mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Subsystems (14)
Mike Rapoport
maintainerv2 cover mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Hi,
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
v2 changes:
* Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret'
* Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option
* Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot. CONFIG_SECRETMEM now depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems from one side and still make it available unconditionally on architectures that support SET_DIRECT_MAP.
The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.
Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host.
For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library
[1] that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification.
I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to memfd_create() or to add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing.
Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks.
The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future.
As the fragmentation of the direct map was one of the major concerns raised during the previous postings, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size pages to each file descriptor and an ability to reserve large chunks of the physical memory at boot time and then use this memory as an allocation pool for the secret memory areas.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200720092435.17469-1-rppt-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org/
rfc-v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706172051.19465-1-rppt-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org/
rfc-v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/
Mike Rapoport (7):
mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER
mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant
mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot
mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 + arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + fs/dax.c | 10 +- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 +- include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 9 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 4 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/internal.h | 3 + mm/mmap.c | 5 +- mm/secretmem.c | 453 ++++++++++++++++++ 18 files changed, 500 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v2 1/7 mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
The definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER denoting the number of base pages in the second-level leaf page is already used by DAX and maybe handy in other cases as well.
Several architectures already have definition of PMD_ORDER as the size of second level page table, so to avoid conflict with these definitions use PMD_PAGE_ORDER name and update DAX respectively.
--- fs/dax.c | 10 +++++----- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/dax.c +5 -5
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static inline unsigned int pe_order(enum page_entry_size pe_size)#define PG_PMD_NR (PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT)/* The order of a PMD entry */ -#define PMD_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) +#define PMD_PAGE_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)static wait_queue_head_t wait_table[DAX_WAIT_TABLE_ENTRIES ];
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static bool dax_is_locked(void *entry)static unsigned int dax_entry_order (void *entry) {if (xa_to_value (entry) &DAX_PMD ) -return PMD_ORDER ; +return PMD_PAGE_ORDER ;return 0 ; }
@@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp, {struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;struct address_space *mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping; -XA_STATE_ORDER (xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff,PMD_ORDER ); +XA_STATE_ORDER (xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff,PMD_PAGE_ORDER );unsigned long pmd_addr = vmf->address &PMD_MASK ;bool write = vmf->flags &FAULT_FLAG_WRITE ;bool sync;
@@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp,* entry is already in the array, for instance), it will return * VM_FAULT_FALLBACK. */ - entry =grab_mapping_entry (&xas, mapping,PMD_ORDER ); + entry =grab_mapping_entry (&xas, mapping,PMD_PAGE_ORDER );if (xa_is_internal (entry)) { result =xa_to_internal (entry); goto fallback;
@@ -1681,7 +1681,7 @@ dax_insert_pfn_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t pfn, unsigned int order)if (order ==0 ) ret =vmf_insert_mixed_mkwrite (vmf->vma, vmf->address, pfn);#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX_PMD - else if (order == PMD_ORDER) + else if (order == PMD_PAGE_ORDER) ret =vmf_insert_pfn_pmd (vmf, pfn,FAULT_FLAG_WRITE );#endif else
include/linux/pgtable.h +3 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@#define USER_PGTABLES_CEILING 0UL#endif +/* Number of base pages in a second level leaf page */ +#define PMD_PAGE_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) +/* * A page table page can be thought of an array like this: pXd_t[PTRS_PER_PxD] *
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v2 4/7 arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 ++ arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 ++++++- 7 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h +2 -0
@@ -885,6 +885,8 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_openat2, sys_openat2) __SYSCALL(__NR_pidfd_getfd, sys_pidfd_getfd)#define __NR_faccessat2 439 __SYSCALL(__NR_faccessat2, sys_faccessat2) +#define __NR_memfd_secret 439 +__SYSCALL (__NR_memfd_secret, sys_memfd_secret)/* * Please add new compat syscalls above this comment and update
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
@@ -20,5 +20,6 @@#define __ARCH_WANT_SET_GET_RLIMIT#define __ARCH_WANT_TIME32_SYSCALLS#define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@*/ #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET#include <uapi/asm/unistd.h>
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +1 -0
@@ -443,3 +443,4 @@ 437 i386 openat2 sys_openat2 438 i386 pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 i386 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 i386 memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret # # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
include/linux/syscalls.h +1 -0
@@ -1005,6 +1005,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig,siginfo_t __user *info, unsigned int flags);asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_getfd (int pidfd,int fd,unsigned int flags); +asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret (unsigned long flags);/* * Architecture-specific system calls
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +6 -1
@@ -858,8 +858,13 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_pidfd_getfd, sys_pidfd_getfd)#define __NR_faccessat2 439 __SYSCALL(__NR_faccessat2, sys_faccessat2) +#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET +#define __NR_memfd_secret 440 +__SYSCALL(__NR_memfd_secret, sys_memfd_secret) +#endif +#undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 440 +#define __NR_syscalls 441/* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v2 5/7 mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Removing a PAGE_SIZE page from the direct map every time such page is allocated for a secret memory mapping will cause severe fragmentation of the direct map. This fragmentation can be reduced by using PMD-size pages as a pool for small pages for secret memory mappings.
Add a gen_pool per secretmem inode and lazily populate this pool with PMD-size pages.
--- mm/secretmem.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 88 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
mm/secretmem.c +88 -19
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@#include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/printk.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> +#include <linux/genalloc.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/pseudo_fs.h> #include <linux/set_memory.h>
@@ -25,24 +26,66 @@#define SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK SECRETMEM_MODE_MASKstruct secretmem_ctx { +struct gen_pool *pool;unsigned int mode; }; -static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page (gfp_t gfp) +static int secretmem_pool_increase (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx,gfp_t gfp) { -/* -* FIXME: use a cache of large pages to reduce the direct map -* fragmentation -*/ -return alloc_page (gfp); +unsigned long nr_pages = (1 <<PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); +struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; +unsigned long addr; +struct page *page; +int err; + + page =alloc_pages (gfp,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); +if (!page) +return -ENOMEM ; + + addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); +split_page (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); + + err =gen_pool_add (pool, addr,PMD_SIZE ,NUMA_NO_NODE ); +if (err) { +__free_pages (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); +return err; + } + +__kernel_map_pages (page, nr_pages,0 ); + +return 0 ; +} + +static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, +gfp_t gfp) +{ +struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; +unsigned long addr; +struct page *page; +int err; + +if (gen_pool_avail (pool) <PAGE_SIZE ) { + err =secretmem_pool_increase (ctx, gfp); +if (err) +return NULL ; + } + + addr =gen_pool_alloc (pool,PAGE_SIZE ); +if (!addr) +return NULL ; + + page =virt_to_page (addr); +get_page (page); + +return page; }static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault (struct vm_fault *vmf) { +struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = vmf->vma->vm_file->private_data;struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping;struct inode *inode =file_inode (vmf->vma->vm_file);pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff; -unsigned long addr;struct page *page;int ret =0 ;
@@ -51,7 +94,7 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) page =find_get_entry (mapping, offset);if (!page) { - page =secretmem_alloc_page (vmf->gfp_mask); + page =secretmem_alloc_page (ctx, vmf->gfp_mask);if (!page)return vmf_error (-ENOMEM );
@@ -59,14 +102,8 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)if (unlikely (ret)) goto err_put_page; - ret =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page); -if (ret) - goto err_del_page_cache; - - addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PAGE_SIZE ); -__SetPageUptodate (page); +set_page_private (page, (unsigned long )ctx); ret =VM_FAULT_LOCKED ; }
@@ -74,8 +111,6 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) vmf->page = page;return ret; -err_del_page_cache: -delete_from_page_cache (page); err_put_page:put_page (page);return vmf_error (ret);
@@ -134,7 +169,11 @@ static int secretmem_migratepage(struct address_space *mapping,static void secretmem_freepage (struct page *page) { -set_direct_map_default_noflush (page); +unsigned long addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); +struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = (struct secretmem_ctx *)page_private (page); +struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; + +gen_pool_free (pool, addr,PAGE_SIZE ); }static const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops = {
@@ -159,13 +198,18 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)if (!ctx) goto err_free_inode; + ctx->pool =gen_pool_create (PAGE_SHIFT ,NUMA_NO_NODE ); +if (!ctx->pool) + goto err_free_ctx; + file =alloc_file_pseudo (inode, secretmem_mnt,"secretmem" ,O_RDWR , &secretmem_fops);if (IS_ERR (file)) - goto err_free_ctx; + goto err_free_pool;mapping_set_unevictable (inode->i_mapping); + inode->i_private = ctx; inode->i_mapping->private_data = ctx; inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &secretmem_aops;
@@ -179,6 +223,8 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)return file; +err_free_pool: +gen_pool_destroy (ctx->pool); err_free_ctx:kfree (ctx); err_free_inode:
@@ -223,11 +269,34 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags)return err; } +static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk (struct gen_pool *pool, +struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk,void *data) +{ +unsigned long start = chunk->start_addr; +unsigned long end = chunk->end_addr; +unsigned long nr_pages, addr; + + nr_pages = (end - start +1 ) /PAGE_SIZE ; +__kernel_map_pages (virt_to_page (start), nr_pages,1 ); + +for (addr = start; addr < end; addr +=PAGE_SIZE ) +put_page (virt_to_page (addr)); +} + +static void secretmem_cleanup_pool (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx) +{ +struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; + +gen_pool_for_each_chunk (pool, secretmem_cleanup_chunk, ctx); +gen_pool_destroy (pool); +} +static void secretmem_evict_inode (struct inode *inode) {struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = inode->i_private;truncate_inode_pages_final (&inode->i_data); +secretmem_cleanup_pool (ctx);clear_inode (inode);kfree (ctx); }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v2 2/7 mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation.
--- mm/internal.h | 3 +++ mm/mmap.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/internal.h +3 -0
@@ -349,6 +349,9 @@ static inline void munlock_vma_pages_all(struct vm_area_struct *vma)extern void mlock_vma_page (struct page *page);extern unsigned int munlock_vma_page (struct page *page); +extern int mlock_future_check (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long flags, +unsigned long len); +/* * Clear the page's PageMlocked(). This can be useful in a situation where * we want to unconditionally remove a page from the pagecache -- e.g.,
mm/mmap.c +2 -3
@@ -1310,9 +1310,8 @@ static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint)return hint; } -static inline int mlock_future_check (struct mm_struct *mm, -unsigned long flags, -unsigned long len) +int mlock_future_check (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long flags, +unsigned long len) {unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v2 3/7 mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.
The user will create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call where flags supplied as a parameter to this system call will define the desired protection mode for the memory associated with that file descriptor. Currently there are two protection modes:
* exclusive - the memory area is unmapped from the kernel direct map and it is present only in the page tables of the owning mm.
* uncached - the memory area is present only in the page tables of the owning mm and it is mapped there as uncached.
For instance, the following example will create an uncached mapping (error handling is omitted):
fd = memfd_secret(SECRETMEM_UNCACHED); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
--- include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 9 ++ kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 4 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/secretmem.c | 266 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 283 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c
include/uapi/linux/magic.h +1 -0
@@ -97,5 +97,6 @@#define DEVMEM_MAGIC 0x454d444d/* "DMEM" */ #define Z3FOLD_MAGIC 0x33#define PPC_CMM_MAGIC 0xc7571590 +#define SECRETMEM_MAGIC 0x5345434d/* "SECM" */ #endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */
include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h new file +9 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECRERTMEM_H +#define _UAPI_LINUX_SECRERTMEM_H + +/* secretmem operation modes */ +#define SECRETMEM_EXCLUSIVE 0x1 +#define SECRETMEM_UNCACHED 0x2 + +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECRERTMEM_H */
kernel/sys_ni.c +2 -0
@@ -349,6 +349,8 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_mprotect);COND_SYSCALL (pkey_alloc);COND_SYSCALL (pkey_free); +/* memfd_secret */ +COND_SYSCALL (memfd_secret);/* * Architecture specific weak syscall entries.
mm/Kconfig +4 -0
@@ -872,4 +872,8 @@ config ARCH_HAS_HUGEPD config MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS bool +config SECRETMEM + def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED + select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR + endmenu
mm/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -121,3 +121,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) += memfd.o obj-$(CONFIG_MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS) += mapping_dirty_helpers.o obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += ptdump.o obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_REPORTING) += page_reporting.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECRETMEM) += secretmem.o
mm/secretmem.c new file +266 -0
266 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v2 6/7 mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Taking pages out from the direct map and bringing them back may create undesired fragmentation and usage of the smaller pages in the direct mapping of the physical memory.
This can be avoided if a significantly large area of the physical memory would be reserved for secretmem purposes at boot time.
Add ability to reserve physical memory for secretmem at boot time using "secretmem" kernel parameter and then use that reserved memory as a global pool for secret memory needs.
--- mm/secretmem.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 126 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
mm/secretmem.c +126 -8
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@#include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/genalloc.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/pseudo_fs.h> #include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
@@ -30,6 +31,39 @@ struct secretmem_ctx {unsigned int mode; }; +struct secretmem_pool { +struct gen_pool *pool; +unsigned long reserved_size; +void *reserved; +}; + +static struct secretmem_pool secretmem_pool; + +static struct page *secretmem_alloc_huge_page (gfp_t gfp) +{ +struct gen_pool *pool = secretmem_pool.pool; +unsigned long addr =0 ; +struct page *page =NULL ; + +if (pool) { +if (gen_pool_avail (pool) <PMD_SIZE ) +return NULL ; + + addr =gen_pool_alloc (pool,PMD_SIZE ); +if (!addr) +return NULL ; + + page =virt_to_page (addr); + }else { + page =alloc_pages (gfp,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); + +if (page) +split_page (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); + } + +return page; +} +static int secretmem_pool_increase (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx,gfp_t gfp) {unsigned long nr_pages = (1 <<PMD_PAGE_ORDER );
@@ -38,12 +72,11 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)struct page *page;int err; - page =alloc_pages (gfp,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); + page =secretmem_alloc_huge_page (gfp);if (!page)return -ENOMEM ; addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -split_page (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); err =gen_pool_add (pool, addr,PMD_SIZE ,NUMA_NO_NODE );if (err) {
@@ -269,11 +302,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags)return err; } -static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk (struct gen_pool *pool, -struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk,void *data) +static void secretmem_recycle_range (unsigned long start,unsigned long end) +{ +gen_pool_free (secretmem_pool.pool, start,PMD_SIZE ); +} + +static void secretmem_release_range (unsigned long start,unsigned long end) { -unsigned long start = chunk->start_addr; -unsigned long end = chunk->end_addr;unsigned long nr_pages, addr; nr_pages = (end - start +1 ) /PAGE_SIZE ;
@@ -283,6 +318,18 @@ static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool,put_page (virt_to_page (addr)); } +static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk (struct gen_pool *pool, +struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk,void *data) +{ +unsigned long start = chunk->start_addr; +unsigned long end = chunk->end_addr; + +if (secretmem_pool.pool) +secretmem_recycle_range (start, end); +else +secretmem_release_range (start, end); +} +static void secretmem_cleanup_pool (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx) {struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool;
@@ -322,14 +369,85 @@ static struct file_system_type secretmem_fs = { .kill_sb = kill_anon_super, }; +static int secretmem_reserved_mem_init (void ) +{ +struct gen_pool *pool; +struct page *page; +void *addr; +int err; + +if (!secretmem_pool.reserved) +return 0 ; + + pool =gen_pool_create (PMD_SHIFT ,NUMA_NO_NODE ); +if (!pool) +return -ENOMEM ; + + err =gen_pool_add (pool, (unsigned long )secretmem_pool.reserved, + secretmem_pool.reserved_size,NUMA_NO_NODE ); +if (err) + goto err_destroy_pool; + +for (addr = secretmem_pool.reserved; + addr < secretmem_pool.reserved + secretmem_pool.reserved_size; + addr +=PAGE_SIZE ) { + page =virt_to_page (addr); +__ClearPageReserved (page); +set_page_count (page,1 ); + } + + secretmem_pool.pool = pool; + page =virt_to_page (secretmem_pool.reserved); +__kernel_map_pages (page, secretmem_pool.reserved_size /PAGE_SIZE ,0 ); +return 0 ; + +err_destroy_pool: +gen_pool_destroy (pool); +return err; +} +static int secretmem_init (void ) { -int ret =0 ; +int ret; + + ret =secretmem_reserved_mem_init (); +if (ret) +return ret; secretmem_mnt =kern_mount (&secretmem_fs); -if (IS_ERR (secretmem_mnt)) +if (IS_ERR (secretmem_mnt)) { +gen_pool_destroy (secretmem_pool.pool); ret =PTR_ERR (secretmem_mnt); + }return ret; }fs_initcall (secretmem_init); + +static int __init secretmem_setup (char *str) +{ +phys_addr_t align =PMD_SIZE ; +unsigned long reserved_size; +void *reserved; + + reserved_size =memparse (str,NULL ); +if (!reserved_size) +return 0 ; + +if (reserved_size *2 >PUD_SIZE ) + align =PUD_SIZE ; + + reserved =memblock_alloc (reserved_size, align); +if (!reserved) { +pr_err ("failed to reserve %lu bytes\n" , secretmem_pool.reserved_size); +return 0 ; + } + + secretmem_pool.reserved_size = reserved_size; + secretmem_pool.reserved = reserved; + +pr_info ("reserved %luM\n" , reserved_size >>20 ); + +return 1 ; +} +__setup ("secretmem=" , secretmem_setup);
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v2 7/7 mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Taking pages out from the direct map and bringing them back may create undesired fragmentation and usage of the smaller pages in the direct mapping of the physical memory.
This can be avoided if a significantly large area of the physical memory would be reserved for secretmem purposes at boot time.
Add ability to reserve physical memory for secretmem at boot time using "secretmem" kernel parameter and then use that reserved memory as a global pool for secret memory needs.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +4 -0
@@ -4548,6 +4548,10 @@ Format: integer between 0 and 10 Default is 0. + secretmem=n[KMG] + [KNL,BOOT] Reserve specified amount of memory to + back mappings of secret memory. + skew_tick= [KNL] Offset the periodic timer tick per cpu to mitigate xtime_lock contention on larger systems, and/or RCU lock contention on all systems with CONFIG_MAXSMP set.
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Mike Rapoport
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 7/7] mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot
Oops, something went wrong with the rebase, this should have been squashed into the previous patch...
Quoted 36 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Taking pages out from the direct map and bringing them back may create undesired fragmentation and usage of the smaller pages in the direct mapping of the physical memory.
This can be avoided if a significantly large area of the physical memory would be reserved for secretmem purposes at boot time.
Add ability to reserve physical memory for secretmem at boot time using "secretmem" kernel parameter and then use that reserved memory as a global pool for secret memory needs.
Signed-off-by Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +4
-0@@ -4548,6 +4548,10 @@ Format: integer between 0 and 10 Default is 0. + secretmem=n[KMG] + [KNL,BOOT] Reserve specified amount of memory to + back mappings of secret memory. + skew_tick= [KNL] Offset the periodic timer tick per cpu to mitigate xtime_lock contention on larger systems, and/or RCU lock contention on all systems with CONFIG_MAXSMP set.Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Signature · 2 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike.
Re: [PATCH v2 4/7] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant
In reply to Mike RapoportQuoted 8 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Wire up
memfd_secretsystem call on architectures that defineARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86.Signed-off-by Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>Acked-by Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Catalin Marinas
maintainerHi Mike,
Quoted 6 lines · Mike Rapoport
For instance, the following example will create an uncached mapping (error handling is omitted):
fd = memfd_secret(SECRETMEM_UNCACHED); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
[...]
Quoted 77 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +77
-0+static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page (gfp_t gfp) +{ +/* +* FIXME: use a cache of large pages to reduce the direct map +* fragmentation +*/ +return alloc_page (gfp); +} + +static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault (struct vm_fault *vmf) +{ +struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping; +struct inode *inode =file_inode (vmf->vma->vm_file); +pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff; +unsigned long addr; +struct page *page; +int ret =0 ; + +if (((loff_t )vmf->pgoff <<PAGE_SHIFT ) >=i_size_read (inode)) +return vmf_error (-EINVAL ); + + page =find_get_entry (mapping, offset); +if (!page) { + page =secretmem_alloc_page (vmf->gfp_mask); +if (!page) +return vmf_error (-ENOMEM ); + + ret =add_to_page_cache (page, mapping, offset, vmf->gfp_mask); +if (unlikely (ret)) + goto err_put_page; + + ret =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page); +if (ret) + goto err_del_page_cache; + + addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); +flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PAGE_SIZE ); + +__SetPageUptodate (page); + + ret =VM_FAULT_LOCKED ; + } + + vmf->page = page; +return ret; + +err_del_page_cache: +delete_from_page_cache (page); +err_put_page: +put_page (page); +return vmf_error (ret); +} + +static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = { + .fault = secretmem_fault, +}; + +static int secretmem_mmap (struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = file->private_data; +unsigned long mode = ctx->mode; +unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; + +if (!mode) +return -EINVAL ; + +if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED |VM_MAYSHARE )) ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (mlock_future_check (vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_flags |VM_LOCKED , len)) +return -EAGAIN ; + +switch (mode) { +case SECRETMEM_UNCACHED : + vma->vm_page_prot =pgprot_noncached (vma->vm_page_prot); + fallthrough; +case SECRETMEM_EXCLUSIVE :
mm/secretmem.c line 117
Quoted 10 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +10
-0+ vma->vm_ops = &secretmem_vm_ops; +break ; +default : +return -EINVAL ; + } + + vma->vm_flags |=VM_LOCKED ; + +return 0 ; +}
I think the uncached mapping is not the right thing for arm/arm64. First of all, pgprot_noncached() gives us Strongly Ordered (Device memory) semantics together with not allowing unaligned accesses. I suspect the semantics are different on x86.
The second, more serious problem, is that I can't find any place where the caches are flushed for the page mapped on fault. When a page is allocated, assuming GFP_ZERO, only the caches are guaranteed to be zeroed. Exposing this subsequently to user space as uncached would allow the user to read stale data prior to zeroing. The arm64 set_direct_map_default_noflush() doesn't do any cache maintenance.
Signature · 1 line
Catalin
Mike Rapoport
maintainerQuoted 94 lines · Catalin Marinas
Hi Mike,
Quoted 6 lines · Mike Rapoport
For instance, the following example will create an uncached mapping (error handling is omitted):
fd = memfd_secret(SECRETMEM_UNCACHED); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);[...]
Quoted 84 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +84
-0+static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page (gfp_t gfp) +{ +/* +* FIXME: use a cache of large pages to reduce the direct map +* fragmentation +*/ +return alloc_page (gfp); +} + +static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault (struct vm_fault *vmf) +{ +struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping; +struct inode *inode =file_inode (vmf->vma->vm_file); +pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff; +unsigned long addr; +struct page *page; +int ret =0 ; + +if (((loff_t )vmf->pgoff <<PAGE_SHIFT ) >=i_size_read (inode)) +return vmf_error (-EINVAL ); + + page =find_get_entry (mapping, offset); +if (!page) { + page =secretmem_alloc_page (vmf->gfp_mask); +if (!page) +return vmf_error (-ENOMEM ); + + ret =add_to_page_cache (page, mapping, offset, vmf->gfp_mask); +if (unlikely (ret)) + goto err_put_page; + + ret =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page); +if (ret) + goto err_del_page_cache; + + addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); +flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PAGE_SIZE ); + +__SetPageUptodate (page); + + ret =VM_FAULT_LOCKED ; + } + + vmf->page = page; +return ret; + +err_del_page_cache: +delete_from_page_cache (page); +err_put_page: +put_page (page); +return vmf_error (ret); +} + +static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = { + .fault = secretmem_fault, +}; + +static int secretmem_mmap (struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = file->private_data; +unsigned long mode = ctx->mode; +unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; + +if (!mode) +return -EINVAL ; + +if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED |VM_MAYSHARE )) ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (mlock_future_check (vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_flags |VM_LOCKED , len)) +return -EAGAIN ; + +switch (mode) { +case SECRETMEM_UNCACHED : + vma->vm_page_prot =pgprot_noncached (vma->vm_page_prot); + fallthrough; +case SECRETMEM_EXCLUSIVE : + vma->vm_ops = &secretmem_vm_ops; +break ; +default : +return -EINVAL ; + } + + vma->vm_flags |=VM_LOCKED ;
Quoted 8 lines
mm/secretmem.c line 117
Quoted 3 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +3
-0+ +return 0 ; +}I think the uncached mapping is not the right thing for arm/arm64. First of all,
pgprot_noncached()gives us Strongly Ordered (Device memory) semantics together with not allowing unaligned accesses. I suspect the semantics are different on x86.
Hmm, on x86 it's also Strongly Ordered, but I didn't find any alignment restrictions. Is there a mode for arm64 that can provide similar semantics?
Would it make sence to use something like
#define pgprot_uncached(prot) \ __pgprot_modify(prot, PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK, \ PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL_NC) | PTE_PXN)
or is it too weak?
Quoted 6 lines
The second, more serious problem, is that I can't find any place where the caches are flushed for the page mapped on fault. When a page is allocated, assuming
GFP_ZERO, only the caches are guaranteed to be zeroed. Exposing this subsequently to user space as uncached would allow the user to read stale data prior to zeroing. The arm64set_direct_map_default_noflush()doesn't do any cache maintenance.
Well, the idea of uncached mappings came from Elena [1] to prevent possibility of side channels that leak user space memory. So I think even without cache flushing after the allocation, user space is protected as all its memory accesses bypass cache so even after the page is freed there won't be stale data in the cache.
I think that it makes sense to limit SECRETMEM_UNCACHED only for architectures that define an appropriate protection, e.g. pgprot_uncahced(). For x86 it can be aliased to pgprot_noncached() and other architecures can define their versions.
Signature · 2 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike.
Catalin Marinas
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 7 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 6 lines · Mike Rapoport
For instance, the following example will create an uncached mapping (error handling is omitted):
fd = memfd_secret(SECRETMEM_UNCACHED); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
[...]
Quoted 40 lines
Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 27 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +27
-0+static int secretmem_mmap (struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = file->private_data; +unsigned long mode = ctx->mode; +unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; + +if (!mode) +return -EINVAL ; + +if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED |VM_MAYSHARE )) ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (mlock_future_check (vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_flags |VM_LOCKED , len)) +return -EAGAIN ; + +switch (mode) { +case SECRETMEM_UNCACHED : + vma->vm_page_prot =pgprot_noncached (vma->vm_page_prot); + fallthrough; +case SECRETMEM_EXCLUSIVE : + vma->vm_ops = &secretmem_vm_ops; +break ; +default : +return -EINVAL ; + } + + vma->vm_flags |=VM_LOCKED ;Quoted 8 lines
mm/secretmem.c line 117
Quoted 3 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +3
-0+ +return 0 ; +}I think the uncached mapping is not the right thing for arm/arm64. First of all,
pgprot_noncached()gives us Strongly Ordered (Device memory) semantics together with not allowing unaligned accesses. I suspect the semantics are different on x86.Hmm, on x86 it's also Strongly Ordered, but I didn't find any alignment restrictions. Is there a mode for arm64 that can provide similar semantics?
Quoted 7 lines
Would it make sence to use something like
#define pgprot_uncached(prot) \ __pgprot_modify(prot, PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK, \ PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL_NC) | PTE_PXN)or is it too weak?
Reading Elena's email, that's about preventing speculative loads. While the arm64 Normal NC is non-cacheable (equivalent to write-combine), a CPU is allowed to speculatively read from it. A carefully crafted gadget could leave an imprint on a different part of the cache via speculative execution based on a value in the secret memory. So IIUC, we want memory that cannot be speculatively loaded from and that would be Device memory on arm64 (with the alignment restrictions).
Now, I think we could relax this to Device_GRE. So maybe add a pgprot_nospec() and allow architectures to define whatever they find suitable. The exact semantics will be different between architectures.
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 6 lines
The second, more serious problem, is that I can't find any place where the caches are flushed for the page mapped on fault. When a page is allocated, assuming
GFP_ZERO, only the caches are guaranteed to be zeroed. Exposing this subsequently to user space as uncached would allow the user to read stale data prior to zeroing. The arm64set_direct_map_default_noflush()doesn't do any cache maintenance.Well, the idea of uncached mappings came from Elena [1] to prevent possibility of side channels that leak user space memory. So I think even without cache flushing after the allocation, user space is protected as all its memory accesses bypass cache so even after the page is freed there won't be stale data in the cache.
Quoted 4 lines
I think that it makes sense to limit
SECRETMEM_UNCACHEDonly for architectures that define an appropriate protection, e.g.pgprot_uncahced(). For x86 it can be aliased topgprot_noncached()and other architecures can define their versions.
Indeed, though as I said above, maybe use a name that suggests no speculation since non-cacheable doesn't always guarantee that. Something like pgprot_nospec() and SECRETMEM_NOSPEC.
However, your implementation still has the problem that such memory must have the caches flushed before being mapped in user-space, otherwise we leak other secrets via such pages to the caller. The only generic API we have in the kernel for such things is the DMA one. If hch doesn't mind, you could abuse it and call arch_dma_prep_coherent() prior to set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() (if the mapping is non-cacheable).
Signature · 1 line
Catalin
Mark Rutland
reviewerQuoted 38 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 20 lines · Mike Rapoport
mm/secretmem.c new file +20
-0+static int secretmem_mmap (struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = file->private_data; +unsigned long mode = ctx->mode; +unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; + +if (!mode) +return -EINVAL ; + +if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED |VM_MAYSHARE )) ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (mlock_future_check (vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_flags |VM_LOCKED , len)) +return -EAGAIN ; + +switch (mode) { +case SECRETMEM_UNCACHED : + vma->vm_page_prot =pgprot_noncached (vma->vm_page_prot); + fallthrough; +case SECRETMEM_EXCLUSIVE :mm/secretmem.c line 117
Quoted 10 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +10
-0+ vma->vm_ops = &secretmem_vm_ops; +break ; +default : +return -EINVAL ; + } + + vma->vm_flags |=VM_LOCKED ; + +return 0 ; +}I think the uncached mapping is not the right thing for arm/arm64. First of all,
pgprot_noncached()gives us Strongly Ordered (Device memory) semantics together with not allowing unaligned accesses. I suspect the semantics are different on x86.
Quoted 6 lines
The second, more serious problem, is that I can't find any place where the caches are flushed for the page mapped on fault. When a page is allocated, assuming
GFP_ZERO, only the caches are guaranteed to be zeroed. Exposing this subsequently to user space as uncached would allow the user to read stale data prior to zeroing. The arm64set_direct_map_default_noflush()doesn't do any cache maintenance.
It's also worth noting that in a virtual machine this is liable to be either broken (with a potential loss of coherency if the host has a cacheable alias as existing KVM hosts have), or pointless (if the host uses S2FWB to upgrade Stage-1 attribues to cacheable as existing KVM hosts also have).
I think that trying to avoid the data caches creates many more problems than it solves, and I don't think there's a strong justification for trying to support that on arm64 to begin with, so I'd rather entirely opt-out on supporting SECRETMEM_UNCACHED.
Thanks,
Mark.
Catalin Marinas
maintainerQuoted 51 lines · Mark Rutland
Quoted 37 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 20 lines · Mike Rapoport
mm/secretmem.c new file +20
-0+static int secretmem_mmap (struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = file->private_data; +unsigned long mode = ctx->mode; +unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; + +if (!mode) +return -EINVAL ; + +if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED |VM_MAYSHARE )) ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (mlock_future_check (vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_flags |VM_LOCKED , len)) +return -EAGAIN ; + +switch (mode) { +case SECRETMEM_UNCACHED : + vma->vm_page_prot =pgprot_noncached (vma->vm_page_prot); + fallthrough; +case SECRETMEM_EXCLUSIVE :mm/secretmem.c line 117
Quoted 10 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +10
-0+ vma->vm_ops = &secretmem_vm_ops; +break ; +default : +return -EINVAL ; + } + + vma->vm_flags |=VM_LOCKED ; + +return 0 ; +}I think the uncached mapping is not the right thing for arm/arm64. First of all,
pgprot_noncached()gives us Strongly Ordered (Device memory) semantics together with not allowing unaligned accesses. I suspect the semantics are different on x86.Quoted 6 lines
The second, more serious problem, is that I can't find any place where the caches are flushed for the page mapped on fault. When a page is allocated, assuming
GFP_ZERO, only the caches are guaranteed to be zeroed. Exposing this subsequently to user space as uncached would allow the user to read stale data prior to zeroing. The arm64set_direct_map_default_noflush()doesn't do any cache maintenance.It's also worth noting that in a virtual machine this is liable to be either broken (with a potential loss of coherency if the host has a cacheable alias as existing KVM hosts have), or pointless (if the host uses S2FWB to upgrade Stage-1 attribues to cacheable as existing KVM hosts also have).
Quoted 4 lines
I think that trying to avoid the data caches creates many more problems than it solves, and I don't think there's a strong justification for trying to support that on arm64 to begin with, so I'd rather entirely opt-out on supporting
SECRETMEM_UNCACHED.
Good point, I forgot the virtualisation aspect. So unless there is a hypervisor API to unmap it from the host memory, the uncached option isn't of much use on arm64.
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Catalin