
Initialize the mutex immediately after allocating the driver state, before creating any ancillary clients. This keeps every cleanup path matched with a completed mutex initialization.
A QEMU x86_64 test using an i2c-stub bus instantiated an ADV7280 client at address 0x21 and occupied its VPP ancillary address 0x42. This forced i2c_new_ancillary_device() to return -EBUSY. An instrumentation oracle observed an uninitialized mutex on the buggy kernel and an initialized mutex on the fixed kernel. The failure was deliberately injected to exercise the error path; no natural crash was observed.
--- drivers/media/i2c/adv7180.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/i2c/adv7180.c +1 -1
@@ -1367,6 +1367,7 @@ static int adv7180_probe(struct i2c_client *client,if (state ==NULL )return -ENOMEM ; +mutex_init (&state->mutex); state->client = client; state->field =V4L2_FIELD_ALTERNATE ; state->chip_info = (struct adv7180_chip_info *)id->driver_data;
@@ -1407,7 +1408,6 @@ static int adv7180_probe(struct i2c_client *client, } state->irq = client->irq; -mutex_init (&state->mutex); state->curr_norm =V4L2_STD_NTSC ;if (state->chip_info->flags &ADV7180_FLAG_RESET_POWERED ) state->powered = true;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 528/2214 media: au0828: Fix media device leak in au0828_usb_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7b7a69c91c0537d48150942d9707614a4fdd3766 ]
au0828_media_device_init() takes a reference to a media device with media_device_usb_allocate(). When au0828_v4l2_device_register() fails right after, the error path only unregisters the entities and frees au0828_dev, so that reference is never released.
Release it with media_device_delete() on that path.
--- drivers/media/usb/au0828/au0828-core.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/media/usb/au0828/au0828-core.c +4 -0
@@ -702,6 +702,10 @@ static int au0828_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *interface, retval =au0828_v4l2_device_register (interface, dev);if (retval) {au0828_usb_v4l2_media_release (dev); +#ifdef CONFIG_MEDIA_CONTROLLER +media_device_delete (dev->media_dev,KBUILD_MODNAME , +THIS_MODULE ); +#endif mutex_unlock (&dev->lock);kfree (dev);return retval;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 529/2214 media: vpif_display: Fix i2c adapter reference leak in vpif_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f5863ea3f99265e5e297e3dcf0f47432fee2b8ac ]
vpif_probe() takes a reference to the i2c adapter with i2c_get_adapter() and passes it to v4l2_i2c_new_subdev_board(), which does not consume it, but the reference is never released, so it is leaked both when the probe succeeds and when it fails after the adapter has been acquired.
Release the reference with i2c_put_adapter() on the success path and in the probe_subdev_out cleanup.
--- drivers/media/platform/davinci/vpif_display.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/media/platform/davinci/vpif_display.c +3 -0
@@ -1287,9 +1287,12 @@ static __init int vpif_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)if (err) goto probe_subdev_out; +i2c_put_adapter (i2c_adap); +return 0 ; probe_subdev_out: +i2c_put_adapter (i2c_adap);kfree (vpif_obj.sd); vpif_unregister:v4l2_device_unregister (&vpif_obj.v4l2_dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 530/2214 mfd: wcd934x: Fix NULL pointer dereference on IRQ probe deferral
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Heidelberg <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit dcf0e640b553d33512fbcaedb909c32ba9636a64 ]
ddata->dev is only assigned at the end of wcd934x_slim_probe(), but the of_irq_get() error path has passed it to the error print since the driver was added, while it is still NULL.
This used to be harmless with dev_err(), which copes with a NULL device and was skipped on -EPROBE_DEFER. Since the switch to dev_err_probe(), a deferred IRQ reaches device_set_deferred_probe_reason() -> dev_driver_string(), which dereferences the NULL pointer and crashes during probe. Use dev, which is already valid at this point.
--- drivers/mfd/wcd934x.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mfd/wcd934x.c +1 -1
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int wcd934x_slim_probe(struct slim_device *sdev) ddata->irq =of_irq_get (np,0 );if (ddata->irq <0 ) -return dev_err_probe (ddata->dev, ddata->irq, +return dev_err_probe (dev, ddata->irq,"Failed to get IRQ\n" ); reset_gpio =of_get_named_gpio (np,"reset-gpios" ,0 );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 531/2214 nilfs2: fix deadlock between nilfs_evict_inode() and find_inode()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ryusuke Konishi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ff1227f70eead8704ecfec69259fb4c041f92cda ]
Syzbot reported a deadlock between nilfs_evict_inode(), executed via an asynchronous workqueue (kworker) as:
process_one_work()
process_scheduled_works()
nilfs_iput_work_func()
nilfs_dispose_list()
iput()
iput_final()
evict()
s_op->evict_inode()
nilfs_evict_inode()and find_inode(), called via
nilfs_mkdir()
nilfs_new_inode()
nilfs_insert_inode_locked()
insert_inode_locked4()
inode_insert5()
find_inode()When an inode is deleted (i_nlink == 0), nilfs_evict_inode() clears its ifile bitmap entry and then synchronously triggers the log writer via nilfs_transaction_commit() if IS_SYNC(inode) is true.
If a concurrent directory creation via nilfs_new_inode() attempts to allocate the same newly freed inode number, however, find_inode() called just before inserting it into the inode hash, blocks waiting for the old inode's evict() to complete.
Meanwhile, the synchronous log writer invoked from nilfs_evict_inode() tries to acquire a write lock on 'ns_segctor_sem' which is read locked by the caller of nilfs_new_inode() (in this case, nilfs_mkdir()), resulting in a deadlock.
The synchronous log writer invocation from nilfs_evict_inode() is a legacy artifact; it is no longer necessary because the call itself (triggered by iput()) is now handled asynchronously with a kworker if i_nlink == 0. It merely increases the risk of deadlock.
Fix this deadlock by removing the synchronous log writer trigger from nilfs_evict_inode().
--- fs/nilfs2/inode.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
fs/nilfs2/inode.c +0 -6
@@ -975,13 +975,7 @@ void nilfs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)nilfs_clear_inode (inode); -if (IS_SYNC (inode)) -nilfs_set_transaction_flag (NILFS_TI_SYNC );nilfs_transaction_commit (sb); -/* -* May construct a logical segment and may fail in sync mode. -* But delete_inode has no return value. -*/ } int nilfs_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 532/2214 kobject: fix out-of-bounds access in kobject_action_type()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiacheng Xu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d516455c940555566642b975d1835c67f08136b3 ]
kobject_action_type() compares the input against each known action using strncmp() and then indexes the action string using count_first to check for an exact-length match.
An embedded NUL can make strncmp() return zero even when count_first exceeds the length of the action string. For example, the five-byte input "add\0X" makes the parser access kobject_actions[KOBJ_ADD][5], which is beyond the end of the "add" string.
Check the action string length with strlen() instead of indexing it with the input-derived offset. This rejects malformed action strings containing embedded NUL bytes with -EINVAL instead of invoking undefined behavior.
--- lib/kobject_uevent.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
lib/kobject_uevent.c +1 -1
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static int kobject_action_type(const char *buf, size_t count,for (action =0 ; action <ARRAY_SIZE (kobject_actions); action++) {if (strncmp (kobject_actions[action], buf, count_first) !=0 )continue ; -if (kobject_actions[action][count_first] !='\0' ) +if (strlen (kobject_actions[action]) != count_first)continue ;if (args) *args = args_start;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 533/2214 ASoC: Intel: atom: Fix platform device leak on probe failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit dcc36d766dc82bc57cd730915d484119befcfca8 ]
sst_acpi_probe() registers platform devices for the SST platform and machine board using platform_device_register_data(), but does not unregister them when later probe steps fail.
--- sound/soc/intel/atom/sst/sst_acpi.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/soc/intel/atom/sst/sst_acpi.c +13 -1
@@ -254,6 +254,11 @@ static int sst_platform_get_resources(struct intel_sst_drv *ctx)return 0 ; } +static void sst_unregister_platform_device (void *data) +{ +platform_device_unregister (data); +} +static int sst_acpi_probe (struct platform_device *pdev) {struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
@@ -342,7 +347,10 @@ static int sst_acpi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) pdata->platform);return PTR_ERR (plat_dev); } - + ret =devm_add_action_or_reset (dev, sst_unregister_platform_device, + plat_dev); +if (ret) +return ret;/* * Create platform device for sst machine driver, * pass machine info as pdata
@@ -355,6 +363,10 @@ static int sst_acpi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)return PTR_ERR (mdev); } + ret =devm_add_action_or_reset (dev, sst_unregister_platform_device, + mdev); +if (ret) +return ret;/* Fill sst platform data */ ctx->pdata = pdata;strcpy (ctx->firmware_name, mach->fw_filename);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 534/2214 regulator: core: Fix coupled regulators reference leak on removal
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b9205f0837ca91a0bbe6aa9002207656840c1406 ]
of_parse_coupled_regulator() returns the coupled regulator with its device reference incremented and regulator_resolve_coupling() stores it in coupling_desc.coupled_rdevs[]. regulator_remove_coupling() clears those pointers without dropping the references, so they are leaked when the couple is torn down.
Release the reference of each coupled regulator while removing the coupling.
--- drivers/regulator/core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/regulator/core.c +2 -0
@@ -5389,6 +5389,8 @@ static void regulator_remove_coupling(struct regulator_dev *rdev) c_desc->coupled_rdevs[i] =NULL ; c_desc->n_resolved--; + +put_device (&c_rdev->dev); }if (coupler && coupler->detach_regulator) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 535/2214 hwmon: (lm95245) Fix negative temperature conversion
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ridham Khurana <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f58c16056f8585ebafb0f1f5d90c23085443a4b9 ]
temp_from_reg_signed() uses only the high byte when the sign bit is set and drops the fractional bits in the low byte. Writing -500 to temp2_offset stores 0xff80 (-0.5 degrees C) in the offset registers, but reading temp2_offset back returns -1000.
Negative temp1_input and temp2_input values are rounded down to the next whole degree the same way. The chip reports -0.125 degrees C as 0xffe0, which the driver returns as -1000.
Treat the register pair as a single 16-bit two's complement value.
--- drivers/hwmon/lm95245.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/hwmon/lm95245.c +3 -3
@@ -98,9 +98,9 @@ static int temp_from_reg_unsigned(u8 val_h, u8 val_l)static int temp_from_reg_signed (u8 val_h,u8 val_l) { -if (val_h &0x80 ) -return (val_h -0x100 ) *1000 ; -return temp_from_reg_unsigned (val_h, val_l); +s16 val_hl = (val_h <<8 ) | val_l; + +return val_hl *1000 /256 ; }static int lm95245_read_conversion_rate (struct lm95245_data *data)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 536/2214 mtd: rawnand: atmel: Fix MCK clock leak in atmel_nand_controller_init()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 94edcda45d888c3bb1310de11e10e4537c166f00 ]
atmel_nand_controller_init() takes a reference to the MCK clock with of_clk_get() and keeps it in nc->mck for the lifetime of the controller. If the "atmel,smc" phandle is missing or the SMC regmap cannot be obtained afterwards, the error path jumps to out_release_dma which only releases the DMA channel, so the clock reference is leaked. The callers return the error directly and never run atmel_nand_controller_cleanup(), where the clock is normally put.
Release the reference on those error paths. The path on which of_clk_get() itself fails keeps jumping to out_release_dma, as nc->mck only holds an error pointer there.
--- drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/atmel/nand-controller.c +4 -2
@@ -2079,7 +2079,7 @@ static int atmel_nand_controller_init(struct atmel_nand_controller *nc,if (!np) {dev_err (dev,"Missing or invalid atmel,smc property\n" ); ret = -EINVAL ; - goto out_release_dma; + goto out_put_mck; } nc->smc =syscon_node_to_regmap (np);
@@ -2087,11 +2087,13 @@ static int atmel_nand_controller_init(struct atmel_nand_controller *nc,if (IS_ERR (nc->smc)) { ret =PTR_ERR (nc->smc);dev_err (dev,"Could not get SMC regmap (err = %d)\n" , ret); - goto out_release_dma; + goto out_put_mck; }return 0 ; +out_put_mck: +clk_put (nc->mck); out_release_dma:if (nc->dmac)dma_release_channel (nc->dmac);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 537/2214 mtd: maps: pci: balance PCI enable on cleanup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Myeonghun Pak <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3be16e5d4990bf96309ac5ba35cb369c6015bce7 ]
mtd_pci_probe() leaves the PCI device enabled on later probe failure and mtd_pci_remove() does not disable it either. Use pcim_enable_device() to release the enable reference after the existing map and region cleanup.
The imbalance is already present in the initial Git import.
This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.
--- drivers/mtd/maps/pci.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mtd/maps/pci.c +1 -1
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static int mtd_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *dev, const struct pci_device_id *id)struct mtd_info *mtd =NULL ;int err; - err =pci_enable_device (dev); + err =pcim_enable_device (dev);if (err) goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 538/2214 mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: cap the write-buffer chunk at 256 bytes on an x8 device
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Orgad Shaneh <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cfc5ebc9540e29f8f96db88bbfa261139e5afedb ]
The Write to Buffer command takes the number of words to program minus one, and do_write_buffer() sends that count as a single bus word:
map_write(map, CMD(words - 1), cmd_adr);
CMD() replicates the value into every device lane, so each device reads the count off its own data lines - eight of them on an x8 part. A count that does not fit in eight bits is truncated there, which limits one Write to Buffer to 256 words on an x8 device, however large a buffer the chip advertises in its CFI query.
The M29EW on a Cavium Octeon CN6335 board (an x16 part strapped to x8) advertises MaxBufWriteSize = 512 bytes, so cfi_amdstd_write_buffers() split the data into 512-byte chunks and do_write_buffer() sent a count of
511. The chip saw 511 & 0xff = 255, expected 256 bytes, and aborted the program when the 257th arrived. Chunks below 256 bytes - the leading partial chunk of a write - completed normally, so only the full-size ones failed:
MTD do_write_buffer_wait(): software timeout, address:0x03278bff.
jffs2: Write of 4164 bytes at 0x02c789b4 failed. returned -5, retlen 68
jffs2: No space for garbage collection. Aborting GC thread
Clamp MaxBufWriteSize for x8 devices in the write-buffer fixup, and recompute mtd->writebufsize, which cfi_cmdset_0002_setup() derives from MaxBufWriteSize before the fixups run.
The clamp deliberately keys off the device width rather than the part, even though the driver already recognises this one in is_m29ew(): the ceiling comes from the width of a device's data bus, not from the chip, so any x8 device advertising a larger buffer is told a count it cannot receive. The M29EW is only where it was found.
--- drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c +15 -0
@@ -284,6 +284,21 @@ static void fixup_use_write_buffers(struct mtd_info *mtd)pr_debug ("Using buffer write method\n" ); mtd->_write = cfi_amdstd_write_buffers; } + +/* +* The word count of the Write to Buffer command is a single bus +* word per device, so an x8 device can be told to program at most +* 256 bytes however large a buffer it advertises - including when +* several of them are interleaved on a wider bus, where CMD() +* replicates the count into each device's lane and it is truncated +* there. +*/ +if (cfi->device_type ==CFI_DEVICETYPE_X8 && + cfi->cfiq->MaxBufWriteSize >8 ) { + cfi->cfiq->MaxBufWriteSize =8 ; + mtd->writebufsize =cfi_interleave (cfi) << + cfi->cfiq->MaxBufWriteSize; + } }#endif /* !FORCE_WORD_WRITE */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 539/2214 mtd: amd76xrom: Fix PCI device reference leak in amd76xrom_init_one()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1a122f5fecbabd47b81b1be3f0934f57b78aad42 ]
init_amd76xrom() obtains the PCI device with pci_get_device() and hands the reference over to amd76xrom_init_one(), which stores it in window->pdev. When reserving the ROM window fails, that function returns -EBUSY directly instead of going through amd76xrom_cleanup(), so the reference is neither released nor cleared.
Drop the reference and clear window->pdev on that path.
--- drivers/mtd/maps/amd76xrom.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/mtd/maps/amd76xrom.c +2 -0
@@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ static int amd76xrom_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, printk(KERN_ERR MOD_NAME" %s(): Unable to register resource %pR - kernel bug?\n" , __func__, &window->rsrc); +pci_dev_put (window->pdev); + window->pdev =NULL ;return -EBUSY ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 540/2214 mtd: maps: l440gx: Fix double put of the ISA bridge in init_l440gx()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 521ad948e04934b2d70ae899bc016bbb38802e90 ]
init_l440gx() takes a single reference on the PIIX4 ISA bridge with pci_get_device() and drops it again right after the lookups, before the flash window is set up. The pci_assign_resource() failure path then calls pci_dev_put() on the same device a second time, releasing a reference that is no longer owned and underflowing the reference count.
Remove the extra pci_dev_put().
--- drivers/mtd/maps/l440gx.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mtd/maps/l440gx.c +0 -1
@@ -110,7 +110,6 @@ static int __init init_l440gx(void)/* Allocate the resource region */ if (pci_assign_resource (pm_dev,PIIXE_IOBASE_RESOURCE ) !=0 ) { -pci_dev_put (dev);pci_dev_put (pm_dev);printk (KERN_WARNING "Could not allocate pm iobase resource\n" );iounmap (l440gx_map.virt);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 541/2214 mtd: maps: l440gx: Fix double put of the PM device in init_l440gx()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e6ca524ee5b2705be30ea19ce2e55122d9f9ed8f ]
The PIIX4 PM device reference taken with pci_get_device() is dropped again before the iobase resource is allocated. If pci_assign_resource() fails, the error path calls pci_dev_put() on pm_dev a second time, releasing a reference that is no longer owned and underflowing the reference count.
Remove the extra pci_dev_put().
--- drivers/mtd/maps/l440gx.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mtd/maps/l440gx.c +0 -1
@@ -110,7 +110,6 @@ static int __init init_l440gx(void)/* Allocate the resource region */ if (pci_assign_resource (pm_dev,PIIXE_IOBASE_RESOURCE ) !=0 ) { -pci_dev_put (pm_dev);printk (KERN_WARNING "Could not allocate pm iobase resource\n" );iounmap (l440gx_map.virt);return -ENXIO ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 542/2214 mtd: Call get_wunit() on the master partition
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 904f18430e8cce829cb9130eab7a93020e33fc89 ]
The code checks whether master has get_wunit() but still calls it on the child. Fix this.
--- drivers/mtd/mtdcore.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mtd/mtdcore.c +1 -1
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ int mtd_pairing_info_to_wunit(struct mtd_info *mtd,return -EINVAL ;if (master->pairing && master->pairing->get_wunit) -return mtd->pairing->get_wunit (master, info); +return master->pairing->get_wunit (master, info);return info->pair; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 543/2214 ASoC: wcd9335: Fix device reference leak in wcd9335_slim_status()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ma Ke <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f0cc352be29ba616e0682f66f551d3f3029886fd ]
wcd9335_slim_status() obtains the SLIM interface device with of_slim_get_device(), which uses device_find_child() internally and returns the device with a reference held. As the device_find_child() documentation says: you will need to drop the reference with put_device() after use. The reference is stored in wcd->slim_ifc_dev and never dropped, so the SLIM interface device cannot be released. Fix it by using devm_add_action_or_reset() or put_device() respectively.
Found by code review.
--- sound/soc/codecs/wcd9335.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
sound/soc/codecs/wcd9335.c +12 -0
@@ -5172,6 +5172,13 @@ static int wcd9335_slim_probe(struct slim_device *slim)return 0 ; } +static void wcd9335_put_device_action (void *data) +{ +struct device *dev = data; + +put_device (dev); +} +static int wcd9335_slim_status (struct slim_device *sdev,enum slim_device_status status) {
@@ -5196,6 +5203,11 @@ static int wcd9335_slim_status(struct slim_device *sdev,return -EINVAL ; } + ret =devm_add_action_or_reset (dev, wcd9335_put_device_action, + &wcd->slim_ifc_dev->dev); +if (ret) +return ret; +slim_get_logical_addr (wcd->slim_ifc_dev); wcd->regmap =regmap_init_slimbus (sdev, &wcd9335_regmap_config);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 544/2214 MIPS: mm: do not write a huge TLB entry when the probe misses
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Orgad Shaneh <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0cb17268887e1df5c425ea052f5146b42d126323 ]
__update_tlb() probes for the 8K pair at the address it is given and, for a huge pmd, writes the huge entry with tlbwi at the probed index or with tlbwr when the probe misses. That works only if the caller passes the faulting address, so that the probe finds the 4K entry the refill handler loaded for the faulting page and the huge entry replaces it.
update_mmu_cache_pmd() is not called that way. do_set_pmd() has always passed the huge-aligned address, and since commit ebcfc63d6bca ("mm:
abstract THP allocation") the anonymous THP fault path does too (map_anon_folio_pmd()). The probe then misses the stale 4K entry, which sits at the faulting page somewhere else in the 2 MB range, tlbwr adds a huge entry next to it, and the TLB holds two entries matching the faulting address. Octeon raises "Machine Check exception - caused by multiple matching entries in the TLB" on the next refill of that page; a process on a CN63XX board died this way within a second of start, on the first anonymous THP of its bss.
Skip the write when the probe misses. The refill and TLBL/TLBS handlers probe the faulting address themselves and rewrite the stale entry with the huge one (they also set the software young bit), so the entry is installed on the next access at the cost of one exception.
--- arch/mips/mm/tlb-r4k.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/mips/mm/tlb-r4k.c +17 -4
@@ -332,6 +332,19 @@ void __update_tlb(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long address, pte_t pte)/* this could be a huge page */ if (pmd_huge (*pmdp)) {unsigned long lo; + +/* +* The probe above only covers the 8K pair at @address, and +* a huge mapping is installed with the huge-aligned address +* while the refill that started the fault left a 4K entry +* for the faulting page elsewhere in the range. Writing the +* huge entry to a random index would leave two entries +* matching the faulting address; leave it to the refill and +* TLBL/TLBS handlers, which probe the faulting address. +*/ +if (idx <0 ) + goto out; +write_c0_pagemask (PM_HUGE_MASK ); ptep = (pte_t *)pmdp; lo =pte_to_entrylo (pte_val (*ptep));
@@ -339,10 +352,7 @@ void __update_tlb(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long address, pte_t pte)write_c0_entrylo1 (lo + (HPAGE_SIZE >>7 ));mtc0_tlbw_hazard (); -if (idx <0 ) -tlb_write_random (); -else -tlb_write_indexed (); +tlb_write_indexed ();tlbw_use_hazard ();write_c0_pagemask (PM_DEFAULT_MASK ); }else
@@ -375,6 +385,9 @@ void __update_tlb(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long address, pte_t pte)tlb_write_indexed (); }tlbw_use_hazard (); +#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_HUGE_TLB_SUPPORT +out: +#endif htw_start ();flush_micro_tlb_vm (vma);local_irq_restore (flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 545/2214 netfilter: ctnetlink: fix inverted IPv6 address match in dump filter
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Piotr Kubik <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1ae2d094b0200f687923298c0e42579273558988 ]
ctnetlink_filter_match_tuple() rejects an entry when !ipv6_addr_cmp(filter, entry) is true. ipv6_addr_cmp() is a memcmp() and returns 0 for equal addresses, so the condition is true exactly when the addresses match: a CTA_FILTER dump with an IPv6 CTA_IP_SRC or CTA_IP_DST skips every entry that matches the requested address and returns all the others. The IPv4 branch compares with != and behaves correctly.
Observed with libnetfilter_conntrack NFCT_FILTER_DUMP_TUPLE: a dump filtered on src 2001:db8::10 returned only the unrelated entries, and a dump filtered on ::1 returned every entry except the ::1 ones. conntrack-tools does not use the tuple filter for -L, which is why this went unnoticed.
Use ipv6_addr_equal() so the IPv6 branch mirrors the IPv4 one.
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +4 -4
@@ -1058,13 +1058,13 @@ static int ctnetlink_filter_match_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *filter_tuple,break ;case NFPROTO_IPV6 :if ((flags &CTA_FILTER_FLAG (CTA_IP_SRC )) && - !ipv6_addr_cmp (&filter_tuple->src.u3.in6, - &ct_tuple->src.u3.in6)) + !ipv6_addr_equal (&filter_tuple->src.u3.in6, + &ct_tuple->src.u3.in6))return 0 ;if ((flags &CTA_FILTER_FLAG (CTA_IP_DST )) && - !ipv6_addr_cmp (&filter_tuple->dst.u3.in6, - &ct_tuple->dst.u3.in6)) + !ipv6_addr_equal (&filter_tuple->dst.u3.in6, + &ct_tuple->dst.u3.in6))return 0 ;break ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 546/2214 arm64: dts: qcom: sdm845-xiaomi-beryllium: Extend the xbl_mem region
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Heidelberg <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 511c4fea32708a065e03503c0e4d44f48990c530 ]
Xiaomi's Oreo-era tree still had the CAF 1 MiB region, the 2 MiB version arrived with the Pie import. This isn't a board-layout quirk, it tracks the firmware. The later XBL wants one extra MiB below the old region.
--- arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845-xiaomi-beryllium.dts | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845-xiaomi-beryllium.dts +6 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ /delete-node/ &slpi_mem; /delete-node/ &spss_mem; /delete-node/ &rmtfs_mem; +/delete-node/ &xbl_mem; / { model = "Xiaomi Pocophone F1";
@@ -54,6 +55,11 @@ vol-up { /* Reserved memory changes from downstream */ reserved-memory { + xbl-mem@85d00000 { + reg = <0 0x85d00000 0 0x200000>; + no-map; + }; + tz_mem: memory@86200000 { reg = <0 0x86200000 0 0x4900000>; no-map;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 547/2214 fs/ntfs3: fix integer overflow in find_log_rec() causing OOB read
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ibrahim Hashimov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e2fcb0040b0b4097b2e97f3fbe77d3b66df9e816 ]
find_log_rec() validates the on-disk LFS_RECORD_HDR.client_data_len field (len, a raw u32 read straight from a mounted $LogFile page) against the log's total available space:
len = le32_to_cpu(rh->client_data_len);
rec_len = len + log->record_header_len;
if (rec_len >= log->total_avail)
return -EINVAL;The addition is unchecked. For len in [0xffffffd0, 0xffffffff] (i.e. log->record_header_len away from UINT_MAX), rec_len wraps to a small u32 value that trivially clears the rec_len >= log->total_avail guard, so a record whose declared length is actually ~4 GiB is reported as valid and in-page.
Because find_log_rec() wrongly accepts the record, its caller read_log_rec_lcb() hands it back to log_replay() as good. On the transaction-table replay leg, log_replay() re-derives the record length directly from the same raw, still-unclamped client_data_len field and uses it to size the restart-table blob:
rec_len = le32_to_cpu(frh->client_data_len); /* ~0xffffffff */
...
t16 = le16_to_cpu(lrh->redo_off);
rt = Add2Ptr(lrh, t16);
t32 = rec_len - t16; /* still ~4 GiB */
if (!check_rstbl(rt, t32))
return -EINVAL;check_rstbl()'s own bytes < ts bounds guard is defeated because the caller-supplied bytes (t32) is itself the poisoned ~4 GiB value, so the guard can never trigger. The subsequent entry-validation loop then walks rt->used (also attacker-controlled) entries of sizeof(struct RESTART_TABLE) == 0x18 bytes each straight past the end of the kmalloc(log->page_size) log-page buffer allocated in read_log_page(), producing an out-of-bounds read that is reachable simply by mounting a crafted $LogFile (no genuine dirty-page / crash-recovery state is required). Confirmed via KASAN as a slab-out-of-bounds read in check_rstbl(), called from log_replay() -> ntfs_loadlog_and_replay() -> ntfs_fill_super() -> mount(2).
Fix the root cause instead of hardening every downstream consumer of the poisoned length: make the addition in find_log_rec() overflow-safe with check_add_overflow(), mirroring the pattern fs/ntfs3/run.c already uses to validate other attacker-controlled on-disk length/offset arithmetic decoded from MAPPING_PAIRS runs, e.g.:
if (check_add_overflow(vcn64, len, &next_vcn))
return -EINVAL;
...
if (check_add_overflow(lcn, len, &lcn_end))
return -EINVAL;(fs/ntfs3/run.c, run_unpack()).
With the overflow rejected instead of silently wrapped, rec_len is only ever a true, non-wrapped sum, so the existing rec_len >= log->total_avail check now correctly rejects any oversized record up front. log_replay()'s transaction-table leg then never gets a chance to re-read the poisoned client_data_len, and check_rstbl() is never invoked with an attacker-inflated bytes for this path.
Verified on a v6.19 KASAN build: mounting a crafted $LogFile whose client_data_len overflows trips a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds-read report in check_rstbl() before this fix; with check_add_overflow() applied, the same image is cleanly rejected during log replay and no KASAN report fires.
--- fs/ntfs3/fslog.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ntfs3/fslog.c +3 -1
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@#include <linux/blkdev.h> #include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -2459,7 +2460,8 @@ static int find_log_rec(struct ntfs_log *log, u64 lsn, struct lcb *lcb)* Check that the length field isn't greater than the total * available space the log file. */ - rec_len = len + log->record_header_len; +if (check_add_overflow (len, log->record_header_len, &rec_len)) +return -EINVAL ;if (rec_len >= log->total_avail)return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 548/2214 media: qcom: camss: vfe-17x: Fix write master buffer done being dropped
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hitesh Patel <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit eed550a8191c2f6984047a1b794b313d1bacf77d ]
The VFE 17x interrupt handler reads and clears the bus status registers on every interrupt, but only acts on the per write master BUF_DONE bits when bit 9 of IRQ_STATUS_0 is set as well. Bit 9 is the ping-pong flag of image master 1. It has nothing to do with the other write masters, and it is not guaranteed to be set in the same interrupt in which a write master reports a completed buffer.
The bus status is read-to-clear. When a buffer done arrives while bit 9 is not set, the handler clears the status and never calls wm_done() for it. The buffer stays queued in the driver and the video node never receives that frame.
With one RDI streaming this is rare. With two RDIs streaming on the same VFE, for instance two virtual channels demultiplexed by the CSID, the interrupt rate doubles and one of the two lines loses buffer done events continuously.
Act on the bus status alone, as the other gen2 VFE handlers do.
--- drivers/media/platform/qcom/camss/camss-vfe-170.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/qcom/camss/camss-vfe-170.c +2 -3
@@ -383,9 +383,8 @@ static irqreturn_t vfe_isr(int irq, void *dev) vfe->isr_ops.comp_done (vfe, i);for (wm =0 ; wm <MSM_VFE_IMAGE_MASTERS_NUM ; wm++) -if (status0 &BIT (9 )) -if (vfe_bus_status[1 ] &STATUS1_WM_CLIENT_BUF_DONE (wm)) - vfe->isr_ops.wm_done (vfe, wm); +if (vfe_bus_status[1 ] &STATUS1_WM_CLIENT_BUF_DONE (wm)) + vfe->isr_ops.wm_done (vfe, wm);return IRQ_HANDLED ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 549/2214 ALSA: sgio2audio: Only free successfully requested IRQs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Runyu Xiao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit af3d225b639c6f9fb8fd5e1e27f11672d56724b6 ]
snd_sgio2audio_create() calls snd_sgio2audio_free() when an IRQ request fails. The cleanup helper currently walks the complete IRQ table, including entries whose request_irq() calls have not been attempted yet. free_irq() then receives an IRQ and dev_id pair that was never registered.
Pass the number of successfully requested IRQs to the cleanup helper on the request failure path, while retaining the full-table cleanup for teardown after all requests have succeeded.
--- sound/mips/sgio2audio.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
sound/mips/sgio2audio.c +7 -6
@@ -751,7 +751,8 @@ static struct {/* ALSA driver */ -static int snd_sgio2audio_free (struct snd_sgio2audio *chip) +static int snd_sgio2audio_free (struct snd_sgio2audio *chip, +unsigned int irq_count) {int i;
@@ -761,7 +762,7 @@ static int snd_sgio2audio_free(struct snd_sgio2audio *chip)writeq (0 , &mace->perif.audio.control);/* release IRQ's */ -for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (snd_sgio2_isr_table); i++) +for (i =0 ; i < irq_count; i++)free_irq (snd_sgio2_isr_table[i].irq, &chip->channel[snd_sgio2_isr_table[i].idx]);
@@ -777,7 +778,7 @@ static int snd_sgio2audio_dev_free(struct snd_device *device) {struct snd_sgio2audio *chip = device->device_data; -return snd_sgio2audio_free (chip); +return snd_sgio2audio_free (chip,ARRAY_SIZE (snd_sgio2_isr_table)); }static const struct snd_device_ops ops = {
@@ -828,7 +829,7 @@ static int snd_sgio2audio_create(struct snd_card *card, 0, snd_sgio2_isr_table[i].desc, &chip->channel[snd_sgio2_isr_table[i].idx])) { -snd_sgio2audio_free (chip); +snd_sgio2audio_free (chip, i);printk (KERN_ERR "sgio2audio: cannot allocate irq %d\n" , snd_sgio2_isr_table[i].irq);return -EBUSY ;
@@ -852,13 +853,13 @@ static int snd_sgio2audio_create(struct snd_card *card,/* initialize the AD1843 codec */ err =ad1843_init (&chip->ad1843);if (err <0 ) { -snd_sgio2audio_free (chip); +snd_sgio2audio_free (chip,ARRAY_SIZE (snd_sgio2_isr_table));return err; } err =snd_device_new (card,SNDRV_DEV_LOWLEVEL , chip, &ops);if (err <0 ) { -snd_sgio2audio_free (chip); +snd_sgio2audio_free (chip,ARRAY_SIZE (snd_sgio2_isr_table));return err; } *rchip = chip;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 550/2214 m68k: dmasound: Keep the Q40 IRQ handler registered
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Runyu Xiao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fa2e77ac5bf81a60864e71fc72196227692d7162 ]
Q40PlayNextFrame() re-registers the sample IRQ after stopping it. This function can be called with dmasound.lock held and from the sample IRQ handler, so free_irq() and request_irq() can sleep or deadlock. A failed re-registration can also leave playback without an IRQ.
Register one handler for the lifetime of the driver and select mono or stereo sample handling inside that handler. Call the frame completion path after releasing dmasound.lock so it can refill the queue safely.
--- sound/oss/dmasound/dmasound_q40.c | 65 ++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
sound/oss/dmasound/dmasound_q40.c +29 -36
@@ -49,9 +49,8 @@ static int Q40SetFormat(int format);static int Q40SetVolume (int volume);static void Q40PlayNextFrame (int index);static void Q40Play (void ); -static irqreturn_t Q40StereoInterrupt (int irq,void *dummy); -static irqreturn_t Q40MonoInterrupt (int irq,void *dummy); -static void Q40Interrupt (void ); +static irqreturn_t q40_audio_interrupt (int irq,void *dummy); +static void q40_frame_done (void );/*** Mid level stuff *********************************************************/
@@ -372,8 +371,8 @@ static void Q40Free(void *ptr, unsigned int size)static int __init Q40IrqInit (void ) {/* Register interrupt handler. */ -if (request_irq (Q40_IRQ_SAMPLE , Q40StereoInterrupt,0 , -"DMA sound" , Q40Interrupt)) +if (request_irq (Q40_IRQ_SAMPLE , q40_audio_interrupt,0 , +"DMA sound" , q40_frame_done))return 0 ;return (1 );
@@ -384,7 +383,7 @@ static int __init Q40IrqInit(void)static void Q40IrqCleanUp (void ) {master_outb (0 ,SAMPLE_ENABLE_REG ); -free_irq (Q40_IRQ_SAMPLE , Q40Interrupt); +free_irq (Q40_IRQ_SAMPLE , q40_frame_done); }#endif /* MODULE */
@@ -403,7 +402,6 @@ static void Q40PlayNextFrame(int index)u_char *start;u_long size;u_char speed; -int error;/* used by Q40Play() if all doubts whether there really is something * to be played are already wiped out.
@@ -420,15 +418,6 @@ static void Q40PlayNextFrame(int index) speed=(dmasound.hard.speed==10000 ?0 :1 );master_outb (0 ,SAMPLE_ENABLE_REG ); -free_irq (Q40_IRQ_SAMPLE , Q40Interrupt); -if (dmasound.soft.stereo) - error =request_irq (Q40_IRQ_SAMPLE , Q40StereoInterrupt,0 , -"Q40 sound" , Q40Interrupt); -else - error =request_irq (Q40_IRQ_SAMPLE , Q40MonoInterrupt,0 , -"Q40 sound" , Q40Interrupt); -if (error &&printk_ratelimit ()) -pr_err ("Couldn't register sound interrupt\n" );master_outb ( speed,SAMPLE_RATE_REG );master_outb (1 ,SAMPLE_CLEAR_REG );
@@ -456,31 +445,35 @@ static void Q40Play(void)spin_unlock_irqrestore (&dmasound.lock, flags); } -static irqreturn_t Q40StereoInterrupt (int irq,void *dummy) -{ -spin_lock (&dmasound.lock); -if (q40_sc>1 ){ - *DAC_LEFT =*q40_pp++; - *DAC_RIGHT =*q40_pp++; - q40_sc -=2 ; -master_outb (1 ,SAMPLE_CLEAR_REG ); - }else Q40Interrupt (); -spin_unlock (&dmasound.lock); -return IRQ_HANDLED ; -} -static irqreturn_t Q40MonoInterrupt (int irq,void *dummy) +static irqreturn_t q40_audio_interrupt (int irq,void *dummy) { +bool frame_done = false; +spin_lock (&dmasound.lock); -if (q40_sc>0 ){ - *DAC_LEFT =*q40_pp; - *DAC_RIGHT =*q40_pp++; - q40_sc --; -master_outb (1 ,SAMPLE_CLEAR_REG ); - }else Q40Interrupt (); +if (dmasound.hard.stereo) { +if (q40_sc >1 ) { + *DAC_LEFT = *q40_pp++; + *DAC_RIGHT = *q40_pp++; + q40_sc -=2 ; +master_outb (1 ,SAMPLE_CLEAR_REG ); + }else { + frame_done = true; + } + }else if (q40_sc >0 ) { + *DAC_LEFT = *q40_pp; + *DAC_RIGHT = *q40_pp++; + q40_sc--; +master_outb (1 ,SAMPLE_CLEAR_REG ); + }else { + frame_done = true; + }spin_unlock (&dmasound.lock); +if (frame_done) +q40_frame_done ();return IRQ_HANDLED ; } -static void Q40Interrupt (void ) + +static void q40_frame_done (void ) {if (!write_sq.active) {/* playing was interrupted and sq_reset() has already cleared
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 551/2214 drm/msm/hdmi_bridge: Correct poweroff/audio cleanup order in post_disable
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0499f0576e4442d67c164119f9d7f75d3cc945e7 ]
Turning off the power in msm_hdmi_bridge_atomic_post_disable() should follow reverse order of powering up, not only because it is logical, but also because msm_hdmi_audio_update() accesses registers thus block should still be powered on.
Depending on specific timing, existing code could have accesses to MMIO of powered off block.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/752655/
--- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/hdmi/hdmi_bridge.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/hdmi/hdmi_bridge.c +1 -1
@@ -189,10 +189,10 @@ static void msm_hdmi_bridge_post_disable(struct drm_bridge *bridge)msm_hdmi_phy_powerdown (phy);if (hdmi->power_on) { -power_off (bridge); hdmi->power_on = false;if (hdmi->hdmi_mode)msm_hdmi_audio_update (hdmi); +power_off (bridge);msm_hdmi_phy_resource_disable (phy); } }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 552/2214 staging: greybus: uart: fix racy TIOCMIWAIT implementation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e94cda6551d4716b17353fc458baa9e85ddea9ff ]
Check the wakeup condition after adding the task to the waitqueue and updating the task state to avoid missing a racing modem status update or disconnect.
Store the old icount on entry and do not update it in the completion handler to avoid missing events or reporting spurious ones (due to modem status changes before TIOCMIWAIT was called).
--- drivers/staging/greybus/uart.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/greybus/uart.c +18 -12
@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ struct gb_tty {spinlock_t read_lock;spinlock_t write_lock;struct async_icount iocount; -struct async_icount oldcount;wait_queue_head_t wioctl;struct mutex mutex;u8 ctrlin;/* input control lines */
@@ -642,11 +641,16 @@ static int wait_serial_change(struct gb_tty *gb_tty, unsigned long arg)if (!(arg & (TIOCM_DSR |TIOCM_RI |TIOCM_CD )))return -EINVAL ; - do { +spin_lock_irq (&gb_tty->read_lock); + old = gb_tty->iocount; +spin_unlock_irq (&gb_tty->read_lock); + +add_wait_queue (&gb_tty->wioctl, &wait); +for (;;) { +set_current_state (TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE ); +spin_lock_irq (&gb_tty->read_lock); - old = gb_tty->oldcount; new = gb_tty->iocount; - gb_tty->oldcount = new;spin_unlock_irq (&gb_tty->read_lock);if ((arg &TIOCM_DSR ) && (old.dsr != new.dsr))
@@ -656,18 +660,20 @@ static int wait_serial_change(struct gb_tty *gb_tty, unsigned long arg)if ((arg &TIOCM_RI ) && (old.rng != new.rng))break ; -add_wait_queue (&gb_tty->wioctl, &wait); -set_current_state (TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE ); -schedule (); -remove_wait_queue (&gb_tty->wioctl, &wait);if (gb_tty->disconnected) { -if (arg &TIOCM_CD ) -break ; retval = -ENODEV ; - }else if (signal_pending (current)) { +break ; + } + +schedule (); + +if (signal_pending (current)) { retval = -ERESTARTSYS ; +break ; } - }while (!retval); + } +__set_current_state (TASK_RUNNING ); +remove_wait_queue (&gb_tty->wioctl, &wait);return retval; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 553/2214 staging: rtl8723bs: fix RX buffer OOB write from device-reported length
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tianchu Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c52929073fccbc149267a2fd7458626a7e9abcfc ]
sd_recv_rxfifo() trusts the device-reported RX0_REQ_LEN value (hal->SdioRxFIFOSize, a u16 read from the card via CMD52) as the size of the next RX packet and passes it to sdio_read_port(), which copies that many bytes into the recvbuf skb whose data area is only MAX_RECVBUF_SZ (10240) bytes. A bogus device on SDIO can report up to 65535 bytes, causing a heap overflow of up to ~55KB past the skb buffer.
Bail out when the RX0_REQ_LEN exceeds MAX_RECVBUF_SZ. This is expected to keep behavior unchanged on normal devices.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
--- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/sdio_ops.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/sdio_ops.c +7 -0
@@ -792,6 +792,13 @@ static struct recv_buf *sd_recv_rxfifo(struct adapter *adapter, u32 size)struct recv_priv *recv_priv;struct recv_buf *recvbuf; +/* RX0_REQ_LEN is device-reported; the skb buffer is only +* MAX_RECVBUF_SZ bytes, reject bogus lengths instead of +* overflowing past it. +*/ +if (size >MAX_RECVBUF_SZ ) +return NULL ; +/* Patch for some SDIO Host 4 bytes issue */ /* ex. RK3188 */ readsize =round_up (size,4 );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 554/2214 media: tw686x: fix V4L2 device lifetime on probe failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ce6c6dd632b3b4a2c2bfc9efd8f656f4d2137dbd ]
tw686x_video_init() registers the V4L2 device, which initializes its reference count. Successfully registered video devices take additional references to the V4L2 device as well.
The probe failure paths currently tear down the PCI resources and then free the channel arrays and the tw686x device directly. This bypasses the V4L2 device reference count and the tw686x_dev_release() callback.
If a video device still holds a reference, its eventual release will drop a reference to the already freed V4L2 device. Even when no extra references remain, directly freeing the device bypasses the lifetime management established by v4l2_device_register().
After cleaning up the PCI resources, check whether the V4L2 device was registered. If so, mark the hardware unavailable and drop the driver's V4L2 device reference, letting tw686x_dev_release() free the backing objects when the final reference is released. Keep the existing direct free path for failures that occur before V4L2 device registration.
This issue was found by manual code inspection.
--- drivers/media/pci/tw686x/tw686x-core.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/media/pci/tw686x/tw686x-core.c +10 -0
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ static int tw686x_probe(struct pci_dev *pci_dev, const struct pci_device_id *pci_id) {struct tw686x_dev *dev; +unsigned long flags;int err; dev =kzalloc (sizeof (*dev),GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -349,6 +350,15 @@ static int tw686x_probe(struct pci_dev *pci_dev,pci_release_regions (pci_dev); disable_pci:pci_disable_device (pci_dev); +if (dev->v4l2_dev.dev) { +spin_lock_irqsave (&dev->lock, flags); + dev->pci_dev =NULL ; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&dev->lock, flags); + +v4l2_device_put (&dev->v4l2_dev); +return err; + } + free_audio:kfree (dev->audio_channels); free_video:
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 555/2214 media: pvrusb2: Fix USB parent device leak in class_dev_create()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 02421d7278e4a62c3daf37ad6c45d4af96ee4252 ]
class_dev_create() stores a reference to the USB device obtained with get_device() in class_dev->parent, which class_dev_destroy() releases. When device_register() fails the function only drops class_dev, so the reference to the USB parent device is never released.
Drop the parent reference on the failure path as well.
--- drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-sysfs.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-sysfs.c +1 -0
@@ -641,6 +641,7 @@ static void class_dev_create(struct pvr2_sysfs *sfp,if (ret) {pvr2_trace (PVR2_TRACE_ERROR_LEGS ,"device_register failed" ); +put_device (class_dev->parent);put_device (class_dev);return ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 556/2214 media: rtl28xxu: fix SDR platform device leak
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 083a92996598a5080965f1baa84175082e14a45b ]
rtl2832u_tuner_attach() registers an rtl2832_sdr platform device, but does not unregister it if no driver is bound. It also does not take a reference on the bound driver module.
Unregister the platform device when no driver is bound or the module reference cannot be acquired. Drop the module reference in rtl28xxu_tuner_detach() before unregistering the device.
The issue was identified by a static analysis tool I developed and confirmed by manual review.
--- drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/rtl28xxu.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/rtl28xxu.c +12 -2
@@ -1391,8 +1391,16 @@ static int rtl2832u_tuner_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)"rtl2832_sdr" ,PLATFORM_DEVID_AUTO , &pdata, sizeof(pdata)); -if (IS_ERR (pdev) || pdev->dev.driver ==NULL ) +if (IS_ERR (pdev))break ; +if (!pdev->dev.driver) { +platform_device_unregister (pdev); +break ; + } +if (!try_module_get (pdev->dev.driver->owner)) { +platform_device_unregister (pdev); +break ; + } dev->platform_device_sdr = pdev;break ;default :
@@ -1426,8 +1434,10 @@ static int rtl28xxu_tuner_detach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)/* remove platform SDR */ pdev = dev->platform_device_sdr; -if (pdev) +if (pdev) { +module_put (pdev->dev.driver->owner);platform_device_unregister (pdev); + }/* remove I2C tuner */ client = dev->i2c_client_tuner;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 557/2214 media: exynos4-is: Fix a race between s_stream(0) and the interrupt handler
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ginger Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c65eb69f8170975802ddbede84420553eb681d62 ]
fimc_lite_subdev_s_stream(on = 0) sets ST_FLITE_OFF outside of the fimc->slock protected region, and only then stops the capture in the hardware. flite_irq_handler() runs under fimc->slock and clears ST_FLITE_OFF, so an interrupt can be handled in between: the handler finds ST_FLITE_OFF already set, clears it and wakes up fimc->irq_queue before the capture has actually been stopped. The wait_event_timeout() right after it then returns immediately and the driver continues as if the capture had stopped.
Set ST_FLITE_OFF in the same critical section that stops the capture, as fimc_lite_stop_capture() already does.
--- drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-lite.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-lite.c +1 -2
@@ -1215,9 +1215,8 @@ static int fimc_lite_subdev_s_stream(struct v4l2_subdev *sd, int on)spin_unlock_irqrestore (&fimc->slock, flags); } }else { -set_bit (ST_FLITE_OFF , &fimc->state); -spin_lock_irqsave (&fimc->slock, flags); +set_bit (ST_FLITE_OFF , &fimc->state);flite_hw_capture_stop (fimc);spin_unlock_irqrestore (&fimc->slock, flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 558/2214 media: em28xx: fix double free in em28xx_alloc_urbs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kaho Jiang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fd427b8adae437cac78a2332241a03cac56e95c2 ]
When allocation of usb_bufs->buf[i] fails, em28xx_alloc_urbs() explicitly frees all items within usb_bufs->buf before calling em28xx_uninit_usb_xfer(), which also frees these items, causing them to be freed twice.
BUG: KASAN: double-free in usb_free_urb.part.0 (drivers/usb/core/urb.c:25 ./include/linux/kref.h:65 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:96) Free of addr ffff88802fd37c00 by task kworker/1:2/1182 Workqueue: events request_module_async Call Trace: kasan_report_invalid_free (mm/kasan/report.c:557) check_slab_allocation (mm/kasan/common.c:235) kfree (./include/linux/kasan.h:199 (discriminator 1) mm/slub.c:2693 (discriminator 1) mm/slub.c:6508 (discriminator 1) mm/slub.c:6801 (discriminator 1)) usb_free_urb.part.0 (drivers/usb/core/urb.c:25 ./include/linux/kref.h:65 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:96) usb_free_urb (drivers/usb/core/urb.c:95) em28xx_uninit_usb_xfer (drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-core.c:964) em28xx_alloc_urbs (drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-core.c:1076) em28xx_dvb_init (drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-dvb.c:1734 drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-dvb.c:1698) em28xx_init_extension (drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-core.c:1248) request_module_async (drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-cards.c:3685) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) Allocated by task 1182: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:57) kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:78) __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:398 mm/kasan/common.c:415) __kmalloc_noprof (./include/linux/kasan.h:263 mm/slub.c:5414 mm/slub.c:5439) em28xx_alloc_urbs (./include/linux/slab.h:995 ./include/linux/slab.h:1312 drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-core.c:1081) em28xx_dvb_init (drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-dvb.c:1734 drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-dvb.c:1698) em28xx_init_extension (drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-core.c:1248) request_module_async (drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-cards.c:3685) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) Freed by task 1182: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:57) kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:78) kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:584) __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:253 mm/kasan/common.c:285) kfree (./include/linux/kasan.h:235 mm/slub.c:2748 mm/slub.c:6508 mm/slub.c:6801) em28xx_alloc_urbs (drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-core.c:1084) em28xx_dvb_init (drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-dvb.c:1734 drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-dvb.c:1698) em28xx_init_extension (drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-core.c:1248) request_module_async (drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-cards.c:3685) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
Remove the explicit cleanup loop and let em28xx_uninit_usb_xfer() handle the cleanup.
--- drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-core.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-core.c +0 -3
@@ -958,9 +958,6 @@ int em28xx_alloc_urbs(struct em28xx *dev, enum em28xx_mode mode, int xfer_bulk, usb_bufs->buf[i] =kzalloc (sb_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!usb_bufs->buf[i]) { -for (i--; i >=0 ; i--) -kfree (usb_bufs->buf[i]); -em28xx_uninit_usb_xfer (dev, mode);return -ENOMEM ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 559/2214 dm-writecache: report I/O error if flush failed
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 78a6afc2999d26e5a30a56db77db34c22b88f5d5 ]
There was a bug that if writecache_flush fails due to I/O error, the error is not reported in the FUA bio. This commit fixes it.
--- drivers/md/dm-writecache.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-writecache.c +5 -2
@@ -1481,10 +1481,13 @@ static enum wc_map_op writecache_map_write(struct dm_writecache *wc, struct bio } }while (bio->bi_iter.bi_size); -if (unlikely (bio->bi_opf &REQ_FUA || wc->uncommitted_blocks >= wc->autocommit_blocks)) +if (unlikely (bio->bi_opf &REQ_FUA || wc->uncommitted_blocks >= wc->autocommit_blocks)) {writecache_flush (wc); -else +if (writecache_has_error (wc)) + bio->bi_status =BLK_STS_IOERR ; + }else {writecache_schedule_autocommit (wc); + }return WC_MAP_SUBMIT ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 560/2214 dm-writecache: fix a quirk in statistics
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c1ab80af0d99a906b60b769f2e692c37d2db1323 ]
writecache_bio_copy_ssd() unconditionally adds the number of extra blocks in the merged bio to stats.writes_allocate. That is only correct when the entries were taken off the freelist.
When the function is called with search_used == true -- i.e. from the write_hits_uncommitted / write_hits_committed paths in writecache_map_write() -- the first entry was found in the rbtree and every following entry is picked up with rb_next(), so nothing is allocated at all. Accordingly the writes_allocate++ that accompanies a successful writecache_pop_from_freelist() is skipped for that case, but the batch accounting below still adds n - 1.
An in-place overwrite of n contiguous cached blocks therefore reports n - 1 allocations that never happened. Only the dmsetup status output is affected; there is no functional change.
--- drivers/md/dm-writecache.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/md/dm-writecache.c +2 -1
@@ -1413,7 +1413,8 @@ static void writecache_bio_copy_ssd(struct dm_writecache *wc, struct bio *bio,dm_accept_partial_bio (bio, bio_size >>SECTOR_SHIFT ); wc->stats.writes += bio->bi_iter.bi_size >> wc->block_size_bits; - wc->stats.writes_allocate += (bio->bi_iter.bi_size - wc->block_size) >> wc->block_size_bits; +if (!search_used) + wc->stats.writes_allocate += (bio->bi_iter.bi_size - wc->block_size) >> wc->block_size_bits;if (unlikely (wc->uncommitted_blocks >= wc->autocommit_blocks)) { wc->uncommitted_blocks =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 561/2214 dm-writecache: fix a crash if we attempt to use non-dax device
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b15dc73f60ebf02410bc7014ce34fb7fd1040045 ]
If we specify a non-DAX device as a cache device in the 'P' mode, dm-writecache crashes on NULL pointer dereference inside dax_synchronous.
Note that this is not a security bug because only root can trigger it.
--- drivers/md/dm-writecache.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/md/dm-writecache.c +5 -0
@@ -2486,6 +2486,11 @@ static int writecache_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv) }if (WC_MODE_PMEM (wc)) { +if (!wc->ssd_dev->dax_dev) { + r = -EOPNOTSUPP ; + ti->error ="Cache device is not a DAX device" ; + goto bad; + }if (!dax_synchronous (wc->ssd_dev->dax_dev)) { r = -EOPNOTSUPP ; ti->error ="Asynchronous persistent memory not supported as pmem cache" ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 562/2214 dm-writecache: fix uncommitted_blocks underflow
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8a0cc5f3446a324b13f62020eeddb32d6ba1c2db ]
Revert the commit 39495b12ef1cf602e6abd350dce2ef4199906531
writecache_bio_copy_ssd sets wc->uncommitted_blocks = 0; and then queues the flush work: queue_work(wc->writeback_wq, &wc->flush_work);
It may be possible that discard is dispatched in this window, and the discard would decrement wc->uncommitted_blocks to -1U.
Note that this bug is benign - wc->uncommitted_blocks is only used to trigged autocommit, so decrementing it to -1U will trigger a spurious autocommit, but won't cause any data corruption.
--- drivers/md/dm-writecache.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-writecache.c +0 -2
@@ -896,8 +896,6 @@ static void writecache_discard(struct dm_writecache *wc, sector_t start, sector_ } discarded_something = true; } -if (!writecache_entry_is_committed (wc, e)) - wc->uncommitted_blocks--;writecache_free_entry (wc, e); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 563/2214 PCI: Disable MSI for ULi M1575 EHCI controller
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Imre Kaloz <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5f30217ec296fb5742f6fd306586dbca5b81b4eb ]
With MSI, the ULi M1575 EHCI controller (10b9:5239) intermittently stops executing its asynchronous schedule. Control transfers time out ("device not accepting address", "device descriptor read/64"), the port is handed to the companion OHCI controller, and the device ends up at full speed. On a configured hub the stall shows up as hub descriptor and status read failures. Only re-initializing the controller recovers it.
On a Sun Ultra 45, 65 of 800 controller initializations stalled with MSI and none of 200 with INTx. Each initialization is an unbind and bind of ehci-pci on the EHCI function, with MSI or INTx selected through its msi_bus attribute; with this quirk, 0 of 100 cycles of the same loop stalled. The stall reproduces on a kernel that already contains commit 0b60557230ad ("usb: ehci: Prevent missed ehci interrupts with edge-triggered MSI").
The OHCI functions (10b9:5237) keep MSI. They showed no stall, and the hub enumerated through them on MSI during the EHCI failures, so only the EHCI function is quirked.
The illumos EHCI driver also disables MSI on this chip, in ehci_register_intrs_and_init_mutex() in usr/src/uts/common/io/usb/hcd/ehci/ehci_util.c.
Until USB HCDs started trying MSI first in v5.9, the controller always used INTx. Disable MSI so it uses INTx again on this chipset.
--- drivers/pci/quirks.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/pci/quirks.c +2 -0
@@ -1828,6 +1828,8 @@ DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_ATI, 0x4388, quirk_no_msi);DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL (PCI_VENDOR_ID_ATI ,0x4389 , quirk_no_msi);DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL (PCI_VENDOR_ID_ATI ,0x438a , quirk_no_msi);DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL (PCI_VENDOR_ID_ATI ,0x438b , quirk_no_msi); +/* ULi M1575 EHCI (10b9:5239): MSI stalls the async schedule */ +DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL (PCI_VENDOR_ID_AL ,0x5239 , quirk_no_msi);static void quirk_pcie_mch (struct pci_dev *pdev) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 564/2214 media: uvcvideo: Fix NULL deref on events for uninitialized controls
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wei Jie Law <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit daa379e2b74d6c10ba4e3b56eeca5aa8c8704fca ]
A null-ptr-deref exists in v6.12.105 and upstream. KASAN crash log:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000080-0x0000000000000087] Workqueue: events uvc_ctrl_status_event_work RIP: 0010:uvc_ctrl_status_event+0x105/0x280 uvc_ctrl_status_event_work+0x82/0x240 process_one_work+0x66f/0x10b0
XU controls are initialized lazily, on the first UVCIOC_CTRL_MAP or UVCIOC_CTRL_QUERY. Until then ctrl->info is all zeroes, so info.mappings is not a valid list head, list_empty() returns false, and uvc_ctrl_status_event() walks it from a NULL next pointer.
--- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c +1 -1
@@ -1513,7 +1513,7 @@ bool uvc_ctrl_status_event_async(struct urb *urb, struct uvc_video_chain *chain,struct uvc_device *dev = chain->dev;struct uvc_ctrl_work *w = &dev->async_ctrl; -if (list_empty (&ctrl->info.mappings)) +if (!ctrl->initialized ||list_empty (&ctrl->info.mappings))return false; w->data = data;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 565/2214 crypto: caam - fix double-free in caam_rsa_set_priv_key_form()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: ZhaoJinming <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a91d9346a70b68f77884cba9d9ec3b70f96bf9d2 ]
caam_rsa_set_priv_key_form() frees the partially allocated key components (p, q, tmp1, tmp2, dp, dq) with kfree_sensitive() on its error path, but does not set those pointers to NULL afterward.
When the function returns an error, caam_rsa_set_priv_key() jumps to its err label and calls caam_rsa_free_key(), which frees all of those same pointers again, resulting in a double-free.
This is reachable when the allocation of q, tmp1, tmp2, dp, dq or qinv fails, e.g. under memory pressure, or for a malformed key whose CRT members decode to zero length and make caam_read_rsa_crt() return NULL.
Set each pointer to NULL right after freeing it so that the subsequent caam_rsa_free_key() call becomes a no-op for the already-freed fields.
--- drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c +6 -0
@@ -1025,16 +1025,22 @@ static int caam_rsa_set_priv_key_form(struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx, free_dq:kfree_sensitive (rsa_key->dq); + rsa_key->dq =NULL ; free_dp:kfree_sensitive (rsa_key->dp); + rsa_key->dp =NULL ; free_tmp2:kfree_sensitive (rsa_key->tmp2); + rsa_key->tmp2 =NULL ; free_tmp1:kfree_sensitive (rsa_key->tmp1); + rsa_key->tmp1 =NULL ; free_q:kfree_sensitive (rsa_key->q); + rsa_key->q =NULL ; free_p:kfree_sensitive (rsa_key->p); + rsa_key->p =NULL ;return -ENOMEM ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 566/2214 hwrng: amd - report partial reads in non-blocking mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e7f5ce911efb2017381f28bbedb6243a74a9c285 ]
amd_rng_read() returns 0 if no more data is available, even if some data was already copied to the output buffer. Return the number of copied bytes instead.
--- drivers/char/hw_random/amd-rng.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/hw_random/amd-rng.c +1 -1
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int amd_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *buf, size_t max, bool wait)if (timeout-- ==0 )return read; }else { -return 0 ; +return read; } }else { *data =ioread32 (priv->iobase +RNGDATA );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 567/2214 hwrng: ba431 - fix reported byte count
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7e638679883ceff5b6e7b6dcad09c21a105e941f ]
Use the size of the buffer element instead of the pointer size to report the number of bytes read. Since data is a u32 pointer and sizeof(data) is 8 bytes on 64-bit systems, using the pointer size reports twice the number of bytes actually read.
--- drivers/char/hw_random/ba431-rng.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/hw_random/ba431-rng.c +1 -1
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ static int ba431_trng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *buf, size_t max, bool wait) } } - n *=sizeof (data); + n *=sizeof (*data);return (n || !wait) ? n : -EIO ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 568/2214 hwrng: core - reject unknown RNG names
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7e7be8815143751c20260f80cb4e7fe14dd24b74 ]
In rng_current_store(), err is 0 after successfully locking rng_mutex, and if the requested RNG name cannot be found, the function reports success even though the current RNG was not changed.
Set err = -ENODEV before searching the RNG list to reject unknown names.
--- drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/char/hw_random/core.c +1 -0
@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ static ssize_t rng_current_store(struct device *dev,if (sysfs_streq (buf,"" )) { err =enable_best_rng (); }else { + err = -ENODEV ;list_for_each_entry (rng, &rng_list, list) {if (sysfs_streq (rng->name, buf)) { cur_rng_set_by_user =1 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 569/2214 crypto: nx - validate ignore before subtracting in decompress
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aldo Ariel Panzardo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b5c2df42977390a71f1940def5be9bd5c69ac2e0 ]
The decompress() function subtracts the header-supplied ignore value (a u16 from the compressed stream) from dlen (the number of bytes produced by the decompressor) without checking that ignore <= dlen.
If a caller decompresses a crafted buffer where hdr->ignore exceeds the actual decompressed length, the subtraction wraps around to a near-UINT_MAX value. The subsequent memcpy() then copies gigabytes of data past the destination buffer, causing an out-of-bounds kernel write.
Add a bounds check before the subtraction and return -EINVAL if the value is inconsistent.
--- drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842.c +2 -0
@@ -416,6 +416,8 @@ static int decompress(struct nx842_crypto_ctx *ctx, slen -= spadding; +if (ignore > dlen) +return -EINVAL ; dlen -= ignore;if (ignore)pr_debug ("ignoring last %x bytes\n" , ignore);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 570/2214 media: meson: vdec: size capture planes from the aligned canvas
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Freidkin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b3a805dd5a83ba8c85e2085d3411eb9975e0aea4 ]
The decoder writes a whole canvas of ALIGN(width, 32) x ALIGN(height, 32) (amvdec_set_canvases()) and reports bytesperline = ALIGN(width, 32), but get_output_size() derives sizeimage from the raw width x height.
When the width is not a multiple of 32 the planes are too small for the advertised stride: for 720x360 NV12M the luma plane is 262144 bytes while 736 * 360 = 264960 are needed (282624 for the canvas the firmware fills). The decoder writes past the buffer, and importing the capture dma-buf into DRM fails: drmModeAddFB2() returns -EINVAL, so e.g. Kodi plays the sound over a black screen. 1280x720 and 1920x1080 are not affected.
Size the planes from the aligned canvas the hardware actually uses.
Tested on an S905X (GXL p212) board with LibreELEC 12 (6.16.0-rc3):
720x360 and 1920x1080 H.264 play through V4L2 m2m + DRM PRIME with no AddFB2 errors.
--- drivers/staging/media/meson/vdec/vdec.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/staging/media/meson/vdec/vdec.c +1 -1
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ struct dummy_buf {static u32 get_output_size (u32 width,u32 height) { -return ALIGN (width * height,SZ_64K ); +return ALIGN (ALIGN (width,32 ) *ALIGN (height,32 ),SZ_64K ); }u32 amvdec_get_output_size (struct amvdec_session *sess)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 571/2214 media: mediatek: vpu: release reserved memory on remove
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8af0e2bdd9791848d9caf3761825ac51a67c2b9c ]
mtk_vpu_probe() may assign a reserved memory region to the VPU device with of_reserved_mem_device_init(). The probe failure path releases the assignment with of_reserved_mem_device_release(), but the normal remove path does not perform the corresponding cleanup.
As a result, removing the VPU driver after a successful probe can leave the reserved memory assignment associated with the device after its lifetime has ended.
Release the reserved memory assignment after freeing the VPU external firmware memory, matching the cleanup performed by the probe failure path.
This issue was found by manual code inspection.
--- drivers/media/platform/mtk-vpu/mtk_vpu.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/media/platform/mtk-vpu/mtk_vpu.c +1 -0
@@ -972,6 +972,7 @@ static int mtk_vpu_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) }vpu_free_ext_mem (vpu,P_FW );vpu_free_ext_mem (vpu,D_FW ); +of_reserved_mem_device_release (&pdev->dev);mutex_destroy (&vpu->vpu_mutex);clk_unprepare (vpu->clk);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 572/2214 media: vicodec: fix NULL deref on oversized frame
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Junrui Luo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c657eb609197e289b054bc2c4e86a0fc32dd7ebe ]
job_ready() only honours the is_header_valid() verdict when ctx->comp_has_frame is set, and comp_has_frame is only set once comp_size reaches the full frame size. Since the copy is clamped to ctx->comp_max_size, a header advertising a larger size leaves comp_size stuck at comp_max_size, so comp_has_frame stays false and the failed validation is discarded.
Control then falls into the resolution change branch, which calls update_capture_data_from_header(). That function re-derives info via info_from_header(), assigns it to q_dst->info and dereferences it as q_dst->info->sizeimage_mult, with no NULL check of its own. is_header_valid() does check that same info_from_header() result -- if (!info) return false which is precisely the false verdict job_ready() discarded above. info_from_header() returns NULL whenever the header flags resolve to no supported pixel format.
Drop the comp_has_frame conjunct so an invalid header always bails out. The resolution change path is unaffected, as it is entered with a valid header. Oversized frames are then rejected by device_process(), which already returns -EINVAL when comp_frame_size exceeds comp_max_size.
--- drivers/media/test-drivers/vicodec/vicodec-core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/test-drivers/vicodec/vicodec-core.c +1 -1
@@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ static int job_ready(void *priv)* if the header is invalid the device_run will just drop the frame * with an error */ -if (!is_header_valid (&ctx->state.header) && ctx->comp_has_frame) +if (!is_header_valid (&ctx->state.header))return 1 ; flags =ntohl (ctx->state.header.flags); hdr_width_div = (flags &V4L2_FWHT_FL_CHROMA_FULL_WIDTH ) ?1 :2 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 573/2214 media: hantro: Harden MPEG-2 control access against NULL
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tharit Tangkijwanichakul <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2b685dba4226792933f45b1cbf8991e89ccd21ce ]
The MPEG-2 sequence and picture controls are validated before a job is queued, so hantro_get_ctrl() is not expected to return NULL in hantro_g1_mpeg2_dec_run(). The controls are nonetheless dereferenced unconditionally.
Harden the invariant by checking the sequence and picture controls with WARN_ON().
Found by code inspection.
--- drivers/staging/media/hantro/hantro_g1_mpeg2_dec.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/staging/media/hantro/hantro_g1_mpeg2_dec.c +5 -0
@@ -161,8 +161,13 @@ int hantro_g1_mpeg2_dec_run(struct hantro_ctx *ctx) seq =hantro_get_ctrl (ctx,V4L2_CID_STATELESS_MPEG2_SEQUENCE ); +if (WARN_ON (!seq)) +return -EINVAL ; + pic =hantro_get_ctrl (ctx,V4L2_CID_STATELESS_MPEG2_PICTURE ); +if (WARN_ON (!pic)) +return -EINVAL ; reg =G1_REG_DEC_AXI_RD_ID (0 ) | G1_REG_DEC_TIMEOUT_E(1) |
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 574/2214 fsverity: hoist statx reporting of fs-verity flag
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrey Albershteyn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f9e450420da2624c93ce9585deebfabb87932774 ]
All filesystems, supporting fsverity, report this status by checking inode flag. Also, BTRFS was missing stat->attributes_mask, which is fixed now.
--- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 3 --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 5 +---- fs/f2fs/file.c | 5 +---- fs/stat.c | 6 +++++- 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/inode.c +0 -3
@@ -9525,7 +9525,6 @@ static int btrfs_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct inode *inode =d_inode (path->dentry);u32 blocksize = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize;u32 bi_flags =BTRFS_I (inode)->flags; -u32 bi_ro_flags =BTRFS_I (inode)->ro_flags; stat->result_mask |=STATX_BTIME ; stat->btime.tv_sec =BTRFS_I (inode)->i_otime.tv_sec;
@@ -9538,8 +9537,6 @@ static int btrfs_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, stat->attributes |=STATX_ATTR_IMMUTABLE ;if (bi_flags &BTRFS_INODE_NODUMP ) stat->attributes |=STATX_ATTR_NODUMP ; -if (bi_ro_flags &BTRFS_INODE_RO_VERITY ) - stat->attributes |=STATX_ATTR_VERITY ; stat->attributes_mask |= (STATX_ATTR_APPEND | STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED |
fs/ext4/inode.c +1 -4
@@ -5677,15 +5677,12 @@ int ext4_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, const struct path *path, stat->attributes |=STATX_ATTR_IMMUTABLE ;if (flags &EXT4_NODUMP_FL ) stat->attributes |=STATX_ATTR_NODUMP ; -if (flags &EXT4_VERITY_FL ) - stat->attributes |=STATX_ATTR_VERITY ; stat->attributes_mask |= (STATX_ATTR_APPEND |STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED |STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED |STATX_ATTR_IMMUTABLE | -STATX_ATTR_NODUMP | -STATX_ATTR_VERITY ); +STATX_ATTR_NODUMP );generic_fillattr (mnt_userns, inode, stat);return 0 ;
fs/f2fs/file.c +1 -4
@@ -836,15 +836,12 @@ int f2fs_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, const struct path *path, stat->attributes |=STATX_ATTR_IMMUTABLE ;if (flags &F2FS_NODUMP_FL ) stat->attributes |=STATX_ATTR_NODUMP ; -if (IS_VERITY (inode)) - stat->attributes |=STATX_ATTR_VERITY ; stat->attributes_mask |= (STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED |STATX_ATTR_APPEND |STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED |STATX_ATTR_IMMUTABLE | -STATX_ATTR_NODUMP | -STATX_ATTR_VERITY ); +STATX_ATTR_NODUMP );generic_fillattr (&init_user_ns, inode, stat);
fs/stat.c +5 -1
@@ -115,8 +115,12 @@ int vfs_getattr_nosec(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,if (IS_DAX (inode)) stat->attributes |=STATX_ATTR_DAX ; +if (IS_VERITY (inode)) + stat->attributes |=STATX_ATTR_VERITY ; + stat->attributes_mask |= (STATX_ATTR_AUTOMOUNT | -STATX_ATTR_DAX ); +STATX_ATTR_DAX | +STATX_ATTR_VERITY ); mnt_userns =mnt_user_ns (path->mnt);if (inode->i_op->getattr)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 575/2214 power: supply: ab8500_fg: Report sub-percent charge changes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4d40dba1815d46c6ef9019ed80e3b998b0fc443d ]
The fuel gauge updates bat_cap.mah from the coulomb counter but exposes bat_cap.prev_mah through CHARGE_NOW and ENERGY_NOW. It only refreshes prev_mah when the rounded integer capacity percentage changes, making the momentary properties appear frozen between percentage steps.
Refresh prev_mah and notify userspace whenever the new charge remains within the currently accepted percentage. If a discharge estimate tries to cross upward into a higher percentage, the existing rejection still leaves both the reported percentage and charge unchanged.
The AB8500 fuel-gauge implementations in the Samsung-GT-I8160-Codina, Samsung-GT-I8160_HD-Codina, Samsung-GT-I8530-Gavini, Samsung-GT-S7710-Skomer, Samsung-SGH-I407-Kyle and Samsung-SGH-T599-Codina-TMO product trees retain the same percentage-gated prev_mah update and contain no finer-grained reporting workaround.
--- drivers/power/supply/ab8500_fg.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/power/supply/ab8500_fg.c +7 -0
@@ -1374,6 +1374,13 @@ static void ab8500_fg_check_capacity_limits(struct ab8500_fg *di, bool init) } } +/* Keep the charge properties current between percentage changes. */ +if (di->bat_cap.prev_percent == percent && + di->bat_cap.prev_mah != di->bat_cap.mah) { + di->bat_cap.prev_mah = di->bat_cap.mah; + changed = true; + } +if (changed) {if (di->bm->capacity_scaling) { di->bat_cap.cap_scale.scaled_cap =
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 576/2214 perf: xgene: initialize lock before requesting IRQ
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Runyu Xiao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d4b7b0c77142b3bc535192fa65130474a129c487 ]
xgene_pmu_probe() requests the PMU IRQ before initializing xgene_pmu->lock. request_irq() enables IRQ handling before it returns, so xgene_pmu_isr() can run in this window and acquire the uninitialized raw spinlock.
Initialize the lock before requesting the IRQ so the handler always sees a valid lock.
--- drivers/perf/xgene_pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/perf/xgene_pmu.c +2 -2
@@ -1896,6 +1896,8 @@ static int xgene_pmu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)if (irq <0 )return -EINVAL ; +raw_spin_lock_init (&xgene_pmu->lock); + rc =devm_request_irq (&pdev->dev, irq, xgene_pmu_isr,IRQF_NOBALANCING |IRQF_NO_THREAD ,dev_name (&pdev->dev), xgene_pmu);
@@ -1906,8 +1908,6 @@ static int xgene_pmu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) xgene_pmu->irq = irq; -raw_spin_lock_init (&xgene_pmu->lock); -/* Check for active MCBs and MCUs */ rc =xgene_pmu_probe_active_mcb_mcu_l3c (xgene_pmu, pdev);if (rc) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 577/2214 svcrdma: Grant credits from the clamped sc_max_requests
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b7037e5da3fb81abcd6309daecb112f1d5926760 ]
svc_rdma_accept() computes sc_fc_credits from sc_max_requests before the Receive Queue depth is checked against the device's max_qp_wr. When that check lowers sc_max_requests, the credit grant keeps the original value, so the server advertises more credits than it has Receives posted. A client that uses the full grant overruns the Receive Queue, and the connection is lost with an RNR error.
Set sc_fc_credits after the clamp so the grant matches the number of Receives the server posts.
--- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_transport.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_transport.c +2 -1
@@ -397,7 +397,6 @@ static struct svc_xprt *svc_rdma_accept(struct svc_xprt *xprt) newxprt->sc_max_requests = svcrdma_max_requests; newxprt->sc_max_bc_requests = svcrdma_max_bc_requests; newxprt->sc_recv_batch =RPCRDMA_MAX_RECV_BATCH ; - newxprt->sc_fc_credits =cpu_to_be32 (newxprt->sc_max_requests);/* Qualify the transport's resource defaults with the * capabilities of this particular device.
@@ -418,6 +417,8 @@ static struct svc_xprt *svc_rdma_accept(struct svc_xprt *xprt) newxprt->sc_max_bc_requests =2 ; } + newxprt->sc_fc_credits =cpu_to_be32 (newxprt->sc_max_requests); +/* Estimate the needed number of rdma_rw contexts. The maximum * Read and Write chunks have one segment each. Each request * can involve one Read chunk and either a Write chunk or Reply
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 578/2214 floppy: dont store a stack buffer in timeout_message
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Denis Efremov (Oracle) <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 66be62ee5d64b6ad1285978644798d8611add931 ]
request_done() formats "request done %d" into a buffer on its stack and passes it to reschedule_timeout(), which keeps the pointer in timeout_message. show_floppy() prints timeout_message long after request_done() has returned, e.g. from result() in the interrupt handler, and reads a dead stack frame:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in string+0x39c/0x3d0 lib/vsprintf.c:720 Read of size 1 at addr ffffc900003cfc70 by task swapper/3/0 Call Trace: <IRQ> ... show_floppy+0xb1/0x45f drivers/block/floppy.c:1838 result.cold+0x2b/0x30 drivers/block/floppy.c:1183 floppy_interrupt+0x191/0x340 drivers/block/floppy.c:1755 floppy_hardint+0x1a7/0x200 arch/x86/include/asm/floppy.h:66
uptodate is either 0 or 1, so pass one of two string literals instead.
--- drivers/block/floppy.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/block/floppy.c +2 -3
@@ -2277,11 +2277,10 @@ static void request_done(int uptodate) {struct request *req = current_req;int block; -char msg[sizeof ("request done " ) +sizeof (int ) *3 ]; probing =0 ; -snprintf (msg,sizeof (msg),"request done %d" , uptodate); -reschedule_timeout (MAXTIMEOUT , msg); +reschedule_timeout (MAXTIMEOUT , + uptodate ?"request done 1" :"request done 0" );if (!req) {pr_info ("floppy.c: no request in request_done\n" );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 579/2214 floppy: return the drive state flags from the 32-bit FDGETDRVSTAT
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Denis Efremov (Oracle) <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bb38473f1bcb287567f2fa7980e483a778092504 ]
compat_getdrvstat() copies every field of the drive state to a 32-bit caller except ->flags, which stays zero. 32-bit FDGETDRVSTAT and FDPOLLDRVSTAT therefore never report FD_DISK_WRITABLE, FD_DISK_CHANGED or FD_VERIFY: i386 fdutils (floppycontrol -P, fdmount), and other 32-bit users see every disk as write-protected and never see a disk change. The compat code in block/compat_ioctl.c copied the field; it was lost when that code moved into floppy.c
Also declare the field as compat_ulong_t: the 32-bit struct floppy_drive_struct starts with an unsigned long, and a signed char at offset 0 only lines up with its low byte on little-endian machines. The size and offsets of the compat structure, and so FDGETDRVSTAT32, do not change.
--- drivers/block/floppy.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/block/floppy.c +2 -1
@@ -3603,7 +3603,7 @@ struct compat_floppy_drive_params { };struct compat_floppy_drive_struct { -signed char flags; +compat_ulong_t flags;compat_ulong_t spinup_date;compat_ulong_t select_date;compat_ulong_t first_read_date;
@@ -3787,6 +3787,7 @@ static int compat_getdrvstat(int drive, bool poll, goto Eintr;process_fd_request (); } + v.flags = drive_state[drive].flags; v.spinup_date = drive_state[drive].spinup_date; v.select_date = drive_state[drive].select_date; v.first_read_date = drive_state[drive].first_read_date;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 580/2214 wifi: brcmsmac: Adjust txpwrindex value in nphy_ipa_rxcal_gaintbl_2GHz
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f7463a9c99a506b3308a852f9aaaf2a26b659e95 ]
After a recent change in clang to warn on signed char conversions within array initializers [1], there is a warning (or error with CONFIG_WERROR=y / W=e) from nphy_ipa_rxcal_gaintbl_2GHz:
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_n.c:224:18: error: implicit conversion from 'int' to 's8' (aka 'signed char') changes value from 128 to -128 [-Werror,-Wconstant-conversion]
224 | {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 128},
| ~ ^~~1 error generated.
This value was introduced in the original staging merge of brcmsmac in commit a9533e7ea3c4 ("Staging: Add initial release of brcm80211 - Broadcom 802.11n wireless LAN driver.") and it is the same in the proprietary driver [2]. Presumably it is correct since there have been no reported issues, so update the value to '-128' to be type correct and clear up the warning.
--- drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_n.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_n.c +1 -1
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static const struct nphy_ipa_txrxgain nphy_ipa_rxcal_gaintbl_5GHz[] = { };static const struct nphy_ipa_txrxgain nphy_ipa_rxcal_gaintbl_2GHz[] = { - {0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,128 }, + {0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,-128 }, {0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,70 }, {0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,20 }, {0 ,0 ,0 ,3 ,0 ,20 },
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 581/2214 resource: fix lost wakeup when waiting for a muxed region
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: DAI RENJIE <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 405c00e43a9c72a0b9b318cc2d2e298386ffb58e ]
A task waiting for a muxed region can sleep forever in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE even though the region it waits for is already free. __request_region_locked() queues itself on muxed_resource_wait and drops resource_lock before setting TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE, while __release_region() wakes the queue after dropping the same lock. A wakeup landing in between finds TASK_RUNNING, does not match TASK_NORMAL and is discarded; callers hold a muxed region only across a bounded transaction, so no further release is coming. The task is unkillable and its caller never returns.
The window is one store wide, but an interrupt is enough to hold the waiter in it, and the machine this was seen on runs PREEMPT_DYNAMIC in its voluntary default. Since v6.11 spd5118 exports the DDR5 sensors of AMD boards through i2c-piix4, which takes a muxed region per SMBus transaction; a third of the in-tree users of request_muxed_region() are hwmon drivers, so reading a world-readable attribute is all an unprivileged user needs to drive the contention. The blocked task sleeps holding the i2c adapter bus lock, and 27 more piled up behind it.
Reproduced by building a kernel with the two orderings selectable at runtime and a 2ms delay inside the window. Switching only that knob, a two-thread barriered reproducer loses the wakeup 200 times out of 200 before the fix and 0 out of 200 after it; without the delay it goes 20000 times through the wait path and loses none.
Fix it by setting the task state before dropping resource_lock, as prepare_to_wait() does: the releasing side needs resource_lock to unlink the resource, so it cannot reach the wakeup before the state is published.
--- kernel/resource.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/resource.c +1 -1
@@ -1214,8 +1214,8 @@ static int __request_region_locked(struct resource *res, struct resource *parent }if (conflict->flags & flags &IORESOURCE_MUXED ) {add_wait_queue (&muxed_resource_wait, &wait); -write_unlock (&resource_lock);set_current_state (TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE ); +write_unlock (&resource_lock);schedule ();remove_wait_queue (&muxed_resource_wait, &wait);write_lock (&resource_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 582/2214 fat: fix fat_ent_write() for reverting the value
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: OGAWA Hirofumi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 63c4b67ee163b2a67a7561314bf2106d6c79c53c ]
commit 64d9183203ee ("fat: restore original value when fat_ent_write failed") try to revert the fatent value to old value when got the error on mirror FAT.
However it didn't work if the error is when writing the fatent bh. In that case, the bh is cleared the uptodate flag, so reuse bh is invalid.
Fix this by reverting the fatent only if got the error on mirror FAT.
--- fs/fat/fat.h | 2 +- fs/fat/fatent.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- fs/fat/file.c | 3 ++- fs/fat/misc.c | 6 ++---- 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
fs/fat/fat.h +1 -1
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ extern void fat_ent_access_init(struct super_block *sb);extern int fat_ent_read (struct inode *inode,struct fat_entry *fatent,int entry);extern int fat_ent_write (struct inode *inode,struct fat_entry *fatent, -int new,int wait); +int new,int old,int wait);extern int fat_alloc_clusters (struct inode *inode,int *cluster,int nr_cluster);extern int fat_free_clusters (struct inode *inode,int cluster);
fs/fat/fatent.c +18 -3
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ static int fat_mirror_bhs(struct super_block *sb, struct buffer_head **bhs, }int fat_ent_write (struct inode *inode,struct fat_entry *fatent, -int new,int wait) +int new,int old,int wait) {struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;const struct fatent_operations *ops =MSDOS_SB (sb)->fatent_ops;
@@ -417,10 +417,25 @@ int fat_ent_write(struct inode *inode, struct fat_entry *fatent, ops->ent_put (fatent, new);if (wait) { err =fat_sync_bhs (fatent->bhs, fatent->nr_bhs); -if (err) +if (err) { +/* +* bhs are not uptodate after I/O error. So we +* can't simply re-dirty to revert. And it +* would not have value to write again on I/O +* error. +*/ return err; + } } -return fat_mirror_bhs (sb, fatent->bhs, fatent->nr_bhs); + + err =fat_mirror_bhs (sb, fatent->bhs, fatent->nr_bhs); +if (err) { +/* Try to revert if got the error on mirror FAT */ + ops->ent_put (fatent, old); +if (wait) +fat_sync_bhs (fatent->bhs, fatent->nr_bhs); + } +return err; } static inline int fat_ent_next(struct msdos_sb_info *sbi,
fs/fat/file.c +2 -1
@@ -359,7 +359,8 @@ static int fat_free(struct inode *inode, int skip) __func__, MSDOS_I(inode)->i_pos); ret = -EIO ; }else if (ret >0 ) { - err =fat_ent_write (inode, &fatent,FAT_ENT_EOF , wait); + err =fat_ent_write (inode, &fatent,FAT_ENT_EOF , ret, + wait);if (err) ret = err; }
fs/fat/misc.c +2 -4
@@ -127,11 +127,9 @@ int fat_chain_add(struct inode *inode, int new_dclus, int nr_cluster) ret =fat_ent_read (inode, &fatent, last);if (ret >=0 ) {int wait =inode_needs_sync (inode); -int old = ret; - ret =fat_ent_write (inode, &fatent, new_dclus, wait); -if (ret <0 ) -fat_ent_write (inode, &fatent, old, wait); + ret =fat_ent_write (inode, &fatent, new_dclus, ret, + wait);fatent_brelse (&fatent); }if (ret <0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 583/2214 fault-inject: fix dentry leak
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ceb43516a9aae0d969a4ec5ab40d45bd09e64229 ]
fault_create_debugfs_attr() has always taken an extra dentry reference on the created directory (attr->dname = dget(dir)) so that fail_dump() could print the name via %pd from any context. Nothing anywhere in the tree ever calls dput() on attr->dname.
For callers with a matching teardown, that unmatched reference causes one dentry plus its attached inode to leak per fault_create_debugfs_attr / debugfs_remove_recursive cycle. simple_recursive_removal() drops debugfs's own +1 ref on the child dentry, but the dget()'d ref keeps its refcount at 1: the dentry ends up unhashed but pinned, and its inode is never freed.
Boot-once callers (mm/failslab, block/blk-core, etc.) leak exactly once at init and never destroy the tree, so the impact there is bounded. But per-lifecycle callers (drivers/nvme, drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1, drivers/mmc, drivers/iommu/iommufd, drivers/media, drivers/misc, drivers/gpu/drm/msm, drivers/crypto, net/sunrpc) leak on every create/destroy cycle.
We observed this in production: an NVMe/RDMA host repeatedly reconnecting to a target that rejected the CRTO Property Get went through ~50 nvme controller create/destroy cycles per second, and dentry and inode_cache grew by ~13k pinned objects per 240 s -- unrecoverable through drop_caches. Byte math matched a per-cycle 1-dentry / 1-inode leak from the "fault_inject" directory dentry.
Fix this by not holding any external reference in fault_attr. Embed the directory name as a fixed-size char array (FAULT_ATTR_DNAME_LEN, 64 bytes) inside struct fault_attr, copied by strscpy() at fault_create_debugfs_attr() time. fail_dump() prints it via %s.
Advantages of an embedded array over kstrdup() + kfree() paired with a new destroy API:
- Zero API footprint. No new export and no caller changes required:
callers already own their fault_attr's memory and free it when they are done, and now that suffices.
- No allocation on the create path.
- fault_create_debugfs_attr() cannot fail from the name-copy step.
- No lifetime coupling between attr->dname and debugfs; the string is valid for exactly as long as the containing struct.
The 64-byte length accommodates every in-tree caller with generous headroom (the longest current name is "fail_dma_array_full", 19 chars).
The user-visible fail_dump() format changes from "name %pd" to "name %s", but the printed content is identical -- %pd on the created directory renders the same string that was passed in as @name.
drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c drops a now-invalid "attr.dname = NULL" statement; the surrounding kzalloc() already zero-initialises the array.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c | 1 - include/linux/fault-inject.h | 10 ++++++++-- lib/fault-inject.c | 7 +++++-- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c +0 -1
@@ -227,7 +227,6 @@ int hfi1_fault_init_debugfs(struct hfi1_ibdev *ibd) ibd->fault->attr.interval =1 ; ibd->fault->attr.require_end =ULONG_MAX ; ibd->fault->attr.stacktrace_depth =32 ; - ibd->fault->attr.dname =NULL ; ibd->fault->attr.verbose =0 ; ibd->fault->enable = false; ibd->fault->opcode = false;
include/linux/fault-inject.h +8 -2
@@ -9,6 +9,13 @@#include <linux/ratelimit.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> +/* +* Length of the debugfs directory name embedded in struct fault_attr. +* Chosen to accommodate every in-tree caller of fault_create_debugfs_attr() +* (the longest is "fail_dma_array_full", 19 chars) with generous headroom. +*/ +#define FAULT_ATTR_DNAME_LEN 64 +/* * For explanation of the elements of this struct, see * Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.rst
@@ -28,7 +35,7 @@ struct fault_attr {unsigned long count;struct ratelimit_state ratelimit_state; -struct dentry *dname; +char dname[FAULT_ATTR_DNAME_LEN ]; };#define FAULT_ATTR_INITIALIZER { \
@@ -38,7 +45,6 @@ struct fault_attr { .stacktrace_depth = 32, \ .ratelimit_state = RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT_DISABLED, \ .verbose = 2, \ - .dname = NULL, \ }#define DECLARE_FAULT_ATTR (name) struct fault_attr name = FAULT_ATTR_INITIALIZER
lib/fault-inject.c +5 -2
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@#include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/stat.h> +#include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/export.h>
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ static void fail_dump(struct fault_attr *attr) {if (attr->verbose >0 &&__ratelimit (&attr->ratelimit_state)) { printk(KERN_NOTICE "FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.\n" - "name %pd, interval %lu, probability %lu, " + "name %s, interval %lu, probability %lu, " "space %d, times %d\n", attr->dname, attr->interval, attr->probability, atomic_read(&attr->space),
@@ -226,7 +227,9 @@ struct dentry *fault_create_debugfs_attr(const char *name,debugfs_create_ul ("reject-end" , mode, dir, &attr->reject_end);#endif /* CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_STACKTRACE_FILTER */ - attr->dname =dget (dir); +if (strscpy (attr->dname, name,sizeof (attr->dname)) == -E2BIG ) +pr_warn ("FAULT_INJECTION: name '%s' truncated to '%s'\n" , + name, attr->dname);return dir; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fault_create_debugfs_attr);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 584/2214 USB: gadgetfs: do not WARN about excessively large memory allocations
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zi Yan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a156148976eac47bee7210097afbb609cafe88b6 ]
GadgetFS passes an excessively large user input len to kmalloc and kmalloc gives a WARN (see below for details). Suppress it by passing __GFP_NOWARN to kmalloc used by both ep_write_iter() and ep_read_iter(). Follow the same method as commit 4f2629ea67e72 ("USB: usbfs: Don't WARN about excessively large memory allocations").
kmalloc is used to allocate physically contiguous memory for kernel allocations. For requests larger than KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE, kmalloc uses the page allocator and can only support up to KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. For request sizes bigger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, the page allocator can emit a WARN because kmalloc allocates an order greater than MAX_PAGE_ORDER.
--- drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c +2 -2
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ ep_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to)return -EBADMSG ; } - buf =kmalloc (len,GFP_KERNEL ); + buf =kmalloc (len,GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);if (unlikely (!buf)) {mutex_unlock (&epdata->lock);return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ ep_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)return -EBADMSG ; } - buf =kmalloc (len,GFP_KERNEL ); + buf =kmalloc (len,GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);if (unlikely (!buf)) {mutex_unlock (&epdata->lock);return -ENOMEM ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 585/2214 ocfs2: exit recovery thread on mount error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6163a859649e9432e9c79c541f36dbf3bba9172f ]
When a mount fails after the cluster connection has been established, e.g. in ocfs2_mount_volume(), ocfs2_fill_super() unwinds via out_debugfs/out_super and frees the osb without disabling recovery.
A node failure event can concurrently launch the recovery thread, which blocks in __ocfs2_wait_on_mount() waiting for the volume state to become VOLUME_MOUNTED or VOLUME_DISABLED. As the mount error path neither sets VOLUME_DISABLED nor wakes osb_mount_event, the thread can never make
progress: the kthread leaks and stays blocked on the wait queue embedded in the freed osb, which may then be accessed as freed memory.
Fix it by setting VOLUME_DISABLED and waking osb_mount_event on this path so the thread bails out, and replace the plain kfree(osb->recovery_map) with ocfs2_recovery_exit(), which waits for a running recovery thread to exit before the recovery map is freed.
--- fs/ocfs2/super.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ocfs2/super.c +10 -1
@@ -1170,8 +1170,17 @@ static int ocfs2_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) out_debugfs:debugfs_remove_recursive (osb->osb_debug_root); out_super: +/* +* A recovery thread launched by a node failure event may still be +* waiting for the volume to be mounted. Set VOLUME_DISABLED and +* wake it up, then wait for it to exit before osb is freed, +* otherwise the kthread would leak and stay blocked on the wait +* queue embedded in the freed osb. +*/ +atomic_set (&osb->vol_state,VOLUME_DISABLED ); +wake_up (&osb->osb_mount_event);ocfs2_release_system_inodes (osb); -kfree (osb->recovery_map); +ocfs2_recovery_exit (osb);ocfs2_delete_osb (osb);kfree (osb); out:
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 586/2214 ocfs2: free replay slots in ocfs2_recovery_exit()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1ddadc6d41c1a29fd8fad1891bdcd2956e08b7f0 ]
Commit ce2fcf1516d6 ("ocfs2: fix memory leak in ocfs2_mount_volume()") added ocfs2_free_replay_slots() calls to the mount error paths out_dismount and out_check_volume to fix a leak of osb->replay_map. However these calls are unlocked while the bail path of the recovery thread, which is woken up by out_dismount right before the call, also frees the replay slots under osb->recovery_lock. Both sides can thus observe a non-NULL osb->replay_map and trigger a double free.
Fix this by moving ocfs2_free_replay_slots() into ocfs2_recovery_exit() after ocfs2_recovery_disable(), which waits for a running recovery thread to exit under osb->recovery_lock, and drop the unlocked call sites. Both ocfs2_dismount_volume() and the out_super path of ocfs2_fill_super() call ocfs2_recovery_exit(), so the replay slots are freed on every path. Since super.c no longer references it, make ocfs2_free_replay_slots() static again.
--- fs/ocfs2/journal.c | 3 ++- fs/ocfs2/journal.h | 1 - fs/ocfs2/super.c | 5 +---- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/ocfs2/journal.c +2 -1
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static void ocfs2_queue_replay_slots(struct ocfs2_super *osb, replay_map->rm_state =REPLAY_DONE ; } -void ocfs2_free_replay_slots (struct ocfs2_super *osb) +static void ocfs2_free_replay_slots (struct ocfs2_super *osb) {struct ocfs2_replay_map *replay_map = osb->replay_map;
@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ void ocfs2_recovery_exit(struct ocfs2_super *osb)/* XXX: Should we bug if there are dirty entries? */ kfree (rm); +ocfs2_free_replay_slots (osb); } static int __ocfs2_recovery_map_test(struct ocfs2_super *osb,
fs/ocfs2/journal.h +0 -1
@@ -151,7 +151,6 @@ void ocfs2_recovery_exit(struct ocfs2_super *osb);void ocfs2_recovery_disable_quota (struct ocfs2_super *osb);int ocfs2_compute_replay_slots (struct ocfs2_super *osb); -void ocfs2_free_replay_slots (struct ocfs2_super *osb);/* * Journal Control: * Initialize, Load, Shutdown, Wipe a journal.
fs/ocfs2/super.c +1 -4
@@ -1163,7 +1163,6 @@ static int ocfs2_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) out_dismount:atomic_set (&osb->vol_state,VOLUME_DISABLED );wake_up (&osb->osb_mount_event); -ocfs2_free_replay_slots (osb);ocfs2_dismount_volume (sb,1 ); goto out;
@@ -1838,14 +1837,12 @@ static int ocfs2_mount_volume(struct super_block *sb) status =ocfs2_truncate_log_init (osb);if (status <0 ) {mlog_errno (status); - goto out_check_volume; + goto out_system_inodes; }ocfs2_super_unlock (osb,1 );return 0 ; -out_check_volume: -ocfs2_free_replay_slots (osb); out_system_inodes:if (osb->local_alloc_state ==OCFS2_LA_ENABLED )ocfs2_shutdown_local_alloc (osb);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 587/2214 ocfs2: skip uninitialized lockres in ocfs2_mark_lockres_freeing()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6a3ed6b290513859bd27d9fcb67739347d6315fa ]
A hard readonly mount skips ocfs2_dlm_init(), so the per-osb lock resources are never initialized and osb->cconn stays NULL. Before commit 550842cc60987 ("ocfs2: fix freeing uninitialized resource on ocfs2_dlm_shutdown") ocfs2_dismount_volume() only called ocfs2_dlm_shutdown() when osb->cconn was set. It now calls it unconditionally, so unmounting a hard readonly mount drops the osb locks and takes the never initialized l_lock in ocfs2_mark_lockres_freeing(). With lockdep enabled this triggers:
INFO: trying to register non-static key. The code is fine but needs lockdep annotation, or maybe you didn't initialize this object before use? turning off the locking correctness validator.
ocfs2_drop_lock() and ocfs2_lock_res_free() already skip lock resources without OCFS2_LOCK_INITIALIZED. Add the same check to ocfs2_mark_lockres_freeing(), which is reachable before them through ocfs2_simple_drop_lockres(), so an uninitialized lockres is never touched.
--- fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.c +4 -0
@@ -3529,6 +3529,10 @@ void ocfs2_mark_lockres_freeing(struct ocfs2_super *osb,struct ocfs2_mask_waiter mw;unsigned long flags, flags2; +/* We didn't get anywhere near actually using this lockres. */ +if (!(lockres->l_flags &OCFS2_LOCK_INITIALIZED )) +return ; +ocfs2_init_mask_waiter (&mw);spin_lock_irqsave (&lockres->l_lock, flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 588/2214 wifi: mt76: mt76x02: validate TX-status rate index before mac80211 handoff
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Anthony Agarro <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fbd12e8dabc8a9d2e81f427906749b4cff85d641 ]
mt76x02_mac_process_tx_rate() extracts the rate index straight from the hardware's raw TX-status word with no bounds check for the HT/HT_GF/VHT cases, and mt76x02_mac_fill_tx_status() ignores its return value. A stale or corrupt hardware index reaches mac80211's minstrel_ht rate control, whose per-group rate array is a fixed 10 entries (MCS_GROUP_RATES), causing an out-of-bounds write.
Validate the index in mt76x02_mac_process_tx_rate() (HT: 0-31,
VHT: MCS nibble 0-9) and have mt76x02_mac_fill_tx_status() bail out cleanly on failure instead of passing an invalid index through.
--- .../net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x02_mac.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x02_mac.c +13 -6
@@ -302,10 +302,14 @@ mt76x02_mac_process_tx_rate(struct ieee80211_tx_rate *txrate, u16 rate, txrate->flags |=IEEE80211_TX_RC_GREEN_FIELD ; fallthrough;case MT_PHY_TYPE_HT : +if (idx >31 ) +return -EINVAL ; txrate->flags |=IEEE80211_TX_RC_MCS ; txrate->idx = idx;break ;case MT_PHY_TYPE_VHT : +if ((idx &0xf ) >9 ) +return -EINVAL ; txrate->flags |=IEEE80211_TX_RC_VHT_MCS ; txrate->idx = idx;break ;
@@ -493,18 +497,21 @@ mt76x02_mac_fill_tx_status(struct mt76x02_dev *dev, struct mt76x02_sta *msta, first_rate = st->rate & ~MT_PKTID_RATE ; first_rate |= st->pktid &MT_PKTID_RATE ; -mt76x02_mac_process_tx_rate (&rate[0 ], first_rate, - dev->mphy.chandef.chan->band); +if (mt76x02_mac_process_tx_rate (&rate[0 ], first_rate, + dev->mphy.chandef.chan->band)) +return ; }else if (rate[0 ].idx <0 ) {if (!msta)return ; -mt76x02_mac_process_tx_rate (&rate[0 ], msta->wcid.tx_info, - dev->mphy.chandef.chan->band); +if (mt76x02_mac_process_tx_rate (&rate[0 ], msta->wcid.tx_info, + dev->mphy.chandef.chan->band)) +return ; } -mt76x02_mac_process_tx_rate (&last_rate, st->rate, - dev->mphy.chandef.chan->band); +if (mt76x02_mac_process_tx_rate (&last_rate, st->rate, + dev->mphy.chandef.chan->band)) +return ;for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (info->status.rates); i++) { retry--;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 589/2214 wifi: mt76: mt7615: do not tear down BSS/STA state for monitor vifs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Anthony Agarro <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f7517b3d8b7f1008e07edcb8bb692c6ca53ef23b ]
Tearing down a monitor interface oopses:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:mt76_connac_mcu_uni_add_bss+0x144/0x370 [mt76_connac_lib] Call Trace: mt7615_remove_interface+0x6a/0x200 [mt7615_common] drv_remove_interface+0x60/0x140 [mac80211] ieee80211_del_virtual_monitor+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211] ieee80211_do_open+0x550/0x7d0 [mac80211] ieee80211_open+0xaa/0xb0 [mac80211] __dev_open+0x11b/0x280
mt7615_remove_interface() tears down BSS and STA state for every vif type. On MT7663 with offload firmware that reaches mt76_connac_mcu_uni_add_bss(), which has no monitor case in its iftype switch. It takes WARN_ON(1), then copies ETH_ALEN from vif->bss_conf.bssid, which is NULL for a monitor vif.
mt76_connac_mcu_bss_basic_tlv() in the same file handles this. It has an NL80211_IFTYPE_MONITOR case and it copies phy->macaddr in place of the bssid. The uni variant has neither.
There is nothing to tear down. mt7615_add_interface() only calls mt7615_mcu_add_dev_info(). The BSS and STA state comes from beacon enable in mt7615_bss_info_changed(), from mt7615_set_key() and from mt7615_mac_sta_add(), so a monitor vif never has any.
Reported on mt7615e going from monitor back to managed, and on mt7663u on an "ip link set down", both through ieee80211_del_virtual_monitor().
--- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7615/main.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7615/main.c +4 -2
@@ -256,8 +256,10 @@ static void mt7615_remove_interface(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,mt7615_mutex_acquire (dev); -mt7615_mcu_add_bss_info (phy, vif,NULL , false); -mt7615_mcu_sta_add (phy, vif,NULL , false); +if (vif->type !=NL80211_IFTYPE_MONITOR ) { +mt7615_mcu_add_bss_info (phy, vif,NULL , false); +mt7615_mcu_sta_add (phy, vif,NULL , false); + }mt76_testmode_reset (phy->mt76, true);if (vif == phy->monitor_vif)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 590/2214 wifi: mt76: mt792x: fix UAF in SDIO TX path when out of memory
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eason Lai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f5dd4833463ed45794027e33928539b3c532f82d ]
Using __skb_pad() instead of skb_pad() in mt76_skb_adjust_pad() to prevent double-free, as the caller handles cleanup.
Free the MCU message skb in __mt76x02u_mcu_send_msg() as well, which relied on skb_pad() to release it.
--- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x02_usb_mcu.c | 2 +- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/tx.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x02_usb_mcu.c +1 -1
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ __mt76x02u_mcu_send_msg(struct mt76_dev *dev, struct sk_buff *skb,MT_MCU_MSG_TYPE_CMD ; ret =mt76x02u_skb_dma_info (skb,CPU_TX_PORT , info);if (ret) -return ret; + goto out; ret =mt76u_bulk_msg (dev, skb->data, skb->len,NULL ,500 ,MT_EP_OUT_INBAND_CMD );
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/tx.c +1 -1
@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ int mt76_skb_adjust_pad(struct sk_buff *skb, int pad) } } -if (skb_pad (last, pad)) +if (__skb_pad (last, pad, false))return -ENOMEM ;__skb_put (last, pad);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 591/2214 wifi: mt76: fix memory leak in USB TX path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eason Lai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 82856da2d3b6a30011f4db6ea5f34c13484e0ef8 ]
When errors occur in mt76u_tx_queue_skb(), the skb is not properly freed, leading to memory leaks. This happens when:
- The queue is full
- tx_prepare_skb() drops zero-length frames (such as WMM NULL frames) to prevent hardware TX hangs
- Buffer setup fails
Fix by properly releasing the skb with ieee80211_tx_status_ext() when the queue is full or tx_prepare_skb() fails, and using mt76_tx_complete_skb() when mt76u_tx_setup_buffers() fails (since tx_prepare_skb() has already succeeded and may have allocated resources that need cleanup)
--- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c +26 -5
@@ -904,23 +904,36 @@ mt76u_tx_queue_skb(struct mt76_dev *dev, struct mt76_queue *q, enum mt76_txq_id qid, struct sk_buff *skb, struct mt76_wcid *wcid, struct ieee80211_sta *sta) { + struct ieee80211_tx_status status = { + .sta = sta, + };struct mt76_tx_info tx_info = { .skb = skb, };u16 idx = q->head;int err; -if (q->queued == q->ndesc) -return -ENOSPC ; +if (q->queued == q->ndesc) { + err = -ENOSPC ; + goto err_free_skb; + } skb->prev = skb->next =NULL ; err = dev->drv->tx_prepare_skb (dev,NULL , qid, wcid, sta, &tx_info);if (err <0 ) -return err; + goto err_free_skb; err =mt76u_tx_setup_buffers (dev, tx_info.skb, q->entry[idx].urb); -if (err <0 ) -return err; +if (err <0 ) { +/* +* mt76_tx_status_skb_get() walks the idr and dereferences +* a freed skb. This SKB is not counted in non-AQL counter +* due to error return, so using 0xffff as wcid to keep +* balanced. +*/ +mt76_tx_complete_skb (dev,0xffff , tx_info.skb); + goto err_ret; + } mt76u_fill_bulk_urb(dev, USB_DIR_OUT, q2ep(q->hw_idx), q->entry[idx].urb, mt76u_complete_tx,
@@ -932,6 +945,14 @@ mt76u_tx_queue_skb(struct mt76_dev *dev, struct mt76_queue *q, q->queued++;return idx; + +err_free_skb: + status.skb = tx_info.skb; +spin_lock_bh (&dev->rx_lock); +ieee80211_tx_status_ext (dev->hw, &status); +spin_unlock_bh (&dev->rx_lock); +err_ret: +return err; }static void mt76u_tx_kick (struct mt76_dev *dev,struct mt76_queue *q)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 592/2214 wifi: mt76: mt7615: cancel reset work during unregister
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiale Yao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5b779c63fb1e20e6729d3241b78be7502759296d ]
The MCU error interrupt handler queues reset_work on the device workqueue. Device removal can reach mt76_unregister_device() while that work is still pending, since the workqueue is not destroyed until mt76_free_device().
If reset_work runs in this window, it operates on an unregistered hw and can requeue mac_work after ieee80211_unregister_hw() has torn the device down. Cancel it before unregistering the device so it cannot outlive the registered hw.
--- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7615/pci_init.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7615/pci_init.c +1 -0
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ void mt7615_unregister_device(struct mt7615_dev *dev) mcu_running =mt7615_wait_for_mcu_init (dev);mt7615_unregister_ext_phy (dev); +cancel_work_sync (&dev->reset_work);mt76_unregister_device (&dev->mt76);if (mcu_running)mt7615_mcu_exit (dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 593/2214 wifi: mt76: Fix of_node reference leak in mt76_get_rate_power_limits()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8d604c899f7bd1a76a2eb21c0b706c02878abd36 ]
mt76_find_power_limits_node() and mt76_find_channel_node() return nodes with the reference held, but mt76_get_rate_power_limits() overwrites the "txpower-<band>" node reference and never releases the channel node reference, leaking both.
Drop the intermediate and the channel node reference on every exit path, and take a reference on the fallback node returned by mt76_find_power_limits_node() so the caller's of_node_put() is balanced.
--- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/eeprom.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/eeprom.c +12 -5
@@ -145,12 +145,14 @@ mt76_find_power_limits_node(struct mt76_dev *dev)struct property *regd =of_find_property (cur,"regdomain" ,NULL );if (!country && !regd) { - fallback = cur; +of_node_put (fallback); + fallback =of_node_get (cur);continue ; }if (mt76_string_prop_find (country, dev->alpha2) ||mt76_string_prop_find (regd, region_name)) { +of_node_put (fallback);of_node_put (np);return cur; }
@@ -274,7 +276,7 @@ s8 mt76_get_rate_power_limits(struct mt76_phy *phy, s8 target_power) {struct mt76_dev *dev = phy->dev; -struct device_node *np; +struct device_node *np, *band_np;const s8 *val;char name[16 ];u32 mcs_rates = dev->drv->mcs_rates;
@@ -304,15 +306,18 @@ s8 mt76_get_rate_power_limits(struct mt76_phy *phy, band ='5' ;break ;default : +of_node_put (np);return target_power; }snprintf (name,sizeof (name),"txpower-%cg" , band); - np =of_get_child_by_name (np, name); -if (!np) + band_np =of_get_child_by_name (np, name); +of_node_put (np); +if (!band_np)return target_power; - np =mt76_find_channel_node (np, chan); + np =mt76_find_channel_node (band_np, chan); +of_node_put (band_np);if (!np)return target_power;
@@ -337,6 +342,8 @@ s8 mt76_get_rate_power_limits(struct mt76_phy *phy,ARRAY_SIZE (dest->ru), val, len, target_power, txs_delta, &max_power); +of_node_put (np); +return max_power; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (mt76_get_rate_power_limits);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 594/2214 clocksource/drivers/fttmr010: Fix clk reference leak in error paths
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 277e5657237a92e279ee28da2f5c07902cc6aa0b ]
fttmr010_common_init() obtains the PCLK reference with of_clk_get_by_name() but never calls clk_put(). If clk_prepare_enable() fails the reference is leaked directly, and every error path that jumps to out_disable_clock only calls clk_disable_unprepare(), which releases the prepare/enable state but not the reference obtained from of_clk_get_by_name().
Add clk_put() to the clk_prepare_enable() failure path and to the out_disable_clock label so the clock reference is no longer leaked. The success path keeps PCLK enabled for the lifetime of the timer and is left untouched.
--- drivers/clocksource/timer-fttmr010.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/clocksource/timer-fttmr010.c +2 -0
@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ static int __init fttmr010_common_init(struct device_node *np, ret =clk_prepare_enable (clk);if (ret) {pr_err ("failed to enable PCLK\n" ); +clk_put (clk);return ret; }
@@ -432,6 +433,7 @@ static int __init fttmr010_common_init(struct device_node *np,kfree (fttmr010); out_disable_clock:clk_disable_unprepare (clk); +clk_put (clk);return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 595/2214 clocksource/drivers/digicolor: Fix clk reference leak on request_irq failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9cc2e18b32f12d26ae6729c62a03640423956b17 ]
digicolor_timer_init() obtains the timer clock with of_clk_get() and enables it, but the request_irq() failure path returns without releasing the clock reference, leaking both the enable/prepare state and the reference itself.
Disable and put the clock before returning on the request_irq() failure path. The success path keeps the clock enabled for the lifetime of the timer and is left untouched.
--- drivers/clocksource/timer-digicolor.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/clocksource/timer-digicolor.c +2 -0
@@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ static int __init digicolor_timer_init(struct device_node *node) &dc_timer_dev.ce);if (ret) {pr_warn ("request of timer irq %d failed (%d)\n" , irq, ret); +clk_disable_unprepare (clk); +clk_put (clk);return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 596/2214 aoe: pull in the headers each received packet type reads
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e1274a6bc40a4618f6fbaebbdc51cca865d51bed ]
aoenet_rcv() only pulls the AoE and ATA headers into the skb head when the packet is long enough to hold both. A shorter packet goes through unpulled, and aoenet_rcv() reads the AoE header from it anyway. CFG responses go on to aoecmd_cfg_rsp(), which reads the config header after it, and ATA responses get queued for ktiocomplete(), which skb_pull()s both headers. Ethernet pads frames to 60 bytes, so this mostly takes a virtual link, but nothing stops a short frame from getting here.
Pull the AoE header up front and drop the packet if it isn't there, then pull the ATA or config header in the switch arm that hands the packet on, so each path gets the headers it reads. This also replaces the open-coded __pskb_pull_tail() with pskb_may_pull().
--- drivers/block/aoe/aoenet.c | 14 ++++++-------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/block/aoe/aoenet.c +6 -8
@@ -132,9 +132,7 @@ static int aoenet_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ifp, struct packet_type *pt, struct net_device *orig_dev) { struct aoe_hdr *h; -struct aoe_atahdr *ah;u32 n; -int sn;if (dev_net (ifp) != &init_net) goto exit;
@@ -145,12 +143,8 @@ aoenet_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ifp, struct packet_type *pt,if (!is_aoe_netif (ifp)) goto exit;skb_push (skb,ETH_HLEN );/* (1) */ - sn =sizeof (*h) +sizeof (*ah); -if (skb->len >= sn) { - sn -=skb_headlen (skb); -if (sn >0 && !__pskb_pull_tail (skb, sn)) - goto exit; - } +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb,sizeof (*h))) + goto exit; h = (struct aoe_hdr *) skb->data; n =get_unaligned_be32 (&h->tag);if ((h->verfl &AOEFL_RSP ) ==0 || (n &1 <<31 ))
@@ -172,10 +166,14 @@ aoenet_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ifp, struct packet_type *pt,switch (h->cmd) {case AOECMD_ATA : +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb,sizeof (*h) +sizeof (struct aoe_atahdr ))) + goto exit;/* ata_rsp may keep skb for later processing or give it back */ skb =aoecmd_ata_rsp (skb);break ;case AOECMD_CFG : +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb,sizeof (*h) +sizeof (struct aoe_cfghdr ))) + goto exit;aoecmd_cfg_rsp (skb);break ;default :
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 597/2214 PCI/sysfs: Pass the device name length in UTF-16 code units
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Krzysztof Wilczyński <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit af5ca2d75147bf283239e8ef0fbf6e5e0488ca91 ]
Currently, dsm_label_utf16s_to_utf8s() passes the ACPI buffer length to utf16s_to_utf8s() unchanged. The Device Name _DSM may return the device name as a buffer holding a UTF-16 string, and the ACPI length counts bytes while the converter counts wchar_t elements. The converter therefore receives a count twice the number of code units the buffer holds, and that count is its only bound on the input.
A NUL code unit ends the conversion early, so a name that carries one is converted correctly and the error stays hidden. ACPICA zeroes the entire result allocation, and the padding placed after the buffer supplies that NUL for most lengths. Lengths that leave no padding, or a single byte of it, do not, and the conversion then runs up to its own length in bytes past the end of the allocation. The bytes beyond the allocation are decoded into the "label" attribute, which is world readable.
Divide the buffer length by the size of wchar_t so that the converter receives a count of code units. The division truncates, so the converter is never told to read more bytes than the buffer holds, including for an odd length.
Reaching the out of bounds read needs firmware that returns the name as a buffer and omits the terminator.
--- drivers/pci/pci-label.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pci/pci-label.c +1 -1
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static int dsm_label_utf16s_to_utf8s(union acpi_object *obj, char *buf)int len; len =utf16s_to_utf8s ((const wchar_t *)obj->buffer.pointer, - obj->buffer.length, + obj->buffer.length /sizeof (wchar_t),UTF16_LITTLE_ENDIAN , buf,PAGE_SIZE -1 ); buf[len++] ='\n' ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 598/2214 fanotify: report names longer than NAME_MAX
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matthias Goergens <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ff05910cb1b77c2b229c5e6e260c6173a17b579b ]
fanotify keeps the length of a reported name in a u8, so it drops any name longer than NAME_MAX and warns:
WARNING: fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.h:217 at fanotify_handle_event+0x2e82/0x39f0
Such names are legitimate on some filesystems. vfat mounted with utf8 takes up to 255 UTF-16 characters, which are up to 765 bytes of UTF-8, and FUSE accepts names up to PATH_MAX - 1. readdir() and inotify report them in full. fanotify sends the event without the name, and for FAN_RENAME it trips a second warning in copy_fid_info_to_user(), after which read() fails with EFAULT and the event is lost.
When syzbot hit this, Jan suggested accommodating names up to PATH_MAX [1], the limit readdir() already applies to a name (verify_dirent_name()). Store the name lengths as u16, which keeps struct fanotify_info at 8 bytes, and drop without a warning only names of PATH_MAX bytes or more, which no path can refer to. An event with such a name can exceed a page, so allocate name events with kvmalloc(), as Jan also suggested. Names up to NAME_MAX are reported exactly as before, and the record format is unchanged: an event with a long name is just longer.
--- fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c | 7 +++++-- fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.h | 21 ++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c +5 -2
@@ -610,6 +610,9 @@ static struct fanotify_event *fanotify_alloc_name_event(struct inode *dir,unsigned long name2_len = name2 ? name2->len :0 ;unsigned int len, size; +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (name_len >=PATH_MAX || name2_len >=PATH_MAX )) +return NULL ; +/* Reserve terminating null byte even for empty name */ size =sizeof (*fne) + name_len + name2_len +2 ;if (dir_fh_len)
@@ -618,7 +621,7 @@ static struct fanotify_event *fanotify_alloc_name_event(struct inode *dir, size +=FANOTIFY_FH_HDR_LEN + dir2_fh_len;if (child_fh_len) size +=FANOTIFY_FH_HDR_LEN + child_fh_len; - fne =kmalloc (size, gfp); + fne =kvmalloc (size, gfp);if (!fne)return NULL ;
@@ -1013,7 +1016,7 @@ static void fanotify_free_fid_event(struct fanotify_event *event)static void fanotify_free_name_event (struct fanotify_event *event) { -kfree (FANOTIFY_NE (event)); +kvfree (FANOTIFY_NE (event)); } static void fanotify_free_error_event(struct fsnotify_group *group,
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.h +12 -9
@@ -42,9 +42,16 @@ struct fanotify_info {u8 dir_fh_totlen;u8 dir2_fh_totlen;u8 file_fh_totlen; -u8 name_len; -u8 name2_len; -u8 pad[3 ]; +u8 pad; +/* +* Deliberately not limited to NAME_MAX: some filesystems return longer +* names (vfat up to 255 UTF-16 characters, as Windows allows, which is +* up to 765 bytes of UTF-8; FUSE up to PATH_MAX - 1), and readdir() and +* inotify report them in full. Only names of PATH_MAX bytes or more, +* which no path can refer to, are dropped. +*/ +u16 name_len; +u16 name2_len;unsigned char buf[];/* * (struct fanotify_fh) dir_fh starts at buf[0]
@@ -167,7 +174,7 @@ static inline char *fanotify_info_name2(struct fanotify_info *info)static inline void fanotify_info_init (struct fanotify_info *info) {BUILD_BUG_ON (FANOTIFY_FH_HDR_LEN +MAX_HANDLE_SZ >U8_MAX ); -BUILD_BUG_ON (NAME_MAX >U8_MAX ); +BUILD_BUG_ON (PATH_MAX >U16_MAX ); info->dir_fh_totlen =0 ; info->dir2_fh_totlen =0 ;
@@ -213,8 +220,7 @@ static inline void fanotify_info_set_file_fh(struct fanotify_info *info,static inline void fanotify_info_copy_name (struct fanotify_info *info,const struct qstr *name) { -if (WARN_ON_ONCE (name->len >NAME_MAX ) || -WARN_ON_ONCE (info->name2_len >0 )) +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (info->name2_len >0 ))return ; info->name_len = name->len;
@@ -224,9 +230,6 @@ static inline void fanotify_info_copy_name(struct fanotify_info *info,static inline void fanotify_info_copy_name2 (struct fanotify_info *info,const struct qstr *name) { -if (WARN_ON_ONCE (name->len >NAME_MAX )) -return ; - info->name2_len = name->len;strcpy (fanotify_info_name2 (info), name->name); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 599/2214 ext4: skip extra isize expansion while unmounting
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hemanth Selam <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 418adcde99032194416248168df810535a1a93f9 ]
syzbot reports a WARN from ext4_xattr_inode_create() reached through the unmount path:
EXT4-fs warning (device loop0): ext4_xattr_inode_create:1485: refuse to create EA inode when umounting
WARNING: fs/ext4/xattr.c:1486 at ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create ext4_xattr_block_set ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea __ext4_expand_extra_isize __ext4_mark_inode_dirty ext4_dirty_inode __mark_inode_dirty sync_lazytime iput dentry_kill shrink_dentry_list shrink_dcache_for_umount generic_shutdown_super kill_block_super ext4_kill_sb
shrink_dcache_for_umount() clears s_root before generic_shutdown_super() clears SB_ACTIVE, so during the dcache shrink the last iput() of a lazytime inode still redirties it and reaches the isize expansion. The expansion can move xattrs out to a block, and creating the EA inode for them needs s_root, which ext4_xattr_inode_create() refuses without.
ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize() already declines to expand when the superblock is not active, but that test does not cover this window. Decline while s_root is gone as well. The expansion is best effort and __ext4_mark_inode_dirty() ignores its return value, so nothing else changes; the inode can be expanded on a later mount.
Running the syzbot reproducer for 60 seconds produced 3583 splats before this change and none after it, with the same number of mount cycles.
--- fs/ext4/inode.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/inode.c +7 -1
@@ -5954,8 +5954,14 @@ static int ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize(struct inode *inode,* When !SB_ACTIVE, iput triggers write_inode_now() which acquires * s_writepages_rwsem, causing a deadlock with the caller's active * jbd2 handle (lock order: s_writepages_rwsem -> jbd2_handle). +* +* Skip it while unmounting as well. shrink_dcache_for_umount() +* clears s_root before generic_shutdown_super() clears SB_ACTIVE, and +* the last iput() of a lazytime inode in that window redirties it and +* lands here. Moving xattrs out to a block then needs a new EA inode, +* which ext4_xattr_inode_create() refuses without s_root. */ -if (unlikely (!(inode->i_sb->s_flags &SB_ACTIVE ))) +if (unlikely (!(inode->i_sb->s_flags &SB_ACTIVE ) || !inode->i_sb->s_root))return -EBUSY ;/*
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 600/2214 ext4: dont report delalloc data as a hole on indirect-mapped inodes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daejun Park <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit aed43f47e1edeee1454eea86006a8c09480e5ed3 ]
When a plain lookup finds no block, ext4_ind_map_blocks() sizes the hole it reports by counting the empty subtrees under 'partial' in the on-disk indirect tree. That count knows nothing about delayed allocation, so a range holding delalloc data that has not been written back yet is reported as a plain hole. The extent-mapped path does not have this
problem: it trims the hole it found at the first delayed extent before returning it.
ext4_map_blocks() consults the extent status tree before it calls into the mapping layer, so a query that starts exactly on the delayed block still finds it. A query that starts earlier does not, because the hole reported for the earlier block already spans the delayed one. On a 4k-block filesystem, lseek(SEEK_DATA) from offset 0 on a file whose only data block is at logical block N and is still dirty returns:
N = 0..11 direct blocks N << 12 N = 12 first single-indirect block N << 12 N = 13..1035 inside that indirect block -1 ENXIO N = 1036 first double-indirect block N << 12
Blocks 12 and 1036 survive because the query lands on the delayed block itself. Blocks 13..1035 are swallowed by the 1024-block hole reported for block 12. fiemap loses the same data for the same reason.
An ext3 filesystem mounted as ext4 hits this during ordinary use: ext3 inodes stay indirect mapped, while mount -t ext4 turns on delayed allocation even though mounting ext3 with -o delalloc is explicitly rejected. install(1) from coreutils uses SEEK_DATA to locate data in its source file, so installing a sparse file that has not been written back silently produces a destination of the right size holding none of the data:
truncate -s 1G img && mkfs.ext3 -F img && mount -t ext4 img mnt echo | dd of=mnt/src bs=1 count=1 seek=64K install mnt/src mnt/dst cmp mnt/src mnt/dst # differ: char 65537
Reconciling a hole with the extent status tree does not depend on how the hole was found, so instead of open coding it a second time, split the delalloc handling out of ext4_ext_determine_insert_hole() into ext4_determine_insert_hole(), which takes the hole the caller located, and call that from ext4_ind_map_blocks() as well. All the special cases and the comments explaining them stay in one place.
Two things change for indirect-mapped inodes. They now cache the holes they report, as the extent-mapped path already does: ext4_punch_hole() already puts EXTENT_STATUS_HOLE on such inodes, ext4_map_blocks() and ext4_da_map_blocks() already handle a cached hole, the latter by replacing it with the delayed extent, and consecutive hole entries merge, so the tree does not grow with the length of a scan. And when a delayed extent covers the queried block itself - a race, since ext4_map_blocks() found nothing in the tree just before - the hole is now reported only up to the end of that extent instead of in full.
The indirect path passes hole_start == lblk, so the "delalloc extent in front of the queried range" case cannot be reached there:__es_tree_search() never returns an extent ending before the block it was searched for.
With this the sweep above returns N << 12 for every N, while the nodelalloc and extent-mapped controls are unchanged. generic/225, generic/285, generic/448 and generic/490 pass on ext4 made both with and without the extent feature. generic/286 and generic/436 pass on extent-mapped ext4 and are skipped without it, since they need fallocate.
--- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 3 +++ fs/ext4/extents.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- fs/ext4/indirect.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/ext4.h +3 -0
@@ -3734,6 +3734,9 @@ extern void ext4_ext_tree_init(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode);extern int ext4_ext_index_trans_blocks (struct inode *inode,int extents);extern int ext4_ext_map_blocks (handle_t *handle,struct inode *inode,struct ext4_map_blocks *map,int flags); +ext4_lblk_t ext4_determine_insert_hole (struct inode *inode,ext4_lblk_t lblk, +ext4_lblk_t hole_start, +ext4_lblk_t hole_len);extern int ext4_ext_truncate (handle_t *,struct inode *);extern int ext4_ext_remove_space (struct inode *inode,ext4_lblk_t start,ext4_lblk_t end);
fs/ext4/extents.c +13 -13
@@ -4096,21 +4096,19 @@ static int get_implied_cluster_alloc(struct super_block *sb, }/* -* Determine hole length around the given logical block, first try to -* locate and expand the hole from the given @path, and then adjust it -* if it's partially or completely converted to delayed extents, insert -* it into the extent cache tree if it's indeed a hole, finally return -* the length of the determined extent. +* Adjust the hole [@hole_start, @hole_start + @hole_len) the caller found +* around the queried block @lblk if it's partially or completely converted +* to delayed extents, insert it into the extent cache tree if it's indeed a +* hole, finally return the length of the determined extent starting at +* @lblk. @hole_start must not be behind @lblk. */ -static ext4_lblk_t ext4_ext_determine_insert_hole (struct inode *inode, -struct ext4_ext_path *path, -ext4_lblk_t lblk) +ext4_lblk_t ext4_determine_insert_hole (struct inode *inode,ext4_lblk_t lblk, +ext4_lblk_t hole_start, +ext4_lblk_t hole_len) { -ext4_lblk_t hole_start, len; +ext4_lblk_t len = hole_len;struct extent_status es; - hole_start = lblk; - len =ext4_ext_find_hole (inode, path, &hole_start); again:ext4_es_find_extent_range (inode, &ext4_es_is_delayed, hole_start, hole_start + len -1 , &es);
@@ -4275,9 +4273,11 @@ int ext4_ext_map_blocks(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,* we couldn't try to create block if create flag is zero */ if ((flags &EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE ) ==0 ) { -ext4_lblk_t len; +ext4_lblk_t hole_start = map->m_lblk, len; - len =ext4_ext_determine_insert_hole (inode, path, map->m_lblk); + len =ext4_ext_find_hole (inode, path, &hole_start); + len =ext4_determine_insert_hole (inode, map->m_lblk, + hole_start, len); map->m_pblk =0 ; map->m_len = min_t(unsigned int, map->m_len, len);
fs/ext4/indirect.c +17 -0
@@ -586,6 +586,23 @@ int ext4_ind_map_blocks(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,for (i = partial - chain +1 ; i < depth; i++) count = count * epb + (epb - offsets[i] -1 ); count++; + +/* +* The count knows nothing about delayed allocation, so let +* the common helper reconcile it with the extent status +* tree. Only when the lookup really did find a hole: +* ext4_get_branch() also returns a non-NULL partial when it +* failed, and caching a hole for a range it could not read +* would answer every later read from that cache instead of +* retrying. Clamp the count first, a subtree can be bigger +* than the logical block space when the block size is large. +*/ +if (!err) { + count =umin (count,EXT_MAX_BLOCKS - map->m_lblk); + count =ext4_determine_insert_hole (inode, map->m_lblk, + map->m_lblk, count); + } +/* Fill in size of a hole we found */ map->m_pblk =0 ; map->m_len =umin (map->m_len, count);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 601/2214 ext4: fix out-of-bounds read in ext4_get_group_info()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jinjie Ruan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b067d3c1f90b536e9aa9f48b19580475a0b34f0f ]
A plain read of s_groups_count in ext4_get_group_info() allows CPU load-load reordering. On weak memory models, speculative prefetch of s_group_info prior to the boundary check could lead to an out-of-bounds read if a concurrent online resize expands the array and increments s_groups_count.
The data race occurs between the ioctl configuration path (holding the resize lock via ext4_resize_begin) and the lockless metadata lookup path:
CPU 0 (Writer, Resize Lock) CPU 1 (Reader, Lockless)
--------------------------- ------------------------
ext4_ioctl()
[EXT4_IOC_GROUP_ADD]
ext4_ioctl_group_add()
ext4_resize_begin() // Takes lock
ext4_group_add()
ext4_mb_alloc_groupinfo()
// Publishes expanded array via RCU
rcu_assign_pointer(s_group_info, ...)
ext4_flex_group_add()
ext4_update_super()
ext4_get_group_info()
// Speculative / out-of-order read
[Loads old/smaller s_group_info pointer]
[Plain C store / smp_wmb()]
sbi->s_groups_count += ...;
// Reads new s_groups_count,
// boundary check passes
if (group >= s_groups_count)
// Out-of-bounds array access!
sbi_array_rcu_deref(..., s_group_info)Fix this by using ext4_get_groups_count() to enforce acquire semantics.
--- fs/ext4/balloc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/balloc.c +1 -1
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ struct ext4_group_info *ext4_get_group_info(struct super_block *sb,struct ext4_group_info **grp_info;long indexv, indexh; -if (unlikely (group >=EXT4_SB (sb)->s_groups_count)) +if (unlikely (group >=ext4_get_groups_count (sb)))return NULL ;if (unlikely (!EXT4_SB (sb)->s_group_info))return NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 602/2214 mm/nommu: reject wrapping ranges in access_remote_vm()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anastasios Papagiannis <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 51a8de81fd2edbf87d8046e352060329bb216fad ]
The NOMMU implementation of access_process_vm() rejects address ranges whose end wraps around, but access_remote_vm() bypasses this check even though both functions delegate to __access_remote_vm().
Move the wraparound check into __access_remote_vm() so it applies to both entry points.
This is originally reported in [1].
--- mm/nommu.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/nommu.c +3 -3
@@ -1665,6 +1665,9 @@ int __access_remote_vm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, void *buf,struct vm_area_struct *vma;int write = gup_flags &FOLL_WRITE ; +if (addr + len < addr) +return 0 ; +if (mmap_read_lock_killable (mm))return 0 ;
@@ -1718,9 +1721,6 @@ int access_process_vm(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr, void *buf, in {struct mm_struct *mm; -if (addr + len < addr) -return 0 ; - mm =get_task_mm (tsk);if (!mm)return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 603/2214 clk: imx: Fix clock reference leak in imx_get_clk_hw_by_name()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8e177ca735761a1f03e1dedffd7ab00d6d0540ae ]
imx_get_clk_hw_by_name() obtains a consumer clock with of_clk_get_by_name(), extracts the hardware pointer with __clk_get_hw() and returns it without ever calling clk_put(), leaking the consumer reference on both return paths.
Extract the hardware pointer first and drop the clock reference with clk_put() before returning.
--- drivers/clk/imx/clk.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/clk/imx/clk.c +5 -1
@@ -111,12 +111,16 @@ struct clk_hw * imx_obtain_fixed_clk_hw(struct device_node *np, const char *name) {struct clk *clk; +struct clk_hw *hw; clk =of_clk_get_by_name (np, name);if (IS_ERR (clk))return ERR_PTR (-ENOENT ); -return __clk_get_hw (clk); + hw =__clk_get_hw (clk); +clk_put (clk); + +return hw; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (imx_obtain_fixed_clk_hw);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 604/2214 clk: imx: Fix clock reference leak in imx_obtain_fixed_clock_hw()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 52d4d1b26a5bc64de95099d0a3dd8b90dba1f3a3 ]
imx_obtain_fixed_clock_hw() obtains the clock through imx_obtain_fixed_clock_from_dt(), which creates a consumer reference via of_clk_get_from_provider(). The reference is discarded right after __clk_get_hw() returns the hardware pointer, leaking it.
Keep the imx_clk_fixed() fallback unchanged and drop the DT-obtained consumer reference with clk_put() once the hardware pointer has been extracted.
--- drivers/clk/imx/clk.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/imx/clk.c +7 -2
@@ -100,11 +100,16 @@ struct clk_hw *imx_obtain_fixed_clock_hw( const char *name, unsigned long rate) { struct clk *clk; +struct clk_hw *hw; clk =imx_obtain_fixed_clock_from_dt (name);if (IS_ERR (clk)) - clk =imx_clk_fixed (name, rate); -return __clk_get_hw (clk); +return __clk_get_hw (imx_clk_fixed (name, rate)); + + hw =__clk_get_hw (clk); +clk_put (clk); + +return hw; } struct clk_hw * imx_obtain_fixed_clk_hw(struct device_node *np,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 605/2214 soc: fsl: dpio: Fix cleanup on IRQ registration failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Myeonghun Pak <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 45ecea8c55521d424513178fb612cefffb09a9f5 ]
IRQ registration happens after dpaa2_io_create(), but its failure path only releases the IRQ resources and the MC portal. The I/O object stays allocated and published in the service list and per-CPU lookup table, while devres unmaps its portal registers after probe fails.
Call dpaa2_io_down() on IRQ registration failure to remove the object from those lookup structures and free it. Reorder the error labels so that a failed dpaa2_io_create() still skips this cleanup.
Remove unregister_dpio_irq_handlers() from the probe error path, since no IRQ handler or affinity hint has been installed when registration fails.
This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.
--- drivers/soc/fsl/dpio/dpio-driver.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/fsl/dpio/dpio-driver.c +2 -2
@@ -248,9 +248,9 @@ static int dpaa2_dpio_probe(struct fsl_mc_device *dpio_dev)return 0 ; -err_dpaa2_io_create: -unregister_dpio_irq_handlers (dpio_dev); err_register_dpio_irq: +dpaa2_io_down (priv->io); +err_dpaa2_io_create:fsl_mc_free_irqs (dpio_dev); err_allocate_irqs:dpio_disable (dpio_dev->mc_io,0 , dpio_dev->mc_handle);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 606/2214 USB: cdc-acm: fix urb leak on disconnect
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 648b08aa37c1b24a61662ad78964f2bca659ca26 ]
Make sure to drop the reference taken by usb_anchor_urb() when removing URBs from the delayed URB anchor to prevent them from leaking when the device is later disconnected.
--- drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c +2 -1
@@ -773,6 +773,7 @@ static void acm_port_shutdown(struct tty_port *port) urb =usb_get_from_anchor (&acm->delayed);if (!urb)break ; +usb_put_urb (urb); wb = urb->context; wb->use = false;usb_autopm_put_interface_async (acm->control);
@@ -1658,7 +1659,7 @@ static int acm_resume(struct usb_interface *intf) urb =usb_get_from_anchor (&acm->delayed);if (!urb)break ; - +usb_put_urb (urb);acm_start_wb (acm, urb->context); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 607/2214 USB: serial: option: add Rolling Wireless RN947R
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Reinhard Speyerer <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 931aad81f3f2d26276fff6b7bda6793267a65725 ]
Add Rolling Wireless RN947R 0x9300 compositions:
Standard mode: DIAG + ADB + NMEA + MODEM + RMNET + QDSS + ADPL
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=02 Cnt=02 Dev#= 6 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=33f8 ProdID=9300 Rev= 0.00 S: Manufacturer=Rolling Wireless S: Product=RN947R S: SerialNumber=xxxxxxxxxxx C:* #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=usbfs E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 8 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=50 Driver=qmi_wwan E: Ad=88(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 8 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=87(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#=21 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=70 Driver=(none)
E: Ad=89(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#=22 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=80 Driver=(none)
E: Ad=8a(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
QDL mode:
T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=02 Cnt=02 Dev#= 12 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=33f8 ProdID=9300 Rev= 0.00 S: Manufacturer=Rolling Wireless S: Product=RN947R S: SerialNumber=xxxxxxxxxxx C:* #Ifs= 1 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr= 2mA I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=10 Driver=option E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
--- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/option.c +4 -0
@@ -2511,6 +2511,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = { .driver_info = RSVD(5) }, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x33f8, 0x1003, 0xff), /* Rolling RW135R-GL (laptop MBIM) */ .driver_info = RSVD(5) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x33f8, 0x9300, 0xff, 0xff, 0x30) }, /* Rolling RN947R */ + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x33f8, 0x9300, 0xff, 0xff, 0x40) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x33f8, 0x9300, 0xff, 0xff, 0x10), + .driver_info = ZLP }, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x3466, 0x3301, 0xff) }, /* TDTECH MT5710-CN */ { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x3731, 0x0100, 0xff, 0xff, 0x30) }, /* NetPrisma LCUK54-WWD for Global */ { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x3731, 0x0100, 0xff, 0x00, 0x40) },
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 608/2214 USB: serial: option: add support for ASR 1286:4e3c modem
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Wyraz <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 87c56085bcdfec305f5c350fe1c58a62a7f65843 ]
The ASR modem used in the Tuoshi LT22M exposes an RNDIS function on interfaces 0 and 1, a diagnostic port on interface 2, and AT ports on interfaces 3 and 4. Match only the vendor-specific serial interfaces so option does not bind to the RNDIS function.
--- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/usb/serial/option.c +1 -0
@@ -2444,6 +2444,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = { { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x04b7, 0x8217, 0xff, 0xff, 0x30) }, /* Compal EXM-G1x */ { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x04b7, 0x8217, 0xff, 0xff, 0x40) }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x04b7, 0x8217, 0xff, 0xff, 0x60) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x1286, 0x4e3c, 0xff) }, /* ASR modem */ { USB_DEVICE(0x1508, 0x1001), /* Fibocom NL668 (IOT version) */ .driver_info = RSVD(4) | RSVD(5) | RSVD(6) }, { USB_DEVICE(0x1782, 0x4d10) }, /* Fibocom L610 (AT mode) */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 609/2214 USB: serial: usb_wwan: fix urb leak on disconnect
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c78dd373b5c56a5a02da591b583c6b48d0d62954 ]
Make sure to drop the reference taken by usb_anchor_urb() when removing URBs from the delayed URB anchor to prevent them from leaking when the device is later disconnected.
--- drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c +3 -0
@@ -401,6 +401,7 @@ void usb_wwan_close(struct usb_serial_port *port) urb =usb_get_from_anchor (&portdata->delayed);if (!urb)break ; +usb_put_urb (urb);unbusy_queued_urb (urb, portdata);usb_autopm_put_interface_async (serial->interface); }
@@ -578,6 +579,8 @@ static int usb_wwan_submit_delayed_urbs(struct usb_serial_port *port)if (!urb)break ; +usb_put_urb (urb); + err =usb_submit_urb (urb,GFP_ATOMIC );if (err) { dev_err(&port->dev, "%s: submit urb failed: %d\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 610/2214 slimbus: messaging: fix leaked PM vote on tid allocation failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zongmin Zhou <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c26cc979e28f5193310e4379e14aa6417375c565 ]
In slim_do_transfer(), when a transaction needs a tid and slim_alloc_txn_tid() fails, the function returns directly instead of jumping to slim_xfer_err. The runtime PM vote taken earlier with pm_runtime_get_sync() is then never released, leaving the controller permanently powered up.
As txn->tid is still 0 at that point, jumping to slim_xfer_err drops the vote exactly like it is done for other failed transactions.
--- drivers/slimbus/messaging.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/slimbus/messaging.c +1 -1
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ int slim_do_transfer(struct slim_controller *ctrl, struct slim_msg_txn *txn)if (need_tid) { ret =slim_alloc_txn_tid (ctrl, txn);if (ret) -return ret; + goto slim_xfer_err;if (!txn->msg->comp) txn->comp = &done;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 611/2214 USB: cdc-acm: add VeriFone VX820 device ID
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Drobyshev Vladimir <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ddbddee6592ecf6cf6c24d888780f9ad45a3e30b ]
Add USB ID 11ca:0219 for the VeriFone VX820 to the cdc-acm device table and apply the SINGLE_RX_URB quirk.
--- drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c +3 -0
@@ -1767,6 +1767,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id acm_ids[] = { { USB_DEVICE(0x11ca, 0x0201), /* VeriFone Mx870 Gadget Serial */ .driver_info =SINGLE_RX_URB , }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x11ca, 0x0219), /* VeriFone Vx820 Gadget Serial */ + .driver_info = SINGLE_RX_URB, + }, { USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0006), /* GE Healthcare Patient Monitor UI Controller */ .driver_info = DISABLE_ECHO, /* DISABLE ECHO in termios flag */ },
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 612/2214 usb: typec: ucsi_ccg: Add retry mechanism in ccg_read
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wayne Chang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bbf6b99a57b2479bf51c3c8ad0946f4b8c33ed69 ]
CCG4 firmware occasionally fails to respond to I2C read requests, especially when reading cci and intr_reg from the ISR path. In these cases, i2c_transfer() returns -EREMOTEIO.
The CCG4 is EOL, and Infineon no longer supports firmware updates, so a software workaround is necessary.
Attempt the read up to CCG_READ_MAX_RETRIES (4) times in total when -EREMOTEIO is returned, sleeping ~1 ms via fsleep() between attempts. This allows recovery from transient I2C failures without affecting other error paths.
The sleep is safe because ccg_read() is called both from process context and from ccg_irq_handler(), which runs in threaded IRQ context (registered via request_threaded_irq() with a NULL hard-IRQ handler), so sleeping is allowed in both cases.
--- drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi_ccg.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi_ccg.c +14 -1
@@ -129,6 +129,8 @@ struct version_format {#define NVIDIA_FTB_DP_OFFSET (2)#define NVIDIA_FTB_DBG_OFFSET (3) +#define CCG_READ_MAX_RETRIES 4 +struct version_info {struct version_format base;struct version_format app;
@@ -239,6 +241,7 @@ static int ccg_read(struct ucsi_ccg *uc, u16 rab, u8 *data, u32 len) };u32 rlen, rem_len = len, max_read_len = len;int status; +int retry_count;/* check any max_read_len limitation on i2c adapter */ if (quirks && quirks->max_read_len)
@@ -250,7 +253,17 @@ static int ccg_read(struct ucsi_ccg *uc, u16 rab, u8 *data, u32 len) rlen =min_t (u16, rem_len, max_read_len); msgs[1 ].len = rlen;put_unaligned_le16 (rab, buf); - status =i2c_transfer (client->adapter, msgs,ARRAY_SIZE (msgs)); + +for (retry_count =0 ; retry_count <CCG_READ_MAX_RETRIES ; retry_count++) { + status =i2c_transfer (client->adapter, msgs,ARRAY_SIZE (msgs)); + +/* Only retry on -EREMOTEIO, and not after the last attempt */ +if (status != -EREMOTEIO || retry_count ==CCG_READ_MAX_RETRIES -1 ) +break ; + +fsleep (1000 ); + } +if (status <0 ) {dev_err (uc->dev,"i2c_transfer failed %d\n" , status);pm_runtime_put_sync (uc->dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 613/2214 mailbox: qcom-ipcc: Guard against NULL con_priv in send_data()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anup Vishwakarma <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7b3cc361b5942ac600f38e5dff7aed009be34964 ]
qcom_ipcc_mbox_shutdown() clears chan->con_priv with no locking. qcom_ipcc_mbox_send_data() dereferences the same field without checking for NULL first, so a send racing a concurrent shutdown can crash:
mchan = chan->con_priv; ... hwirq = qcom_ipcc_get_hwirq(mchan->client_id, mchan->signal_id);
Add the same NULL guard mbox_send_message() already uses for chan->cl, and bail out before dereferencing a cleared con_priv.
To close the remaining race where send_data() reads con_priv a moment before a concurrent shutdown clears it, acquire the spinlock in qcom_ipcc_mbox_shutdown() using the modern guard(spinlock_irqsave) primitive before setting con_priv to NULL.
--- drivers/mailbox/qcom-ipcc.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/mailbox/qcom-ipcc.c +6 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@#include <linux/mailbox_controller.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/platform_device.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <dt-bindings/mailbox/qcom-ipcc.h>
@@ -149,6 +150,9 @@ static int qcom_ipcc_mbox_send_data(struct mbox_chan *chan, void *data)struct qcom_ipcc_chan_info *mchan = chan->con_priv;u32 hwirq; +if (!mchan) +return -EINVAL ; + hwirq =qcom_ipcc_get_hwirq (mchan->client_id, mchan->signal_id);writel (hwirq, ipcc->base +IPCC_REG_SEND_ID );
@@ -157,6 +161,8 @@ static int qcom_ipcc_mbox_send_data(struct mbox_chan *chan, void *data)static void qcom_ipcc_mbox_shutdown (struct mbox_chan *chan) { +guard (spinlock_irqsave)(&chan->lock); + chan->con_priv =NULL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 614/2214 USB: serial: sierra: fix urb leak on write completion
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e7daa54802c566ed3f22e81513f84c8c9197c5d1 ]
Make sure to drop the reference taken by usb_anchor_urb() also on successful submission of delayed write URBs during runtime resume to prevent them from leaking on completion.
--- drivers/usb/serial/sierra.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/serial/sierra.c +2 -1
@@ -974,12 +974,13 @@ static int sierra_submit_delayed_urbs(struct usb_serial_port *port) intfdata->in_flight--;usb_unanchor_urb (urb);kfree (urb->transfer_buffer); -usb_free_urb (urb);spin_lock (&portdata->lock); portdata->outstanding_urbs--;spin_unlock (&portdata->lock); } + +usb_put_urb (urb); }if (ec)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 615/2214 dm-snapshot: fix crash if dm_io_client_create fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 829c4d21148a205eca864429e06530319e1f92d5 ]
If dm_io_client_create() fails, it stores error into the ps->io_client variable. The code would try to free it later with dm_io_client_destroy(ps->io_client), causing an invalid pointer dereference. Fix this by setting ps->io_client = NULL.
--- drivers/md/dm-snap-persistent.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-snap-persistent.c +5 -2
@@ -322,8 +322,11 @@ static int read_header(struct pstore *ps, int *new_snapshot) } ps->io_client =dm_io_client_create (); -if (IS_ERR (ps->io_client)) -return PTR_ERR (ps->io_client); +if (IS_ERR (ps->io_client)) { + r =PTR_ERR (ps->io_client); + ps->io_client =NULL ; +return r; + } r =alloc_area (ps);if (r)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 616/2214 arm64/efi: Clear PTE_WRITE when applying EFI_MEMORY_RO
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 215d7b6622733603751f546b9faf9b84b0c281d4 ]
set_permissions() sets PTE_RDONLY for regions that the Memory Attributes Table describes as read-only, but leaves PTE_WRITE set. PTE_WRITE is the DBM bit, so when hardware dirty state management is enabled (TCR_EL1.HD), such a descriptor is writable-clean rather than read-only, and a write by the firmware will be permitted by the hardware (which marks the entry dirty) instead of faulting.
Clear PTE_WRITE as well, as pte_wrprotect() does.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c +7 -1
@@ -101,8 +101,14 @@ static int __init set_permissions(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, void *data)efi_memory_desc_t *md = data;pte_t pte =READ_ONCE (*ptep); +/* +* Clear PTE_WRITE as well: it doubles as the DBM bit, and leaving it +* set would permit the hardware to make the mapping writable again +* when TCR_EL1.HD is set. +*/ if (md->attribute &EFI_MEMORY_RO ) - pte =set_pte_bit (pte,__pgprot (PTE_RDONLY )); + pte =set_pte_bit (clear_pte_bit (pte,__pgprot (PTE_WRITE )), +__pgprot (PTE_RDONLY ));if (md->attribute &EFI_MEMORY_XP ) pte =set_pte_bit (pte,__pgprot (PTE_PXN ));set_pte (ptep, pte);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 617/2214 btrfs: zoned: fix block group reference leak in btrfs_repair_one_zone()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 886f1aa6e6b30a02901aa7f140149d466e10a873 ]
btrfs_repair_one_zone() hands the block group reference taken by btrfs_lookup_block_group() over to relocating_repair_kthread(), which drops it. However the return value of kthread_run() is not checked, so when the kernel thread fails to spawn, nothing executes the put and the block group reference is leaked.
Check kthread_run() and drop the reference if the thread failed to start.
--- fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/volumes.c +4 -2
@@ -8485,6 +8485,7 @@ static int relocating_repair_kthread(void *data)int btrfs_repair_one_zone (struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,u64 logical) {struct btrfs_block_group *cache; +struct task_struct *task;/* Do not attempt to repair in degraded state */ if (btrfs_test_opt (fs_info,DEGRADED ))
@@ -8503,8 +8504,9 @@ int btrfs_repair_one_zone(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 logical) cache->relocating_repair =1 ;spin_unlock (&cache->lock); -kthread_run (relocating_repair_kthread, cache, -"btrfs-relocating-repair" ); + task =kthread_run (relocating_repair_kthread, cache,"btrfs-relocating-repair" ); +if (IS_ERR (task)) +btrfs_put_block_group (cache);return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 618/2214 mtd: parsers: qcom: fix offset/size overflow on large partitions
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Weigang He <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2f7fa8d90694d21dce68ceabd8383252b111cfea ]
In parse_qcomsmem_part() the partition offset and size are computed as
parts[j].offset = le32_to_cpu(pentry->offset) * mtd->erasesize; parts[j].size = le32_to_cpu(pentry->length) * mtd->erasesize;
Both le32_to_cpu() and mtd->erasesize are 32-bit (u32). The multiply is therefore evaluated in 32-bit arithmetic and the product is truncated to 32 bits before being widened and stored into the 64-bit (u64) parts[j].offset / parts[j].size fields, so the 64-bit destinations are never used at their full width.
The SMEM partition table is firmware-provided and the per-entry offset and length are not bounds-checked against the device geometry (only numparts is capped). On a sufficiently large flash, a partition whose (offset|length) * erasesize is >= 2^32 gets a silently truncated offset/size and is mapped to the wrong region of the master MTD, which can overlap or extend into an unintended area.
Cast one operand to u64 so the multiplication is performed in 64-bit and the result fits the 64-bit fields without truncation.
Found by static analysis tool CodeQL.
--- drivers/mtd/parsers/qcomsmempart.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/parsers/qcomsmempart.c +2 -2
@@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ static int parse_qcomsmem_part(struct mtd_info *mtd, *c =tolower (*c); parts[j].name = name; - parts[j].offset =le32_to_cpu (pentry->offset) * mtd->erasesize; + parts[j].offset = (u64 )le32_to_cpu (pentry->offset) * mtd->erasesize; parts[j].mask_flags = pentry->attr; - parts[j].size =le32_to_cpu (pentry->length) * mtd->erasesize; + parts[j].size = (u64 )le32_to_cpu (pentry->length) * mtd->erasesize;pr_debug ("%d: %s offs=0x%08x size=0x%08x attr:0x%08x\n" , i, pentry->name,le32_to_cpu (pentry->offset),le32_to_cpu (pentry->length), pentry->attr);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 619/2214 xprtrdma: prevent disconnect feedback during endpoint teardown
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tim Menninger <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0b5bb4e586f7b0a449f4d90a524f76a3be5db355 ]
xprt_autoclose() clears XPRT_CLOSE_WAIT before invoking the transport's ->close() operation. For RPC/RDMA, ->close() calls rpcrdma_xprt_disconnect(), which disconnects the RDMA CM endpoint and drains its QP.
Since commit 31e62d25b5b8 ("xprtrdma: Simplify RPC wake-ups on connect"), RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED requests a SUNRPC transport disconnect. Today that path, along with failed completion handling, reaches xprt_force_disconnect() through rpcrdma_force_disconnect().
Commit c487eb7d8e41 ("xprtrdma: Clean up disconnect") later added re_force_disconnect to ensure that multiple failure indications request only one SUNRPC disconnect. However, the gate remains open when SUNRPC itself begins endpoint teardown.
If re_force_disconnect is still clear, either a CM disconnect event or a completion error can set XPRT_CLOSE_WAIT again while the current close is in progress. When the transport send lock is subsequently released, xprt_clear_locked() observes XPRT_CLOSE_WAIT and queues another autoclose.
Requesting a disconnect this way is necessary when a connection is lost unexpectedly, but not when the event was generated by rpcrdma_xprt_disconnect() itself. In that case SUNRPC is already committed to closing the transport.
Mark re_force_disconnect before initiating local endpoint teardown so that CM events and completion errors caused by that teardown cannot request another close. An unexpected error that wins the race before local endpoint teardown begins can still request a disconnect normally.
Use a fully ordered exchange so that the gate is globally closed before rdma_disconnect() can transition the QP to error and generate the callbacks that the gate suppresses.
In 30-second traces of a sustained recovery loop, without this change there were 7,693 xprt_force_disconnect() calls, 6,267 SUNRPC autocloses, and 172,892 receive-side IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR completions. With this change, the same tracepoints recorded 3,512 xprt_force_disconnect() calls, 3,212 autocloses, and 131,287 receive-side flush completions. Thus QP teardown continues to produce flushed completions, but closing the disconnect gate before teardown substantially reduces their feedback into the SUNRPC close path.
--- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c +6 -3
@@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ static void rpcrdma_xprt_drain(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt)rpcrdma_ep_put (ep); } -/* Ensure xprt_force_disconnect() is invoked exactly once when a -* connection is closed or lost. (The important thing is it needs -* to be invoked "at least" once). +/* Ensure xprt_force_disconnect() is invoked at most once for an +* unexpected endpoint failure. Local endpoint teardown closes this +* gate before it can generate CM events and flushed completions. */ void rpcrdma_force_disconnect (struct rpcrdma_ep *ep) {
@@ -583,6 +583,9 @@ void rpcrdma_xprt_disconnect(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt)if (!ep)return ; +/* Prevent teardown-generated events from requesting another close. */ +atomic_xchg (&ep->re_force_disconnect,1 ); + id = ep->re_id; rc =rdma_disconnect (id);trace_xprtrdma_disconnect (r_xprt, rc);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 620/2214 xprtrdma: trim head iovec when the payload arrives via a Write chunk
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yongjian Mu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9ee534a75912361308b1f956bc3e7895a082a422 ]
The upper layer sets rq_rcv_buf.head[0].iov_len from its estimate of the reply header size. For RPCSEC_GSS that estimate includes auth->au_ralign, which gss_create_new() initializes to GSS_VERF_SLACK >> 2 (25 XDR words, or 100 bytes) and which is corrected to the real verifier size only after the first reply on that rpc_auth has been unwrapped. In this case, the krb5 MIC verifier is 36 bytes, so every request encoded before the first reply completes has a head that is 64 bytes too long.
On TCP this is harmless: xdr_realign_pages() moves the excess head bytes, which are genuine reply data, into the page list. With RPC-over-RDMA and a Write chunk (sec=krb5, i.e. RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE, where DDP is allowed), the payload has already been placed directly into the page list, and the receive buffer holds only the inline part of the reply. rpcrdma_inline_fixup() clamps its local copy of the head length to the inline length but leaves head.iov_len untouched, so xdr_realign_pages() still sees iov_len > cur and shifts whatever lies past the inline reply in the receive buffer into the front of the directly-placed payload:
rpc_xdr_recvfrom: head=[...,196] page=524288 tail=[...,64]
rpc_xdr_alignment: nfsv4 READ offset=132 copied=64
The first 64 bytes returned by each such READ are incorrect (zeroed, or shifted right by 64 bytes depending on the kernel's xdr_shrink_bufhead() implementation). This is readily hit with pNFS flexfiles over RDMA and sec=krb5: the per-DS rpc_clnt gets a fresh rpc_auth whose first RPC is a large READ. Reads following the first completed reply return the expected data.
Commit cb0ae1fbb2f5 ("xprtrdma: Do not update {head, tail}.iov_len in rpcrdma_inline_fixup()") removed the head-length correction while fixing the handling of pure-inline krb5p replies.
When a Write chunk conveyed the payload, trim head.iov_len (in both rq_rcv_buf and rq_private_buf, which call_decode() expects to match) to the inline length actually received so that the XDR layer does not realign the page list. These READ replies have no trailing inline fields, and the payload is already in the page list, so the upper layer's head estimate can be safely reduced. Reduce buflen by the same amount to avoid treating unused head capacity as additional tail capacity. Pure inline replies and Reply chunk replies are unchanged.
Tested on Linux 6.8.0 and 7.3-rc4 with NFSv4.1 pNFS flexfiles over RPC/RDMA and sec=krb5.
--- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c +23 -4
@@ -1022,12 +1022,16 @@ void rpcrdma_reset_cwnd(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt)* @rqst: controlling RPC request * @srcp: points to RPC message payload in receive buffer * @copy_len: remaining length of receive buffer content -* @pad: Write chunk pad bytes needed (zero for pure inline) +* @writelist: bytes conveyed by the Write chunk (zero for pure inline) * * The upper layer has set the maximum number of bytes it can * receive in each component of rq_rcv_buf. These values are set in * the head.iov_len, page_len, tail.iov_len, and buflen fields. * +* For READ replies with a Write chunk, the payload is already in +* the page list. An overestimated head length and buflen can be +* reduced without moving reply data. +* * Unlike the TCP equivalent (xdr_partial_copy_from_skb), in * many cases this function simply updates iov_base pointers in * rq_rcv_buf to point directly to the received reply data, to
@@ -1036,13 +1040,16 @@ void rpcrdma_reset_cwnd(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt)* Returns the count of bytes which had to be memcopied. */ static unsigned long -rpcrdma_inline_fixup (struct rpc_rqst *rqst,char *srcp,int copy_len,int pad) +rpcrdma_inline_fixup (struct rpc_rqst *rqst,char *srcp,int copy_len, +u32 writelist) {unsigned long fixup_copy_count;int i, npages, curlen;char *destp;struct page **ppages;int page_base; +int pad = writelist &3 ; +unsigned int delta;/* The head iovec is redirected to the RPC reply message * in the receive buffer, to avoid a memcopy.
@@ -1054,8 +1061,20 @@ rpcrdma_inline_fixup(struct rpc_rqst *rqst, char *srcp, int copy_len, int pad)* head.iov_len bytes are copied into the page list. */ curlen = rqst->rq_rcv_buf.head[0 ].iov_len; -if (curlen > copy_len) +if (curlen > copy_len) { +/* These READ replies have no inline fields after the payload. +* Trim the head without moving the directly-placed data. +*/ +if (writelist) { + delta = curlen - copy_len; + + rqst->rq_rcv_buf.head[0 ].iov_len = copy_len; + rqst->rq_private_buf.head[0 ].iov_len = copy_len; + rqst->rq_rcv_buf.buflen -= delta; + rqst->rq_private_buf.buflen -= delta; + } curlen = copy_len; + } srcp += curlen; copy_len -= curlen;
@@ -1283,7 +1302,7 @@ rpcrdma_decode_msg(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt, struct rpcrdma_rep *rep, base = (char *)xdr_inline_decode (xdr,0 ); rpclen =xdr_stream_remaining (xdr); r_xprt->rx_stats.fixup_copy_count += -rpcrdma_inline_fixup (rqst, base, rpclen, writelist &3 ); +rpcrdma_inline_fixup (rqst, base, rpclen, writelist); r_xprt->rx_stats.total_rdma_reply += writelist;return rpclen +xdr_align_size (writelist);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 621/2214 mm/page_alloc: do not boost watermarks in kdump capture kernels
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yuanhe Shu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 331f94007d79b3c02d3098eea469a92aea3efc2c ]
A watermark boost is not confined to one watermark: wmark_pages() adds it to min, low and high alike, so every watermark check sees it, including should_reclaim_retry() and the last ditch ALLOC_WMARK_HIGH attempt in __alloc_pages_may_oom(). Once the boost exceeds the memory still free the allocator gives up and invokes the OOM killer, and a capture kernel that is still booting has nothing to kill: the boot panics and the vmcore is lost.
Seen on an arm64 machine with 64K pages, CONFIG_PAGE_BLOCK_MAX_ORDER=10 (pageblock = 64M) and crashkernel=512M, running a distribution kernel based on 7.0.14. A high order UNMOVABLE allocation fell back to a MOVABLE pageblock while the capture kernel was still in do_initcalls():
Node 0 DMA free:68096kB boost:65536kB min:68160kB low:68800kB high:69440kB managed:479168kB Out of memory and no killable processes...
Kernel panic - not syncing: System is deadlocked on memory
The zone was not short of memory. Subtracting the boost gives min:2624kB low:3264kB high:3904kB, so the 68096kB still free sat 17 times above the high watermark and the allocator would not even have entered its slow path. The boost supplied 65536kB of the 68160kB min and by itself put the zone 64kB under water. It is that large because boost_watermark() clamps it with max(pageblock_nr_pages, max_boost); watermark_boost_factor alone would have allowed 5824kB.
Commit 14f69140ff9c ("mm: limit boost_watermark on small zones") already tried to protect capture kernels, but it infers them from the zone size and skips the boost only below four pageblocks. arm64 64K pageblocks were 512M then, so the guard reached zones up to 2G; CONFIG_PAGE_BLOCK_MAX_ORDER can cap them at 64M, which shrinks the guard to zones under 256M and lets this 468M zone through.
kdump is a property of the kernel, not of the zone, so test for it directly. A capture kernel exits within seconds and never uses the fragmentation avoidance the boost buys. Normal kernels are unaffected:
the size based check still covers their genuinely tiny zones.
Passing sysctl.vm.watermark_boost_factor=0 to the capture kernel does not cover this window: sysctl.* parameters are written through procfs by do_sysctl_args(), which runs after do_initcalls() where the panic above happened, and watermark_boost_factor has no early_param of its own.
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +10 -2
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@#include <linux/debugobjects.h> #include <linux/kmemleak.h> #include <linux/compaction.h> +#include <linux/crash_dump.h> #include <trace/events/kmem.h> #include <trace/events/oom.h> #include <linux/prefetch.h>
@@ -2612,10 +2613,17 @@ static inline bool boost_watermark(struct zone *zone)if (!watermark_boost_factor)return false; + +/* +* A kdump capture kernel exits before a boost can pay off, while +* the raised watermark can exceed the memory left for the dump. +*/ +if (is_kdump_kernel ()) +return false; +/* * Don't bother in zones that are unlikely to produce results. -* On small machines, including kdump capture kernels running -* in a small area, boosting the watermark can cause an out of +* On small machines, boosting the watermark can cause an out of * memory situation immediately. */ if ((pageblock_nr_pages *4 ) >zone_managed_pages (zone))
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 622/2214 fbdev: ssd1307fb: check for fb_deferred_io_init() error
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 81ae1f9a6c850efab3e5dec6b7c9aa5c587f92b7 ]
fb_deferred_io_init() allocates deferred I/O state, populating info->fbdefio_state, or leaving it NULL if an error occurs.
Currently ssd1307fb_probe() ignores its return value.
Therefore if an error arises in fb_deferred_io_init() (for instance, due to an allocation failure) info->fbdefio_state is left NULL.
When the file is subsequently opened, fb_open() will dereference a NULL pointer (calling fb_deferred_io_open()).
Fix this by checking for the error.
--- drivers/video/fbdev/ssd1307fb.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/ssd1307fb.c +5 -1
@@ -753,7 +753,11 @@ static int ssd1307fb_probe(struct i2c_client *client) info->fix.smem_start =__pa (vmem); info->fix.smem_len = vmem_size; -fb_deferred_io_init (info); + ret =fb_deferred_io_init (info); +if (ret) { +dev_err (dev,"failed to init fb deferred io: %d\n" , ret); + goto fb_defio_error; + }i2c_set_clientdata (client, info);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 623/2214 fbdev: xen-fbfront: check for fb_deferred_io_init() error
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5b234b0dd29d79207c059c7b40851dd1e934fa3a ]
fb_deferred_io_init() allocates deferred I/O state, populating info->fbdefio_state, or leaving it NULL if an error occurs.
Currently xenfb_probe() ignores its return value.
Therefore if an error arises in fb_deferred_io_init() (for instance, due to an allocation failure) info->fbdefio_state is left NULL.
When the file is subsequently opened, fb_open() will dereference a NULL pointer (calling fb_deferred_io_open()).
Fix this by checking for the error.
--- drivers/video/fbdev/xen-fbfront.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/xen-fbfront.c +6 -1
@@ -464,7 +464,11 @@ static int xenfb_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev, } fb_info->fbdefio = &xenfb_defio; -fb_deferred_io_init (fb_info); + ret =fb_deferred_io_init (fb_info); +if (ret <0 ) { +xenbus_dev_fatal (dev, ret,"fb_deferred_io_init" ); + goto error_cmap; + }xenfb_init_shared_page (info, fb_info);
@@ -486,6 +490,7 @@ static int xenfb_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev, error_fb:fb_deferred_io_cleanup (fb_info); +error_cmap:fb_dealloc_cmap (&fb_info->cmap);framebuffer_release (fb_info); error_nomem:
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 624/2214 fbdev: udlfb: check for fb_deferred_io_init() error
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit eae055f33e41e1d3e1a7e905bdcb1e9f196ed31d ]
fb_deferred_io_init() allocates deferred I/O state, populating info->fbdefio_state, or leaving it NULL if an error occurs.
Currently dlfb_ops_open() ignores its return value.
Therefore if an error arises in fb_deferred_io_init() (for instance, due to an allocation failure) info->fbdefio_state is left NULL.
fb_open() will then dereference a NULL pointer (calling fb_deferred_io_open()) as soon as dlfb_ops_open() returns.
Additionally, if the allocation of info->fbdefio itself fails, dlfb_ops_open() sets info->fbdefio to NULL and invokes fb_deferred_io_init() regardless, hitting BUG_ON(!fbdefio).
Fix this by only invoking fb_deferred_io_init() if the allocation succeeded, and checking for the error.
The driver already supports operating without deferred I/O, so in either case fall back to that by setting info->fbdefio to NULL.
The ignored return value was introduced in commit 56c134f7f1b5 ("fbdev:
Track deferred-I/O pages in pageref struct").
However, the BUG_ON() issue originates from the earlier commit 5bea1fbf9423 ("staging: udlfb: fix incorrect fb_defio implementation for multiple framebuffers"), so target that for the fix.
--- drivers/video/fbdev/udlfb.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/udlfb.c +6 -3
@@ -1006,10 +1006,13 @@ static int dlfb_ops_open(struct fb_info *info, int user) fbdefio->delay =DL_DEFIO_WRITE_DELAY ; fbdefio->sort_pagereflist = true; fbdefio->deferred_io = dlfb_dpy_deferred_io; - } - info->fbdefio = fbdefio; -fb_deferred_io_init (info); + info->fbdefio = fbdefio; +if (fb_deferred_io_init (info)) { +kfree (fbdefio); + info->fbdefio =NULL ; + } + } } dev_dbg(info->dev, "open, user=%d fb_info=%p count=%d\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 625/2214 fbdev: smscufx: check for fb_deferred_io_init() error
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8ea6c6e77ccf887f3e68c64f4c261071a345da1e ]
fb_deferred_io_init() allocates deferred I/O state, populating info->fbdefio_state, or leaving it NULL if an error occurs.
Currently ufx_ops_open() ignores its return value.
Therefore if an error arises in fb_deferred_io_init() (for instance, due to an allocation failure) info->fbdefio_state is left NULL.
fb_open() will then dereference a NULL pointer (calling fb_deferred_io_open()) as soon as ufx_ops_open() returns.
Additionally, if the allocation of info->fbdefio itself fails, ufx_ops_open() sets info->fbdefio to NULL and invokes fb_deferred_io_init() regardless, hitting BUG_ON(!fbdefio).
Fix this by only invoking fb_deferred_io_init() if the allocation succeeded, and checking for the error.
The driver already supports operating without deferred I/O, so in either case fall back to that by setting info->fbdefio to NULL.
The ignored return value was introduced in commit 56c134f7f1b5 ("fbdev:
Track deferred-I/O pages in pageref struct").
However, the BUG_ON() issue originates from the earlier commit 3c8a63e22a08 ("Add support for SMSC UFX6000/7000 USB display adapters"), so target that for the fix.
--- drivers/video/fbdev/smscufx.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/smscufx.c +6 -3
@@ -1095,10 +1095,13 @@ static int ufx_ops_open(struct fb_info *info, int user)if (fbdefio) { fbdefio->delay =UFX_DEFIO_WRITE_DELAY ; fbdefio->deferred_io = ufx_dpy_deferred_io; - } - info->fbdefio = fbdefio; -fb_deferred_io_init (info); + info->fbdefio = fbdefio; +if (fb_deferred_io_init (info)) { +kfree (fbdefio); + info->fbdefio =NULL ; + } + } } pr_debug("open /dev/fb%d user=%d fb_info=%p count=%d",
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 626/2214 fbdev: sh_mobile_lcdc: check for fb_deferred_io_init() error
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5192201aaac2a923ff98306e3ccda58718ee395f ]
fb_deferred_io_init() allocates deferred I/O state, populating info->fbdefio_state, or leaving it NULL if an error occurs.
Currently sh_mobile_lcdc_start() ignores its return value.
Therefore if an error arises in fb_deferred_io_init() (for instance, due to an allocation failure) info->fbdefio_state is left NULL.
When the file is subsequently opened, fb_open() will dereference a NULL pointer (calling fb_deferred_io_open()).
Fix this by checking for the error.
Also clear info->fbdefio in that case, so that sh_mobile_lcdc_stop() does not attempt to clean up deferred I/O state that was never initialised.
--- drivers/video/fbdev/sh_mobile_lcdcfb.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/sh_mobile_lcdcfb.c +5 -1
@@ -1047,7 +1047,11 @@ static int sh_mobile_lcdc_start(struct sh_mobile_lcdc_priv *priv) ch->defio.deferred_io = sh_mobile_lcdc_deferred_io; ch->defio.delay =msecs_to_jiffies (tmp); ch->info->fbdefio = &ch->defio; -fb_deferred_io_init (ch->info); + ret =fb_deferred_io_init (ch->info); +if (ret) { + ch->info->fbdefio =NULL ; +return ret; + } }sh_mobile_lcdc_display_on (ch);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 627/2214 speakup: Fix NULL pointer dereference on VT switch + selection
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Samuel Thibault <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e1301ab8a8411fccc7effe0711fc09939a94953c ]
When selecting/pasting very quickly after VT switch, the tty is not set yet, leading to a NULL dereference. We can just abort the operation.
--- drivers/accessibility/speakup/selection.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/accessibility/speakup/selection.c +6 -0
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ static struct speakup_selection_work speakup_sel_work = {int speakup_set_selection (struct tty_struct *tty) { +if (!tty) +return -ENODEV ; +/* we get kref here first in order to avoid a subtle race when * cancelling selection work. getting kref first establishes the * invariant that if speakup_sel_work.tty is not NULL when
@@ -120,6 +123,9 @@ static struct speakup_selection_work speakup_paste_work = {int speakup_paste_selection (struct tty_struct *tty) { +if (!tty) +return -ENODEV ; +tty_kref_get (tty);if (cmpxchg (&speakup_paste_work.tty,NULL , tty)) {tty_kref_put (tty);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 628/2214 iomap: dont lose a fiemap iteration error when emitting the last extent
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrea Parri <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0d0104adc2c8316433b660cdf6d182a09881864f ]
iomap_fiemap() emits extents one behind: iomap_fiemap_iter() flushes the previous extent and remembers the current one, and the remembered extent is written with FIEMAP_EXTENT_LAST after the iteration loop.
That final flush overwrites ret, so when ->iomap_begin() fails partway through the iteration the error is replaced by the result of iomap_to_fiemap() (zero on success) and iomap_fiemap() returns success with a truncated extent list whose last entry is wrongly marked as the last extent in the file. The pre-iomap_iter code returned the error from inside the loop, before flushing the pending extent.
Check for the iteration error before flushing the pending extent, so that real errors are propagated and only a successful iteration emits the final FIEMAP_EXTENT_LAST extent. -ENOENT (no mapping) is still not an error, and the pending extent is still emitted in that case.
--- fs/iomap/fiemap.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/iomap/fiemap.c +4 -4
@@ -79,15 +79,15 @@ int iomap_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fi,while ((ret =iomap_iter (&iter, ops)) >0 ) iter.processed =iomap_fiemap_iter (&iter, fi, &prev); +/* inode with no (attribute) mapping will give ENOENT */ +if (ret <0 && ret != -ENOENT ) +return ret; +if (prev.type !=IOMAP_HOLE ) { ret =iomap_to_fiemap (fi, &prev,FIEMAP_EXTENT_LAST );if (ret <0 )return ret; } - -/* inode with no (attribute) mapping will give ENOENT */ -if (ret <0 && ret != -ENOENT ) -return ret;return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (iomap_fiemap);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 629/2214 nvme-rdma: dont complete a request after a bogus remote invalidation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yehyeong Lee <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 909307cea08aff4e486cdb7491de5c76a2c31341 ]
When a remote invalidation names an rkey that is not the one we handed out for this request, nvme_rdma_process_nvme_rsp() logs and schedules error recovery, then falls through to nvme_rdma_end_request(). The request is completed with req->mr never invalidated, and nvme_rdma_unmap_data() hands it back with ib_mr_pool_put(), which only puts it on a list. The rkey stays valid and still maps the pages the completed read filled, so a controller that sent the bogus invalidation can write into those pages after pread() has returned.
Return instead, the way the local invalidation path below already does, and leave the request for error recovery to cancel.
--- drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c +1 -0
@@ -1765,6 +1765,7 @@ static void nvme_rdma_process_nvme_rsp(struct nvme_rdma_queue *queue,"Bogus remote invalidation for rkey %#x\n" , req->mr ? req->mr->rkey : 0);nvme_rdma_error_recovery (queue->ctrl); +return ; } }else if (req->mr) {int ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 630/2214 nvmet: free the bvec on file namespace range errors
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jérémy Jean <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9d820d55b3cb4859c7cf42a74dc78f6154f97398 ]
nvmet_file_execute_rw() allocates the bvec before nvmet_file_execute_io() checks whether the request fits in the backing file. If the request extends beyond the file, nvmet_file_execute_io() calls nvmet_req_complete() to return an error. This skips nvmet_file_io_done(), so the allocated memory is never freed. Repeated requests can exhaust memory.
Use nvmet_file_io_done() to free the bvec before returning the range error to the client.
--- drivers/nvme/target/io-cmd-file.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/target/io-cmd-file.c +2 -2
@@ -140,8 +140,8 @@ static bool nvmet_file_execute_io(struct nvmet_req *req, int ki_flags) pos =le64_to_cpu (req->cmd->rw.slba) << req->ns->blksize_shift;if (unlikely (pos + req->transfer_len > req->ns->size)) { -nvmet_req_complete (req,errno_to_nvme_status (req, -ENOSPC )); -return true; + ret = -ENOSPC ; + goto complete; }memset (&req->f.iocb,0 ,sizeof (struct kiocb ));
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 631/2214 nvmet: zns: dont leak stale memory in zone management receive
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrea Parri <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 31b8a6af19b73e6167c4b655cd5e86681bac1c41 ]
A Zone Management Receive report returns the full buffer the host asked for, but nvmet_bdev_zone_zmgmt_recv_work() writes only the 8-byte Number of Zones field and one 64-byte descriptor for each matching zone that fits. The 56 reserved header bytes and every descriptor slot past the last match keep whatever the buffer held before. A 4096-byte report covering a single zone leaves 4024 bytes unwritten.
The tcp, rdma and fc transports allocate that buffer with sgl_alloc() and pci-epf with kmalloc(), none with __GFP_ZERO, and on success each sends the whole buffer to the host (nvmet_setup_c2h_data_pdu() for tcp), so the host receives old kernel memory from the target.
nvmet_bdev_execute_zone_mgmt_recv() also never checks the transport data length against NUMD, so on transports where the host sets that length, the buffer sent back can be much larger than the report NUMD describes. pci-epf derives its data length from NUMD, so the length check below does not apply there, but the zeroing still covers the report.
Reject a data length that does not match NUMD with nvmet_check_transfer_len(), as nvmet_bdev_execute_zone_append() does, and zero the report with nvmet_zero_sgl() before filling it. Zeroing NUMD bytes is only enough because of the length check, so the two go together.
Allocating with __GFP_ZERO in the transports would also close the leak, but it adds a memset to every read command to fix one handler, so the transports are left alone.
Tested over the loop, tcp, rdma and fc transports with a zoned null_blk namespace: before this patch, zone reports carried stale bytes and a data length larger than NUMD was accepted; with it, reports are fully initialized and such a length fails with Data SGL Length Invalid.
--- drivers/nvme/target/zns.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/nvme/target/zns.c +10 -0
@@ -291,6 +291,11 @@ static void nvmet_bdev_zone_zmgmt_recv_work(struct work_struct *w)if (status) goto out; +/* Only the zone count and matching descriptors are written below. */ + status =nvmet_zero_sgl (req,0 , out_bufsize); +if (status) + goto out; +if (!req_slba_nr_zones) { status =NVME_SC_SUCCESS ; goto out;
@@ -319,6 +324,11 @@ static void nvmet_bdev_zone_zmgmt_recv_work(struct work_struct *w)void nvmet_bdev_execute_zone_mgmt_recv (struct nvmet_req *req) { +u32 out_bufsize = (le32_to_cpu (req->cmd->zmr.numd) +1 ) <<2 ; + +if (!nvmet_check_transfer_len (req, out_bufsize)) +return ; +INIT_WORK (&req->z.zmgmt_work, nvmet_bdev_zone_zmgmt_recv_work);queue_work (zbd_wq, &req->z.zmgmt_work); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 632/2214 sh: intc: Sort the prio and sense lists after filling them
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Karl Mehltretter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 94a219eda3b5fb1d1753a5ecf28b171c8f308a27 ]
register_intc_controller() sorts d->prio and d->sense right after allocating them, with hw->nr_prio_regs and hw->nr_sense_regs as the element count. The lists hold hw->nr_vectors entries and are only filled later, by intc_register_irq().
On SH7785, sh7785-irq0123 and sh7785-irq4567 have four vectors but the SoC's eleven priority registers, so sort() swaps 88 bytes in a 32 byte kmalloc object at boot. slub_debug=FZPU reports "Right Redzone overwritten" in kmalloc-32, and v6.5 and v6.6 panic in __kmem_cache_alloc_node() while registering sh7785-irq0123.
Found with a custom QEMU model of the SH7785LCR. On it, v6.4 sh7785lcr_defconfig boots with SLAB, the defconfig default before v6.5, and hangs before the console is up when built with SLUB.
Sort the lists once all vectors are registered, with the number of entries that were added.
--- drivers/sh/intc/core.c | 11 +++++------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/sh/intc/core.c +5 -6
@@ -277,9 +277,6 @@ int __init register_intc_controller(struct intc_desc *desc) k +=save_reg (d, k, hw->prio_regs[i].set_reg, smp); k +=save_reg (d, k, hw->prio_regs[i].clr_reg, smp); } - -sort (d->prio, hw->nr_prio_regs,sizeof (*d->prio), - intc_handle_int_cmp,NULL ); }if (hw->sense_regs) {
@@ -290,9 +287,6 @@ int __init register_intc_controller(struct intc_desc *desc)for (i =0 ; i < hw->nr_sense_regs; i++) k +=save_reg (d, k, hw->sense_regs[i].reg,0 ); - -sort (d->sense, hw->nr_sense_regs,sizeof (*d->sense), - intc_handle_int_cmp,NULL ); }if (hw->subgroups)
@@ -360,6 +354,11 @@ int __init register_intc_controller(struct intc_desc *desc) } } +sort (d->prio, d->nr_prio,sizeof (*d->prio), + intc_handle_int_cmp,NULL ); +sort (d->sense, d->nr_sense,sizeof (*d->sense), + intc_handle_int_cmp,NULL ); +intc_subgroup_init (desc, d);/* enable bits matching force_enable after registering irqs */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 633/2214 f2fs: check every cur_*_segno[] entry on readonly images
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kaixuan Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9c4ee79190c8c23a9fb5c07d3bc87eaac514b2bb ]
sanity_check_ckpt() bounds-checks cur_node_segno[] and cur_data_segno[] against main_segs, but on an image with the RO feature the goto that skips the duplicate-segno cross-checks also leaves the enclosing loop, so only index 0 of each array is ever checked.
An unchecked index reaches __set_sit_entry_type() through build_curseg() -> reset_curseg(), which writes se->type through &sit_i->sentries[segno]. With segment_count_main 120 and cur_data_segno[1] set to 200, KASAN reports three out-of-bounds writes during mount and the mount then succeeds.
Use continue so every index is bounds-checked, and skip the node-vs-data cross-check explicitly, which is the other thing the old goto skipped.
--- fs/f2fs/super.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/super.c +6 -3
@@ -3529,7 +3529,7 @@ int f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)return 1 ;if (f2fs_sb_has_readonly (sbi)) - goto check_data; +continue ;for (j = i +1 ; j <NR_CURSEG_NODE_TYPE ; j++) { if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_segno[i]) ==
@@ -3541,14 +3541,14 @@ int f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) } } } -check_data: +for (i =0 ; i <NR_CURSEG_DATA_TYPE ; i++) {if (le32_to_cpu (ckpt->cur_data_segno[i]) >= main_segs ||le16_to_cpu (ckpt->cur_data_blkoff[i]) >= blocks_per_seg)return 1 ;if (f2fs_sb_has_readonly (sbi)) - goto skip_cross; +continue ;for (j = i +1 ; j <NR_CURSEG_DATA_TYPE ; j++) { if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_segno[i]) ==
@@ -3560,6 +3560,9 @@ int f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) } } } +if (f2fs_sb_has_readonly (sbi)) + goto skip_cross; +for (i =0 ; i <NR_CURSEG_NODE_TYPE ; i++) {for (j =0 ; j <NR_CURSEG_DATA_TYPE ; j++) { if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_segno[i]) ==
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 634/2214 lib/decompress_bunzip2: fix off-by-one in run-length bounds check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matt Turner <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 69919be2b93ef3922f646729ff42b4bd9a30846b ]
The run-length path rejects a block when dbufCount+t equals dbufSize, but the loop that follows writes exactly t bytes starting at dbufCount, so a block that fills the buffer exactly is legal. bzip2 allows it too: its decompressor bounds a block at 100000 * blockSize100k and checks that limit per byte appended. Use > instead of >=.
bzip2's encoder stops filling a block 19 bytes early, so nothing it produces ever reaches the limit and the bug stays hidden. Compressors that use the full block size do reach it: an lbzip2 -9 image whose block ends on a run fails to decode, and a self-extracting kernel built that way does not boot.
This code came from busybox, which fixed the same line in 2013 in commit 932e233a491b ("bunzip2: fix off-by-one check").
I ran into this because my system uses lbzip2 as /bin/bzip2 -- a common thing on Gentoo I believe. As far as I can tell, anyone using lbzip2 as their system bzip2 would run into this and it's only because it's very uncommon these days to compress a kernel with bzip2 that no one has noticed. I only noticed because I was adding support for various compression formats on alpha.
--- lib/decompress_bunzip2.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
lib/decompress_bunzip2.c +1 -1
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static int INIT get_next_block(struct bunzip_data *bd)array.) */ if (runPos) { runPos =0 ; -if (dbufCount+t >= dbufSize) +if (dbufCount+t > dbufSize)return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR ; uc = symToByte[mtfSymbol[0 ]];
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 635/2214 lib: decompress_bunzip2: fix integer overflow in run-length decoding
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aamir Ahmed <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b822ad8d702df0be9fe3f24f71caeb0522d72319 ]
The RUNA/RUNB decoder in get_next_block() accumulates a run length into the signed int t with no bound. runPos doubles per symbol, so t grows as at least 2^n-1 and reaches INT_MAX after 31 RUNA symbols. The guard that follows, dbufCount+t >= dbufSize, is itself a signed addition, and as the kernel builds with -fno-strict-overflow it wraps negative once dbufCount is nonzero, so the guard is skipped. while (t--) dbuf[dbufCount++] = uc then writes INT_MAX entries into a buffer holding at most 900000. One literal symbol ahead of the run is enough to make dbufCount nonzero.
Bound t to the block size as it is accumulated. t only grows within a run, so the value tested never exceeds the final run length; any stream that decodes today satisfies dbufCount+t < dbufSize at the flush, hence t < dbufSize throughout, and no such stream is rejected. Because t grows as at least 2^n-1 the bound trips by the 20th symbol, leaving runPos at most 2^19, so the following runPos <<= 1 cannot overflow either.
--- lib/decompress_bunzip2.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
lib/decompress_bunzip2.c +4 -0
@@ -428,6 +428,10 @@ static int INIT get_next_block(struct bunzip_data *bd) t += (runPos << nextSym);/* +runPos if RUNA; +2*runPos if RUNB */ +/* Bound the run so t and runPos cannot overflow. */ +if (t >= dbufSize) +return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR ; + runPos <<=1 ;continue ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 636/2214 ALSA: cs46xx: fix unit mismatch in DSP code area bounds check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Denis Arefev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fd65108f5001ffb416dc9bd37ec1893f55cff24a ]
ins->code.offset and code->size are measured in 32-bit words, while DSP_CODE_BYTE_SIZE is the size of the DSP code area in bytes. The check ins->code.offset + code->size > DSP_CODE_BYTE_SIZE in cs46xx_dsp_load_module() therefore allowed up to four times more code than the code area can hold.
The shadow buffer ins->code.data is allocated with kmalloc(DSP_CODE_BYTE_SIZE), i.e. it holds DSP_CODE_BYTE_SIZE/4 words. A firmware file with a code segment larger than DSP_CODE_BYTE_SIZE/4 words (28 KiB) passed the check and caused an out-of-bounds write in shadow_and_reallocate_code() and an out-of-bounds read in snd_cs46xx_download().
Compare the sum in words against DSP_CODE_BYTE_SIZE/4 and cast it to u64 so that the sum cannot wrap for large code->size values.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
--- sound/pci/cs46xx/dsp_spos.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/pci/cs46xx/dsp_spos.c +1 -1
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ int cs46xx_dsp_load_module (struct snd_cs46xx * chip, struct dsp_module_desc * mdev_dbg (chip->card->dev,"dsp_spos: module got no code segment\n" ); }else { -if (ins->code.offset + code->size >DSP_CODE_BYTE_SIZE ) { +if ((u64 )ins->code.offset + code->size >DSP_CODE_BYTE_SIZE /4 ) {dev_err (chip->card->dev,"dsp_spos: no space available in DSP\n" );return -ENOMEM ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 637/2214 serial: 8250_lpss: do not touch uninitialized line in ehl_serial_exit()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiri Slaby (SUSE) <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3e3ae95a3d84a6028f37a07ab7ad78bb14689f2e ]
lpss8250_probe() calls lpss->board->exit() on its error path. For the EHL board, that is ehl_serial_exit() and it does:
serial8250_get_port(lpss->data.line)->dma = NULL;
But when lpss8250_dma_setup() or serial8250_register_8250_port() fails, lpss->data.line was never assigned. As lpss is kzalloc()ed, line is 0 and ehl_serial_exit() clears the dma pointer of an unrelated port -- serial8250_ports[0], i.e. ttyS0, which is often the console.
Initialize lpss->data.line to -1 in probe and skip the clearing in ehl_serial_exit() if no port was registered.
--- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_lpss.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_lpss.c +4 -3
@@ -185,9 +185,8 @@ static int ehl_serial_setup(struct lpss8250 *lpss, struct uart_port *port)static void ehl_serial_exit (struct lpss8250 *lpss) { -struct uart_8250_port *up =serial8250_get_port (lpss->data.line); - - up->dma =NULL ; +if (lpss->data.line >=0 ) +serial8250_get_port (lpss->data.line)->dma =NULL ; }#ifdef CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_DMA
@@ -334,6 +333,8 @@ static int lpss8250_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)return ret; lpss->board = (struct lpss8250_board *)id->driver_data; +/* for tests in lpss->board->exit() */ + lpss->data.line =-1 ;memset (&uart,0 ,sizeof (struct uart_8250_port ));
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 638/2214 serial: pmac_zilog: push received data to the port that received it
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tim Douglas <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f3dc727da3af64abc12b625bbf1eb68d55d882cc ]
pmz_interrupt() drains both channels but, since commit 2e124b4a390c ("TTY: switch tty_flip_buffer_push"), pushes the flip buffer of the port whose handler is running rather than the port that was drained. With both ports open, data received on the other port can be left in its flip buffer until something else pushes it, so its reader may not see it.
--- drivers/tty/serial/pmac_zilog.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/pmac_zilog.c +2 -2
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ static irqreturn_t pmz_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) skip_a:spin_unlock (&uap_a->port.lock);if (push) -tty_flip_buffer_push (&uap->port.state->port); +tty_flip_buffer_push (&uap_a->port.state->port);if (!uap_b) goto out;
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ static irqreturn_t pmz_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) skip_b:spin_unlock (&uap_b->port.lock);if (push) -tty_flip_buffer_push (&uap->port.state->port); +tty_flip_buffer_push (&uap_b->port.state->port); out:return rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 639/2214 ARM: 9491/1: alignment: restore uaccess state on emulation fault
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Karl Mehltretter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 80dafbcb705cead6d25cb821cf29c47da8860c8c ]
The alignment handlers enable access to user memory while emulating unaligned instructions. If a checked access faults, its exception table fixup jumps to the handler's fault label and bypasses uaccess_restore(). This leaves DOMAIN_USER as DOMAIN_CLIENT with SW domain PAN, or leaves TTBR0 page table walks enabled with TTBR0 PAN, while the fault is handled.
An ARM926 QEMU test using LDMIA across an unmapped page boundary reports DOMAIN_USER=1 at TYPE_FAULT before this change and DOMAIN_USER=0 after it. SW domain PAN is the default on ARMv5, ARMv6, and non-LPAE ARMv7 builds.
Keep the saved uaccess state at function scope and track whether it was saved. Restore it at the fault label only when needed. Paths that did not enable user access continue to skip the restore.
--- arch/arm/mm/alignment.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
arch/arm/mm/alignment.c +37 -14
@@ -341,6 +341,8 @@ static int do_alignment_ldrhstrh(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs) {unsigned int rd =RD_BITS (instr); +unsigned int ua_flags; +bool ua_saved = false; ai_half +=1 ;
@@ -364,10 +366,11 @@ do_alignment_ldrhstrh(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs) user:if (LDST_L_BIT (instr)) {unsigned long val; -unsigned int __ua_flags =uaccess_save_and_enable (); + ua_flags =uaccess_save_and_enable (); + ua_saved = true;get16t_unaligned_check (val, addr); -uaccess_restore (__ua_flags); +uaccess_restore (ua_flags);/* signed half-word? */ if (instr &0x40 )
@@ -375,14 +378,17 @@ do_alignment_ldrhstrh(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs) regs->uregs[rd] = val; }else { -unsigned int __ua_flags =uaccess_save_and_enable (); + ua_flags =uaccess_save_and_enable (); + ua_saved = true;put16t_unaligned_check (regs->uregs[rd], addr); -uaccess_restore (__ua_flags); +uaccess_restore (ua_flags); }return TYPE_LDST ; fault: +if (ua_saved) +uaccess_restore (ua_flags);return TYPE_FAULT ; }
@@ -391,6 +397,8 @@ do_alignment_ldrdstrd(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs) {unsigned int rd =RD_BITS (instr);unsigned int rd2; +unsigned int ua_flags; +bool ua_saved = false;int load;if ((instr &0xfe000000 ) ==0xe8000000 ) {
@@ -425,26 +433,30 @@ do_alignment_ldrdstrd(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs) user:if (load) {unsigned long val, val2; -unsigned int __ua_flags =uaccess_save_and_enable (); + ua_flags =uaccess_save_and_enable (); + ua_saved = true;get32t_unaligned_check (val, addr);get32t_unaligned_check (val2, addr +4 ); -uaccess_restore (__ua_flags); +uaccess_restore (ua_flags); regs->uregs[rd] = val; regs->uregs[rd2] = val2; }else { -unsigned int __ua_flags =uaccess_save_and_enable (); + ua_flags =uaccess_save_and_enable (); + ua_saved = true;put32t_unaligned_check (regs->uregs[rd], addr);put32t_unaligned_check (regs->uregs[rd2], addr +4 ); -uaccess_restore (__ua_flags); +uaccess_restore (ua_flags); }return TYPE_LDST ; bad:return TYPE_ERROR ; fault: +if (ua_saved) +uaccess_restore (ua_flags);return TYPE_FAULT ; }
@@ -452,6 +464,8 @@ static int do_alignment_ldrstr(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs) {unsigned int rd =RD_BITS (instr); +unsigned int ua_flags; +bool ua_saved = false; ai_word +=1 ;
@@ -469,18 +483,22 @@ do_alignment_ldrstr(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs) trans:if (LDST_L_BIT (instr)) {unsigned int val; -unsigned int __ua_flags =uaccess_save_and_enable (); + ua_flags =uaccess_save_and_enable (); + ua_saved = true;get32t_unaligned_check (val, addr); -uaccess_restore (__ua_flags); +uaccess_restore (ua_flags); regs->uregs[rd] = val; }else { -unsigned int __ua_flags =uaccess_save_and_enable (); + ua_flags =uaccess_save_and_enable (); + ua_saved = true;put32t_unaligned_check (regs->uregs[rd], addr); -uaccess_restore (__ua_flags); +uaccess_restore (ua_flags); }return TYPE_LDST ; fault: +if (ua_saved) +uaccess_restore (ua_flags);return TYPE_FAULT ; }
@@ -502,6 +520,8 @@ do_alignment_ldmstm(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs) {unsigned int rd, rn, correction, nr_regs, regbits;unsigned long eaddr, newaddr; +unsigned int ua_flags; +bool ua_saved = false;if (LDM_S_BIT (instr)) goto bad;
@@ -547,7 +567,8 @@ do_alignment_ldmstm(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs)#endif if (user_mode (regs)) { -unsigned int __ua_flags =uaccess_save_and_enable (); + ua_flags =uaccess_save_and_enable (); + ua_saved = true;for (regbits =REGMASK_BITS (instr), rd =0 ; regbits; regbits >>=1 , rd +=1 )if (regbits &1 ) {
@@ -559,7 +580,7 @@ do_alignment_ldmstm(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs)put32t_unaligned_check (regs->uregs[rd], eaddr); eaddr +=4 ; } -uaccess_restore (__ua_flags); +uaccess_restore (ua_flags); }else {for (regbits =REGMASK_BITS (instr), rd =0 ; regbits; regbits >>=1 , rd +=1 )
@@ -581,6 +602,8 @@ do_alignment_ldmstm(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs)return TYPE_DONE ; fault: +if (ua_saved) +uaccess_restore (ua_flags); regs->ARM_pc -= correction;return TYPE_FAULT ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 640/2214 Bluetooth: 6lowpan: Pin module for 6lowpan_control debugfs file
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bui Viet Dung <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8368f0c2cde48c09ed70644059f24172b0c59f52 ]
An open debugfs file retains lowpan_control_fops in the debugfs proxy state. However, lowpan_control_fops has no .owner set to THIS_MODULE. As a result, full_proxy_open_regular() calls fops_get() which succeeds without taking a reference to the bluetooth_6lowpan module.
With CONFIG_BT_6LOWPAN=m, a userspace process can keep the debugfs file descriptor for 6lowpan_control open across module unload (delete_module / rmmod bluetooth_6lowpan). When the process subsequently closes the file descriptor, full_proxy_release() accesses the already freed and unmapped lowpan_control_fops table, causing a kernel page fault or oops.
The issue was discovered via manual code audit ofnet/bluetooth/6lowpan.c.
Set .owner = THIS_MODULE on lowpan_control_fops so that debugfs pins the module until all open file descriptors have finished.
--- net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c +1 -0
@@ -1205,6 +1205,7 @@ static int lowpan_control_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) }static const struct file_operations lowpan_control_fops = { + .owner =THIS_MODULE , .open = lowpan_control_open, .read = seq_read, .write = lowpan_control_write,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 641/2214 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Reject mode changes on connected channels
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Siwei Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c1398cf11b31a94c27ed810ba69515e0df5ce379 ]
A peer can send a configuration response with an RFC option for another mode to a connected channel, for example to switch it from Streaming to ERTM mode. l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() then changes chan->mode, but l2cap_ertm_init() is not called again, so the ERTM sequence lists are never allocated. The next out-of-sequence I-frame makes l2cap_seq_list_clear() write through the NULL srej_list.list.
Refuse the channel when a response tries to change the mode of a connected channel.
--- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +5 -1
@@ -3941,7 +3941,11 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *rsp, int len, } } -if (chan->mode ==L2CAP_MODE_BASIC && chan->mode != rfc.mode) +/* A connected channel cannot change its mode, as the new mode would +* not be initialized. +*/ +if (chan->mode != rfc.mode && + (chan->mode ==L2CAP_MODE_BASIC || chan->state ==BT_CONNECTED ))return -ECONNREFUSED ; chan->mode = rfc.mode;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 642/2214 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Reject invalid TxWindow in configuration requests
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Siwei Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c5ebb0245fe927cf5fa33510a9cb2799c4a2dd01 ]
A peer can send an ERTM RFC option with a TxWindow of zero, which is out of spec. It is stored in remote_tx_win unchanged and later passed to l2cap_seq_list_init(), where roundup_pow_of_two(0) is undefined. On some architectures this results in a ZERO_SIZE_PTR list and a remote kernel oops.
A TxWindow above 63 is out of spec as well. With 6-bit sequence numbers we would then send more unacknowledged frames than the sequence space can tell apart.
Reply with L2CAP_CONF_UNACCEPT and propose the default TxWindow instead of accepting the value, so remote_tx_win always stays within 1 to 63. Keep the parameters of an earlier request then, and do not treat the request as done because an earlier one was.
Also refuse a zero size in l2cap_seq_list_init(), so any other path that reaches it with a zero TxWindow fails the channel instead of the kernel.
--- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +27 -8
@@ -347,6 +347,10 @@ static int l2cap_seq_list_init(struct l2cap_seq_list *seq_list, u16 size) {size_t alloc_size, i; +/* roundup_pow_of_two(0) is undefined */ +if (!size) +return -EINVAL ; +/* Allocated size is a power of 2 to map sequence numbers * (which may be up to 14 bits) in to a smaller array that is * sized for the negotiated ERTM transmit windows.
@@ -3788,18 +3792,33 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *data, size_t databreak ;case L2CAP_MODE_ERTM : -if (!test_bit (CONF_EWS_RECV , &chan->conf_state)) - chan->remote_tx_win = rfc.txwin_size; -else - rfc.txwin_size =L2CAP_DEFAULT_TX_WINDOW ; - - chan->remote_max_tx = rfc.max_transmit; - size =min_t (u16,le16_to_cpu (rfc.max_pdu_size), chan->conn->mtu -L2CAP_EXT_HDR_SIZE -L2CAP_SDULEN_SIZE -L2CAP_FCS_SIZE ); rfc.max_pdu_size =cpu_to_le16 (size); - chan->remote_mps = size; + +/* The TxWindow must be within 1 to 63, otherwise +* propose the default one and keep the parameters of +* an earlier request. This overrides a PENDING result +* from the EFS check above, so the request is no +* longer pending, nor done if an earlier one was. +*/ +if (!rfc.txwin_size || + rfc.txwin_size >L2CAP_DEFAULT_TX_WINDOW ) { + result =L2CAP_CONF_UNACCEPT ; +clear_bit (CONF_LOC_CONF_PEND , &chan->conf_state); +clear_bit (CONF_OUTPUT_DONE , &chan->conf_state); + rfc.txwin_size =L2CAP_DEFAULT_TX_WINDOW ; + remote_efs =0 ; + }else { +if (!test_bit (CONF_EWS_RECV , &chan->conf_state)) + chan->remote_tx_win = rfc.txwin_size; +else + rfc.txwin_size =L2CAP_DEFAULT_TX_WINDOW ; + + chan->remote_max_tx = rfc.max_transmit; + chan->remote_mps = size; + }__l2cap_set_ertm_timeouts (chan, &rfc);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 643/2214 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Use default TxWindow for zero socket option
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Siwei Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 226fa3b676cbf2236f803bccd347462433ffc2c8 ]
L2CAP_OPTIONS accepts a txwin_size of zero and
stores it in tx_win. The zero is then sent to the
peer in our configuration request, and if the
channel ends up in ERTM mode it is passed tol2cap_seq_list_init().
Use the default TxWindow instead, as the mode can
still be changed to ERTM during configuration.
--- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +4 -0
@@ -803,6 +803,10 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt_old(struct socket *sock, int optname,break ; } +/* A zero TxWindow is invalid, use the default instead */ +if (!opts.txwin_size) + opts.txwin_size =L2CAP_DEFAULT_TX_WINDOW ; +if (!l2cap_valid_mtu (chan, opts.imtu)) { err = -EINVAL ;break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 644/2214 cpufreq: schedutil: Serialize sugov_start() against rate limit updates
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hui Su <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ce390caf5541c493c9061e7a2d98a463e66b736a ]
The current value of sg_policy->tunables->rate_limit_us is used in sugov_start() without locking to update sg_policy->freq_update_delay_ns, so if rate_limit_us_store() runs in parallel with it, the rate limit update may go unnoticed and the new freq_update_delay_ns value may be stale until the rate limit is updated again.
To avoid that, acquire the update_lock mutex of the rate limit sysfs attribute, that is held by rate_limit_us_store() during rate limit updates, around the freq_update_delay_ns in sugov_start().
--- kernel/sched/cpufreq_schedutil.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/sched/cpufreq_schedutil.c +13 -1
@@ -78,6 +78,18 @@ static void sugov_update_rate_limit_us(struct sugov_policy *sg_policy) (s64 )sg_policy->tunables->rate_limit_us *NSEC_PER_USEC ; } +static void sugov_update_rate_limit_us_sync (struct sugov_policy *sg_policy) +{ +/* +* Serialize with rate_limit_us_store() to prevent this path from using +* a stale rate limit tunable value to set the limit for the given +* policy. +*/ +guard (mutex)(&sg_policy->tunables->attr_set.update_lock); + +sugov_update_rate_limit_us (sg_policy); +} +static bool sugov_should_update_freq (struct sugov_policy *sg_policy,u64 time) {s64 delta_ns;
@@ -790,7 +802,7 @@ static int sugov_start(struct cpufreq_policy *policy)void (*uu)(struct update_util_data *data,u64 time,unsigned int flags);unsigned int cpu; -sugov_update_rate_limit_us (sg_policy); +sugov_update_rate_limit_us_sync (sg_policy); sg_policy->last_freq_update_time =0 ; sg_policy->next_freq =0 ; sg_policy->work_in_progress = false;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 645/2214 irqchip/gic-v3-its: Dont clamp nvecs to zero when id_bits is 32
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5a9d62555e7164ec79a5fe70153d79cf1fdfd614 ]
GITS_TYPER_IDBITS is five bits, so id_bits reaches 32 and min_t(unsigned int, ...) truncates BIT(32) to 0. nvecs becomes 0, its_lpi_alloc() rejects that, and its_msi_prepare() returns -ENOMEM. On 32-bit ARM the shift is undefined instead.
The clamp is correct for every value below the maximum, so only that one value is affected.
--- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c +1 -1
@@ -3411,7 +3411,7 @@ static struct its_device *its_create_device(struct its_node *its, u32 dev_id,* Also honor the ITS's own EID limit. */ id_bits =FIELD_GET (GITS_TYPER_IDBITS , its->typer) +1 ; - nvecs = min_t(unsigned int, nvecs, BIT(id_bits)); + nvecs =min_t (u64, nvecs,BIT_ULL (id_bits)); nr_ites =max (2 , nvecs); sz = nr_ites * (FIELD_GET (GITS_TYPER_ITT_ENTRY_SIZE , its->typer) +1 ); sz =max (sz,ITS_ITT_ALIGN ) +ITS_ITT_ALIGN -1 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 646/2214 spi: jcore: fix divide-by-zero when speed_hz is zero
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Weibin Liu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7db773075501248893c22b11bedc6745d6d0be45 ]
jcore_spi_baudrate() computes hw->clock_freq / 2 / speed without validating speed. The SPI core fills transfer.speed_hz from spi->max_speed_hz when it is zero, and jcore_spi_probe() never sets host->max_speed_hz, so the clamp in __spi_setup() is skipped. A spi_device created via the sysfs new_device interface (or a DT node without spi-max-frequency) therefore has max_speed_hz == 0, and any SPI_IOC_MESSAGE transfer reaches jcore_spi_baudrate() with speed == 0, causing a division by zero and a kernel panic.
Clamp speed to a minimum of 1 Hz before the division so the divisor is never zero. The computed divider then truncates to the register field width and the transfer simply runs at the slowest supported rate.
Verified by inspection of the __spi_setup() clamp and __spi_validate()'s speed_hz handling; the division-by-zero path requires the J-Core controller, which was not available.
--- drivers/spi/spi-jcore.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/spi/spi-jcore.c +2 -0
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ static void jcore_spi_baudrate(struct jcore_spi *hw, int speed) {if (speed == hw->speed_hz)return ; +if (speed <=0 ) + speed =1 ; hw->speed_hz = speed;if (speed >= hw->clock_freq /2 ) hw->speed_reg =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 647/2214 efi/libstub: Dont replace an existing LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE table
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit aaf3ed0f46298e18ec8bc477cf0a37478e41f2ea ]
The LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE table is the root of a linked list of memory reservations that need to persist across kexec, such as the GICv3 LPI pending and property tables, which cannot be moved once the redistributors have been enabled. Each kernel adds its own reservations to the list that it finds via the EFI configuration table, and honours the ones made by its predecessors.
The EFI stub installs a new, empty table unconditionally, replacing any existing one. This is fine on a cold boot, but not if the stub is being executed by a loader that passes on the configuration tables of an earlier kernel, e.g., a kexec loader that runs the incoming kernel's EFI stub, as the reservations made by earlier kernels would be lost.
So leave an existing table in place, and only install a new one if none exists yet.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c +8 -0
@@ -79,6 +79,14 @@ static void install_memreserve_table(void)efi_guid_t memreserve_table_guid =LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID ;efi_status_t status; +/* +* If an earlier boot stage installed a memreserve table already, e.g., +* a kexec loader passing on the persistent reservations made by the +* previous kernel, use it as is: installing a new one would replace it. +*/ +if (get_efi_config_table (memreserve_table_guid)) +return ; + status =efi_bs_call (allocate_pool,EFI_LOADER_DATA ,sizeof (*rsv), (void **)&rsv);if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 648/2214 KVM: arm64: Move OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE publication past context being saved
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1d4ce2901f1e25b06d447c0b02d105d6dd3550d8 ]
OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE indicates to the rest of KVM that the vcpu has exited. So far, this is set as soon as we return from the notional hypervisor (which with VHE is just a function call away).
However, code that uses OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE as a synchronisation point relies on the vcpu state to have been written back to the in-memory structures. Clearly, this is not what is happening.
Move the publication of OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE to the point where the state is actually written, and give this write release semantics to ensure the correct ordering.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +8 -2
@@ -847,12 +847,12 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)smp_store_mb (vcpu->mode,IN_GUEST_MODE );if (ret <=0 ||kvm_vcpu_exit_request (vcpu, &ret)) { - vcpu->mode =OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE ;isb ();/* Ensure work in x_flush_hwstate is committed */ kvm_pmu_sync_hwstate (vcpu);if (static_branch_unlikely (&userspace_irqchip_in_use))kvm_timer_sync_user (vcpu);kvm_vgic_sync_hwstate (vcpu); +smp_store_release (&vcpu->mode,OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE );local_irq_enable ();preempt_enable ();continue ;
@@ -868,7 +868,6 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) ret =kvm_arm_vcpu_enter_exit (vcpu); - vcpu->mode =OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE ; vcpu->stat.exits++;/* * Back from guest
@@ -900,6 +899,13 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxsync_fp (vcpu); +/* +* The state that was pushed into the CPU on entering +* the guest has been synchronised back, let's +* advertise we're outside of the guest. +*/ +smp_store_release (&vcpu->mode,OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE ); +/* * We must ensure that any pending interrupts are taken before * we exit guest timing so that timer ticks are accounted as
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 649/2214 spi: npcm-fiu: limit UMA data_size to the 16-byte staging buffer
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Weibin Liu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f0be928a41384ea93c876364f360779f70359249 ]
npcm_fiu_uma_read() and npcm_fiu_uma_write() use a 16-byte on-stack staging buffer (u32 data_reg[4]) and move data_size bytes to or from it. data_size comes straight from op->data.nbytes, which is supplied by the SPI MEM operation and is not bounded by the driver:npcm_fiu_exec_op() only validates op->addr.nbytes, and no adjust_op_size callback truncates the transfer to the controller FIFO size.
A SPI MEM operation with addr.nbytes == 0 and data.nbytes > 16 therefore overflows data_reg[] on the kernel stack (write path) or reads past it (read path), corrupting the stack.
Reject data_size larger than the staging buffer in both UMA helpers by returning -EOPNOTSUPP, so spi_mem falls back to the generic SPI message path. The chunked path in npcm_fiu_manualwrite() always passes at most CHUNK_SIZE bytes, so it is unaffected.
--- drivers/spi/spi-npcm-fiu.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/spi/spi-npcm-fiu.c +8 -0
@@ -323,6 +323,10 @@ static int npcm_fiu_uma_read(struct spi_mem *mem,u32 val;u32 i; +/* data_reg holds at most 16 bytes */ +if (data_size >sizeof (data_reg)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + regmap_update_bits(fiu->regmap, NPCM_FIU_UMA_CTS, NPCM_FIU_UMA_CTS_DEV_NUM, (mem->spi->chip_select <<
@@ -378,6 +382,10 @@ static int npcm_fiu_uma_write(struct spi_mem *mem,u32 val;u32 i; +/* data_reg holds at most 16 bytes */ +if (data_size >sizeof (data_reg)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + regmap_update_bits(fiu->regmap, NPCM_FIU_UMA_CTS, NPCM_FIU_UMA_CTS_DEV_NUM, (mem->spi->chip_select <<
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 650/2214 mfd: tps65217: Fix NULL pointer dereference on IRQ init failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Radiy Zhambakiev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0473a5b0663663b75573bf284beb77459e07c461 ]
tps65217_probe() ignores the return value of tps65217_irq_init(), so when the irq domain creation fails the probe still completes and the driver ends up bound with a NULL tps->irq_domain. Unloading the module then makes tps65217_remove() call irq_domain_remove() on the NULL pointer and oops the kernel. On top of that, irq_find_mapping() may fall back to the default irq domain and dispose of mappings that belong to other interrupt controllers.
Check the return value and abort the probe on failure so the error is reported and no inconsistent state is left for removal.
--- drivers/mfd/tps65217.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mfd/tps65217.c +3 -1
@@ -342,7 +342,9 @@ static int tps65217_probe(struct i2c_client *client) }if (client->irq) { -tps65217_irq_init (tps, client->irq); + ret =tps65217_irq_init (tps, client->irq); +if (ret) +return ret; }else {int i;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 651/2214 mfd: tps65217: Check return value when masking interrupt sources
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Radiy Zhambakiev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 66ed12c1e5a986bee1dc63f9bd9c7f068138a69a ]
tps65217_irq_init() ignores the error returned by tps65217_set_bits() when masking all interrupt sources. A failed register write leaves the driver's software mask out of sync with the hardware and may result in spurious interrupts.
Check the return value and propagate the error to the caller.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
--- drivers/mfd/tps65217.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mfd/tps65217.c +6 -2
@@ -164,8 +164,12 @@ static int tps65217_irq_init(struct tps65217 *tps, int irq)/* Mask all interrupt sources */ tps->irq_mask =TPS65217_INT_MASK ; -tps65217_set_bits (tps,TPS65217_REG_INT ,TPS65217_INT_MASK , -TPS65217_INT_MASK ,TPS65217_PROTECT_NONE ); + ret =tps65217_set_bits (tps,TPS65217_REG_INT ,TPS65217_INT_MASK , +TPS65217_INT_MASK ,TPS65217_PROTECT_NONE ); +if (ret) { +dev_err (tps->dev,"Failed to mask interrupt sources: %d\n" , ret); +return ret; + } tps->irq_domain =irq_domain_add_linear (tps->dev->of_node,TPS65217_NUM_IRQ , &tps65217_irq_domain_ops, tps);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 652/2214 dax: Return errors from dax_core_init()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jianyun Gao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4da700e2cadf84a6e858391d5be51d64dcba080f ]
dax_core_init() returns success when either the character device number allocation or DAX bus registration fails, even though the error paths have already released the initialized resources.
For modular DAX, this allows the module to remain loaded despite failed initialization, leaving subsequent users and module removal to access resources that have already been released.
Return the error code from the failed operation so that module loading fails rather than reporting successful initialization after the resources have been released.
--- drivers/dax/super.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/dax/super.c +1 -1
@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ static int __init dax_core_init(void)unregister_chrdev_region (dax_devt,MINORMASK +1 ); err_chrdev:dax_fs_exit (); -return 0 ; +return rc; } static void __exit dax_core_exit(void)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 653/2214 ipv6: defrag: orphan skb before queuing
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zixuan Chai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5dfa91a5ec53cfbf907a1fca095ac3ac7a4e94c9 ]
IPv4 and nf_conntrack fragment queues orphan skbs before returning -EINPROGRESS, but ip6_frag_queue() leaves the socket association intact.
Commit 18685451fc4e ("inet: inet_defrag: prevent sk release while still in use") moved skb_orphan() into ip_frag_queue() and nf_ct_frag6_queue(), but missed ip6_frag_queue().
Without orphaning, inet_frag_reasm_finish() clears fp->sk on frag_list skbs but leaves fp->destructor set to sock_pfree. Freeing the reassembled skb then calls sock_pfree() with a NULL socket. A socket using SOCK_RCU_FREE may also be released while its fragment is queued, leaving a stale socket pointer; this is a second consequence of the same missing orphan.
Orphan the skb before returning -EINPROGRESS so the queued fragment no longer retains the socket association or destructor.
--- net/ipv6/reassembly.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/ipv6/reassembly.c +1 -0
@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ static int ip6_frag_queue(struct frag_queue *fq, struct sk_buff *skb, }skb_dst_drop (skb); +skb_orphan (skb);return -EINPROGRESS ; insert_error:
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 654/2214 sctp: hold transport reference across connect wait
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Seung Min Shin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5bef8649bb9ac4b2a014bcc227202ebd2df824be ]
sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() selects a transport before waiting for a new interleaved association to become established. sctp_wait_for_connect() drops the socket lock while sleeping.
While the lock is dropped, backlog processing can handle a COOKIE ACK and an ASCONF DEL-IP that removes the selected transport. sctp_assoc_rm_peer() then marks the transport dead and drops its association-owned reference. The transport can be freed through RCU before the send path resumes.
After the wait, the stale pointer is assigned to newly created DATA or I-DATA chunks and later dereferenced by sctp_outq_select_transport().
Hold a reference to the selected transport across sctp_wait_for_connect(). After the socket lock is reacquired, abort the send if the transport was marked dead. Callers without a selected transport pass NULL and retain their existing behavior.
--- net/sctp/socket.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
net/sctp/socket.c +19 -7
@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc,struct sctp_transport *transport, long *timeo_p, size_t msg_len);static int sctp_wait_for_packet (struct sock *sk,int *err,long *timeo_p); -static int sctp_wait_for_connect (struct sctp_association *,long *timeo_p); +static int sctp_wait_for_connect (struct sctp_association *, +struct sctp_transport *,long *timeo_p);static int sctp_wait_for_accept (struct sock *sk,long timeo);static void sctp_wait_for_close (struct sock *sk,long timeo);static void sctp_destruct_sock (struct sock *sk);
@@ -1242,7 +1243,7 @@ static int __sctp_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *kaddrs, *assoc_id = asoc->assoc_id; timeo =sock_sndtimeo (sk, flags &O_NONBLOCK ); -return sctp_wait_for_connect (asoc, &timeo); +return sctp_wait_for_connect (asoc,NULL , &timeo); out_free: pr_debug("%s: took out_free path with asoc:%p kaddrs:%p err:%d\n",
@@ -1847,7 +1848,7 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,if (asoc->ep->intl_enable) { timeo =sock_sndtimeo (sk,0 ); - err =sctp_wait_for_connect (asoc, &timeo); + err =sctp_wait_for_connect (asoc, transport, &timeo);if (err || sk->sk_shutdown &RCV_SHUTDOWN ) { err = -ESRCH ; goto err;
@@ -1890,7 +1891,7 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,if (unlikely (wait_connect)) { timeo =sock_sndtimeo (sk, msg->msg_flags &MSG_DONTWAIT ); -sctp_wait_for_connect (asoc, &timeo); +sctp_wait_for_connect (asoc,NULL , &timeo); } err = msg_len;
@@ -9355,7 +9356,9 @@ static bool sctp_writeable(const struct sock *sk)/* Wait for an association to go into ESTABLISHED state. If timeout is 0, * returns immediately with EINPROGRESS. */ -static int sctp_wait_for_connect (struct sctp_association *asoc,long *timeo_p) +static int sctp_wait_for_connect (struct sctp_association *asoc, +struct sctp_transport *transport, +long *timeo_p) {struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;int err =0 ;
@@ -9364,12 +9367,16 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_connect(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p)pr_debug ("%s: asoc:%p, timeo:%ld\n" , __func__, asoc, *timeo_p); -/* Increment the association's refcnt. */ +/* Hold references while the socket lock is dropped. */ +if (transport) +sctp_transport_hold (transport);sctp_association_hold (asoc);for (;;) {prepare_to_wait_exclusive (&asoc->wait, &wait,TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE ); +if (transport && transport->dead) + goto do_transport_dead;if (!*timeo_p) goto do_nonblock;if (sk->sk_shutdown &RCV_SHUTDOWN )
@@ -9398,7 +9405,8 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_connect(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p) out:finish_wait (&asoc->wait, &wait); -/* Release the association's refcnt. */ +if (transport) +sctp_transport_put (transport);sctp_association_put (asoc);return err;
@@ -9417,6 +9425,10 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_connect(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p) do_nonblock: err = -EINPROGRESS ; goto out; + +do_transport_dead: + err = -EAGAIN ; + goto out; }static int sctp_wait_for_accept (struct sock *sk,long timeo)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 655/2214 RDS/IB: validate receive fragment completions
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shubham Antil <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 65cf6863606b0507a7c3bd1711317e4f5d6b8b7e ]
rds_ib_process_recv() accounts every receive fragment as contributing min(i_recv_data_rem, RDS_FRAG_SIZE) bytes, regardless of the completion length. When a completion is shorter than the header-declared amount, receive accounting can advance beyond the payload supplied by the completion.
Only an IB_WC_RECV completion has the buffer layout expected by this receive path. Other successful completion opcodes must not be interpreted as ordinary receive completions.
Reject successful completions with any other opcode before processing their length. For ordinary receive completions, require enough payload to cover the amount accounted to the fragment before linking its page into the incoming message.
This is compatible with the current transmit paths. MSG_ZEROCOPY is restricted to RDS/TCP, while RDS/IB copied and page-vector messages use full-sized non-final scatterlist entries.
Found during an LLM-assisted source audit and validated under KMSAN with a malformed short receive completion.
--- net/rds/ib_recv.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rds/ib_recv.c +12 -1
@@ -948,6 +948,12 @@ static void rds_ib_process_recv(struct rds_connection *conn, } } +if (data_len <min_t (u32, ic->i_recv_data_rem,RDS_FRAG_SIZE )) { +rds_ib_conn_error (conn, +"fragment shorter than header-declared length; forcing reconnect\n" ); + goto done; + } +list_add_tail (&recv->r_frag->f_item, &ibinc->ii_frags); recv->r_frag =NULL ;
@@ -1003,7 +1009,12 @@ void rds_ib_recv_cqe_handler(struct rds_ib_connection *ic,* event is processed. */ if (wc->status ==IB_WC_SUCCESS ) { -rds_ib_process_recv (conn, recv, wc->byte_len, state); +if (wc->opcode !=IB_WC_RECV ) +rds_ib_conn_error (conn, +"recv completion had unexpected opcode %u, disconnecting and reconnecting\n" , + wc->opcode); +else +rds_ib_process_recv (conn, recv, wc->byte_len, state); }else {/* We expect errors as the qp is drained during shutdown */ if (rds_conn_up (conn) ||rds_conn_connecting (conn))
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 656/2214 ALSA: seq: oss: Skip events until fully initialized
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 68d4a6ea6cc6091a05836f783bc17d525d266d0b ]
When an OSS sequencer device is opened, it creates a sequencer port, then further initializes the internal states like a timer instance, etc. Since the sequencer port is published, an event can be already delivered, and this may hit unexpected event handling, which can eventually cause a NULL dereference (like the timer start/stop event triggered before the timer initialization).
For avoiding such a race, introduce a simple guard and skips the event processing until the port is fully initialized.
At releasing the device, in turn, clear this guard, so that any input events will be discarded during the teardown.
--- sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_device.h | 1 + sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_event.c | 3 +++ sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_init.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_device.h +1 -0
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ struct seq_oss_devinfo {int cseq;/* sequencer client number */ int port;/* sequencer port number */ int queue;/* sequencer queue number */ +bool initialized;struct snd_seq_addr addr;/* address of this device */
sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_event.c +3 -0
@@ -425,6 +425,9 @@ snd_seq_oss_event_input(struct snd_seq_event *ev, int direct, void *private_datastruct seq_oss_devinfo *dp = (struct seq_oss_devinfo *)private_data;union evrec *rec; +if (!dp || !smp_load_acquire (&dp->initialized)) +return 0 ;/* ignored */ +if (ev->type !=SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_ECHO )return snd_seq_oss_midi_input (ev, direct, private_data);
sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_init.c +2 -0
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ snd_seq_oss_open(struct file *file, int level) client_table[dp->index] = dp; num_clients++; +smp_store_release (&dp->initialized, true);return 0 ;
@@ -409,6 +410,7 @@ snd_seq_oss_release(struct seq_oss_devinfo *dp) client_table[dp->index] =NULL ; num_clients--; +smp_store_release (&dp->initialized, false);snd_seq_oss_reset (dp);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 657/2214 alpha: run check_mmu_context() from finish_arch_post_lock_switch()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Magnus Lindholm <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 020d2e70b7538b66eee3c3480d2b8921fb182f0c ]
check_mmu_context() clears asn_lock and acts on need_new_asn, but it runs only as the tail of switch_to(), after alpha_switch_to() returns.
A newly forked user task never gets there: its first context switch resumes at ret_from_fork and reaches schedule_tail() without returning to the code following alpha_switch_to().
asn_lock is left set on that CPU, so the new user task can run with interrupts enabled while shootdown IPIs keep taking the deferred path. The handshake meant to complete those invalidations never runs.
New kernel threads also reach schedule_tail(), but context_switch() does not call switch_mm() for a task without an mm. They therefore do not set asn_lock in the first place and are not affected by this bug.
Move check_mmu_context() to finish_arch_post_lock_switch(), which is called by finish_task_switch() for both existing and newly created tasks. Drop the now redundant call from switch_to().
The hook runs after finish_lock_switch() releases the rq lock and enables interrupts. An IPI arriving before asn_lock is cleared retires the slot through flush_tlb_other(); an IPI arriving afterwards can flush directly, since PAL_swpctx has already installed the incoming context.
Set need_new_asn whether ev5_switch_mm() reuses or allocates an ASN. An IPI in that interval can zero either slot. Without this, the allocated case can return to user space with a live ASN but a zero context slot, which a later context-based shootdown shortcut could mistake for an inactive CPU. check_mmu_context() reloads only when the slot is zero.
Call the hook unconditionally. Alpha selects ARCH_NO_PREEMPT, and neither kthread_use_mm() nor sched_force_init_mm() sleeps between the direct switch and this hook. RCU_STRICT_GRACE_PERIOD can enable PREEMPT_COUNT, but cannot make those callers migrate there. Testing preemptible() would only leave asn_lock set in that configuration.
This requires the preceding direct-switch fix, "alpha: load the MMU context when switch_mm() switches the current task". It installs the borrowed context before kthread_use_mm() reaches this hook, so clearing asn_lock cannot expose a targeted invalidate against the wrong context.
--- arch/alpha/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 15 +++++++++++++-- arch/alpha/include/asm/switch_to.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/alpha/include/asm/mmu_context.h +13 -2
@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ ev5_switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev_mm, struct mm_struct *next_mm, next_mm->context[cpu] = mmc; }#ifdef CONFIG_SMP - else - cpu_data[cpu].need_new_asn = 1; +/* A deferred shootdown can also invalidate a newly allocated ASN. */ + cpu_data[cpu].need_new_asn =1 ;#endif /* Always update the PCB ASN. Another thread may have allocated
@@ -201,6 +201,17 @@ do { \#define check_mmu_context () do { } while(0)#endif +/* +* Also called from kthread_use_mm() with preemption enabled. Alpha has +* no kernel preemption, so the task is still on the CPU that ran +* switch_mm(). +*/ +#define finish_arch_post_lock_switch finish_arch_post_lock_switch +static inline void finish_arch_post_lock_switch (void ) +{ +check_mmu_context (); +} + __EXTERN_INLINE voidev5_activate_mm (struct mm_struct *prev_mm,struct mm_struct *next_mm) {
arch/alpha/include/asm/switch_to.h +0 -1
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ extern struct task_struct *alpha_switch_to(unsigned long, struct task_struct *);#define switch_to (P ,N ,L ) \ do { \ (L) = alpha_switch_to(virt_to_phys(&task_thread_info(N)->pcb), (P)); \ - check_mmu_context(); \ } while (0)#endif /* __ALPHA_SWITCH_TO_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 658/2214 alpha: only use a targeted tbi() when the target mm is really current
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Magnus Lindholm <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0d92845ac5dbc79e4ac4810b33c673f4c1c227e3 ]
ipi_flush_tlb_page() gates a targeted tbi() on current->active_mm. tbi() acts on the address space context currently loaded on the CPU, so it is only guaranteed to reach an mm's translations when a thread of that mm is running there. current->active_mm is not sufficient: under lazy TLB an idle or kernel task keeps an mm as its active_mm while a different ASN is loaded, so the invalidate is issued against the wrong context and the stale entry can survive. Nothing retires the old ASN afterwards either, mm->context[cpu] still being valid, so the resuming thread can reuse it.
Test current->mm instead and otherwise fall back to flush_tlb_other(), which clears mm->context[cpu] and forces a fresh ASN at the next switch whatever is loaded now.
For an mm borrowed through kthread_use_mm(), patch 1 of this series installs the context before the task can take a shootdown IPI. The current->mm test therefore covers that case as well.
--- arch/alpha/kernel/smp.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/alpha/kernel/smp.c +2 -1
@@ -679,7 +679,8 @@ ipi_flush_tlb_page(void *x)struct flush_tlb_page_struct *data = (struct flush_tlb_page_struct *)x;struct mm_struct * mm = data->mm; -if (mm == current->active_mm && !asn_locked ()) +/* A targeted tbi() needs a thread of MM to be current. */ +if (mm == current->mm && !asn_locked ())flush_tlb_current_page (mm, data->vma, data->addr);else flush_tlb_other (mm);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 659/2214 alpha: invalidate the local context in flush_tlb_page()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Magnus Lindholm <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c0db730bf05eb3c10c1fae64b19f6913dce129fc ]
When the target mm is not the calling CPU's active_mm, flush_tlb_page() does nothing locally, and smp_call_function() reaches only the other CPUs. This CPU may still hold translations for the mm and can later reuse the old ASN together with them.
Add the missing else branch. flush_tlb_other() clears mm->context[cpu] so a fresh ASN is taken at the next switch. Add this before changing the current->active_mm test to current->mm: that change will also send lazy callers here, so their local invalidate must already be in place.
The uniprocessor implementations of flush_tlb_mm() and flush_icache_user_page() in asm/tlbflush.h and asm/cacheflush.h already contain exactly this branch.
--- arch/alpha/kernel/smp.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/alpha/kernel/smp.c +3 -0
@@ -707,6 +707,9 @@ flush_tlb_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)preempt_enable ();return ; } + }else { +/* smp_call_function() does not call back into this CPU. */ +flush_tlb_other (mm); } data.vma = vma;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 660/2214 alpha: fix the local TLB invalidate in flush_tlb_page()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Magnus Lindholm <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 32f4dd420d626f96128fcfeea2ab24760b4f21a6 ]
flush_tlb_page() invalidates the calling CPU itself before asking the others, and gates that on current->active_mm. For a non-executable vma that means a targeted tbi(2, addr), which acts on the context currently loaded and is only guaranteed to invalidate the intended translations when the target mm's context is the loaded one. A lazy active_mm does not establish that, so as in ipi_flush_tlb_page() the target mm's stale translations can survive, and nothing forces the old ASN to be retired afterwards.
Test current->mm instead. A lazy caller then takes the flush_tlb_other() branch added by the previous patch, retiring its local context. Adding that branch first preserves the local invalidate at every step, including on EV7 where a targeted tbi() against a foreign ASN appeared to work.
Which callers reach here with a foreign mm depends on the configuration. folio_mkclean(), from the writeback flusher kworker that has no mm of its own, accounted for about half the calls during writeback of a shared mapping and none at all on anonymous memory. Those counts were measured with CONFIG_COMPACTION=n: with COMPACTION=y, asm/pgtable.h overrides ptep_clear_flush() to call migrate_flush_tlb_page(), which rendezvouses with every CPU and handles the context itself, so folio_mkclean() does not reach this function.
--- arch/alpha/kernel/smp.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/alpha/kernel/smp.c +2 -1
@@ -694,7 +694,8 @@ flush_tlb_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)preempt_disable (); -if (mm == current->active_mm) { +/* As in ipi_flush_tlb_page(): a targeted tbi() needs MM current. */ +if (mm == current->mm) {flush_tlb_current_page (mm, vma, addr);if (atomic_read (&mm->mm_users) <=1 ) {int cpu, this_cpu =smp_processor_id ();
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 661/2214 alpha: fix the local TLB invalidate in the UP flush_tlb_page()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Magnus Lindholm <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c825bf802a7a43fd302c879ef25c975e067a2e94 ]
The uniprocessor flush_tlb_page() in asm/tlbflush.h has the same wrong test as the SMP one: a targeted tbi() is only guaranteed to invalidate the intended translations when the target mm's context is loaded, but the gate is current->active_mm, which a lazily borrowed mm also satisfies.
Test current->mm instead. The else branch it falls to already exists here, so unlike the SMP side this is the whole fix. arch/alpha/kernel/smp.c is not built with CONFIG_SMP=n, so this is how the same defect reaches a uniprocessor, where the flusher kworker necessarily shares the only CPU with the writer.
--- arch/alpha/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/alpha/include/asm/tlbflush.h +2 -1
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ flush_tlb_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr) {struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm; -if (mm == current->active_mm) +/* A targeted tbi() needs a thread of MM to be current. */ +if (mm == current->mm)flush_tlb_current_page (mm, vma, addr);else flush_tlb_other (mm);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 662/2214 alpha: invalidate the local context in flush_tlb_mm()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Magnus Lindholm <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 721bb7a129771f0ff9cef1dd5abfc106ef65feba ]
flush_tlb_mm() has the same caller-CPU omission that was fixed in flush_tlb_page(): when the target mm is not the calling CPU's active_mm nothing happens locally, and smp_call_function() handles only the other CPUs, so this CPU may later reuse the old ASN together with the translations it still holds.
The active_mm test itself is left alone here. That path calls flush_tlb_current(), which loads a fresh context through __load_new_mm_context() rather than issuing a targeted tbi() against whatever ASN happens to be loaded, so it does not depend on which context is current.
The uniprocessor implementation in asm/tlbflush.h already has the missing branch. Counted over a fork-heavy run, flush_tlb_mm() was entered with the mm not this CPU's active_mm 2934 times, and 632 times while otherwise idle.
The proposed Alpha hugetlb support routes hugetlb invalidations through flush_tlb_range(), which calls this function. Unmapping or migrating a hugetlb folio from another context will also need this local invalidate.
--- arch/alpha/kernel/smp.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/alpha/kernel/smp.c +3 -0
@@ -659,6 +659,9 @@ flush_tlb_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)preempt_enable ();return ; } + }else { +/* smp_call_function() does not call back into this CPU. */ +flush_tlb_other (mm); }smp_call_function (ipi_flush_tlb_mm, mm,1 );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 663/2214 alpha: invalidate the local context in flush_icache_user_page()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Magnus Lindholm <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4244c555ac440a445cc168f860b2677099d761f9 ]
flush_icache_user_page() has the same caller-CPU omission that the previous patch fixed in flush_tlb_mm(): when the target mm is not the calling CPU's active_mm nothing happens locally, and smp_call_function() handles only the other CPUs, so this CPU may later reuse the old ASN together with the translations it still holds.
This matters here in particular because the function exists for operating on another process's mappings: the comment above it describes setting breakpoints through ptrace, and access_remote_vm() reaches it through copy_to_user_page(). The calling CPU is therefore often running something other than the target mm.
As in flush_tlb_mm(), the uniprocessor implementation in asm/cacheflush.h already has the missing case.
No imb() is needed, here or in ipi_flush_icache_page(). Alpha's user-space I-cache flush works by allocating a new ASN rather than by invalidating the I-cache: the entries stay, but they are tagged with the old ASN and can no longer match. An imb() is only required when the ASN space wraps and numbers are reused, and __get_new_mm_context() already does one in that case.
--- arch/alpha/kernel/smp.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/alpha/kernel/smp.c +3 -0
@@ -768,6 +768,9 @@ flush_icache_user_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *page,preempt_enable ();return ; } + }else { +/* smp_call_function() does not call back into this CPU. */ +flush_tlb_other (mm); }smp_call_function (ipi_flush_icache_page, mm,1 );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 664/2214 ALSA: hda/via: Apply runtime PM workaround for ASUS X55A
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasiliy Kovalev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f6e8d5ebde5ceb7d3c0eef6e9e4d82862b503ade ]
ASUS X55A requires the same workaround like other machines with VT1802, otherwise it loses the codec power on a few nodes and the sound stays silent.
--- sound/pci/hda/patch_via.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_via.c +1 -0
@@ -1046,6 +1046,7 @@ static const struct hda_fixup via_fixups[] = {static const struct snd_pci_quirk vt2002p_fixups[] = {SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x1043 ,0x13f7 ,"Asus B23E" ,VIA_FIXUP_POWER_SAVE ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x1043 ,0x1487 ,"Asus G75" ,VIA_FIXUP_ASUS_G75 ), +SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x1043 ,0x1c33 ,"Asus X55A" ,VIA_FIXUP_POWER_SAVE ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x1043 ,0x8532 ,"Asus X202E" ,VIA_FIXUP_INTMIC_BOOST ),SND_PCI_QUIRK_VENDOR (0x1558 ,"Clevo" ,VIA_FIXUP_POWER_SAVE ), {}
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 665/2214 hwmon: (corsair-cpro) Make wait_input_report_lock IRQ safe
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sanan Hasanov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e4fdc82f55cf0e3d5df5c88278da5baa76a109d1 ]
ccp_raw_event() is the HID ->raw_event() callback and takes wait_input_report_lock with a plain spin_lock(). This callback can run in very different contexts depending on the transport: from process context (e.g. uhid, via a write() to /dev/uhid) with softirqs and interrupts enabled, and from URB completion, which is softirq context for HCDs using HCD_BH and hard interrupt context for HCDs that do not (e.g. OHCI, UHCI).
Taking the lock from process context with softirqs enabled while the same lock is also taken from softirq context can deadlock if the softirq interrupts the lock holder on the same CPU. Lockdep reports:
WARNING: inconsistent lock state inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage.
...
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:347 [inline] ccp_raw_event+0x51/0x110 drivers/hwmon/corsair-cpro.c:161 __hid_input_report+0x41c/0x580 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2175 hid_irq_in+0x492/0x710 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:287 __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x378/0x540 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657 dummy_timer+0xa91/0x4cc0 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:2023
For the same reason, the spin_lock_bh() in send_usb_cmd() is not sufficient when ccp_raw_event() is called from hard interrupt context.
Use spin_lock_irqsave() in ccp_raw_event(), since it may be called with interrupts already disabled, and spin_lock_irq() in send_usb_cmd(), which always runs in process context.
--- drivers/hwmon/corsair-cpro.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/hwmon/corsair-cpro.c +5 -4
@@ -128,9 +128,9 @@ static int send_usb_cmd(struct ccp_device *ccp, u8 command, u8 byte1, u8 byte2,* the raw event parsing and marked the ccp->wait_input_report * completion as done. */ -spin_lock_bh (&ccp->wait_input_report_lock); +spin_lock_irq (&ccp->wait_input_report_lock);reinit_completion (&ccp->wait_input_report); -spin_unlock_bh (&ccp->wait_input_report_lock); +spin_unlock_irq (&ccp->wait_input_report_lock); ret =hid_hw_output_report (ccp->hdev, ccp->cmd_buffer,OUT_BUFFER_SIZE );if (ret <0 )
@@ -149,15 +149,16 @@ static int send_usb_cmd(struct ccp_device *ccp, u8 command, u8 byte1, u8 byte2,static int ccp_raw_event (struct hid_device *hdev,struct hid_report *report,u8 *data,int size) {struct ccp_device *ccp =hid_get_drvdata (hdev); +unsigned long flags;/* only copy buffer when requested */ -spin_lock (&ccp->wait_input_report_lock); +spin_lock_irqsave (&ccp->wait_input_report_lock, flags);if (!completion_done (&ccp->wait_input_report)) {memcpy (ccp->buffer, data,min (IN_BUFFER_SIZE , size)); ccp->buffer_recv_size = size;complete_all (&ccp->wait_input_report); } -spin_unlock (&ccp->wait_input_report_lock); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&ccp->wait_input_report_lock, flags);return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 666/2214 f2fs: flush SIT journal during filesystem resize
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wenjie Qi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a6ede405455106bf42164ec96fd84008c5aabdd9 ]
During a filesystem resize, SBI_IS_RESIZEFS prevents new SIT entries from being added to the journal and forces existing entries to the SIT area. However, f2fs_flush_sit_entries() returns early when there are no new dirty sentries, leaving existing journal entries behind.
After the main area shrinks, a later checkpoint can access a journal entry whose segment number is outside the new geometry and trigger f2fs_bug_on().
Only take the zero-dirty fast path when entries may be written back to the journal. This lets resize drain existing entries through remove_sits_in_journal() even when there are no new dirty sentries.
--- fs/f2fs/segment.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/segment.c +1 -1
@@ -4232,7 +4232,7 @@ void f2fs_flush_sit_entries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct cp_control *cpc)down_write (&sit_i->sentry_lock); -if (!sit_i->dirty_sentries) +if (!sit_i->dirty_sentries && to_journal) goto out;/*
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 667/2214 f2fs: fix submit accounting for IPU writeback
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Seongjae Jeong <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6d1f622b9c069378cdb83088be2b15a9b480b8a3 ]
f2fs_write_cache_pages() uses the submitted count, which is set to fio.submitted in f2fs_write_single_data_page(), to update nwritten and decrement wbc->nr_to_write.
In the OPU path, f2fs_submit_page_write() sets fio->submitted to 1. However, in the IPU path, fio->submitted is never set and remains zero. As a result, successful IPU writes are not accounted for. This can cause asynchronous writeback to continue beyond its budget.
Set fio->submitted in f2fs_inplace_write_data() after a page is successfully merged into a bio or submitted, so that successful IPU writes are included in the writeback accounting.
--- fs/f2fs/segment.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/f2fs/segment.c +1 -0
@@ -3631,6 +3631,7 @@ int f2fs_inplace_write_data(struct f2fs_io_info *fio)else err =f2fs_submit_page_bio (fio);if (!err) { + fio->submitted =1 ;f2fs_update_device_state (fio->sbi, fio->ino, fio->new_blkaddr,1 );f2fs_update_iostat (fio->sbi, fio->io_type,F2FS_BLKSIZE );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 668/2214 rtc: cmos: Disable ACPI RTC event before handling it
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gregory Price <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3f67038df8b5cba07254d1cff60d73e988b49ab7 ]
Users of RTC_UIE_ON can stop receiving update interrupts when rtc-cmos handles alarms through ACPI. In one 50-run test, 40 runs passed and 10 timed out after receiving between one and four of five expected events.
The ACPI ff_rt_clk counter stopped at 218, exactly matching the number of events delivered to userspace, and reported:
218 STS disabled unmasked
rtc_handler() runs in the threaded ACPI SCI handler and calls cmos_interrupt(), which schedules rtc->irqwork. The work can run before rtc_handler() returns:
ACPI SCI thread rtc->irqwork
cmos_interrupt()
schedule_work()
__rtc_set_alarm()
rtc_wake_on()
acpi_clear_event()
acpi_disable_event()The SCI thread then disables the event that the worker enabled for the next alarm. That alarm sets its status while delivery remains disabled, so no update interrupt reaches userspace.
Clear and disable the current ACPI RTC event before cmos_interrupt() schedules the work. The worker can then enable the next event without the handler undoing it. With this ordering, 150 runs delivered all 750 events without a stall.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-cmos.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-cmos.c +3 -3
@@ -758,7 +758,9 @@ static u32 rtc_handler(void *context)unsigned char rtc_intr;unsigned long flags; - +/* Quiesce this event before rtc->irqwork can arm the next one. */ +acpi_clear_event (ACPI_EVENT_RTC ); +acpi_disable_event (ACPI_EVENT_RTC ,0 );/* * Always update rtc irq when ACPI is used as RTC Alarm. * Or else, ACPI SCI is enabled during suspend/resume only,
@@ -781,8 +783,6 @@ static u32 rtc_handler(void *context) }pm_wakeup_hard_event (dev); -acpi_clear_event (ACPI_EVENT_RTC ); -acpi_disable_event (ACPI_EVENT_RTC ,0 );return ACPI_INTERRUPT_HANDLED ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 669/2214 hwmon: (sht3x) Return the consumed count for heater writes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Baek Kyu, Kim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 817ac527100c8e20684211eb919ffd6d875adc7a ]
heater_enable_store() returns the result of i2c_master_send(), which is the two-byte command length on success rather than the sysfs input count. This can report more bytes than were supplied, or a partial write for a fully processed input. For example, writing "on\n" returns two instead of three, so a caller retrying the remaining newline gets -EINVAL even though the heater command succeeded. Retrying the remainder of "off\n" can also send the heater-off command twice.
Return count after a complete command transfer. Preserve negative I2C errors and return -EIO for nonnegative incomplete transfers, so a zero-message transfer is not reported as a successful zero-byte write. Keep the existing boolean parsing, command selection and locking.
--- drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c +4 -1
@@ -541,7 +541,10 @@ static ssize_t heater_enable_store(struct device *dev,mutex_unlock (&data->i2c_lock); -return ret; +if (ret !=SHT3X_CMD_LENGTH ) +return ret <0 ? ret : -EIO ; + +return count; } static ssize_t update_interval_show(struct device *dev,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 670/2214 cgroup: fix cgroup.kill for exited thread group leader
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kir Kolyshkin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit da13e0e72a7329c95642c44b2d03d194ab071e04 ]
cgroup.kill does not work in case a process' thread group leader is gone but other threads are still running. This is because __cgroup_kill() only walks the thread group leaders and sends SIGKILL to each of them with send_sig(), which uses PIDTYPE_PID:
1. The exited leader is still listed by CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS as long as the process has live threads, but a signal directed at a single exiting task never takes effect: complete_signal() does not look for another thread to deliver it to, and __send_signal_locked() now drops it altogether. The process keeps running.
2. The live threads of such a process can be migrated to another cgroup by writing any of their IDs to cgroup.procs, while the exited leader stays behind. The destination cgroup has no thread group leader to iterate, so writing to its cgroup.kill does nothing at all.
In both cases the cgroup stays populated after cgroup.kill, and a process inside a container can use this to survive the container being killed. This also works with a private PID namespace when the init of the container is the process, as the PID namespace is not torn down while init has live threads.
Case 1 can be fixed by using do_send_sig_info(..., PIDTYPE_TGID) instead of send_sig(), so that the signal is taken by a live thread even if the task found by the iterator is exiting. Note it was pointed out by Eric in [1] while reviewing v2 of cgroup.kill patchset, and v3 was meant to switch to it, but the change was only made in cgroup_post_fork(), leaving __cgroup_kill() with send_sig().
Case 2 can only be fixed by iterating over all threads, so this is what the fix also does. Once a thread group is being killed, its other threads are skipped since they already have a fatal signal pending.
I ran some performance checks and the added cost is ~60 ns per every thread on my laptop (and less than a millisecond for 10K threads), which seems low. The time to "populated 0" seems unchanged.
The issue was found in crun by Anthropic's OSS Scanner, and crun is getting a workaround for it [2] (which does what we needed to do before cgroup.kill was added).
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[2] https://github.com/containers/crun/pull/2351
--- kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +2 -2
@@ -3845,7 +3845,7 @@ static void __cgroup_kill(struct cgroup *cgrp) cgrp->kill_seq++;spin_unlock_irq (&css_set_lock); -css_task_iter_start (&cgrp->self,CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS |CSS_TASK_ITER_THREADED , &it); +css_task_iter_start (&cgrp->self,CSS_TASK_ITER_THREADED , &it);while ((task =css_task_iter_next (&it))) {/* Ignore kernel threads here. */ if (task->flags &PF_KTHREAD )
@@ -3855,7 +3855,7 @@ static void __cgroup_kill(struct cgroup *cgrp)if (__fatal_signal_pending (task))continue ; -send_sig (SIGKILL , task,0 ); +do_send_sig_info (SIGKILL ,SEND_SIG_NOINFO , task,PIDTYPE_TGID ); }css_task_iter_end (&it); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 671/2214 netdevsim: reject cls_bpf programs bound to another device
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5820ca58b409402505b9e904d1ded4908e0b6b81 ]
The issue:nsim_bpf_setup_tc_block_cb() installs any device-bound SCHED_CLS program without checking that its offload device matches the target netdev. The core cls_bpf attach path rejects a mismatching program, but a netdev that joins a shared block later is replayed the stored filter by cls_bpf_reoffload() before it is inserted into block->ports, so the attach-time check cannot see it. The driver callback is the authoritative per-device acceptance boundary and must enforce the match itself, as nfp already does in nfp_net_bpf_offload().
Without the check, replaying a device-bound program onto a different bpf_offload_dev installs it into that device's netdevsim state, which trips the WARN in nsim_bpf_uninit() (ns->bpf_offloaded set on a foreign device) and can dereference a NULL prog->aux->offload in nsim_prog_set_loaded().
The Fix:
Reject a device-bound program whose offload device does not match the target netdev, with -EINVAL and an extack so the rejected replay is not silent. The check is intentionally narrower than nfp's: it fires only for a dev-bound program, so nsim's bpf_tc_non_bound_accept mode (which admits an unbound program onto the device) is unaffected. Teardown is never blocked: the guard is on the program being installed and an unbind passes cls_bpf.prog = NULL.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
- CONFIG_NETDEVSIM=y, CONFIG_NET_CLS_BPF=y
- load and pin a dev-bound SCHED_CLS program for netdevsim device B
- install the program on a shared block owned by B
- add an independently backed netdevsim device C to that block; the bind replays the filter to C's callback, and C's ports/0/bpf_offloaded_id takes the B-bound program id.
The reported Sashiko review is at
https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/[email protected]
--- drivers/net/netdevsim/bpf.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
drivers/net/netdevsim/bpf.c +11 -0
@@ -150,6 +150,17 @@ int nsim_bpf_setup_tc_block_cb(enum tc_setup_type type,return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +/* A dev-bound program can be replayed here when a netdev joins +* a shared block, after the core attach-time check has run; +* enforce the device match as nfp does. +*/ +if (prog &&bpf_prog_is_dev_bound (prog->aux) && + !bpf_offload_dev_match (prog, ns->netdev)) { +NSIM_EA (cls_bpf->common.extack, +"program bound to a different device" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } +if (cls_bpf->command !=TC_CLSBPF_OFFLOAD )return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 672/2214 ALSA: compress: add missing OPEN-state gate to SET_METADATA
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Peter Ujfalusi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 931f5714b7921290cd1a4742e185aeeae7270ee6 ]
snd_compr_set_metadata() calls stream->ops->set_metadata() straight after copy_from_user(), without ever checking runtime->state, even though the function's own comment says a parameter change should only be allowed once the stream has left the OPEN state. Every other metadata/param entry point in this file (SET_PARAMS, WRITE, ...) enforces that gate.
A codec driver's set_metadata callback can assume SET_PARAMS has already run and initialised its private state; calling it while the stream is still OPEN can operate on that uninitialised state.
Add the OPEN-state check the existing comment already documents.
--- sound/core/compress_offload.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
sound/core/compress_offload.c +3 -0
@@ -674,6 +674,9 @@ snd_compr_set_metadata(struct snd_compr_stream *stream, unsigned long arg)* we should allow parameter change only when stream has been * opened not in other cases */ +if (stream->runtime->state ==SNDRV_PCM_STATE_OPEN ) +return -EBADFD ; +if (copy_from_user (&metadata, (void __user *)arg,sizeof (metadata)))return -EFAULT ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 673/2214 blk-mq: clear stale inactive flag on hctx reuse
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nirmoy Das <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit afc1de47a7ab607ae6403c4bfda36b0bf3cd342f ]
When the last CPU mapped to an hctx goes offline, blk_mq_hctx_notify_offline() sets BLK_MQ_S_INACTIVE. Updating the number of hardware queues exits every hctx and parks it on q->unused_hctx_list. A later update can reuse a parked hctx through blk_mq_alloc_and_init_hctx(), at any queue index, and nothing clears the flag.
If the reused hctx is mapped to an online CPU, blk_mq_get_tag() keeps returning BLK_MQ_NO_TAG for it. __blk_mq_alloc_requests() sleeps and retries, expecting CPU hotplug to move the task to another CPU, so a task that stays on that CPU never gets a tag. Onlining the original CPU doesn't recover it either, because blk_mq_hctx_notify_online() only clears the flag on the hctx that CPU now maps to.
Clear BLK_MQ_S_INACTIVE in blk_mq_init_hctx() so a reused hctx starts like a freshly allocated one. A reused hctx has no cpuhp instances at that point, so the offline callback can't set the flag again before blk_mq_add_hw_queues_cpuhp() registers it. Clearing the flag in blk_mq_exit_hctx() is not enough, because a parked hctx keeps its cpuhp instances until blk_mq_remove_hw_queues_cpuhp(). Preserve the other hctx state flags.
Reproduced with null_blk on v7.3 in a four-vCPU arm64 QEMU/KVM guest:
modprobe null_blk nr_devices=0
mkdir /sys/kernel/config/nullb/nullb0
cd /sys/kernel/config/nullb/nullb0
echo 4 > submit_queues; echo 1 > memory_backed; echo 16 > size echo 1 > power
echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu3/online
echo 2 > submit_queues
echo 4 > submit_queues
Offlining CPU3 marks hctx3 inactive. After the two updates it comes back as hctx1 and is mapped to CPU0:
# cat /sys/block/nullb0/mq/1/cpu_list 0 # cat /sys/kernel/debug/block/nullb0/hctx1/state INACTIVE
A 4K O_DIRECT read pinned to CPU0 hangs in D state, while the same read on CPU1 and CPU2 completes. Onlining CPU3 again leaves hctx1 inactive and the CPU0 read still hangs. With this change hctx1 state is empty and the reads on CPU0, CPU1 and CPU2 complete, before and after onlining CPU3.
--- block/blk-mq.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
block/blk-mq.c +1 -0
@@ -2771,6 +2771,7 @@ static int blk_mq_init_hctx(struct request_queue *q, struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, unsigned hctx_idx) { hctx->queue_num = hctx_idx; +clear_bit (BLK_MQ_S_INACTIVE , &hctx->state);if (!(hctx->flags &BLK_MQ_F_STACKING )) cpuhp_state_add_instance_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_BLK_MQ_ONLINE,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 674/2214 drm/amdgpu: require _PR3 for BOCO
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luigi Lauro <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 28f3d169f162ca7e803c5a1f7e1bb55bdc915d1c ]
amdgpu_device_supports_boco() returns true for an AMD_IS_PX device on a system with a hybrid ATPX method even when the device has no ACPI power resource (_PR3). On an APU mini PC with a discrete GPU attached over OCuLink, the iGPU's ATPX method reports hybrid graphics, the dGPU is flagged AMD_IS_PX, and runtime PM in auto mode picks BOCO:
amdgpu: ATPX Hybrid Graphics
amdgpu 0000:c6:00.0: Using BOCO for runtime pm
In BOCO mode the driver leaves powering the device off to the PCI core, which can only do it through _PR3 on the upstream bridge. No device on this dGPU's path has _PR3, so when it runtime suspends the card stays powered, with its fans at about 700 rpm.
Require has_pr3 for BOCO, as the function's description ("dGPU with ACPI power resources") says. The same card then picks BACO, which powers it down:
amdgpu 0000:c6:00.0: Using BACO for runtime pm
This only changes systems with a hybrid ATPX method and no _PR3 on the dGPU's upstream bridge, where BOCO cannot cut the power today. Tested on one such system only, an RX 9070 XT (Navi 48) over OCuLink with a Ryzen AI 9 HX 470, with the change backported to 7.2.9: the stock module logs "Using BOCO", the patched one "Using BACO"; BACO runtime suspend powers the card off and it resumes cleanly. Not tested on a hybrid laptop or a Thunderbolt eGPU.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c +2 -4
@@ -255,10 +255,8 @@ bool amdgpu_device_supports_boco(struct drm_device *dev) {struct amdgpu_device *adev =drm_to_adev (dev); -if (adev->has_pr3 || - ((adev->flags &AMD_IS_PX ) &&amdgpu_is_atpx_hybrid ())) -return true; -return false; +/* BOCO needs a platform power resource (_PR3) to cut the power */ +return adev->has_pr3; }/**
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 675/2214 drm/amdgpu: reset CIK ASIC on Apple boards with VRAM at 0
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej Kucharek <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 095f634ea0aa5b9da19495520b5fc1a155b2c137 ]
On MacBookPros with switchable graphics, the firmware puts VRAM at MC address 0 when the iGPU is enabled. A later post (S3 resume, GPU reset) moves VRAM back to the VBIOS default. The SI fix resets and posts the ASIC at load, so the driver uses the VBIOS layout from the start:
"drm/amdgpu: reset SI ASIC on MacBookPros with VRAM at 0"
No MacBookPro has a CIK GPU, and no affected CIK board is known. Add the same test to cik_need_reset_on_init(), so that SI, CIK and VI handle this firmware layout in the same way. gmc_v7_0 reads MC_VM_FB_LOCATION once at init and does not reprogram it. A CIK board with VRAM at 0 therefore has the same problem as the SI boards.
After the reset, FB_BASE is not 0, so the new test does not fire again on a module reload.
Only compile-tested.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/cik.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/cik.c +10 -0
@@ -1947,6 +1947,16 @@ static bool cik_need_reset_on_init(struct amdgpu_device *adev) {u32 clock_cntl, pc; +/* +* MacBookPros with switchable graphics put VRAM at 0 when the iGPU +* is enabled. Any later post (S3 resume, GPU reset) moves it back to +* the vbios default, so reset and post on load to start with the +* vbios layout. +*/ +if (adev->pdev->subsystem_vendor ==PCI_VENDOR_ID_APPLE && + !(RREG32 (mmMC_VM_FB_LOCATION) &MC_VM_FB_LOCATION__FB_BASE_MASK )) +return true; +if (adev->flags &AMD_IS_APU )return false;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 676/2214 drm/amdgpu: reset VI ASIC on Apple boards with VRAM at 0
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej Kucharek <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 92a5184787b81e67f7b831ad860ca9b053505cf8 ]
On MacBookPros with switchable graphics, the firmware puts VRAM at MC address 0 when the iGPU is enabled. A later post (S3 resume, GPU reset) moves VRAM back to the VBIOS default. gmc_v8_0 reads MC_VM_FB_LOCATION once at init and reprograms it only on SR-IOV. On bare metal, the driver then keeps using the old layout.
vi_reset_quirks[] handles this for the MacBookPro14,3 by PCI ID:
commit b6b1d9721851 ("drm/amdgpu: reset VI ASIC on MacBookPro14,3")
Add the test that SI and CIK use: an Apple subsystem vendor and VRAM at
0. Other Polaris MacBookPros then get the same reset at load, for example the MacBookPro13,3 if its firmware leaves VRAM at 0. These boards are not tested.
Keep vi_reset_quirks[]. Its MacBookPro15,1 entries fix a different failure, a module reload after S3:
commit a5be7ad8f5f0 ("drm/amdgpu: reset VI ASIC on MacBookPro15,1")
VRAM is not at 0 at that point, so the new test may not cover it.
After the reset, FB_BASE is not 0, so the new test does not fire again on a module reload.
Only compile-tested.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vi.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vi.c +10 -0
@@ -1450,6 +1450,16 @@ static bool vi_need_reset_on_init(struct amdgpu_device *adev)unsigned int i;u32 clock_cntl, pc; +/* +* MacBookPros with switchable graphics put VRAM at 0 when the iGPU +* is enabled. Any later post (S3 resume, GPU reset) moves it back to +* the vbios default, so reset and post on load to start with the +* vbios layout. +*/ +if (adev->pdev->subsystem_vendor ==PCI_VENDOR_ID_APPLE && + !(RREG32 (mmMC_VM_FB_LOCATION) &MC_VM_FB_LOCATION__FB_BASE_MASK )) +return true; +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (vi_reset_quirks); i++) if (adev->pdev->device == vi_reset_quirks[i].device && adev->pdev->subsystem_vendor == vi_reset_quirks[i].subsystem_vendor &&
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 677/2214 drm/amdgpu: reject ANONONLY userptrs that span multiple VMAs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jesse Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d577b68a854d0f590f480777249b041507d0708c ]
For AMDGPU_GEM_USERPTR_ANONONLY, amdgpu_ttm_tt_get_user_pages() only checks the VMA at the start of the range for a backing file, and amdgpu_hmm_range_get_pages() then faults in the whole range, across any other VMAs. The check used to reject ranges ending beyond the first VMA (vma->vm_end < end), which got lost when the code moved to HMM.
An ANONONLY userptr over one page of file-backed memory is rejected with -EPERM, but one over an anonymous page followed by the same file-backed page is accepted.
Restore the check and reject ANONONLY userptrs that cross more than one VMA. The second userptr is now rejected too.
v2: reject ranges spanning multiple VMAs instead of walking every VMA
(Christian)
v3: cast num_pages to u64 to avoid an overflow (Christian)
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c +2 -1
@@ -706,7 +706,8 @@ int amdgpu_ttm_tt_get_user_pages(struct amdgpu_bo *bo, struct page **pages) goto out_unlock; }if (unlikely ((gtt->userflags &AMDGPU_GEM_USERPTR_ANONONLY ) && - vma->vm_file)) { + (vma->vm_file || + vma->vm_end < start + (u64 )ttm->num_pages *PAGE_SIZE ))) { r = -EPERM ; goto out_unlock; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 678/2214 drm/amd/display: Fix swap in median3() for DSC rate control
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Keita Morisaki <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7b23bf82ccbdb4cf0752f2b8686e7319a7ce497f ]
median3() is meant to return the median of three values, but its last compare-and-swap step swaps b and c instead of a and b. When c is smaller than both a and b, it returns max(a, b) instead of min(a, b). For example, median3(2, 3, 1) returns 3 instead of 2.
_do_calc_rc_params() always passes 0 as the first argument, and the second argument is never below 12. So whenever the third argument is negative, first_line_bpg_offset (and second_line_bpg_offset for 4:2:0) is set to the second argument instead of 0.
Fix this by swapping a and b in the last step, as intended.
Note that this change does not affect valid DSC configurations. The third argument is negative only when bits per pixel exceeds the uncompressed rate of the colour format:
- 3 * bpc for 4:4:4, 3 * bpc + 2 for RGB
- 2 * bpc for 4:2:2
- 1.5 * bpc for 4:2:0
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dsc/rc_calc_fpu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dsc/rc_calc_fpu.c +1 -1
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static int median3(int a, int b, int c)if (b > c)swap (b, c);if (a > b) -swap (b, c); +swap (a, b);return b; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 679/2214 ipv6: initialize temporary ifaddr before publication
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daehyeon Ko <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ed7f278812e540db507f683e5bf9b6d0a1f5bc1e ]
ipv6_create_tempaddr() holds a reference to the public ifaddr, publishes the new temporary address through ipv6_add_addr(), and only then stores the reference and final timestamps.
addrconf_ifdown() can remove the temporary address before ifpub is stored, leaking the public ifaddr reference. Publishing ifpub alone is
insufficient: manage_tempaddrs() can then find the object before cstamp and tstamp are final, update its lifetimes, and have the constructor overwrite its timestamp with an older value.
This follow-on was found by source review and was not separately triggered at runtime.
Pass the public ifaddr and both timestamps in ifa6_config. Initialize all three fields before adding the temporary address to either the hash or per-device lists. On success the existing public-ifaddr reference transfers to the temporary object. On error it remains owned and released by ipv6_create_tempaddr().
--- include/net/addrconf.h | 3 +++ net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/net/addrconf.h +3 -0
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ struct ifa6_config {unsigned int plen;const struct in6_addr *peer_pfx; +struct inet6_ifaddr *ifpub; +unsigned long cstamp; +unsigned long tstamp;u32 rt_priority;u32 ifa_flags;
net/ipv6/addrconf.c +13 -7
@@ -1145,10 +1145,19 @@ ipv6_add_addr(struct inet6_dev *idev, struct ifa6_config *cfg, ifa->flags |=IFA_F_TENTATIVE ; ifa->valid_lft = cfg->valid_lft; ifa->prefered_lft = cfg->preferred_lft; - ifa->cstamp = ifa->tstamp = jiffies; ifa->tokenized = false; ifa->rt = f6i; + ifa->ifpub = cfg->ifpub; +if (cfg->ifpub) { + ifa->cstamp = cfg->cstamp; + ifa->tstamp = cfg->tstamp; + }else { +unsigned long now = jiffies; + + ifa->cstamp = now; + ifa->tstamp = now; + } ifa->idev = idev;in6_dev_hold (idev);
@@ -1434,6 +1443,9 @@ static int ipv6_create_tempaddr(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, bool block) cfg.pfx = &addr; cfg.scope =ipv6_addr_scope (cfg.pfx); + cfg.ifpub = ifp; + cfg.cstamp = now; + cfg.tstamp = tmp_tstamp; ift =ipv6_add_addr (idev, &cfg, block,NULL );if (IS_ERR (ift)) {
@@ -1444,12 +1456,6 @@ static int ipv6_create_tempaddr(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, bool block) goto retry; } -spin_lock_bh (&ift->lock); - ift->ifpub = ifp; - ift->cstamp = now; - ift->tstamp = tmp_tstamp; -spin_unlock_bh (&ift->lock); -addrconf_dad_start (ift);in6_ifa_put (ift);in6_dev_put (idev);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 680/2214 ipv6: do not restart DAD for a dead ifaddr
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daehyeon Ko <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ffb668669ce4144347973d8b2fad449e9be0563d ]
addrconf_dad_failure() can create a stable-privacy replacement without RTNL. After ipv6_add_addr() publishes it, addrconf_ifdown() can mark the new ifaddr DEAD, clear its route, and unlink it before the recovery path takes ifp2->lock.
The recovery path then unconditionally changes the state back to PREDAD and queues delayed DAD work. The MTU teardown path can leave IF_READY set. For an optimistic address, addrconf_dad_begin() can consequently pass the cleared NULL route to ip6_ins_rt().
This follow-on was found by source review and was not separately triggered at runtime.
The new ifaddr is already initialized in PREDAD. Under ifp2->lock, record the retry and queue DAD only if teardown has not changed the state to DEAD. If teardown wins after this check, the work observes DEAD and exits without reviving the address.
This complements the existing lock_errdad check that preserves the original ifaddr's DEAD state after the same function reacquires its lock.
--- net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/addrconf.c +7 -3
@@ -2144,6 +2144,7 @@ void addrconf_dad_failure(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp) ifp->idev->dev->name, &ifp->addr, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source);if (ifp->flags &IFA_F_STABLE_PRIVACY ) { +bool start_dad = false;struct in6_addr new_addr;struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp2;int retries = ifp->stable_privacy_retry +1 ;
@@ -2182,11 +2183,14 @@ void addrconf_dad_failure(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp) goto lock_errdad;spin_lock_bh (&ifp2->lock); - ifp2->stable_privacy_retry = retries; - ifp2->state =INET6_IFADDR_STATE_PREDAD ; +if (ifp2->state !=INET6_IFADDR_STATE_DEAD ) { + ifp2->stable_privacy_retry = retries; + start_dad = true; + }spin_unlock_bh (&ifp2->lock); -addrconf_mod_dad_work (ifp2, net->ipv6.sysctl.idgen_delay); +if (start_dad) +addrconf_mod_dad_work (ifp2, net->ipv6.sysctl.idgen_delay);in6_ifa_put (ifp2); lock_errdad:spin_lock_bh (&ifp->lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 681/2214 fbdev: bitblit: Fix glyph clipping when fbcon pans
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tingjie Zhong <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 06fccf840640d8f6b0e08a1756f8d2f0435b4cbe ]
Commit 3637d34b35b2 ("fbdev: Add bounds checking in bit_putcs to fix vmalloc-out-of-bounds") made bit_putcs() clip glyphs to var.yres. When fbcon scrolls by panning, it draws text rows up to var.yres_virtual, so after the first pan most new text is not drawn until the next full redraw. This affects fbdev drivers that set FBINFO_HWACCEL_YPAN or FBINFO_HWACCEL_YWRAP, such as vesafb with the ypan option, when CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE_LEGACY_ACCELERATION=y.
Clip to GETVYRES() instead, which fbcon_ud.c and fbcon_ccw.c already use as the drawing area height. When fbcon does not pan, GETVYRES() returns var.yres, keeping the existing bound. When fbcon pans, it returns var.yres_virtual, which the framebuffer memory must cover anyway for panning to work.
--- drivers/video/fbdev/core/bitblit.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/core/bitblit.c +5 -2
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include <linux/console.h> #include <asm/types.h> #include "fbcon.h" +#include "fbcon_rotate.h" /* * Accelerated handlers.
@@ -151,7 +152,9 @@ static void bit_putcs(struct vc_data *vc, struct fb_info *info, const unsigned short *s, int count, int yy, int xx, int fg, int bg) { + struct fbcon_par *par = info->fbcon_par;struct fb_image image; +u32 vyres =GETVYRES (par->p, info);u32 width =DIV_ROUND_UP (vc->vc_font.width,8 );u32 cellsize = width * vc->vc_font.height;u32 maxcnt = info->pixmap.size/cellsize;
@@ -168,10 +171,10 @@ static void bit_putcs(struct vc_data *vc, struct fb_info *info, image.height = vc->vc_font.height; image.depth =1 ; -if (image.dy >= info->var.yres) +if (image.dy >= vyres)return ; - image.height =min (image.height, info->var.yres - image.dy); + image.height =min (image.height, vyres - image.dy);if (attribute) { buf =kmalloc (cellsize,GFP_ATOMIC );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 682/2214 net/rds: ib: dont enable IRQs in rds_ib_conn_free()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nguyen Ngoc Thang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f6fa1d60ec3ceb7e6c26aa91eadfef34f94014e1 ]
__rds_conn_create() calls trans->conn_free() with rds_conn_lock held and IRQs disabled when it loses the race to insert a connection. rds_ib_conn_free() takes the device list lock with spin_lock_irq() and releases it with spin_unlock_irq(), so IRQs are turned on while rds_conn_lock is still held:
raw_local_irq_restore() called with IRQs enabled
WARNING: kernel/locking/irqflag-debug.c:10 at warn_bogus_irq_restore+0xc/0x20 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x67/0x80 __rds_conn_create+0x1de5/0x2290 rds_conn_create_outgoing+0x43/0x60 rds_sendmsg+0xfca/0x20e0 __sys_sendto+0x408/0x5a0
It needs an RDS socket bound to an address on an RDMA device (e.g. rxe) and two concurrent sendto() calls to the same new destination.
The TCP and loopback ->conn_free() callbacks already use irqsave, so do the same here.
--- net/rds/ib_cm.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/rds/ib_cm.c +4 -2
@@ -1271,6 +1271,7 @@ void rds_ib_conn_free(void *arg) {struct rds_ib_connection *ic = arg;spinlock_t *lock_ptr; +unsigned long flags;rdsdebug ("ic %p\n" , ic);
@@ -1281,9 +1282,10 @@ void rds_ib_conn_free(void *arg)*/ lock_ptr = ic->rds_ibdev ? &ic->rds_ibdev->spinlock : &ib_nodev_conns_lock; -spin_lock_irq (lock_ptr); +/* May be called with IRQs already disabled (see __rds_conn_create()) */ +spin_lock_irqsave (lock_ptr, flags);list_del (&ic->ib_node); -spin_unlock_irq (lock_ptr); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (lock_ptr, flags);rds_ib_recv_free_caches (ic);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 683/2214 net: unix: reject negative max_dgram_qlen values
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yingjie Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1a4e7bc6e3457ad95515a9d2c042452c3161bb2c ]
net.unix.max_dgram_qlen is parsed as a signed int and copied to the u32 sock::sk_max_ack_backlog when an AF_UNIX socket is created. Consequently, a negative value such as -1 is accepted and converted to UINT_MAX. Since the receive queue length is also u32, its fullness check cannot become true for that limit.
max_dgram_qlen has no documented negative sentinel. Its existing signed interface represents nonnegative values only through INT_MAX; negative bit patterns are not a supported encoding for the upper half of the u32 consumer range.
Switch to proc_dointvec_minmax and make the established 0..INT_MAX input range explicit. This rejects negative values without adding new accepted values or changing the default and zero-value behavior. Very large valid values can still make the queue limit impractical to reach; this change corrects the input domain rather than imposing a new resource ceiling.
--- Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst | 3 ++- net/unix/sysctl_net_unix.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst +2 -1
@@ -2895,5 +2895,6 @@ plpmtud_probe_interval - INTEGER max_dgram_qlen - INTEGER The maximum length of dgram socket receive queue - Default: 10 + Possible values: 0 - INT_MAX + Default: 10
net/unix/sysctl_net_unix.c +3 -1
@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ static struct ctl_table unix_table[] = { .data = &init_net.unx.sysctl_max_dgram_qlen, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_INT_MAX, }, { } };
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 684/2214 net/smc: queue the copied chunk when smc_tx_sendmsg() faults
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c0703534b223a5c6993e0f000fd1c3abe621fb65 ]
When a send wraps the end of the send buffer, smc_tx_sendmsg() copies the data in two chunks. If memcpy_from_msg() faults on the second one, smc_tx_sendmsg() returns send_done, which already counts the first chunk, but leaves tx_curs_prep and sndbuf_space as they were. send() reports bytes the peer never receives, and the next send() overwrites them. Any caller can hit this on its own stream with a buffer whose tail is unreadable.
On a fault in the second chunk, queue the first one. The next pass retries the rest and returns send_done if it faults again, so send() reports only what it queued, as TCP does.
--- net/smc/smc_tx.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
net/smc/smc_tx.c +7 -0
@@ -206,6 +206,13 @@ int smc_tx_sendmsg(struct smc_sock *smc, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) rc =memcpy_from_msg (sndbuf_base + chunk_off, msg, chunk_len);if (rc) { +if (chunk) { +/* send_done counts the first chunk: +* queue it and retry the rest +*/ + copylen -= chunk_len; +break ; + }smc_sndbuf_sync_sg_for_device (conn);if (send_done)return send_done;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0