mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Subsystems (13)
Mike Rapoport
maintainerv4 cover mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Hi,
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
v4 changes:
* rebase on v5.9-rc1
* Do not redefine PMD_PAGE_ORDER in fs/dax.c, thanks Kirill
* Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags to memfd_secret() system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :)
v3 changes:
* Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the command line option.
* Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable it only on x86.
v2 changes:
* Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret'
* Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option
* Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot. CONFIG_SECRETMEM now depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems from one side and still make it available unconditionally on architectures that support SET_DIRECT_MAP.
The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.
Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host.
For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library
[1] that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification.
I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to memfd_create() or to add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing.
Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks.
The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future.
As the fragmentation of the direct map was one of the major concerns raised during the previous postings, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size pages to each file descriptor and an ability to reserve large chunks of the physical memory at boot time and then use this memory as an allocation pool for the secret memory areas.
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
rfc-v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
rfc-v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/
Mike Rapoport (6):
mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER
mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant
mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot
arch/Kconfig | 7 + arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + fs/dax.c | 11 +- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 +- include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 8 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 4 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/internal.h | 3 + mm/mmap.c | 5 +- mm/secretmem.c | 451 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 20 files changed, 501 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c
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2.26.2 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v4 1/6 mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
The definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER denoting the number of base pages in the second-level leaf page is already used by DAX and maybe handy in other cases as well.
Several architectures already have definition of PMD_ORDER as the size of second level page table, so to avoid conflict with these definitions use PMD_PAGE_ORDER name and update DAX respectively.
--- fs/dax.c | 11 ++++------- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/dax.c +4 -7
@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ static inline unsigned int pe_order(enum page_entry_size pe_size)#define PG_PMD_COLOUR ((PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) - 1)#define PG_PMD_NR (PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) -/* The order of a PMD entry */ -#define PMD_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -static wait_queue_head_t wait_table[DAX_WAIT_TABLE_ENTRIES ];static int __init init_dax_wait_table (void )
@@ -98,7 +95,7 @@ static bool dax_is_locked(void *entry)static unsigned int dax_entry_order (void *entry) {if (xa_to_value (entry) &DAX_PMD ) -return PMD_ORDER ; +return PMD_PAGE_ORDER ;return 0 ; }
@@ -1455,7 +1452,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp, {struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;struct address_space *mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping; -XA_STATE_ORDER (xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff,PMD_ORDER ); +XA_STATE_ORDER (xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff,PMD_PAGE_ORDER );unsigned long pmd_addr = vmf->address &PMD_MASK ;bool write = vmf->flags &FAULT_FLAG_WRITE ;bool sync;
@@ -1514,7 +1511,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp,* entry is already in the array, for instance), it will return * VM_FAULT_FALLBACK. */ - entry =grab_mapping_entry (&xas, mapping,PMD_ORDER ); + entry =grab_mapping_entry (&xas, mapping,PMD_PAGE_ORDER );if (xa_is_internal (entry)) { result =xa_to_internal (entry); goto fallback;
@@ -1680,7 +1677,7 @@ dax_insert_pfn_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t pfn, unsigned int order)if (order ==0 ) ret =vmf_insert_mixed_mkwrite (vmf->vma, vmf->address, pfn);#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX_PMD - else if (order == PMD_ORDER) + else if (order == PMD_PAGE_ORDER) ret =vmf_insert_pfn_pmd (vmf, pfn,FAULT_FLAG_WRITE );#endif else
include/linux/pgtable.h +3 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@#define USER_PGTABLES_CEILING 0UL#endif +/* Number of base pages in a second level leaf page */ +#define PMD_PAGE_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) +/* * A page table page can be thought of an array like this: pXd_t[PTRS_PER_PxD] *
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2.26.2 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v4 2/6 mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation.
--- mm/internal.h | 3 +++ mm/mmap.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/internal.h +3 -0
@@ -350,6 +350,9 @@ static inline void munlock_vma_pages_all(struct vm_area_struct *vma)extern void mlock_vma_page (struct page *page);extern unsigned int munlock_vma_page (struct page *page); +extern int mlock_future_check (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long flags, +unsigned long len); +/* * Clear the page's PageMlocked(). This can be useful in a situation where * we want to unconditionally remove a page from the pagecache -- e.g.,
mm/mmap.c +2 -3
@@ -1310,9 +1310,8 @@ static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint)return hint; } -static inline int mlock_future_check (struct mm_struct *mm, -unsigned long flags, -unsigned long len) +int mlock_future_check (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long flags, +unsigned long len) {unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
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2.26.2 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v4 3/6 mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.
The user will create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call where flags supplied as a parameter to this system call will define the desired protection mode for the memory associated with that file descriptor.
Currently there are two protection modes:
* exclusive - the memory area is unmapped from the kernel direct map and it is present only in the page tables of the owning mm.
* uncached - the memory area is present only in the page tables of the owning mm and it is mapped there as uncached.
The "exclusive" mode is enabled implicitly and it is the default mode for memfd_secret().
The "uncached" mode requires architecture support and an architecture should opt-in for this mode using HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED configuration option.
For instance, the following example will create an uncached mapping (error handling is omitted):
fd = memfd_secret(SECRETMEM_UNCACHED); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
--- arch/Kconfig | 7 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 8 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 4 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/secretmem.c | 264 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 288 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c
arch/Kconfig +7 -0
@@ -975,6 +975,13 @@ config HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR config ARCH_HAS_VDSO_DATA bool +config HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED + bool + help + An architecture can select this if its semantics of non-cached + mappings can be used to prevent speculative loads and it is + useful for secret protection. + source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig" source "scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig"
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER select HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO + select HAVE_SECRETMEM_UNCACHED select HOTPLUG_SMT if SMP select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING select NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH
include/uapi/linux/magic.h +1 -0
@@ -97,5 +97,6 @@#define DEVMEM_MAGIC 0x454d444d/* "DMEM" */ #define Z3FOLD_MAGIC 0x33#define PPC_CMM_MAGIC 0xc7571590 +#define SECRETMEM_MAGIC 0x5345434d/* "SECM" */ #endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */
include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h new file +8 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECRERTMEM_H +#define _UAPI_LINUX_SECRERTMEM_H + +/* secretmem operation modes */ +#define SECRETMEM_UNCACHED 0x1 + +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECRERTMEM_H */
kernel/sys_ni.c +2 -0
@@ -349,6 +349,8 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_mprotect);COND_SYSCALL (pkey_alloc);COND_SYSCALL (pkey_free); +/* memfd_secret */ +COND_SYSCALL (memfd_secret);/* * Architecture specific weak syscall entries.
mm/Kconfig +4 -0
@@ -868,4 +868,8 @@ config ARCH_HAS_HUGEPD config MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS bool +config SECRETMEM + def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED + select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR + endmenu
mm/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -121,3 +121,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) += memfd.o obj-$(CONFIG_MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS) += mapping_dirty_helpers.o obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += ptdump.o obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_REPORTING) += page_reporting.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECRETMEM) += secretmem.o
mm/secretmem.c new file +264 -0
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2.26.2 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v4 4/6 arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 ++ arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 ++++++- 8 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -1
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@#define __ARM_NR_compat_set_tls (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 5)#define __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 0x800) -#define __NR_compat_syscalls 440 +#define __NR_compat_syscalls 441#endif #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h +2 -0
@@ -887,6 +887,8 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_openat2, sys_openat2) __SYSCALL(__NR_pidfd_getfd, sys_pidfd_getfd)#define __NR_faccessat2 439 __SYSCALL(__NR_faccessat2, sys_faccessat2) +#define __NR_memfd_secret 440 +__SYSCALL (__NR_memfd_secret, sys_memfd_secret)/* * Please add new compat syscalls above this comment and update
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
@@ -20,5 +20,6 @@#define __ARCH_WANT_SET_GET_RLIMIT#define __ARCH_WANT_TIME32_SYSCALLS#define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@*/ #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET#include <uapi/asm/unistd.h>
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +1 -0
@@ -444,3 +444,4 @@ 437 i386 openat2 sys_openat2 438 i386 pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 i386 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 i386 memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret # # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
include/linux/syscalls.h +1 -0
@@ -1006,6 +1006,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig,siginfo_t __user *info, unsigned int flags);asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_getfd (int pidfd,int fd,unsigned int flags); +asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret (unsigned long flags);/* * Architecture-specific system calls
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +6 -1
@@ -860,8 +860,13 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_pidfd_getfd, sys_pidfd_getfd)#define __NR_faccessat2 439 __SYSCALL(__NR_faccessat2, sys_faccessat2) +#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET +#define __NR_memfd_secret 440 +__SYSCALL(__NR_memfd_secret, sys_memfd_secret) +#endif +#undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 440 +#define __NR_syscalls 441/* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v4 5/6 mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Removing a PAGE_SIZE page from the direct map every time such page is allocated for a secret memory mapping will cause severe fragmentation of the direct map. This fragmentation can be reduced by using PMD-size pages as a pool for small pages for secret memory mappings.
Add a gen_pool per secretmem inode and lazily populate this pool with PMD-size pages.
--- mm/secretmem.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 88 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
mm/secretmem.c +88 -19
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@#include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/printk.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> +#include <linux/genalloc.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/pseudo_fs.h> #include <linux/set_memory.h>
@@ -40,24 +41,66 @@#define SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK SECRETMEM_MODE_MASKstruct secretmem_ctx { +struct gen_pool *pool;unsigned int mode; }; -static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page (gfp_t gfp) +static int secretmem_pool_increase (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx,gfp_t gfp) { -/* -* FIXME: use a cache of large pages to reduce the direct map -* fragmentation -*/ -return alloc_page (gfp); +unsigned long nr_pages = (1 <<PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); +struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; +unsigned long addr; +struct page *page; +int err; + + page =alloc_pages (gfp,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); +if (!page) +return -ENOMEM ; + + addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); +split_page (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); + + err =gen_pool_add (pool, addr,PMD_SIZE ,NUMA_NO_NODE ); +if (err) { +__free_pages (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); +return err; + } + +__kernel_map_pages (page, nr_pages,0 ); + +return 0 ; +} + +static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, +gfp_t gfp) +{ +struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; +unsigned long addr; +struct page *page; +int err; + +if (gen_pool_avail (pool) <PAGE_SIZE ) { + err =secretmem_pool_increase (ctx, gfp); +if (err) +return NULL ; + } + + addr =gen_pool_alloc (pool,PAGE_SIZE ); +if (!addr) +return NULL ; + + page =virt_to_page (addr); +get_page (page); + +return page; }static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault (struct vm_fault *vmf) { +struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = vmf->vma->vm_file->private_data;struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping;struct inode *inode =file_inode (vmf->vma->vm_file);pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff; -unsigned long addr;struct page *page;int ret =0 ;
@@ -66,7 +109,7 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) page =find_get_entry (mapping, offset);if (!page) { - page =secretmem_alloc_page (vmf->gfp_mask); + page =secretmem_alloc_page (ctx, vmf->gfp_mask);if (!page)return vmf_error (-ENOMEM );
@@ -74,14 +117,8 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)if (unlikely (ret)) goto err_put_page; - ret =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page); -if (ret) - goto err_del_page_cache; - - addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PAGE_SIZE ); -__SetPageUptodate (page); +set_page_private (page, (unsigned long )ctx); ret =VM_FAULT_LOCKED ; }
@@ -89,8 +126,6 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) vmf->page = page;return ret; -err_del_page_cache: -delete_from_page_cache (page); err_put_page:put_page (page);return vmf_error (ret);
@@ -138,7 +173,11 @@ static int secretmem_migratepage(struct address_space *mapping,static void secretmem_freepage (struct page *page) { -set_direct_map_default_noflush (page); +unsigned long addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); +struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = (struct secretmem_ctx *)page_private (page); +struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; + +gen_pool_free (pool, addr,PAGE_SIZE ); }static const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops = {
@@ -163,13 +202,18 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)if (!ctx) goto err_free_inode; + ctx->pool =gen_pool_create (PAGE_SHIFT ,NUMA_NO_NODE ); +if (!ctx->pool) + goto err_free_ctx; + file =alloc_file_pseudo (inode, secretmem_mnt,"secretmem" ,O_RDWR , &secretmem_fops);if (IS_ERR (file)) - goto err_free_ctx; + goto err_free_pool;mapping_set_unevictable (inode->i_mapping); + inode->i_private = ctx; inode->i_mapping->private_data = ctx; inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &secretmem_aops;
@@ -183,6 +227,8 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)return file; +err_free_pool: +gen_pool_destroy (ctx->pool); err_free_ctx:kfree (ctx); err_free_inode:
@@ -221,11 +267,34 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags)return err; } +static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk (struct gen_pool *pool, +struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk,void *data) +{ +unsigned long start = chunk->start_addr; +unsigned long end = chunk->end_addr; +unsigned long nr_pages, addr; + + nr_pages = (end - start +1 ) /PAGE_SIZE ; +__kernel_map_pages (virt_to_page (start), nr_pages,1 ); + +for (addr = start; addr < end; addr +=PAGE_SIZE ) +put_page (virt_to_page (addr)); +} + +static void secretmem_cleanup_pool (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx) +{ +struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; + +gen_pool_for_each_chunk (pool, secretmem_cleanup_chunk, ctx); +gen_pool_destroy (pool); +} +static void secretmem_evict_inode (struct inode *inode) {struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = inode->i_private;truncate_inode_pages_final (&inode->i_data); +secretmem_cleanup_pool (ctx);clear_inode (inode);kfree (ctx); }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v4 6/6 mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Taking pages out from the direct map and bringing them back may create undesired fragmentation and usage of the smaller pages in the direct mapping of the physical memory.
This can be avoided if a significantly large area of the physical memory would be reserved for secretmem purposes at boot time.
Add ability to reserve physical memory for secretmem at boot time using "secretmem" kernel parameter and then use that reserved memory as a global pool for secret memory needs.
--- mm/secretmem.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 126 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
mm/secretmem.c +126 -8
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/genalloc.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/pseudo_fs.h> #include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
@@ -45,6 +46,39 @@ struct secretmem_ctx {unsigned int mode; }; +struct secretmem_pool { +struct gen_pool *pool; +unsigned long reserved_size; +void *reserved; +}; + +static struct secretmem_pool secretmem_pool; + +static struct page *secretmem_alloc_huge_page (gfp_t gfp) +{ +struct gen_pool *pool = secretmem_pool.pool; +unsigned long addr =0 ; +struct page *page =NULL ; + +if (pool) { +if (gen_pool_avail (pool) <PMD_SIZE ) +return NULL ; + + addr =gen_pool_alloc (pool,PMD_SIZE ); +if (!addr) +return NULL ; + + page =virt_to_page (addr); + }else { + page =alloc_pages (gfp,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); + +if (page) +split_page (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); + } + +return page; +} +static int secretmem_pool_increase (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx,gfp_t gfp) {unsigned long nr_pages = (1 <<PMD_PAGE_ORDER );
@@ -53,12 +87,11 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)struct page *page;int err; - page =alloc_pages (gfp,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); + page =secretmem_alloc_huge_page (gfp);if (!page)return -ENOMEM ; addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -split_page (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); err =gen_pool_add (pool, addr,PMD_SIZE ,NUMA_NO_NODE );if (err) {
@@ -267,11 +300,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags)return err; } -static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk (struct gen_pool *pool, -struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk,void *data) +static void secretmem_recycle_range (unsigned long start,unsigned long end) +{ +gen_pool_free (secretmem_pool.pool, start,PMD_SIZE ); +} + +static void secretmem_release_range (unsigned long start,unsigned long end) { -unsigned long start = chunk->start_addr; -unsigned long end = chunk->end_addr;unsigned long nr_pages, addr; nr_pages = (end - start +1 ) /PAGE_SIZE ;
@@ -281,6 +316,18 @@ static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool,put_page (virt_to_page (addr)); } +static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk (struct gen_pool *pool, +struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk,void *data) +{ +unsigned long start = chunk->start_addr; +unsigned long end = chunk->end_addr; + +if (secretmem_pool.pool) +secretmem_recycle_range (start, end); +else +secretmem_release_range (start, end); +} +static void secretmem_cleanup_pool (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx) {struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool;
@@ -320,14 +367,85 @@ static struct file_system_type secretmem_fs = { .kill_sb = kill_anon_super, }; +static int secretmem_reserved_mem_init (void ) +{ +struct gen_pool *pool; +struct page *page; +void *addr; +int err; + +if (!secretmem_pool.reserved) +return 0 ; + + pool =gen_pool_create (PMD_SHIFT ,NUMA_NO_NODE ); +if (!pool) +return -ENOMEM ; + + err =gen_pool_add (pool, (unsigned long )secretmem_pool.reserved, + secretmem_pool.reserved_size,NUMA_NO_NODE ); +if (err) + goto err_destroy_pool; + +for (addr = secretmem_pool.reserved; + addr < secretmem_pool.reserved + secretmem_pool.reserved_size; + addr +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + page =virt_to_page (addr); +__ClearPageReserved (page); +set_page_count (page,1 ); + } + + secretmem_pool.pool = pool; + page =virt_to_page (secretmem_pool.reserved); +__kernel_map_pages (page, secretmem_pool.reserved_size /PAGE_SIZE ,0 ); +return 0 ; + +err_destroy_pool: +gen_pool_destroy (pool); +return err; +} +static int secretmem_init (void ) { -int ret =0 ; +int ret; + + ret =secretmem_reserved_mem_init (); +if (ret) +return ret; secretmem_mnt =kern_mount (&secretmem_fs); -if (IS_ERR (secretmem_mnt)) +if (IS_ERR (secretmem_mnt)) { +gen_pool_destroy (secretmem_pool.pool); ret =PTR_ERR (secretmem_mnt); + }return ret; }fs_initcall (secretmem_init); + +static int __init secretmem_setup (char *str) +{ +phys_addr_t align =PMD_SIZE ; +unsigned long reserved_size; +void *reserved; + + reserved_size =memparse (str,NULL ); +if (!reserved_size) +return 0 ; + +if (reserved_size *2 >PUD_SIZE ) + align =PUD_SIZE ; + + reserved =memblock_alloc (reserved_size, align); +if (!reserved) { +pr_err ("failed to reserve %lu bytes\n" , secretmem_pool.reserved_size); +return 0 ; + } + + secretmem_pool.reserved_size = reserved_size; + secretmem_pool.reserved = reserved; + +pr_info ("reserved %luM\n" , reserved_size >>20 ); + +return 1 ; +} +__setup ("secretmem=" , secretmem_setup);
Signature · 4 lines
2.26.2 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot
Quoted 6 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Taking pages out from the direct map and bringing them back may create undesired fragmentation and usage of the smaller pages in the direct mapping of the physical memory.
Quoted 6 lines
This can be avoided if a significantly large area of the physical memory would be reserved for secretmem purposes at boot time.
Add ability to reserve physical memory for secretmem at boot time using "secretmem" kernel parameter and then use that reserved memory as a global pool for secret memory needs.
Wouldn't something like CMA be the better fit? Just wondering. Then, the memory can actually be reused for something else while not needed.
Quoted 198 lines
Signed-off-by Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>--- mm/secretmem.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 126 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)mm/secretmem.c +126
-8@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/genalloc.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/pseudo_fs.h> #include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> @@ -45,6 +46,39 @@ struct secretmem_ctx {unsigned int mode; }; +struct secretmem_pool { +struct gen_pool *pool; +unsigned long reserved_size; +void *reserved; +}; + +static struct secretmem_pool secretmem_pool; + +static struct page *secretmem_alloc_huge_page (gfp_t gfp) +{ +struct gen_pool *pool = secretmem_pool.pool; +unsigned long addr =0 ; +struct page *page =NULL ; + +if (pool) { +if (gen_pool_avail (pool) <PMD_SIZE ) +return NULL ; + + addr =gen_pool_alloc (pool,PMD_SIZE ); +if (!addr) +return NULL ; + + page =virt_to_page (addr); + }else { + page =alloc_pages (gfp,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); + +if (page) +split_page (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); + } + +return page; +} +static int secretmem_pool_increase (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx,gfp_t gfp) {unsigned long nr_pages = (1 <<PMD_PAGE_ORDER );@@ -53,12 +87,11 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)struct page *page;int err; - page =alloc_pages (gfp,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); + page =secretmem_alloc_huge_page (gfp);if (!page)return -ENOMEM ; addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -split_page (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); err =gen_pool_add (pool, addr,PMD_SIZE ,NUMA_NO_NODE );if (err) {@@ -267,11 +300,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags)return err; } -static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk (struct gen_pool *pool, -struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk,void *data) +static void secretmem_recycle_range (unsigned long start,unsigned long end) +{ +gen_pool_free (secretmem_pool.pool, start,PMD_SIZE ); +} + +static void secretmem_release_range (unsigned long start,unsigned long end) { -unsigned long start = chunk->start_addr; -unsigned long end = chunk->end_addr;unsigned long nr_pages, addr; nr_pages = (end - start +1 ) /PAGE_SIZE ;@@ -281,6 +316,18 @@ static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool,put_page (virt_to_page (addr)); } +static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk (struct gen_pool *pool, +struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk,void *data) +{ +unsigned long start = chunk->start_addr; +unsigned long end = chunk->end_addr; + +if (secretmem_pool.pool) +secretmem_recycle_range (start, end); +else +secretmem_release_range (start, end); +} +static void secretmem_cleanup_pool (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx) {struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool;@@ -320,14 +367,85 @@ static struct file_system_type secretmem_fs = { .kill_sb = kill_anon_super, }; +static int secretmem_reserved_mem_init (void ) +{ +struct gen_pool *pool; +struct page *page; +void *addr; +int err; + +if (!secretmem_pool.reserved) +return 0 ; + + pool =gen_pool_create (PMD_SHIFT ,NUMA_NO_NODE ); +if (!pool) +return -ENOMEM ; + + err =gen_pool_add (pool, (unsigned long )secretmem_pool.reserved, + secretmem_pool.reserved_size,NUMA_NO_NODE ); +if (err) + goto err_destroy_pool; + +for (addr = secretmem_pool.reserved; + addr < secretmem_pool.reserved + secretmem_pool.reserved_size; + addr +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + page =virt_to_page (addr); +__ClearPageReserved (page); +set_page_count (page,1 ); + } + + secretmem_pool.pool = pool; + page =virt_to_page (secretmem_pool.reserved); +__kernel_map_pages (page, secretmem_pool.reserved_size /PAGE_SIZE ,0 ); +return 0 ; + +err_destroy_pool: +gen_pool_destroy (pool); +return err; +} +static int secretmem_init (void ) { -int ret =0 ; +int ret; + + ret =secretmem_reserved_mem_init (); +if (ret) +return ret; secretmem_mnt =kern_mount (&secretmem_fs); -if (IS_ERR (secretmem_mnt)) +if (IS_ERR (secretmem_mnt)) { +gen_pool_destroy (secretmem_pool.pool); ret =PTR_ERR (secretmem_mnt); + }return ret; }fs_initcall (secretmem_init); + +static int __init secretmem_setup (char *str) +{ +phys_addr_t align =PMD_SIZE ; +unsigned long reserved_size; +void *reserved; + + reserved_size =memparse (str,NULL ); +if (!reserved_size) +return 0 ; + +if (reserved_size *2 >PUD_SIZE ) + align =PUD_SIZE ; + + reserved =memblock_alloc (reserved_size, align); +if (!reserved) { +pr_err ("failed to reserve %lu bytes\n" , secretmem_pool.reserved_size); +return 0 ; + } + + secretmem_pool.reserved_size = reserved_size; + secretmem_pool.reserved = reserved; + +pr_info ("reserved %luM\n" , reserved_size >>20 ); + +return 1 ; +} +__setup ("secretmem=" , secretmem_setup);
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
Mike Rapoport
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 6/6] mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot
Quoted 10 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 9 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Taking pages out from the direct map and bringing them back may create undesired fragmentation and usage of the smaller pages in the direct mapping of the physical memory.
This can be avoided if a significantly large area of the physical memory would be reserved for secretmem purposes at boot time.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Add ability to reserve physical memory for secretmem at boot time using "secretmem" kernel parameter and then use that reserved memory as a global pool for secret memory needs.
Wouldn't something like CMA be the better fit? Just wondering. Then, the memory can actually be reused for something else while not needed.
The memory allocated as secret is removed from the direct map and the boot time reservation is intended to reduce direct map fragmentatioan and to avoid splitting 1G pages there. So with CMA I'd still need to allocate 1G chunks for this and once 1G page is dropped from the direct map it still cannot be reused for anything else until it is freed.
I could use CMA to do the boot time reservation, but doing the reservesion directly seemed simpler and more explicit to me.
Quoted 204 lines
Quoted 197 lines
Signed-off-by Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>--- mm/secretmem.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 126 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)mm/secretmem.c +126
-8@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/genalloc.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/pseudo_fs.h> #include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> @@ -45,6 +46,39 @@ struct secretmem_ctx {unsigned int mode; }; +struct secretmem_pool { +struct gen_pool *pool; +unsigned long reserved_size; +void *reserved; +}; + +static struct secretmem_pool secretmem_pool; + +static struct page *secretmem_alloc_huge_page (gfp_t gfp) +{ +struct gen_pool *pool = secretmem_pool.pool; +unsigned long addr =0 ; +struct page *page =NULL ; + +if (pool) { +if (gen_pool_avail (pool) <PMD_SIZE ) +return NULL ; + + addr =gen_pool_alloc (pool,PMD_SIZE ); +if (!addr) +return NULL ; + + page =virt_to_page (addr); + }else { + page =alloc_pages (gfp,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); + +if (page) +split_page (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); + } + +return page; +} +static int secretmem_pool_increase (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx,gfp_t gfp) {unsigned long nr_pages = (1 <<PMD_PAGE_ORDER );@@ -53,12 +87,11 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)struct page *page;int err; - page =alloc_pages (gfp,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); + page =secretmem_alloc_huge_page (gfp);if (!page)return -ENOMEM ; addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -split_page (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); err =gen_pool_add (pool, addr,PMD_SIZE ,NUMA_NO_NODE );if (err) {@@ -267,11 +300,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags)return err; } -static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk (struct gen_pool *pool, -struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk,void *data) +static void secretmem_recycle_range (unsigned long start,unsigned long end) +{ +gen_pool_free (secretmem_pool.pool, start,PMD_SIZE ); +} + +static void secretmem_release_range (unsigned long start,unsigned long end) { -unsigned long start = chunk->start_addr; -unsigned long end = chunk->end_addr;unsigned long nr_pages, addr; nr_pages = (end - start +1 ) /PAGE_SIZE ;@@ -281,6 +316,18 @@ static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool,put_page (virt_to_page (addr)); } +static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk (struct gen_pool *pool, +struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk,void *data) +{ +unsigned long start = chunk->start_addr; +unsigned long end = chunk->end_addr; + +if (secretmem_pool.pool) +secretmem_recycle_range (start, end); +else +secretmem_release_range (start, end); +} +static void secretmem_cleanup_pool (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx) {struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool;@@ -320,14 +367,85 @@ static struct file_system_type secretmem_fs = { .kill_sb = kill_anon_super, }; +static int secretmem_reserved_mem_init (void ) +{ +struct gen_pool *pool; +struct page *page; +void *addr; +int err; + +if (!secretmem_pool.reserved) +return 0 ; + + pool =gen_pool_create (PMD_SHIFT ,NUMA_NO_NODE ); +if (!pool) +return -ENOMEM ; + + err =gen_pool_add (pool, (unsigned long )secretmem_pool.reserved, + secretmem_pool.reserved_size,NUMA_NO_NODE ); +if (err) + goto err_destroy_pool; + +for (addr = secretmem_pool.reserved; + addr < secretmem_pool.reserved + secretmem_pool.reserved_size; + addr +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + page =virt_to_page (addr); +__ClearPageReserved (page); +set_page_count (page,1 ); + } + + secretmem_pool.pool = pool; + page =virt_to_page (secretmem_pool.reserved); +__kernel_map_pages (page, secretmem_pool.reserved_size /PAGE_SIZE ,0 ); +return 0 ; + +err_destroy_pool: +gen_pool_destroy (pool); +return err; +} +static int secretmem_init (void ) { -int ret =0 ; +int ret; + + ret =secretmem_reserved_mem_init (); +if (ret) +return ret; secretmem_mnt =kern_mount (&secretmem_fs); -if (IS_ERR (secretmem_mnt)) +if (IS_ERR (secretmem_mnt)) { +gen_pool_destroy (secretmem_pool.pool); ret =PTR_ERR (secretmem_mnt); + }return ret; }fs_initcall (secretmem_init); + +static int __init secretmem_setup (char *str) +{ +phys_addr_t align =PMD_SIZE ; +unsigned long reserved_size; +void *reserved; + + reserved_size =memparse (str,NULL ); +if (!reserved_size) +return 0 ; + +if (reserved_size *2 >PUD_SIZE ) + align =PUD_SIZE ; + + reserved =memblock_alloc (reserved_size, align); +if (!reserved) { +pr_err ("failed to reserve %lu bytes\n" , secretmem_pool.reserved_size); +return 0 ; + } + + secretmem_pool.reserved_size = reserved_size; + secretmem_pool.reserved = reserved; + +pr_info ("reserved %luM\n" , reserved_size >>20 ); + +return 1 ; +} +__setup ("secretmem=" , secretmem_setup);Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
Signature · 2 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike.
Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot
Quoted 18 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 10 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 9 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Taking pages out from the direct map and bringing them back may create undesired fragmentation and usage of the smaller pages in the direct mapping of the physical memory.
This can be avoided if a significantly large area of the physical memory would be reserved for secretmem purposes at boot time.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Add ability to reserve physical memory for secretmem at boot time using "secretmem" kernel parameter and then use that reserved memory as a global pool for secret memory needs.
Wouldn't something like CMA be the better fit? Just wondering. Then, the memory can actually be reused for something else while not needed.
Quoted 8 lines
The memory allocated as secret is removed from the direct map and the boot time reservation is intended to reduce direct map fragmentatioan and to avoid splitting 1G pages there. So with CMA I'd still need to allocate 1G chunks for this and once 1G page is dropped from the direct map it still cannot be reused for anything else until it is freed.
I could use CMA to do the boot time reservation, but doing the reservesion directly seemed simpler and more explicit to me.
Well, using CMA would give you the possibility to let the memory be used for other purposes until you decide it's the right time to take it + remove the direct mapping etc.
I wonder if a sane approach would be to require to allocate a pool during boot and only take pages ever from that pool. That would avoid spilling many unmovable pages all over the place, locally limiting them to your area here.
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
Mike Rapoport
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 6/6] mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot
Quoted 25 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 24 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 10 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 9 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Taking pages out from the direct map and bringing them back may create undesired fragmentation and usage of the smaller pages in the direct mapping of the physical memory.
This can be avoided if a significantly large area of the physical memory would be reserved for secretmem purposes at boot time.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Add ability to reserve physical memory for secretmem at boot time using "secretmem" kernel parameter and then use that reserved memory as a global pool for secret memory needs.
Wouldn't something like CMA be the better fit? Just wondering. Then, the memory can actually be reused for something else while not needed.
The memory allocated as secret is removed from the direct map and the boot time reservation is intended to reduce direct map fragmentatioan and to avoid splitting 1G pages there. So with CMA I'd still need to allocate 1G chunks for this and once 1G page is dropped from the direct map it still cannot be reused for anything else until it is freed.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I could use CMA to do the boot time reservation, but doing the reservesion directly seemed simpler and more explicit to me.
Well, using CMA would give you the possibility to let the memory be used for other purposes until you decide it's the right time to take it + remove the direct mapping etc.
I still can't say I follow you here. If I reseve a CMA area as a pool for secret memory 1G pages, it is still reserved and it still cannot be used for other purposes, right?
Quoted 4 lines
I wonder if a sane approach would be to require to allocate a pool during boot and only take pages ever from that pool. That would avoid spilling many unmovable pages all over the place, locally limiting them to your area here.
That's what I tried to implement. The pool reserved at boot time is in a way similar to booting with mem=X and then splitting the remaining memory between the VMs.
In this case, the memory reserved at boot is never in the direct map and allocations from such pool will not cause fragmentation.
Quoted 5 lines
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
Signature · 2 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike.
Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot
Quoted 29 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 28 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 26 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 10 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 9 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Taking pages out from the direct map and bringing them back may create undesired fragmentation and usage of the smaller pages in the direct mapping of the physical memory.
This can be avoided if a significantly large area of the physical memory would be reserved for secretmem purposes at boot time.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Add ability to reserve physical memory for secretmem at boot time using "secretmem" kernel parameter and then use that reserved memory as a global pool for secret memory needs.
Wouldn't something like CMA be the better fit? Just wondering. Then, the memory can actually be reused for something else while not needed.
The memory allocated as secret is removed from the direct map and the boot time reservation is intended to reduce direct map fragmentatioan and to avoid splitting 1G pages there. So with CMA I'd still need to allocate 1G chunks for this and once 1G page is dropped from the direct map it still cannot be reused for anything else until it is freed.
I could use CMA to do the boot time reservation, but doing the reservesion directly seemed simpler and more explicit to me.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Well, using CMA would give you the possibility to let the memory be used for other purposes until you decide it's the right time to take it + remove the direct mapping etc.
I still can't say I follow you here. If I reseve a CMA area as a pool for secret memory 1G pages, it is still reserved and it still cannot be used for other purposes, right?
So, AFAIK, if you create a CMA pool it can be used for any MOVABLE allocations (similar to ZONE_MOVABLE) until you actually allocate CMA memory from that region. Other allocations on that are will then be migrated away (using alloc_contig_range()).
For example, if you have a 1~GiB CMA area, you could allocate 4~MB pages from that CMA area on demand (removing the direct mapping, etc ..), and free when no longer needed (instantiating the direct mapping). The free memory in that area could used for MOVABLE allocations.
Please let me know if I am missing something important.
Signature · 6 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 6/6] mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot
Quoted 43 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 29 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 28 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 26 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 10 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 9 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Taking pages out from the direct map and bringing them back may create undesired fragmentation and usage of the smaller pages in the direct mapping of the physical memory.
This can be avoided if a significantly large area of the physical memory would be reserved for secretmem purposes at boot time.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Add ability to reserve physical memory for secretmem at boot time using "secretmem" kernel parameter and then use that reserved memory as a global pool for secret memory needs.
Wouldn't something like CMA be the better fit? Just wondering. Then, the memory can actually be reused for something else while not needed.
The memory allocated as secret is removed from the direct map and the boot time reservation is intended to reduce direct map fragmentatioan and to avoid splitting 1G pages there. So with CMA I'd still need to allocate 1G chunks for this and once 1G page is dropped from the direct map it still cannot be reused for anything else until it is freed.
I could use CMA to do the boot time reservation, but doing the reservesion directly seemed simpler and more explicit to me.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Well, using CMA would give you the possibility to let the memory be used for other purposes until you decide it's the right time to take it + remove the direct mapping etc.
I still can't say I follow you here. If I reseve a CMA area as a pool for secret memory 1G pages, it is still reserved and it still cannot be used for other purposes, right?
So, AFAIK, if you create a CMA pool it can be used for any MOVABLE allocations (similar to
ZONE_MOVABLE) until you actually allocate CMA memory from that region. Other allocations on that are will then be migrated away (usingalloc_contig_range()).
Quoted 4 lines
For example, if you have a 1~GiB CMA area, you could allocate 4~MB pages from that CMA area on demand (removing the direct mapping, etc ..), and free when no longer needed (instantiating the direct mapping). The free memory in that area could used for MOVABLE allocations.
The boot time resrvation is intended to avoid splitting 1G pages in the direct map. Without the boot time reservation, we maintain a pool of 2M pages so the 1G pages are split and 2M pages remain unsplit.
If I scale your example to match the requirement to avoid splitting 1G pages in the direct map, that would mean creating a CMA area of several tens of gigabytes and then doing cma_alloc() of 1G each time we need to refill the secretmem pool.
It is quite probable that we won't be able to get 1G from CMA after the system worked for some time.
With boot time reservation we won't need physcally contiguous 1G to satisfy smaller allocation requests for secretmem because we don't need to maintain 1G mappings in the secretmem pool.
That said, I believe the addition of the boot time reservation, either direct or with CMA, can be added as an incrememntal patch after the "core" functionality is merged.
Quoted 7 lines
Please let me know if I am missing something important.
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
Signature · 2 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike.
Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot
Quoted 53 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 43 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 29 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 28 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 26 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 10 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 9 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Taking pages out from the direct map and bringing them back may create undesired fragmentation and usage of the smaller pages in the direct mapping of the physical memory.
This can be avoided if a significantly large area of the physical memory would be reserved for secretmem purposes at boot time.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Add ability to reserve physical memory for secretmem at boot time using "secretmem" kernel parameter and then use that reserved memory as a global pool for secret memory needs.
Wouldn't something like CMA be the better fit? Just wondering. Then, the memory can actually be reused for something else while not needed.
The memory allocated as secret is removed from the direct map and the boot time reservation is intended to reduce direct map fragmentatioan and to avoid splitting 1G pages there. So with CMA I'd still need to allocate 1G chunks for this and once 1G page is dropped from the direct map it still cannot be reused for anything else until it is freed.
I could use CMA to do the boot time reservation, but doing the reservesion directly seemed simpler and more explicit to me.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Well, using CMA would give you the possibility to let the memory be used for other purposes until you decide it's the right time to take it + remove the direct mapping etc.
I still can't say I follow you here. If I reseve a CMA area as a pool for secret memory 1G pages, it is still reserved and it still cannot be used for other purposes, right?
So, AFAIK, if you create a CMA pool it can be used for any MOVABLE allocations (similar to
ZONE_MOVABLE) until you actually allocate CMA memory from that region. Other allocations on that are will then be migrated away (usingalloc_contig_range()).Quoted 4 lines
For example, if you have a 1~GiB CMA area, you could allocate 4~MB pages from that CMA area on demand (removing the direct mapping, etc ..), and free when no longer needed (instantiating the direct mapping). The free memory in that area could used for MOVABLE allocations.
The boot time resrvation is intended to avoid splitting 1G pages in the direct map. Without the boot time reservation, we maintain a pool of 2M pages so the 1G pages are split and 2M pages remain unsplit.
Quoted 7 lines
If I scale your example to match the requirement to avoid splitting 1G pages in the direct map, that would mean creating a CMA area of several tens of gigabytes and then doing
cma_alloc()of 1G each time we need to refill the secretmem pool.It is quite probable that we won't be able to get 1G from CMA after the system worked for some time.
Why? It should only contain movable pages, and if that is not the case, it's a bug we have to fix. It should behave just as ZONE_MOVABLE. (although I agree that in corner cases, alloc_contig_pages() might temporarily fail on some chunks - e.g., with long/short-term page pinnings - in contrast to memory offlining, it won't retry forever)
Quoted 4 lines
With boot time reservation we won't need physcally contiguous 1G to satisfy smaller allocation requests for secretmem because we don't need to maintain 1G mappings in the secretmem pool.
You can allocate within your CMA area however you want - doesn't need to be whole gigabytes in case there is no need for it.
Again, the big benefit of CMA is that the reserved memory can be reused for other purpose while nobody is actually making use of it.
Quoted 4 lines
That said, I believe the addition of the boot time reservation, either direct or with CMA, can be added as an incrememntal patch after the "core" functionality is merged.
I am not convinced that we want to let random processes to do alloc_pages() in the range of tens of gigabytes. It's not just mlocked memory. I prefer either using CMA or relying on the boot time reservations. But let's see if there are other opinions and people just don't care.
Having that said, I have no further comments.
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
Mike Rapoport
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 6/6] mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot
Hi David,
Quoted 59 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 58 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 43 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 29 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 28 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 26 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 10 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 9 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Taking pages out from the direct map and bringing them back may create undesired fragmentation and usage of the smaller pages in the direct mapping of the physical memory.
This can be avoided if a significantly large area of the physical memory would be reserved for secretmem purposes at boot time.
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Add ability to reserve physical memory for secretmem at boot time using "secretmem" kernel parameter and then use that reserved memory as a global pool for secret memory needs.
Wouldn't something like CMA be the better fit? Just wondering. Then, the memory can actually be reused for something else while not needed.
The memory allocated as secret is removed from the direct map and the boot time reservation is intended to reduce direct map fragmentatioan and to avoid splitting 1G pages there. So with CMA I'd still need to allocate 1G chunks for this and once 1G page is dropped from the direct map it still cannot be reused for anything else until it is freed.
I could use CMA to do the boot time reservation, but doing the reservesion directly seemed simpler and more explicit to me.
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Well, using CMA would give you the possibility to let the memory be used for other purposes until you decide it's the right time to take it + remove the direct mapping etc.
I still can't say I follow you here. If I reseve a CMA area as a pool for secret memory 1G pages, it is still reserved and it still cannot be used for other purposes, right?
So, AFAIK, if you create a CMA pool it can be used for any MOVABLE allocations (similar to
ZONE_MOVABLE) until you actually allocate CMA memory from that region. Other allocations on that are will then be migrated away (usingalloc_contig_range()).Quoted 4 lines
For example, if you have a 1~GiB CMA area, you could allocate 4~MB pages from that CMA area on demand (removing the direct mapping, etc ..), and free when no longer needed (instantiating the direct mapping). The free memory in that area could used for MOVABLE allocations.
The boot time resrvation is intended to avoid splitting 1G pages in the direct map. Without the boot time reservation, we maintain a pool of 2M pages so the 1G pages are split and 2M pages remain unsplit.
If I scale your example to match the requirement to avoid splitting 1G pages in the direct map, that would mean creating a CMA area of several tens of gigabytes and then doing
cma_alloc()of 1G each time we need to refill the secretmem pool.
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It is quite probable that we won't be able to get 1G from CMA after the system worked for some time.
Why? It should only contain movable pages, and if that is not the case, it's a bug we have to fix. It should behave just as
ZONE_MOVABLE. (although I agree that in corner cases,alloc_contig_pages()might temporarily fail on some chunks - e.g., with long/short-term page pinnings - in contrast to memory offlining, it won't retry forever)
The use-case I had in mind for the boot time reservation in secretmem is a machine that runs VMs and there is a desire to have the VM memory protected from the host. In a way this should be similar to booting a host with mem=X where most of the machine memory never gets to be used by the host kernel.
For such use case, boot time reservation controlled by the command line parameter seems to me simpler than using CMA. I agree that there is no way to use the reserved memory for other purpose, but then we won't need to create physically contiguous chunk of several gigs every time a VM is created.
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With boot time reservation we won't need physcally contiguous 1G to satisfy smaller allocation requests for secretmem because we don't need to maintain 1G mappings in the secretmem pool.
You can allocate within your CMA area however you want - doesn't need to be whole gigabytes in case there is no need for it.
The whole point of boot time reservation is to prevent splitting 1G pages in the direct map. Allocating smaller chunks will still cause fragmentation of the direct map.
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Again, the big benefit of CMA is that the reserved memory can be reused for other purpose while nobody is actually making use of it.
Right, but I think if a user explicitly asked to use X gigabytes for the secretmem we can allow that.
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That said, I believe the addition of the boot time reservation, either direct or with CMA, can be added as an incrememntal patch after the "core" functionality is merged.
I am not convinced that we want to let random processes to do
alloc_pages()in the range of tens of gigabytes. It's not just mlocked memory. I prefer either using CMA or relying on the boot time reservations. But let's see if there are other opinions and people just don't care.Having that said, I have no further comments.
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
Signature · 5 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike. _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Quoted 35 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Hi,
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
v4 changes:
* rebase on v5.9-rc1
* Do not redefinePMD_PAGE_ORDERinfs/dax.c, thanks Kirill
* Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags tomemfd_secret()system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :)v3 changes:
* Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the command line option.
* Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable it only on x86.v2 changes:
* Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret'
* Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option
* Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot.CONFIG_SECRETMEMnow depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems from one side and still make it available unconditionally on architectures that supportSET_DIRECT_MAP.The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated
memfd_secretsystem call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. Themmap()of the file descriptor created withmemfd_secret()will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
Quoted 8 lines
Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.
Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host.
Just a general question. I assume such pages (where the direct mapping was changed) cannot get migrated - I can spot a simple alloc_page(). So essentially a process can just allocate a whole bunch of memory that is unmovable, correct? Is there any limit? Is it properly accounted towards the process (memctl) ?
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
Mike Rapoport
maintainerQuoted 45 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 35 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Hi,
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
v4 changes:
* rebase on v5.9-rc1
* Do not redefinePMD_PAGE_ORDERinfs/dax.c, thanks Kirill
* Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags tomemfd_secret()system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :)v3 changes:
* Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the command line option.
* Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable it only on x86.v2 changes:
* Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret'
* Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option
* Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot.CONFIG_SECRETMEMnow depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems from one side and still make it available unconditionally on architectures that supportSET_DIRECT_MAP.The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated
memfd_secretsystem call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. Themmap()of the file descriptor created withmemfd_secret()will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.Quoted 8 lines
Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.
Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host.
Quoted 5 lines
Just a general question. I assume such pages (where the direct mapping was changed) cannot get migrated - I can spot a simple
alloc_page(). So essentially a process can just allocate a whole bunch of memory that is unmovable, correct? Is there any limit? Is it properly accounted towards the process (memctl) ?
The memory as accounted in the same way like with mlock(), so normal user won't be able to allocate more than RLIMIT_MEMLOCK.
Quoted 5 lines
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
Signature · 2 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike.
Quoted 46 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 45 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 43 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Hi,
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
v4 changes:
* rebase on v5.9-rc1
* Do not redefinePMD_PAGE_ORDERinfs/dax.c, thanks Kirill
* Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags tomemfd_secret()system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :)v3 changes:
* Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the command line option.
* Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable it only on x86.v2 changes:
* Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret'
* Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option
* Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot.CONFIG_SECRETMEMnow depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems from one side and still make it available unconditionally on architectures that supportSET_DIRECT_MAP.The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated
memfd_secretsystem call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. Themmap()of the file descriptor created withmemfd_secret()will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.
Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Just a general question. I assume such pages (where the direct mapping was changed) cannot get migrated - I can spot a simple
alloc_page(). So essentially a process can just allocate a whole bunch of memory that is unmovable, correct? Is there any limit? Is it properly accounted towards the process (memctl) ?The memory as accounted in the same way like with
mlock(), so normal user won't be able to allocate more thanRLIMIT_MEMLOCK.
Okay, thanks. AFAIU the difference to mlock() is that the pages here are not movable, fragment memory, and limit compaction. Hm.
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
Mike Rapoport
maintainerAny comments on this?
Quoted 113 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Hi,
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
v4 changes:
* rebase on v5.9-rc1
* Do not redefinePMD_PAGE_ORDERinfs/dax.c, thanks Kirill
* Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags tomemfd_secret()system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :)v3 changes:
* Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the command line option.
* Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable it only on x86.v2 changes:
* Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret'
* Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option
* Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot.CONFIG_SECRETMEMnow depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems from one side and still make it available unconditionally on architectures that supportSET_DIRECT_MAP.The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated
memfd_secretsystem call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. Themmap()of the file descriptor created withmemfd_secret()will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.
Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host.
For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library
[1] that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all theOPENSSL_malloccalls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification.I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to
memfd_create()or to add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing.Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using
address_space_operationsfor e.g. page migration callbacks.The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement
mmap(MAP_SECRET)and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future.As the fragmentation of the direct map was one of the major concerns raised during the previous postings, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size pages to each file descriptor and an ability to reserve large chunks of the physical memory at boot time and then use this memory as an allocation pool for the secret memory areas.
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
rfc-v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
rfc-v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/Mike Rapoport (6):
mm: add definition ofPMD_PAGE_ORDER
mmap: makemlock_future_check()global
mm: introducememfd_secretsystem call to create "secret" memory areas arch, mm: wire upmemfd_secretsystem call were relevant
mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at bootarch/Kconfig | 7 + arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + fs/dax.c | 11 +- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 +- include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 8 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 4 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/internal.h | 3 + mm/mmap.c | 5 +- mm/secretmem.c | 451 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 20 files changed, 501 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.cSignature · 1 line
2.26.2
Signature · 5 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike. _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerAny updates on this?
Quoted 113 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Hi,
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
v4 changes:
* rebase on v5.9-rc1
* Do not redefinePMD_PAGE_ORDERinfs/dax.c, thanks Kirill
* Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags tomemfd_secret()system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :)v3 changes:
* Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the command line option.
* Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable it only on x86.v2 changes:
* Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret'
* Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option
* Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot.CONFIG_SECRETMEMnow depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems from one side and still make it available unconditionally on architectures that supportSET_DIRECT_MAP.The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated
memfd_secretsystem call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. Themmap()of the file descriptor created withmemfd_secret()will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.
Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host.
For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library
[1] that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all theOPENSSL_malloccalls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification.I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to
memfd_create()or to add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing.Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using
address_space_operationsfor e.g. page migration callbacks.The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement
mmap(MAP_SECRET)and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future.As the fragmentation of the direct map was one of the major concerns raised during the previous postings, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size pages to each file descriptor and an ability to reserve large chunks of the physical memory at boot time and then use this memory as an allocation pool for the secret memory areas.
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
rfc-v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
rfc-v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/Mike Rapoport (6):
mm: add definition ofPMD_PAGE_ORDER
mmap: makemlock_future_check()global
mm: introducememfd_secretsystem call to create "secret" memory areas arch, mm: wire upmemfd_secretsystem call were relevant
mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at bootarch/Kconfig | 7 + arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + fs/dax.c | 11 +- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 +- include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 8 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 4 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/internal.h | 3 + mm/mmap.c | 5 +- mm/secretmem.c | 451 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 20 files changed, 501 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.cSignature · 1 line
2.26.2
Signature · 2 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike.