amd/msr: implement MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests
v6 cover amd/msr: implement MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests
Hello,
The following series implements support for MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (VIRT_SSBD) on different AMD CPU families.
Note that the support is added backwards, starting with the newer CPUs that support MSR_SPEC_CTRL and moving to the older ones either using MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL or the SSBD bit in LS_CFG.
Xen is still free to use it's own SSBD setting, as the selection is context switched on vm{entry,exit}.
On Zen2 and later, SPEC_CTRL.SSBD should exist and should be used in preference to VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD. However, for migration compatibility, Xen offers VIRT_SSBD to guests (in the max cpuid policy, not default) implemented in terms of SPEC_CTRL.SSBD.
On Fam15h thru Zen1, Xen exposes VIRT_SSBD to guests by default to abstract away the model and/or hypervisor specific differences in MSR_LS_CFG/MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.
So the implementation of VIRT_SSBD exposed to HVM guests will use one of the following underlying mechanisms, in the preference order listed below:
* SPEC_CTRL.SSBD: patch 1
* VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD: patch 2.
* Non-architectural way using LS_CFG: patch 3.
NB: patch 3 introduces some logic in GIF=0 context, such logic has been kept to a minimum due to the special context it's running on.
Roger Pau Monne (3):
amd/msr: implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests on top of SPEC_CTRL amd/msr: allow passthrough of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests amd/msr: implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests using legacy SSBD
CHANGELOG.md | 3 + xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++--- xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c | 21 ++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S | 8 ++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 39 +++++++ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/amd.h | 4 + xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 14 +++ xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 26 +++++ xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 12 +- xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 2 +- 12 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.36.0
PATCH v6 1/3 amd/msr: implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests on top of SPEC_CTRL
Use the logic to set shadow SPEC_CTRL values in order to implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (signaled by VIRT_SSBD CPUID flag) for HVM guests. This includes using the spec_ctrl vCPU MSR variable to store the guest set value of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD, which will be OR'ed with any SPEC_CTRL values being set by the guest.
On hardware having SPEC_CTRL VIRT_SPEC_CTRL will not be offered by default to guests. VIRT_SPEC_CTRL will only be part of the max CPUID policy so it can be enabled for compatibility purposes.
Use '!' to annotate the feature in order to express that the presence of the bit is not directly tied to its value in the host policy.
---
Changes since v3:
- Use '!' to annotate the feature.
Changes since v2:
- Reword reasoning for using '!s'.
- Trim comment about only setting SSBD bit in spec_ctrl.raw.
Changes since v1:
- Only expose VIRT_SSBD if AMD_SSBD is available on the host.
- Revert change to msr-sc= command line option documentation.
- Only set or clear the SSBD bit of spec_ctrl.
--- xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c | 7 +++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 4 ++++ xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 3 ++- xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 2 +- 6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +7 -0
@@ -550,6 +550,13 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void)__clear_bit (X86_FEATURE_IBRSB , hvm_featureset);__clear_bit (X86_FEATURE_IBRS , hvm_featureset); } +else if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD ) ) +/* +* If SPEC_CTRL.SSBD is available VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD can be exposed +* and implemented using the former. Expose in the max policy only as +* the preference is for guests to use SPEC_CTRL.SSBD if available. +*/ +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset);/* * With VT-x, some features are only supported by Xen if dedicated
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +1 -0
@@ -1334,6 +1334,7 @@ static const uint32_t msrs_to_send[] = {MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES ,MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS ,MSR_IA32_XSS , +MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL ,MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK ,MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK , MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK,
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h +4 -0
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ struct vcpu_msrs {/* * 0x00000048 - MSR_SPEC_CTRL +* 0xc001011f - MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (if X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD) * * For PV guests, this holds the guest kernel value. It is accessed on * every entry/exit path.
@@ -306,6 +307,9 @@ struct vcpu_msrs* We must clear/restore Xen's value before/after VMRUN to avoid unduly * influencing the guest. In order to support "behind the guest's back" * protections, we load this value (commonly 0) before VMRUN. +* +* Once of such "behind the guest's back" usages is setting SPEC_CTRL.SSBD +* if the guest sets VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD. */ struct {uint32_t raw;
xen/arch/x86/msr.c +18 -0
@@ -381,6 +381,13 @@ int guest_rdmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val) ? K8_HWCR_TSC_FREQ_SEL : 0;break ; +case MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL : +if ( !cp->extd.virt_ssbd ) + goto gp_fault; + + *val = msrs->spec_ctrl.raw &SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; +break ; +case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG :if ( !(cp->x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD |X86_VENDOR_HYGON )) ) goto gp_fault;
@@ -666,6 +673,17 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val)wrmsr_tsc_aux (val);break ; +case MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL : +if ( !cp->extd.virt_ssbd ) + goto gp_fault; + +/* Only supports SSBD bit, the rest are ignored. */ +if ( val &SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ) + msrs->spec_ctrl.raw |=SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; +else + msrs->spec_ctrl.raw &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; +break ; +case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG :/* * OpenBSD 6.7 will panic if writing to DE_CFG triggers a #GP:
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +2 -1
@@ -402,12 +402,13 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)* mitigation support for guests. */ #ifdef CONFIG_HVM -printk (" Support for HVM VMs:%s%s%s%s%s\n" , +printk (" Support for HVM VMs:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n" , (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ) ||boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM ) ||boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR ) || opt_eager_fpu) ?"" :" None" ,boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ) ?" MSR_SPEC_CTRL" :"" , +boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ) ?" MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL" :"" ,boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM ) ?" RSB" :"" , opt_eager_fpu ?" EAGER_FPU" :"" ,boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR ) ?" MD_CLEAR" :"" );
xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h +1 -1
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBRS_SAME_MODE, 8*32+19) /*S IBRS provides same-mode protection XEN_CPUFEATURE(NO_LMSL, 8*32+20) /*S EFER.LMSLE no longer supported. */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(AMD_PPIN, 8*32+23) /* Protected Processor Inventory Number */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(AMD_SSBD, 8*32+24) /*S MSR_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD available */ -XEN_CPUFEATURE(VIRT_SSBD, 8*32+25) /* MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD */ +XEN_CPUFEATURE(VIRT_SSBD, 8*32+25) /*! MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SSB_NO, 8*32+26) /*A Hardware not vulnerable to SSB */XEN_CPUFEATURE (PSFD ,8 *32 +28 )/*S MSR_SPEC_CTRL.PSFD */
Signature · 1 line
2.36.0
PATCH v6 2/3 amd/msr: allow passthrough of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests
In reply to Roger Pau MonneAllow HVM guests access to MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL if the platform Xen is running on has support for it. This requires adding logic in the vm{entry,exit} paths for SVM in order to context switch between the hypervisor value and the guest one. The added handlers for context switch will also be used for the legacy SSBD support.
Introduce a new synthetic feature leaf (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM) to signal whether VIRT_SPEC_CTRL needs to be handled on guest vm{entry,exit}.
---
Changes since v5:
- Add comment regarding VIRT_SSBD exposure.
- Store guest value in 'val' local variable in
vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl.
Changes since v4:
- Fix exposing in the max policy.
Changes since v3:
- Always trap write accesses to VIRT_SPEC_CTRL in order to cache the guest setting.
- Do not use the 'S' annotation for the VIRT_SSBD feature.
Changes since v2:
- Reword part of the commit message regarding annotation change.
- Fix MSR intercept.
- Add handling of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL to guest_{rd,wr}msr when using VIRT_SSBD also.
Changes since v1:
- Introduce virt_spec_ctrl vCPU field.
- Context switch VIRT_SPEC_CTRL on vmentry/vmexit separately from SPEC_CTRL.
--- xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c | 14 +++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S | 8 ++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 10 ++++++++ xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 16 +++++++++--- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 9 ++++++- 7 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +14 -0
@@ -541,6 +541,13 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void) raw_cpuid_policy.basic.sep )__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_SEP , hvm_featureset); +/* +* VIRT_SSBD is exposed in the default policy as a result of +* VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM being set, it also needs exposing in the max policy. +*/ +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) ) +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset); +/* * If Xen isn't virtualising MSR_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests (functional * availability, or admin choice), hide the feature.
@@ -597,6 +604,13 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_def_policy(void)guest_common_feature_adjustments (hvm_featureset);guest_common_default_feature_adjustments (hvm_featureset); +/* +* Only expose VIRT_SSBD if AMD_SSBD is not available, and thus +* VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM is set. +*/ +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) ) +__set_bit (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD , hvm_featureset); +sanitise_featureset (hvm_featureset);cpuid_featureset_to_policy (hvm_featureset, p);recalculate_xstate (p);
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S +8 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ .file "svm/entry.S" +#include <xen/lib.h> + #include <asm/asm_defns.h> #include <asm/page.h>
@@ -57,6 +59,9 @@ __UNLIKELY_END(nsvm_hap) clgi + ALTERNATIVE "", STR(call vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl), \ + X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM + /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe beyond this point. */ /* SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_SVM Req: b=curr %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */ .macro svm_vmentry_spec_ctrl
@@ -114,6 +119,9 @@ __UNLIKELY_END(nsvm_hap) ALTERNATIVE "", svm_vmexit_spec_ctrl, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */ + ALTERNATIVE "", STR(call vmexit_virt_spec_ctrl), \ + X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM + stgi GLOBAL(svm_stgi_label) mov %rsp,%rdi
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c +35 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@#include <asm/hvm/svm/svmdebug.h> #include <asm/hvm/svm/nestedsvm.h> #include <asm/hvm/nestedhvm.h> +#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h> #include <asm/x86_emulate.h> #include <public/sched.h> #include <asm/hvm/vpt.h>
@@ -610,6 +611,16 @@ static void cf_check svm_cpuid_policy_changed(struct vcpu *v)svm_intercept_msr (v,MSR_SPEC_CTRL , cp->extd.ibrs ?MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE :MSR_INTERCEPT_RW ); +/* +* Always trap write accesses to VIRT_SPEC_CTRL in order to cache the guest +* setting and avoid having to perform a rdmsr on vmexit to get the guest +* setting even if VIRT_SSBD is offered to Xen itself. +*/ +svm_intercept_msr (v,MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , + cp->extd.virt_ssbd && cpu_has_virt_ssbd && + !cpu_has_amd_ssbd ? +MSR_INTERCEPT_WRITE :MSR_INTERCEPT_RW ); +/* Give access to MSR_PRED_CMD if the guest has been told about it. */ svm_intercept_msr (v,MSR_PRED_CMD , cp->extd.ibpb ?MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE :MSR_INTERCEPT_RW );
@@ -3105,6 +3116,30 @@ void svm_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)vmcb_set_vintr (vmcb, intr); } +/* Called with GIF=0. */ +void vmexit_virt_spec_ctrl (void ) +{ +unsigned int val = opt_ssbd ?SPEC_CTRL_SSBD :0 ; + +if ( val == current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw ) +return ; + +if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) +wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , val,0 ); +} + +/* Called with GIF=0. */ +void vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl (void ) +{ +unsigned int val = current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw; + +if ( val == (opt_ssbd ?SPEC_CTRL_SSBD :0 ) ) +return ; + +if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) +wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , val,0 ); +} +/* * Local variables: * mode: C
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_HVM, X86_SYNTH(24)) /* VERW used by Xen for HVM */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_IDLE, X86_SYNTH(25)) /* VERW used by Xen for idle */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SHSTK, X86_SYNTH(26)) /* Xen uses CET Shadow Stacks */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_IBT, X86_SYNTH(27)) /* Xen uses CET Indirect Branch Tracking */ +XEN_CPUFEATURE (VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ,X86_SYNTH (28 ))/* MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL exposed to HVM */ /* Bug words follow the synthetic words. */#define X86_NR_BUG 1
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h +10 -0
@@ -375,6 +375,16 @@ struct vcpu_msrs*/ uint32_t tsc_aux; +/* +* 0xc001011f - MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (if !X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD) +* +* AMD only. Guest selected value, context switched on guest VM +* entry/exit. +*/ +struct { +uint32_t raw; + } virt_spec_ctrl; +/* * 0xc00110{27,19-1b} MSR_AMD64_DR{0-3}_ADDRESS_MASK *
xen/arch/x86/msr.c +12 -4
@@ -385,7 +385,10 @@ int guest_rdmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)if ( !cp->extd.virt_ssbd ) goto gp_fault; - *val = msrs->spec_ctrl.raw &SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; +if ( cpu_has_amd_ssbd ) + *val = msrs->spec_ctrl.raw &SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; +else + *val = msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw;break ;case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG :
@@ -678,10 +681,15 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val) goto gp_fault;/* Only supports SSBD bit, the rest are ignored. */ -if ( val &SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ) - msrs->spec_ctrl.raw |=SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; +if ( cpu_has_amd_ssbd ) + { +if ( val &SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ) + msrs->spec_ctrl.raw |=SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; +else + msrs->spec_ctrl.raw &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; + }else - msrs->spec_ctrl.raw &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ; + msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw = val &SPEC_CTRL_SSBD ;break ;case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG :
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +8 -1
@@ -406,9 +406,12 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ) ||boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM ) ||boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR ) || +boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ) || opt_eager_fpu) ?"" :" None" ,boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ) ?" MSR_SPEC_CTRL" :"" , -boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ) ?" MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL" :"" , + (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ) || +boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM )) ?" MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL" + :"" ,boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM ) ?" RSB" :"" , opt_eager_fpu ?" EAGER_FPU" :"" , boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) ? " MD_CLEAR" : "");
@@ -1069,6 +1072,10 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM ); } +/* Support VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD if AMD_SSBD is not available. */ +if ( opt_msr_sc_hvm && !cpu_has_amd_ssbd && cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM ); +/* If we have IBRS available, see whether we should use it. */ if ( has_spec_ctrl && ibrs ) default_xen_spec_ctrl |=SPEC_CTRL_IBRS ;
Signature · 1 line
2.36.0
Re: [PATCH v6 2/3] amd/msr: allow passthrough of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests
Quoted 6 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Allow HVM guests access to
MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRLif the platform Xen is running on has support for it. This requires adding logic in the vm{entry,exit} paths for SVM in order to context switch between the hypervisor value and the guest one. The added handlers for context switch will also be used for the legacy SSBD support.
Quoted 6 lines
Introduce a new synthetic feature leaf (
X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM) to signal whetherVIRT_SPEC_CTRLneeds to be handled on guest vm{entry,exit}.Suggested-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
PATCH v6 3/3 amd/msr: implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests using legacy SSBD
In reply to Roger Pau MonneExpose VIRT_SSBD to guests if the hardware supports setting SSBD in the LS_CFG MSR (a.k.a. non-architectural way). Different AMD CPU families use different bits in LS_CFG, so exposing VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD allows for an unified way of exposing SSBD support to guests on AMD hardware that's compatible migration wise, regardless of what underlying mechanism is used to set SSBD.
Note that on AMD Family 17h and Hygon Family 18h processors the value of SSBD in LS_CFG is shared between threads on the same core, so there's extra logic in order to synchronize the value and have SSBD set as long as one of the threads in the core requires it to be set. Such logic also requires extra storage for each thread state, which is allocated at initialization time.
Do the context switching of the SSBD selection in LS_CFG between hypervisor and guest in the same handler that's already used to switch the value of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.
---
Changes since v5:
- Fix one codding style issue.
Changes since v4:
- Slightly change usage of val/opt_ssbd in vm{exit,entry}_virt_spec_ctrl.
- Pull opt_ssbd outside of the for loop in amd_setup_legacy_ssbd().
- Fix indentation.
- Remove ASSERTs/BUG_ONs from GIF=0 context.
Changes since v3:
- Align ssbd per-core struct to a cache line.
- Open code a simple spinlock to avoid playing tricks with the lock detector.
- s/ssbd_core/ssbd_ls_cfg/.
- Fix log message wording.
- Fix define name and remove comment.
- Also handle Hygon processors (Fam18h).
- Add changelog entry.
Changes since v2:
- Fix codding style issues.
- Use AMD_ZEN1_MAX_SOCKETS to define the max number of possible sockets in Zen1 systems.
Changes since v1:
- Report legacy SSBD support using a global variable.
- Use ro_after_init for ssbd_max_cores.
- Handle boot_cpu_data.x86_num_siblings < 1.
- Add comment regarding _irqsave usage in amd_set_legacy_ssbd.
--- CHANGELOG.md | 3 + xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 4 ++ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/amd.h | 4 ++ xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 4 +- 5 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
CHANGELOG.md +3 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/) ### Removed / support downgraded - dropped support for the (x86-only) "vesa-mtrr" and "vesa-remap" command line options +### Added + - Support VIRT_SSBD feature for HVM guests on AMD. + ## [4.16.0](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=shortlog;h=staging) - 2021-12-02 ### Removed
xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +104 -17
153 lines not on this page · raw message
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c +4 -0
@@ -3126,6 +3126,8 @@ void vmexit_virt_spec_ctrl(void)if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd )wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , val,0 ); +else +amd_set_legacy_ssbd (val); }/* Called with GIF=0. */
@@ -3138,6 +3140,8 @@ void vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl(void)if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd )wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , val,0 ); +else +amd_set_legacy_ssbd (val); }/*
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/amd.h +4 -0
@@ -151,4 +151,8 @@ void check_enable_amd_mmconf_dmi(void);extern bool amd_acpi_c1e_quirk;void amd_check_disable_c1e (unsigned int port,u8 value); +extern bool amd_legacy_ssbd; +bool amd_setup_legacy_ssbd (void ); +void amd_set_legacy_ssbd (bool enable); +#endif /* __AMD_H__ */
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +3 -1
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#include <xen/param.h> #include <xen/warning.h> +#include <asm/amd.h> #include <asm/hvm/svm/svm.h> #include <asm/microcode.h> #include <asm/msr.h>
@@ -1073,7 +1074,8 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) }/* Support VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD if AMD_SSBD is not available. */ -if ( opt_msr_sc_hvm && !cpu_has_amd_ssbd && cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) +if ( opt_msr_sc_hvm && !cpu_has_amd_ssbd && + (cpu_has_virt_ssbd || (amd_legacy_ssbd &&amd_setup_legacy_ssbd ())) )setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM );/* If we have IBRS available, see whether we should use it. */
Signature · 1 line
2.36.0
RE: [PATCH v6 3/3] amd/msr: implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests using legacy SSBD
Hi,
It seems that this series [1] has been stale for more than a month and also this series seems to be properly reviewed and acked already.
From what Jan has replied to Roger and Andrew:
"... this addition the series would now look to be ready to go in, I'd like to have some form of confirmation by you, Andrew, that you now view this as meeting the comments you gave on an earlier version."
So I guess this can be merged. Sending this as a gentle reminder for possible actions from Roger and Andrew. Thanks!
Also, not sure why my acked-by for the CHANGELOG.md is missing in patchwork, just in case - for the change in CHANGELOG.md in patch#3:
[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/xen-devel/list/?series=642413
Kind regards,
Henry
Quoted 316 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Roger Pau Monne <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH v6 3/3] amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests using legacy SSBDExpose
VIRT_SSBDto guests if the hardware supports setting SSBD in theLS_CFGMSR (a.k.a. non-architectural way). Different AMD CPU families use different bits inLS_CFG, so exposing VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD allows for an unified way of exposing SSBD support to guests on AMD hardware that's compatible migration wise, regardless of what underlying mechanism is used to set SSBD.Note that on AMD Family 17h and Hygon Family 18h processors the value of SSBD in
LS_CFGis shared between threads on the same core, so there's extra logic in order to synchronize the value and have SSBD set as long as one of the threads in the core requires it to be set. Such logic also requires extra storage for each thread state, which is allocated at initialization time.Do the context switching of the SSBD selection in
LS_CFGbetween hypervisor and guest in the same handler that's already used to switch the value ofVIRT_SPEC_CTRL.Suggested-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>---
Changes since v5:
- Fix one codding style issue.Changes since v4:
- Slightly change usage of val/opt_ssbd in vm{exit,entry}_virt_spec_ctrl.
- Pullopt_ssbdoutside of the for loop inamd_setup_legacy_ssbd().
- Fix indentation.
- Remove ASSERTs/BUG_ONs from GIF=0 context.Changes since v3:
- Align ssbd per-core struct to a cache line.
- Open code a simple spinlock to avoid playing tricks with the lock detector.
- s/ssbd_core/ssbd_ls_cfg/.
- Fix log message wording.
- Fix define name and remove comment.
- Also handle Hygon processors (Fam18h).
- Add changelog entry.Changes since v2:
- Fix codding style issues.
- UseAMD_ZEN1_MAX_SOCKETSto define the max number of possible sockets in Zen1 systems.Changes since v1:
- Report legacy SSBD support using a global variable.
- Usero_after_initforssbd_max_cores.
- Handle boot_cpu_data.x86_num_siblings < 1.
- Add comment regarding_irqsaveusage inamd_set_legacy_ssbd.--- CHANGELOG.md | 3 + xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 4 ++ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/amd.h | 4 ++ xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 4 +- 5 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)CHANGELOG.md +0
-0@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/) ### Removed / support downgraded - dropped support for the (x86-only) "vesa-mtrr" and "vesa-remap"command line options
CHANGELOG.md +3
-1+### Added + - Support VIRT_SSBD feature for HVM guests on AMD. + ## [4.16.0](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=shortlog;h=staging) - 2021-12-02 ### Removedxen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +1
-0@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ boolean_param("allow_unsafe", opt_allow_unsafe);/* Signal whether the ACPI C1E quirk is required. */ bool __read_mostly amd_acpi_c1e_quirk; +bool __ro_after_init amd_legacy_ssbd;static inline int rdmsr_amd_safe (unsigned int msr,unsigned int *lo,unsigned int *hi)@@ -685,23 +686,10 @@ void amd_init_lfence(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)* Refer to the AMD Speculative Store Bypass whitepaper: * https://developer.amd.com/wp- content/resources/124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_White paper_final.pdf
*/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +1
-11-void amd_init_ssbd (const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +static bool set_legacy_ssbd (const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c,bool enable) {int bit =-1 ; -if (cpu_has_ssb_no) -return ; - -if (cpu_has_amd_ssbd) { -/* Handled by common MSR_SPEC_CTRL logic */ -return ; - } - -if (cpu_has_virt_ssbd) { - wrmsrl(MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, opt_ssbd ?
SPEC_CTRL_SSBD: 0);xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +47
-6-return ; - } -switch (c->x86) {case 0x15 : bit =54 ;break ;case 0x16 : bit =33 ;break ;@@ -715,20 +703,119 @@ void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)if (rdmsr_safe (MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG , val) || ({ val &= ~mask; -if (opt_ssbd) +if (enable) val |= mask; false; }) ||wrmsr_safe (MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG , val) || ({rdmsrl (MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG , val); - (val & mask) != (opt_ssbd * mask); + (val & mask) != (enable * mask); })) bit =-1 ; } -if (bit <0 ) +return bit >=0 ; +} + +void amd_init_ssbd (const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ +if (cpu_has_ssb_no) +return ; + +if (cpu_has_amd_ssbd) { +/* Handled by common MSR_SPEC_CTRL logic */ +return ; + } + +if (cpu_has_virt_ssbd) { +wrmsrl (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , opt_ssbd ?SPEC_CTRL_SSBD :0 ); +return ; + } + +if (!set_legacy_ssbd (c, opt_ssbd)) {printk_once (XENLOG_ERR "No SSBD controls available\n" ); +if (amd_legacy_ssbd) +panic ("CPU feature mismatch: no legacy SSBD\n" ); + }else if (c == &boot_cpu_data) + amd_legacy_ssbd = true; +} + +static struct ssbd_ls_cfg { +bool locked; +unsigned int count; +} __cacheline_aligned *ssbd_ls_cfg; +static unsigned int __ro_after_init ssbd_max_cores; +#define AMD_FAM17H_MAX_SOCKETS 2 + +bool __init amd_setup_legacy_ssbd (void ) +{ +unsigned int i; + +if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 !=0x17 && boot_cpu_data.x86 !=0x18 ) || + boot_cpu_data.x86_num_siblings <=1 ) +return true; + +/* +* One could be forgiven for thinking that c->x86_max_cores is the +* correct value to use here. +* +* However, that value is derived from the current configuration, and
xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +5
-0+* c->cpu_core_id is sparse on all but the top end CPUs. Derive +* max_cpus from ApicIdCoreIdSize which will cover any sparseness. +*/ +if (boot_cpu_data.extended_cpuid_level >=0x80000008 ) { + ssbd_max_cores = 1u <<
MASK_EXTR(cpuid_ecx(0x80000008), 0xf000);xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +12
-0+ ssbd_max_cores /= boot_cpu_data.x86_num_siblings; + } +if (!ssbd_max_cores) +return false; + + ssbd_ls_cfg = xzalloc_array(struct ssbd_ls_cfg, + ssbd_max_cores *AMD_FAM17H_MAX_SOCKETS ); +if (!ssbd_ls_cfg) +return false; + + if (opt_ssbd) + for (i = 0; i < ssbd_max_cores *
AMD_FAM17H_MAX_SOCKETS; i++)xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +2
-0+/* Set initial state, applies to any (hotplug) CPU. */ + ssbd_ls_cfg[i].count =boot_cpu_data.x86_num_siblings;
xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +6
-0+ +return true; +} + +/* +* Executed from GIF==0 context: avoid using BUG/ASSERT or other functionality
+ * that relies on exceptions as those are not expected to run in GIF==0
+ * context.
+ */xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +6
-0+void amd_set_legacy_ssbd (bool enable) +{ +const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = ¤t_cpu_data; +struct ssbd_ls_cfg *status; + +if ((c->x86 !=0x17 && c->x86 !=0x18 ) || c->x86_num_siblings <=1 ){
xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +9
-0+set_legacy_ssbd (c, enable); +return ; + } + + status = &ssbd_ls_cfg[c->phys_proc_id * ssbd_max_cores + + c->cpu_core_id]; + +/* +* Open code a very simple spinlock: this function is used with GIF==0
xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +2
-0+* and different IF values, so would trigger the checklock detector. +* Instead of trying to workaround the detector, use a very simple lock
xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +1
-0+* implementation: it's better to reduce the amount of code executed
xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +9
-0+* with GIF==0. +*/ +while (test_and_set_bool (status->locked)) +cpu_relax (); + status->count += enable ?1 :-1 ; +if (enable ? status->count ==1 : !status->count) +set_legacy_ssbd (c, enable); +barrier (); +write_atomic (&status->locked, false); }void __init detect_zen2_null_seg_behaviour (void )xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c +4
-0@@ -3126,6 +3126,8 @@ void vmexit_virt_spec_ctrl(void)if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd )wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , val,0 ); +else +amd_set_legacy_ssbd (val); }/* Called with GIF=0. */ @@ -3138,6 +3140,8 @@ void vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl(void)if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd )wrmsr (MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL , val,0 ); +else +amd_set_legacy_ssbd (val); }/* xen/arch/x86/include/asm/amd.h +4
-0@@ -151,4 +151,8 @@ void check_enable_amd_mmconf_dmi(void);extern bool amd_acpi_c1e_quirk;void amd_check_disable_c1e (unsigned int port,u8 value); +extern bool amd_legacy_ssbd; +bool amd_setup_legacy_ssbd (void ); +void amd_set_legacy_ssbd (bool enable); +#endif /* __AMD_H__ */ xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +3
-1@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#include <xen/param.h> #include <xen/warning.h> +#include <asm/amd.h> #include <asm/hvm/svm/svm.h> #include <asm/microcode.h> #include <asm/msr.h> @@ -1073,7 +1074,8 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) }/* Support VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD if AMD_SSBD is not available. */ -if ( opt_msr_sc_hvm && !cpu_has_amd_ssbd && cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) +if ( opt_msr_sc_hvm && !cpu_has_amd_ssbd && + (cpu_has_virt_ssbd || (amd_legacy_ssbd &&amd_setup_legacy_ssbd ())) )setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM );/* If we have IBRS available, see whether we should use it. */--
2.36.0
Re: [PATCH v6 3/3] amd/msr: implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests using legacy SSBD
Quoted 11 lines · Henry Wang
It seems that this series [1] has been stale for more than a month and also this series seems to be properly reviewed and acked already.
From what Jan has replied to Roger and Andrew:
"... this addition the series would now look to be ready to go in, I'd like to have some form of confirmation by you, Andrew, that you now view this as meeting the comments you gave on an earlier version."So I guess this can be merged. Sending this as a gentle reminder for possible actions from Roger and Andrew. Thanks!
My view here remains as before - I'd prefer to avoid merging this without at least informal agreement by Andrew.
Quoted 4 lines
Also, not sure why my acked-by for the CHANGELOG.md is missing in patchwork, just in case - for the change in CHANGELOG.md in patch#3:
Acked-by Henry Wang <[email protected]>
At a guess that might be because that earlier reply that you did send was to 0/3, not 3/3.
Jan
RE: [PATCH v6 3/3] amd/msr: implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests using legacy SSBD
Hi Jan (and Andrew),
Quoted 12 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>Quoted 9 lines · Henry Wang
It seems that this series [1] has been stale for more than a month and also this series seems to be properly reviewed and acked already.
From what Jan has replied to Roger and Andrew:
"... this addition the series would now look to be ready to go in, I'd like to have some form of confirmation by you, Andrew, that you now view this as meeting the comments you gave on an earlier version."
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So I guess this can be merged. Sending this as a gentle reminder for possible actions from Roger and Andrew. Thanks!
My view here remains as before - I'd prefer to avoid merging this without at least informal agreement by Andrew.
Sure, then I would route this email to Andrew (by directly "To:" him) so that he can take a look when he gets some free time.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Also, not sure why my acked-by for the CHANGELOG.md is missing in patchwork, just in case - for the change in CHANGELOG.md in patch#3:
Acked-by Henry Wang <[email protected]>At a guess that might be because that earlier reply that you did send was to 0/3, not 3/3.
Yep that should be the reason - now this patch in patchwork has my acked-by. Thanks for the information and I will keep this in mind in the future :)
Kind regards,
Henry
Quoted 2 lines
Jan
Quoted 29 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Hello,
The following series implements support for
MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL(VIRT_SSBD) on different AMD CPU families.Note that the support is added backwards, starting with the newer CPUs that support
MSR_SPEC_CTRLand moving to the older ones either usingMSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRLor the SSBD bit inLS_CFG.Xen is still free to use it's own SSBD setting, as the selection is context switched on vm{entry,exit}.
On Zen2 and later, SPEC_CTRL.SSBD should exist and should be used in preference to VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD. However, for migration compatibility, Xen offers
VIRT_SSBDto guests (in the max cpuid policy, not default) implemented in terms of SPEC_CTRL.SSBD.On Fam15h thru Zen1, Xen exposes
VIRT_SSBDto guests by default to abstract away the model and/or hypervisor specific differences in MSR_LS_CFG/MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.So the implementation of
VIRT_SSBDexposed to HVM guests will use one of the following underlying mechanisms, in the preference order listed below:* SPEC_CTRL.SSBD: patch 1
* VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD: patch 2.
* Non-architectural way usingLS_CFG: patch 3.
Quoted 7 lines
NB: patch 3 introduces some logic in GIF=0 context, such logic has been kept to a minimum due to the special context it's running on.
Roger Pau Monne (3):
amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests on top ofSPEC_CTRLamd/msr: allow passthrough ofVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests using legacy SSBD
FTAOD, while besides a missing ack for ...
Quoted 1 line
CHANGELOG.md | 3 +
... this addition the series would now look to be ready to go in, I'd like to have some form of confirmation by you, Andrew, that you now view this as meeting the comments you gave on an earlier version.
Jan
Henry Wang
Acked-byHi Jan, Roger and Andrew,
Quoted 43 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>Quoted 17 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Hello,
The following series implements support for
MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL(VIRT_SSBD) on different AMD CPU families.Note that the support is added backwards, starting with the newer CPUs that support
MSR_SPEC_CTRLand moving to the older ones either usingMSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRLor the SSBD bit inLS_CFG.Xen is still free to use it's own SSBD setting, as the selection is context switched on vm{entry,exit}.
On Zen2 and later, SPEC_CTRL.SSBD should exist and should be used in preference to VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD. However, for migration compatibility, Xen offers
VIRT_SSBDto guests (in the max cpuid policy, not default) implemented in terms of SPEC_CTRL.SSBD.Quoted 5 lines
On Fam15h thru Zen1, Xen exposes
VIRT_SSBDto guests by default to abstract away the model and/or hypervisor specific differences in MSR_LS_CFG/MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.So the implementation of
VIRT_SSBDexposed to HVM guests will use oneof
Quoted 7 lines
the following underlying mechanisms, in the preference order listed below:
* SPEC_CTRL.SSBD: patch 1
* VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD: patch 2.
* Non-architectural way usingLS_CFG: patch 3.Quoted 5 lines
NB: patch 3 introduces some logic in GIF=0 context, such logic has been kept to a minimum due to the special context it's running on.
Roger Pau Monne (3):
amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests on top of
SPEC_CTRLQuoted 2 lines
amd/msr: allow passthrough of
VIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests using legacy SSBD
Quoted 8 lines
FTAOD, while besides a missing ack for ...
Quoted 1 line
CHANGELOG.md | 3 +... this addition the series would now look to be ready to go in, I'd like to have some form of confirmation by you, Andrew, that you now view this as meeting the comments you gave on an earlier version.
Not completely sure if I am proper to do that but for the CHANGELOG.md change:
Kind regards,
Henry
Quoted 2 lines
Jan
Quoted 14 lines · Henry Wang
Quoted 14 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>Quoted 2 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Roger Pau Monne (3):
amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests on top of
SPEC_CTRLQuoted 2 lines
amd/msr: allow passthrough of
VIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests using legacy SSBDFTAOD, while besides a missing ack for ...
Quoted 1 line
CHANGELOG.md | 3 +
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
... this addition the series would now look to be ready to go in, I'd like to have some form of confirmation by you, Andrew, that you now view this as meeting the comments you gave on an earlier version.
Not completely sure if I am proper to do that but for the CHANGELOG.md change:
Well, no-one except you actually can ack changes to this file, as per ./MAINTAINERS.
Quoted 1 line
Acked-by Henry Wang <[email protected]>
Thanks.
Jan
Hi Jan,
Quoted 24 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>Quoted 9 lines · Henry Wang
Quoted 9 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>Quoted 2 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Roger Pau Monne (3):
amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests on top of
SPEC_CTRLQuoted 2 lines
amd/msr: allow passthrough of
VIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests using legacySSBD
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 9 lines
FTAOD, while besides a missing ack for ...
Quoted 1 line
CHANGELOG.md | 3 +... this addition the series would now look to be ready to go in, I'd like to have some form of confirmation by you, Andrew, that you now view this as meeting the comments you gave on an earlier version.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Not completely sure if I am proper to do that but for the CHANGELOG.md change:
Well, no-one except you actually can ack changes to this file, as per ./MAINTAINERS.
Thanks for confirming and sending the reminder to help me to understand that I should ack the changes in CHANGELOG.md for this series, I will keep the information in mind and I guess I am gradually acquiring experiences :)
Kind regards,
Henry
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Acked-by Henry Wang <[email protected]>Thanks.
Jan
PING: [PATCH v6 0/3] amd/msr: implement MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests
In reply to Roger Pau MonneQuoted 4 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Roger Pau Monne (3):
amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests on top ofSPEC_CTRLamd/msr: allow passthrough ofVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests using legacy SSBD
While, somewhat different from Jürgen's series, here the delay is more voluntary (in that I had told Roger that I'd prefer to commit this only with your (perhaps informal) agreement, I think we also can't wait much longer. I'm willing to give it until the end of next week, so I guess I'd move forward with committing early the week after, unless I hear substantial arguments against doing so (at which point the two of us would likely need to decide who's going to pick up this work while Roger is away).
Once again thanks for your understanding,
Jan
Quoted 4 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Roger Pau Monne (3):
amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests on top ofSPEC_CTRLamd/msr: allow passthrough ofVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests using legacy SSBD
I came to realize that I had announced that I would commit this about a month ago. I've done so now, but there was quite a bit of re-basing necessary, to a fair degree because of this delay that I did introduce by oversight. I hope I didn't screw up anywhere.
Jan
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Roger Pau Monne (3):
amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests on top ofSPEC_CTRLamd/msr: allow passthrough ofVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests using legacy SSBDI came to realize that I had announced that I would commit this about a month ago. I've done so now, but there was quite a bit of re-basing necessary, to a fair degree because of this delay that I did introduce by oversight. I hope I didn't screw up anywhere.
Revert them, or I will.
There has not been adequate review or testing.
Patch 2 in particular is firmly nacked, because the only thing I have ever suggested in that area is deleting the patch.
~Andrew
Quoted 6 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Roger Pau Monne (3):
amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests on top ofSPEC_CTRLamd/msr: allow passthrough ofVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests using legacy SSBD
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I came to realize that I had announced that I would commit this about a month ago. I've done so now, but there was quite a bit of re-basing necessary, to a fair degree because of this delay that I did introduce by oversight. I hope I didn't screw up anywhere.
Revert them, or I will.
There is no basis for reverting, at this point at least. May I remind you of the fact that Xen is a community project? I know you've done reverts in the past without even waiting for a discussion to settle, but this wasn't okay back then and is not going to be okay this time round, nor going forward. If you see issues with a series, and in particular one which is otherwise fully qualified for committing, you ought to voice these concerns. You cannot expect people to guess that you're still not happy with the adjustments which were made in an attempt to address earlier voiced concerns.
Quoted 1 line
There has not been adequate review or testing.
No adequate review? Am I a 2nd class citizen all of the sudden? In my reviews I've tried hard to account for the few comments you gave (or should I say that Roger was able to shake out of you)? Plus I've said more than once that I would prefer to not commit this without you having given it a (perhaps just informal) look over. Yet no feedback ever surfaced. I don't recall you going ...
Quoted 2 lines
Patch 2 in particular is firmly nacked, because the only thing I have ever suggested in that area is deleting the patch.
... this far (and in particular not for the later versions of the series), but I do recall Roger re-working the patch to (try to) address your concerns. Going from just my mailbox (which goes back only to v3) I see no replies from you _at all_ on this patch. There was a longish reply to 0/3, but nothing on v4 or newer, despite pings which were sent your way.
Knowing this has happened in the past - is your reaction based on v6 or rather on the last version you've actually looked at (presumably v3)?
Jan
Quoted 7 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 6 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Roger Pau Monne (3):
amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests on top ofSPEC_CTRLamd/msr: allow passthrough ofVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests using legacy SSBD
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I came to realize that I had announced that I would commit this about a month ago. I've done so now, but there was quite a bit of re-basing necessary, to a fair degree because of this delay that I did introduce by oversight. I hope I didn't screw up anywhere.
Revert them, or I will.
There is no basis for reverting
You have falsified tags from me, which is a consequence of the series not having been reviewed correctly.
~Andrew
Quoted 12 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 11 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 10 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Roger Pau Monne (3):
amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests on top ofSPEC_CTRLamd/msr: allow passthrough ofVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests using legacy SSBDI came to realize that I had announced that I would commit this about a month ago. I've done so now, but there was quite a bit of re-basing necessary, to a fair degree because of this delay that I did introduce by oversight. I hope I didn't screw up anywhere.
Quoted 5 lines
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Revert them, or I will.
There is no basis for reverting
You have falsified tags from me, which is a consequence of the series not been reviewed correctly.
Andrew, please, come on. I have not added any tags from you, hence I cannot possibly have falsified any. The Suggested-by tags had been there all the time. I also cannot see any evidence of "the series not [having] been reviewed correctly". Please can you support your claims by actual facts?
As to the series itself and its possible reverting (or fixing) - can you please reply with technical comments on the problematic patch(es) of the most recent version?
Henry - you may want to add this to your list of things to monitor. The situation will need resolving one way or another, but obviously we first need to determine the most suitable way.
Jan
Hello all,
This thread was brought to the attention of the Code of Conduct team because it contains some fairly serious accusations. Having looked into the matter, and given the people involved a chance to respond, we’d like to set the record straight (to the best of our current knowledge).
First of all, we’d like to acknowledge that the issue addressed in this series has been a long-term source of frustration: Andrew first mentioned the need for this functionality in 2018, and from then until January 2022 repeatedly mentioned it as something critical to get in but which he simply didn’t have time to personally address.
That said, while his frustration is understandable, there were a number of accusations made which, as far as we can tell, were unfounded; so we want to set the record straight. In particular, having looked into the history of this series and had discussions with all the parties, we have concluded the following:
* Roger attempted to address all of the feedback Andrew gave; and not only was the minimum check-in process followed, but Jan and Roger made every effort to get Andrew's feedback before checking in the patch.
* The "Suggested-by" tags were reasonable for Roger to have put in, and reasonable for Jan to have retained.
This is not the kind of community we strive to be. In particular, we’d like to exhort people to avoid charged language and attempt to lay out the facts — with references — such that they speak for themselves.
We are also attempting to improve communication and shared understanding, to hopefully keep frustration levels low in the future.
Thanks,
-The Xen Project Conduct Team
Quoted 12 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 11 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 10 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Roger Pau Monne
Roger Pau Monne (3):
amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests on top ofSPEC_CTRLamd/msr: allow passthrough ofVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests amd/msr: implementVIRT_SPEC_CTRLfor HVM guests using legacy SSBDI came to realize that I had announced that I would commit this about a month ago. I've done so now, but there was quite a bit of re-basing necessary, to a fair degree because of this delay that I did introduce by oversight. I hope I didn't screw up anywhere.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 1 line
Revert them, or I will.
There is no basis for reverting
You have falsified tags from me, which is a consequence of the series not having been reviewed correctly.
Seeing the changes done to the commits, I guess the problem was the 'Suggested-by' tag. This was added by me, and has been there since v1 because it was you who suggested to do this work, and additionally provided guidance on how the implementation should look like in:
https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/[email protected]/
I'm sorry if this turned out to not look like you expected/wanted. It's possible we had informal conversations about this where we discussed changes, but TBH I have quite a big queue of patches, so it's likely I've forgotten about.
I'm happy to make any further adjustments to the code, but I will need to be pointed out at issues.
Thanks, Roger.